Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D17B/Q1

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Translated by Peter Simpson.

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Quaestio 1 Second Part On the Manner of Increase in Charity Question One
195 Circa augmentum caritatis, supposito quod caritas possit augeri secundum illud Augustini in Epistola ad Bonifatium, et ponitur libro II distinctione 26 cap. 3, ((caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici)), et secundum ipsum VI De Trinitate 7 ((in rebus incorporeis idem est melius esse quod maius esse)) (aliqua autem caritas est melior quam alia quia ei correspondet maius praemium essentiale, ergo aliqua caritas est maior alia) - quaero de modo augmenti caritatis, et primo: utrum tota caritas praeexsistens corrumpatur, ita quod nulla realitas eadem numero maneat in caritate maiore et minore. ƿ 195. About increase in charity, on the supposition that charity could be increased - according to what Augustine says in his letter to Boniface [Epist. Ad Paulinum ch.3 n.10], and it is found in Lombard II d.26 ch.2 n.231, "charity merits increase so that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected," and according to what he says On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 "in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater"[1] (for some charity is better than another because a greater essential reward corresponds to it, therefore some charity is greater than another) - I ask about the manner of increase in charity, and first whether the whole of pre-existing charity is corrupted so that no reality that is the same in number remains in a greater and a lesser charity.
196 Et quod sic, arguo: Quia alias ipsa forma augeretur subiective, quia eadem manens transmutaretur ab imperfectione ad perfectionem; sed forma est invariabilis, secundum auctorem Sex principiorum; ergo non potest caritas sic augeri. 196. And that it does I argue: Because otherwise the form itself would increase in the subject, because while remaining the same it would be transmuted from imperfection to perfection; but form is unchanging, according to the author of Six Principles ch.1 n.1; therefore charity cannot be increased in this way.[2]
197 Contra: I De generatione, 'auctum oportet manere'; ergo in augmento quocumque non est corruptio praeexsistentis. 197. On the contrary: De Generatione et Corruptione 1.5.321b10-13, "the thing increased has to remain"; therefore in any increase there is no corruption of what pre-existed.[3]
198 Hic dicitur quod nihil caritatis praeexsistentis manet idem numero in caritate aucta, sed totum quod praefuit corrumpitur, et aliud individuum perfectius illo generatur. ƿ 198. Here it is said that nothing of preexistent charity remains the same in number in increased charity, but the whole of what existed before is corrupted and another individual more perfect than it is generated.
199 Ad hoc ponitur ratio, quia termini motus sunt incompossibiles (ex V Physicorum), ergo huius motus vel mutationis - quo caritas augetur - termini erunt incompossibiles; ergo illud quod est terminus 'ad quem', simpliciter est incompossibile termino 'a quo'; igitur non includit idem numero. 199. The reason set down[4] for this is that the terms of motion are incompossible (Physics 5.3.227a7-10), therefore the terms of this motion or change - whereby charity is increased - will be incompossible terms; therefore that which is the term 'to which' is simply incompossible with the term 'from which'; therefore it does not include anything the same in number.[5]
200 Confirmatur ista ratio, quia sicut in speciebus ponitur magis et minus propter ordinem essentialem specierum, ita videtur ponendum suo modo in individuis eiusdem speciei; sed species perfectior (quae dicitur maior) est simpliciter alia natura ab imperfectiore, ita quod nihil idem numero - naturae scilicet inferioris- manet in superiore, immo superior est in se simplicior quam inferior, quia in formis superior est perfectior et actualior et simplicior (patet in formis substantiarum separatarum, unde Deus est simplicissimus); ergo in individuis eiusdem speciei nihil imperfectioris idem numero manet in perfectiore, quia tunc 'perfectior' esset compositior imperfectiore. ƿ 200. A confirmation for this reason is that just as, in the case of species, the positing of the more and less is on account of the essential ordering of species, so it seems it should in its own way be in the case of individuals of the same species; but a more perfect species (which is called a greater species) is simply a different nature from a more imperfect species, such that nothing the same in number - that is, of the inferior nature - remains in the superior, and the superior is in itself simpler than the inferior, because in the case of forms the superior is more perfect and more actual and simpler (the fact is plain in the forms of separate substances, and hence God is most simple); therefore in the case of individuals of the same species nothing of the more imperfect remains the same in number in the more perfect, because then 'the more perfect' would be more composite than the more imperfect.[6]
201 $a Confirmatur secundo, quia simili modo videtur ponendum magis et minus in substantia (si ibi sit) in eadem specie, et in accidente in eadem specie, praecipue in illo accidente secundum quod non est motus; sed propter defectum motus in substantia, ponitur ibi 'magis' omnino aliud individuum, non habens in se 'minus' quasi aliquid sui, sed aeque simplex vel simplicius quam ipsum minus; ergo similiter ponetur in caritate, secundum quam non est motus, patet. a$ 201. A second confirmation is that it seems likewise that in a substance the more and less (if they exist there) should be posited in the same species, and also in an accident in the same species, especially in the case of an accident where there is no change in accord with it; but substance, because of its lack of change, the 'more' posited there is altogether another individual, not possessing in itself the 'less' as some part of itself but being as simple as or more simple than that 'less'; therefore the like will be posited in the case of charity, which no change accords with - the point is plain.[7]
202 Contra istam positionem arguitur sex viis, quarum una sumitur ex praesuppositione formae in augmento illius formae, - et secundum istam viam arguo primo sic: ƿLicet non necesse sit Deum augere caritatem in illo instanti quo elicitur actus meritorius (quo 'meretur caritas augeri'), tamen potest tunc augere caritatem, ita quod augmentum quod quis meretur, simul tempore detur quando actus elicitur. 202. Against this position [n.198] there is argument in six ways, one of which is taken from the presupposition of form in the case of increase in that form - and in accord with this way I argue first as follows: [First way] - Although it is not necessary that God increase charity in the instant in which a meritorious act is elicited (by which 'charity merits to be increased' [n.195]), yet he can then increase it, such that the increase which someone merits is given at the same point in time as the act is elicited.
