Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D17A/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question Two
6 Iuxta hanc quaestionem propono aliam, in generali, de habitu: utrum necesse sit ponere in habitu rationem principii activi respectu actus. ƿQuod sic, arguitur: Habitus est quo habens utitur cum voluerit, ex Commentatore III De anima commento 18; 'uti' competit agenti, nam patiens principio passivo non utitur.	6. Alongside this question I propose another, in general, about habit: whether it is necessary to posit in a habit the idea of active principle with respect to act. Argument that it is: A habit is that which the possessor of it uses when he wills, from the Commentator on De Anima 3 comm. 18; 'to use' belongs to the agent, for the patient does not use a passive principle.
7 Praeterea, quattuor condiciones attribuimus habitui, et habenti habitum: quod operatur delectabiliter, faciliter, expedite et prompte.	7. Further, we attribute four conditions to a habit and to what has a habit: that it operate with pleasure, easily, without impediment, and promptly.
8 Ex qualibet potest argui propositum: Ex prima, quia actus qui prius fuit disconveniens agenti, non fit conveniens sibi nisi ipsum in quantum agens aliter se habeat; ergo cum per istum habitum, per quem competit sibi operari, sit sibi conveniens, et ita delectabile, - agens ipsum aliter se habet in quantum agens. ƿ	8. From each an argument can be given for the intended proposition: From the first, that an act which was first disagreeable to the agent does not become agreeable to it unless the agent itself, insofar as it is agent, be differently disposed; therefore when, through this habit, by which action belongs to it, action is agreeable to it and so pleasant, the agent itself is differently disposed insofar as it is agent.
9 Ex secunda condicione arguitur, quia quod est ex se summe dispositum ad patiendum, non indiget facilitari ut patiatur; sed potentia habitualis - cuiusmodi est intellectus et voluntas - est ex se summe disposita ad recipiendum actum (quia non habent contrarium, et propter hoc non indigent motu ad hoc ut agant); ergo habitus per quem facilitatur, disponit ipsum ad agendum et non ad patiendum.	9. From the second condition the argument is that what is of itself supremely disposed to undergo something does not need to be helped so that it might undergo it; but a habitual potency - of which sort is the intellect and will - is of itself supremely disposed to receiving act (because they do not have a contrary and, for this reason, they do not need motion in order to act); therefore the habit whereby the potency is helped disposes it to acting and not to undergoing.
10 Ex tertia condicione arguitur, quia cuius est impediri, ei competit expeditio; sed impediri competit agenti, quando virtus activa eius deficit et ab alia superatur; ergo habitus per quem competit alicui expedite operari, est ipsius ut est activum.	10. From the third condition the argument is that absence of impediment belongs to that of which there is a being impeded; but being impeded belongs to the agent when its active power fails and is overcome by another; therefore the habit by which acting without impediment belongs to something belongs to it insofar as it is active.
11 Ex quarta arguitur sic, quia cuius est tarde vel non prompte operari, eius est etiam promptitudo; sed 'non prompte operari' competit agenti in quantum activum, non in quantum passivum; ergo et promptitudo, quam tribuit habitus, pertinet ad agens in quantum agens.	11. From the fourth the argument is as follows, that promptness belongs to that of which there is an acting sluggishly or promptly; but 'not to act promptly' belongs to an agent insofar as it is active, not insofar as it is passive; therefore the promptness, which the habit bestows, belongs to the agent insofar as it is agent.
12 Praeterea, ad principale: Habitus inclinat potentiam ad actum. Duplex autem est inclinatio, videlicet potentiae passivae ad formam et potentiae activae ad agere: habitus non inclinat primo modo, nam actus recipitur in ƿpotentia immediate, alioquin actus perfectus et imperfectus non haberent idem susceptivum; ergo inclinat secundo modo, ut principium activum ad agere, - quod est propositum.	12. Further, to the principal point: A habit inclines a power to act. But there is a double inclination, namely of a passive power to form and of an active power to act; habit does not incline in the first way, for act is received in the power immediately, otherwise perfect and imperfect act would not have the same thing susceptive of them; therefore it inclines in the second way, as an active principle for acting, - and this is the intended proposition.
13 Item, secundum Philosophum VIII Physicorum et II De anima, anima ante scientiam est in potentia essentiali, habens autem scientiam est in potentia accidentali. Quod autem reducit de potentia essentiali ad accidentalem respectu operationis, videtur esse principium activum respectu eius, quia est quo habens operatur: unde Philosophus vult II De anima, quod sicut scientia est ((quo scimus)), ita anima est ((quo vivimus et sentimus)) etc., et per consequens sicut anima est quo agimus actus vitales, ita scientia est quo active speculamur.	13. Again, according to the Philosopher in Physics 8.4.255a30-255b5 and De Anima 2.5.417a21-28, the soul is, before knowledge, in essential potency, but when it has knowledge it is in accidental potency. But what reduces something from essential potency to accidental potency as regard operation seems to be the active principle with respect to it, because it is that whereby the possessor of it acts; hence the Philosopher intends, in De Anima 2.2.414a4-7, 12-13, that just as science is 'that whereby we know' so the soul is 'that whereby we live and sense' etc., and consequently, just as the soul is that whereby we perform vital acts, so science is that whereby we actively speculate.
14 Item, aliquis habitus est practicus, et talis aliquis est activus, ut prudentia, - aliquis factivus, ut ars; ratio practici in communi, et factivi in speciali, videtur concludere in tali habitu rationem principii activi.	14. Again, some habits are practical, and one such is active, as prudence, and another productive, as art; the idea of a practical habit in general, and of a productive one in particular, seems to involve in such habit the idea of active principle.
15 Contra: Relatio non est principium activum, nec aliquid essentialiter includens relationem; habitus autem est 'ad aliquid', secundum Philosophum VII Physicorum; ergo etc. ƿ	15. On the contrary: Relation is not an active principle, nor anything that essentially includes relation; but habit is 'in relation to something', according to the Philosopher in Physics 7.3.246a30-b21; therefore etc.
16 Confirmatur ratio, quia non minus requiritur entitas realis absoluta in principio motus quam in termino: si ergo habitus caret entitate absoluta quae sufficiat ad terminandum motum (secundum Philosophum V), multo magis caret ea quae requiritur in principio activo.	16. A confirmation of the reason is that absolute real entity is no less required in the principle of motion than in its term; if therefore a habit lacks the absolute entity that would suffice for terminating motion (according to the Philosopher in Physics 5.2.225b11-13), much more does it lack the absolute entity that is required in an active principle.
17 Praeterea, secundo, respectu unius actionis est una potentia activa (Commentator V Physicorum); sed non solus habitus est potentia activa respectu operationis, quia tunc ipse habitus esset potentia (quia potentia est qua simpliciter possumus), et non esset 'illud quod perficitur per ipsum' simpliciter potentia; ergo solum illud quod perficitur per habitum, est principium activum operationis.	17. Further, second, in respect of one action there is one active potency (the Commentator on Physics 5 com.38); but the habit alone is not the active power with respect to operation, because then the habit itself would be a power (because power is that by which we are simply able), and 'what is perfected by it' would not be power simply; therefore only that which is perfected by a habit is the active principle of operation.
18 Confirmatur ista ratio, quia una actio requirit principium formale quo eliciatur 'per se unum'; aggregatum ex potentia et habitu est 'unum per accidens', non 'per se'; ergo hoc totum non potest esse 'quo' respectu operationis 'per se unius'.	18. A confirmation of this reason is that a single action requires a formal principle 'per se one' whereby to be elicited; something composed of power and habit is 'per accidens one' and not ' per se one'; therefore this composite whole cannot be the 'by which' in respect of an operation 'per se one'.
19 Praeterea, accidens non est principium agendi in subiectum proprium; sed operatio, ad quam ponitur habitus, recipitur frequenter in potentia cuius est ille habitus; ergo respectu illius non est habitus principium activum.	19. Further, an accident is not a principle of acting in its proper subject; but operation, for which habit is posited, is repeatedly received in the power to which the habit belongs; therefore with respect to operation the habit is not the active principle.
20 Praeterea, aliqui habitus sunt in potentiis sensitivis appetitivis; iste appetitus non est activus, quia secundum Damascenum ƿ((sensus non ducit, sed ducitur)); ergo nec forma eius potest esse principium activum, quia si esset, oporteret quod concurreret cum potentia in agendo.	20. Further, some habits are in the sensitive appetitive powers; this appetite is not active, because according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.36, "sense does not lead but is led;" therefore neither can the form of it be an active principle, because if it were it ought to concur with the power in acting.
21 Ad istam quaestionem dicitur quod aliter est de habitu acquisito et aliter de habitu infuso. Nam ab alio est actus naturalis hominis, et expeditio actus, propter indeterminationem quam habet natura respectu illius actus, - et ideo virtus acquisita est perfectio naturae, praesuppositae in ratione principii actus; sed si virtus supernaturalis esset naturae, praesuppositae in illo esse cui correspondet talis actio, tunc ipsa tantum facilitaret naturam, sicut virtus acquisita: sed hoc est falsum, immo ab eodem est 'esse gratuitum' et simpliciter elicitur actio gratuita, secundum illum gradum, - ita quod virtus acquisita est virtus secundum illam rationem virtutis quae ponitur II Ethicorum, sed virtus theologica non sic, sed secundum illam rationem virtutis qua ponitur quod virtus est 'ultimum de potentia'. ƿ	21. [Exposition of the opinion] - To this question it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that things are differently disposed as regard acquired habit and infused habit. For the natural act of a man, and the lack of impediment in the act, is from another, because of the indetermination that nature has with respect to that act, - and therefore acquired virtue is a perfection of nature, with nature presupposed under the idea of the principle of act; but if supernatural virtue belonged to nature (with nature presupposed in that to which such an act corresponds), then the supernatural virtue alone would facilitate nature, as acquired virtue does; but this is false, nay by the same thing there is 'gratuitous existence' and a gratuitous act, according to that [supernatural] degree, is simply elicited - the result being that acquired virtue is a virtue according to the idea of virtue that is posited in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17, but theological virtue is not like that but accords with the idea of virtue by which it is laid down that virtue is 'the utmost of power' (De Caelo 1.11.281a10-12).
22 Contra istam opinionem, si sic intelligat quod habitus supernaturalis est simpliciter principium respectu actus, arguo sic: Quo quis potest simpliciter operari, illud est potentia; ergo habitus supernaturalis erit potentia. Antecedens patet, quia potentia est qua simpliciter et primo possumus agere.	22. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion [n.21], if thus he [sc. Henry of Ghent] understands that a supernatural habit is simply principle with respect to act, I argue as follows: That by which someone can act simply is a power; therefore a supernatural habit will be a power. The antecedent is plain, because power is that whereby we are simply and first able to act.
23 Praeterea, ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod non plus erit voluntas bona si operetur per habitum caritatis, quam lignum perficitur in agendo si agit per calorem inhaerentem accidentaliter; exemplum: sicut enim ex hoc nulla competit actio ligno per formam ligni, sed tantum illi agenti quod recipitur in ipso, ita etiam videtur quod actio illa quae competeret caritati ut principali principio, nullo modo competeret voluntati ut voluntas. Et etiam sequitur ulterius' quod sicut calor si esset separatus, aeque calefaceret, ita caritas si esset separata, aeque ageret, nam omnis forma quae est totale principium agendi ut est in subiecto, si per se est, potest ƿper se operari, - et ita sequitur evidenter propositum, quod scilicet habitus erit potentia.	23. Further, from this [sc. that a supernatural habit is a principle of act] it follows in addition that no more will the will be good if it acts through the habit of charity than a piece of wood is perfected in acting if it acts by the heat inhering in it accidentally; an example: for just as from this fact [sc. the wood acting through heat] no action belongs to the wood through the form of wood but only to the agent [sc. the heat] that is received in the wood, so also it seems that the action that would belong to charity as to principal principle would in no way belong to the will as will. And it also follows further that just as heat, if it were separated, would heat equally as much, so charity, if it were separated, would act equally as much, for every form that is the total principle of acting as it exists in a subject, can, if it exists per se, operate per se - and thus the intended proposition evidently follows, namely that the habit will be a power.
24 Praeterea, operatio non elicitur libere, cuius principium activum est mere naturale; sed habitus cum non sit formaliter voluntas, nec per consequens formaliter liber, si est principium activum erit mere naturale; ergo operatio eius non erit mere libera, et ita nullum 'velle' erit liberum si eliciatur ab habitu ut a totali principio activo.	24. Further, an operation whose active principle is purely natural is not freely elicited; but a habit, since it is not formally the will, nor as a consequence formally free, will, if it is an active principle, be purely natural; therefore its operation will not be purely free, and thus no 'willing' will be free if it is elicited by the habit as by a total active principle.
25 Praeterea, tunc homo semel habens caritatem, numquam posset peccare mortaliter, quod est inconveniens. - Probatio consequentiae, quia habens formam aliquam activam praedominantem sibi, numquam potest moveri contra inclinationem illius formae praedominantis, sicut numquam corpus mixtum grave potest ƿascendere contra inclinationem terrae dominantis; sed caritas - si est totale principium activum - praedominatur ipsi voluntati, quae non potest in actum illum; ergo voluntas sequitur semper inclinationem caritatis in agendo, et ita numquam peccabit.	25. Further, in that case a man who once has charity could never sin mortally, which is unfitting. - The proof of the consequence is that he who has some active form predominating in him can never be moved against the inclination of that predominating form, just as never can a heavy mixed body be raised upwards against the inclination of the dominating earth in it; but charity - if it is the total active principle - is predominant over the will itself, which has no power for that act; therefore the will always follows the inclination of charity in acting, and so it will never sin.
26 Praeterea, actus ille non est meus qui non est in potestate mea; sed actio ipsius habitus non est in potestate mea, quia habitus ipse - si est activus - non est liber, sed principium naturale; ergo illud 'diligere' non erit meum, sic quod in potestate mea sit, et ita non merebor illo actu.	26. Further, that act is not mine which is not in my power; but the action of the habit itself is not in my power, because the habit itself - if it is active - is not free but is a natural principle; therefore the 'loving' will not be mine, such that it be in my power, and so I will not merit by that act.
27 Alia via potest dici quod virtutes acquisitae et infusae non differunt modo praedicto, sed eodem modo comparantur ambae quantum ad substantiam actus: et tunc est unus modus dicendi, quod actus habet suam substantiam a poƿtentia, sed intensionem talem vel talem habet ab habitu, ita quod quasi duobus in actu - scilicet substantiae et intensioni - correspondeant duo in ratione principii vel causae.	27. [Exposition of the opinion] - In another way it can be said that acquired and infused virtues do not differ in the aforesaid way [n.21], but both are compared as to substance of act in the same way; and then there is one way of speaking, that the act has its substance from the power but has such and such intensity from the habit, so that to the two things as it were in the act - namely the substance and the intensity - there correspond two things in the idea of the principle or the cause.
28 Contra istud arguo, quia intensio actus non est aliquod extrinsecum, accidens actui, sed gradus intrinsecus actui, - ita quod actus intensus est quoddam 'per se unum', sicut huiusmodi individuum in specie. Non ergo potest esse aliud principium substantiae huiusmodi actus, et intensionis suae, quia a quo est hoc individuum, ab eodem est gradus intrinsecus proprius huic individuo: non enim potest recipere naturam ab aliquo, et 'hanc naturam' signatam, quin recipiat eam in certo gradu. - Iuxta hoc, quasi ex eodem medio, posset argui sicut prius argutum est ad principale, quod cum actus intensus sit 'per se unum', et aggregatum ex potentia et habitu sit quasi 'unum per accidens', non potest hoc totum esse principium illius. Sed ista forma arguendi non cogit (unde et postea solvetur), sed prima cogit, quod unde est 'hoc unum', inde habet certum gradum intrinsecum huic.	28. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this I argue that the intensity of an act is not something extrinsic, an accident of the act, but a degree intrinsic to the act, - such that an intense act is something 'per se one', just as an individual of this sort is one in species. There cannot, therefore, be one principle of the substance of this sort of act and another of its intensity, because that by which there is this individual is that by which there is an intrinsic degree proper to this individual; for it cannot receive nature, and a nature designated 'this nature', from something else without receiving it in a certain degree. - Following on from this, as if from the same middle term, one could argue the way it was argued before against the principal point [n.18], that since an intense act is 'per se one', and what is combined from potency and habit is as it were 'per accidens one', this whole cannot be the principle of that. But this form of arguing is not cogent (hence it will also be solved later [nn.73-74]), though the first form is, because that whereby it is 'this one thing' is that whereby it has a definite degree intrinsic to this.
29 Praeterea, secundo, quandocumque principium naturaliter activum concurrit cum causa libera agente, semper illud principium ƿnaturale coagit quantum potest (exemplum de voluntate et potentia inferiore naturaliter agente quantum est de se); tale enim licet impediatur ab agendo quando liberum non agit, tamen - libero agente - ipsum necessario agit, quia per modum naturae, quantum est de se, coagit illi libero quantum potest; ergo si habitus determinatus in voluntate det intensionem determinatam actui, tunc voluntate operante ad substantiam actus, necessario habitus dabit illam intensionem sibi correspondentem, et ita quantumcumque ex modico conatu voluntas operaretur, semper esset actus eius aeque intensus, quia ipsa causante substantiam actus, habitus quia agit per modum naturae - necessario causaret quod suum est.	29. Further, second, whenever a naturally active principle concurs with a free acting cause, the natural principle always jointly acts as much as it can (an example about the will and an inferior power acting naturally as much as belongs to itself); for although it be prevented from acting when the free principle does not act, yet - when the free principle is acting - it necessarily acts, because it acts by way of nature, as much as belongs to it, it jointly acts with the free principle as much as it can; therefore if a determinate habit in the will give a determinate intensity to the act, then, with the will operating on the substance of the act, the habit will necessarily give the intensity corresponding to itself, and thus, however much the will operates with a modicum of effort, its act would always be equally as intense, because, although the will causes the substance of the act, the habit - because it acts by way of nature - would necessarily cause what is its own.
30 Praeterea, si habitus det intensionem actui, hoc esset in aliquo gradu signato (signetur ille gradus); voluntas ergo cum habitu isto potest habere actum intensum in 'hoc' gradu. Fiat alia voluntas, perfectior ista voluntate secundum proportionem 'a gradus' ad actum in infimo gradu (puta, si a est gradus quartus in actu, fiat alia voluntas excedens primam voluntatem in quattuor gradibus), ista ergo voluntas - sine habitu - posset habere actum aeque intensum sicut illa voluntas cum habitu. Ergo a potentia non est praecise substantia actus ita quod non intensio.	30. Further, if the habit give intensity to the act, this would be in some designated degree (that degree will be given the mark a below); therefore the will can, along with this habit, have an act that is intense to that degree. Let there be another will, more perfect than this will in proportion to 'degree a' by relation to an act in the lowest degree (to wit, if a is the fourth degree in the act, let there be another will exceeding the first will by four degrees), then this will - without a habit - could have an act as equally intense as the will with the habit. Therefore the substance of the act is not so precisely from the power that the intensity is not from it.
31 Praeterea, sola voluntas infinita - circumscripta omni ratione ƿhabitus - potest in actum infinitum; ergo et voluntas, in quocumque gradu naturae, potest in actum determinati gradus. - Antecedens patet, quia voluntas unde infinita, non est receptiva alicuius habitus, quia non deficit sibi aliqua perfectio possibilis voluntati. Consequentia probatur, quia 'sicut summum ad summum, ita simpliciter ad simpliciter' et quilibet gradus ad gradum sibi correspondentem.	31. Further, only an infinite will - excluding all idea of habit - has power for an infinite act; therefore too the will, in whatever degree of nature it is, has power for an act of a determinate degree. - The antecedent is plain, because a will, by the fact it is infinite, is not receptive of any habit, because there is not lacking to it any perfection that is possible to will. The proof of the consequence is that 'as the highest is to the highest, so is the simply to the simply' and so is any degree whatever to the degree corresponding to it.
32 Tertio modo, attribuendo habitui aliquo modo rationem principii activi respectu actus, potest dici quod habitus est causa partialis activa, cum ipsa potentia (quae est etiam causa partialis), respectu actus perfecti procedentis a potentia et habitu, licet ipsa potentia posset esse totalis causa respectu actus imperfecti praecedentis generationem habitus. Et tunc de distinctione istarum duarum causarum partialium, et quomodo per se faciunt unam totalem causam, dicendum esset sicut dictum est supra distinctione quaestione 'De causa notitiae genitae'.	32. [Exposition of the Opinion] - In a third way, by attributing somehow to the habit the idea of active principle in respect of the act, one can say that the habit is a partial active cause, along with the power itself (which is also a partial cause), in respect of a perfect act proceeding from the power and the habit, although the power itself could be the total cause in respect of an imperfect act preceding the generation of the habit. And then one would have to speak about the distinction of these two partial causes, and how they per se make one total cause, in the way spoken above in distinction 3 in the question 'On the Cause of Generated Knowledge' [I d.3 nn.495-498].
33 Sed tunc est dubitatio. Cum ista duo non sint ƿcausae eiusdem ordinis, sicut duo trahentes navem, - quod eorum habet rationem causae prioris?	33. [A doubt] - But then there is a doubt. Since these two [sc. power and habit] are not causes of the same order, as are two people hauling a boat, - which of them has the idea of prior cause?
34 Videtur quod habitus, quia causae prioris est determinare secundam, et non e converso: habitus autem determinat potentiam ad agendum et inclinat eam, et non e converso; inclinare autem est superioris respectu inferioris, et non e converso.	34. It seems that the habit does, because it belongs to the prior cause to determine the second and not conversely; but the habit determines the power toward act; and it gives inclination to it, and not conversely; but to give inclination belongs to the superior in respect of the inferior, and not conversely
35 Sed oppositum huius videtur: Primo, quia potentia utitur habitu, non e converso, - quia quod utitur alio in agendo, est principalius eo, et illud quo utitur est quasi instrumentum vel causa secunda respectu eius.	35. But the opposite of this seems to be the case: First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely, - because what uses another in acting is more principal than it, and that which it uses is as it were the instrument or the second cause with respect to it [I d.3. n.562]
36 Similiter, potentia est illimitatior in agendo quam habitus, quia ad plura se extendit; sed causa superior videtur esse illimitatior extensive; ergo etc.	36. Likewise, the power is more unlimited in acting than the habit, because it extends to more things; but the superior cause seems to be more unlimited in extent; therefore etc. [ibid. n.559].
