Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4F

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 4
327 Ad rationes principales. Ad primam dico quod Averroes in VIII Physicorum commento 49, cuius textus incipit ((Utrum unumquodque moventium)), non loquitur expresse nisi de homine, et quoad hoc contradicit Avicennae, sicut ipse dicit ibidem. Imponit igitur Avicennae quod posuerit quod homo poterat generari aequivoce, - et tunc conclusio Averrois vera est, quia nullum generabile univoce potest generari aequivoce, nisi sit ita imperfectum quod causa aequivoca sive univoca sufficit ad generationem eius; et ideo imperfecta entia possunt generari univoce et aequivoce, perfecta autem non. Tamen rationes Averrois videntur concludere non tantum de homine, sed de quacumque specie naturalium generabilium: et si hoc intendat, conclusio eius est falsa, et rationes non concludunt.	327. To the principal reasons [nn.212-218]. – To the first [n.212] I say that Averroes in comment 49 on the Physics 8, whose text begins “Whether each of the moving things,” is only speaking expressly of man, and on this point he is contradicting Avicenna (On the Nature of Animals, XV ch.1 59rb-va), as he himself says in the same place. He imputes to Avicenna, then, that he posited that man could be generated equivocally, – and in that case the conclusion of Averroes [n.212] is true, because nothing univocally generable can be generated equivocally unless it is so imperfect that an equivocal or a univocal cause is sufficient for its generation; and therefore imperfect beings can be generated univocally and equivocally but not perfect ones. However, the reasons of Averroes [nn.213-214] seem to prove the conclusion not only about man but about any species of natural generable things; and if he does not intend this, his conclusion is false and his reasons not conclusive.
328 Quod conclusio sua sit falsa, patet per Augustinum III De Trinitate cap. 9. Et ratio Augustini ibidem est, quod generatum ƿper putrefactionem propagat alia; propagantia autem sunt univoca generatis a se: igitur propagata et generata per putrefactionem sunt univoca.	328. That his conclusion [n.212] is false is plain from Augustine On the Trinity III ch.8 n.13. And the reason of Augustine, in the same place, is that a generated thing propagates other things through putrefaction; but the propagators are univocal with the things generated by them; therefore things propagated and generated by putrefaction are univocal.
329 Quod si negat Averroes assumptum de apibus et de animalibus, non potest negare de plantis, quia aequivoce generatae, hoc est non de semine, postea producunt univoce semen, ex quo generantur plantae aliae eiusdem speciei.	329. But if Averroes deny the assumption of bees and of animals, he cannot deny it of plants, because plants equivocally generated, that is, not generated from seed, do afterwards produce semen univocally, from which are generated other plants of the same species.
330 Contradicit etiam ei Augustinus in Epistola ad Deogratias, et Ambrosius De Incarnatione, in fine.	330. Augustine also contradicts him in Letter to Deogratias q.1 n.4, and so does Ambrose On the Incarnation at the end, ch.9 nn.101-102.
331 Sed et ipsemet contradicit sibi ipsi in aliis locis de hac conclusione. Nam de generatione accidentium aequivoca patet per ipsum II De caelo et mundo commento 42, ubi ipse concedit quod in accidentibus non semper est generatio ab univoco; et ponit exemplum de calore et igne: ponit enim quod calor generatur aequivoce ex ƿmotu et ex concursu radiorum, et etiam a calore univoce. - In substantiis etiam patet quod ignis generatur et univoce et aequivoce. Quod aequivoce, patet III De caelo commento 56: ((Exitus ignis a lapide non est de capitulo translationis, sed de capitulo alterationis)), hoc est non generatur per lationem, sed per alterationem; generatur etiam per motum localem, XII Metaphysicae commento 19, et I Meteorologicorum de generatione impressionum ignitarum. - Item patet de animalibus quod multa generantur aequivoce, XII Metaphysicae commento 19: ((Vespae enim videntur fieri de corporibus equorum mortuorum, et apes de corporibus vaccarum)), etc.	331. But Averroes himself also contradicts himself in other places about this conclusion. For about the equivocal generation of accidents he himself makes it plain in On the Heavens 2 com.42, where he himself concedes that in accidents there is not always generation by a univocal cause; and he sets down an example about heat and fire; for he posits that heat is generated equivocally from the motion and the concourse of rays, and also univocally from heat. – In substances too it is plain that fire is generated univocally and equivocally. That it is generated equivocally is plain from On the Heavens com.56: “The proceeding of fire from a stone is not in the chapter on transfer but in the chapter on alteration,” that is, it is not generated by transference but by alteration; it is also generated by local motion, Metaphysics 12 com.19, and Meteorology 1 summa II ch.1, about the generation of ignition by striking. – The same is plain about animals, that many are generated equivocally, Metaphysics 12 com.19: “For wasps seem to come to be from the bodies of dead horses, and bees from the bodies of dead cows, etc.”
