Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4H
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< Authors | Duns Scotus | Ordinatio | Ordinatio I | D2
Jump to navigationJump to searchTranslated by Peter Simpson.
| Latin | English | |
|---|---|---|
| Quaest. 4 | ||
| 376 Ad primam quaestionem dico quod simul stat unitas essentiae et pluralitas personarum, quod apparet ex solutione quaestionis praecedentis, quia simul est ibi ista pluralitas personarum cum ista unitate. | 376. To the first question [n.191] I say that the unity of essence and plurality of persons do stand together, as appears from the solution of the preceding question [nn.353-370], because this plurality exists there at the same time along with this unity. | |
| 377 Ad hoc autem aliqualiter declarandum notandum est quod sicut repugnantia repugnant ex suis propriis rationibus, ita non repugnantia, sive compossibilitas, est ex propriis rationibus compossibilium. | 377. Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant by their own proper reasons, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper reasons of the compossible things. | |
| 378 Ad videndum autem istam compossibilitatem videnda est ratio extremorum, scilicet naturae et suppositi. Ubi notandum quod natura non se habet ad suppositum sicut universale ad singulare, quia in accidentibus etiam invenitur singularitas sine ratione suppositi, et in substantia nostra natura atoma assumpta est a Verbo, secundum Damascenum, non tamen ƿsuppositum nostrae naturae. Neque se habet natura ad suppositum sicut 'quo' ad 'quod', nam cuicumque 'quo' correspondet proprium 'quod' vel 'quis', et ita, sicut natura est 'quo', ita habet proprium 'quod' vel 'quis' quod non contrahit ad suppositum, et sicut suppositum est 'quod' vel 'quis', ita habet suum proprium 'quo' quo subsistit et tamen concomitanter suppositum de necessitate est singulare, - et etiam, non potest esse 'quo' respectu alterius, quia est subsistens, non potens esse actus alicuius subsistentis; $a haec duo dicunt duplicem incommunicabilitatem. a$ | 378. But to see this compossibility one must look at the reasons of the extremes, namely of nature and of the supposit. Here one should note that nature is not related to the supposit as a universal to a singular, because in accidents too singularity is found without the idea of supposit, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is the nature related to the supposit as the ‘in which’ to the ‘what’, for to the ‘in which’ of anything there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and so, as nature is the ‘in what’, so it has a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’ which it does not contract to the supposit, and as the supposit is the ‘what’ or the ‘who’, so it has a proper ‘in what’ in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is of necessity a singular, – and also, the nature cannot be an ‘in what’ with respect to something else, because it is subsistent, incapable of being the act of another subsistent thing; these two indicate a twofold incommunicability.[1] | |
| 379 Ubi sciendum quod communicabile dicitur aliquid vel per identitatem, ita quod illud cui communicatur sit 'ipsum', vel per informationem, ita quod illud cui communicatur sit 'ipso', non 'ipsum'. | 379. Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is ‘it’, or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is ‘in it’, not ‘it’. | |
| 380 Primo modo universale communicatur singulari, et secundo modo forma materiae. Natura igitur quaecumque quantum est ex se et de ratione naturae est communicabilis utroque modo, videƿlicet pluribus suppositis, quorum quodlibet sit 'ipsum', - et etiam ut 'quo', tamquam forma, quo singulare vel suppositum sit ens quiditative, vel habens naturam; suppositum autem est incommunicabile duplici incommunicabilitate opposita. | 380. In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.[2] Any nature, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposits, each of which is ‘it’, – and also as ‘in which’, by way of form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by the opposed twofold incommunicability. | |
| 381 Ex his declaratur propositum. Et primo sic: natura quaecumque est communicabilis pluribus per identitatem, igitur et natura divina est communicabilis (hoc etiam patet ex quaestione praeposita); non est autem divisibilis, ex quaestione de unitate Dei; igitur communicabilis sine divisione. | 381. On this basis the intended proposition is made clear. And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things by identity, therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before [nn.353-370]); but the nature is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God [nn.157-190]; therefore it is communicable without division. | |
| 382 $a Item arguo sic: 'perfectio simpliciter' quantum est ex se est, quolibet sibi incompossibili, melior cuilibet supposito absolute sumpto secundum rationem suppositi; natura divina non est sic melior, ex hypothesi; ergo. Probatio minoris: ipsa ex se determinat sibi unicam subsistentiam, ergo ipsa ex se est incompossibilis cuilibet alteri subsistentiae, etiam praecise acceptae ut est subsistentia altera, non considerando scilicet quod sit in altera natura; et ultra, ergo ipsa ex se non est melior alicui alteri ut est altera subsistentia. | 382. Again I argue thus: ‘perfection simply’ as far as concerns itself, whatever may be incompossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, ex hypothesi; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a single subsistence, therefore it is of itself incompossible with any other subsistence, even precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as this other thing is another subsistence. | |