37 Praeterea, tertio, habitus est causa naturalis. Ergo si ipse sit causa principalis, movens potentiam, moveret eam per modum naturae, et per consequens potentia cum agat eo modo quo movetur, ageret per modum naturae: nam agens quod agit in quantum movetur - si movetur per modum naturae - agit etiam ulterius per modum naturae, et ita omnis actio potentiae habituatae esset naƿturalis et nulla libera (saltem non in potestate voluntatis), quod est inconveniens.	37. Further, third, a habit is a natural cause. Therefore if it be the principal cause, which moves the power, it would move it by way of nature and consequently the power, since it acts in the way in which it is moved, would act by way of nature; for an agent that acts insofar as it is moved - if it be moved by way of nature - also acts further by way of nature, and so every action of an habituated power would be natural and none free (at any rate none would be in the power of the will), which is a unfitting result.
38 Item, quarto, habitus esset potentia, quia esset illud quo habens primo potest operari.	38. Again, fourth, the habit would be the power, because it would be that by which the possessor of it can first act.
39 Item, quinto, quando duae sunt causae ordinatae quarum una est causa alterius, illa quae est causa alterius, est causa superior; sed potentia est causa habitus - saltem mediantibus actibus - et nullo modo e converso; ergo etc.	39. Again, fifth, when there are two ordered causes one of which is cause of the other, that which is cause of the other is the superior cause; but the power is the cause of the habit - at any rate by the mediation of acts - and not in any way conversely; therefore etc.
40 Concedo, propter istas rationes, quod tenendo habitum esse causam partialem respectu actus, esset causa secunda et non prima, sed ipsa potentia esset causa prima et absolute non indiget habitu ad operandum; tamen minus perfecte operatur sine habitu quam cum habitu (et hoc, posito aequali conatu ex parte potentiae), sicut quando duae causae concurrunt ad effectum unum, una sola non potest per se in ita perfectum effectum sicut ambae simul. Et hoc modo salvatur quare actus est intensior a potentia et ab habitu quam a potentia sola: non quidem quod potentia sit causa substantiae actus, et habitus causa intensionis actus (quasi duobus causatis correspondeant duae causae), sed quod ambae causae concurrentes possunt producere perfectiorem effectum quam altera sola, - qui tamen effectus secundum se totum et ut 'per se unus', est a duabus causis, sed in diverso ordine causantibus. ƿ	40. [Clarification of the opinion] - I concede, for these reasons [nn.35-39] that, by holding the habit to be a partial cause with respect to the act [n.32], the habit would be second cause and not first, but the power itself would be the first cause and absolutely would not need the habit for operating; yet it operates less perfectly without the habit than with it (and that when an equal effort on the part of the power is posited), just as, when two causes come together for one effect, one cause alone does not have power per se for an effect as perfect as both together do. And in this way there is saved why the act is more intense when from the power and the habit than when from the power alone; not indeed that the power is the cause of the substance of the act and the habit the cause of the intensity of the act (as if there were two causes corresponding to the two caused things [n.27]), but that both causes coming together are able to produce a more perfect effect than one alone [I d.3 n.296], - which effect, however, being a whole in itself and as 'per se one' is from the two causes, but causing in diverse order [nn.32-33].
41 Contra istam opinionem arguitur sic: Nulla distincta specie sunt sibi invicem causae aequivocae agentes; habitus et actus distinguuntur specie, igitur non sunt sibi invicem causae aequivocae agentes; sed actus est necessario causa aequivoca in generatione habitus, acquisiti saltem, - non ergo e converso.	41. [Against the opinion] - Against this opinion there is the following argument: No things distinct in species are equivocal agent causes for each other; habit and act are distinct in species; therefore they are not equivocal agent causes for each other; but an act is necessarily an equivocal cause in the generation of a habit, an acquired habit at least, - not therefore conversely.
42 Probatio maioris, quia causa aequivoca eminenter continet in se perfectionem effectus; non autem possunt duo distincta specie se invicem eminenter continere. - Praeterea, comparando ad eandem causam primam duos effectus, videtur quod alter illorum habeat determinatum ordinem, immediatum vel mediatum, priorem vel posteriorem, - et hoc, loquendo de tota specie alterius illorum effectuum. Hoc apparet inductive in passionibus consequentibus idem subiectum, in quibus est necessario determinatus ordo, quod una immediatius consequitur subiectum quam altera, et hoc secundum totam speciem, ita quod iste ordo non variatur in quibuscumque individuis specierum. Ergo respectu potentiae - quae est causa communis actus et habitus - habebunt isti duo effectus ordinem determinatum, ita quod vel necessario actus secundum totam speciem praecederet habitum, vel e converso; et cum aliquis actus de necessitate praecedat habitum ut causa eius, habitus non praecedet aliquem actum.	42. The proof of the major is that an equivocal cause contains eminently in itself the perfection of the effect; but two things distinct in species cannot eminently contain each other. - Further, in comparing the same first cause to two effects, it seems that the second of the effects would have a determinate order, immediate or mediate, prior or posterior - and that when speaking of the whole species of the second of those effects. The point is evident by induction in passions that follow the same subject, wherein there is necessarily a determinate order, that one follows the subject more immediately than the other, and that according to its whole species, so that this order does not vary in any individuals whatever of the species. Therefore with respect to the power - which is the common cause of the act and the habit - the two effects will have a determinate order, so that either necessarily the act according to its whole species would precede the habit or conversely; and since some act of necessity precedes the habit as the cause of it, the habit would not precede any act.
43 Praeterea, si habitus sit causa partialis respectu actus et aequivoca, ergo causa huius causae erit perfectior causa aequivoca eiusƿdem actus (consequentia patet, quia in causis aequivocis causa causae est perfectior causa quam causa proximior causato); sed actus est causa generationis habitus; ergo si potentia cum habitu potest in actum perfectum, multo magis si esset sub actu generativo habitus, posset in eundem actum perfectum, - quod videtur inconveniens, quia duo actus perfecti non possunt esse in eadem potentia, aut saltem si possent, non videtur quod unus illorum possit esse aliquo modo principium activum respectu alterius.	43. Further, if the habit is a partial and equivocal cause with respect to the act, then the cause of this cause will be more perfect than the equivocal cause of the same act (the consequence is plain, because in equivocal causes the cause of the cause is a more perfect cause than the cause closer to the thing caused); but the act is the cause of the generation of the habit; therefore if the power along with the habit can perform a perfect act [nn.32, 40], it could much more perform the same perfect act if it were under the act that generates the habit, - which seems an unfitting result, because two perfect acts cannot exist in the same power, or at any rate, if they could, it does not seem that one of them could in any way be the active principle with respect to the other.
44 Praeterea, si habitus est quasi causa secunda, supplens aliquem gradum causalitatis qui deest potentiae, ergo posset habitus fieri ita perfectus quod suppleret vicem totius potentiae, - et ita aliquis habitus solus, sine potentia, posset esse sufficienter causa et in ratione habitus et in ratione potentiae: universaliter enim, in agentibus eiusdem rationis, videtur quod ita posset intendi virtus unius quod aequaretur duobus.	44. Further, if the habit is as it were the second cause [n.40], supplying some degree of causality that is lacking to the power, then the habit could become so perfect that it would supply the place of the whole power; for universally, in agents of the same nature, it seems that the virtue of one could be so intensified that it would equal the two [I d.3 n.497].
45 Praeterea, si teneretur quod in motu intensionis et remissionis individuum praeexsistens corrumpitur, necesse esset ponere habitum non esse causam actus, quia corrumpitur in actu illo quo intenditur; causa autem non est causa quando corrumpitur, quia quod non est, nullius est causa.	45. Further, if it be held that, in the process of making more or less intense, the preexisting individual is corrupted, it would be necessary to posit that the habit is not the cause of the act, because it is corrupted in the act whereby it is made more intense; but a cause is not a cause when it is corrupted, because what does not exist is not cause of anything. 4. Fourth Way
46 Qui vellet tenere conclusionem istarum rationum, posset negare ab habitu omnem rationem principii ƿactivi, et dicere quod habitus tantum inclinat ad operationem, quasi actus prior conveniens cum actu secundo, et determinans ad actum illum, - sicut gravitas est actus prior, determinans et inclinans ad determinatum 'ubi', licet secundum aliquos gravitas non sit principium respectu esse in illo 'ubi'.	46. [Exposition of the opinion] - He who would maintain the conclusion of these reasons [nn.41-45] could negate of habit all idea of active principle, and say that a habit only gives an inclination to operation as a sort of prior act agreeing with second act and giving a determination to that act - just as heaviness is a prior act, giving determination and inclination to a determinate 'where', although, according to some, heaviness is not a principle with respect to existing in that 'where'.
47 Et istud videtur probabile, quia nulli debet attribui causalitas respectu alicuius nisi talis causalitas sit evidens ex natura rerum (vel causae vel causati); nulli etiam causae neganda est perfecta causalitas nisi manifeste appareat imperfectio causalitatis in ea, quia nullam naturam negandum est habere perfectionem qua non est evidens eam carere. Nulla autem videtur ƿnecessitas ponendi causalitatem aliquam activam in habitu respectu actus, quia sine hoc salvabuntur omnes condiciones quae communiter attribuuntur habitui; nulla etiam est necessitas auferendi a potentia perfectam rationem causalitatis, ut attribuatur partialis causa. litas potentiae. Ergo non est aliqua causalitas habitui attribuenda.	47. [Approval of the opinion] - And this opinion seems probable, because to nothing should causality with respect to anything be attributed unless such causality is evident from the nature of the things (whether of the cause or of the thing caused); also to no cause should perfect causality be denied unless imperfection of causality appears manifestly in it, because no nature should be denied to possess a perfection which it does not evidently lack. But there seems to be no necessity of positing any active causality in the habit with respect to the act, because without this all the conditions commonly attributed to the habit will be saved [n.48]; also there is no necessity to take away from the power the perfect idea of causality so as to attribute a partial causality to the power. Therefore there is no need to attribute any causality to the habit.
48 Assumptum patet, quia illae quattuor condiciones quae attribuuntur habitui, videlicet quod est 'quo habens faciliter operatur, delectabiliter, expedite et prompte', salvantur propter solam inclinationem habitus, quam tribuit potentiae ut est receptiva operationis.	48. The assumption is plain, because the four conditions that are attributed to the habit, namely that it is 'that whereby the possessor of it operates easily, with pleasure, without impediment, and promptly' [n.7], are saved by the habit's inclination alone, which the habit attributes to the power as the power is receptive of operation.
49 Delectatio quidem est propter condicionem recipientis, cui competit operatio recepta et obiectum circa quod est operatio. Numquam enim delectatio est in factione quae praecise est factio, sed quia actio est in agente, potest esse actio delectabilis propter convenientiam agentis ad obiectum; hanc autem convenientiam potest tribuere habitus ex hoc quod inclinat ad actionem et obiectum. Ergo delectabilitas non concludit rationem principii activi, sed tantum convenientiam principii passivi ad potentiam et obiectum, et hoc quantum ad actionem quae est de genere qualitatis, non quae est de genere actionis, - de qua differentia actionum dictum est supra distinctione 3. Operatio quidem est actio quae est ƿqualitas, et illa competit potentiae habituatae, quae per habitum inclinatur ad talem actum et ad obiectum terminans talem operationem; non habituatae autem non sic competit, nec talis forma nec tale obiectum.	49. Pleasure indeed exists because of the condition of the receiver, to whom belongs the operation received and the object about which the operation is. For pleasure is never in a making that is precisely a making, but because action is in the agent action can be pleasant because of the agreement of the agent with the object; but this agreement can be provided by the habit from the fact that it gives an inclination toward the action and the object. Pleasurability, therefore, does not include the idea of active principle, but only the agreement of the passive principle with the power and the object, and that as to action which is of the genus of quality, not action which is of the genus of action, - which difference in actions was stated above in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.600-604]. Operation indeed is an action that is a quality, and it belongs to an habituated power that is, by the habit, inclined to such an act and to the object that terminates such an operation; but it does not thus belong to a non-habituated power, nor does such a form or such an object so belong.
50 Similiter quoad condicionem secundam. Difficultas in operatione accidit ex hoc quod receptivum operationis non est dispositum ad recipiendum, et non solum ex defectu virtutis activae; ergo si receptivum sit dispositum, erit facilitas in agendo, in quantum agens agit circa tale passum.	50. Likewise as to the second condition. Difficulty in operation occurs from the fact that what is receptive of the operation is not disposed to receiving it, and not merely from a defect in the active virtue; therefore if what is receptive is disposed, there will be easiness in acting, to the extent the agent acts on such a receptive thing.
51 Similiter de expeditione et promptitudine. Nam impeditio et tardatio agentis in agendo potest esse propter indispositionem ipsius passi, potissime quando idem est agens et recipiens, ita quod ipsummet non operabitur prompte quia est indispositum ad operandum. Haec ergo indispositio non est ad agendum actionem de genere actionis, sed ad habendum actionem de genere qualitatis; nihil enim dicitur formaliter operari in quantum elicit operationem, sed in quantum recipit eam in se.	51. Likewise about absence of impediment and promptness. For impediment to, and slowness of, the agent in acting can be because of the indisposition of the receptive thing itself, especially when the same thing is agent and recipient, so that it will not itself operate promptly because it is indisposed to operating. This indisposition, then, is not for performing an action in the genus of action, but for having an action in the genus of quality; for nothing is said formally to operate insofar as it elicits operation but insofar as it receives it in itself.
52 Qualiter etiam alia communiter attributa habitui salventur, attribuendo totam actionem potentiae et nullam activitatem habitui, patebit solvendo argumenta ad principale. ƿ	52. Also, the way that the other things commonly attributed to a habit are saved, by attributing the whole action to the power and no activity to the habit, will be plain from solving the arguments to the principal point [nn.6-7, 12-14, 87-91].
53 Sic ergo patet qualiter, duabus viis primis 'de habitu' tamquam inconvenientibus derelictis, duae ultimae viae probabiles possunt sustineri, videlicet tertia et quarta: attribuendo, secundum tertiam viam, aliquam activitatem habitui, et non solum 'rationem principii activi' potentiae, - et secundum quartam negando ab habitu rationem activi, et quod sit tamquam forma inclinans ad aliquam formam ulteriorem recipiendam, licet non sit ratio recipiendi respectu eius (sicut gravitas inclinat ad deorsum, licet non sit ratio receptivi eius quod est deorsum, sed 'corpus quantum', in quantum est receptivum alicuius 'ubi').	53. Thus then it is plain how, once the two first ways 'about habit' are abandoned as unfitting, the two last ways, namely the third and fourth, can be sustained as probable, by attributing, in line with the third way, some activity to the habit and not only 'the idea of active principle' to the power [n.32], - and, in line with the fourth way, by denying to the habit the idea of active principle and saying that it is as it were a form giving inclination to receive some further form, although it not be the idea of receiving with respect to it (as heaviness gives inclination downwards, although it is not the idea of that which receives what is downwards, but 'a bodily magnitude' is, insofar as it is receptive of some 'where' n.46]).
54 Ad argumenta quae sunt contra istas duas vias ultimas, quarum utraque posset probabiliter sustineri, postea respondebitur, secundum alterutram istarum viarum tenendo de actu quantum ad substantiam actus sive quantum ad gradum intrinsecum.	54. To the arguments that are against these two last ways, each of which ways can be sustained with probability, a response will be given later [nn.71-86], according to one of these two ways by maintaining it about the act either as to the substance of the act or as to the intrinsic degree.
55 Restat modo inquirere ulterius de bonitate accidentali actus (qualis est bonitas moralis) et de habitu morali, utrum habitus ƿmoralis in quantum virtus, sit aliquo modo principium activum respectu bonitatis moralis in actu.	55. It remains now to inquire further about the accidental goodness of the act (which is the sort moral goodness is), and about moral habit, whether moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is in any way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in the act.
56 Videtur quod sic: Quia, secundum Philosophum II Ethicorum, virtus est ((quae habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit)); non reddit autem illud bonum in ratione principii passivi, quia non est ratio recipiendi; ergo in ratione principii activi.	56. [Arguments for the fifth way] - It seems that it is Because, according to the Philosopher Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17, virtue is "what perfects the possessor and makes his work good;" but it does not make it good in the idea of passive principle, because it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it does so in the idea of active principle
57 Praeterea, virtus est ((dispositio perfecti ad optimum)), ex VII Physicorum; non est autem dispositio passiva, quia - ut prius non est ratio recipiendi; ergo est in ratione principii activi. - Et confirmatur ratio, quia 'sicut bonum ad bonum, ita optimum ad optimum'; sed cum 'optima ratio' sit principii activi, igitur secundum istam rationem virtus perficit potentiam, et ita ad agendum. ƿ	57. Further, virtue is "the disposition of the perfect in relation to the best", from Physics 73.246b23; but it is not a passive disposition because - as before - it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it is in the idea of active principle. - There is a confirmation also for the reason, because 'as good is to good so is best to best' [Topics 3.2.117b22-26]; but since 'the best idea' belongs to the active principle, then according to this reason virtue perfects the power, and so perfects it for acting.
58 Praeterea, virtus est moderatrix passionum; non moderatur autem passiones per rationem principii passivi, quia obiectum, ex quo est naturalis causa, causat actionem secundum ultimum potentiae suae, - ergo quantum potest, si non impediatur per aliquid contra agens; ergo habitus impediendo obiectum sic summe agere, in reprimendo passionem moderatur eam per rationem principii activi.	58. Further, virtue is moderator of the passions; but it does not moderate the passions through the idea of passive principle, because the object, by the fact it is the natural cause, causes the action according to the utmost of its power, - therefore as much as it can, if it is not impeded by some contrary agent; therefore the habit, by preventing the object from thus acting completely, moderates it in repressing the passion through the idea of active principle.
59 Praeterea, II Ethicorum dicit Philosophus quod 'non habens iustitiam, etsi possit operari iusta, non tamen iuste', - et ita de aliis actibus; bonitas autem moralis requirit operari iuste vel fortiter, - et sic de aliis; ergo virtus est tale principium actus, in quantum bonus, quod sine ea non posset actus esse bonus. ƿ	59. Further, Ethics 2.3.1105b7-9, the Philosopher says that 'he who does not have justice, although he could do just things, not however justly', - and so in the case of other acts; but moral goodness requires acting justly or formally, - and thus in other cases; therefore virtue, insofar as it is good, is such a principle of act, because without it an act could not be good.
60 Sed contrarium huius arguitur per hoc quod bonitas moralis in actu non dicit nisi relationem, quia actum esse circumstantionatum debitis circumstantiis non est aliquid absolutum in actu, sed tantum comparatio debita eius ad illa quibus debet convenire; ergo istud non habet aliquod principium proprium activum, sicut nec aliquis respectus.	60. [Arguments against the fifth way] - But there is an argument to the contrary of this through the fact that moral goodness in an act asserts only relation, because that an act is circumstanced with its due circumstances is not anything absolute in the act but is only a due comparison of it to the things it ought to agree with; therefore this does not have any proper active principle, just as neither does a respect have it.
61 Praeterea, si habitus in quantum 'virtus' esset principium activum bonitatis moralis in actu, cum habitus non sit virtus nisi ex respectu, videlicet ex conformitate eius ad prudentiam (est enim ((habitus electivus medii, ut determinatur a recta ratione))), ergo aliqua ratio relativa in virtute esset ratio principii activi, quod est impossibile.	61. Further, if a habit, insofar as it is a 'virtue', were the active principle of the moral goodness in an act, since the habit is not a virtue save in a respect, namely from its conformity with prudence (for it is "an elective habit of the mean, as determined by right reason" Ethics 2.5.1106b36-07a2), therefore some relative idea in virtue would be the idea of active principle, which is impossible.
62 Quantum ad istum articulum, dici potest quod sicut pulchritudo non est aliqua qualitas absoluta in corpore pulchro, sed est aggregatio omnium convenientium tali corpori (puta magnitudinis, figurae et coloris), et aggregatio etiam omnium respectuum (qui sunt istorum ad corpus et ad se invicem), ita bonitas moralis actus est quasi quidam decor illius actus, incluƿdens aggregationem debitae proportionis ad omnia ad quae habet proportionari (puta ad potentiam, ad obiectum, ad finem, ad tempus, ad locum et ad modum), et hoc specialiter ut ista dictantur a ratione recta debere convenire actui: ita quod pro omnibus possumus dicere quod convenientia actus ad rationem rectam est qua posita actus est bonus, et qua non posita - quibuscumque aliis conveniat - non est bonus, quia quantumcumque actus sit circa obiectum qualecumque, si non sit secundum rationem rectam in operante (puta si ille non habeat rationem rectam in operando), actus non est bonus. Principaliter ergo conformitas actus ad rationem rectam - plene dictantem de circumstantiis omnibus debitis istius actus - est bonitas moralis actus.	62. [Response to the fifth way] - As to this article [n.55], it can be said that, just as beauty is not some absolute quality in the beautiful body but is the aggregation of all the things that become such a body (to wit size, figure, and color), and an aggregation too of all the respects (which are aggregations of all the becoming things in relation to the body and to each other), so the moral goodness of an act is as it were a certain comeliness of that act, including the aggregation of a due proportion with all the things that it has to be in proportion with (to wit, with the power, the object, the end, the time, the place, the manner), and that specifically in the way these are determined by right reason to be needing to agree with the act; the result is that we can say on behalf of all of them that the agreement of the act with right reason is that by which, once posited, the act is good, and that by which, when not posited - whatever other things it agrees with - the act is not good, because however much an act is about an object of some kind or other, if it is not according to right reason in the one who does it (to wit if he do not have right reason in his operating), the act is not good. Principally, therefore, the conformity of the act to right reason - a right reason determining fully all the circumstances due to that act - is the moral goodness of an act.