332 Quod autem omnia praedicta generata aequivoce sint eiusdem speciei cum generatis univoce, probatur, quia habent easdem operationes, et circa eadem obiecta; ab eisdem conservantur et ab eisdem corrumpuntur. Eosdem habent motus, sive quantum ad ƿsursum sive quantum ad deorsum, sive quantum ad motum progressivum et eadem organa motus progressivi; ex unitate autem motus concludit Aristoteles I De caelo et mundo unitatem naturae, et Commentator ibidem commento 8: ((motus unus non provenit nisi ex unitate naturae)). Habent etiam - haec et illa membra eiusdem speciei, et ((membra leonis non differunt a membris cervi nisi quia anima ab anima)), I De anima. Et generaliter, quaecumque media possunt concludere unitatem specificam, sive sumpta ex actibus sive ex operationibus, concludunt propositum de univocatione generatorum sic et sic.	332. But that all the aforesaid generated things are of the same species with things generated univocally is proved by the fact they have the same operations, and operations about the same objects; they are preserved by the same things and are corrupted by the same things. They have the same motions, either as to going up or down, or as to progress forward and as to the same organs of progress forward; but from the unity of motion Aristotle concludes, in On the Heavens 1.2.269a2-7, to the unity of nature, and the Commentator in com.8 at the same place says: “unity of motion only comes from unity of nature.” These – the former and the latter generated things – also have limbs of the same species, and “the limbs of a lion do not differ from those of a deer save because soul differs from soul,” Averroes On the Soul 1 com.53. And generally all the middle terms that prove unity of species, whether these terms are taken from acts or from operations, prove the intended proposition about the univocity of things generated in this way and in that.
333 Conclusioni etiam Averrois Philosophus contradicit VII Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod sicut aliqua eadem fiunt ab arte et a casu, quando scilicet principium est in materia simile illi quod esset principium motus factionis si idem fieret ab arte, ita vult quod quaedam naturalia fiunt a natura et a casu, et quaedam non; et ibidem Averroes - et incipit textus ((Ergo sicut in syllogismis)) vult quod illa possunt generari sine semine, et per consequens ƿsecundum ipsum aequivoce, in quorum materia potest induci virtute caelesti aliqua virtus, similis virtuti seminis in propagatis.	333. Averroes’ conclusion is also contradicted by the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.9.1034a9-14, 30-b7, where his intention is that, just as some of the same things come to be by nature and by chance, namely when the principle is in a matter similar to what would be the principle of the motion of making if the same thing were to come to be by art, so his intention is that some of the natural things come to be by nature and by chance, and some do not; and in the same place Averroes’ intention – and the text begins “Therefore just as in syllogisms” [Metaphysics 7 com.31] – is that those things can be generated without semen, and consequently, according to him, equivocally, in whose matter some virtue, similar to the virtue of semen in propagated things, can be introduced by the virtue of the heavens.
334 Patet igitur oppositum conclusionis Averrois si generaliter et universaliter intelligatur.	334. Therefore the opposite of the conclusion of Averroes is plain, if he be understood generally and universally.