203 Ex hoc arguo: iste actus qui meretur augmentum caritatis, est meritorius, - ergo praesupponit caritatem in illo instanti in quo elicitur. Quaero quam? Non illam novam partem quae acquiritur, quia illa sequitur actum sicut praemium meritum; ergo praesupponit illam quae praeexsistebat, et per consequens non corrumpitur illa in illo instanti, - quia si sic, tunc in illo instanti non posset actus meritorius elici, in quo tamen quis meretur augmentum caritatis. 203. From this I argue: this act, which merits increase of charity, is meritorious, -therefore it presupposes charity in the instant in which it is elicited. I ask which charity? Not the new part which is acquired, because this follows the act as the reward the merit; therefore it presupposes the charity that was pre-existent, and consequently it is not corrupted in that instant, - because if so, then in that instant a meritorious act could not be elicited, in which instant however someone merits increase of charity.[8]
204 Si autem proterviat quis quod Deus numquam auget caritatem in illo instanti temporis in quo habetur actus meritorius respectu augmenti, sed semper posterius duratione, pro eo quod non auget propter actum in quantum est elicitus sed in quantum est in acceptatione divina, et hoc modo manet post instans in quo elicitur, et tunc post ipsum confertur augmentum: 204. But if someone impudently says that God never increases charity in the instant of time in which the act is had that is meritorious in respect of the increase but always later in duration, on the ground that God increases charity, not because of the act insofar as it is elicited, but insofar as it is in divine acceptance, and that in this way the charity remains after the instant in which the act is elicited, and that then after that instant the increase is conferred:
205 Licet ista responsio sit omnino improbabilis si neget Deum posse tunc augere (quod si potest, ponatur in esse et procedit argumentum), tamen non evadit difficultatem in aliis. Primo quidem, quia in virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus ƿvirtus augetur per actum elicitum, et non quando actus ille non est, quia quando non est, nihil causat, ergo quando actus ille inest, tunc est ratio augendi habitum. Ergo si tunc generetur novum individuum et corrumpatur quod praefuit, sequitur quod actus augmentativus habitus non elicietur ab habitu sed a sola potentia, quod videtur inconveniens, quia tunc - secundum dicta in praecedente quaestione actus augmentativus habitus esset imperfectior quam alius non augmentativus habitus, elicitus ab habitu. 205. Although this response is altogether improbable if it deny that God can increase charity then [sc. in the same instant that the act is elicited] (because if he can, let his doing so be posited in fact, and the argument proceeds), nevertheless it does not in other respects escape difficulty. First indeed because in moral and intellectual virtues virtue is increased by the elicited act, and not when the act is not, because when it is not it causes nothing; therefore then, when the act is present, is there reason for increasing the habit. Therefore if then a new individual is generated and the one that was before is corrupted, it follows that the act that is augmentative of the habit is not elicited by the habit but by the power alone, which seems discordant, because then - in accord with what was said in the preceding question [nn.69-70] - the act that is augmentative of the habit would be more imperfect than another act, elicited by the habit, that is non-augmentative of the habit.[9]
206 Et si etiam concedat conclusionem quod ' actus augmentativus habitus acquisiti elicitur a sola potentia' (quamvis hoc videatur inconveniens), tamen non evadet hanc difficultatem specialem, si ponatur species intelligibilis augeri per actum intelligendi. Non enim potest ille actus elici a sola potentia, circumscripta specie, quia sicut patuit distinctione 3 huius primi - non sufficit intellectus sine specie ad eliciendum actum intelligendi; ergo non potest aliqua ƿintellectio augere speciem, quae eliciatur a sola potentia; illa ergo, augmentativa speciei, praesupponit speciem, et non illud individuum quod generatur, - ergo individuum praeexsistens, et per consequens praeexsistens non corrumpitur. 206. And if it also concede the conclusion that 'the act augmentative of the acquired habit is elicited by the power alone' (although this seems discordant), yet it does not escape the following special difficulty, if the intelligible species is posited as being increased by the act of understanding. For that act cannot be elicited by the power alone, the species having been removed, because - as was made plain in I d.3 nn.486-498 - the intellect is not sufficient without the species for eliciting an act of understanding; therefore no intellection that is elicited from the power alone can increase the species; the intellection, then, that is augmentative of the species presupposes the species, and not the individual one that is generated - so the preexisting individual, and consequently the preexisting one is not corrupted.
207 Quod si negetur intellectionem augere speciem intelligibilem, ultima instantia - ad propositum - est ista: Voluntas per actum suum potest remittere actum intelligendi, quod probatur, quia potest totaliter corrumpere et amovere intellectum ab hoc actu; et tamen volitio illa remissiva intellectionis necessario praesupponit intellectionem: non aliquam novam quae sequatur ipsam volitionem, patet; ergo aliquam praecedentem volitionem, et per consequens intellectio praeexsistens non corrumpitur per eam. 207. But if it be denied that intellection increases the intelligible species, the final instance - against the proposal - is as follows: The will can, by its own act, weaken an act of understanding, - the proof is that it can totally corrupt and remove the intellect from this act; and yet the volition that weakens intellection necessarily presupposes intellection; not some new one that follows the volition itself, as is plain; therefore some intellection that precedes volition and consequently the preexisting intellection is not corrupted by it.[10]