63 Haec autem bonitas nullum habet principium proprium activum, sicut nec aliquis respectus, - potissime cum iste respectus consequatur 'extrema posita' ex natura extremorum: impossibile enim est aliquem actum poni in esse et rationem rectam poni in esse, quin ex natura extremorum sequatur in actu talis conformitas ad rationem rectam; relatio autem consequens extrema necessario, non habet causam propriam aliam ab extremis.	63. But this goodness has no proper active principle, just as neither does any respect, - especially since this respect is, from the nature of the extreme terms, consequent to the extremes posited; for it is impossible for any act to be posited in existence and for right reason to be posited in existence without there following in the act, from the nature of the extreme terms, such a conformity to right reason; but a relation that necessarily follows the extremes does not have any proper cause other than the extremes.
64 Quantum ergo ad istam condicionem accidentalem actus, quae ƿest bonitas moralis, non oportet aliquem habitum habere aliquam rationem proprii principii activi, nisi in quantum habet rationem principii activi respectu substantiae actus, - qui actus natus est convenire completo dictamini prudentiae: et ad illum actum in se ƿinclinat habitus aliquis ex natura habitus, et ex hoc - ex consequente - inclinat ad actum qui sit conformis rectae rationi, si recta ratio insit operanti. ƿ	64. Therefore, as concerns this accidental condition of the act, which is moral goodness, there is no necessity for any habit to have any idea of proper active principle, save insofar as it has the idea of active principle with respect to the substance of the act -which act is of a nature to agree with the full determination of prudence; and toward that act some habit inclines in itself from the nature of the habit, and from this - as a consequence - it inclines to the act which is conform to right reason, if right reason is present in the one acting.
65 Sicut dictum est de bonitate morali actus, proportionaliter est de habitu dicendum, quod virtus moralis non addit super substantiam habitus - ut est forma in genere qualitatis - nisi conformitatem habitualem ad rationem rectam. Idem enim habitus in natura, qui generaretur ex actibus abstinentiae elicitis cum ratione erronea in eliciente, manens post cum ratione recta, esset post virtus abstinentiae et prius non habitus virtutis, quamdiu non fuit ƿratio recta abstinendi; nec tamen aliquid mutatum est circa illum habitum in se, sed tantummodo nunc coniungitur prudentiae et prius non.	65. What has been said of the moral goodness of an act [n.62] must be said proportionally of the habit, because moral virtue adds over and above the substance of the habit - as it is a form in the genus of quality - only an habitual conformity to right reason. For the same habit in nature, which might be generated from acts of abstinence elicited along with an erroneous reason in the one eliciting them, when it remains afterwards along with right reason, would afterwards be the virtue of abstinence and would before not be a habit of virtue, as long as there was no right reason of abstaining; nor yet has anything changed in that habit in itself but only now it is conjoined with prudence while before it was not.
66 'Coniungi' ergo 'prudentiae' attribuit habitui (ut est forma de genere qualitatis) esse virtutem, quando ille habitus ex natura sua natus est esse conformis prudentiae, - et ita nihil aliud in entitate absoluta dicit habitus qui est virtus moralis, ab illo qui est talis in natura, et non virtus, si sit sine prudentia: et per consequens, nullam aliam causalitatem potest habere ut est virtus quam ut est qualitas talis naturalis, nisi quia 'ut coniungitur prudentiae' natus est esse causa secunda - quasi directa a prudentia - respectu effectus communis amborum; ut autem est sine prudentia, non potest esse causa secunda respectu eiusdem effectus (sicut visus in freneƿtico non potest esse libera potentia per participationem, quia ille non potest habere usum voluntatis, quae est potentia libera per essentiam, - in sano autem visus habet usum potentiae liberae per participationem, et quasi causa secunda respectu voluntatis). Sed adhuc, quando est causa secunda respectu prudentiae, causalitatem propriam - convenientem sibi in suo ordine causandi habet praecise ex hoc quod est talis forma vel qualitas quaedam in natura, non autem per respectum conformitatis vel coniunctionis ad prudentiam, quia licet causa secunda coniuncta primae aliter agat quam sine ea, non tamen habet virtutem suam propriam activam ex coniunctione tali, sed ex natura sua absoluta.	66. To be conjoined, therefore, to prudence attributes to the habit (as it is a form in the genus of quality) the being of virtue, when the habit is of its nature naturally conform to prudence, - and so the habit that is a moral virtue indicates nothing in absolute entity other than is indicated by a habit such in nature, but does not indicate a virtue, if it be without prudence; and consequently it can have no other causality as it is a virtue than as it is such a natural quality, save that 'as it is conjoined with prudence' it is of a nature to be second cause - directed as it were by prudence - with respect to the common effect of both; but as it is without prudence it cannot be second cause with respect to the same effect (just as sight in a phrenetic cannot be a free power by participation, because he is unable to have use of will, which is a free power by essence -but in someone healthy sight does have use of free power by participation, and it is as it were a second cause with respect to the will). But still, when it is a second cause with respect to prudence, it has a proper causality - agreeing with it in its order of causing -precisely from the fact that it is such a form and a certain quality in nature, but not by respect of conformity or conjunction with prudence, because although a second cause joined to a first acts otherwise than when it is without it, yet it does not have its proper active virtue from such conjunction, but from its absolute nature.
67 Nec igitur ex parte actus in quantum est bonus moraliter, nec ex parte habitus in quantum est virtus moralis, potest inveniri ratio specialis secundum quam virtus 'ut virtus' sit principium actus ut bonus moraliter, nisi illa quae est ex parte habitus et actus quantum ad naturam eorum.	67. [Conclusion to the fifth way] - Neither, therefore, on the part of the act insofar as it is morally good, nor on the part of the habit insofar as it is a moral virtue, can there be found any special idea according to which a virtue 'as it is a virtue' is a principle of an act insofar as the act is morally good save the one which is on the part of the habit and the act as concerns their nature.
68 Istam ergo quintam viam, de actione virtutis moralis respectu actus ut est bonus moraliter, non ƿoportet pertractare quasi aliam ab illis quae tangunt de substantia habitus et substantia actus, - et ita breviter, quantum ad totam quintam viam, oportet tenere vel tertiam viam vel quartam, de omni habitu.	68. [What one should think of the fifth way] - This fifth way, therefore, about the action of a moral virtue with respect to the act as it is morally good, should not be treated as other than the ways that touch on the substance of the habit and the substance of the act [n.67], - and so, in brief, as to the whole of the fifth way, one should hold either the third or the fourth way [nn.32, 46] about every habit.
69 Tenendo tertiam viam (quae videtur attribuere plus habitui), potest dici sic quod sicut si esset aliqua gravitas in lapide quae non esset sufficiens principium activum respectu descensus deorsum, esset tamen principium partiale activum (sicut dicetur in II de gravitate sufficiente quod est totale principium activum respectu descensus), illa - inquam - gravitas deminuta, cum alia potentia motiva principaliter movente ad descensum, posset deminute agere, ita quod potentia alia motiva ex aequali conatu agente, descensus esset velocior qui causaretur ab illa alia potentia motiva extrinseca et a gravitate deminuta intrinsecus movente, quam qui a sola causaretur potentia motiva extrinseca cum aequali conatu movente, potentia tamen motiva extrinseca posset cum tanto conatu movere corpus neutrum (cuius videlicet nulla esset gravitas nec levitas), ƿsicut istud corpus moveretur a gravitate intrinseca et a potentia motiva extrinseca remisse agente; - ita, in proposito, habitus movet potentiam quasi quoddam pondus, quod tamen ex se non sufficit ad eliciendum active ipsam operationem, sufficit autem sola virtus potentiae activae, sine tali pondere; sed quando ambo concurrunt, ita tamen quod non sit maior conatus ex parte potentiae nunc quam prius, perfectior operatio elicitur nunc quam prius posset elici ab ipsa potentia sola.	69. By maintaining the third way (which seems to attribute more to the habit), it can thus be said that, just as, if there were some heaviness in a stone that would not be a sufficient active principle with respect to descent downwards, yet it would be a partial active principle (as will be said in II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.2-11 about a sufficient heaviness, because it is a total active principle with respect to descent downwards), that - I say -diminished heaviness, along with another moving power moving it to the descent, could act in a diminished way, such that, with the other moving power acting with equal effort, the descent that is caused by that other extrinsic moving power and by the diminished heaviness moving intrinsically would be quicker than a descent that is caused by the extrinsic moving power alone moving with equal effort, yet the extrinsic moving power could, with so much effort, move a neutral body (namely one which had no heaviness or lightness), just as this body would be moved by intrinsic heaviness and by an extrinsic moving power acting weakly; - so, in the proposed case, the habit moves the power as a sort of weight, which, however, is of itself not sufficient for actively eliciting the operation, but the virtue alone of the active power, without such weight, is sufficient; but when both come together, yet such that there is not on the part of the power a greater effort now than before, a more perfect operation is elicited now than could be elicited before by the power itself alone.
70 Et videtur pro ista via esse experientia communis, quia quilibet potest experiri, se habituatum, ex aequali conatu posse habere perfectiorem operationem quam possit habere non habituatus (quae perfectio actus non posset attribui habitui, si esset tantum principium passivum inclinans), quia saltem, ut videtur, in priore instanti naturae in quo elicitur - prius quam recipiatur in potentia - esset aequalis ratio principii activi in eliciendo, et ita aeque perfecta operatio eliceretur aequali conatu a potentia habituata et non habituata.	70. And common experience seems to be in favor of this way, because anyone can experience that, when he has been habituated, he can with equal effort have a more perfect operation than he could have when not habituated (which perfection of the act could not be attributed to the habit, if the habit were only an inclining passive principle), because at any rate, as it seems, in the prior instant of nature in which the operation is elicited - before it is received in the power - there would be an equal idea of active principle in the eliciting, and so a perfect operation would be elicited with equal effort by an habituated and by a non-habituated power.
71 Ad argumenta principalia. Tenendo hanc viam, ad primum respondeo. Quamvis dicaƿtur habitum non esse formam absolutam, propter illa verba Philosophi VII Physicorum, tamen tenendo omnem qualitatem esse formam absolutam (et qualitas primae speciei non est minus qualitas quam alterius speciei), potest dici quod aliquid cui relatio est eadem, potest esse principium activum, licet relatio non sit principium activum; nec etiam illud cui ipsa est eadem, per rationem relationis est principium activum, sed per rationem absoluti, cui ipsa relatio est eadem. Distinctio istorum, videlicet relationis et essentiae absolutae cui relatio est eadem, patere potest ex multis aliis dictis supra, ubi cum identitate reali perfecta ponitur non identitas formalis; et hoc magis patebit in II distinctione 1, ubi dicetur quod relatio creaturae ad Deum est eadem essentiae absolutae rei creatae et tamen non formaliter eadem. Pro tanto ergo potest exponi Philosophus 'habitum esse ad aliquid', quia per identitatem includit respectum; et tamen non est reƿspectus tantum, sed est quoddam absolutum, - et ideo potest sibi competere actio tamquam principio agendi.	71. [To the principal negative arguments] - To the principal arguments. By holding this way [sc. the third], I reply to the first argument [n.15]. Although it be said that a habit is not an absolute form, because of those words of the Philosopher in Physics 7 [n.15], yet, by holding any quality to be an absolute form (and a quality of the first species is no less a quality than one of another species [Categories 8.8b25-11a38]), it can be said that something which the relation is the same as can be an active principle, although relation is not an active principle; nor either is that which the relation is the same as an active principle by reason of the relation, but by reason of the absolute which the relation itself is the same as. The distinction between these things, namely relation and the absolute essence which the relation is the same as, can be plain from many other things said above, where formal non-identity is posited along with perfect real identity [I d.2 nn.388-410, d.8 n.191-217]; and this will be plainer in II d.1 q.4 nn.21-25, where it will be said that the relation of the creature to God is the same as the absolute essence of the created thing and yet is not formally the same. To this extent, then, can the Philosopher by expounded, that 'habit is in relation to something', because by identity it includes the respect; and yet it is not a respect only, but something absolute, - and therefore action can belong to it as to a principle of acting.
72 Ad confirmationem rationis potest dici quod maior absolutio requiritur in termino motus quam in principio agendi, quia nihil potest terminare motum quod habet relationem eandem sibi. ƿNon sic est de principio activo.	72. In confirmation of the reason [n.16] it can be said that a greater absoluteness is required in a term of motion than in a principle of acting, because nothing can be the term of a motion that has the same relation to itself. It is not so with the active principle.
73 Ad secundum argumentum dico quod unius actionis unum est principium per se, et hoc in uno ordine principiandi; tamen ƿmulta possunt esse principia, in diverso ordine principiandi, quorum non sit unitas in quantum principiant nisi unitas ordinis, licet ƿquandoque cum unitate ordinis concurrat quod sit unitas accidentis et subiecti, sed hoc accidit. Ita in proposito. Habitus et potentia sunt duo principia activa alterius ordinis, et utrumque in suo ordine est 'unum per se'. Et cum ista unitate ordinis concurrit unitas accidentis et subiecti inter haec ordinata, sed hoc accidit, quia si ita posset coniungi causa prima cum secunda sine informatione tali unius ad alteram, sicut coniunguntur quando informatur una ab altera, eodem modo possent habere unitatem sufficientem ad causandum unum effectum. Quando ergo dicitur quod 'unius actionis est causa activa per se una', concedo, quod scilicet in uno ordine, - sed in alio ordine principiandi bene potest esse alia et alia causa, et hoc sive haec et ƿilla constituant 'unum per accidens' sive non, sed tantum 'unum unitate ordinis'; et licet sit ibi 'unitas per accidens', adhuc tamen semper salvatur unitas ordinis principii ad principiatum.	73. To the second argument [n.17] I say that of one action there is one principle per se, and that in one order of being principle; however, there can be many principles in diverse orders of being principle, which do not have a unity insofar as they are principles save the unity of order, although sometimes along with unity of order comes the fact that there is a unity of subject and accident, but this is accidental. So in the proposed case. Habit and power are two active powers of different order, each is in its order 'aper se one'. And along with this unity of order there comes the unity of accident and subject among these ordered things, and this is accidental, because if the first cause could be conjoined to the second without such an informing of one by the other as they are conjoined with when one is informed by the other, they could in the same way have sufficient unity for causing one effect. When therefore it is said that 'of one action there is an active cause per se one', I concede that there is, namely in one order, - but in another order of being principle there can well be one cause and another cause, and that whether this and that cause constitute 'a one per accidens' or not but only 'a one in unity of order'; and although there be here 'a unity per accidens', yet there is always still preserved a unity of order of principle to thing caused by the principle.
74 Per hoc apparet ad illam confirmationem de unitate principii formalis: concedo enim talem unitatem in illo quod est principium 'quo' in uno ordine principiandi.	74. By this the response is plain to the confirmation about the unity of formal principle [n.18]; for I concede such unity in what is the principle 'by which' in one order of being principle.
75 Ad aliud dico quod accidens bene potest esse principium alicuius effectus receptibilis in suo subiecto, sicut species intelligibilis est principium intellectionis receptae in intellectu possibili; et ita forma potest esse principium 'quo' respectu transmutationis sui subiecti.	75. To the other [n.19] I say that an accident can well be the principle of some effect that can be received in its subject, just as the intelligible species is the principle of understanding received in the possible intellect; and thus can a form be the principle 'by which' with respect to the change of its subject.
76 Ad aliud, de appetitu sensitivo, dico quod ille habet rationem principii activi aliquo modo, licet non activi libere; et hoc est quod Damascenus intelligit, quod 'non ducit sensus, sed ducitur': hoc est, non dominatur actioni suae, quod est 'ducere', - sed respectu actionis suae determinatur ab ipso agente ad certam operationem, et hoc est 'duci'. Quod etiam appetitus sensitivus non sit liber, tamen sit aliquo modo activus, et ipse sensus similiter, de hoc dicetur alias.	76. To the other [n.20], about sensitive appetite, I say that it has the idea of active principle in some way, although not of being active freely; and this is what Damascene means, that 'sense does not lead but is led'; that is, it is not master of its own action, which is 'to lead', - but with respect to its own action it is determined by the agent itself to a definite operation, and this is 'to be led'. Also, that the sensitive appetite is not free, although it is in some way active, and the sense itself similarly - this will be spoken of elsewhere [II d.29 q. un nn.3-4, Suppl. d.25 q. un nn.8, 24].
77 Ad argumenta quae facta sunt contra viam secundam, ponentem habitum esse principium activum ƿintensionis in actu, quia videntur esse contra istam viam (pro tanto, quia ista ponit actum 'elicitum ab habitu et potentia agente cum aequali conatu' esse intensiorem quam elicitum a potentia sola), discurrendo per illa ostendo quomodo non repugnant huic viae.	77. [To the arguments against the second way] - To the arguments that are made against the second way, which posits that the habit is an active principle of intensity in the act, because they seem to be against this way [sc. the third] (to this extent, that it posits the act 'elicited by the habit and the power acting with equal effort' to be more intense than the act elicited by the power alone), I show, by running through them, how they are not repugnant to this way.
78 De primo patet quod haec via non ponit duo distincta in actu, habentia duo principia, sed idem actus 'per se unus' habet duo principia in diverso ordine principiandi.	78. About the first [n.28] it is plain that this way does not posit two distinct things in act possessing two principles, but the same 'per se one' act has two principles in diverse orders of being principle [n.40].
79 Ad secundum concedo quod infertur, videlicet quod potentia operante ex aequali conatu 'semper actus sit intensior habitu coagente quam non coagente', sed ex hoc non sequitur illud inconveniens - quod sequitur contra illam viam - videlicet quod potentia ex quocumque conatu agente' actus sit semper aeque intensus'; hoc ibi sequitur, quia intensio tota attribuitur habitui, - sed non hic, quia intensio attribuitur duabus causis: et potentiae quidem, ex maiore vel minore conatu, - habitui autem semper aequaliter, quantum est ex se.	79. To the second [n.29] I concede the inference, namely that when the power is operating with equal effort 'the act is always more intense when the habit is working along with it than when it is not', but from this the unfitting result does not follow which does result against that way [sc. the second] - namely that when the power is acting with any effort whatever 'the act is always equally intense'; this does follow there, because all of the intensity is attributed to the habit, - but it does not follow here, because all of the intensity is attributed to two causes; and it is attributed to the power, indeed, according to its greater or lesser effort, - but to the habit always equally, as far as concerns itself [n.32].
80 Ad tertium concedo quod posset fieri voluntas in puris naturalibus, quae actum intensiorem eliceret quam alia voluntas cum habitu; et hoc non est inconveniens, ponendo ista duo esse principia ordinata, sicut esset inconveniens ponendo totam intenƿsionem ab habitu vel attribuendo totam intensionem habitui et non potentiae.	80. To the third [n.30] I concede that a will could come to exist in pure nature that would elicit a more intense act than another will along with the habit does; and this is not unfitting if one posits these two to be ordered principles, as it would be unfitting if one posits the whole intensity to be from the habit or attributes the whole intensity to the habit and not to the power.
81 Per idem ad quartum.	81. The same point answers the fourth argument [n.31].
82 Ad argumenta quae facta sunt contra tertiam opinionem. Ad primum oportet negare maiorem, quia oportet dicere quod duo distinctarum specierum possunt sibi invicem esse causae aequivocae partiales, licet non totales.	82. [To the arguments against the third way specifically] - To the arguments made against the third opinion [nn.41-45]. To the first [n.41] one should deny the major, because one should say that two equivocal partial, but not total, causes of distinct species can be causes for each other.
83 Ad probationem eius, quae est 'per eminentiam causae aequivocae', respondeo: illa probatio tenet de causa totali, et non pono circulum in causis aequivocis totalibus. - Ad aliam probationem dico quod duo effectus, comparati ad unam causam communem eorum, possunt ordinem mutuum habere ad se invicem in ratione causae partialis, - sicut species intelligibilis et intelligere, comparando ad intellectum agentem et possibilem, quia respectu intellectionis causa partialis est species, et posset poni 'intellectio' aliqualis causa speciei, pro quanto includit eam.	83. To the proof of it, which is through 'the eminence of an equivocal cause' I reply: this proof holds of a total cause, and I do not posit a circle in total equivocal causes. - To the other proof I say that two effects, when compared to their one common cause, can have a mutual order to each other in nature of partial cause, - as intelligible species and understanding, when comparing the agent and possible intellect, because with respect to intellection the species is partial cause, and 'intellection' can be posited as a sort of cause of the species insofar as it includes it.
84 Ad aliud potest dici quod non oportet actum generativum habitus esse rationem agendi 'quo', sicut habitus genitus potest esse ratio 'quo', - quemadmodum virtus solis non potest esse principium 'quo' respectu omnis actus, respectu cuius forma geniti a sole potest esse principium 'quo'. Et cum dicitur quod 'quidquid est ƿcausa causae' etc., - verum est sicut remotum 'quo' (ubi est remotum 'quo'), sed non sicut immediatum 'quo'.	84. To the other [n.43] one can say that the generative act of the habit need not be the idea of acting 'by which', as the generated habit can be the idea 'by which', - just as the virtue of the sun cannot be the principle 'by which' with respect to every act with respect to which the form of what is generated by the sun is the principle 'by which'. And when it is said that 'whatever is the cause of a cause etc.' [n.43] - this is true as the remote principle 'by which' (when there is a remote principle 'by which'), but not as the immediate principle 'by which'.
85 Ad tertium dico quod habitus - in quantocumque gradu non posset supplere totam vicem potentiae, quia etsi causalitas eius sit deminuta, et causalitas etiam potentiae deminuta, tamen alterius rationis est causalitas habitus quam causalitas potentiae; quia etsi causalitas potentiae sit deminuta, tamen 'ex ratione sui' habitus est causa secunda, qua videlicet potentia potest uti, - et ita si in infinitum augeretur, numquam posset fieri principium utens (sicut virtus generativa patris, quantumcumque augeretur, non posset fieri virtus solis). Non ergo eiusdem rationis est causalitas potentiae cum causalitate habitus, nec ista intensa posset ascendere ad illam, sed sunt alterius rationis semper; et tamen haec, causans cum illa, causat actum perfectiorem quam si solum causaretur ab una earum.	85. To the third [n.44] I say that a habit - at whatever stage - cannot supply the whole place of the power, because although its causality is diminished, and the causality too of the power is diminished, yet the causality of the habit is of a different idea from the causality of the power; because, although the causality of the power is diminished, yet the habit is 'in its idea' the second cause, namely which the power is able to use, - and thus, if it is increased to infinity, it could never become the principle that uses (as the generative virtue of the father, however much it is increased, cannot become the virtue of the sun). The causality of the power, therefore, is not of the same idea as the causality of the habit, nor can the habit, when made intense, reach to its level, but they are always of a different idea; and yet the habit, when causing along with the power, causes a more perfect act than would be caused by one of them alone.
