Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D17B/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question TwoWhether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity
235 Secundo quaero utrum illud positivum caritatis praeexsistentis quod manet in augmento, sit tota essentia caritatis intensae, ita quod si poneretur caritas intensa sine subiecto, nullam realitatem ƿpositivam haberet in se essentialiter, aliam ab illa quae praefuit in caritate remissa. Et quod hoc modo realitas caritatis praeexsistentis sit tota essentia et realitas caritatis auctae, probo: VIII Metaphysicae: 'formae sunt sicut numeri', - quoad hoc quod 'sicut quilibet numerus additus variat numerum, ita quilibet gradus in forma additus variat speciem'; ergo in essentia huiusmodi formae non potest addi aliquid manente eadem specie. Supponitur autem quod intensa est eiusdem speciei cum remissa, ergo non additur ibi aliquis gradus ultra realitatem illius formae.	235. Secondly I ask whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity, such that if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have in itself essentially no positive reality other than that which preexisted in the mild charity. And that the reality of the preexisting charity is in this way the whole essence and reality of the increased charity I prove thus: Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: "forms are like numbers," - in this respect, that 'just as any number, when added, changes the number, so any degree in form, when added, changes the species'; therefore nothing can be added to the essence of this sort of form while the species remains the same. But the supposition is being made that the intense form is of the same species as the mild one, and so no degree over and above the reality of the form is there added.
236 Praeterea, X Metaphysicae cap. paenultimo, dicit Philosophus quod 'differentiae formales mutant speciem': differentia graduum in essentia formae si esset, esset differentia formalis.	236. Further, in Metaphysics 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that "formal differences change the species:" a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.
237 Praeterea, Porphyrius dicit quod differentia formalis non recipit magis nec minus: ((Esse)) - inquit - ((uniuscuiusque unum et idem est, neque intensionem recipiens neque remissionem)).	237. Further, Porphyry says [The Predicables 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: "The existence," he says, "of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease."
238 Praeterea, auctor Sex principiorum: ((Forma est simplici et invariabili essentia consistens)).	238. Further, the author of the Six Principles [ch.1 n.1] says: "Form consists of a simple and invariable essence."
239 Praeterea, si aliqua realitas advenit praeexsistenti, ergo caritas aucta non erit in specie, quia includet aliquid accidentale naturae specificae; vel si ipsa sit per se in specie, nihil includit nisi aliquid ƿpertinens ad naturam speciei, - et ita caritas minor, quae non includit illum gradum, non erit in specie.	239. Further, if any reality is added to a preexisting charity, then charity when increased will not be in the species, because it will include something that is accidental to the specific nature; or if it is per se in the species, it does not include anything other than what belongs to the nature of the species - and so the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in the species.
240 Contra: Tunc caritas cuiuslibet beati esset aequalis in natura caritatis caritati Christi; et cum secundum Augustinum VI De Trinitate cap. 7 in rebus ((incorporeis idem sit maius esse quod melius esse)), caritas cuiuslibet beati esset aeque bona secundum se caritati Christi, et ita quilibet foret aeque beatus.	240. On the contrary: In that case [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity were the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235] the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 "in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater," the charity of any of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.
241 Opinio innitens argumentis factis ad primam partem, videtur dicere quod praescindendo formam a subƿiecto, non est magis et minus in forma secundum se per realitatem additam; et quia secundum auctoritates oportet ibi salvare aliquo modo magis et minus, oportet ibi ponere secundum inesse accidentis ipsi subiecto (quod quidem inesse est ipsi esse), et ita maioritas quantum ad inesse attribuitur vel maiori dispositioni subiecti vel maiori amotioni oppositi indisponentis.	241. [Exposition of the Opinion] - An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject's existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.
242 Contra istam positionem arguo primo sic: contraria in summo sunt incompossibilia in eodem, in gradibus remissis non. Hoc autem non est nisi quia aliquid est in contrario intenso, quod non est in remisso: si enim tota realitas est in intenso quae est in remisso, non est repugnantia remissi ad intensum. - Sed ista incompossibilitas non est habitudo ad subiectum, ƿnec ex habitudine aliqua ad subiectum: prior enim est incompossibilitas formarum in se quam sit formarum in tertio ut in subiecto recipiente (quia enim sunt in se incompossibiles, ideo non possunt recipi in eodem, - non e converso). Ergo illud quod est ratio incompossibilitatis in intensis, est aliquid positivum in eis secundum se, non tantum in ordine ad subiectum.	242. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees. But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. - But this inability to coexist, or incompossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the incompossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the incompossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are incompossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, - not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their incompossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.
