Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q2A

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 2
10 Utrum aliquod infinitum esse sit per se notum, ut Deum esse. Quod sic, videtur: Damascenus libro I cap. 1: ((Eius quod est esse Deum, cognitio omnibus naturaliter est inserta)); sed illud est per se notum ƿcuius notitia omnibus est inserta, sicut patet in II Metaphysicae, quod prima principia, quae sunt quasi ianua, sunt per se nota; ergo etc.	10. Whether something infinite is known self-evidently, as that God exists. It seems that this is so: Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.1: “Knowledge of the fact that God exists is naturally implanted in everyone;” but that is self-evidently known the knowledge of which is implanted in everyone, as is clear from Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5, because the first principles, which are as it were the entrance doors, are self-evidently known; therefore etc.
11 Praeterea, quo maius nihil cogitari potest, illud esse per se notum est; Deus est huiusmodi, secundum Anselmum, Proslogion, cap. 5; ergo etc. Illud etiam non est aliquod finitum, ergo infinitum. - Probatur maior, quia oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto: si enim non est, non est quo maius cogitari non potest, quia si esset in re, maius esset quam si non esset in re sed in intellectu.	11. Further, that than which nothing greater can be thought is self-evidently known to exist; God is of this sort, according to Anselm Proslogion ch.5; therefore etc. This thing is also not anything finite, therefore it is infinite. – The proof of the major is that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if the subject does not exist, it is not that thing than which nothing greater can be thought, because, if it existed in reality, it would be greater than if it did not exist in reality but in the intellect.
12 Item, veritatem esse est per se notum; Deus est veritas; ergo Deum esse est per se notum. Probatio maioris, quia sequitur ex suo opposito: si enim nulla veritas esset, ergo verum est nullam veritatem esse; ergo veritas est.	12. Again, that truth exists is self-evidently known; God is truth; therefore that God exists is self-evidently known. The proof of the major is that it follows from its opposite: for if there were no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth; therefore there is truth.
13 Item, propositiones habentes necessitatem secundum quid ex ƿterminis habentibus entitatem secundum quid, scilicet ex hoc quod sunt in intellectu, sunt per se notae, sicut prima principia, quae sunt per se nota ex terminis habentibus esse in intellectu; ergo multo magis erit per se nota quae habet necessitatem ex terminis simpliciter necessariis, qualis est illa 'Deus est'. Assumptum patet, quia necessitas primorum principiorum et noscibilitas eorum non est propter exsistentiam terminorum in re, sed tantum propter conexionem extremorum ut est in intellectu concipiente.	13. Again, propositions that have necessity in a certain respect from terms that have existence in a certain respect, namely from the fact that they are in the intellect, are self-evidently known, as first principles which are self-evidently known from terms that have existence in the intellect; therefore much more will that be self-evidently known which has necessity from terms simply necessary, of which sort is the proposition ‘God exists’. The assumption is plain because the necessity of the first principles and their knowability is not because of the existence of the terms in reality but only because of the connection of the extremes as that connection exists in the conceiving intellect.
14 Contra: Per se notum negari non potest a mente alicuius; sed: dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus, etc. ƿ	14. On the contrary: What is self-evidently known cannot be denied by anyone’s mind; but ‘the fool has said in his heart, there is no God,’ Psalm 13.1, 52.1; therefore etc. I. To the Second Question
15 Quia secundum Philosophum II Metaphysicae ((absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et modum sciendi)), primo respondeo ad secundam quaestionem, quae inquirit de modo cognoscendi istam 'Deus est'. Et quantum ad solutionem suam, primo assigno rationem propositionis per se notae, et dico sic: Cum dicitur propositio per se nota, non excluditur per ly 'per se' quaecumque causa, quia non excluduntur termini propositionis; nulla enim propositio nota est exclusa notitia terminorum. Igitur propositio per se nota non est exclusiva notitiae terminorum, quia prima principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus, sed excluditur quaecumque causa et ratio quae est extra per se conceptum terminorum propositionis per se notae. Dicitur igitur propositio per se nota, quae per nihil aliud extra terminos proprios, qui sunt aliquid eius, habet veritatem evidentem. ƿ	15. Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.3.995a13-14: “it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time,” I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing the proposition ‘God exists’. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I say thus: When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, the phrase ‘self-evidently’ does not exclude there being any cause, because it does not exclude the terms of the proposition; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is any cause and reason outside the per se conception of the terms of a selfevidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms that are part of it.