208 Secunda via est ex perfectione illius quod inducitur per augmentum. Ubi arguitur primo sic: in actibus augmentativis habitus, decimus potest esse imperfectior primo, et tamen per illum actum decimum augetur habitus ad aliquem gradum ad quem non potuit prius ƿaugeri per primum vel secundum actum; hoc non posset esse si totum praeexsistens corrumpatur, quia perfectio primi vel secundi actus in se erat maior quam perfectio decimi in se, et per consequens individuum in cuius generationem potuit primus actus, potuit esse perfectius illo individuo in quod potuit decimus actus; ergo quod perfectius sit illud quod sequitur decimum quam primum, non erit quia novum individuum generetur virtute decimi, sed quia praeexsistenti - generato per actus praecedentes - aliquid additur, et sic manebit praeexsistens. 208. [Second way] - The second way is from the perfection of that which is introduced by the increase. Here the argument goes first as follows: in acts augmentative of a habit the tenth act can be more imperfect than the first, and yet by that tenth act the habit is increased to some degree to which it could not before be increased by the first or second act; this cannot be if the preexisting whole is corrupted, because the perfection of the first or second act was in itself greater than the perfection of the tenth act was in itself, and consequently the individual of whose generation the first act was capable could be more perfect than the individual of which the tenth act was capable; therefore the fact that what follows the tenth act is more perfect than what follows the first will not be because the new individual is generated by virtue of the tenth, but because something is added to the preexisting individual - generated by the preceding acts -, and thus the preexisting individual will remain.[11]
209 Si dicatur quod praecedentes actus eliciti a caritate maneant in acceptatione divina (licet non in se, nec etiam in alio impresso ab eis), argumentum non solvitur in acquisitione habituum intellectualium et moralium. ƿ 209. But if it be said that the preceding acts elicited by charity remain in divine acceptance (although not in themselves, nor in anything impressed by them), then the argument about the acquisition of intellectual and moral habits [n.208] is not solved.[12]
210 $a Si nullum agens potest intendere formam, quam invenit in passo, perfectiorem illa quam ipsum posset ex se causare in passo, tota seƿcunda ratio deficit, quia tunc numquam actus intendit habitum nisi ad gradum quantum ipsum posset ex se inducere, et tunc non appareret quare non posset inducere illum si esset novum individuum, ita quod nihil remaneret praeexsistentis. Sed quia manifestum est quod actus decimus, aeque intensus cum primo, intendit habitum ultra gradum inductum per primum vel per secundum, ideo prima propositio videtur neganda. 210. If no agent can intensify the form, which it finds in what it acts on, to make it more perfect than the form which it could of itself cause in what it acts on, this whole second reasoning fails, because then an act never intensifies a habit save to that degree which it could of itself induce, and then it would not be apparent why it could not induce it if it was a new individual such that nothing of what preexisted would remain. But because it is manifest that a tenth act, as equally intense as the first, intensifies the habit beyond the degree induced by the first or second act, therefore the first proposition [sc. at the beginning here, n.210] seems in need of being denied.
211 Sed tunc est dubium, an ita sit in calore, quod remissior adveniens intendat intensiorem inventum in passo (videtur quod non, sicut hic sub, in secunda linea, ibi). Potest dici quod agens univocum non intendit intensiorem formam suam inventam in passo, sed magis e contra; agens autem aequivocum intendit, quia natum est agere in hoc et non pati ab hoc, et forma sua est nobilior ƿquocumque gradu effectus aequivoci quem invenit, licet non possit statim ex se in tantum gradum effectus aequivoci. Itaque lumen intenditur in infinitum, si luminaria eiusdem speciei infinita apponantur circa medium, quorum quodlibet intendat lumen in illo medio. a$ 211. But then there is a doubt whether this is so in the case of heat, namely that a weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies the more intense heat that is found in what it acts on (it seems it does not, as here below in the line marked **[13]). One can say that a univocal agent does not intensify its own more intense form that is found in what it acts on, but rather the reverse; but an equivocal agent does intensify it, because it is of a nature to act on this and not to be acted on by it, and its own form is more noble than any degree of an equivocal effect that it finds, although it not have at once of itself power for so great a degree of equivocal effect. Therefore light is intensified infinitely if infinite lights of the same species are put around a medium, each one of which would intensify the light in that medium.
212 Tertia via accipitur in naturalibus et in actione con-, trarii in contrarium: Calidum enim agens in frigidum, antequam corrumpat totaliter frigidum, remittit ipsum. Si in ista remissione frigidi generatur individuum novum frigidi, quaero a quo generante? Si non fugiatur ad agens universale (quae fuga est hic irrationabilis), non potest assignari aliquod particulare generans huius individui, quia calidum remittens frigidum, non potest per se generare individuum frigidi; ergo nec illud remissum est individuum novum. ƿ 212. [Third way] - The third way is taken from natural things and the action of contrary on contrary. For a hot thing acting on a cold thing weakens the cold thing before it corrupts it completely. If in this weakening of the cold thing a new individual cold thing is generated, I ask by what is it generated? If recourse is not had to a universal agent (which recourse is here irrational), no particular generator for this individual can be assigned, because the hot that is weakening the cold thing cannot of itself generate an individual cold thing; therefore neither is the weakened cold thing a new individual.[14]
213 Quarta via accipitur ex hoc quod Philosophus concedit eodem modo motum in accidentibus, quo negat in substantiis, et per consequens magis et minus in accidentibus sicut requiruntur ad motum, sic non requiruntur in substantiis; si autem non esset augmentum in accidentibus nisi per corruptionem praeexsistentis et generationem novi - et tali modo potest inveniri magis et minus in substantiis - igitur non salvaretur magis motus hic quam ibi. 213. [Fourth way] - The fourth way is taken from the fact that the Philosopher allows for motion in the case of accidents in the same manner in which he denies it for substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11], and consequently the more and less, as they are required in accidents, so they are not required in substances; but if there were no increase in accidents save by corruption of what preexists and by generation of what is new - and this is how more and less can be found in substances - then the more or less would exist no more in accidents than in substances.
