Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D20

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Single Question Whether the Three Persons are Equal in Power
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam quaero utrum tres personae sint aequales in potentia. Arguo quod non: Quia tunc sicut Pater potest generare, ita Filius posset generare. Probatio huius consequentiae: Tum quia Augustinus dicit Contra Maximinum libro III cap. 13: ((Si Pater non potest generare Filium sibi aequalem, est impotens)); ergo ex opposito, si non est impotens sed omnipotens, generare potest Filium, et per consequens 'posse generare' pertinet ad omnipotentiam, - et ita si Filius non potest generare, non est aeque potens vel aequalis potentiae cum Patre. Tum quia Filius non esset omnisciens, si non sciret generationem Patris; nec ergo omnipotens, si non possit in illam generationem . ƿ	1. 1. About the twentieth distinction I ask whether the three persons are equal in power. I argue for the negative: Because then, just as the Father can generate, so the Son could generate. Proof of the consequence: First because Augustine says AgainstMaximinus II ch.7: "If the Father cannot generate a Son equal to himself he is powerless;" therefore, arguing from the opposite, if he is not powerless but all powerful, he can generate a Son, and consequently 'being able to generate' belongs to omnipotence, - and thus if the Son cannot generate he is not equally powerful as, or equal in power with, the Father. Second because the Son would not be omniscient if he did not know the generation of the Father; he would not then be omnipotent if he were not capable of that generation.
2 Praeterea, Richardus I De Trinitate cap. ultimo probat quod non possunt esse plures omnipotentes, quia tunc unus posset facere alium 'nullipotentem'; ergo a simili videtur posse argui in proposito, si ponantur plures personae divinae aeque potentes.	2. Further, Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity I ch.25 proves that there cannot be several omni-potents, because then one of them could make the other nulli-potent; therefore it seems one could give a similar argument in the case of the issue at hand, if one posited several divine persons who were equally powerful.
3 Et sicut ista consequentia Richardi fuit declarata distinctione 2 per duas vias, consimilibus viis declaro etiam eam in proposito: Primo, quia una persona posset suo velle producere omnia possibilia, et eis productis in esse alia persona non posset eaproducere; eadem enim non possunt bis produci totaliter. Et confirmatur ista probatio, quia Pater prius - ordine originis - habet velle creaturarum quam Filius, quia Filius secundum Hilarium est potens 'per se, sed non a se'; ergo prius origine quam Filius producat, intelligitur Pater produxisse, et ita in illo signo in quo intelligitur Filius debere producere nulla sunt sibi possibilia.	3. And just as this inference of Richard's was made clear [in I d.2 n.179] in two ways, I make it clear too in rather similar ways of the issue at hand: First, because one person could by his act of will produce everything possible, and, once they were produced into existence, another person could not produce them; for the same things cannot be twice produced in their totality [I d.2 n.181]. There is also a confirmation for this proof, that the Father has an act of will for creatures before the Son does - before in order of origin -, because the Son, according to Hilary [On the Trinity IX n.48], is potent "of himself but not from himself; therefore the Father is understood to have produced things prior in origin to the Son's producing them, and so at the moment when the Son is understood as needing to produce nothing is possible for him.
4 Secundo, quia omnipotens potest suo velle impedire omnia possibilia alterius omnipotentis, si esset, quia non est necesse voluntates eorum concordare in aliis a se, quia illa omnia contingenter volunt; ita hic, non videtur esse necessarium quod voluntas unius personae concordet in actu volendi alterius personae.	4. Second, because an omnipotent being can by his act of will prevent everything that is possible to some other omnipotent being, if there be some other, because there is no need for their wills to be agreed about things other than themselves, since their will for all those things is contingent [I d.2 n.180]; so here, it does not seem necessary for the will of one person to agree in the act of willing of another person.