86 Ad ultimum: illud suppositum negabitur in materia sequente 'De augmento caritatis'. ƿ	86. To the last one [n.45]: the supposition will be denied in the following material 'On the Increase of Charity' [nn. 225, 249].
87 Qui vult tenere quartam viam, potest respondere ad rationes principales adductas pro prima parte: Ad primam: potentia (vel potens) utitur habitu, quia ipse est quaedam inclinatio ad operandum; non quidem ut potentia activa ad agere, sed ut forma prior inclinat ad formam posteriorem, sicut gravitas ad deorsum.	87. He who wishes to maintain the fourth way [n.46] is able to reply to the principal reasons adduced for the first part [nn.6-14]: To the first [n.6]: the power (or the one who has the power) uses the habit, because the habit is itself a certain inclination to action; not indeed as a power active for acting, but as a prior form inclines to a posterior form, as heaviness downwards.
88 Ad illas quattuor condiciones. Diceretur quod delectatio est ex convenientia operationis ad potentiam et obiectum circa quod est operatio; quae convenientia est obiecti ad potentiam in quantum recipit actionem, non in quantum elicit eam, quia factio sola ut factio numquam est delectatio, et ideo propter delectationem numquam oporteret ponere rationem principii activi. - Similiter, facilitatio, expeditio et promptitudo ponuntur ratione passi, quia passum difficulter potest recipere quando non est dispositum, et impedite et tarde sive non prompte, et ratione indispositionis passi est ibi difficultas et tarditas. Potest ergo agens expedite et prompte et faciliter agere, propter dispositionem passi, et habitus est talis dispositio in passo. Quando ergo dicitur quod 'non est facilitas ad patiendum, quia passum est summe disposiƿtum', respondeo: per abnegationem contrarii est summe dispositum, sed non per positionem dispositionis convenientis. Exemplum de ligno sicco et neutro: lignum quidem neutrum est summe dispositum ad calorem privative, per carentiam cuiuscumque dispositionis oppositae, - non tamen summe dispositum positive, per positionem dispositionis convenientis, qualis est siccitas; et si ista convenientia esset cum sensu, lignum siccum delectabiliter calefieret, non sic lignum neutrum, quia non similiter convenit sibi forma recepta.	88. To the four conditions [n.7]. One would say that pleasure [nn.7-8] is from the agreement of the operation with the power and with the object which the operation is about; this agreement is of the object with the power insofar as the power receives the action, not insofar as it elicits it, because mere making as making is never pleasure, and therefore one should, because of the pleasure, never posit the idea of active principle [n.49]. - Likewise, ease, absence of impediment, and promptitude [nn.7, 9-11] are set down under the idea of the passive, because the passive can receive with difficulty, and with impediment and slowly or not promptly, when it is not disposed, and by reason of the indisposition of the passive thing there is difficulty there and slowness. Therefore the agent can act without impediment and promptly and easily because of the disposition of the passive thing, and habit is such a disposition in the passive thing [nn.50-51]. When it is said, therefore, that 'there is no easiness for undergoing because the passive is supremely disposed' [n.9], I reply: by the abnegation of the contrary it is supremely disposed, but not through the positing of an agreeable disposition. An example about dry wood and neutral wood: wood that is neutral indeed is supremely disposed to heat by way of privation, through lack of any opposed disposition, - but it is not disposed positively by the positing of an agreeable disposition of the sort that dryness is; and if this agreement was accompanied by sense the dry wood would be heated with pleasure, but not so the neutral wood, because the received form does not similarly agree with it.
89 Ad aliud, de inclinatione, posset dici quod inclinat sicut forma prior ad susceptionem formae posterioris, sicut gravitas inclinat ad deorsum esse (etiam secundum eos qui dicunt gravitatem respectu descensus deorsum non esse principium activum); neque oportet sic passive inclinans esse rationem recipiendi formam ad quam inclinat, sicut nec gravitas est principium receptivum 'ubi'. ƿ	89. To the other, about inclination [n.12], one could say that it inclines as the prior form to the taking up of the later form, as heaviness inclines to be downwards (even according to those who say that heaviness with respect to downward descent is not an active principle [n.69]); nor need what thus passively inclines be the reason for receiving the form to which it inclines, just as neither is heaviness the receptive principle 'where' [nn.53, 46].
90 Ad aliud, de scientia, dico quod scientia, per quam anima reducitur de potentia essentiali ad accidentalem, est species intelligibilis ipsius obiecti, et de illa concedo quod ipsa est principium activum respectu considerationis. Sed illa species non est habitus de quo loquimur, qui est quaedam qualitas, relicta ex actibus frequenter elicitis; ipsa enim species praecedit naturaliter primum actum elicitum circa obiectum circa quod est, et licet ista species posset esse radicata in intellectu et - cum fuerit radicata - posset dici habitus, non tamen est ille habitus qui generatur ex actibus frequenter elicitis, ut dictum est. Ideo omnia verba quae loquuntur de specie tamquam de habitu, non procedunt ad intellectum huius quaestionis, nec etiam illa quae accipiunt scientiam pro ista specie (distinctio istorum habituum, videlicet habitus qui est species intelligibilis et habitus intellectivi proprie dicti, patebit in II distinctione 3). Per idem apparet ad illud quod adducitur de esse 'quo': dico quod scientia, stricte accipiendo pro habitu acquisito ex speculationibus, non est proprie quo speculamur, sed quaedam inclinatio ad faciliter et delectabiliter speculandum; illud autem quo ut principio activo - ex parte obiecti - speculamur, est species intelligibilis.	90. To the other, about science [n.13], I say that science, by which the soul is reduced from essential potency to accidental potency, is the intelligible species of the object itself, and about that I concede that it is the active principle with respect to consideration [nn.83, 75]. But the species is not the habit we are speaking of, which is a certain quality left behind from acts frequently elicited; for the species itself naturally precedes the first act elicited about the object which it concerns, and although this species could be rooted in the intellect and - once it has been rooted - could be called a habit, it is however not the habit which is generated from acts repeatedly elicited, as was said [n.90]. Therefore all the words that are spoken about the species as about a habit do not progress to the understanding of this question, nor either do those words that take science for this species (the distinction of these habits, namely of the habit which is the intelligible species and the habit of the intellective part properly speaking, will be plain in II d.3 p.2 q.3 n.15). Through the same point is clear the response to what is added about the being 'by which' [n.13]; I say that science, taking it strictly for the habit acquired from speculations, is not properly that by which we speculate but is a certain inclination for easily and pleasantly speculating; but that by which as by the active principle - on the part of the object - we speculate is the intelligible species.
91 Ad aliud potest dici quod habitus intellectivus - vel practicus - potest dici activus vel factivus, quia inclinat ad praxim; non ƿquod illa praxis sit eius ut principii activi, sed quasi terminans inclinationem eius, - sic quod vel ipsius potentiae habituatae vel alterius potentiae, ut principii activi: sicut electio 'recta practice' active elicitur a voluntate et non a prudentia, quae tamen est habitus practicus respectu illius electionis (quia inclinat ad eam), licet non sit principium activum eius.	91. To the other [n.14] one can say that the intellective habit - or the practical habit - can be called active or making because it is inclined to action; not that action belongs to it as to the active principle, but as terminating its inclination, - such that the action belongs either to the habituated power itself or to another power as to the active principle; just as choice 'practically right' is actively elicited by the will and not by prudence which, however, is the practical habit with respect to that choice (because it inclines to it), although it is not the active principle of it.
92 Ad argumenta illa adducta pro quinta via, quae videntur ostendere quod habitus moralis, in quantum est virtus, est principium activum actus in quantum moralis est, respondeo quod bonitas moralis (ut praedictum est) in actu, est integritas omnium condicionum et circumstantiarum, et hoc praecipue ut illae condiciones dictantur a recta ratione debere inesse actui. Simpliciter ergo necessarium est ad bonitatem moralem actus moralis quod eam praecedat dictamen completum rationis rectae, cui dictamini conformetur, tamquam mensuratum mensurae.	92. [At the same time to all of them] - To the arguments adduced for the fifth way, which seem to show that moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is an active principle of an act insofar as the act is moral [nn.56-59], I reply that moral goodness in an act (as was said before [n.62]) is the completeness of all the conditions and circumstances, and this principally so that these conditions be dictated by right reason as needing to be present in the act. Simply necessary, then, for the moral goodness of a moral act is that a complete dictate of right reason precede it, to which dictate it be conform as the measured to the measure.
93 Sed non oportet illud dictamen esse ab habitu aliquo intellectivo, puta prudentia, nec illum actum conformem dictamini elici ab habitu aliquo morali appetitivo; simpliciter enim dictamen ƿrectum praecedit prudentiam, quia per ipsum generatur primus gradus prudentiae, et ita simpliciter recta electio praecedit habitum moralem, quia per ipsam electionem generatur virtus moralis in primo gradu: tunc igitur in primo actu, et recte, quis dictat sine prudentia generata et recte moraliter eligit sine virtute morali generata. Tamen prudentia, ex primo actu vel ex aliis pluribus rectis dictaminibus generata, magis inclinat ad consimilia dictamina elicienda, hoc est ad recte concludendum conclusiones syllogismorum practicorum de omnibus circumstantiis quae debent inesse actui eliciendo; similiter virtus moralis, generata post primum actum, magis inclinat ad eliciendos similes illis ex quibus est generata.	93. But it is not necessary that the declaration be from some intellective habit, namely from prudence, nor that the act conform to the dictate be elicited by some moral appetitive power; for right dictate simply precedes prudence, because by it the first degree of prudence is generated, and thus right choice simply precedes the moral habit, because by the choice itself moral virtue in the first degree is generated; at that point, then, in a first act, and correctly, someone gives a dictate without generated prudence and rightly chooses morally without generated moral virtue. However, prudence, generated from the first act or from several other right dictates, inclines more to eliciting similar dictates, that is, to rightly drawing conclusions of practical syllogisms about all the circumstances that ought to be present in the act to be elicited; likewise moral virtue, generated after the first act, inclines more to eliciting acts similar to those from which it was generated.
94 Intelligendum tamen quod illud quod generatur de virtute morali, est quaedam qualitas, de cuius ratione - ut est absolute talis qualitas - non est conformitas eius ad prudentiam: posset enim eadem qualitas generari ex actibus similibus in eadem specie, elicitis sine prudentia (immo cum ratione erronea, si esset), sed illa qualitas - quae generatur ex istis actibus secundum speciem naturae - non est virtus ex hoc quod est haec qualitas, sed adhuc requiritur necessario conformitas eius ad prudentiam, vel, quod est expressius, coexsistentia eius cum prudentia in eodem operante. Semper quidem enim, sive prudentia insit sive non, habiƿtus ille natus est esse conformis prudentiae, si esset (sicut habitus abstinendi, generatus ex actibus factis ex ratione erronea, semper - quantum est ex se - natus est esse conformis prudentiae, licet prudentia non insit), quemadmodum alius habitus, generatus ex actibus excessivis, non est natus esse conformis. Quando ergo qualitas, quae est nata esse conformis prudentiae, coexsistit cum ea, tunc non solum habet conformitatem aptitudinalem sed actualem ad prudentiam, quia ad similia inclinat uterque habitus, - et actus elicitus secundum inclinationem istorum duorum habituum est bonus moraliter; qui si esset elicitus secundum inclinationem illius solius qualitatis quae est materialiter virtus moralis, prudentia non coexsistente in eodem operante nec inclinante ad actum illum, non esset ille actus bonus moraliter.	94. However, one must understand that what is generated about moral virtue is a certain quality, in whose idea - as it is absolutely such a quality - is not included its conformity with prudence; for the same quality could be generated from similar acts, in the same species, elicited without prudence (nay with erroneous reason, if it were so [n.65]), but that quality - which is generated from those acts according to a species of nature - is not a virtue from the fact that it is a quality, but there is further necessarily required its conformity with prudence, or, which is more express, its coexistence with prudence in the same actor [n.66]. For always indeed, whether prudence is present or not, the habit is of a nature to be conform to prudence, if prudence were there (just as the habit of abstaining, generated from acts done from an erroneous reason, is always - as far as depends on itself - of a nature to be conform to prudence, although prudence not be present in it), in the way that another habit, generated from excessive acts, is not of a nature to be conform. When the quality, therefore, which is of a nature to be conform to prudence, coexists with prudence, then it has not only an aptitudinal but an actual conformity with prudence, because both habits incline to similar things [n.93], - and the act elicited according to the inclination of those two habits is morally good; but if any act were elicited according to the quality alone that is materially moral virtue, and prudence does not coexist in the same actor nor is inclining to that act, the act would not be morally good.
95 Sic ergo patet quod illa qualitas, quae est materialiter virtus moralis (quae per hoc completive habet rationem virtutis moralis quia coexsistit prudentiae), se habet ad prudentiam - quando inest - sicut causa secunda ad primam, et hoc respectu eiusdem effectus communis eliciendi ab eis; tunc enim prudentia est causa quasi prior et habitus moralis causa quasi posterior. Istae autem duae causae simul concurrentes ad actum eliciendum, possunt ei tribuere bonitatem moralem, quam non posset solus habitus secundus tribuere si esset sine prudentia vel ratione recta: tribuere ƿquidem bonitatem moralem, est tribuere conformitatem ad rationem rectam, - et hoc tribuit qualitas illa, non ex hoc quod qualitas solum, sed ex hoc quia in causando est coexsistens prudentiae, simul inclinanti.	95. Thus, therefore, it is plain that the quality which is materially a moral virtue (which has completely the idea of moral virtue through this, that it coexists with prudence) is related to prudence - when prudence is present - as second cause to first cause, and this in respect of the same common effect to be elicited by them; for then prudence is as it were the prior cause and the moral habit as it were the posterior cause. But these two causes, when they come together at the same time to elicit the act, can attribute to the act the moral goodness which the latter habit alone, if it were without prudence or right reason, could not attribute to it; to attribute moral goodness, indeed, is to attribute conformity to right reason - and this is attributed by that quality, not from the fact alone that it is a quality, but from the fact that in causing it coexists with prudence, which is inclining it at the same time.
96 Patet ergo quod illa qualitas quae est virtus, ex hoc quod est virtus non habet causalitatem specialem respectu bonitatis moralis in actu, sed tantum - ex hoc quod est virtus - habet coexsistentiam cum quadam alia causa eiusdem actus, quae causa simul concurrens ad eliciendum actum, tribuit illi actui bonitatem moralem, quia conformitatem sibi ipsi. Sed adhuc tunc, habitus ille nullam causalitatem habet respectu actus ex ista ratione quae est coexsistentia eius cum prudentia, sed tantum ex ratione suae naturae unde est haec qualitas; et ideo nullo modo concedenda est causalitas aliqua specialis habitui unde moralis, ultra illam quae conceditur sibi unde est habitus iste.	96. [Missing]
97 Et est advertendum quod ista bonitas, ut attribuitur prudentiae sic inclinanti, sicut dictum est in principio, non necessario ƿcompetit habitui prudentiae, nec soli, sed actui illi qui natus esset esse actus prudentiae, qui est dictamen rectum: si enim illud insit, et secundum illud - tamquam secundum mensuram - appetitus appetat, rectus est actus moraliter; et si illud dictamen rectum non inesset, prudentia tamen inesset (secundum quam intellectus posset recte dictare), adhuc actus - elicitus sine dictamine recto non esset perfecte bonus. Itaque, prudentia quando non inest, sufficit ad actum rectum dictandum actus ille qui est rectum dictamen; quando autem prudentia inest, non sufficit sine actu suo elicito, et ita illam rectitudinem quam tribuit prudentia actui morali, tribuit mediante actu proprio prudentiae.	97. And one must note that this goodness, as it is attributed to prudence so inclining, does not, as was said at the beginning [nn.92-93], necessarily belong to the habit of prudence, nor to it solely, but to the act which would be of a nature to be an act of prudence, which is right dictate; for if right dictate is present, and if appetite desires in accordance with it - as if in accordance with a measure - the act is morally right; and if that right dictate were not present, but prudence was present (according to which the intellect could dictate rightly), still the act - elicited without right dictate - would not be perfectly good. Therefore, when prudence is not present, the act which is right dictate suffices for dictating the right act; but, when prudence is present, prudence does not suffice without its own elicited act, and thus the rightness which prudence attributes to the moral act it attributes by the mediation of the proper act of prudence.
98 Ad illas ergo auctoritates, adductas pro quinta via, quae videntur sonare quod virtus 'unde virtus' effective causet bonitatem moralem actus: Primo ad illud de II Ethicorum ((opus eius bonum reddit)), dico quod vel reddit inclinando, et hoc competit sibi ex hoc quod est haec qualitas in specie naturae, - vel quia hoc non sufficit (sic enim inclinaret sine prudentia), reddit unde est virtus, hoc est unde coexsistens prudentiae; reddit quidem in suo genere causae, quia ut causa secunda, - et hoc virtute causae superioris, quae est prudentia. Si ergo teneatur tertia via, puta de activitate habitus, ƿtunc reddit active, sed ut causa partialis et secunda; si autem teneatur quarta via, tunc reddit per modum inclinationis, et hoc non ex hoc solo quod ipsa inclinat sed ex hoc quod ipsa virtus cum prudentia virtute inclinat.	98. [To the individual arguments] - To the authorities, therefore, adduced on behalf of the fifth way, which seem to say that virtue, whereby it is virtue, effectively causes the moral goodness of the act: First to the statement from Ethics 2 that virtue "makes his work good" [n.56], I say that either it does so by inclining, and this belongs to it from the fact that it is this quality in species of nature, - or, since this is not sufficient (for it would incline thus without prudence), it does so whereby it is virtue, that is, whereby it coexists with prudence; it does so indeed in its own class of cause, because it does so as second cause, - and this by virtue of the superior cause, which is prudence. If therefore the third way is maintained, namely about the activity of the habit [n.32], then it does so actively, but as partial and second cause; but if the fourth way be maintained [n.46], then it does so by way of inclination, and this, not from the fact alone that it inclines, but from the fact that the virtue itself along with prudence-virtue inclines.
99 Ad aliud, de 'moderari', dico quod virtus moralis non moderatur active passionem, quasi iam factam - ab obiecto - faciat esse minorem: obiectum enim delectabile, praesens, naturaliter movet secundum ultimum sui. Sed habitus potest facere obiectum minus conveniens potentiae habituatae quam esset potentiae non habituatae: sicut enim gravi magis disconveniens est esse sursum quam corpori neutro (licet gravitas non esset principium activum descensus), ita potentiae secundum se conveniens esset aliquod delectabile excessivum, sibi autem habituatae per habitum inclinantem ad actus moderatos, disconveniens est - vel non ita delectabile et conveniens - illud delectabile excessivum. Et pro tanto, quasi per repugnantiam formalem vel virtualem ad habitum, habitus disconveniens vel excedens moderatur, ne illud delectabile immoderate delectet; et ex hoc non sequitur aliqua activitas habitus, sicut nec humiditatis in ligno, licet ipsa moderetur ne ignis ita immoderate calefaciat vel vehementer, sicut corpus siccum. Aliter potest dici quod virtus moderatur passionem, non iam ƿinfactam vel inhaerentem sed infiendam, pro quanto inclinat potentiam - et hoc cum prudentia coexsistente - ut fugiat immoderata delectabilia, quae nata sunt inferre immoderatas delectationes, et non admittat nisi delectabilia quae nata sunt moderate delectare. Et in hoc quidem moderatur, non delectationem inexsistentem minuendo, sed immoderatam - quae inesset - praecavendo.	99. To the other, about 'moderating' [n.58], I say that moral virtue does not actively moderate passion, as if, when the passion has already been excited - by the object - it makes it to be less; for a pleasant object, when present, naturally moves according to the utmost of itself. But the habit can make the object less agreeable to an habituated power than to a non-habituated power; for just as it is more disagreeable for a heavy object to be upwards than for a neutral object (although heaviness were not the active principle of descent), so some pleasant excessive thing would be in itself agreeable to the power, but to the power when habituated by a habit inclining it to moderate acts that pleasant excessive thing is disagreeable - or is not as pleasant and agreeable. And to this extent, as if by formal or virtual repugnance to the habit, the habit moderates the disagreeable or excessive object, lest the pleasant thing give immoderate pleasure; and from this there does not follow any activity of the habit, just as neither of humidity in a piece of wood, although the humidity moderates the fire so that it does not heat immoderately or strongly, as it does a dry body. In another way it can be said that virtue moderates a passion that is not already generated or inhering but coming to be, to the extent it inclines the power - and this with coexisting prudence - to flee immoderate pleasant things that are of a nature to introduce immoderate pleasures, and only to admit pleasant things that are of a nature to give moderate pleasure. And in this respect indeed it does moderate, not by diminishing an already existing pleasure, but by warding off in advance an immoderate pleasure - which would be present.
100 Ad aliud, de hoc quod 'sine iustitia non potest aliquis operari iuste', respondeo: dico quod in primo actu, quando est dictamen rectum generativum prudentiae et conformatur illi electio alicuius iusti, ibi non tantum iustum, sed iuste operatur eligens. Sed debet intelligi quod non iuste - sine iustitia - operatur secundum omnem perfectionem secundum quam posset aliquis iuste operari, quarum una est delectabilitas et facilitas in operando, quod non competit potentiae non habituatae sicut habituatae.	100. To the other, about the fact that 'without justice no one can operate justly' [n.59], I reply: I say that in the first act, when there is a right dictate generative of prudence and the choice of someone just is conform to it [n.93], there the chooser not only does what is just but does it justly. But one should understand that he operates non-justly - without justice - according to the whole perfection according to which someone could act justly, one of which perfections is pleasure and facility in operating, which does not belong to a non-habituated power as it does to a habituated power.