214 Quinto arguitur per hoc quod natura sub determinato gradu magis vel minus, erit species ad individua, et hoc species ƿinferior contenta sub specie naturae, et ita nulla species - quae modo ponitur - naturae intensibilis vel remissibilis erit specialissima. Consequentia prima probatur, quia quidquid dicitur per se et in 'quid' de individuis, et est 'per se unum', est species eorum; natura in determinato gradu - tali vel tali - dicitur in 'quid' de individuis et est 'per se unum', quia natura secundum hunc gradum est essentialiter eorum quae habent naturam in tali gradu, et gradus nihil addit accidens naturae; patet ergo quod natura in tali gradu est species, et patet quod est minus commune quam species naturae in se: igitur esset species inferior in ordine, specie naturae. ƿ 214. [Fifth way] - Fifth, an argument is drawn from the fact that a nature which admits of more and less in determinate degree will be a species in relation to individuals, and an inferior species to boot contained under a species of nature, and thus no species of a nature capable of being intensified of weakened - as we posit these species now - will be a most specific species.[15] The proof of the first consequence is that anything that is said of individuals per se and in their 'whatness' and is 'per se one thing' is the species of them; nature in a determinate degree - in such and such a degree - is said of individuals in their 'whatness' and it is 'per se one thing', because the nature in this degree belongs essentially to the things that have nature in this degree, and the degree does not add to the nature something accidental to it; so it is plain that the nature in such a degree is a species, and plain that it is less common than the species of the nature in itself; therefore it would be a species inferior in order to the species of the nature.[16]
215 Sexto et ultimo arguitur, quia si ratio adducta pro positione valeat, oportet ipsam concludere eodem modo de quanto molis sicut de quanto virtutis, et ita quando quantum molis augetur, nihil maneret idem; ergo in augmentatione proprie dicta molis, auctum non maneret secundum quantitatem praeexsistentem, quod videtur inconveniens. 215. [Sixth way] - Sixth and last there is the argument that if the reason adduced for the position [nn.198-199] is valid, it should work in the same way about the how much of bulk as about the how much of virtue, and so when a bulk is increased in amount nothing of it would remain the same; therefore in the case of increase in bulk properly speaking the preexisting quantity would not remain in the increased thing, which seems discordant.[17]
216 Respondetur secundum istam positionem, concedendo conclusionem, - quod ita est novum individuum quanti molis, quando aliquid est maius, sicut 'aliquid intensius' est aliud individuum illius formae intensibilis. 216. Response in accord with this position is made by conceding the conclusion -that there is a new individual in the how much of bulk when something is bigger just as, when something is 'more intensified', there is a different individual of that intensifiable form.
217 Sed contra hoc videntur sequi duo inconvenientia: Primum, quia si rarefiant species vini in Eucharistia, erit quantitas molis maior quam prius, quia rarefactionem concomitatur maior quantitas; si ergo illa quantitas, quae fuit vini, non manet post rarefactionem, ergo nec manet ibi sanguis, quia non tenetur communiter ibi sanguis manere nisi quamdiu manent accidentia quae affecerunt vinum conversum. 217. But against this there seem to be two discordant results that follow. The first is that if the species of wine are diluted in the Eucharist,[18] there will be a greater quantity in bulk than there was before, because greater quantity follows on dilution; if then the quantity of wine which existed before does not remain after dilution, then the blood does not remain there, because it is commonly held that the wine does not remain there except to the extent that the accidents remain that are the affections of the converted wine.
218 Aliud inconveniens, quia tunc videretur quod talis rarefactio non posset esse virtute agentis naturalis, vel quod agens naturale ageret non praesupposita aliqua materia vel substantia: patet enim quod ibi non praesupponitur materia substantialis, quia ibi non est substantia alterabilis, nec etiam praesupponitur ibi quantitas eadem ƿ numero manens (per te), et tamen agens naturale potest - ut videtur - sic rarefacere vel condensare istas species; ergo agens naturale potest agere non praesupponendo aliquid in sua actione, et ita creare. 218. The other discordance is that then it would seem that such dilution could not be by virtue of a natural agent, or that the natural agent would act without any matter or substance presupposed; for it is plain that substantial matter is not there presupposed, for there is not there an alterable substance, nor is it even presupposed that a quantity the same in number remains (for you), and yet the natural agent is able - as it seems - thus to dilute or condense those species; therefore the natural agent is able to act without presupposing anything in its action, and thus to create.
219 Ad ista inconvenientia respondetur: Ad primum, quod quamdiu manent accidentia similia illis quae affecerunt vinum, manet sanguis licet autem non maneant eadem, manent tamen similia post rarefactionem. 219. Response to these discordances: To the first, that as long as accidents remain similar to affections of the wine the blood remains; and although they do not remain the same, they do nevertheless remain similar after dilution.
220 Ad aliud conceditur quod virtus naturalis potest agere, nullo manente communi sub terminis, non tamen creat, quia hic posterius - naturali ordine - sequitur prius: ita non est in creatione. 220. To the other the concession is made that the natural agent can act when nothing common remains under the terms; yet it does not create, because this later thing follows - in order of nature - that former thing; creation is not like this.
221 Contra istas responsiones arguitur: Quia cum quantitas ista nova numero differat a quantitate praeexsistente, et non alio modo differt quantitas aquae a quantitate vini nisi numero tantum (quia non specie, patet), sequitur quod propter talem permanentiam accidentium, eorumdem specie, non numero, non plus maneat sanguis sub ista quantitate nova quam maneret sub quantitate aquae si ibi esset praecipue, cum ista quantitas nova non magis inclinetur ad afficiendum vinum - cuius quantitas fuit prior quam ad afficiendum aquam. 221. Argument is made against these responses: Because although this numerically new quantity differs from the preexisting quantity, and a quantity of water does not differ from a quantity of wine in any other way save in number alone (because it plainly does not differ in species), the result is that because of the permanence of the accidents, the same in species, not in number, the blood does not remain under the new quantity more than it would remain under the quantity of water, if water was what was chiefly there, since this new quantity is not inclined to affect the wine - whose quantity it was before - more than to affect the water.
222 Contra aliam responsionem videtur esse inconveniens quod virtus naturalis activa non praesupponat in actione sua subiectum. 222. Against the other response [n.220] there seems to be discordance in an active natural virtue presupposing a subject in its action.
223 Praeterea, quaero quomodo unum istorum sequitur ad alterum? Aut sine actione agentis, - et hoc est manifestum inconveniens, quia tunc agens naturale frustra ageret, quia sine eo istud consequens ad illud esset. Ergo non consequitur nisi per actionem naturalis agenƿtis. Sed tale agens non potest ponere effectum in esse sine causa materiali praesupposita: alias non prohiberetur - per talem consecutionem - creatio vel actio talis qualis repugnat agenti naturali. 223. Further, I ask how one of these follows on the other? Either without the action of the agent - and this is manifestly discordant, because then the natural agent would act in vain, because without it the consequent would still follow. Therefore the consequent does not follow save by the action of the natural agent. But such an agent cannot make the effect to exist unless the material cause is presupposed; otherwise creation, or the sort of action that is repugnant to a natural agent, would not - by such consequence - be prevented.