335 Rationes etiam suae non concludunt. - Ad primam respondeo: materia secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae est ((ex qua fit res cum insit)); 'cum insit' additur ad differentiam oppositi, ex quo transmutato et corrupto fit res, non autem inest rei factae. Si autem accipiat quod 'forma eiusdem rationis est materiae eiusdem rationis' proprie loquendo de materia quae est pars rei inexsistens, concedo; sed si accipiat materiam pro opposito, ex quo corrupto generatur compositum, nego: ignis enim eiusdem speciei generatur sive ex ligno corrupto sive ex aere corrupto. In propagatis autem et putrefactis est materia eiusdem rationis primo modo, sed non secundo modo.	335. His arguments too are not conclusive. – To the first [n.213] I reply: matter according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013a24-25 is that “from which, when present within, a thing comes to be;” ‘when present within’ is added to differentiate the opposite case, when a thing comes to be from something that is transmuted and corrupted but that is not present within the thing made. – But if he take the phrase ‘a form of the same nature belongs to matter of the same nature’, speaking properly of matter as it is a part of a thing which exists within that thing, I concede the point; but if he take matter for the opposite, for that from which, when corrupted, the composite is generated, I deny it; for fire of the same species is generated either from corrupted wood or from corrupted air. In propagated things, however, and things putrefied, the matter is of the same nature in the first way but not in the second way.
336 Ad secundum dico quod non dicitur aliquid fieri raro vel ut in pluribus quia ipsum in se contingat frequenter vel raro; frequentius enim lapis cadens frangit caput quam luna eclipsetur. Sed ista differentia debet intelligi per comparationem alicuius ad suam causam: et dicitur ille effectus eveniens in maiori parte, qui ƿhabet causam ordinatam ad suum eventum, quae ut in pluribus producit effectum; raro dicitur evenire quod non habet causam ordinatam ad suum eventum, sed tantum provenit ex aliqua causa ordinata ad alium effectum, impedita tamen ab illo effectu ad quem ordinatur, et ex tali impeditione evenit istud raro. - Accipitur etiam raro vel ut in pluribus prout disiungit inter opposita contradictoria, non prout inter disparata disiungit.	336. To the second [n.214] I say that something is not said to happen rarely or for the most part because it is in itself a frequent or rare contingency; for a falling stone breaks someone’s head more frequently than the moon is eclipsed. But the difference should be understood by comparison of a thing to its cause; and that effect is said to come about for the most part which has, ordered to the effect, a cause which produces the effect for the most part; that is said to come about rarely which does not have a cause ordered to its coming about but arises only from some cause that is ordered to another effect but that has been prevented from the effect it is ordered to, and from this preventing the thing comes about rarely. – The rare or for the most part are also taken as they distinguish between contradictory opposites, not as they distinguish between disparate things.
337 Cum ergo arguit quod generabile hoc si generatur aequivoce sive non ex semine: 'aut ergo ex necessitate', concedo quod non; 'aut in maiori parte vel raro', concedo quod in maiori parte, comparando ad causam determinatam, et etiam ut est disiunctio inter contradictoria, licet rarius eveniat quod hoc generetur non ex ƿsemine quam quod generetur ex semine, ut videlicet comparantur ad invicem duo disparata.	337. So when he [Averroes, Physics 8 com.46] argues that if this generable thing is generated equivocally, or not from semen, ‘then either it is from necessity’, and this I concede it is not, ‘or it is for the most part or rare’, and this I concede it is for the most part, by comparison to determinate cause and also as distinction between contradictories, although it more rarely happen that this generable thing is generated not from semen than that it is generated from semen, namely as two things disparate among themselves are compared.
338 Quod autem primo modo eveniat ut in pluribus, probatur: ita enim per se sol est causa ordinata ad generandum non ex semine sicut est propagans causa ordinata ad generandum ex semine illud. Si inferat quod si secundo modo raro evenit, 'ergo a casu', non sequitur, - et ita arguit ulterius de casualitate prout casualia dicuntur illa quae eveniunt tantum ex causa alterius effectus impedita; et ideo, ut dicit, casualia sunt monstruosa et non perfecta in aliqua specie.	338. Now, the proof that in the first way a thing happens for the most part is: for thus is the sun per se a cause ordered to generating not from semen, just as a propagating cause is ordered to generating it from semen. If he infers that if in the second way something happens rarely then it happens ‘by chance’, the consequence does not follow, – and he argues further in this way about causality insofar as those things are said to be by chance that happen only from an impeded cause of another thing; and therefore, as he says, chance things are monstrous and not perfect in any species [n.214].