101 Ad primam quaestionem dicitur esse opinio Magistri quod solus Spiritus Sanctus inexsistens, sine aliquo habitu medio ƿinformante voluntatem, movet ipsam ad actum meritorium, aliter quam moveat ipsam ad credere et sperare (quia ad credere et sperare movet mediantibus habitibus fidei et spei), et ita dicitur negasse omnem caritatem creatam.	101. As to the first question, the opinion of the Master is said to be that the indwelling Holy Spirit alone, without any intermediate habit informing the will, moves the will to a meritorious act in a way other than he moves it to acts of belief and hope (for he moves it to acts of belief and hope through the medium of the habits of faith and hope), and in this way the Master is said to have denied any created charity.
102 Pro hac conclusione potest argui duabus viis.	102. One can argue for this conclusion in two ways.
103 Prima accipitur ex imperfectione formae vel habitus, vel non necessitate ad movendum.	103. [First way] - The first way is taken from form's or habit's imperfection, or from its non-necessity for causing movement.
104 Ubi primo arguitur sic: sicut actus naturalis ad habitum naturalem sive acquisitum, ita videtur se habere actus habitus infusi ad habitum infusum; sed habitus acquisitus tribuit tantum delectabiliter operari et facilitat potentiam ad actum (non autem dat substantiam actus), sicut patet ex quaestione praecedente; ergo similiter habitus infusus tantum tribuit delectabiliter operari, aut saltem tribueret si inesset. Sed prius peccator iam iustificatus non delectabiliter elicit actum diligendi Deum: ita enim videtur ei difficilis resistentia a vitiis et continuatio bonorum operum, sicut quando erat in peccatis, vel non multo facilior, quousque per pugnam et victoriam passionum acquisiverit aliquem habitum conƿtrarium, et tunc delectabiliter operetur. Igitur non est aliquis habitus infusus illi iustificato, quia tunc illo delectabiliter operaretur si inesset.	104. Here the argument goes first as follows: as a natural act is related to a natural or acquired habit, so is the act of an infused habit to an infused habit; but an acquired habit only bestows pleasurable acting and a facility in the power for the act (but it does not give the substance of the act), as is plain from the preceding question [nn.47-51, 88]; therefore in like manner an infused habit bestows only pleasurable acting, or would so bestow it if it were present within. But he who was a sinner before and is now justified does not elicit an act of loving God with pleasure; for resistance by his vices and persistence in good works seem as difficult to him as when he was in his sins, or not much easier, until by battle and victory over his passions he has acquired some contrary habit, and then he will act with pleasure. Therefore the justified sinner has no infused habit, because in that case he would, if it were present in him, act with pleasure.
105 Praeterea, si ostendatur bonum supernaturale voluntati in puris naturalibus, voluntas illud sufficienter amabit, quia sufficienter habet obiectum sibi approximatum; ergo non requiritur aliquis habitus infusus ad diligendum bonum supernaturale. Assumptum probatur, quia si minus bonum ostensum voluntati habet unde potest diligi, ergo et maius bonum; igitur si ex puris naturalibus voluntas potest aliquid diligere, potest diligere summum bonum si sibi ostendatur.	105. Further, if a supernatural good be shown to a will in its purely natural state, the will would love it well enough because it has the object sufficiently close to it; therefore an infused habit is not required for loving a supernatural good. The proof of the assumption is that if a lesser good when shown to the will has the wherewithal to be loved, then a greater good has it too; therefore if the will in its purely natural state can love something, it can love the supreme good if that good be shown to it.
106 Praeterea, actus ille diligendi qui esset illius habitus supernaturalis, esset etiam supernaturalis, et ita crearetur immediate (supernaturalia enim non producuntur in esse per aliquam mutationem de aliquo, sed tantum per creationem), et si actus crearetur, ergo non praesupponit aliquid suae productioni.	106. Further, the act of loving that would belong to that supernatural habit would also be supernatural, and so it would be created immediately (for supernatural things are not brought into being by any transition from something, but only by creation), and if the act would be something created then it does not presuppose anything for its creation.
107 Praeterea, habitu contingit uti cum habens voluerit (III De anima in commento 18); sed non experitur aliquis se posse uti isto habitu cum voluerit: non enim, cum voluerit, potest delectabiliter ƿet faciliter elicere actus ferventes amandi Deum, - sicut patet de contemplativis, qui quandoque ex aliquo conatu se experiuntur magnam devotionem habere et quandoque cum aequali conatu vel minorem vel nullam.	107. Further, a habit can be used when the possessor of it wants to (Averroes above, On the Soul com.18); but no one has experience of being able to use this habit when he wants to; for he cannot, when he wants, elicit with pleasure and ease fervent acts of loving God, - as is plain in the case of contemplatives, who sometimes after some effort experience themselves possessed of great devotion and sometimes after equal effort possessed of a lesser devotion or none.
108 Secunda via accipitur ex hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus sufficit movere sine habitu.	108. [Second way] - The second way is taken from the fact that without a habit the Holy Spirit suffices for causing motion.
109 Ubi arguitur primo sic: prima causa potest per se illud quod potest cum causa secunda, quae secunda est tantummodo agens (vel sic accipitur maior: 'causa prima potest per se quidquid potest cum causa secunda quae non est de essentia rei'; hoc addo propter formam et materiam in composito, - Deus enim non posset facere compositum sine partibus intrinsecis componentibus); sed habitus, si inest, non habet causalitatem necessariam respectu actus nisi aliquo modo causae agentis (saltem patet quod non formalis, nec materialis 'de qua'); ergo causalitas eius est extrinseca. Ergo quidquid Spiritus Sanctus potest causare cum habitu in actu, hoc potest sine habitu: pluralitas sine necessitate non videtur ponenda, quia superfluit, - ergo etc.	109. Here the argument goes first as follows: the first cause can do of itself what it can do along with a second cause when the second cause is only an agent cause (or the major is taken this way: 'the first cause can do of itself whatever it can do with a second cause that is not part of the essence of the thing'; I add this because of the form and matter in a composite thing, - for God cannot make a composite thing without the intrinsic parts that compose it); but a habit, if it is present within, does not have a necessary causality with respect to its acts save after some manner of agent causality (plainly at least not after the manner of a formal cause, or of a material cause 'about which' [Prologue n.188]); therefore its causality is extrinsic. Therefore whatever the Holy Spirit can cause in the act along with the habit, he can cause without the habit; plurality without necessity should, it seems, not be posited, because it is superfluous, -therefore, etc.
110 Praeterea, voluntati habenti habitum, ad hoc quod agat secundum illum, oportet Spiritum Sanctum cooperari, alioquin non esset causa prima in omni actione creaturae; non autem coopeƿratur quia voluntas habet illum habitum, quia tunc voluntas creata uteretur Spiritu Sancto ut causa secunda, et Spiritus Sanctus non esset causa prima sed quasi secunda respectu voluntatis habentis habitum, quia determinaretur per habitum voluntatis ad coagendum voluntati; ergo e converso, quia cooperatur voluntati, ideo illa voluntas secundum illum habitum operatur. Sed aeque potest Spiritus Sanctus cooperari voluntati - in illo primo instanti naturae - non habenti caritatem sicut habenti; ergo etc.	110. Further, in order for a will possessed of a habit to act in accordance with the habit, the cooperation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, otherwise he would not be the first cause in every action of creatures; but he does not cooperate because the will has the habit, because then a created will would use the Holy Spirit as a second cause, and the Holy Spirit would not be the first but the second cause with respect to the will that has the habit, because he would be determined by the will's habit to act along with the will; therefore, on the contrary, because he cooperates with the will therefore the will operates in accordance with the habit. But the Holy Spirit can cooperate as equally with a will - in the first instant of its nature - that has the habit of charity as with a will that does not have it; therefore etc.
111 Praeterea, Filius Dei sic est unitus nostrae naturae, quod operabatur opera illius naturae ita quod illi actus vere dicebantur esse Filii Dei ut suppositi agentis; et tamen per hoc nihil derogabatur naturae assumptae, quin ipsa etiam esset principium suarum operationum. Ergo a simili, Spiritus Sanctus potest aliquo modo uniri voluntati, ut ipse agat opera voluntatis nec per hoc derogetur naturae voluntatis in ratione principii operativi quin ipsa possit esse principium suarum operationum.	111. Further, the Son of God was thus united to our nature, because he was doing the works of that nature in such a way that the acts were truly said to belong to the Son of God as to the acting supposit; and yet there was by this fact no derogation from the assumed nature that prevented it being also the principle of its own operations. Therefore, by an argument from similars, the Holy Spirit can be in some way united to the will such that he himself does the works of the will without there being by this fact any derogation from the nature of the will in its idea as an operative power that would prevent it being able to be the principle of its own operations.
112 Praeterea, intellectus est magis passivus quam voluntas, et minus activus; ergo magis indiget aliquo actuante ad hoc quod possit in actum suum. Sed ponitur intellectum posse in visionem beatam absque omni forma informante, ex hoc solo quod essentia Dei est sibi praesens quasi per modum formae; ergo multo magis ƿvoluntas potest in omnem actum suum sine omni forma informante, per hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus sit sibi quasi forma ad diligendum.	112. Further, the intellect is more passive than the will, and less active; therefore it is more in need of something to activate it so that it has power for its own act. But the intellect is posited as being capable, without any form informing it, of the beatific vision by the mere fact that the essence of God is as it were present to it by way of form [n.193]; therefore much more can the will be capable, without any form informing it, of every one of its acts by the fact that the Holy Spirit is for it as it were the form for performing acts of love.
113 Contra hanc conclusionem, sive sit secundum intentionem Magistri sive non, arguitur duabus viis suppositis ex fide: prima accipitur ex iustificatione peccatoris sive acceptatione divina, et hoc absque omni actu elicito, - secunda ex ratione actus meritorii.	113. Against this conclusion, whether it be according to the intention of the Master or not, one can argue in two ways assumed from the faith: the first is taken from the justification of the sinner or from divine acceptance, and this without any elicited act, - the second is taken from the nature of a meritorious act.
114 Ex prima via arguitur primo sic: peccator ante paenitentiam est iniustus, post paenitentiam est iustus, sicut communiter Scriptura peccatorem vocat 'iniustum' et liberatum a peccato 'iustum'. - Ex hoc arguitur: iniustitia, cum sit formaliter privatio, non potest auferri ab aliquo nisi detur ei habitus oppositus, quia 'privare privationem' est ponere habitum, quia sunt immediate opposita circa aptum natum (X Metaphysicae); anima est apta nata recipere iustitiam; ergo iste iustificatus, factus de iniusto iustus, ƿrecipit habitum oppositum illi privationi: si enim nihil inesset sibi formaliter plus nunc quam prius, non magis careret nunc privatione quam prius caruit.	114. [First way] - From the first way the argument goes first as follows: the sinner before repentance is unjust, after repentance just, in the way the Scripture calls the sinner 'unjust' and him who has been freed from sin 'just'. - From this the argument runs: injustice, since it is formally a privation, cannot be taken away from anyone unless the opposite habit is given to him, because 'to deprive of a privation' is to put a habit in its place, for opposites are immediate in the case of a subject naturally fitted for them (Metaphysics 10.4.1055a33, 55b3-6); the soul is naturally fitted to receive justice; therefore the one who is justified, having been made just from being unjust, receives the habit opposite to the privation; for if there were nothing formally more present in him now than before, he would not more lack the privation now than he lacked it before.
115 Praeterea, peccator ante paenitentiam est indignus vita aeterna, post paenitentiam autem est dignus vita aeterna; non autem est dignus nisi per aliquid formaliter inhaerens sibi, cui secundum regulas divinae iustitiae iudicatur vita aeterna reddenda, et nihil tale prius habuit; ergo aliquid positivum inest iusto formaliter, per quod est dignus vita aeterna.	115. Further, a sinner before repentance is not worthy of eternal life, but after repentance he is worthy of eternal life; but he is not worthy save by something formally inhering in him to which, according to the rules of divine justice, it is judged that eternal life should be given, and he had nothing of this sort before; therefore something positive is in the just man formally, by which he is worthy of eternal life.
116 Praeterea, Deus non acceptat peccatorem ad vitam aeternam, iustificatum acceptat. Quaero tunc quid est 'acceptare ad vitam aeternam'? Hoc non est 'velle - voluntate beneplaciti - beatificare pro tunc', quia tunc statim beatificaret; ergo hoc est 'velle istum secundum dispositionem quam nunc habet - esse dignum tali praemio', quem prius non voluit esse dignum tali praemio. Ista diversitas, ut videtur, non potest poni in voluntate divina, quia nihil est ibi novum, quia est immutabilis; ergo propter diversitatem a parte istius, quia isto omni eodem modo se habente, voluntas divina vult ipsum eodem modo se habere.	116. Further, God does not accept a sinner for eternal life, but he does accept him who has been justified. I ask then what it is 'to accept for eternal life'? It is not 'to will -with the will of being well pleased - to beatify him for the present now', because then God would immediately beatify him; therefore it is 'to will that person- in accord with the disposition he now has - to be worthy of such a reward' whom before God did not will to be worthy of such a reward. The difference here cannot, as it seems, be posited in the divine will, because nothing is new there, for the divine will is immutable; therefore it is because of a difference on the part of the person, because the divine will wants any person disposed in the same way to be disposed in the same way.
117 Confirmatur ista ratio, quia volitio divina, quae est unus actus in se, non habet rationem oppositorum sive distinctorum actuum ut velle et nolle - absque omni distinctione obiectorum connotaƿtorum; hoc enim 'velle divinum' non est velle quoddam beneplaciti - et nolle similiter - nisi illa obiecta distinguantur, alioquin contradictoria erunt vera absque omni distinctione causante illam veritatem; ergo cum Deus velit istum iustificatum ad aliquid esse ad quod non vult peccatorem, propter quam diversitatem dicitur diligere iustos et odire peccatores in Scriptura, sequitur quod ista distinctio - secundum rationem ex parte volitionis divinae - necessario requirat distinctionem actualem ex parte ipsorum obiectorum. Aliter ergo se habet iste in se quando dicitur 'dilectus Deo' vel 'acceptus ad vitam aeternam', aliter quando 'oditus'.	117. The confirmation of this reason [n.116] is that divine volition, because it is in itself one act, does not have the idea of opposed or distinct acts - as acts of willing and not willing - in the absence of any distinction in the connoted objects; for this 'divine willing' is not some willing of being well-pleased - and likewise not some not willing -unless the objects are distinct, otherwise contradictories will be true without any distinction to cause that truth; therefore, since God wills the justified person for some being for which he does not will the sinner, on account of which difference he is said in Scripture 'to love the just' and 'to hate sinners' [Proverbs 15.9; Ecclesiastes 12.3, 7; Psalm 5.7], the consequence is that this difference - according to its idea on the part of the divine volition - necessarily requires an actual distinction on the part of the objects themselves. Therefore the person in question is disposed in himself in one way when he is said to be 'beloved of God' or 'accepted for eternal life' but in another way when he is 'hated'.
118 Ultimo arguitur sic secundum istam viam, quia si nihil aliud est in anima istius post paenitentiam quam ante, non videtur quod aliquo alio modo se habeat ad Deum, nec Deus ad ipsum, quia non videtur esse ista alietas propter mutationem aliquam factam ex parte Dei. Ergo si concedatur, sicut videtur necessarium, quod aliquo modo aliter se habet ad Deum, et e converso, hoc est propter mutationem istius, - et ita aliquid infiet sibi formaliter de novo; non autem infiunt in eo de novo fides et spes, quia manserunt in peccatore, - ergo caritas.	118. Lastly there is, according to this first way, an argument as follows, that if there is in the soul of this person nothing after repentance other than what was there before, it does not seem that his soul is disposed any differently toward God, nor God toward him, because this difference does not seem to be on account of any change that has happened on the part of God. Therefore if it be conceded, as seems necessary, that he be in some way differently disposed toward God, and conversely God toward him, then this is because of a change in him, - and so something will come to be formally in him de novo; but faith and hope do not come to be in him de novo, because they have remained in the sinner, - therefore charity does.
119 Posset etiam argui secundum istam viam, quod Deus offensus peccatori prius, postea paenitenti, remittit offensam; hoc non ƿest propter mutationem aliquam voluntatis divinae (sicut potest esse in me quando remitto offensam); igitur hoc est per hoc quod ille cui remittitur offensa, aliter se habet in se.	119. One might also argue, according to his first way, that God, who was offended by the sinner before, remits the offence when the sinner later repents; this is not because of any change in the divine will (as there can be in me when I remit an offense); therefore it is because of the fact that he to whom the offense is remitted is differently disposed in himself.
120 Sed istud argumentum non concludit, sicut patebit in IV distinctione 16, ubi dicetur quod prius natura Deus remittit offensam peccatori quam det ei gratiam. Unde argumenta - si quae valent secundum istam viam - accipienda sunt ex acceptatione passiva et ex ordine sive dignitate ad vitam aeternam, quae conveniunt iustificato et non peccatori, sicut argutum est prius; non autem ex sola remissione offensae, quod secundum se minus est quam iustum esse.	120. But this argument is not conclusive, as will be plain in IV d.16 q.2 n.19, where it will be said that God remits the offense to the sinner first in nature before he gives the sinner grace. Hence the arguments - if any according to this first way are valid - must be taken from passive acceptance and from order or dignity for eternal life, which accord with a justified person and not with a sinner, as has just been argued [n.119]; but they must not be taken from mere remission of the offense [n.113], which is in itself a lesser thing than to be just.
121 Ex secunda via, ex ratione scilicet actus meritorii, arguitur sic: Nihil dicitur formaliter agere aliqua actione nisi principium illius actionis sit forma agentis: hoc accipitur ex II De anima, ubi ex hoc quod anima est ((quo vivimus et sentimus)) etc., concluditur anima esse actus et forma sic agentis; igitur cum operatio meritoria sit voluntatis, vel hominis per voluntatem operantis, sequitur quod illud quo meritorie agit sit forma eius. Hoc autem quo meritorie agit, non potest esse pura natura, quia tunc ex solis naturalibus posset meritorie agere, quod videtur esse error Peƿlagii; ergo requiritur aliquid supernaturale: non fides vel spes, patet, quia manent in peccatore, - ergo caritas.	121. [Second way] - From the second way, namely from the idea of a meritorious act [n.113], the argument goes as follows: Nothing is said to act formally in any action unless the principle of the action is the form of the agent; this is taken from On the Soul 2.2.414a12-14 where, from the fact that the soul is 'that whereby we live and sense' etc. [n.13], the conclusion is drawn that the soul is the act and form of what performs those acts; therefore, since meritorious action belongs to the will, or to the man working through his will, the result is that that by which he meritoriously acts is his form. But that by which he meritoriously acts cannot be pure nature, because then he could meritoriously act from his natural powers alone, which seems to be the error of Pelagius; therefore something supernatural is required; clearly not faith or hope, because these remain in a sinner, - therefore charity.
122 Praeterea, nulla actio est in potestate agentis nisi ipsum habeat formam per quam possit agere: si enim per aliquid coassistens sibi - extrinsecum tantum - quod non est in potestate eius, possit agere, talis actio non est in potestate eius, sicut nec coassistentia illius extrinseci est in potestate eius. Sed Spiritum Sanctum coassistere voluntati non est in potestate voluntatis, sicut nec universaliter actio causae superioris est in potestate causae inferioris. Ergo si ex illa sola coassistentia possit agere, et non habeat in se formam qua sufficienter possit exire in actum meritorium, sequitur quod actus meritorius non esset in potestate eius, - quod videtur inconveniens.	122. Further, no action is in the power of an agent unless that agent has a form by which it can act; for if it could act through something assisting it - something merely extrinsic - which is not in its power, such an action is not in its power, just as neither is the assistance of the extrinsic thing in its power. But the Holy Spirit assisting the will is not in the power of the will, just as neither is universally the action of a superior cause in the power of an inferior cause. Therefore if the will could act from the assistance alone and did not have a form in itself by which it was sufficiently able to proceed to a meritorious act, the result follows that the meritorious act would not be in its power, -which seems discordant.
123 Praeterea, si Spiritus Sanctus moveat specialiter voluntatem in actione meritoria, sequitur quod illa motio est causatio alicuius in ipsa voluntate et quod voluntas respectu illius non habeat aliquam causalitatem, sed tantum receptionem passivam; vel ergo illud est actus diligendi, et ita sequitur quod actus diligendi nullo modo sit a voluntate; vel illud est aliquid aliud, naturaliter praecedens actum diligendi, - et illud voco 'habitum', quia perfectio prior actu in potentia (habituata vel habituabili) videtur esse habitus.	123. Further, if the Holy Spirit is moving the will in a special way in the case of a meritorious action, the consequence is that the motion is cause of something in the will itself and that, with respect to it, the will does not have any causality but only a passive receptivity; either then that something is an act of loving, and then the result is that the act of loving is in no way from the will; or it is some other thing which naturally precedes the act of loving, - and this other thing I call 'a habit', because a perfection prior to act in a power (a perfection that is habitual or can be habitual) seems to be a habit.
124 Praeterea, quarto, maior est identitas Patris ad Filium quam posset esse quaecumque unio Spiritus Sancti ad voluntatem; sed propter istam identitatem non dicitur operari Pater aliquid Filio, ƿsicut patet secundum Augustinum De Trinitate VII cap. l, quia 'Pater non sapit sapientia genita'; ergo nec multo magis voluntas dicetur aliquid operari propter unionem 'Spiritus Sancti operantis' ad ipsam.	124. Further, fourth, the identity of the Father with the Son is greater than any union of the Holy Spirit with the will can be; but the Father is not said, because of this identity, to do anything by the Son, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2, because 'the Father is not wise by generated wisdom'; therefore much less will the will be said to do anything because of the union with it of 'the Holy Spirit at work'. B. Scotus' own Response
125 Ad solutionem huius quaestionis tria sunt videnda: primo, si debeat poni aliquis habitus supernaturalis gratificans naturam beatificabilem; secundo, si sit simpliciter necessarium talem habitum poni ad hoc quod talis natura beatificetur; et tertio, quid circa hoc senserit Magister, propter multa quae imponuntur sibi.	125. For the solution of this question three things need to be looked at: first, whether some supernatural habit needs to be posited that gives grace to a nature capable of being beatified; second, whether it is simply necessary to posit such a habit so that such a nature may be beatified; and third, what the Master thought on this question, on account of the many things imputed to him.
