Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D17A/Q1

Translated BY Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 1	First Part On the Habit of Charity Question One
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem decimam septimam quaero utrum necesse sit ponere caritatem creatam, formaliter inhaerentem naturae beatificabili. Quod non: Augustinus, VIII De Trinitate cap. 11: ((Qui diligit proximum, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat; dilectio autem Deus est; consequens ergo est ut diligat Deum)). Quaero quomodo accipit dilectionem in minore? Si formaliter, habeo propositum; si effective, tunc erunt quattuor termini, quia maior non est vera nisi de dilectione formali qua diligitur proxiƿmus. Si etiam dicas quod 'praeter illam dilectionem quae est Spiritus Sanctus, est alia dilectio formalis', ergo est fallacia consequentis in argumento Augustini, arguendo 'diligit dilectionem formaliter, ergo hanc', - quia antecedens potest verificari pro alia. Si ergo argumentum debeat tenere, oportet quod Deus sit formaliter dilectio et omnis dilectio quae est formaliter in diligente respectu proximi.	1. About the seventeenth distinction I ask whether it is necessary to posit a created charity that formally inheres in a nature capable of beatification. That it is not: Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.7 n.10: "He who loves his neighbor loves as a consequence love itself; but 'God is love'; therefore the consequence is that he loves God." I ask how he is taking 'love' in the minor? If formally, I have the proposition [sc. that positing a created charity is not necessary]; if effectively, then there will be four terms, because the major is not true save of the formal love by which the neighbor is loved. Even if you say that 'besides the love which is the Holy Spirit, there is another formal love', then there is a fallacy of the consequent in Augustine's argument, by arguing 'he loves love formally, therefore this love', - because the antecedent can hold true of the other love. If the argument then has to hold, it is necessary that God formally be love and be every love that is formally in someone who loves in respect of his neighbor.
2 Item, XV De Trinitate cap. 19: 'Nullum est donum excellentius isto dono, quod est caritas; et nullum est donum Dei excellentius Spiritu Sancto; ergo Spiritus Sanctus est caritas'. Istud argumentum non valeret nisi esset de caritate formali et quod praecise Spiritus Sanctus esset illa.	2. Again, On the Trinity XV ch.19 n.37: "No gift is more excellent than this gift, which is love; and no gift of God is more excellent than the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit is love." This argument would not be valid unless it was about formal love, and because precisely the Holy Spirit would be that.
3 Si etiam dicatur ad istas auctoritates quod Spiritus Sanctus dicatur 'caritas' causaliter, obviat Magister in littera, qui adducit Augustinum quod ipse intelligat formaliter. Dicit enim Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 18 vel 17: ((Non dicturi sumus 'caritatem' dictam esse Deum eo quod sit donum Dei, sicut dictum ƿest Tu es patientia mea; hunc enim sensum facile refellit Scripturarum ipsa locutio: tale enim est Tu es patientia mea quale Tu es spes mea)) etc. ((Non autem sic dictum 'Domine, caritas mea', aut 'Tu es caritas mea', sed ita dictum est Deus caritas est sicut dictum est Deus spiritus est)).	3. Even if it be said to these authorities that the Holy Spirit is called 'love' by way of causality, the Master in the text stands opposed, who adduces Augustine, because he understands him formally. For Augustine says On the Trinity XV ch.17, n.27: "We will not say that 'charity' is said to be God by the fact that it is the gift of God, the way it is said 'you are my patience' (Psalm 70.5); for Scripture's locution itself refutes this sense; for 'you are my patience' is of the sort that 'you are my hope' is (Psalm 90,9), etc." "But the saying is not like this, 'Lord, my love', or 'you are my love', but it is said like this, 'God is love' (/ John 4.16) as it is said 'God is spirit' (John 4.24)."
4 Item, per rationem: omnis creatura potest intelligi non bona, quia est bona per participationem; sed caritas non potest intelligi non bona; ergo videtur quod sit bona per essentiam, - igitur etc.	4. Again, by reason: every creature can be understood to be non-good, because it is good by participation; but charity cannot be understood to be non-good; therefore it seems that it is good by essence, - therefore, etc.
5 Contra: Augustinus De moribus Ecclesiae, pertractans illud ad Rom. 8 Quis nos separabit a caritate Christi: ((Caritas Dei)) - inquit - ((huiusmodi dicta est virtus, quae animi nostri rectissima affectio est)).	5. On the contrary: Augustine On the Morals of the Church, treating of the saying in Romans 8.35 'Who will separate us from the love of Christ', says: "This sort of love of God is called virtue, which is the most correct affection of the spirit."