16 Ulterius, qui sunt illi termini proprii ex quibus debet esse evidens? - Dico quod quoad hoc alius terminus est definitio et alius definitum, sive accipiantur termini pro vocibus significantibus sive pro conceptibus significatis.	16. Next, what are those proper terms from which its evidence should come? – I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.
17 Quod probo ex I Posteriorum, quia quod quid est sive definitio alterius extremi, est medium in demonstratione; ergo altera praemissa non differret a conclusione nisi sicut definitum differt a definitione, et tamen praemissa est principium per se notum; conclusio autem non est per se nota, sed demonstrata. Ergo quantum ad rationem propositionis per se notae, alius est conceptus definitionis a definito, quia si idem conceptus definitionis et definiti, in demonstratione potissima esset petitio principii; item, tunc essent ibi tantum duo termini, quod est falsum. ƿ	17. I prove this from the Posterior Analytics 1.6.75a25-27, because the ‘what it is’ or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only be two terms there, which is false.
18 Hoc probatur secundo sic, per Aristotelem I Physicorum, quod nomina sustinent ad definitionem quod totum ad partes, id est quod nomen confusum prius est notum definitione; nomen autem confuse importat quod definitio distincte, quia definitio dividit in singula; ergo conceptus quiditatis ut importatur per nomen confuse, est prius notus naturaliter quam conceptus eius ut importatur distincte per definitionem, et ita alius conceptus et aliud extremum. - Ex hoc ultra: cum propositio sit per se nota quae ex propriis terminis habet evidentem veritatem, et alii termini sunt conceptus quiditatis distincte ut importatur per definitionem, et conceptus quiditatis confuse ut importatur per nomen, sequitur quod propositio non erit per se nota de quiditate confuse ƿaccepta quae non est nota nisi per definitionem eadem distincte concipiatur.	18. This is proved in a second way as follows, through Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a26-b3, that names relate to the definition as the whole to the parts, that is, that a confused name is first known by the definition; but a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its individual parts; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before its concept, as introduced distinctly by the definition, is known, and so it is another concept and another extreme term. – From this further: since a selfevidently known proposition is one which has evident truth from the proper terms, and since the other terms are, as introduced by the definition, concepts of the quiddity in a distinct way, and are, as introduced by the name, concepts of the quiddity in a confused way, the conclusion follows that a proposition about a quiddity taken in a confused way will not be self-evidently known when the same proposition is only known if it is conceived distinctly.
19 Haec etiam conclusio probatur, quia alias quaelibet propositio alia, quae est necessaria et per se primo modo (ut haec: 'homo est animal', et 'corpus', usque ad substantiam), esset per se nota; nam si ratio utriusque extremi assignatur ex rationibus extremorum distincte conceptis, apparet manifeste quod unum extremum includit alterum. Similiter, alias quaelibet propositio esset per se nota in scientiis specialibus quam metaphysicus posset habere per se notam ex definitionibus extremorum, quod non est verum, quia geometer non utitur aliquibus principiis tamquam per se notis nisi quae habent evidentem veritatem ex terminis confuse conceptis, puta concipiendo lineam confuse; evidens verum est quod linea longitudo est sine latitudine, non concipiendo adhuc distincte ad quod genus pertinet linea, sicut considerat metaphysicus. Alias autem propositiones quas metaphysicus posset concipere, puta quod linea est quanta, et huiusmodi, tales propositiones non habet geometer per se notas. ƿ	19. There is another proof of this conclusion, that otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, as far as substance), would be selfevidently known; for if the nature of each extreme is assigned by the natures of the extremes when distinctly conceived, it is plainly manifest that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician might possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth without yet any distinct conception, in the way considered by the metaphysician, of what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and a quantity of this sort, these sort of propositions are not had by the geometer as self-evidently known.