339 Cum arguitur tertio de motu et termino, respondeo quod ista propositio 'motuum differentium specie, sunt termini differentes specie' non est immediata, sed pendet ex aliis duabus: prima est, 'in motibus differentibus specie, sunt formae fluentes, vel formae secundum quas sunt fluxus, differentes specie'; secunda est, ƿ'forma fluens, vel forma secundum quam est fluxus, est eiusdem rationis cum forma terminante'. Ubi altera istarum duarum est falsa, propositio assumpta est falsa. Ita est in proposito, quia forma inducta per productionem non est eiusdem rationis cum forma quae est quasi fluens vel secundum quam est quasi fluxus.	339. When the argument is made, third, about motion and its term [n.215], I reply that this proposition ‘of motions different in species the terms are different in species’ is not an immediate one, but it depends on these two: the first is ‘in motions differing in species, the transient forms, or forms according to which there is transience, are different in species’; the second is, ‘a transient form, or a form according to which there is transience, is of the same nature as the terminating form’. When one of these two is false, the assumed proposition is false. So it is in the proposed case, because the form introduced by the production is not of the same nature as the form which is quasitransient or according to which there is quasi-transience.
340 Sed adhuc videtur remanere difficultas argumentorum Averrois. Licet enim eadem natura possit communicari aequivoce et univoce, non tamen ab aliquo eiusdem speciei, sed ab individuo unius speƿciei tantum univoce communicatur, aequivoce autem a causa superiori; natura autem divina non communicatur ab aliqua causa superiori, sed tantum ab aliquo in eadem natura; igitur videtur quod natura illa non habeat communicationem nisi unius rationis.	340. But the difficulty of Averroes’ arguments still seems to remain. For although the same nature might be communicated equivocally and univocally, yet not by something of the same species, but it is only univocally caused by an individual of one species and equivocally by a superior cause; but divine nature is not communicated by any superior cause, but only by something in the same nature; therefore it seems that the nature would not have a communication save in one idea.
341 Respondeo quod natura creata non potest communicari nisi communicatione unius rationis a supposito illius naturae; ratio est, quia effectus non excedit causam. Effectus autem communicatus a tali supposito est natura; ergo oportet quod principium communicandi sit natura, quia nihil perfectius natura est in tali supposito communicante, nec aliquid aeque perfectum naturae. Natura autem est principium communicativum unius rationis; ergo supposito agenti virtute naturae competit communicatio tantum unius rationis.	341. I reply that created nature cannot be communicated save by a communication in one idea from a supposit of that nature; the reason is that the effect does not exceed the cause. But the communicated effect from such a supposit is nature; therefore the principle of communicating should be nature, because nothing more perfect than nature, nor anything equally perfect with nature, exists in such a communicating supposit. But nature is a communicative principle in one idea; therefore to a supposit acting by virtue of nature there belongs a communication only in one idea.
342 Oppositum est in proposito, quia suppositum istius naturae potest habere principia alterius rationis in producendo quorum utrumque sit aeque perfectum cum natura, et ideo utrumque potest esse principium communicandi naturam; et ita hic potest esse duplex communicatio ab illis suppositis quae sunt huius naturae.	342. The opposite exists in the proposed case [sc. of the divine nature], because a supposit of that nature can have principles of a different idea in producing, each of which is equally perfect with nature, and therefore each can be a principle for communicating nature; and so here there can be a twofold communication by supposits which are of this nature.