5 Quod si dicas eandem esse voluntatem eorum, et ideo concordare in volendo eadem, - contra: ƿForma quae est principium agendi, si est in pluribus, eodem modo illud principium est principium agendi unicuique illorum sicut si esset in uno tantum (sicut si albedo esset in duabus superficiebus, esset eis principium disgregandi eodem modo sicut esset si esset tantum in una); sed si voluntas esset in solo Filio, esset sibi principium contingenter volendi lapidem esse, ita quod illa voluntate posset tunc Filius velle aeque lapidem non esse; ergo posito quod sit in Patre, adhuc erit Filio principium contingenter volendi lapidem esse, et ita quidquid ponatur in Patre, Filius potest aeque velle lapidem esse vel non esse, - et ita si Pater velit lapidem esse et Filius non, unus omnipotens facit alium 'nullipotentem', impediendo omnia possibilia volita ab eo.	5. But if you say that they have the same will and so they do agree in willing the same things, - on the contrary: If the form that is the principle of acting is in several things, the principle is for each of them a principle of acting in just the same way as it would be if it were in one of them alone (just as if whiteness were in two surfaces, the two surfaces would have the principle of diffusing sight in the same way as they would have it if it existed in only one of them); but if will were in the Son alone it would be for him a principle of contingently willing the existence of a stone in such a way that the Son could then, by that will, equally will the stone not to exist; therefore, after one has posited this will as existing in the Father, the Son will still have the principle of contingently willing the stone to exist, and thus, whatever one posits in the Father, the Son can equally will the stone to exist or not to exist, - and thus, if the Father wish the stone to exist and the Son do not, one omnipotent makes the other to be nulli-potent, by preventing all the possible things that it has willed.
6 Item, prima causa plus causat quam secunda, secundum auctorem De causis propositione prima, et II Metaphysicae et I Posteriorum; sed Pater dat Filio virtutem causandi, non e converso; ergo Pater plus potest.	6. Again, a first cause causes more than a second cause does, according to the author of On Causes prop. 1 and according to Metaphysics 2.1.993b26-30 and Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a29-30; but the Father gives to the Son the virtue of causing and not conversely; therefore the Father is more powerful.
7 Ad oppositum est Magister distinctione 19 istius libri, in littera, et adducit Augustinum De fide ad Petrum cap. 2. ƿ	7. On the opposite side is what the Master puts in the text, Sent. I d.19 ch.1 n.168 and he adduces Augustine [rather: Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4.
8 Item, Augustinus Contra Maximinum III probat istam con clusionem tripliciter: Primo auctoritate Salvatoris in Ioan.: Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt; ergo et potentia.	8. Again, Augustine AgainstMaximinus II ch.14 nn.7 & 9, ch.18 n.3 proves this conclusion in three ways: First by the authority of the Savior in John 16.15: "Everything that the Father has is mine;" therefore the Father's power too.
9 Secundo per rationem, quia 'si non potuit dare potentiam aequalem, non fuit omnipotens, - si potuit et noluit, fuit invidus'.	9. Second by reason, because "if he could not give equal power he was not omnipotent, - if he could give it and he refused, he was envious."
10 Tertio per simile, quia 'pater carnalis generaret sibi filium aequalem, si posset, vel maiorem; ergo multo fortius in proposito'.	10. Third by a likeness, because "a carnal father would generate an equal son for himself if he could, or a greater son; therefore much more so in the issue at hand."
11 Respondeo, omittendo potentiam logicam (quae dicit modum compositionis factae ab intellectu) et potentiam metaphorice dictam (qualis est in geometricis, secundum quod ipsi geometrae imaginantur punctum esse in potentia ad lineam et lineam ad superficiem):	11. I reply by setting aside logical power or possibility (which refers to a mode of combining terms done by the intellect), and power said metaphorically (of the sort found in geometry, in the way geometers themselves imagine a point having power for a line and a line for a surface) [cf. Metaphyscis 5.17.1019b30-32, Ord. I d.7 n.27]:
12 Potentia proprie sumitur uno modo (sicut dictum est distinctione 7) prout est differentia entis opposita actui, alio modo secundum quod significat idem quod principium (sicut loquitur Philosophus de ea V Metaphysicae cap. 9). Et potentia isto ƿsecundo modo sumpta dividitur in potentiam activam et passivam, et utroque modo - qualitercumque sumatur - potest intelligi aut pro ipsa relatione principii quam significat, aut pro fundamento proximo illius relationis.	12. Power (as said in I d.7 nn.28-29) is properly taken in one way as it is a differentia of being, the differentia opposed to act, in another way as it signifies the same thing as principle does (as the Philosopher speaks of it in Metaphysics 5.17.1019a19-20). And power taken in this second way is divided into active and passive, and in each way -however it is taken - it can be understood either for the relation itself that it signifies in the power, or for the proximate foundation of that relation.