20 Patet hoc tertio, quia bene stat demonstratio alicuius praedicati de definito cum hoc quod illud praedicatum sit per se notum de definitione.	20. This is clear thirdly because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known about the definition.
21 Est ergo omnis et sola propositio illa per se nota, quae ex terminis sic conceptis ut sunt eius termini, habet vel nata est habere evidentem veritatem complexionis. ƿ	21. Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived in the way in which they are the terms of the proposition, possess or naturally posses the evident truth of the combined proposition.
22 Ex hoc patet quod non est distinguere inter propositionem per se notam et per se noscibilem, quia idem sunt; nam propositio non dicitur per se nota quia ab aliquo intellectu per se cognoscitur (tunc enim si nullus intellectus actu cognosceret, nulla propositio esset per se nota), sed dicitur propositio per se nota quia quantum est de natura terminorum nata est habere evidentem veritatem contentam in terminis etiam in quocumque intellectu concipiente terminos. Si tamen aliquis intellectus non concipiat terminos, et ita non concipiat propositionem, non minus est per se nota quantum est de se: et sic loquimur de per se nota.	22. From this it is plain that there is no distinction between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, for they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as depends on the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to possess, even in any intellect that conceives the terms, the evident truth contained in the terms. But if some intellect does not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, it is, as far as depends on itself, no less selfevidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of self-evidently known.
23 Ex hoc etiam patet quod nulla est distinctio de per se nota in se et naturae et nobis, quia quaecumque est in se per se nota, cuicumque intellectui, licet non actu cognita, tamen quantum est ex terminis est evidenter vera et nota si termini concipiantur. ƿ	23. From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself to nature and the self-evidently known in itself to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, even if not actually known, is evidently true from the terms and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known.
24 Nec valet illa distinctio quod aliquae sunt per se notae primi ordinis, aliquae secundi, quia quaecumque propositiones sunt per se notae conceptis terminis propriis sicut sunt termini, habent evidentem veritatem in ordine suo.	24. Nor is there any validity to the distinction that some propositions are selfevidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions selfevidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.
25 Ex his ad quaestionem dico quod propositio illa est per se nota quae coniungit extrema ista, esse et essentiam divinam ut haec est sive Deum et esse sibi proprium, quo modo Deus videt illam essentiam et esse sub propriissima ratione qua est in Deo hoc esse, quo modo nec esse a nobis nunc intelligitur nec essentia, sed ƿab ipso Deo et a beatis, quia propositio illa ex suis terminis habet evidentem veritatem intellectui, quia illa propositio non est per se secundo modo, quasi praedicatum sit extra rationem subiecti, sed per se primo modo et immediate ex terminis est evidens, quia est immediatissima, ad quam resolvuntur omnes enuntiantes aliquid de Deo quomodocumque concepto. Est igitur ista 'Deus est' sive 'haec essentia est' per se nota, quia extrema illa sunt nata facere evidentiam de ista complexione cuilibet apprehendenti perfecte extrema istius complexionis, quia esse nulli perfectius convenit quam huic essentiae. Sic igitur intelligendo per nomen Dei aliquid quod nos non perfecte cognoscimus nec concipimus ut hanc essentiam divinam, sic est per se nota 'Deus est'.	25. From these points I say to the question that the proposition which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as a this or God and his proper existence, is self-evidently known in the way that God sees this essence and existence under the most proper idea that this existence has in God; and in this way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now, but by God himself and by the blessed, because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not per se in the second mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a37-b5], as when the predicate is outside the idea of the subject, but is per se in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition ‘God exists’ or ‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes naturally make the complex whole evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this complex whole, for existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. In this way, therefore, understanding by the name ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know or conceive as being this divine essence, thus is ‘God exists’ self-evidently known.