343 $a Si instetur quod duplex principium operandi in nobis, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, est aeque perfectum ipsi naturae, quia ƿidem formae, secundum unam opinionem de potentiis animae, - respondeo: a$ licet in nobis sit duplex principium operativum, voluntas et intellectus, et ambo sint perfecta principia operandi et possint habere operationes perfectas sibi adaequatas in ratione perfectionis operationis, non tamen habent operationes sibi adaequatas in esse, hoc est, licet per intellectum nostrum possimus habere intellectionem ita perfectam sicut aliqua potest naturae nostrae competere, non tamen ista intellectio erit ita perfectum ens ut natura, quia intellectio adaequata intellectui ut potentiae vel obiecto in ratione operationis, non est adaequata obiecto vel intellectui in esse. Intellectus igitur et voluntas, scilicet in creatura, licet sint principia producendi operationes adaequatas sibi in ratione operationis, non tamen in esse, et per consequens multo magis nec realiter adaequatas naturae cuius est intellectus et voluntas. Ita potest argui de quibuscumque principiis productivis in creaturis quorum distinctio stat in eodem supposito alicuius naturae. ƿ	343. If an instance be made that the twofold principle of operating in us, namely intellect and will, is equally perfect with the nature, because it is equally perfect with the form, according to one opinion about the powers of the soul, – I reply that although in us there is a twofold operative principle, will and intellect, and both are perfect principles of operating and can have perfect operations adequate to themselves in idea of perfection of operation, yet they do not have operations adequate to themselves in being, that is, although by our intellect we can have an intellection as perfect as any that can belong to our nature, yet this intellection will not be as perfect a being as nature, because an intellection adequate to the intellect, as to a power or object, in idea of operation, is not adequate to the object or intellect in being. The intellect therefore and will, namely in the creature, although they are principles of producing adequate to themselves in idea of operation, are yet not so in being, and consequently much more are they not really adequate to the nature of which they are the intellect and will. Thus can one argue about any productive principles in creatures, the distinction between which principles stands in the same supposit of some nature.
344 In divinis autem principium operativum non tantum aequatur naturae in ratione principii operativi, sed etiam in essendo; operatio etiam aequatur principio operativo, et hoc in essendo, et per consequens aequatur naturae. Similiter principium productivum aequatur naturae in essendo.	344. But in divine reality the operative principle is not only equal with the nature in idea of operative principle but also in being; the operation is also equal with the operative principle, and that in being, and consequently it is equal with nature. Likewise the productive principle is equal with nature in being.
345 Ad argumenta quae probant quod non sunt tantum in Deo duo principia productiva. - Cum primo arguitur de natura et intellectu quod sunt duo principia productiva distincta per Philosophum II Physicorum, respondeo quod Philosophus parum locutus est de.voluntate ut distinguitur contra intellectum, sed communiter in ratione principii activi coniunxit intellectum ad voluntatem; et ideo in II Physicorum, ubi distinguit ista principia activa, naturam scilicet et intellectum, intellectus non debet intelligi ibi ut distinguitur contra voluntatem sed ut concurrit cum voluntate, constituendo idem principium respectu artificialium. ƿ	345. To the arguments which prove that there are not just two productive principles in God [nn.216-218]. – First, when it is argued about nature and intellect that they are two distinct productive principles, from the Philosopher Physics 2.5.196b17-22, I reply that the Philosopher spoke little about the will as it is distinguished from the intellect, but he commonly conjoined intellect with will in idea of active principle; and therefore in the Physics passage, where he distinguished these active principles, namely nature and intellect, the intellect should not be understood there as it is distinguished from the will but as it goes along with the will, by constituting one and the same principle in respect of artifacts.
346 Hoc patebit respondendo ad instantiam Philosophi de IX Metaphysicae, ad quam dico quod intellectus comparatur ad suam naturam et ad suam propriam operationem, cuius est principium elicitivum et productivum aliquo modo; et comparatur etiam ad operationes aliarum potentiarum, respectu quarum est potentia directiva vel regulativa. Si primo modo accipitur, dico quod est mere natura, et in eliciendo et in producendo; quemcumque enim actum intelligendi producit cum obiecto praesente in memoria, mere naturaliter producit, et quamcumque operationem operatur, mere naturaliter operatur.	346. This will be plain from the response to the instance of the Philosopher [n.217], to which instance I say that the intellect is contrasted with its own nature and with its own proper operation, of which it is in some sense the elicitive and productive principle; and it is contrasted also with the operations of the other powers, with respect to which it is the directive and regulative power. If it is taken in the first way, I say that it is merely nature, both in eliciting and in producing; for whatever act of understanding it produces when the object is present in memory, it produces merely naturally, and whatever operation it operates, it operates merely naturally.
