Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4G

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 4
353 Ad secundam quaestionem, cum quaeritur de trinitate personarum in divinis, respondeo quod tantum sunt tres personae in essentia divina. Quod probatur sic: tantum sunt duae productae, et tantum est una improducta; igitur tantum tres sunt. ƿ	353. To the second question, when the question is asked about the trinity of persons in divine reality [n.197], I reply that there are only three persons in the divine essence. The proof is as follows: there are only two produced persons and only one unproduced person; therefore there are only three.
354 Circa propositionem primam primo probo quod sunt duae productae, secundo quod non plures.	354. About the first proposition I first prove that there are two produced persons [nn.355-357], second that there are not more [358].
355 Ad probandum quod sint duae productae, primo probo quod est una persona producta, et hoc sic: intellectus ut est perfecta memoria, hoc est 'habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens', per aliquem actum sui est productivus termini adaequati, scilicet infiniti, ex praecedenti quaestione; nihil autem se ipsum producit, I De Trinitate cap. 1; ergo quod producitur actu intellectus, aliquo modo distinguitur a producente. Essentialiter non distinguitur, quia essentia divina, et quaecumque essentialis perfectio intrinseca sibi, est indistinguibilis, ex quaestione de unitate Dei, igitur distinguitur personaliter productum a producente; igitur est aliqua persona producta actu intellectus.	355. To prove that there are two produced persons I prove first that there is one produced person, and this as follows: the intellect as it is perfect memory, that is ‘having an object actually intelligible present to itself’ [n.221], is through some act of itself productive of an adequate term, namely an infinite one, from the preceding question [nn.302, 222]; but nothing produces itself, On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; therefore what is produced by the act of the intellect is in some way distinguished from the producer. It is not distinguished in essence, because the divine essence, and any essential perfection intrinsic to it, is not distinguishable, from the question about the unity of God [nn.89-104], therefore the thing produced is distinguished in person from the thing producing; therefore there is some person produced by the act of intellect.
356 Consimiliter arguitur de producto actu voluntatis. ƿ	356. There is a similar argument about the act of will [footnote to n.302, nn.222, 226].
357 Quod autem persona producta actu isto et illo sit alia et alia, probatio, quia non potest eadem persona produci duabus productionibus sufficientibus et totalibus; haec autem productio alia est ab illa, ex quaestione praecedenti; ergo hac et illa non producitur eadem persona, sed duae. Probatio maioris: si idem produceretur duabus productionibus totalibus, utraque acciperet esse sufficienter; sed si sufficienter accipit esse a producente hac productione, haberet perfecte esse suum nulla alia productione posita; igitur non potest accipere esse per aliam productionem, quia tunc non esset sine illa.	357. Now that the person produced by this act and by that are different the one from the other is proved because the same person cannot be produced by two sufficient and total productions; but this production is different from that one, from the preceding question [n.303]; therefore by this and that production not the same person but two are produced. Proof of the major: if the same thing were produced by two total productions, it would receive being sufficiently from each; but if it receives being sufficiently from the producer by this production, it would perfectly have its being by no other posited production; therefore it cannot receive being through another production, because then it would not exist without it.
358 Ulterius, quod non possint esse plures personae productae quam istae duae probo sic: non possunt esse nisi duae productiones intra. Quod aliqualiter suadebatur in quaestione praecedente, sed differebatur usque ad distinctionem 7 finaliter declarandum, hoc ergo nunc sit certum, quod tantum duae sunt productiones intra. Nulla autem istarum potest terminari nisi ad unam personam, quia persona producta est terminus adaequatus illi productioni; igitur etc. ƿ	358. Further, that there cannot be more produced persons than these two I thus prove: there can only be two productions inwardly. This was in some way proved in the preceding question [n.303], but the final declaration of it was deferred to distinction 7 [n.309], so let this now be certain, that there are only two productions inwardly. But neither of these can be terminated save in one person, because the produced person is the term adequate to the production; therefore etc. B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality
359 Nunc restat probare quod una sit non producta. Ubi dicit unus doctor quod illud ostenditur sicut ostenditur unitas Dei. - Hoc etiam patet per Hilarium, De synodis, ubi vult quod qui dicit duos innascibiles, confitetur duos deos.	359. It now remains to prove that one person is non-produced. Here one doctor says [Henry of Ghent] that this is shown the way the unity of God is shown. The thing is also clear from Hilary On Synods n.26, where his meaning is that someone who says there are two unborn is confessing two gods.
360 $a Item Henricus 55, 2 ubi arguit ad oppositum: ((innascibilitates essent eiusdem rationis, et ita plures proprietates eiusdem rationis in eadem natura singulari, scilicet deitate, quod est impossibile, sive fuerint absolutae sive relativae; patet in creaturis)).	360. Again Henry [of Ghent] Summa a.54 q.2, where he argues in the opposite way: “two cases of being unborn would be of the same idea, and thus there would be several properties of the same idea in the same singular nature, namely deity, which is impossible, whether these properties be absolute or relative; the thing is clear in the case of creatures.”