26 Sed si quaeratur an esse insit alicui conceptui quem nos concipimus de Deo, ita quod talis propositio sit per se nota in qua enuntiatur esse de tali conceptu puta ut de propositione cuius ƿextrema possunt a nobis concipi, puta, potest in intellectu nostro esse aliquis conceptus dictus de Deo, tamen non communis sibi et creaturae, puta necessario esse vel ens infinitum vel summum bonum, et de tali conceptu possumus praedicare esse eo modo quo a nobis concipitur, - dico quod nulla talis est per se nota, propter tria:	26. But if it be inquired whether existence is present in some concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, whether existence can in our intellect be a concept said of God, though not one common to him and to creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and we can of such a concept predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, – I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:
27 Primo, quia quaelibet talis est conclusio demonstrabilis, et propter quid. Probatio: quidquid primo et immediate convenit alicui, de quolibet quod est in eo potest demonstrari propter quid per illud cui primo convenit tamquam per medium. Exemplum: si triangulus primo habeat tres angulos, aequales duobus rectis, de quolibet contento in triangulo potest demonstrari quod habeat tres angulos demonstratione propter quid per medium quod est triangulus, puta quod aliqua figura haberet tres, etc., de qualibet etiam specie trianguli quod habeat tres, licet non primo. Esse autem primo convenit huic essentiae ut haec quomodo videtur essentia divina a beatis; ergo de quolibet quod est in hac essentia quod potest a nobis concipi, sive sit quasi superius sive quasi passio, potest deƿmonstrari esse per hanc essentiam sicut per medium demonstratione propter quid, sicut per hanc 'triangulus habet tres' demonstratur quod aliqua figura habet tres; et per consequens non est nota per se ex terminis, quia tunc non demonstraretur propter quid.	27. First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: anything that first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in it by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through the middle term. An example: if the triangle is what first has three angles equal to two right angles, of whatever is contained in triangle there can be a demonstration that it has three angles by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is triangle, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to…] etc., and also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles…, although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this essence, in the way it is seen by the blessed; therefore of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through the middle term, by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three…’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three…; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstrationwhy’.
28 Secundo sic: propositio per se nota, cuilibet intellectui ex terminis cognitis est per se nota. Sed haec propositio 'ens infinitum est' non est evidens intellectui nostro ex terminis; probo: terminos enim non concipimus antequam eam credamus vel per demonstrationem sciamus, et in illo priori non est nobis evidens; non enim certitudinaliter eam tenemus ex terminis, nisi per fidem vel demonstrationem.	28. Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from the terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and it is not known to us in that ‘before’; for we do not hold it with certitude from the terms save by faith or demonstration.
29 Tertio, quia nihil est per se notum de conceptu non simpliciter simplici nisi sit per se notum partes illius conceptus uniri; nullus autem conceptus quem habemus de Deo proprius sibi et non conveniens creaturae est simpliciter simplex, vel saltem nullus quem nos distincte percipimus esse proprium Deo est simpliciter simƿplex; ergo nihil est per se notum de tali conceptu nisi per se notum sit partes illius conceptus uniri: sed hoc non est per se notum, quia unio istarum partium demonstratur, per duas rationes.	29. Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is selfevidently known unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of that concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple; therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two reasons mentioned [nn.27-28].
30 Maior est manifesta per Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. De falso, quia ratio in se falsa, est de omni falsa; ergo nulla ratio est de aliquo vera nisi sit in se vera. Ergo ad hoc quod cognoscatur aliquod esse verum de aliqua ratione, vel ipsam esse veram de aliquo, oportet cognoscere ipsam in se esse veram; non est autem ratio in se vera nisi partes illius rationis sint unitae. Et sicut oporƿtet scire quantum ad praedicationes quiditativas quod partes rationis possint uniri quiditative, puta quod altera contineat alteram formaliter, ita quantum ad veritatem propositionis enuntiantis esse oportet cognoscere partes rationis subiecti vel praedicati uniri actualiter. Exemplum: quemadmodum illa 'homo irrationalis est animal' non est per se nota loquendo de praedicatione quiditativa, quia subiectum in se includit falsum, quia propositionem in se includentem contradictoria, ita ista 'homo albus est' non est per se nota si non sit per se notum hominem et album per se coniungi actu; quia si non coniungantur in actuali exsistentia, haec est vera 'nihil est homo albus', et per consequens sua conversa vera 'nullus homo albus est'; ergo sua contradictoria falsa 'homo albus est' .	30. The major is manifest from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.29.1024b31-32, that an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true about anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for something to be true about some account, or for the account to be true about anything, one must known that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contains the other, so as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence one must know that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition ‘man is an irrational animal’ is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so the proposition ‘a man is white’ is not self-evidently known if it is not self-evidently known that man and white are actually per se conjoined; because if they are not conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true ‘nothing is a white man’, and consequently its converse will be true ‘no white man is’; therefore its contradictory is false ‘a white man is’.