| 383 Probatur prima consequentia, quia sicut aliquid ex se deterƿminat sibi unicum, ita repugnat sibi quodlibet alterum incompossibile illi; ex hypothesi, natura divina ex se determinat sibi non tantum subsistentiam quae sit in una natura (cum hoc staret trinitas), sed subsistentiam unicam - hanc et ut haec - in ratione subsistentiae, non considerando tantum quia in hac natura. | 383. The proof of the first consequence is that, just as anything of itself determines for itself a single supposit, so anything else incompossible with that is repugnant to it; ex hypothesi divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a single subsistence – this subsistence as it is a this – in idea of subsistence, without considering only the fact that it is in this nature. | |
| 384 Secunda consequentia probatur, quia sicut est incompossibile huic, ita non est melius huic quam quodcumque sibi incompossibile. a$ ƿ | 384. The proof of the second consequence is that, just as divine nature is incompossible with this other thing, so it is no better than this other thing than is anything else incompossible with itself.[3] | |
| 385 Declaratur ex infinitate, quae est condicio naturae, et hoc sic: forma, quae est aliquo modo illimitata in perficiendo materiam, sine sui distinctione potest perficere plures partes materiae. | 385. There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and that as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction in itself, perfect several parts of matter. | |
| 386 Exemplum. Anima intellectiva, quae non est limitata ad perficiendum hanc partem corporis organici, sine sui distinctione vel extensione qualicumque, vel per se vel per accidens, potest perficere aliam partem corporis organici. Ista autem proprietas, videlicet quod forma non distinguatur et tamen perficiat plures partes corporis vel materiae, non competit animae ratione imperfectionis, quia ipsa ponitur perfectissima inter omnes formas naturales, et omnes aliae formae imperfectiores carent isto gradu in perficiendo: omnes enim limitantur ad perficiendum unum, nec perficiunt plures partes materiae sine extensione per accidens. | 386. An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any distinction or extension of itself, whether per se or per accidens, perfect another part of an organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without per accidens extension. | |
| 387 Ex hoc arguo sic: si talis unitas stet cum pluralitate, et non ex imperfectione illius quod est 'unum', ergo subtracto omni eo quod ƿest imperfectionis ex utraque parte, potest stare perfecta unitas cum pluralitate. Sed quod anima perficiat materiam, hoc est imperfectionis in ea; quod etiam illa plura perfecta sint partes eiusdem totius, hoc est imperfectionis. Si igitur tollatur ab anima hoc quod est 'perficere materiam', et a pluribus distinctis hoc quod est 'esse partes unius totius', remanebit forma habens perfectam unitatem, sed non informans materiam, sed dans totale esse, et hoc pluribus distinctis, quae non erunt partes unius totius, sed erunt per se subsistentes; et tunc erit una natura dans totale esse pluribus suppositis distinctis. Ergo essentia divina, quae est penitus illimitata, a qua aufertur quidquid est imperfectionis, potest dare totale esse pluribus suppositis distinctis. | 387. From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, the ‘perfecting matter’ is taken from the soul, and from the many distinct things the ‘being parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not perfect matter, but does give total being, and that to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but per se subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, which has everything of imperfection taken away from it, can give total being to several distinct supposits. |
Notes
- ↑ 215 Text cancelled by Scotus: “The idea of the supposit then exists in a double incommunicability.”
- ↑ 216 Interpolation: “such that matter is actually a being through form.”
- ↑ 217 Text cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued as follows: divine nature, and whatever belongs to this nature as it is nature, is ‘perfection simply’; every ‘perfection simply’ is communicable to several things; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: ‘perfection simply’ is that which in anything whatever “is better existing than not existing,” Monologion ch.15; which fact is understood in this way, that ‘perfection simply’ is better than whatever may be incompossible with it, whatever supposit absolutely considered it may be in, that is, not determining what nature it is subsistent in. But if the divine nature determined itself to incommunicable subsistence, it would in no other subsistence be better than anything incompossible with it save in that subsistence to which it determined itself, because it would be incompossible with any other subsistence; therefore it would not be ‘perfection simply’.” Text following on from this also cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued on the part of the idea of supposit; for because a supposit is of its idea incommunicable simply, that idea should not include any idea of existing through identity, and thus another distinct idea of supposit can stand, and therefore the idea of supposit is not ‘perfection simply’ in the aforesaid way [in the previous paragraph of this footnote]; but if two distinct ideas of supposit can stand, then so can two distinct supposits, and without division of nature; therefore etc. – This fourth...”