347 Voluntas autem respectu operationis propriae ut productiva habet oppositum modum producendi, et hoc satis apparet per Philosophum IX Metaphysicae 4, ubi tractat quomodo potentia rationalis vel irrationalis reducitur ad actum; et arguit quod potentia rationalis quae ex se est ad opposita, non potest ex se exire in actum: tunc enim simul exiret in opposita, quia simul est oppositorum; et ex hoc concludit quod praeter illam potentiam rationaƿlem oportet ponere aliam potentiam rationalem, determinativam, per quam determinetur, et illa determinata potest exire in actum.	347. Now the will as productive with respect to its proper operation has an opposite mode of producing, and this is sufficiently clear from the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.5.1048a8-11, where he treats of how a rational or irrational power is reduced to act; and he argues that a rational power, which of itself is related to opposites, cannot of itself proceed to act; for then it would proceed to opposites at the same time, because it is of opposites at the same time; and from this he concludes that one must posit, in addition to that rational power, another rational power, a determinative one, by which it is determined, and, when determined, it can proceed to act.
348 Ex hoc sequitur quod intellectus si est oppositorum quod sic est oppositorum, scilicet per modum naturae, quod quantum est de se necessario est oppositorum; nec potest se determinare ad alterum illorum, sed requiritur alterum determinans, quod libere potest exire in alterum oppositorum: hoc autem est appetitus, secundum eundem, vel prohaeresis.	348. And from this it follows that the intellect, if it is of opposites, is of opposites in this way, namely by way of nature, because, as far as concerns itself, it is necessarily of opposites; nor can it determine itself to one or other of them, but requires something else as determinant which can freely proceed to act on one or other of the opposites; but this is appetite, according to him, or choice.
349 Exemplum. Sol habet virtutem producendi opposita, scilicet liquefactionem et constrictionem. Si essent duo approximata quorum alterum esset liquefactibile et alterum coagulabile, de necessitate naturae sol haberet elicere istos duos actus in illis; et si idem esset approximatum quod esset natum recipere ista opposita simul, de necessitate naturae simul produceret opposita, vel neutrum.	349. An example. The sun has the virtue of producing opposites, namely liquefaction and constriction. If there were two things nearby, one of which was liquefiable and the other constrainable, the sun would, by necessity of nature, have to elicit those two acts on them, and if some one and the same thing were nearby that was of a nature to receive opposites at the same time, the sun would, by the necessity of nature, at the same time produce the opposites, or neither of them.
350 Est ergo potentia solis mere naturalis licet oppositorum, quia est illorum mere ex se, ita quod non potest determinare se ad alterum tantum. Talis potentia est intellectus ut intellectus praecise, respectu oppositorum intellectorum; et non est ibi aliqua determinatio ad alterum illorum, et non reliquum, nisi quatenus voluntas concurrit. ƿ	350. The power of the sun, therefore, is merely natural, although it is of opposites, because merely by itself it is of them in such a way that it cannot determine itself to one or other of them. Such a power is intellect, as it is precisely intellect, with respect to understood opposites; and there is no determination there to one of them and not to the other save to the extent the will concurs.
351 Philosophus autem communiter loquitur de intellectu secundum quod cum voluntate constituit unum principium respectu artificialium et non ut est naturaliter elicitivus suae operationis; et ideo quod aliquando contra naturam distinguit intellectum et aliquando artem et aliquando propositum, idem est intellectus per omnia.	351. But the Philosopher commonly speaks of intellect according to how it constitutes along with the will one principle with respect to artifacts, and not as it is naturally elicitive of its own operation; and therefore as to the fact he sometimes distinguishes intellect against nature, and sometimes art against it, and sometimes the thing intended, it is the same intellect in the case of all of them.
352 Cum ultimo dicitur de voluntate quod est principium respectu creaturarum, dico quod prius naturaliter voluntas Dei est principium productivum alicuius producti sibi adaequati quam sit productivum non adaequati; adaequatum infinito est infinitum, et ita creatura est secundarium volitum, et productum a voluntate Dei secundario.	352. When, finally, the statement is made about the will, that it is the principle in respect of creatures [n.218], I say that the will of God is naturally the productive principle of some product adequate to itself before it is the productive principle of something nonadequate; what is adequate to the infinite is infinite, and so the creature is willed secondarily, and produced by the will of God secondarily.