31 Probatio minoris: quemcumque conceptum concipimus sive boni sive veri, si non contrahatur per aliquid ut non sit conceptus simpliciter simplex, non est proprius conceptus Deo. Voco autem conceptum simpliciter simplicem qui non est resolubilis in alios ƿconceptus simplices quorum quilibet possit actu simplici distincte cognosci.	31. Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a proper concept of God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.
32 Ex ista ratione ultima patet ad istas instantias, cum arguitur 'haec est per se nota, necesse esse est' - probatio, quia oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto; si enim non est, non est 'necesse esse', - 'haec etiam est per se nota, Deus est', quia secundum omnem expositionem quam ponit Damascenus cap. 9 dicitur 'Deus' ab operatione actuali, scilicet a fovere vel ardere vel videre, ergo secundum omnem acceptionem idem est 'Deus est' sicut 'operans actu est', quae videtur per se nota, quia ut prius oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto. ƿ	32. From this final reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made ‘this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists’ – proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if the predicate is not, ‘necessary existence’ does not exist – ‘this too is self-evidently known, God exists’, because, according to all the expositions posited by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9, God is called so from actual operation, namely from warming or burning or seeing, therefore, according to all acceptations of the term, ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘God is actually operating’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.
33 Ideo aliter respondeo ad istas, quod nulla istarum propositionum est per se nota, 'necesse esse est' vel 'operans actu est', quia non est per se notum partes quae sunt in subiecto uniri actualiter. Cum dicit 'oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto', dico quod non sequitur ex hoc propositionem esse per se notam nisi ista repugnantia sit evidens, et cum hoc etiam sit evidens utrumque extremum habere conceptum simpliciter simplicem vel quod conceptus partium simpliciter uniantur. ƿ	33. For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that neither of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘the one actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is selfevidently known unless the repugnance is self-evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.
34 Ad argumentum principale Damasceni: potest exponi de potentia cognitiva naturaliter nobis data per quam ex creaturis possumus cognoscere Deum esse, saltem in rationibus generalibus (subdit ibi qualiter cognoscitur ex creaturis!), vel de cognitione Dei sub rationibus communibus convenientibus sibi et creaturae, quae cognita perfectius et eminentius sunt in Deo quam in aliis. Quod autem non loquatur de cognitione actuali et distincta Dei patet per hoc quod dicit ibi: ((nemo novit eum nisi quantum ipse revelavit)).	34. To the principal argument of Damascene [n.10]: it can be expounded of the cognitive power naturally given to us by which we can know from creatures that God exists, at rate in general ideas (he subjoins there how he is known from creatures! On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.3), or it can be expounded of the knowledge of God under common ideas that agree with himself and with creatures, which are known more perfectly and eminently in God than in other things. But that Damascene is not speaking of actual and distinct knowledge of God is clear from what he says there: “no one knows him save to the extent he himself has given revelation.”
35 Ad secundum dico quod Anselmus non dicit istam propositionem esse per se notam, quod apparet, quia non potest inferri ex deductione eius quod ista propositio sit vera nisi ad minus per ƿduos syllogismos, quorum alter erit iste: 'omni non ente ens est maius, summo nihil est maius, ergo summum non est non ens', ex obliquis in secundo secundae; alius syllogismus est iste: 'quod non est non ens est ens, summum non est non ens, ergo etc.' Quomodo autem ratio eius valeat dicetur in sequenti quaestione, argumento sexto, de infinitate probanda.	35. To the second [n.11] I say that Anselm does not say that that proposition is self-evidently known, as is clear, because from his deduction it cannot be inferred that the proposition is true save through at least two syllogisms, one of which is this: ‘being is greater than any non-being, nothing is greater than the supreme thing, therefore the supreme being is not a non-being’, from oblique forms in the second mood of the second figure [of syllogism]; the other syllogism is this: ‘what is not a non-being is a being, the supreme thing is not a non-being, therefore etc.’ But how his reasoning is valid will be explained in the following question, in the sixth argument [n.137], about proving infinity.