243 Praeterea, idem non potest bis produci, et per consequens non potest aliqua realitas per aliquam mutationem acquiri; ergo illa realitas quae acquiritur per motum vel mutationem intensionis, non est eadem positive cum illa quae praefuit, quia tunc illud quod praeexsistit realiter acquireretur.	243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.
244 Praeterea, si forma est indivisibilis, dat subiecto esse indivisibile et indivisibiliter: non enim subiectum est tale secundum formam nisi quia forma est talis; ergo si forma est talis secundum se, non est aliqua maioritas perfectionis, nec subiectum secundum eam dicetur magis tale secundum eam.	244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.
245 Praeterea, contra istos modos, quibus ponitur magis et minus in forma. Primo contra illum modum de dispositione ad magis et minus: ƿSi enim est eadem dispositio - id est secundum rationem unius ad magis et minus, et illa dispositio est forma, sequitur quod in aliqua forma est magis et minus. Si igitur in aliqua forma est dispositio non secundum rationem unius dispositionis, ad magis et minus, sicut aliqui volunt dicere quod in aere humiditas est dispositio ad minorem caliditatem et siccitas in igne est dispositio ad maiorem caliditatem, - contra hoc arguo: una species, secundum ƿse totam, videtur habere in susceptivo rationem unius dispositionis. Praeterea, tunc non erit motus unus ab intenso ad remissum, nec e converso: nihil enim movebitur ad remissum nisi quod habet dispositionem convenientem receptioni eius; intensum autem non habet illam dispositionem convenientem remisso; ergo oportet, ad hoc ut possit moveri ad remissum, quod moveatur ad dispositionem convenientem gradui remisso, - et ita oportet ad hoc ut ex intenso fiat remissum, quod prius fiat motus a dispositione quae est ad intensum, ad dispositionem quae est ad remissum, et ita numquam unus motus immediate erit ab intenso ad remissum, quia non habent idem susceptivum immediatum, conveniens utrique dispositioni.	245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less: For if there is the same disposition - that is, same in idea of being one - to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form. If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say becausehumidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat, - against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition. Further, then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree -and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and so there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptive subject agreeing with each disposition.
246 Alia via, quae dicit de dispositione sive de amotione contrarii indisponentis, videtur improbari per hoc quod in angelis in statu ƿinnocentiae non erat aliqua dispositio maior vel minor ad caritatem; ergo omnes recepissent caritatem aequalem, quod non tenetur.	246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.
247 Tertia etiam via - quae tenetur a quibusdam - 'de radicatione formae in subiecto', videtur improbari, quia ista radicatio aut est aliqua forma absoluta (et habetur propositum, quod in tali est magis et minus), aut non. Si non, sed tantum respectus, tunc videtur quod non possunt habere magis et minus nisi per magis et minus in fundamento, sicut absoluta non conveniunt in respectu nisi per fundamentum.	247. Also a third way - which is held by some people - about 'the rooting down of the form in the subject' seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.
248 Tunc etiam non proprie salvatur forma intensior, quia aliquando forma minus radicata in subiecto potest in se esse intensior: sicut rubor ex verecundia potest esse intensior rubore qui est qualitas passibilis in alio.	248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved, because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.
249 Ad hanc quaestionem concedo - praecipue propter tres rationes primas contra istam opinionem adductas - quod realitas positiva, quae praeexstitit in caritate minore, non est tota realitas positiva quae est in caritate maiore. Immo, si essent caritas maior et minor ƿseparatae a subiecto, maior haberet in se realitatem positivam minoris et aliquam additam: si per impossibile tolleretur omnis habitudo ad subiectum (sicut quantitas molis, si poneretur separata a subiecto), etiam si per impossibile non haberet inclinationem ad subiectum, una tamen esset maior alia, et illa haberet in se totam realitatem positivam minoris et aliquid additum.	249. As to this question [n.235] I concede - especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] - that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if per impossibile all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if per impossibile it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.