126 Quantum ad primum articulum potest dici quod ex nullo actu quem experimur, nec ex substantia actus, nec ex intensione actus, neque ex delectabilitate sive ex facilitate in operando, neque ex bonitate sive ex rectitudine morali actus, possumus concludere aliquem talem habitum ƿsupernaturalem inesse, quia quocumque istorum dato posset aliquis habens caritatem cognoscere se certitudinaliter esse in caritate, ex hoc videlicet quod actum illum experiretur inesse sibi, vel ex hoc quod experiretur actum sic intensum inesse, vel sic delectabiliter et faciliter inesse, vel rectae rationi consonum esse.	126. [A supernatural habit bestowing grace is present within] - As to the first article [n.125] one can say that from no act which we experience, whether from the substance of the act, or from the intensity of the act, or from the pleasure or ease in doing it, or from the goodness or the moral rectitude of the act, can we conclude that some such supernatural habit is present; because from none of them can anyone possessed of charity know with certitude that he exists in charity, namely from the fact that an act with such and such intensity is experienced to exist within him, or to be in him with pleasure and ease, or to be consonant with right reason.
127 Ratio autem quare non potest concludi ex actu, vel ex aliqua condicione ipsius actus, talem habitum inesse, est quia vel actus potest ex sola potentia habere omnia praedicta, concurrente ratione recta (sicut tenendo quartam viam in solutione praecedente positam3, vel si concurreret aliquis habitus propter condicionem aliquam praedictarum, posset ille esse aliquis habitus acquisitus: posset enim amicitia acquisita tantam intensionem actui dare (sicut causa secunda, cum potentia ut prima causa), posset etiam tantam delectationem et facilitationem tribuere, posset etiam habitus esse ita consonus rationi rectae, quod actus elicitus nullam condicionem evidenter apparentem haberet ex qua necessario concluderetur ipsum elici secundum habitum supernaturalem.	127. Now the reason that one cannot conclude from the act or from any condition of the act that such a habit exists within is that either the act is able of its own power alone to have all the aforesaid features, when there is concurrence of right reason (as is the case when one holds the fourth way set down in the preceding solution [n.46]), or, if some habit would, because of any of the aforesaid conditions [n.126], be concurrent with the act, it could be some acquired habit; for acquired friendship could give just as much intensity to the act (as second cause, along with the power as first cause [n.40]), could also bestow just as much pleasure and ease, could even be a habit just as consonant with right reason, because an elicited act would have no clearly apparent condition from which the conclusion would necessarily follow that it was elicited according to a supernatural habit.
128 Quod si dicas 'subito mutatur voluntas ut intense, faciliter et delectabiliter operetur, et hoc, modo consono rationi supernatuƿrali (hoc est dictamini fidei), non autem potest ipsa subito acquirere habitum amicitiae ordinatae consonum fidei, ergo habet habitum aliquem non acquisitum quo ad subito agendum inclinatur', respondeo: voluntas potest satis subito moveri quantum ad actus naturales, qui subsunt totaliter potestati eius, quia - sicut dicit Augustinus I Retractationum cap. 22 - ((nihil tam est in potestate voluntatis quam ipsa voluntas)); ergo ex tali subitatione non potest concludi propositum.	128. But if you say 'the will is moved suddenly to acting intensely, easily, pleasurably, and this in a way consonant with supernatural reason (that is, consonant with the dictate of faith), but the will cannot suddenly acquire a habit of ordered friendship consonant with the faith, therefore it has some non-acquired habit whereby it is inclined suddenly to act', - I reply: the will can be moved to natural acts with suddenness enough, and these natural acts are totally subject to its power, because - as Augustine says Retractions I ch.22 n.4 - "nothing is as much in the power of the will as the will itself; therefore the proposed conclusion cannot be drawn from this suddenness.
129 Dico igitur quod ultra omnes condiciones praedictas, videlicet ultra intensionem actus, delectabilitatem et facilitatem in agendo, rectitudinem sive bonitatem et conformitatem rectae rationi (sive rectae secundum dictamen prudentiae sive secundum dictamen fidei), ultra - inquam - haec omnia, creditur esse una condicio in actu, videlicet quod est acceptabilis Deo; non quidem solum communi acceptatione, qua Deus acceptat omnem creaturam (quo etiam modo vult actum substratum peccato, alioquin non esset ab ipso), sed acceptatione speciali, quae est in voluntate divina ordinatio huiusmodi actus ad vitam aeternam, tamquam meriti condigni ad praemium. Et hoc modo credimus naturam nostram beatificabilem, iustam, esse habitualiter acceptam, - hoc est quod quando non actualiter operatur, adhuc tamen voluntas divina eam ƿordinat ad vitam aeternam, tamquam dignam tanto bono, secundum dispositionem quam habet habitualiter in se. Et propter hanc acceptationem naturae beatificabilis habitualem etiam quando non operatur, et propter acceptationem actualem actus eliciti a tali natura, oportet ponere habitum unum supernaturalem, quo habens formaliter acceptetur a Deo et quo actus eius elicitus acceptetur tamquam meritorius. Sic non videtur acceptari natura vel actus sine aliquo habitu informante, quia - secundum quod argutum est - non videtur Deus aliam volitionem secundum rationem habere de obiecto nullo modo diversificato, nec etiam actus 'ut acceptabilis Deo' videretur esse in potestate agentis, nisi illud quo formaliter ageret esset forma eius.	129. I say, therefore, that over and above all the aforesaid conditions, namely the intensity of the act, pleasure and ease in acting, rectitude or goodness and conformity with right reason (right either according to the dictate of prudence or according to the dictate of faith), over and above - I say - all these, there is one condition in the act that is a matter of belief, namely that the act is acceptable to God; not indeed merely with the common acceptance by which God accepts every creature (which is even the way he wills the act that is substrate to a sin, otherwise the act would not have its existence from him), but with a special acceptance, which is in the divine will an ordering toward eternal life of this sort of act as of something condignly deserving of the reward. And in this way we have belief that our nature is capable of beatification, is just, is habitually accepted, -that is, that when it is not actually operating, yet still the divine will is ordering it to eternal life as being worthy of so great a good, in accord with the disposition that it possesses habitually in itself. And it is because of this habitual acceptance of a nature capable of beatification even when it is not operating, and because of the actual acceptance of an act elicited by such a nature, that one must posit a single supernatural habit whereby he who formally possesses it is accepted by God and whereby his elicited act is accepted as meritorious. So the nature or the act does not seem to be accepted without some habit informing them, because - in accordance with what has been argued [nn.116-117, 122] - God does not seem to have a will different in nature about an object that has in no way been made different [nn.116-117]; nor would even an act 'as it is acceptable to God' seem to be in the power of an agent unless that by which he formally acted were his form [n.122].
130 Sed dubium est qualiter habitus iste sit ratio acceptandi naturam et actum.	130. [Doubt 1] - But there is a doubt about how this habit may be the reason for accepting the nature and the act.
131 Ratio quidem acceptandi naturam videtur esse sicut quidam decor naturae, complacens voluntati divinae, ita quod sive ponatur habitus iste activus sive non activus, ex hoc solo quod est talis forma decorans et ornans animam, potest esse ratio acceptationis et acceptandi naturam. ƿ	131. The reason indeed for accepting the nature seems to be just a sort of comeliness of nature, pleasing to the divine will, such that, whether the habit is posited as active or non-active, from the mere fact that it is such a form, beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of acceptance and a reason for accepting the nature.
132 Sed ad acceptationem actus plus requiritur quam quod agens habeat hunc decorem spiritualem, alioquin habens talem habitum non posset habere aliquem actum indifferentem, nec peccare venialiter, quod est inconveniens. - Consequentia probatur, quia neutrum istorum tollit illum decorem operantis, et ita utrumque esset acceptum si actus acceptaretur ex solo decore operantis.	132. But for the acceptance of an act more is required than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness, otherwise he who has such a habit could not have any act that was indifferent, nor could commit venial sin, which is discordant [II d.41 q. un nn.3-4]. - The proof of the consequence is that neither of these things [indifferent acts and venial sin] takes away the comeliness from the actor, and so each of them would be accepted, if an act were to be accepted merely from the comeliness of the actor.
133 Oportet ergo dicere quod iste habitus, praeter hoc quod est decor spiritualis, etiam est inclinans ad determinatos actus, et hoc sive non active, secundum quartam viam positam in solutione praecedente, - sive (quod magis videtur) active, secundum tertiam viam.	133. One must therefore say that the habit, besides the fact that it is a spiritual comeliness, also inclines toward definite acts, and this either non-actively, according to the fourth way posited in the preceding solution [n.46], or (which seems more to be the case) actively, according to the third way [n.32].
134 Quod probatur: Primo, quia alioquin videretur quod sine illo posset haberi actus intensissimus diligendi Deum, et hoc tam in via quam in patria, et ita beatitudo: nam in illo instanti naturae in quo elicitur actus a principio activo, - si sola voluntas esset ibi principium activum, ipsum esset principium 'in quantum activum' aeque perfectum sine isto habitu sicut cum isto, et potentia ipsa posset aequali conatu agere (ut patet); ergo perfectissimus actus diligendi Deum, sine habitu tali haberi posset.	134. The proof is as follows: First, because otherwise it would seem that, without the habit, one could have a very intense act of loving God, and this both as a wayfarer and in the fatherland, and thus also have beatitude; for in the instant of nature in which an act is elicited by an active principle, if the will alone were the active principle, it would 'insofar as active' be a principle that was just as perfect without the habit as with it, and the power alone could, with equal effort, perform the act (as is plain [n.70]); therefore a most perfect act of loving God could be had without such a habit.
135 Secundo probatur idem, quia alioquin non videretur esse ƿverum quod dicit Augustinus de libero arbitrio, quod 'gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium sicut sessor ad equum', quia sessor active regit et movet equum, aliqualiter. - Nec etiam illud quod dicit in Epistola ad Bonifatium: ((Voluntate)) - inquit - ((concomitante, non praeeunte, pedissequa, non domina)). Non esset autem voluntas pedissequa gratiae, si ipsa gratia nullam causalitatem haberet. ƿ	135. A second proof to the same effect is that otherwise what Augustine says [Pseudo-Augustine Hypognosticon III ch.1 n.20] about free choice would not seem to be true, namely that 'grace is related to free choice as a rider to a horse', because the rider actively directs and moves the horse, in some way or other. - Nor even would that remark seem to be true which he is says in a letter to Boniface [Augustine, Epist. 186 ad Paulinum ch.3 n.10]: 'With the will accompanying,' he says, 'not going ahead; a foot follower, not a lord'. Now the will would not be a foot follower to grace if grace itself had no causality.
136 Sed tunc est ulterius dubium de isto habitu, comparato ad potentiam operantem, - quae videlicet illarum debeat dici causa prima, et quae secunda. ƿ	136. [Doubt 2] - But then there is a further doubt about this habit when compared with the operating power - namely which of them should be called the first cause and which the second.
137 Videtur enim ex dictis quod gratia est causa prima.	137. For it seems from what has been said [n.135] that grace is the first cause.
138 Sed oppositum videtur: Primo, quia potentia utitur habitu, non e converso.	138. But it seems the opposite is the case: First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely.
139 Secundo, quia actio non esset libera, si gratia esset prima causa: voluntas enim naturaliter moveretur, quia gratia naturaliter moveret, - et sicut voluntas non libere moveretur, ita nec libere ageret, cum non ageret nisi quia mota.	139. Second, because the action would not be free if grace were the first cause; for the will would be moved naturally, because grace would move it naturally, - and just as the will would not be moved freely, so neither would it act freely, since it would not act save because it was moved.
140 Tertio, quia non videretur voluntas - semel habens gratiam umquam posse peccare, quia causa secunda semper sequitur inclinationem causae primae, nec potest moveri ad oppositum illius ad quod causa prima inclinat.	140. Third, because the will - once it has grace - would not seem able ever to sin, because the second cause always follows the inclination of the first cause, nor seem able to be moved to the opposite of that to which the first cause inclines it.
141 Similiter, quarto, voluntas est illimitatior ad actus quam habitus iste; illimitatio ad plures effectus videtur competere causae superiori.	141. Similarly, fourth, the will is more without limit as to acts than the habit is; being without limit as to several effects seems to belong to the superior cause [cf. nn.33-39].
142 Hic potest dici quod in actu meritorio (de quo est modo sermo) duo considero, videlicet: illud quod praecedit rationem ƿmeritorii, et in hoc gradu includitur et substantia actus et intensio et rectitudo eius moralis; ultra hoc, considero etiam ipsam rationem meritorii, quod est acceptari a divina voluntate in ordine ad praemium, vel acceptabilem esse sive dignum acceptari.	142. Here it can be said that in a meritorious act (about which the discussion now is [nn.129-135]) I am considering two things, namely: that which precedes the idea of its being meritorious, and in this rank are included the substance of the act and its intensity and its moral rectitude; over and above this I consider also the very idea of its being meritorious, which is that it is accepted by the divine will in order to a reward, or that it is acceptable or worthy of being accepted.
143 Hoc secundum membrum verius esset si actus esset complete meritum per aliquid quod est in merente; acceptare non est in ipso, sed est actio divina: actio autem divina non videtur per se requiri ad meritum. - Quod etiam probatur, quia respectu huiusmodi 'acceptari' videtur esse meritum, nam aliquis actus dignus est acceptari, alius non; ergo antequam intelligatur acceptatus, est aliquid in actu quare dignus sit acceptari; ergo tunc est in ipso ratio meriti, saltem respectu acceptationis.	143. This second thing would be truer if the act had complete merit through something that is in him who merits; to accept is not in him but is a divine action; but divine action does not seem to be per se required for merit. - There is also proof for this in that there seems to be a merit [sc. in him who merits] with respect to this sort of 'being accepted', for some act is worthy to be accepted and another not; therefore before it is understood to have been accepted, there is something in the act whereby it is worthy to be accepted; therefore there is then in it the idea of merit, at least with respect to acceptance.
144 Contra: ratio meriti non habetur complete nisi habeatur ratio digni vel digne ordinabilis ad praemium (quod est beatitudo), et hoc digne secundum iustitiam commutativam vel retributivam; sed quicumque actus, ex solis intrinsece agentibus, non habet hunc ordinem (tunc enim Deus non posset ei qui sic operatus est, non retribuere beatitudinem nisi iniuste eam sibi subtraheret, - hoc est falsum); ergo talis ordo secundum iustitiam est ex sola voluntate ƿdivina gratuite ordinante, et ita ratio meriti complete erit ex voluntate divina ordinante istum actum ad praemium.	144. On the contrary: the idea of merit is not completely had unless the idea of being worthy or worthily ordainable to a reward is had (which reward is beatitude), and this 'worthily' accords with commutative or retributive justice; but no act has this order merely from what acts from within (for then God could not fail to reward beatitude to him who has so acted without unjustly depriving him of it, - this is false); therefore such order according to justice is from the divine will alone gratuitously ordering it, and thus the idea of merit will be complete from the divine will ordering this act to a reward.
145 Et quod adducitur de secundo membro, quod 'actio divina non est de ratione meriti', - respondeo: relatio in actione merentis ad actionem divinam est de ratione meriti, quae relatio non est merentis sine actione divina.	145. And as to what is said about the second thing that 'divine action is not of the idea of merit' [n.143], - I reply: the relation to divine action in the action of him who merits belongs to the idea of merit, because there is no relation of the one who merits without divine action.
146 Si dicas quod 'tunc non est in potestate merentis mereri, sicut nec in potestate eius est illa actio divina', similiter 'principalius erit Dei mereri quam mei, quia principalius in merito est ex actione divina', - ad primum: actus qui est meritum, est in potestate mea, supposita influentia generali, si habeo usum liberi arbitrii et gratiam; sed completio in ratione meriti non est in potestate mea nisi dispositive, tamen sic dispositive quod ex dispositione divina semper sequitur illud completivum ad agere meum, sicut semper sequitur animatio ad organizationem factam a causa naturali. Per idem patet ad secundum, quod licet principalius - id est ultimum et completivum - in merito sit a Deo, non sequitur tamen 'ergo Deus meretur', quia meritum est actus potentiae liberae et secundum donum gratiae elicitus, acceptus Deo ut praemiabilis beatitudine, et ita mereri est sic agere; Deus non sic agit. ƿ	146. If you say that 'then it is not in the power of the one who merits to merit, just as neither is the divine action in his power', and similarly 'the meriting would belong more principally to God than to me, because what is more principal in the merit comes from divine action', - to the first point: the act which is merit is in my power, on the supposition of the general influence, if I have grace and the use of free choice; but the completion of the idea of merit is not in my power save dispositively, although disposivitely in such a way that the completion for my acting always follows from the divine disposition, just as animation always follows on the organizing done by the natural cause. The same thing makes clear the response to the second point, because although what is more principal in merit - that is, what is last and completive - is from God, yet it does not follow that 'therefore God merits', because merit is an act of a free power, and an act elicited according to the gift of grace, accepted by God as being rewardable with beatitude - and therefore to merit is to act thus; God does not act thus.
147 Contra: saltem principalius in merito est a Deo. - Respondeo: si 'principalius' dicatur ultimum completivum, concedatur; si dicatur prima realitas vel perfectior realitas, negatur, quia actus est quid absolutum et prius natura 'illa acceptatione passiva', et magis ens ea.	147. On the contrary: at least what is more principal in merit is from God. - I reply that if by 'more principal' is meant what does the ultimate completing, let it be conceded; if is meant the first reality or the more perfect reality, let it be denied, because an act is something absolute and prior in nature to 'the passive acceptance', and is more a being than it is.
148 Ad illud quod secundo adducebatur pro secundo membro, quod 'actus meretur acceptari', - respondeo: in hoc est ratio meriti 'secundum quid', quia non est ordinatio actus ad beatitudinem ut praemium iuste reddendum pro tali actu, - et concedatur quod acceptatio illa passiva divina non includitur in ratione meriti 'secundum quid', sicut non requiritur in ratione meriti de congruo, quomodo attritus meretur iustificari.	148. To that which was adduced second for the second thing, which was 'the act merits to be accepted' [n.143] - I reply: there is in it the idea of merit 'in a certain respect', because the ordaining of the act to beatitude is not to it as to a reward that has to be justly rendered for such an act, - and let it be conceded that the passive divine acceptance is not included in the idea of merit 'in a certain respect', just as it is not required in the idea of merit by congruity, in the way that someone contrite merits to be justified.
149 Et quod praedictum est, intelligendum est de acceptatione divina aeterna, qua Deus, ab aeterno praevidens hunc actum ex talibus principiis eliciendum, voluit ipsum esse ordinatum ad praemium, et actu volitionis suae ordinando ipsum ad praemium, voluit ipsum fore meritum; qui tamen secundum se consideratus, absque tali acceptatione divina, secundum strictam iustitiam dignus tali praemio non fuisset ex intrinseca bonitate sua quam haberet ex suis principiis: quod patet, quia semper praemium est maius bonum merito et iustitia stricta non reddit melius pro minus bono. Ideo bene dicitur quod Deus semper praemiat ultra condignum, universaliter quidem ultra dignitatem actus qui est meritum, - quia quod ille sit condignum meritum, hoc est ultra ƿnaturam et bonitatem intrinsecam eius, ex gratuita acceptatione divina; et forte adhuc, ultra illud aliud quod de communi lege esset actus acceptandus, quandoque Deus praemiat ex liberalitate mera.	149. And what has just been said [nn.144-148] must be understood of the divine eternal acceptance by which God, foreseeing from eternity this act being elicited from such principles, willed it to be ordered to a reward, and by the act of his will ordering it to a reward, willed it to be a merit; which act, considered in itself without such divine acceptance, would not, in strict justice, have been worthy of such a reward from the intrinsic goodness that it would have from its own principles; the fact is plain because a reward is always a greater good than the merit, and strict justice does not render a greater good for a lesser one. Therefore it is well said that God always rewards beyond condign worth, indeed universally beyond the worth of the act which is the merit, - because that the merit is condign merit is something beyond its nature and its intrinsic goodness, and comes from gratuitous divine acceptance; and perhaps further it is beyond that other merit which an act needing to be accepted would have by common law, whenever God rewards it from pure generosity.
150 Ulterius, sicut in actu meritorio sunt duo praedicta (scilicet substantia actus cum rectitudine, et ratio meriti), similiter habitus gratiae est quaedam qualitas, - et probatur, quia praeter relationem illam quam ad rationem rectam habet in quantum est habitus bonus moraliter, habet specialem relationem ad voluntatem divinam, acceptantem ipsum vel subiectum habens ipsum.	150. In addition, just as in a meritorious act there are the two aforesaid things (namely the substance of the act along with rectitude, and the idea of merit [n.142]), likewise the habit of grace is a certain quality, - and the proof is that besides the relation which it has to right reason insofar as it is a morally good habit, it has a special relation to the divine will accepting it or accepting the subject that has it.
151 Habitus iste secundum substantiam inclinat active ad actum, et hoc active ut causa partialis (tenendo tertiam viam in solutione praecedente), et in hac causalitate habitus est causa secunda et potentia causa prima, sicut dictum est in solutione praecedente de habitu in communi et potentia, ponendo habitum 'activum'; et hoc probant rationes iam adductae.	151. This habit according to its substance actively inclines to act, and this it does actively as a partial cause (when one holds the third way in the preceding solution [n.32]), and in this causality the habit is second cause and the power first cause, as was said in the preceding solution about the habit in general and about the power, when positing the habit as 'active' [n.40]; and this is proved by the reasons already adduced [nn.138-141].