361 Item arguit ibi: ((persona improducta est primum principium; ergo plura prima principia)).	361. Again he there argues: “the un-produced person is the first principle; therefore there would be several first principles.”
362 Item in solutione: ((Richardus V Trinitatis 4: 'persona non ab alia est potens per essentiam; quare habet in se omne posse')).	362. Again, in the solution: “Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity V ch.4: ‘the person not from another has power through the essence; wherefore he has in himself all power’.”
363 Ad primum: negationes eiusdem rationis sunt tot in isto quot ƿsunt possibilia alia eiusdem rationis; innascibilitas negatio. - Aliter: relationes plures in eodem; III liber distinctio 8.	363. To the first [n.360]: there are in this as many negations of the same idea as there are other possibilities of the same idea; being unborn is a negation. – In another way: several relations exist in the same thing, III d.8 q. un.
364 Ad secundum nunc tres personae sunt unum principium omnium aliorum.	364. To the second [n.361]: as things are now, the three persons are one principle of everything else.
365 Ad tertium: omne posse respectu cuiuscumque possibilis. Nec potest ratio colorari sicut coloratur illa de omnipotentia quaestione de unitate Dei; patet quare non. a$	365. To the third [n.362]: all power is in respect of any possible whatever. Nor can the reason be colored as the reason is colored about omnipotence in the question of the unity of God [n.180]; it is plain why not.
366 Praeterea arguit sic: plura supposita absoluta non possunt esse in hac natura, quia natura non est in pluribus suppositis absolutis sine divisione naturae; erunt igitur plura supposita relativa. Aut igitur relatione mutua inter se, aut ad alia. Sed si plura essent supposita non producta, non distinguerentur relatione ad alia supposita, quia non relatione ad supposita producentia, quia nulla sunt, ex hypothesi; nec ad producta, quia ad illa haberent relationem eandem, sicut modo Pater et Filius habent eandem relationem spirationis activae ad Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo relationibus inter se distinguerentur, et hoc relationibus originis, quod est propositum.	363. Further he argues in this way: several absolute supposits cannot exist in this nature, because nature does not exist in several absolute supposits without division of nature; there will then be several relative supposits. Either therefore by mutual relation among themselves, or in relation to some other things. But if there were several unproduced supposits, they would not be distinguished by relation to other supposits, because not by relation to producing supposits, because ex hypothesi there are none; nor by relation to produced supposits, because they would have to them the same relation, as now the Father and the Son have the same relation of active inspiriting to the Holy Spirit. Therefore they would be distinguished by relations among themselves, and this by relations of origin, which is the intended proposition.
367 Istae probationes non videntur sufficientes. Prima non, quia unitas Dei probatur ex hoc quod divina infinitas non dividitur in plures essentias: non autem ita manifestum est quod ratio 'ingeƿniti', vel 'innascibilis', non sit in pluribus suppositis, - tum quia ratio 'innascibilis' non dicit aliquam perfectionem simpliciter, ex qua perfectione simpliciter posset concludi unitas innascibilis sicut ex perfectione infinita concluditur unitas divinae essentiae; tum quia indivisibilitas non concludit incommunicabilitatem. - Similiter, auctoritas Hilarii quam adducit dicit quod ita est, non tamen probat ita esse.	367. These proofs do not seem sufficient. The first [n.359] is not, because the unity of God is proved from the fact that divine infinity is not divided into several essences; but it is not thus manifest that the idea of ‘ungenerated’, or of ‘unborn’, is not in several supposits, – both because the idea of ‘unborn’ does not indicate simply a perfection from which the unity of being unborn could be simply concluded in the way that from infinite perfection the unity of the divine essence is concluded; and also because indivisibility does not prove incommunicability. – Likewise, the authority of Hilary which he adduces [n.359] asserts that it is so but does not prove that it is so.
368 Et cum accipit in ratione sua quod plures personae absolutae non possunt esse in eadem natura, qualiter est hoc notius conclusione? qui enim poneret plures personas ingenitas, non diceret eas formaliter constitui aliquibus relationibus: ergo contra eum accipere quod non possunt esse plures personae absolutae, videtur esse accipere immanifestius concludendo.	368. And when he assumes in his argument that several absolute persons cannot exist in the same nature [n.366], how is this more known than the conclusion? For he who would posit several ungenerated persons would not say that they are formally constituted by any relations; therefore, contrary to him, to assume that there cannot be several absolute persons seems to be to assume what is more immanifest than concluding to it.
369 Cum ultra dicit quod non distinguuntur relationibus inter se, quia hoc non esset nisi per relationes originis, consequentiam hanc oporteret probare. ƿ	369. When he says further that they are not distinguished by relations among themselves, because this would only be by relations of origin [nn.366, 253, 248], he should prove this consequence.