250 Ad argumenta in oppositum. Ad primum - de numeris - dico quod procedit ex defectu intellectus Philosophi. Comparat quidem ibi Philosophus quiditates ad numeros, in quantum sunt definibiles, eo modo quo Plato loquebatur de quiditatibus, ponendo quiditates separatas; substantiae quidem hoc modo acceptae, id est quiditates rerum, comparantur numeris secundum illas quattuor proprietates, - quarum una est ista, quod 'quodlibet additum variat speciem': et intelligo sic, quod de specie faciat aliam speciem vel quod de non specie faciat speciem. Quaelibet enim differentia, addita definitioni, aut indicat quiditatem, aut speciem aliam a praeexsistente constituit, aut si praeexsistens fuit ratio generis, determinat ad rationem speciei, quae non habebatur ante additionem differentiae.	250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239]. To the first - about numbers [n.235] - I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. The Philosopher is there in fact comparing quiddities to numbers, to the extent they are definable, in the way Plato used to speak of quiddities, by positing them as separate [Scotus, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way, the quiddities of things, are indeed compared to numbers according to the four properties [ibid. nn.22-25] - one of which is this, that 'anything added changes the species'; and I understand it thus, that the addition makes another species from the species, or that it makes a species from a non-species. For any difference, when added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the nature of a genus it determines it to the nature of a species, which is something that was not had before the addition of the difference.
251 Dico ergo quod additum quiditati, acceptae secundum rationem quiditatis, alterat speciem, altero dictorum modorum. Sed quod additur non quiditati ut quiditas est, non mutat; gradus autem individualis quicumque, sicut et differentia individualis contrahens ad esse 'hoc', sive unitas sive pluralitas individualis, et breviter quaecumque condicio individualis addita naturae specificae, non additur sibi quantum ad rationem quiditativam, ita quod secundum illam rationem determinet eam, et propter hoc non mutat speciem quidiƿtatis cui additur: non enim potest neque in aliam speciem praeexsistentem mutare, neque de non specie in aliquam speciem, nisi ipsum additum sit ratio speciei, - et tale non est aliqua condicio individualis.	251. I say, then, that an addition to the quiddity, when the quiddity is taken according to the idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species]. But what is not added to a quiddity as it is a quiddity does not change the species; now any individual degree, just as also an individual difference that contracts a thing to being a 'this', whether it is an individual unity or an individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is added; for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor can it change it from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is of the idea of a species, - and no individual condition is of this sort.
252 Ad formam tunc auctoritatis dico quod si adderetur aliquid quod esset pars quiditativa, quiditati praeexsistenti, mutaret speciem, sicut si addatur aliquid quod est pars numeri numero praeexsistenti, mutatur species numeri; si autem addatur aliquid quod non est natum esse pars numeri (puta aliquod accidens), vel pars - numeri materialis (puta si intelligeretur una unitas ternarii fieri intensior quam prius), in se non mutaretur species. Ita in proposito: quaecumque differentia individualis (vel gradus) additur quiditati, non est nata esse pars quiditatis.	252. Next, as to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of number were added to a preexisting number the species of the number would be changed; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or is a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were made more intense than before [e.g. made more white]), then the species would not in itself be changed. So in the proposed case: any individual difference (or degree) that is added to a quiddity is not of the nature to be a part of the quiddity.
253 Per idem apparet ad Porphyrium, qui simili modo loquitur de differentia in quantum est per se pars definitionis. Hoc modo consistit in indivisibili, hoc est accipiendo secundum illam indifferentiam secundum quam abstrahitur ab individuis, quae indifferentia - totalis - est gradus eius ut est differentia specifica; sic non recipit magis et minus, quia 'quaecumque magis et minus' possunt competere individuis hoc modo, et sunt omnia intra istam indifferentiam differentiae et non addunt differentiae secundum hanc indifferentiam. ƿ	253. By the same fact [n.252] the response is plain as regard Porphyry [n.237], that he likewise is speaking of difference insofar as it is a per se part of definition. Difference in this way consists in something indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which indifference - in its totality - is its degree as it is a specific difference; for thus it does not receive the more and less, because 'all cases of more and less' can belong to individuals in this way and these cases are all within this indifference of the difference and do not, in accord with this indifference, add anything to the difference.
254 Ad illud de X Metaphysicae potest responderi per idem, vocando differentiam formalem 'differentiam quiditativam'.	254. To the passage from the Metaphysics 10 [n.236] the same response can be made, by calling formal difference 'quidditative difference'.