36 Ad probationem maioris (dico quod maior est falsa quando accipitur 'illud esse per se notum est', tamen maior vera, non tamen per se nota) cum probatur quia 'oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto', dico quod nec per se evidens est oppositum praedicati repugnare subiecto, nec per se evidens est subiectum habere conceptum simpliciter simplicem vel quod partes illius uniantur in effectu; et ambo ista requiruntur ad hoc quod propositio illa esset per se nota.	36. As to the proof of the major [n.11] (I say the major is false when ‘it is selfevidently known’ is taken; however the major is true, though not self-evidently known), when it is proved that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’, I say that it is neither self-evident that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject nor is it self-evident that the subject possesses a simply simple concept or that its parts are united in fact; and both these are required for that proposition to be self-evidently known.
37 Ad tertium dico quod 'veritatem in communi esse est per se notum, ergo Deum esse' non sequitur, sed est fallacia consequentis; aliter potest negari maior. Et cum probatur 'si nulla veriƿtas est, nullam veritatem esse verum est', consequentia non valet, quia veritas aut accipitur pro fundamento veritatis in re, aut pro veritate in actu intellectus componente et dividente; sed si nulla veritas est, nec verum est nullam veritatem esse, nec veritate rei, quia nulla res est, nec veritate in intellectu componente et dividente, quia nullus est. Bene tamen sequitur 'si nulla veritas est, ergo non est verum aliquam veritatem esse', sed non sequitur ultra 'ergo verum est aliquam veritatem non esse'; fallacia consequentis, a negativa habente duas causas veritatis ad affirmativam quae est una istarum.	37. To the third [n.12] I say that the inference ‘it is self-evidently known that truth in general exists, therefore it is self-evidently known that God exists’ does not follow but is the fallacy of the consequent; alternatively, the major can be denied. And when it is proved ‘if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth’, the consequence is not valid, because truth is taken either for the foundation of truth in reality, or for truth in the act of the intellect combining and dividing; but if there is no truth, neither is it true that there is no truth, whether by the truth of reality, because there is nothing, or by the truth in the intellect combining and dividing, because there is no intellect. However the inference does indeed follow, ‘if there is no truth, therefore it is not true that there is any truth’, but the further inference does not follow, ‘therefore it is true that there is not any truth’; it is the fallacy of the consequent, from a negative having two causes of truth to an affirmative which is one of those causes.
38 Ad ultimum dico quod non dicuntur propositiones per se notae quia extrema habent maiorem necessitatem in se, sive maiorem in re extra intellectum, sed quia extrema ut sunt extrema talis propositionis evidenter ostendunt complexionem esse conformem rationibus terminorum et habitudini eorum, et hoc qualecumque esse termini habeant, sive in re sive in intellectu; evidentia enim huius conformitatis est evidentia veritatis in propositione, quod ƿest propositionem esse per se notam. Nunc autem ista 'omne totum est maius sua parte', vel aliqua consimilis, in quocumque intellectu concipiente terminos nata est habere talem evidentiam ex terminis, quia ex terminis est evidens quod ista comp]exio est conformis habitudini et rationibus terminorum, qualecumque esse termini habeant; et ideo licet sit minor necessitas terminorum, non sequitur quod sit minor evidentia propositionum.	38. To the last principal argument [n.13] I say that propositions are not said to be self-evidently known because the extremes have a greater necessity in themselves, or a greater necessity in reality outside the intellect, but because the extremes, as they are the extremes of such a proposition, show evidently that their combination is in conformity with the natures of the terms and with the relation of them, and this whatever being the terms have, whether in reality or in the intellect; for the evidence of this conformity is the evidence of the truth in the proposition, which is the proposition’s being self-evidently known. But, as it is, the proposition ‘every whole is greater than its part’, or anything similar, in any intellect that conceives the terms, naturally has such evidence from the terms, because from the terms it is evident that the combined proposition is in conformity with the relation and nature of the terms, whatever being the terms have; and therefore although there is less necessity in the terms, it does not follow that there is less evidence in the propositions.