224 Praeterea, secundum hoc posset dici quod agens naturale effective inducit animam intellectivam, quia ipsa naturali ordine consequitur ad organizationem corporis: consequens habetur communiter pro inconvenienti. 224. Further, according to this opinion [n.220] a natural agent could be said to be the effective cause of introducing the intellective soul, because the intellective soul follows by natural order on the organization of the body; the consequence here is commonly held to be discordant[19].
225 Ad quaestionem ergo, propter rationes improbantes istam opinionem et praecipue duas vel tres primas, teneo conclusionem oppositam, videlicet quod realitas illa positiva quae erat in caritate minore, manet eadem realiter in caritate maiore. Qualiter autem hoc sit, patebit in solutionibus sequentium quaestionum. ƿ 225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215] and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249]. [20]
226 $a Ad argumentum pro opinione Godefridi respondeo: per se terminus 'a quo' est privatio gradus inducendi. 226. To the argument on behalf of the opinion of Godfrey [n.199] my response is: the term 'from which' is per se a privation of the degree to be introduced.
227 Sed quis est terminus positivus 'a quo', necessario requisitus? Respondeo: gradus imperfectus. ƿ 227. But what is the positive term 'from which' that is necessarily required? I reply: an imperfect degree.
228 Contra: ille manet in termino 'ad quem'. - Respondeo: non manet actu distincto, sicut fuit terminus 'a quo', sed manet in potentia in toto, sicut pars. 228. On the contrary: the imperfect degree remains in the term 'to which' [n.225]. - I reply: it does not remain in a distinct act, the way the term 'from which' was, but it remains in the whole potentially, the way a part does.
229 Contra: illud sub omni ratione absoluta manet idem; respectus non est ratio termini 'a quo' vel 'ad quem'. Eadem videtur difficultas de aqua divisa et unita, quis terminus 'a quo' et 'ad quem': si enim tota est terminus 'a quo' divisionis, et 'haec pars separata et illa' est terminus 'ad quem', uterque terminus praefuit idem numero, secundum quodcumque absolutum; est hic alia vis, quia duae aquae divisae connumerantur, - ergo manente eadem unitate numerali utriusque, semper connumerantur; sed in toto manet eadem unitas numeralis utriusque, alioquin neutra maneret eadem numero, et ita non esset continuatio praeexsistentium, sed simpliciter corruptio et generatio tertii ex ipsis. Qui diceret partes in toto absoluto habere esse absolutum totius, respectu cuius proprium esse earum est materiale (V Metaphysicae cap. 'De causa': 'materia ut partes totius'), posset dicere quod gradus prior manet in toto secundum esse aliquod absolutum quod non praefuit; similiter de aqua unita alii aquae. 229. On the contrary: it remains the same in every absolute sense; a respect is not the idea of a term 'from which' or 'to which'. There seems to be the same difficultly about water when divided and united, namely what the term is 'from which' and 'to which'; for if all the water is the term 'from which' of the division, and if 'this separated part and that separated part' are the term 'to which', each term was before the same in number in respect of anything absolute; some other force is here involved, because the two divided waters are separately counted, - therefore when the same numerical unity of each remains, they are always separately counted; but the same numerical unity of each remains in the whole, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing. Whoever would say that the parts in an absolute whole have the absolute existence of the whole, with respect to which the proper being of the parts is material (Metaphysics 5.2.1013b19-21), could say that the prior degree remains in the whole according to some absolute existence which was not there before; likewise about the water united to another water.
230 Sed semper quaeritur quis est terminus 'a quo' incompossibilis secundum aliquod absolutum? - Illud non assignatur, ideo breviter respondeo: Per se terminus 'a quo' est incompossibilis termino 'ad quem', ille est privatio; sed terminus positivus 'a quo' non est incompossibilis termino 'ad quem', nisi ut coniungitur 'per se termino a quo': ƿnisi dicendo incompossibilitatem, quod 'hoc non est hoc', - vel quod 'hoc et hoc non simul perficiunt idem' ut actus, in actu distincto. Sic quidem dupliciter est prior gradus incompossibilis termino 'ad quem', quia numquam est ille, etiam quando est in illo; numquam est etiam actus distinctus illius cuius terminus 'ad quem' est actus distinctus. 230. But the question still remains what the term 'from which' is that is incompossible with anything absolute? - No answer is assigned, so I briefly reply: Per se the term 'from which' is incompossible with the term 'to which', - it is its privation; but the positive term 'from which' is not incompossible with the term 'to which' save by being put in the combination 'the per se term from which':[21] unless one asserts the incompossibility, that 'this is not this' - or that 'the same thing is not perfected at the same time by this and this' as they are acts in distinct act. In this way indeed the prior degree is in two ways incompossible with the term 'to which': because it is never it, even when it is in it, and also because it is never the distinct act of that of which the term 'to which' is the distinct act.
231 Sed istorum duorum modorum ((nisi dicendo)) etc., primus non sufficit ad terminos motus, quia albedo non est dulcedo; secundus non potest ponere oppositionem termini 'a quo' propter aliquid absolutum in ipso, quia esse actum distinctum nihil dicit super illum gradum absolutum - ut manet - nisi praecisionem, quod est 'esse in alio' (ut pars in toto), et ita sic ponere terminum est ponere formaliter sub negatione relationis: itaque tene illud. 231. But of these two ways of 'unless one asserts' etc. [n.230] the first is not sufficient for terms of motion, because whiteness is not sweetness [sc. and these are not terms of one and the same motion]; the second cannot posit the opposition of the term 'from which' on account of anything absolute in it, because being a distinct act adds to the absolute degree - in the way this degree remains - nothing but an exclusion, the exclusion of 'being in another' (the way a part is in the whole), and so to posit a term in this way is to posit it formally under the denial of a relation: therefore hold to the first remark, at '(—)' [n.230 and footnote].