152 Sed accipiendo actum secundum rationem meritorii, potest dici quod ista condicio principaliter competit actui ab habitu et minus principaliter a voluntate: magis enim acceptatur actus ut dignus praemio quia est elicitus a caritate, quam quia est a voluntate libere elicitus, quamvis utrumque necessario requiratur. Exemplum huius potest poni de divisione alicuius corporis mediante ƿcultello: ipsa quippe divisio absolute magis est a potentia motiva dividentis quam a cultello, et ideo potentia motiva fortior velocius dividit; sed tamen in quantum haec divisio comparatur ad visum sub ratione acceptabilis - ut cui placet - magis attribuitur cultello, quia lenitas partium divisarum, quae placet visui, magis est ex acutie instrumenti quam ex efficacia virtutis principaliter dividentis. Similiter, sonus magis est ex percussione corporis sonantis quam ex ordine percussionis, et tamen ut acceptabilis auditui, magis est ex ordine percussionis quam ex efficacia potentiae percutientis; immo posset esse efficacior virtus percutiens, et minus acceptabilis, - immo omnino non acceptabilis auditui, quia non est sonus harmonicus. Aliud exemplum: si pater est causa principalis respectu filii et mater minus principalis, tamen ipsa potest esse principalior causa filii, in quantum dilecti aut diligibilis alicui, ita quod filius magis diligatur quia est matris ut gignentis, quam quia est patris generantis.	152. But when one takes the act according to its idea of being meritorious, one can say that this condition belongs principally to the act from the habit and less principally from the will; for the act is more accepted as worthy of reward because it is elicited by charity than because it is freely elicited by the will, although both are necessarily required. An example of this can be posited about the cutting up of a body by means of a knife; the cutting, to be sure, is itself absolutely more from the moving power of the cutter than from the knife, and therefore a stronger moving power cuts more quickly; but yet insofar as this cutting is compared to sight under the idea of being acceptable - as pleasing to someone - it is attributed more to the knife, because the smoothness of the cut parts, which pleases sight, comes more from the sharpness of the instrument than from the efficacy of the virtue that principally does the cutting. Likewise, a sound is more from the percussion of the sounding body than from the orderedness of the percussion, and yet, as acceptable to hearing, it is more from the orderedness of the percussion than from the efficacy of the percussive power; nay the percussive virtue could be more efficacious and less acceptable, - nay altogether not acceptable to hearing, because the sound is not harmonious. Another example: if the father is the principal cause with respect to the son and the mother is less principal, yet she can be a more principal cause of the son insofar as he is loved or lovable by someone, such that the son is more loved because he is the mother's as his bearer than because he is the father's as his begetter.
153 Ita potest Deus ordinasse aliquem actum acceptare tamquam dignum praemio - vel acceptabilem sive acceptandum esse - quia ad illum actum inclinat aliquis habitus ut principium eius activum partiale, et quod propter hoc principalius acceptetur vel sit acceptabilis, quam quia est a reliqua causa partiali.	153. So it is possible for God to have ordained to accept some act as worthy of reward - or as acceptable or to be accepted - because some habit inclines to that act as the partial active principal of it, and which because of this is more principally accepted or more principally acceptable than because it is from the remaining partial cause.
154 Secundum hoc ergo potest convenienter exponi illud Auguƿstini 'caritas est sicut sessor ad equum', et illud etiam quod 'voluntas respectu gratiae est pedissequa et non praevia': hoc quidem verum est respectu actus in quantum meritorius est, sed non in quantum ille actus 'in substantia'.	154. In this way [nn.152-153], then, can the remark of Augustine be expounded that 'charity is like a rider to a horse' [n.135], and also the remark that 'the will in respect of grace follows on foot behind and does not go ahead'; this is indeed true with respect to the act insofar as it is meritorious, but not insofar as it is the act 'in its substance'.
155 Et esset primum exemplum omnino simile, si equus esset liber et sessor esset per modum naturae dirigens equum ad certum terminum. Magis placere posset, et hoc alicui ordinatae voluntati, cursus equi ex hoc quod esset secundum inclinationem naturalem ipsius sessoris ad certum terminum, quam ex hoc quod equus vi sua motiva velociter curreret. Tunc etiam posset equus ex sua libertate sessorem deicere, vel praeter eius directionem in terminum, ad aliud se movere: et in primo quidem fieret equus omnino non-acceptabilis, quia non haberet sessorem propter quem acceptaretur a tali voluntate, - in secundo, licet equus talis esset acceptabilis, non tamen cursus eius acceptaretur, quia non esset secundum directionem sessoris. - Hoc modo in proposito. Voluntas est quasi equus liber, et gratia quasi sessor per modum naturae, inclinans ad obiectum per modum determinatum: secundum huiusmodi inclinationem cursus voluntatis placeret, - alius non placeret, sicut quando est peccatum veniale vel actus indifferens; quando autem sessor abicitur, quod fit per peccatum mortale, omnino ipsa voluntas fit displicens. ƿ	155. And the first example [about rider and horse] would be altogether similar if the horse were free and the rider were directing the horse by way of nature to a definite end. The horse's course would be more pleasing, and that to some ordained will, from the fact that it was according to the natural inclination of the rider himself to a definite end than from the fact that the horse was by its own motive force running quickly. Then too the horse could of its own liberty throw off the rider, or move itself to something else at a tangent to the rider's direction to the end; and in the first case indeed the horse would become altogether non-acceptable, because it would not have the rider on account of which it would be accepted by such a will, - in the second case, although such a horse would be acceptable, yet its course would not be accepted, because it would not be according to the direction of the rider. - This is how it is in the proposed case. The will is as it were a free horse, and grace as it were the rider by way of nature, inclining it to an object in a determinate way; a course of the will in accordance with this sort of inclination would be pleasing, - a different course would not be pleasing, as when there is venial sin or an indifferent act; but when the rider is thrown off, which is done by mortal sin, the will itself becomes altogether displeasing.
156 Hoc etiam modo voluntas est pedissequa, quia non ex se ita determinate inclinat ad terminum (propter quam inclinationem actus acceptetur) sicut gratia inclinat, et voluntas potest illud participare a gratia, quia competit gratiae magis per essentiam quam sibi; et in hoc ipsa voluntas est causa secunda, non quod in causando 'aliquid intrinsecum actui' sit causa secunda, sed in essendo propter quod actus acceptetur, quod dicit respectum eius ad extrinsecum: satis quippe possibile est propter causam principaliorem effectus competere effectui aliquam relationem ad extra minus principaliter, quam propter causam eius minus principalem, sicut patet in exemplis supra positis.	156. In this way too the will is a foot follower, because it does not of itself as determinately incline to the term (on account of which inclination the act is accepted) as grace inclines, and the will participates that inclination from grace, because the inclination belongs more to grace by its essence than to the will; and in this respect is the will itself a second cause, not because in causing 'something intrinsic to the act' it is second cause, but it is so in being that because of which the act is accepted, because it states a respect of the act to what is extrinsic; certainly it is possible enough for some relation to what is external to belong less principally to an effect because of a more principal cause of the effect than because of a less principal cause of it, as is plain in the examples set down above [n.152].
157 Habet autem habitus iste, sicut et quilibet habitus moralis, inclinare determinate ad obiectum - sive ad finem - ex virtute obiecti quam aliquo modo participat; nam sicut habitus intellectualis habet aliquo modo in se obiectum tamquam praesens sub ratione obiecti intelligibilis, ita habitus moralis habet aliquo modo obiectum in se sub ratione boni diligibilis, - et ita sicut ille habet virtute obiecti quodammodo agere ad praesentiam obiecti, ita iste virtute obiecti suo modo contenti habet inclinare ad obiectum: ex hoc apparet quomodo habitus magis determinate inclinat ad obiectum quam potentia, quia determinatius includit obiectum.	157. But this habit, just like any other moral habit also, has to incline itself determinately to the object - or to the end - by virtue of the object which in some way it participates; for just as an intellectual habit has the object in some way in itself as present to it under the idea of intelligible object, so a moral habit has the object in some way in itself under the idea of lovable good, - and thus, just as the former by virtue of the object has in some way to act in the presence of the object, so the latter by virtue of the object it in some way contains has to incline toward the object; from this it is clear how the habit inclines more determinately to the object than the power does, because it more determinately includes the object.
158 Et secundum hoc etiam posset dici quod illa causalitas parƿtialis quae attribuitur habitui, competit sibi ex ea parte qua obiectum dicitur esse activum respectu actionis et non ex ea parte qua potentia dicitur activa, quia magis habitus habet vim suam ex obiecto quod determinate includit quam ex ipsa potentia.	158. And in accord with this [n.157] one could also say that the partial causality which is attributed to the habit [nn151, 40, 32] comes to it from the part of the cause by which the object is said to be active with respect to the action and not from the part of the cause by which the power is said to be active, because a habit has its force more from the object which it determinately includes than from the power itself.
159 Et si tunc arguatur, sicut argutum fuit in praedicta solutione, quod 'habitus determinat et inclinat potentiam, ergo est causa prior', - responsionem quaere.	159. And if it is then argued, as was argued in the aforesaid solution, that 'the habit determines and inclines the power, therefore it is a prior cause' [n.34], - look for the response there [n.85].
160 De secundo articulo dico quod Deus de potentia absoluta bene potuisset acceptare naturam beatificabilem - acceptatione speciali praedicta - exsistentem in puris naturalibus; et similiter, actum eius ad quem esset inclinatio mere naturalis, potuisset acceptare ut meritorium. Sed non creditur ita disposuisse quod naturam puram vel actum eius sic acceptet, quia 'actum ex puris naturalibus esse meritorium' appropinquat errori Pelagii. Ideo verisimilius creditur quod acceptet naturam, et actum eius tamquam meritorium, per habitum supernaturalem.	160. About the second article [n.125] I say that God could of his absolute power have very well accepted - with the special acceptance stated before [n.129] - a nature capable of beatification that was existing in its pure natural state; and likewise, the act of it, for which it had a purely natural inclination, he could have accepted as meritorious. But he is not believed to have so disposed things that he should thus accept its pure nature or act, because to say that 'an act from purely natural powers is meritorious' comes close to the error of Pelagius [n.121]. Therefore the more likely belief is that he accepts nature and its act as meritorious on the basis of a supernatural habit.
161 Sed hic duplex est dubitatio. Una, quomodo aliquid in natura creata possit esse ratio quare ƿacceptetur a voluntate divina (vel absolute vel tali modo), cum nihil in creatura sit ratio actus divini, nec in se nec ut super tale obiectum tendit.	161. But there is a double doubt here. One as to how something in created nature could be a reason for acceptance by the divine will (whether absolutely or in such a way [sc. of special acceptance]), since nothing in nature is a reason for divine action, whether in itself or as it tends about such an object.
162 Alia dubitatio, quia circumscripto omni dono Dei supernaturali, est distinguere inter amicum et inimicum, - ut inimicus dicatur in quo est peccatum non deletum (et ideo manet offensa), non inimicus dicatur in quo non est offensa; sed ante collationem omnis doni supernaturalis posset alicui 'prius inimico' dimitti offensa, sicut dicetur in IV libro distinctione 16.	162. The other doubt is because, when every supernatural gift of God is excluded, there is a distinguishing between friend and enemy, - so that an enemy is said to be he in whom sin has not been destroyed (and so the offense remains), and a non-enemy is said to be he in whom it is not an offense; but in advance of the conferring of any spiritual gift an offense could be removed from someone who was 'an enemy before', as will be said in IV d.16 [n.120].
163 Respondeo. Non-inimicus non est 'amicus': quia aliquis, condonans alteri offensam - per hoc quod non amplius quaerit vindictam pro offensa - non fit amplius eius inimicus; sed non propter hoc sequitur quod statim recolligat eum ut amicum, nec quod respuat eum ut inimicum contrarie, sed negative, - quod nec velit sibi malum ut inimico, nec bonum ut amico. ƿ	163. I reply. A non-enemy is not a 'friend'; because someone who forgives an offense in another - for the reason that he no longer seeks punishment for the offense -does not become that other's enemy more; but it does not follow because of this that he at once recover him as a friend, nor that he repel him as an enemy in some contrary way, but in a negative one - that he neither will him evil as an enemy nor good as a friend.
164 Quantum ergo ad istum articulum, non est necessarium ponere habitum supernaturalem gratificantem, loquendo de necessitate respiciente potentiam Dei absolutam (praecipue cum posset dare beatitudinem sine omni merito praecedente), licet tamen hoc sit necessarium loquendo de necessitate quae respicit potentiam Dei ordinatam, quem ordinem colligimus in Scriptura et ex dictis sanctorum, ubi habemus quod peccator non est dignus vita aeterna et iustus est dignus.	164. As far as this article [n.162] is concerned, then, there is no necessity to posit a supernatural habit conferring grace when speaking of the necessity that regards God's absolute power (especially since he could give beatitude without any preceding merit), although however this may be necessary when speaking of the necessity that regards God's ordained power, which ordaining we pick up in Scripture and from the sayings of the saints, where we have it that a sinner is not worthy of eternal life and that a just man is worthy.
165 Quantum ad tertium articulum, posset dici quod Magister non negat omnem habitum supernaturalem. Ipse quippe distinctione 37 primi, capitulo illo ((Illud quoque mirabile)), adducit Augustinum Ad Dardanum, dicentem quod ((ad templum Dei pertinent pueri sanctificati, qui non valent cognoscere Deum)); ergo Deus inhabitat parvulum, qui tamen non potest actum elicitum habere circa Deum. Ista inhabitatio, quae competit parvulo regenerato et non alii, non potest esse sine habitu supernaturali in ipso parvulo: nec enim potest poni propter actum, quia talem non habet (nec habere potest), nec propter solam naturam, quia non inhabitat alium parvulum non regeneratum, cum tamen in eo sit eadem natura. ƿ	165. As to the third article [n.125], one could say that the Master does not deny every supernatural habit. He himself indeed, in d.37 of the first book, in the chapter 'That also is marvelous', ch.2 n.338, adduces Augustine to Dardanus [On the Foreknowledge of God ch.6 n.21] saying that "to the temple of God belong sanctified children, who are not able to know God"; therefore God dwells in a child who, however, cannot have an elicited act about God. This indwelling, which belongs to a regenerated child and not to some other, cannot exist in the child without a supernatural habit; for it cannot be posited there either because of an act, because a child has (and can have) no such act, or because of nature alone, because God does not indwell some other non-regenerated child, although the same nature nevertheless exists in him.
166 Similiter, distinctione 26 libri II videtur ponere gratiam creatam in anima.	166. Likewise, in d.26 of book II, ch.1 nn.228-229, he seems to posit created grace in the soul.
167 Itaque potest dici quod Magister posuerit habitum unum, quo informante animam, Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat et ut inhabitans quasi perficit potentias habitibus supernaturalibus: duas quidem- scilicet intellectum et voluntatem - fide et spe, ad credendum et sperandum; sed voluntatem nullo habitu alio - ad amandum quam illo per quem dicitur inhabitare, quia actus ille amandi est ita perfectus quod potest attribui immediate illi habitui quo formaliter inhaerente Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat, tamquam perfectissimo habitui. Non sic possunt actus credendi et sperandi attribui immediate illi habitui per quem Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat, propter imperfectionem istorum actuum, et perfectionem illius habitus quo Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat mentem: ille enim debet esse ita perfectus, quod nec in patria evacuetur, quando anima erit templum Domini; tunc enim non manebunt credere et sperare.	167. Therefore it can be said that the Master posited one habit whereby, when it informs the soul, the Holy Spirit indwells and, as indwelling, perfects the soul's powers as it were with supernatural habits: perfects two powers indeed - namely intellect and will - with faith and hope, for act of believing and hoping; but he perfects the will - for act of loving - with no habit other than that by which he is said to indwell, because the act of loving is so perfect that it can be attributed immediately to the habit by which, when it formally inheres, the Holy Spirit indwells, as by a most perfect habit. Acts of believing and hoping cannot thus be immediately attributed to the habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells, on account of the imperfection of those acts and the perfection of the habit whereby the Holy Spirit indwells the mind; for that habit should be thus perfect, because it will not be removed even in the fatherland, when the soul will be the temple of the Lord; for believing and hoping will not remain there [n.101].
168 Et hoc modo auctoritates Augustini faciunt pro Magistro, non quod nullus sit habitus supernaturalis formaliter gratificans animam, sed quod non alius ab illo per quem Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat animam, eo modo quo habitus credendi et sperandi alius est ab habitu quo inhabitat; et hoc patebit solvendo rationes quae adducuntur pro prima parte quaestionis.	168. And in this way the authorities from Augustine [nn.1-3] make for the Master, not because there is no supernatural habit formally giving the soul grace, but because it is not a different habit from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul in the way that the habit of believing and hoping is other than the habit by which he indwells; and this will be plain from solving the reasons that are adduced for the first part of the question [nn.171-177].
169 Secundum hoc ergo non videtur discordare ab aliis, nisi quia vel ponant gratiam esse alium habitum a caritate, vel saltem dicant istum habitum - qui realiter est gratia - formaliter esse in volunƿtate et non in essentia animae, quia tunc non inhabitaret Spiritus Sanctus per habitum unum quasi radicalem respectu fidei et spei ut primo infiunt, sed inhabitaret per habitum formaliter inhaerentem, informantem voluntatem, qui quodam ordine naturae esset posterior fide et spe.	169. In this regard, then, the Master does not seem to disagree with others save because they either posit grace to be a habit other than charity, or at least say that this habit - which in reality is grace - is formally in the will and not in the essence of the soul, for then the Holy Spirit would not indwell by a single as it were radical habit with respect to faith and hope as these first come to be, but he would indwell by a habit formally inherent, informing the will, which habit would be posterior, in some order of nature, to faith and hope.
170 Sed tenendo eundem habitum realiter esse caritatem et gratiam, videtur quod iste habitus informet essentiam animae primo, et sic a Spiritu Sancto, inhabitante essentiam animae, primo fluant virtutes informantes potentias, - vel sit in voluntate formaliter, iam praesuppositis fide et spe in potentiis (de hoc in II libro distinctione 26); saltem caritas non videtur esse alius habitus realiter ab illo per quem Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat animam, et ita non sic Spiritus Sanctus per habitum 'medium' - supple 'alium ab illo quo inhabitat' - movet ad diligere sicut movet ad credere et sperare.	170. But when one holds that the same habit is in reality charity and grace [II d.27 q. un nn.3-4], it seems that this habit would inform the essence of the soul first, and thus the virtues that inform the powers would flow first from the Holy Spirit indwelling the essence of the soul, - or that this habit is in the will formally, on the presupposition already of faith and hope in the powers (on which point see II Suppl. d.26 q. un); at any rate charity does not seem to be a different habit in reality from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, and thus the Holy Spirit does not move to act of love through a 'mediating' habit [n.101] - supply 'habit other than that by which he indwells' - as he does so move to act of belief and hope.
171 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum dico quod argumentum Augustini sic tenet: 'omnis diligens proximum, diligit dilectionem suam formaliter, si convertat se ad illam; omnis autem diligens dilectionem suam formaliter, diligit Spiritum Sanctum qui est dilectio per essentiam; ƿergo omnis diligens fratrem suum, diligit Spiritum Sanctum qui est dilectio per essentiam'. - Secunda propositio in ordine (quae tamen esset maior, disponendo in syllogismo) probatur sic, quia omnis ordinate diligens minus bonum, magis debet diligere aliquid magis bonum, praecipue quando in minore bono non est ratio diligibilitatis nisi a maiore bono; dilectio autem mea formaliter est minus bonum quam dilectio illa per essentiam quae est Spiritus Sanctus, et praecipue ab illa dilectione habet rationem diligibilitatis. $a Ratio ergo Augustini habet reduci in duos syllogismos, sic: 'diligens dilectionem-actum, diligit dilectionem per essentiam; sed diligens proximum, diligit dilectionem-actum; ergo diligens proximum, diligit dilectionem per essentiam. Sed Deus est huiusmodi dilectio; ergo etc.' a$ ƿ	171. To the principal arguments [nn.1-6]. To the first [n.1] I say that the argument of Augustine holds as follows: 'everyone who loves his neighbor loves his own love formally, if he turns himself toward it; but everyone who loves his own love formally loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love; therefore everyone who loves his brother loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love'. -The second proposition in order here (which however would be the major if one arranges it in a syllogism) is proved as follows, that everyone who loves a lesser good in an ordered way ought to love more some greater good, especially when the reason for lovability in the lesser good is only from the greater good; but my love is formally a lesser good than the love by essence that is the Holy Spirit, and in particular it gets from that love its own reason of lovability. The reasoning of Augustine, therefore, has to be reduced to two syllogisms as follows: 'he who loves his love-act loves love by essence; but he who loves his neighbor loves his love-act; therefore he who loves his neighbor loves love by essence. But God is this sort of love; therefore etc.'
172 De secundo argumento eius, videlicet de dono excellentissimo, dici posset quod argumentum sic tenet: 'nullum donum creatum est excellentius creata caritate, ergo caritas est perfectio simpliciter et non ex ratione sui includens imperfectionem vel limitationes'. Consequentia ista probatur, quia omni dono quod non est perfectio simpliciter, eminentius est aliud donum in creaturis quod est perfectio simpliciter. Ulterius: omnis perfectio simpliciter formalius competit Spiritui Sancto, ex hoc quod ipse est donum simpliciter excellentissimum, ac per hoc Deus (quia Deus potest dare se ipsum), et ita excellentissimum donum est Deus; ergo Spiritus Sanctus, ex hoc quod est donum excellentissimum simpliciter, est omnis perfectio simpliciter. Sed cum hoc stat quod ista 'perfectio simpliciter' sit in nobis participata, et essentialiter alia ab illa persona divina, quae est perfecta hac perfectione simpliciter.	172. About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift [n.2], one could say that the argument holds as follows: 'no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply, and includes of its nature no imperfection or limitation'. - The proof of this consequence is that more eminent than any gift which is not perfection simply is some other gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit from his being himself the simply most excellent gift, and thereby from God being so (because God can give himself), and so the most excellent gift is God; therefore the Holy Spirit, from his being the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But there stands along with this the fact that this 'perfection simply' is participated in by us and is essentially other than the divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.