13 Ad propositum. Planum est quod in Deo oportet ponere potentiam activam, cum sit principium efficiens (ex distinctione 2), et de ista potentia loquitur Magister distinctione ista.	13. As for the issue at hand. It is plain that one should posit active power in God, since he is an efficient principle (from I d.2 nn.43-58), and it is about this power that the Master is speaking in the present distinction.
14 Et huiusmodi aequalitas potest intelligi dupliciter: aut secundum extensionem obiectorum possibilium, ad quae se extendit potentia, aut secundum intensionem ipsius potentiae in se. Exemplum: potentia calefactiva dicitur aequalis secundum extensionem, si ad aequalia calefactibilia se extendat (et sic omnis caritas est aequalis, et extendit se ad omnia diligibilia ex caritate); secundum intensionem, si aeque perfecta sit potentia et in aeque perfectum actum possit; licet non tot possibilia sibi subessent sicut alii potentiae), ut patet posito illo casu qui ponitur distinctione 7, quod calor calefactione sibi adaequata produceret alium calorem.	14. Equality in power of this sort can also be understood in two ways: either as to the extent of possible objects to which the power is extended, or as to the intensity of the very power in itself. An example: a power to heat is said to be equal in extent if it is extended to an equal number of heatable things (and in this way all charity is equal and is extended to everything that can from charity be loved); it is said to be equal in intensity if the power is equally perfect and is capable of an act that is equally perfect, although not as many things be subject to it as to another power, as is plain from positing the case that was posited in I d.7 n.41, that heat possessed of a heating adequate to it would produce another heat.
15 Et istae duae aequalitates frequenter concomitantur se invicem; potest tamen utraque intelligi sine altera. Loquendo autem de aequalitate extensionis, non est difficultas nisi de actionibus ƿnotionalibus et de terminis illarum actionum, quia illi duo termini non sunt producibiles ab omnibus personis, sed Filius a solo Patre, Spiritus Sanctus autem a Patre et Filio.	15. And these two equalities frequently accompany each other; each can however be understood without the other. Now, when speaking of equality of extent, no difficulty arises save about the notional acts [sc. the acts that concern the production of the divine persons], and about the terms of those acts, because the two terms are not producible by all the persons, but the Son is producible only by the Father while the Holy Spirit is producible only by the Father and the Son.
16 Unde quoad hoc dicitur sic, quod potentia generandi pertinet ad omnipotentiam in Patre, non autem in Filio.	16. [Exposition of the opinion] - Hence as concerns this point [n.15] one statement is as follows, that the power of generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father but not in the Son.
17 Quod declaratur dupliciter: Primo, quia omnipotentia est ad omne illud quod non includit contradictionem; sed Patrem generare non includit contradictionem, Filium autem generare includit contradictionem; ergo etc.	17. This statement is clarified in two ways: First, because omnipotence is power for everything that does not include a contradiction; but that the Father generates does not include a contradiction, while that the Son generates does include a contradiction; therefore etc.
18 Praeterea, secundo, quia aliter est de actionibus transeuntibus ad extra et aliter de actionibus immanentibus: possibilitas actionis transeuntis iudicatur ex ratione actionis in se et termino eius, possibilitas actionis immanentis non iudicatur ex his praecise, sed cum hoc ex comparatione ad agens in quo manet talis actio; cum ergo generatio sit actio immanens, possibilitas eius iudicanda est non tantum ex se ipsa in se et termino eius, sed quia est compossibilis supposito illi agenti in quo debet manere: est autem generatio compossibilis Patri et non Filio, ergo idem quod prius.	18. Further, second, because what holds of actions that are transitive, or pass onward to something external, is different from what holds of actions that are immanent; possibility in the case of a transitive action is judged from the idea of the action in itself and from its term, while possibility in the case of an immanent action is not judged exclusively from these features but also from comparison with the agent which such action is immanent in; since therefore generation is an immanent action, its possibility is to be judged not only from it in itself and from its term but also from its being compossible with the acting supposit which it should be immanent in; but generation is compossible with the Father and not with the Son, therefore the same as before.
19 Tertia declaratio additur, quia 'potens' dicitur quod potest ƿin omne illud ad quod habet formam, et non dicitur 'impotens' si non potest in illam actionem ad quam non se extendit sua forma (sicut ignis non dicitur 'impotens' quia non potest frigefacere, quia non habet formam ad frigefaciendum); Pater autem habet formam convenientem generationi, et Filius non; ergo Pater est impotens si non potest generare, non autem Filius est impotens si non possit generare, - et ita 'posse generare' pertinet ad omnipotentiam Patris et non ad omnipotentiam Filii.	19. A third clarification is added that that is said to be 'potent' which has power for everything for which it has the form, and is said to be 'impotent' for that action to which its form does not extend (as fire is said to be 'impotent' because it cannot cool things, for it does not have the form for cooling); but the Father has a form that agrees with generation and the Son does not; therefore the Father is impotent if he cannot generate but the Son is not impotent if he be unable to generate, - and so 'being able to generate' pertains to the omnipotence of the Father and not to the omnipotence of the Son.