232 Ad illud aliud, de aquis, respondeo: sicut pars in toto, est quidem et in actu terminante generationem (quia divisio non est generatio), non tamen est in actu distincto, qui est actus cum praecisione partialitatis; ita correspondet sibi unitas secundum rationem primam actus, et illa manet in divisione et in unione, - secundum autem rationem actus distincti correspondet proprie unitas quae est principium numeri. 232. To the other point, about the divided water [n.229], I reply: just as a part in a whole does indeed exist, and in the act which terminates its generation (because division is not generation), yet it does not exist in a distinct act, which is an act along with exclusion of being a part; so there corresponds to it the unity that accords with the first idea of act [sc. the act that terminates its generation], and this unity remains with it in division and in union, - but according to the idea of distinct act [sc. act along with exclusion of being a part] there properly corresponds the unity that is the principle of number.
233 Ad formam. Prima consequentia tenet, loquendo de unitate secundo modo, quia numerus est discretorum; quaecumque partes continui sunt unum numero, loquendo stricte de numero. - Ulterius: minor est falsa de unitate numerali secundo modo, primo modo vera. Nec tamen sequitur idem habere duas unitates numerales, sed idem secundum esse absolutum habet unicam, perpetuam, dum manet; secundum autem esse praecisum, correspondet sibi unitas connumerata. Et sicut accidit sibi esse praecisum, ita accidit sibi suam unitatem esse connumerabilem: quando enim suum esse est praecisum, sua propria unitas est connumerabilis, - quando non, sed est in alio esse praeciso ut aliquid eius, tunc sua unitas propria non est connumerabilis, sed est aliquid unitatis connumerabilis, ita ƿquod breviter ' unitatem esse connumerabilem' proprie requirit ipsam esse praecisam, quia numerus est discretorum. a$ 233. To the form. The first consequence [n.229] holds, speaking of unity in the second way [sc. unity as principle of number], because number is of discrete things; all the parts of a continuous thing are one in number, speaking of number strictly. - Further, the minor [sc. 'there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing'] is false of numerical unity in the second way; it is true of it in the first way. Yet it does not follow that the same thing has two numerical unities; rather the same thing has, according to its absolute being, a unique and perpetual unity while it remains; but according to its exclusive being there corresponds to it a unity that is separately counted. And just as exclusive being is accidental to it, so its having a separately countable unity is accidental to it; for when its being is exclusive, its proper unity is separately countable, - when its being is not exclusive but it exists in another precisely as some part of it, then its proper unity is not separately counted but is a part of some separately counted unity, such that, in brief, 'to be a separately countable unity' properly requires exclusive being, because number is of discrete things.
234 Ad argumentum in oppositum dico quod non sequitur 'manet forma eadem in individuo imperfecto et perfecto, ergo ipsa mutatur subiective', quia non manet ut subiectum transmutationis, sed manet sicut natura in individuis, supra quam quodlibet individuum aliquid addit. Et ratio defectus consequentiae est, quia illud quod est subiectum unius individui naturae, est etiam subiectum individui alterius, et illud etiam est possibile et mutabile ab individuo in individuum; ipsa autem forma sicut unius individui non est subiectum ita nec alterius, et per consequens nec mutabile de uno in aliud. 234. To the argument for the opposite [n.196] I say that this consequence does not hold 'the same form remains in the imperfect and perfect individual, therefore it is changed in subject', because it does not remain as a subject of change but it remains as a nature in individual things, to which nature any individual whatever adds something. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is because that which is the subject of one individual of the nature is also the subject of another individual of it, and because the subject is possible and changeable from individual to individual; but the form itself, just as it is not the subject of one individual, so it is not the subject of another individual, and consequently it is not changeable from one to the other[22].

Notes

  1. ↑ Interpolation: "in the case of things that are not great in mass, to be greater is to be better."
  2. ↑ Interpolation, replacing 'because...increased': "Because if it were not corrupted, then the form of charity would be changed from lesser to greater; this is false, because a simple form cannot be the subject of a transmutation."
  3. ↑ Interpolation, in place of 'therefore...pre-existed': "therefore pre-existing charity, when increased by a new degree of subsequent charity, should remain and not be corrupted."
  4. ↑ Interpolation, in place of 'nothing...reason': "in every intensification of any form whatever, the degree of the preceding form is corrupted upon the advent of the other, subsequent form."
  5. ↑ Interpolation, in place of 'therefore...number': "the degree that precedes and that which arrives de novo are, in the case of this change of increase in the form, terms of the change, therefore they are not together at the same time; therefore one is corrupted when the other arrives."
  6. ↑ Interpolation, in place of n.200: "For this opinion [n.198] I add two reasons. The first is this: the more and less in the same species are related in the same way that the more and less in diverse species are proportionally related; but in diverse species the more that one species is more perfect than another the more perfectly it contains it and in a simpler way, such that the species contained by it does not make any addition to it; therefore since simplicity is perfection in all forms, it seems too that in the same species the simpler form is more perfect, not possessing a preceding degree or form added to it."
  7. ↑ Interpolation, in place of n.201: "Again, more and less in accidental forms are related in a way similar to that in which they are related in substantial forms, if there be more and less in substances; but according to everyone who posits a more and less in substantial form, the more perfect substance, even in the same species, is simpler than another one, not by making addition to the less perfect but by containing it in a simple way - as is posited about the soul of Christ, which was not more composite than the soul of Peter but simpler, and yet was more perfect in essence of soul; therefore it is the same way with accidental form."
  8. ↑ Interpolation, in place of nn.202-203: "Against this opinion [n.198] the argument goes as follows: the supposition is made that it is possible that God can increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, - so let it be posited in fact that he is then increasing charity. I ask then by which charity the meritorious act is elicited (because it is necessarily elicited by some charity, as was shown before [Reportatio IA d.17 n.27]); not by the newly infused charity which was increasing charity in the instant in which that charity was supporting the act, because the newly infused charity is the reward of such an act and follows that meritorious act in some order; nor is it elicited by the preceding charity, because according to you [Godfrey] it is corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is corrupted; therefore in the instant in which charity is increased there is a meritorious act and yet it is not from any charity, which is impossible."
