Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q1

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 1
ƿ1 Circa secundam distinctionem quaero primo de his quae pertinent ad unitatem Dei, et primo, utrum in entibus sit aliquid exsistens actu infinitum. ƿQuod non, sic arguitur: Si unum contrariorum esset actu infinitum, nihil sibi contrarium esset in natura; ergo si aliquod bonum sit actu infinitum, nihil mali esset in universo.	1. On the second distinction I inquire first about what pertains to the unity of God, and first whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite. That there is not is argued as follows: If one contrary were actually infinite, there would be nothing in nature contrary to it; therefore if there were some good actually infinite, there would be no evil in the universe.
2 Respondetur quod maior est vera de contrariis formaliter; sed nihil malum contrariatur Deo formaliter.	2. The response is made that the major is true of contraries formally; but nothing evil is formally contrary to God.
3 Contra: sive formaliter sive virtualiter contrarietur, si est infinitum, nihil patitur contrarium sui effectus, quia propter infinitam virtutem destruet omne incompossibile suo effectui. Est ergo maior vera de contrario virtualiter sicut formaliter. Exemplum: si sol esset infinite calidus virtualiter, nihil relinqueret frigidum in universo, sicut nec si esset infinite calidus formaliter. ƿ	3. On the contrary: whether it is formally or virtually contrary, if it is infinite, it suffers nothing contrary to its effect, because it will, on account of its infinite virtue, destroy everything incompossible with its effect. The major is true, then, of the virtual contrary as of the formal contrary. An example: if the sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would leave nothing cold in the universe, just as if it were infinitely hot formally.
4 Item, corpus infinitum nullum aliud corpus secum compatitur, igitur nec ens infinitum aliud ens cum eo. Probatio consequentiae, tum quia sicut repugnat dimensio dimensioni, ita videtur actualitas actualitati repugnare; tum quia sicut corpus aliud ab infinito faceret cum illo aliquid maius infinito, ita ens aliud ab infinito videtur facere aliquid maius infinito.	4. Again, an infinite body allows of no other body along with it, therefore neither does an infinite being allow of any other being along with it. Proof of the consequence is first because, just as dimension opposes dimension, so actuality seems to oppose actuality; and second because, just as a body different from the infinite would produce along with it something greater than the infinite, so a being other than the infinite seems to produce something greater than the infinite.
5 Praeterea, quod ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum respectu ubi, et quod nunc est ita quod non alias, est finitum respectu quando, et sic de singulis. Quod ita agit hoc quod non aliud, est finitum quantum ad actionem, ergo quod est ita hoc aliquid quod non aliud, est finitum secundum entitatem; Deus est summe hoc, quia ex se singularitas; ergo non est infinitus.	5. Further, what is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere is finite with respect to ‘where’, and what is now in such a way that it is not at another time, is finite with respect to ‘when’, and thus with each category. What does this particular thing in such a way that it does not do something else is finite as to action, therefore what is a this something in such a way that it is not something else is finite in entity; God is supremely a this, because he is of himself singularity; therefore he is not infinite.
6 Item, VIII Physicorum, virtus infinita si esset, moveret in non tempore; nulla virtus potest movere in non tempore, quia si sic, motus esset in instanti; ergo nulla est infinita.	6. Again, from Physics 8.10.266a24-b6, if there were an infinite virtue, it would move in non-time; no virtue can move in non-time, because if it did motion would exist in an instant; therefore no virtue is infinite.
7 Contra: Ibidem Philosophus, VIII Physicorum, probat primum moƿvens esse potentiae infinitae, quia movet motu infinito. Sed haec conclusio non potest intelligi tantum de infinitate durationis, quia propter infinitatem potentiae probat quod non possit esse in magnitudine; non repugnat autem magnitudini, secundum eum, quod in ea sit potentia infinita secundum durationem, sicut poneret de caelo.	7. On the contrary: In the same place of the Physics [266a10-24, b6-20, 7b17-26] the Philosopher proves that the first mover is of infinite power because it moves with an infinite motion. But this conclusion cannot be understood only of infinity of duration, because he proves, on account of its infinity of power, that it cannot exist in magnitude; but it is not repugnant to magnitude, in his view, that there is a power in it infinite in duration, the way he posited in the case of the heavens.
8 Item, in Psalmo: Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis.	8. Again Psalm 47.2: “Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised.”
9 Item, Damascenus libro I cap . 4: ((Est pelagus)), etc.	9. Again Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9: “He is a sea, etc.” Question 2 Whether something infinite is known self-evidently