20 Contra istud. Non comparando 'generare' ad aliquod suppositum, quaero: aut istud, ut est ipsius geniti tamquam termini, est aliquid ad quod nata est esse aliqua potentia activa, aut non. Si sic, ergo in quocumque non est potentia ad illud, non est in eo omnipotentia (hoc est, non potentia ad omne illud ad quod nata est esse potentia); si non, ergo in nullo est potentia ad illud, et ita non pertinet ad omnipotentiam Patris.	20. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this: Without comparing the 'to generate' with any supposit I ask: either this generating, as it belongs to the generated supposit as to a term, is something for which some active power is naturally fit, or it is not. If it is, then whatever does not have power for this generating does not have omnipotence (that is, it does not have power for everything for which power is naturally fit); if it is not, then nothing has this power for generating, and thus this power does not pertain to the omnipotence of the Father.
21 Confirmationes etiam non valent. Prima non, quia omnipoƿtens potest in omne illud quod est terminus potentiae simpliciter, et hoc producendo illud in eo in quo natum est produci, si natum est produci in aliquo, vel producendo ipsum in se subsistens si non est natum produci in aliquo. Non autem oportet quod possit producere omne tale formaliter in se: sicut potest producere cursum in animali (ut in homine vel asino), in quo natus est esse cursus, sed hoc non potest producere in se (sicut nec potest formaliter currere), quia per istud verbum neutrum significaretur quod talis forma esset in ipso formaliter. Licet ergo Filius non possit formaliter generare ut generatio sit in ipso, nec possit principiare generationem in se ipso, tamen si istud sit terminus omnipotentiae, oportet dicere quod Filius possit principiare generationem in eo in quo nata est esse, quia aliter non esset omnipotens, sicut non esset omnipotens si non posset causare intellectionem in intellectu potente recipere eam. Generare autem non potest aliquo modo esse a Filio, nec ut in Filio, - ergo si generare est terminus potentiae simpliciter, Filius non erit omnipotens.	21. The confirmations too [nn.18-19] are not valid. Not the second [n.18] because omnipotence is capable of everything which is the term of power simply, and this either by producing it in that which it is of a nature to be produced in, if it is of a nature to be produced in something, or by producing it as subsistent in itself, if it is not of a nature to be produced in something. But there is no necessity that omnipotence be able to produce all such things formally in themselves; just as omnipotence can produce running in an animal (as in a man or a horse), which is what running is of a nature to be in, but cannot produce running in itself (as neither can it produce running formally), because this neuter word 'itself would signify that such a form existed in itself formally. Although therefore the Son not be able to generate formally such that generation should be in himself, nor be able to be a principle of generation in himself, yet, if generation be a term of omnipotence, then one should say that the Son is able to be a principle of generation in that which generation is of a nature to be in, because otherwise he would not be omnipotent, just as neither would he be omnipotent if he could not cause understanding in an intellect capable of receiving understanding. But 'to generate' cannot in any way be from the Son, not even as it is in the Son - therefore if 'to generate' is a term of power simply the Son will not be omnipotent.
22 Secunda non valet, quia quod habet formam limitatam ad agendum, non est omnipotens ad agendum: licet enim ignis sit potens ignire et calefacere, si tamen non possit frigefacere non erit ƿsimpliciter omnipotens, quia forma eius - limitata ad actum unum - concludit ipsum non esse simpliciter omnipotentem; ergo Filium non habere formam convenientem omni actioni, quam actionem nata sit potentia simpliciter respicere, concludit Filium non esse simpliciter potentem.	22. The third confirmation [n.19] is not valid, because what has a form that is limited with respect to acting is not omnipotent with respect to acting; for although fire be potent as to burning and heating, if yet it be not able to cool it will not be simply omnipotent, because its form - limited to one act - entails that it is not simply omnipotent; therefore that the Son does not have a form agreeing with every action, although the action is one which power is of a nature to have simply regard to, entails that the Son is not simply potent.