  9. ↑ Interpolation, in place of nn.204-205: "You will say that God does not increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, but the act of charity passes by and stands in divine acceptance as something rewardable, and then God - accepting the meritorious act - afterward gives increase to the pre-existing charity as a sort of reward for the act, and he does not at once in the same instant give the reward along with the merit, just as he did not give beatitude to the good angels in the first instant in which they merited it but in some later instant of nature. - On the contrary: although this could be said in the proposed case about the infused virtues, yet it could not be said about the increase of the natural virtues, moral and intellectual, and especially the moral; for moral virtue is increased by moral acts, just as it is generated from them (Ethics 2.1.1103b21-22); therefore the act which augments and increases moral virtue is only increasing it when it exists. Therefore I ask whether, when it increases it, it does so from some virtue or not. If from some virtue, from which virtue? Not from the preceding one, because that is corrupted - nor from the degree that it brings about, because that is posterior as effect to its cause; therefore, when it increases virtue it does so not from any virtue; but this is impossible, because then it would not be virtuous and yet it would generate virtue, which is against the Philosopher and against all understanding, because "from like acts like habits are generated" [Ethics ibid.]. - One could argue in the same way about an intellectual act: when the act of speculating exists the intellectual or speculative habit is increased, because when the act does not exist it does nothing; but that act is not from the preceding habit, because then there is no such habit because it is corrupted (because in the instant in which it comes to be is the habit increased, not from the preceding degree [of the habit]); nor is it from the subsequent degree, because that is subsequent; therefore such an act cannot be said in any way to cause increase, because there is no term at which the increase comes to be."
  10. ↑ Interpolation, in place of n.207: "Again, the will can weaken an act of understanding, because it can corrupt the act of it altogether by its own willing, by turning it away from consideration of any secondary object so that it does not determinately consider it. But every act of the will is naturally preceded by an act of the intellect. In that instant, then, in which the will weakens the act of the intellect by its own imperative act, the intellect must be in its own act; not in the preceding intense act, because that act does not remain intense when the will thus weakens it, as the position holds; nor in the weakened act, because that act naturally follows the act of the will; therefore if the weakened act is not some part of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in the instant in which the will is in its act with respect to any object, the intellect is not first naturally in act with respect to that object, and then the will is willing something unknown, - which is impossible."
  11. ↑ Interpolation, in place of n.208: "Secondly I argue in this way by supposing that the second or third act could intensify the habit even though it is not more perfect or more intense than the first act, -then I argue: if the later act intensifies the habit and yet is not necessarily more intense nor more perfect than any preceding act whatever, then it does not generate a more perfect individual habit of charity, which is contrary to you [sc. Godfrey]. The proof of the consequence is that an act generating a habit cannot generate it save according to the proportion of its own virtue; so if this act, which is more imperfect than the first act, generates an individual habit of charity, and a more perfect one, this will be either in virtue of the preceding acts, and then these acts remain and are not corrupted, asthe opinion supposes [of Godfrey], - or by its own virtue, and then the effect will be more perfect than its whole cause in virtue, which is false."
  12. ↑ Text cancelled by Scotus: "The reasoning about natural agents [n.208] is also not solved; for posit that to something with nine degrees of heat there comes something hot in a lesser degree, then the latter can in some way intensify the former thing with its nine degrees of heat, and consequently the hot thing that will exist in the term of the action will be more perfect in heat than the agent is that comes to it and increases it; this would be impossible if it were 'a new individual' generated by the act of the now present hot thing. The proof of the major is that, according to the Philosopher Physics 8.10.266a24-b6, "a greater extensive virtue exists in a greater magnitude," - therefore if from the beginning the virtue in the greater magnitude is close to the thing acted on by it, it will act more; but this, as far as the action is concerned, is just the same as if it was one greater continuous magnitude, or was many magnitudes all together - contiguous with each other - equal to that one magnitude; therefore a less extensive magnitude, if it is from the beginning contiguous with a greater extensive hot thing, has power for introducing a more perfect form, - therefore, if from the beginning a large hot thing acts of itself, it will not introduce as great a form as would be introduced if some small hot thing were contiguous with it; therefore the thing acted on is left potential with respect to a degree [sc. of heat] that can be introduced by that lesser hot thing if it becomes contiguous, - therefore the lesser thing, when it arrives, will reduce it to act. Response: let everything be conceded up to the final consequence; but let that consequence be denied, because a lesser thing, when it arrives, does not find the thing that is acted on to be in a contrary disposition which it could conquer but it is conquered by that disposition - therefore it will be simply acted on, and if it does any little thing to the contrary, this will be by being more intensely weakened, but eventually it will be conquered.
    Nor can this be evaded by an order of degrees, to wit, that the agent can reduce the thing acted on, which was before in a different degree, to a more perfect degree than it could have reduced it to at the beginning, just as an agent can make a thing acted on, which is already organized, to be alive, and yet it cannot reduce a non-organized thing to as great a perfection as the prior one did (and this because of the order of forms in becoming, or of degrees in form, on account of which order the thing existing in a more imperfect degree can be at once reduced to a degree more perfect, - not so if it were not in that degree); this response - I say - is not valid, because if a thing hot in eight degrees intensifies a thing hot in nine degrees and this intensification is done by the heat of a weaker agent and by the generation of a new individual, then in the instant in which a thing hot in ten degrees is generated, the thing generated will exceed in perfection the heat of the generator - which is impossible; therefore increase does not happen in this way."
    This interpolation is followed by the following note of Duns Scotus: "The two reasons are against Godfrey, one that in alteration there is no continuous change (because what subject would it have?), the other that a changeable thing will be hot with many heats, because the part in a motion more remote from the mover is not as intense in form as a part close to the mover. [**] But what is set down here above under [the above interpolation] is not certain, because what is there supposed, namely that 'the weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies more intensely, even as to any degree at all', is rather the other way round, and then 'the thing that is acted on is contrary, insofar as what arrives is imperfect and is not able to conquer what is more perfect but is conquered by it, -therefore it does not act, or if it reacts in any respect, it will be more intensely weak in making it like itself; this does not seem to be an instance, save in the case of light; perhaps there something less virtuous than the first agent intensifies the effect of it, and yet it would not be capable in itself save of what is weaker in the form which it finds in the thing it acts on. What is the cause there if the hot thing does not so act?"
  13. ↑ A reference to the passage marked [**] in the note to n.209.