173 Absolute ergo argumenta Augustini praesupponunt quod ƿDeus sit formaliter caritas et dilectio, - non tantum effective, sicut est effective 'spes' vel 'patientia mea', quia efficit patientiam tamquam non-perfectionem simpliciter, et ideo non convenientem sibi formaliter; sed caritatem efficit in anima - et dilectionem tamquam perfectionem simpliciter, et ideo convenientem sibi formaliter. Quemadmodum, alio modo facit humanitatem in homine, alio modo bonitatem: ex hoc quippe quod facit humanitatem, non sequitur quod sit formaliter homo, sed tantum causa effectiva hominis; sed ex hoc quod efficit bonitatem, sequitur quod sit formaliter bonitas, - et ratio est, quia omnis perfectio simpliciter quae est in causato, reducitur ad causam formaliter habentem illam perfectionem. Non sic de perfectione limitata.	173. Absolutely, then, the arguments of Augustine [nn.1-2] presuppose [nn.171-172] that God is formally charity and love, - not only effectively, as 'hope' or 'my patience' is so effectively, because it effects patience as a non-perfection simply, and so as not agreeing with itself formally; but he effects in the soul charity - and love - as a perfection simply, and therefore as agreeing with himself formally. In this way he in one way makes humanity in a man and in another way goodness; from the fact, to be sure, that he makes humanity it does not follow that he is formally man, but only that he is effective cause of man; but from the fact that he causes goodness it does follow that he is formally goodness, - and the reason is that every perfection simply that exists in the caused thing is reduced to a cause that formally possesses that perfection. It is not so with a limited perfection.
174 Sed quid faciunt istae auctoritates, sic intellectae, ad propositum Magistri? Respondeo quod ille habitus quo inclinatur anima ad diligendum meritorie, est perfectio simpliciter, in tantum ut illa 'perfectio simpliciter' conveniat Spiritui Sancto; sequitur ergo quod iste habitus possit esse immediatus habitus respectu dilectionis quae est perfectio simpliciter, et per hoc Spiritus Sanctus - ut inhabitans per istum habitum - immediatius causat illum actum quam credere vel sperare, respectu quorum non potest esse aliqua causa proxima quae sit perfectio simpliciter. ƿSed contra istam responsionem arguitur:	174. But what do these authorities [nn.1-3], so understood [n.173], do for the proposal of the Master [nn.165-170]? I reply that the habit by which the soul is inclined toward meritoriously loving is a perfection simply, insofar as the 'perfection simply' belongs to the Holy Spirit; it follows therefore that this habit could be an immediate habit with respect to the love that is perfection simply, and hereby the Holy Spirit - as indwelling through this habit - more immediately causes that act of love than do acts of believing and hoping, with respect to which acts there cannot be any proximate cause that is perfection simply.
175 Primo, quod propositio sit falsa cui innititur, videlicet quod 'omni perfectione non-simpliciter, in creaturis, eminentior sit sive perfectior aliqua perfectio simpliciter'; videtur enim habere instantiam de essentia supremi angeli, quae non est perfectio simpliciter et tamen nulla res nobilior illa videtur esse in tota creatura.	175. But against this response there is the following argument: First, that the proposition on which it relies is false, namely that 'more eminent or more perfect than any perfection non-simply in creatures is some perfection simply' [n.172]; for it seems to have an instance against it in the case of the essence of the supreme angel, which is not a perfection simply and yet nothing more noble than it seems to exist in the whole of creation.
176 Praeterea, male videtur intentio et ratio Augustini adduci ad intentionem Magistri, quia ex prima ratione habetur quod Spiritus Sanctus est formaliter dilectio per essentiam, ex secunda habetur - si quid valet - quod Spiritus Sanctus est formaliter caritas per essentiam. Quomodo ergo ex hoc inferretur quod non est in nobis aliqua dilectio habitualis, sive caritas, alia ab illo habitu per quem Spiritus Sanctus dicitur inhabitare? Ille quippe habitus quo Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat, vel non est perfectio simpliciter, sed aliqua perfectio limitata, - vel si est, non sequitur quin habitus alius ab illo posset poni principium proximum eliciendi actum meum diligendi meritorie, nam ille actus est limitatus, et 'perfectio' limitata; aliter non potest dici de ratione Augustini, ad propositum Magistri.	176. Besides, the intention and reason of Augustine seem badly adduced for the intention of the Master [n.174], because from the first reason [n.1] is had that the Holy Spirit is formally love by essence [n.171], and from the second [n.2] - if it is valid - is had that the Holy Spirit is formally charity by essence [n.172]. How then from this is it inferred that there is not in us some habitual love, or charity, different from the habit by which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell? The habit indeed by which the Holy Spirit indwells is either not a perfection simply but some limited perfection, - or, if it is, there does not fail to follow that a habit other than it could be posited as the proximate principle for eliciting my act of meritoriously loving, for that act is limited and a limited 'perfection'; one cannot speak about the reason of Augustine otherwise for the proposal of the Master.
177 Ad aliud patet quomodo caritas est bona per participationem, ex distinctione 8 quaestione 4, ubi expositum est quomodo forma simplex participat causam suam. ƿ	177. To the other argument [n.9] it is plain how charity is a good by participation from I d.8 n.213, where it was expounded how a simple form participates its own cause.
178 Ad argumenta pro opinione quae imponitur Magistro, quae videlicet negat habitum supernaturalem gratificantem.	178. To the arguments for the opinion imposed on the Master, namely the opinion that denies a supernatural habit bestowing grace [nn.101-112].
179 Ad primum dico quod iste habitus simpliciter dat acceptabiliter operari, et etiam dat aliquam activitatem respectu actus, sicut aliqua causa secunda respectu eius; sed non dat delectabiliter neque faciliter operari, quae conveniunt habitui acquisito in quantum distinguitur ab infuso, quia per hoc quod acquiritur ex frequenter agere.	179. [To the arguments for the first way] - To the first [n.104] I say that the habit in question gives acceptable acting [nn.150, 129], and that it gives some activity with respect to act, as some second cause with respect to it [n.151]; but it does not give pleasurable or easy acting, which belong to an acquired habit insofar as it is distinguished from an infused habit, on account of its being acquired from repeated acting.
180 Ad secundum, licet aliqui dicant voluntatem in puris naturalibus nullum actum posse habere circa obiectum supernaturale nude visum, tamen hoc improbatum est distinctione 1 quaestione 4. Concedo ergo quod posset habere actum circa tale obiectum ostensum sive nude sive per actum fidei, - sed ille actus circa obiectum ostensum a fide, non esset meritorius, quia non esset secundum inclinationem illius habitus, secundum quem solum Deus disponit acceptare actum; nec etiam in patria esset beatitudo, quia non esset ita perfectus sicut posset haberi a tali potentia, si esset perfecta proportionaliter habitu supernaturali. ƿ	180. To the second [n.105] I say that although some say the will in its purely natural state cannot have any act about a supernatural object seen bare, yet this was rejected in I d.1 nn.88-89, 141-142. I concede, then, that the will could have an act about such an object whether shown bare or by an act of faith, - but the act about an object shown by faith would not be meritorious, because it would not be according to the inclination of the habit by which alone God makes disposition to accept the act; nor even in the fatherland would it be beatitude, because it would not be as perfect as it could be possessed by such a power if the power were perfect in a way proportionate to the supernatural habit.
181 Et si obicias quod ille actus circa essentiam divinam visam posset esse ita perfectus quod totaliter quietaret voluntatem, quia eliceretur secundum totum conatum eius et per consequens esset beatificus, - quod etiam videtur, quia talis voluntas haberet 'quidquid vellet, et nihil male vellet' (hoc autem est 'esse beatum' secundum Augustinum XIII De Trinitate cap. 5), - respondeo quod non solum illa voluntas non esset beata quia non haberet quidquid vellet, eo modo quo deberet velle (deberet enim velle 'acceptabiliter diligere', et hoc non haberet), sed etiam non esset beata quia non haberet actum ita perfectum sicut sibi competeret in gradu naturae suae. Nulla enim potentia habituabilis potest habere actum ita perfectum sine habitu, sicut cum habitu; immo quanto potentia perfectior est, tanto minus potest habere actum proportionalem suae perfectioni, si careat omni habitu, quia ex quo similis est proportio geometrica duarum potentiarum inaequalium ad habitus proportionaliter perfectivos, ergo erit alia proportio, arithmetica, - et ita simpliciter magis deficiet potentia perfectior, si non habituetur, quam potentia inferior et imperfectior.	181. And if you object that the act about the divine essence as seen could be so perfect that it would give rest to the will, because the act would be elicited in accord with its total effort and would consequently be beatific, - which seems to be the case also because such a will would have 'whatever it wanted and would want nothing badly' (but this is 'to be blessed' according to Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.5 n.8), - I reply that it would not be blessed, not only because it would not have whatever it wanted in the way it should want it (for it should want 'to love acceptably' and this it would not have), but also because it would not have an act as perfect as to agree with it in the grade of its nature. For no power capable of being habituated can have, without that habit, an act as perfect as it can with it [nn.40, 70, following the third way, n.32]; nay, the more perfect the power the less can it, if it lacks all habit, have an act proportional to its perfection, because, from the fact that the geometrical proportion between two unequal powers is like proportionally perfective habits, there will be therefore another proportion, arithmetical proportion - and thus a more perfect power, if it has not been habituated, will be simply more deficient than a lower and more imperfect power [III Suppl. d.27 q. un. n.19]
182 Quod etiam additur quod 'habet quidquid vult', - respondeo: ƿnon tanta volitione quanta potest ordinate appetere illud obiectum. Potest enim ordinate appetere illud habere tanto actu quantus competeret sibi ex natura potentiae et habitus sibi proportionalis, et non tantum ita perfecto actu sicut competit sibi ex puris naturalibus; non autem haberet primo modo, sed tantum secundo.	182. As to the remark added that 'it has whatever it wants', - I reply: not with as much volition as it can in an ordered way desire the object with. For it can in an ordered way desire to have it with an act as great as would agree with it from the nature of the power and the habit proportional to it, and not merely with an act as perfect as agrees with it from its purely natural resources; now it would not have [sc. whatever it wants] in the first way but only in the second.
183 Contra istud: Videtur tunc quod nulla voluntas esset beata, quae non haberet caritatem maximam cuius est capax.	183. Against this [nn.181-182]: It seems then that no will would be blessed that did not have the greatest charity it was capable of.
184 Praeterea, sicut argutum fuit in solutione praecedente, ex ratione qua potentia est perfecta in summo gradu potentiae, potest in supremum actum, ita quod nihil sibi deficit ex defectu habitus; ergo voluntati in quocumque gradu, nihil deficit in illo gradu propter defectum habitus.	184. Further, as was argued in the preceding solution [n.30], by that reason by which a power in the supreme grade of the power is perfect, it is capable of the supreme act such that nothing is lacking to it from lack of the habit; therefore to a will in any grade nothing in that grade is lacking to it because of lack of the habit.
185 Ad primum dico quod non potest ordinate velle habere obiectum beatificum maiore actu quam correspondente meritis suis; talis non est maximus 'cuius est capax', semper tamen maior illo quem posset habere exsistens in puris naturalibus.	185. To the first [183] I say that it cannot in an ordered way will to have the beatific object with a greater act than corresponds with its merits; such an act is not the greatest 'it is capable of', although always greater than the one it could have existing in its purely natural state.
186 Ad secundum dico quod voluntas infinita continet in se eminenter per identitatem omnem perfectionem vel totam perfectionem habitus, et ideo nullam minorem perfectionem dat actui, quia non intelligitur informari habitu; sed potentia finita non includit per identitatem habitum proportionalem sibi, et ideo potest deficere a proportione sibi conveniente in agendo, si non perficiatur habitu. ƿ	186. To the second [184] I say that an infinite will contains eminently in itself by identity every perfection or the whole perfection of the habit, and so it does not give any lesser perfection to its act on account of not being understood to be informed with the habit; but a finite power does not include by identity the habit proportional to it, and so it can in its acting fail of the proportion that agrees with it, if be not perfected with the habit.
187 Ad tertium dico quod iste actus non creatur, proprie loquendo de creatione: tum quia respectu eius concurrit aliqua causa secunda activa, creatio autem est solius agentis primi sine causa secunda, - tum quia praesupponitur hic aliquod receptivum ipsius actus (puta voluntas), in creatione autem nullum praesupponitur susceptivum. Quando ergo dicitur quod 'omne supernaturale creatur', Si concedatur de omni actu primo supernaturali, non oportet concedere de supernaturali qui est actus secundus, quia ad ipsum concurrit potentia creata, et in ratione activi aliquo modo et in ratione receptivi; et tamen potest dici supernaturalis, ratione formae sive habitus concurrentis ad eius productionem, licet non immediate creetur.	187. To the third [n.106] I say that this act is not created, speaking of creation properly; both because there is, with respect to it, the concurrence of some active second cause, while creation belongs to the first agent alone without a second cause, - and because there is presupposed here something that is receptive of the act (namely the will), while in creation nothing is presupposed that is susceptive of creation. When therefore it is said that 'everything supernatural is created' [n.106], if it be conceded of every supernatural first act, yet it should not be conceded of something supernatural that is a second act, because there is for this latter the concurrence of created power, both in idea of what is active in some way [nn.152-153] and in idea of what is receptive; and yet it can be called supernatural by reason of the form or the habit that concurs in its production, even though it be not immediately created.
188 Aliter potest dici quod actus non est proprie supernaturalis sicut habitus, quia etsi 'habitus praesuppositus' sit a causa supernaturali immediate, tamen ille positus in esse est causa naturalis respectu sui actus; et ideo actus qui producitur per talem habitum, non est supernaturalis: ita enim naturaliter potest se habere ad actum suum forma quae supernaturaliter producitur, sicut se habet ad actum suum forma quae est mere naturalis, ita quod differentia in productione formarum non causat nec concludit distinctionem earum in comparatione ad suos actus.	188. One can in another way say [to the third, n.106] that the act is not properly supernatural the way the habit is, because although 'the presupposed habit' is immediately from a supernatural cause, yet it is, when posited in existence, a natural cause with respect to its act; and so the act that is produced by such a habit is not supernatural; for the form that is supernaturally produced can be as naturally related to its act as a form that is merely natural is related to its act, so that the difference in the production of the forms does not cause nor entail a distinction between them in comparison to their acts.
189 Ad quartum dici potest quod in potestate voluntatis sic habiƿtuatae est uti huiusmodi habitu; et quando cum aequali conatu operatur voluntas, habitus sibi aequaliter cooperatur, quia habitus ex parte sui agit per modum naturae. Nec tamen semper erit aequalis delectatio, consequens actum elicitum: delectatio quippe est ab obiecto quod attingitur per actum, et non tantum ab ipsa potentia agente circa obiectum; nunc autem quando obiectum non est praesens in se sed in aenigmate, potest ab obiecto limitato causari diversimode, nunc plus nunc minus, licet actus circa ipsum aeque intensus ex aequali conatu eliciatur. - Quod ergo dicitur de contemplativis, verum est de devotione, hoc est de delectatione consequente actum; non autem de ipso actu amandi elicito, qui quandoque est intensior et quandoque magis meritorius, licet ipsum sequatur minor delectatio vel quasi nulla, - et quandoque minorem actum, in se et in acceptatione divina, concomitatur maior delectatio, ad alliciendum parvulos ut avidius sequantur illud cuius dulcedinem praegustarunt.	189. To the fourth [n.107] one can say that a will thus habituated has in its power the use of a habit of this sort; and when the will operates with equal effort, the habit cooperates equally along with it, because a habit acts, on its own part, by way of nature. However, there will not always be an equal pleasure following on the elicited act; the pleasure is, to be sure, from the object that is attained by the act and not only from the power acting about the object; but now [sc. in this present life], when the object is not present in itself but in figure, the pleasure can be caused by a limited object in diverse ways, now more now less, although an equally intense act with equal effort be elicited about it. - As for what is said of contemplatives [n.107], it is true about the devotion, that is, about the pleasure consequent to the act; but it is not true about the elicited act of loving itself, which is sometimes more intense and sometimes more meritorious, although a lesser pleasure or almost none follow upon it, - and sometimes a lesser act, lesser both in itself and in divine acceptance, is accompanied by a greater pleasure, for attracting little ones so that they might more eagerly pursue that whose sweetness they have had advance taste of.
190 Ad primum de secunda via concedo quod Spiritus Sanctus possit actum causare immediate in voluntate, et posset illum actum - tamquam a se causatum acceptare tamquam dignum vita aeterna: sed tunc nec iste actus esset voluntatis, nec in potestate eius; nec credimus ipsum talem ƿactum acceptare, sed disponit actum liberi arbitrii - qui est in potestate eius - acceptare.	190. [To the arguments for the second way] - To the first argument about the second way [nn.108-109], I concede that the Holy Spirit could cause an act immediately in the will, and could accept that act - as caused by himself - as worthy of eternal life; but then that act would neither be of the will nor in its power; nor do we believe that he accepts such an act, but he makes disposition to accept an act of free choice - which act is in the will's power.
191 Ad secundum dico quod Spiritum Sanctum cooperari igni ad calefaciendum, non est miraculum; cooperari tamen aquae ad calefaciendum (si tamen sibi sine contradictione posset dici competere aliqua causalitas respectu calefactionis), hoc esset miraculosum. Ita dico in proposito quod Spiritum Sanctum cooperari voluntati humanae habituatae ad actum eliciendum secundum illum habitum, hoc est de communi lege qua Deus assistit causae secundae ad actum suum agendum; sed ipsum cooperari voluntati non-habituatae, esset miraculosum, si tamen voluntas ipsa posset operari. Dico ergo quod Spiritus Sanctus cooperatur voluntati habenti caritatem; non quidem quia habet, ita quod caritas eius sit causa prior, movens scilicet Spiritum Sanctum ad cooperandum, - sed quia Spiritus Sanctus cum causa secunda generaliter cooperatur ad actum illum ad quem secundum formam suam ordinatur, quomodo est de diligere in voluntate habituata. - Cum ergo dicis quod 'prius cooperatur quam voluntas habet caritatem', falsum est, nisi intelligatur de prioritate naturae, sicut causa superior. Simul quippe Spiritus Sanctus cooperatur voluntati ƿhabenti caritatem, et ipsa operatur, - aut si concedatur quod prius cooperatur Spiritus Sanctus voluntati quam habeat caritatem, non sequitur ergo quod 'aeque posset cooperari voluntati non habenti caritatem', quia non ita cooperatur non habenti formam ad agendum sicut habenti.	191. To the second [n.110] I say that the Holy Spirit's cooperating with fire for it to heat is not a miracle; but his cooperating with water for it to heat (provided however some causality with respect to heating could, without contradiction, be said to belong to water), this would be miraculous. Thus I say in the proposed case that the Holy Spirit's cooperating with an habituated human will for it to elicit an act in accord with the habit, that this is part of the common law by which God assists a second cause in doing its act; but his cooperating with a non-habituated will would be miraculous, provided however the will itself could operate. I say, therefore, that the Holy Spirit cooperates with a will possessed of charity; not indeed because the will possesses it such that its charity is the prior cause, namely moving the Holy Spirit to cooperate, - but because the Holy Spirit cooperates generally with a second cause in the act to which the second cause, according to its form, is ordered, the way it is with act of love in an habituated will. - When you say, therefore, that 'the Holy Spirit cooperates before the will has charity' [n.110], this is false unless it be understood of priority of nature, as a superior cause is prior. The Holy Spirit, to be sure, cooperates with a will possessed of charity at the same time as the will operates, - or if it be conceded that the Holy Spirit cooperates with the will before the will have charity, it does not therefore follow that 'he could be cooperating equally with a will not possessed of charity' [n.110], because he does not cooperate with a will not possessed of a form for acting as he does with a will that is.
192 Ad tertium dico quod etsi per communicationem idiomatum operationes humanae vere dicantur de Verbo, tamen actus proprii Verbi in natura divina non erant in potestate 'istius hominis', ut ille in quantum homo possit mereri actibus illis: non enim Christus in hoc nobis meruit, si Filius Dei - qui erat in carne - creavit animas cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto; et ita ad propositum, non merebitur voluntas si Spiritus Sanctus, quomodocumque sibi coniunctus, causaret in ea actum diligendi.	192. To the third [n.111] I say that although by the communication of properties [sc. between the two natures in the incarnate Christ] human operations are truly asserted of the Word, yet the proper acts of the Word in his divine nature were not in the power of 'this man' [sc. Christ] so that he could, insofar as man, merit by those acts; for Christ did not merit for us in this act, namely if the Son of God - who was in the flesh - created souls along with the Father and the Holy Spirit; and so as to the proposed case, the will will not merit if the Holy Spirit, in whatever way he is joined to it, were to cause in it an act of loving.
193 Ad ultimum dico quod licet faciat difficultatem tenentibus speciem esse actum primum respectu intellectus, per quam intellectus potest in actum secundum (sicut lignum calidum calefacit calore), quia si hoc esset verum, difficile esset salvare quod intellectus 'non informatus aliqua forma' posset in operationem; tamen secundum illam viam quam dixi distinctione 3 huius I, quod 'obiectum - sive in se sive in specie - est sicut causa partialis, conƿcurrens cum intellectu ad causandum intellectionem', non facit aliquam difficultatem, quia obiectum in se praesens (quomodo erit in patria) sufficit absque omni informatione ad causandum visionem, vel ex se solo cum intellectu.	193. To the final argument [n.112] I say that although it cause difficulty for those who hold that the species is first act with respect to the intellect whereby the intellect is capable of second act (as hot wood heats by heat), because if this were true it would be difficult to save the proposition that the intellect 'when not informed by any form' would be capable of operation [I d.3 nn.456-459]; yet according to the way that I stated in distinction 3 of this first book [d.3 nn.494-498], that 'the object - whether in itself or in the species - is a sort of partial cause, concurring with the intellect in causing intellection', this argument does not cause any difficulty, because the object when present in itself (the way it will be in the fatherland) suffices without any informing for causing vision, or suffices of itself alone along with the intellect.
194 Et si arguatur 'si sine habitu informante potest esse visio perfecta, ergo et fruitio perfectissima', - respondeo: nullus negat, communiter, in gloria 'habitum luminis gloriae in intellectu', et ille ex parte intellectus potest poni correspondere caritati ex parte voluntatis. ƿ	194. And if it be argued 'if vision can be perfect without an informing habit, then the enjoyment can be most perfect too [sc. without a habit]', - I reply: no one commonly denies that in glory there is 'a habit of the light of glory in the intellect' [I d.3 n.114; III d.14 qq.102 nn.2-4, 8; IV Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.3 nn.9-10], - and this habit on the part of the intellect can be set down as corresponding to charity on the part of the will.