23 Item, ista via non salvat quomodo Pater et Filius sunt aeque potentes, quia Pater potest in actum generationis (qui, per te, terminus est potentiae simpliciter), in quem actum non potest Filius, et ita non erunt aeque potentes quantum ad extensionem.	23. Again, this way [n.16] does not save the fact of how the Father and the Son are equally potent, because the Father has power for an act of generation (which, for you [sc. the holder of the opinion in question here, nn.16-18] is a term of power simply), for which action the Son does not have power, and so they will not be equally powerful as to extent.
24 Quantum ad istum articulum dico aliter quod potentiae activae primum correlativum est 'possibile', - non communiter sumptum, prout opponitur impossibili, quia hoc modo possibile est Deum esse; ergo oportet quod possibile, ut est potentiae activae correlativum, sumatur determinatius. Hoc autem non videtur nisi secundum quod Avicenna accipit 'possibile', VI Metaphysicae et alibi frequenter, prout opponitur ei quod est necessarium ex se. Et tunc, cum quodlibet intrinsecum Deo sit in se formaliter necessarium (vel per identitatem cum essentia, quae est ex se formaliter necessaria), nihil intrinsecum Deo erit terminus potentiae activae proprie dictae; et si hoc, cum ad omnia alia ab essentia divina eandem rationem principii habeant tres personae, quia ƿprius intelligitur principium illud producendi creaturas communicatum tribus quam possit habere actum producendi illa alia, sequitur quod aequalis est potentia trium personarum quantum ad numerum possibilium.	24. As for this article [nn.15] I say differently that the first correlative for active power is the possible, - not taken generally, the way the possible is opposed to the impossible, because in this way God's existence is possible; the possible then, as it is the correlative of active power, must be taken more determinately. But this correlative seems only to be what accords with how Avicenna takes the possible, Metaphysics VI chs.1, 3 (91va, 93rb) and elsewhere, VIII chs.4, 5 (99rb, 99vb), I ch.7 (73rab), in the way that what is opposed to the possible is the of itself necessary. And then, since anything intrinsic to God is in itself formally necessary (or exists by identity with the essence, which essence is formally necessary), nothing intrinsic to God will be the term of active power properly stated; and if so, since the three persons possess the same idea of principle with respect to everything other than the divine essence, because the principle of producing creatures is understood first to be communicated to the three persons before the principle is able to have the act of producing those other things, - the consequence is that the power of the three persons is equal as to number of possibles.
25 Assumptum autem plus declaratur in quaestione illa 'De ordine productionum extrinsecarum ad intrinsecas' (II libro, quaestione 1).	25. Now the assumption [sc. 'the principle of producing creatures is understood first...'] is made clearer in the question 'On the Order of Extrinsic Productions to the Intrinsic Ones' [II d.1 q.1 nn.8-11, 22].
26 Et breviter patet ex hoc quod principium necessarium respectu unius productionis et contingens respectu alterius productionis, prius est principium producendi necessarium quam contingens; quidquid autem sit principium producendi personas, necessario se habet ad productiones illarum, contingenter autem se habet principium producendi creaturas ad ipsas creaturas; prius ergo communicatur tribus personis quam possit habere actum respectu possibilium extra.	26. It is also plain, in brief, from the fact that a principle necessary in respect of one production and contingent in respect of a second production is first a necessary principle of producing before it is a contingent one; now whatever be the principle of producing the persons, it is necessarily related to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently related to the creatures themselves; therefore it is communicated to the three persons first before it can have an act with respect to possible things outside it.
27 Ex hoc apparet quod potentia est aequalis in divinis personis, non tantum quantum ad extensionem sed etiam quantum ad intensionem: sive enim potentia accipiatur pro absoluto (quod est fundamentum relationis principii), patet quod illud secundum eandem magnitudinem est in tribus, non tantum secundum eandem magnitudinem 'secundum quid' sed 'simpliciter', sicut dictum est in quaestione praecedente 'De aequalitate magnitudinis'; sive ƿaccipiatur pro relatione (fundata super illud absolutum), eadem relatio est trium, et si quam habet magnitudinem, eadem est magnitudo illius relationis in tribus, et ita omni modo est aequalitas potentiae et secundum extensionem et secundum intensionem.	27. Hereby it is apparent that power in the divine persons is equal not only as to extent but also as to intensity; for if power be taken for what is absolute (namely for the foundation of the relation of the principle), it is plain that it is in the three to the same magnitude, not only to same magnitude 'in a certain respect' but also to the same magnitude 'simply', as was said in the preceding question 'About Equality of Magnitude' [I d.19 nn.13-14]; or if it be taken for the relation (which is founded on what is absolute), then there is the same relation in the three and, if the relation has any magnitude, the magnitude of the relation is the same in the three, and so there is an equality of power in every way, both in extent and in intensity.