370 Aliter ergo persuadeo conclusionem intentam sic: quidquid potest esse in pluribus suppositis et non determinatur ad certum numerum per aliud a se, quantum est de se potest esse in infinitis; et si est necesse esse, est in infinitis, quia quidquid potest ibi esse, est. Sed ingenitum si potest esse in pluribus suppositis, non determinatur ab alio in quot suppositis sit, quia determinari ab alio ad esse in supposito vel suppositis est contra rationem ingeniti; ergo de ratione sua potest esse in infinitis: et si potest esse, est, quia omne ingenitum est ex se necesse esse. Consequens est impossibile, ergo illud ex quo sequitur.	370. So I prove the intended conclusion in another way thus: whatever can be in several supposits and is not determined to a definite number by something other than itself, can, as far as concerns itself, exist in infinite supposits; and if it is a necessary being, it does exist in infinite supposits, because whatever can exist there does exist there. But if what is ungenerated can exist in several supposits, it is not determined by another as to how many supposits it is in, because to be determined by another to existence in a supposit or in several supposits is contrary to the idea of the ungenerated; therefore of its own idea it can exist in infinite supposits; and if it can exist, it does exist, because everything ungenerated is of itself a necessary being. The consequent is impossible, therefor also that from which it follows.
371 Ad argumenta. - Cum arguitur 'aeque nobiles sunt, ergo tot', figura dictionis est, commutando 'quid' vel 'quale' in 'quot'. Et ƿratio defectus consequentiae est: non enim est propter nobilitatem vel ignobilitatem relationis principii vel principiati quod multiplicetur vel non multiplicetur, sed de ratione principii est unitas licet in principiatis possit esse pluralitas, quia semper est reductio pluralitatis ad unitatem. Et ideo stante aequali nobilitate potest esse multiplicatio in relationibus productorum licet non in relationibus producentium.	371. To the arguments. – When it is argued ‘they are equally noble, therefore they are equally many [n.197]’, there is figure of speech, by change of ‘what’ or ‘what sort’ to ‘how many’. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is: for it is not because of nobility or ignobility of the relation of principle or of what is from a principle that it is multiplied or not multiplied, but unity is of the idea of principle, although in things from a principle there can be plurality, because there is always reduction of plurality to unity. And so, with equal nobility standing, there can be multiplication in the relations of the produced though not in the relations of the producers.
372 Alia responsio est quod ibi quaelibet relatio unius rationis est de se haec, tamen a pluribus relationibus producentium potest forsan abstrahi unum commune, puta 'productivum', et ita a pluribus relationibus producti potest abstrahi unum commune, puta 'productum'. Etsi ergo sit una relatio in communi - si est commune abstrahibile - quae dicitur in communi 'relatio producentis', sunt tamen duae relationes producentis, sic et sic, sicut sunt duae correspondentes eis.	372. Another response is that any relation there of one idea is of itself a this, although from the several relations of the producers there can perhaps be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘productive’, and so from the several relations of the produced there can be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘produced’. Although therefore there is one relation in common – if there is a common abstractable – which is called in common ‘relation of producer’, yet there are two relations of the producer, in this way and in that, just as there are two relations corresponding to them.
373 Ad secundam rationem concedo quod relationibus ex parte productorum correspondent relationes ex parte productivi, et tot, sed non sequitur 'si relationes producti distinguuntur personaliter, ƿigitur et relationes producentis'; cuius ratio assignatur, $a quia ex parte producentis sufficit alia ratio producendi, a$ sicut productio artificialis et naturalis sic distinguuntur per principia productiva, scilicet per artem et naturam, licet ista concurrant in eodem supposito. Relationes autem producti non possunt ita concurrere in eodem supposito et una persona, sed sunt distinctae personaliter, quia productum est per se subsistens et suppositum.	373. To the second reason [n.198] I concede that to relations on the part of the produced there correspond relations on the part of the productive, and as many relations, but it does not follow ‘if the relations of the produced are distinguished personally, therefore so are the relations of the producer’; the reason for which is assigned as that on the part of the producer another idea of producing is sufficient, just as artificial and natural production are thus distinguished through productive principles, namely art and nature, although they come together in the same supposit. But the relations of the produced cannot so come together in the same supposit and in one person, but they are personally distinct, because the produced is per se subsistent and supposit.
374 Alia responsio patet ex solutione quaestionis, quia non potest idem produci duabus productionibus totalibus, licet idem possit producere duabus productionibus totalibus; et ideo relationes producti non plurificantur in eodem, licet relationes producentis possint plurificari.	374. Another response is plain from the solution of the question [nn.357, 172- 173], because the same thing cannot be produced by two total productions, although the same thing can produce by two total productions; and so the relations of the produced are not multiplied in the same thing, although the relations of the producer can be multiplied.
375 Ad tertium: potentia finita non potest habere simul duos terminos adaequatos in produci, licet possit habere unum in produci ƿet alium in producto esse; potentia autem infinita habet suum terminum intra semper in produci, et iste est adaequatus, et ideo non potest habere plures terminos.	375. To the third [n.199]: a finite power cannot have at the same time two adequate terms in being produced, although it can have one in being produced and another in having been produced; but an infinite power has its term always within in being produced, and this term is adequate, and therefore it cannot have several terms.