  14. ↑ Interpolation, in place of 212: "Third as follows: a hot thing corrupting a cold thing first weakens the cold thing; for two movements go together, intensification and increase in heat and weakening in coldness (namely the motion of intensifying heat and weakening coldness); therefore according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] a new individual cold thing is generated. I ask then for the term 'from which' of this motion towards coldness; it cannot be said that the greater coldness is what precedes, because this coldness is corrupted; nor is the weaker degree of cold that which follows, because then the effect would surpass its cause in entity and perfection, which is not intelligible, according to Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12 ch.16 n.33 and 83 Questions q.2. - Again, everything which moves is, while it moves, partly in the term 'from which' and partly in the term 'to which' (Physics 6.1.231b28-232a6). If therefore the hot thing acts on the cold thing, then in the whole motion the cold thing possesses something of the term 'to which' (namely something of hot); if then in the whole motion the cold thing is not weakened before it is corrupted, the consequence is that the extreme contrary, and not a weakened contrary, exists along with some degree of its contrary, and consequently, since these forms of contrariety do not have any latitude in being contrary, extreme contraries could at the same time be true. The cold thing then is weakened. Therefore, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] some supposit for cold is generated; but it is not generated from the preceding cold, because that has been corrupted; therefore it is generated from the hot, and thus the hot would generate the cold, which is impossible. - Again, fourth as follows: if the preceding form is always corrupted, the consequence is that there cannot be motion according to degree in the form of quality, because as soon as there is a departure from the term 'from which', another form is generated; therefore there will only be motion in quality according to the degree of the movable thing. But this is false, because then there would be a continuous motion whose parts were yet not joined to any common term, because the changing that joins them - I ask what is it in? Either it is in something divisible or in something indivisible; not in a part that is divisible, because no part is changed as a whole but part before part, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey]; therefore the motion would take place in an indivisible part, and so a point would become hot. - Again, it also follows that every heatable, while it is being heated, is heated with infinite heats; because if motion takes place precisely successively in accord with the degrees of the movable thing, since there are infinite parts in a movable thing (as in a heatable thing), at least potentially, and no part of the movable is made hot with the same degree of heat as another part, but with another heat and in another degree, - the result is that the whole will be made hot by infinite degrees of heat, which is impossible."
  15. ↑ Tr. Whiteness and blackness etc. are now posited to be most specific species in the genus of color, but if each of these has inferior species beneath it (sc. because each degree of whiteness or blackness is a sub-species under the species of white and black), then whiteness and blackness will be the genera of these inferior species and not most specific species themselves after all.
  16. ↑ Note by Duns Scotus: "The fifth argument needs to be solved in the case of substances, against which it draws its conclusion. The minor then is false [sc. nature in a determinate degree - in such and such a degree - is said of individuals in their 'whatness' and it is 'perse one thing'], because of the part that reads 'in their whatness', because the 'what' abstracts from all individual conditions, from 'more' just as much as from 'thisness' (Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11). 'More' is an individual condition, not a determinate one as is 'this', but an indeterminate one, because there can be the same degree though not the same 'this'; but not conversely; for there cannot be this individual without this degree. - On the contrary: in that case the degree is being understood to determine the nature rather than to determine the 'this', and to be doing so per se and at that prior stage; otherwise it is an accident and a common difference; therefore etc. Response: common, but not universal, because individual. - On the contrary: at least it is a per se predicable, a mean between the most specific species and the individual; likewise, some species is posited as being distinguished by degrees of the form, as animals by degrees of sensitive form and angels by degrees of intellective form. Response: a species states the 'what', a species in a certain degree states the 'what of the how much in virtue'; 'how much' is not a [specific] difference [I d.8 n.108]."
  17. ↑ [Interpolation] Further, the reasoning [n. 199] is not valid, because then it would work universally about any increase, and so in bodily increase the term that precedes and the degree that increases would be incompossibles, which is to destroy increase.
  18. ↑ Tr. In preparing the wine for consecration a small amount of water is added to it, and this small amount of water must, to that small extent, dilute the wine.
  19. ↑ a. [Interpolation] They reply - see elsewhere, and for the arguments contrary to it, namely in IV d.12 p.2 a.1 q.1 n.6-7, 14-17.
  20. ↑ a. [Interpolation, in place of n.225] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [Followed by this second interpolation] Nor is it corrupted per se, save as to the existence that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example comes from matter per se or form per se, which are not corrupted as they exist in the whole but remain in the whole more perfectly than when they had existence per se; the thing is plain in the case of a how much of bulk when it is increased. - As to the reason for this opinion [nn. 198-199] I say that the terms of motion per se, of which sort are privation and form, are incompossibles; but a weakened form and an increased form are not per se these sorts of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positive state. Weakened and intense forms are terms of motion not per se but per accidens, namely to the extent that a weakened form is conjoined to a per se term that is a privation; hence although the per se term 'from which' of motion is, as a privation, corrupted when the term 'to which' is reached, yet the form that per accidens accompanies such a term 'from which' need not be per se corrupted. A fallacy of the consequent is therefore committed, because the weakened form is a term 'from which' as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being per se, and this does not remain; but as it exists in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term 'to which', and thus it remains the same in number as before, but more intense and more perfect. - To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and so one species does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can exist at the same time, and the form is so much the more intense and more perfect the more it exists under such several degrees of form. It exists in opposite ways, then, in this case and in that. - To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less by way of the parts of bulk (rather he in this way concedes their existence there), therefore he denies in the accidents the more and less in this way, namely by way of parts of bulk; now he denies in substances the more and less by way of degrees of form, so he concedes them in this way in accidents. Hence, because he lays down that substantial form is in itself indivisible, therefore he does not posit one degree of form along with another; things are the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible by way of degrees, - therefore any degree is compatible with another degree and is perfected by it.
  21. ↑ The sign '(—)' was put here for this clause by Scotus.
  22. ↑ [Interpolation] To the principal reason [see interpolation to n. 196] I say that the form is not the subject of the change but is related to diverse degrees of it as a species to two individuals that possess the being of the species de novo; and the form is not the subject of them because, when individuals are multiplied de novo, the species begins now to be in one individual and now to be in another; hence there is no change of form according to those degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature of the form but they are intrinsic modes, asserting a certain degree of virtual quantity of that form.
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