28 Quod autem dictum est de primo correlativo potentiae activae, quod sit 'possibile', intelligendum est de possibili obiective (scilicet quod est terminus potentiae), non de possibili subiective, quia illud non est correlativum convertibile respectu potentiae activae: non enim omnis potentia activa habet aliquod sic possibile, sibi correspondens, sed tantum illa potentia activa quae est transmutativa. Aequatur ergo 'possibile obiective', ut correlativum, potentiae activae, non autem 'possibile subiective', et tale est illud 'possibile' de quo adductus est Avicenna, quod scilicet opponitur 'necessario ex se formaliter'.	28. Now as to what is said about the first correlative of active power, which is the possible [n.24], one must understand it of the objectively possible (namely the object which is the term of the power), not of the subjectively possible, because the subjectively possible is not a convertible correlative in respect of active power; for not every active power has something that is thus [sc. subjectively] possible corresponding to it, but only that active power does which is transformative. The objectively possible then is, as correlative, equal to the active power, but the subjectively possible is not - and such an objectively possible is the possible that Avicenna was adduced for [n.24], namely the one that is opposed to the of itself formally necessary.
29 Quod autem illud differat a 'necessario ex se formaliter', sive a producente, posset confirmari per Philosophum V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod principium et causa convertantur realiter; omne autem causatum est aliud a causa, ergo et possibile (hoc est principiatum) aliud est - secundum eum - a principio.	29. But that the objectively possible differs from the of itself formally necessary, or from the producer, may be confirmed from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.1.1013a17, where he intends it to be the case that principle and cause are really convertible; but everything caused is other than its cause, therefore the possible too (that is, the thing that has a principle) is other - according to him - than the principle.
30 Confirmatur etiam per rationem potentiae activae positam V Metaphysicae, quod ipsa est ((principium transmutandi aliud aut ƿin quantum aliud)); ergo multo magis est principium producendi aliud, quia non potest causatum ita esse idem causae sicut activum potest esse idem passivo in creaturis.	30. There is a confirmation too from the idea of active power set down in Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15-16, 19-20, that it is "a principle of transforming that which is other, or insofar as it is other;" therefore much more is it a principle of producing what is other, because a caused thing cannot be as identical with the cause as the active can be identical with the passive in creatures.
31 Sed tunc restat dubitatio quomodo potentia generandi dicatur 'potentia', cum non sit respectu alicuius possibilis secundum praedicta. Respondeo. Possibile potest sumi adhuc magis extendendo quam ut opponitur necessario ex se, dicendo illud esse possibile quod opponitur necessario a se, - et hoc modo omne originatum esset possibile, sed nec sic videntur sancti communiter loqui nec philosophi. Et hoc modo posset concedi Filium esse possibilem, quia originatum, et ita potentiam correspondentem activam huic termino esse 'potentiam'. Verius tamen conceditur Filium esse principiatum, et non possibilem; in Patre tamen conceditur potentia activa generandi, quia potentia activa in creaturis aliquam dicit perfectionem, - possibilitas autem sibi correspondens, quia repugnat necessitati ex se, dicit imperfectionem; transfertur ergo nomen illius quod dicit perfectionem, nomen autem alterius correlativi - quod dicit imperfectionem - non transfertur in se sed in aliquo communiore se, ut sic ex parte producentis dicatur esse potentia et tamen ex parte producti non dicatur esse possibilitas sed tantum ratio principiati.	31. But in that case there is a doubt how the power of generating may be called a 'power', since, according to what has been said [nn.24-30], it has no respect to anything possible. I reply. The possible can be taken in a still more extensive way than as it is opposed to the of itself necessary, namely by saying that that is possible which is opposed to the by itself necessary - and in this way everything that is originated would be possible, but neither the saints nor the philosophers seem commonly to speak thus. And it is in this way that the Son could be conceded to be possible, because he is originated, and so the active power corresponding to this term is a 'power'. However, the Son is more truly conceded to be something from a principle and not to be something possible; still there is conceded to be in the Father an active power of generating, because active power in creatures asserts a certain perfection - though the possibility corresponding to it, because it is repugnant to of itself necessity, asserts an imperfection; so the name for that which asserts perfection is transferred [sc. to God], but the name for the other correlative -which asserts imperfection - is not transferred in itself but in something more common than itself, so that in this way power is said to exist on the part of the producer and yet possibility is not said to exist on the part of the produced but only the idea of being from a principle.