255 Potest etiam dici - ad formam - quod non omnis differentia formarum est formalis, proprie loquendo de formali, prout videlicet differentia formalis est differentia secundum formas, sicut non omnis differentia hominum est differentia in humanitate. Cuius ratio assignatur et realiter et logice. Realiter sic: possunt homines habere humanitatem, et differre, licet non per humanitatem, - et ita in humanitate non differunt; ita possunt purae formae differre, et tamen non per formalitatem differunt, et ita nec formaliter, quia idem est differre formaliter - proprie loquendo - quod differre in forma vel secundum formam. Logice sic: quia terminus differentiae intelligitur per negationem, inclusam in differentia, respectu illius negationis potest accipi confuse et distributive; ita etiam illud quod denominatur esse ratio differentiae (quale est illud quod construitur cum differre, ut in quo vel secundum quod denominatur), quod posset confundi a negatione. Nunc autem ad negationem inferioris non sequitur negatio superioris, sed est destructio antecedentis et fallacia consequentis. ƿ	255. One can also reply - as to the form - that not every difference of forms is a formal difference, speaking properly of formal difference, namely insofar as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference in men is a difference in the form of humanity. A reason in reality and in logic is assigned for this. In reality as follows: men can possess the form of humanity and be different, though not by humanity - and so they do not differ in humanity; thus pure forms can differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not be formally different, because to differ formally -properly speaking - is the same as to differ in form or according to form. In logic as follows: because the term of a difference is understood through the negation that is included in the difference, therefore it can be taken confusedly or distributively with respect to that negation; so too, that which is denominated as being the idea of the difference (of which sort is what is construed along with the verb 'differ', as that in which or according to which the denomination is made) could be confounded by the negation. But, as it is, the negation of the superior does not follow on the negation of the inferior, but there is denial of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.
256 Ad aliud, de Sex principiis: sicut probat simplicitatem formae, ita concedenda est sibi conclusio. Probat autem simplicitatem oppositam quantitati molis, quia ipsa addita non facit magis secundum molem (forma enim posita in subiecto non est aliquid magis quam prius fuit). Concedatur ergo simplicitas formae opposita quantitati molis, - sed hoc nihil est contra intensionem secundum magis, quae pertinet ad propositum.	256. To the other authority from the Six Principles [n.238]: its conclusion is to be conceded in the way it proves the simplicity of the form. But it proves a simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when a form is added it does not make a greater in bulk (for a form when placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let a simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded - but this is nothing against an intensity in amount, which is what pertains to the proposed case.
257 Ad rationem illam dico quod hoc quod dicitur 'aliquid accidere naturae speciei', potest intelligi duobus modis: uno modo sic quod sit extra rationem quiditativam speciei, quomodo dicitur differentia accidere generi, - et sic accipitur accidens in fallacia accidentis pro extraneo, quod est extra rationem alterius; alio modo dicitur accidens, quod non facit 'per se unum' cum eo cui accidit, sicut albedo cum corpore. Primo modo, dico quod albedo intensa aliquid habet quod accidit naturae speciei (ita etiam habet albedo remissa, immo omne individuum habet aliquid quod accidit naturae speciei, - alias non contraheretur natura speciei); secundo modo, dico quod intensa non habet aliquid quod accidit naturae speciei, quia ille gradus qui intelligitur addi naturae secundum se, facit 'unum per se' cum natura, sicut et quaecumque differentia individualis addita naturae facit 'unum per se' cum natura. Quando ergo dicis 'si intensum includit aliquid quod accidit naturae speciei, ergo remissum quod non includit illud, non est in specie', consequentia non valet loquendo de accidente primo modo sumpto, quo modo - et non alio - antecedens est verum.	257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to the remark 'something that is accidental to the nature of the species', it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus - and in this way an accident is taken in the fallacy of accident for something extraneous that is outside the idea of another thing; in another way an accident is said to be what does not make a 'per se unity' together with that of which it is an accident, as white together with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which is accidental to the nature of the species (so also does a mild whiteness, nay any individual has something that is accidental to the nature of the species -otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted to individuals); in the second way I say that an intense whiteness does not have something that is accidental to the nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in itself makes a 'per se unity' with the nature, just as any individual difference added to the nature makes a 'per se unity' with the nature. When therefore you say 'if the intense thing includes something which is accidental to the nature of the species, then the mild thing, which does not include it, is not in the species' [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, but the antecedent is true in this first way -and not in the other way.