32 Ex hoc apparet irrationabilitas illius dicti quod 'sub omnipotentia de virtute sermonis contineatur potentia generandi, non ƿautem secundum usum sanctorum', quia etsi aliquando sancti vel doctores dicant 'potentiam generandi esse potentiam' et 'generare esse terminum potentiae', tamen de virtute sermonis neutra est vera simpliciter, loquendo de potentia prout respicit terminum possibilem, sed tantum applicando rationem potentiae ad rationem principii prout in communi respicit principiabile.	32. Hence is apparent the irrationality of the saying that 'under omnipotence, by virtue of the word, there is contained the power of generating, though not according to the usage of the saints', because although the saints or the doctors sometimes say that 'the power of generating is a power' and that 'to generate is the term of a power', yet by virtue of the word neither is simply true but only when applying the idea of power to the idea of principle insofar as principle commonly has regard to that which can come from a principle.
33 Hoc modo loquendo, ad quaestionem de aequalitate potentiae in personis divinis respondeo, - et dico quod etiam sic sunt aequales, quia secundum Magistrum distinctione 7 istius libri 'eadem potentia qua Pater potest generare, et Filius potest generari'; sed tunc ista aequalitas potentiae non est ad idem: sicut si poneretur aequalitas potentiae in colore ad immutandum visum et in sapore ad immutandum gustum, essent quidem ista duo aequalis potentiae, non tamen haberent eandem potentiam, nec ad idem. Ita in proposito: loquendo de potentia hoc modo - extendendo ad actum notionalem - aequales sunt Pater et Filius in potentia et extensive et intensive, quia potentia quae est in Patre ad actum generandi, est aeque perfecta in Filio et ad aequalia obiecta; non tamen hoc modo omnino est eadem potentia, sicut potentia est eadem quae est respectu possibilis, - et secundum hoc concedendum est quod in Filio non est omnis potentia, vel non est in eo potentia ad omne possibile, accipiendo potentiam sic extensive, licet in ipso sit omnipotenti: quae dicit potentiam ad omnia possibilia. ƿ	33. By speaking in this way I reply to the question about the equality of power in the divine persons, - and I say that they are equal even in this way, because according to the Master in distinction 7 of this book [I d.7 ch.2 n.77] 'by the same power by which the Father can generate the Son can also be generated'; but then this equality of power is not relative to the same thing; just as, if one were to posit an equality of power in color for affecting sight and in savor for affecting taste, these two would indeed have equal power yet they would not have the same power, nor relative to the same thing. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand: when speaking of power in this way - extending it to the notional act - Father and Son are equal in power both in extent and in intensity, because the power that is in the Father for the act of generating is equally perfect in the Son and in relation to equal objects; yet it is not in this way altogether the same power the way a power is the same that has regard to what is possible - and in this respect one should concede that not every power is in the Son, or that there is not in him power for every possible, taking power in this extended way [sc. so as to include the notional act], although there is in him the omnipotence that means power as to all possible things.
34 Et si quaeras 'si idem absolutum est in Patre et in Filio super quod fundatur potentia aequalis secundum extensionem et intensionem, etiam illa quae est ad intra, quare non est potentia omnis eadem in utroque?', - respondeo: dico quod etsi idem absolutum, quod est potentia, sit in Patre et in Filio, non tamen sub ratione potentiae quantum ad actum notionalem est in utroque, quia non sub ratione prioris ad illum actum, et potentia sive principium requirit ordinem prioritatis ad terminum.	34. And if you ask 'if there is in the Father and the Son the same absolute reality on which a power equal in extent and in intensity is founded, even as to power that is inwardly directed, why is not every power the same in both of them?' - I reply: I say that although the same absolute reality, which is the power, is in the Father and the Son, yet it is not in each of them under the idea of power as far as the notional act is concerned, because it is not under the idea of what is prior to act, and power or principle requires the order of priority to a term.
35 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum dico negando illam consequentiam primam, quantum est ex forma consequentiae. Cum probatur per Augustinum Contra Maximinum, respondeo quod illud argumentum non tenet per locum intrinsecum (quasi per locum a toto in quantitate ad partem totius in quantitate, quasi posse generare sit aliquod posse), sed tenet per multas propositiones subintellectas. Et habet illud argumentum reduci ad multos syllogismos, hoc modo: Maximinus concessit Patrem generare Filium, sed non aequalem, - Augustinus arguit 'si genuit, et non potuit generare Filium aequalem, ergo fuit impotens'. Probatio huius consequentiae: ex quo dedit Filio deitatem (etiam secundum Maximinum, quia aliter non esset generatio proƿprie), sed deitatem minorem (secundum eum) deitate Patris, ergo deitas non est infinita ex se, quia infinito non potest aliquid esse maius, nec infinitum potest minui; et si deitas non est infinita, ergo habens eam non est omnipotens: nihil enim est omnipotens (cum omnipotentia requirat infinitam potentiam) nisi habeat infinitam essentiam. Ergo non tenet consequentia quasi sub isto universali contineatur illud singulare, sed quia istud universale - quod est 'esse omnipotens' - concomitatur infinitas essentiae et ita communicabilitas in aequalitate. Et consimiliter sequitur 'si Pater non potest intelligere, Pater non est omnipotens'; sed non sequitur per locum intrinsecum (quasi intelligere Patris sit terminus omnipotentiae), sed per istas propositiones subintellectas: 'quod non potest intelligere, non habet omnem perfectionem simpiiciter, et tunc non est infinitae essentiae, ac per hoc nec omnipotens'.	35. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.1] I speak by denying the first consequence, as far as the form of the consequence is concerned. When proof is given from Augustine Against Maximinus I reply that the argument does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as on the move from a universal whole to a part of a universal whole, by supposing that 'to be able to generate' is a particular 'being able'), but it holds because of many implicitly understood propositions. In fact the argument has to be reduced to many syllogisms as follows: Maximinus has conceded that the Father generates a Son, though not an equal Son, - Augustine argues 'if he generated and could not generate an equal Son, then he was impotent'. Proof of the consequence: from the fact that the Father gave deity to the Son (even according to Maximinus, because otherwise there would properly be no generation), but a deity lesser (according to Maximinus) than the deity of the Father, then deity is not of itself infinite, because there cannot be anything greater than the infinite, nor can the infinite be lessened; and if deity is not infinite then he who has deity is not omnipotent; for nothing is omnipotent (since omnipotence requires infinite power) unless it have an infinite essence. Therefore the consequence holds, not because the singular instance [sc. being able to generate] is contained under the universal [sc. being omnipotent], but because the universal - which is the 'to be omnipotent' - is accompanied by infinity of essence and so by an ability to be communicated equally. And this inference similarly holds, 'if the Father cannot understand, the Father is not omnipotent'; but it does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as if the Father's act of understanding were the term of omnipotence), but on the basis of these implicitly understood propositions: 'what cannot understand does not have every perfection simply, and in that case it is not of infinite essence, and therefore not omnipotent either'.
36 Cum arguitur postea de omnisciente, dico quod scientia non requirit ordinem determinatum ad scibilia, nec ordinem prioris nec posterioris, - et ideo scientia de necessitate extendit se ad ƿomne ens, quia omne ens est scibile; potentia autem non extendit se - ut ad obiectum - ad omne ens, sed tantum ad ens possibile, quod, quomodocumque sumendo 'possibile', natum est esse posterius: et ideo non ad illud quod non est natum esse posterius, et ideo nec ad illud quod non est natum esse in persona infinita idem illi personae.	36. When the argument is then made about omniscience [n.1], I say that knowledge does not require an order that is determinate to knowable things, nor an order of prior or posterior, - and therefore knowledge is of necessity extended to every being, because every being is knowable; but power is not extended - as to extension to an object - to every being, but only to possible being, which possible being, in whatever way 'possible' is taken, is of a nature to be posterior; and so it is not extended to what is not of a nature to be posterior, and therefore not to that which is [not?] of a nature to be, in an infinite person, the same thing as that person.
37 Cum postea arguitur per Richardum, dico quod argumentum valet si ponerentur duo Dii, per impossibile (sicut declaratum est distinctione 2), non autem de duabus personis aeque potentibus.	37. When the argument next from Richard is made [n.2], I say the argument is valid if it be supposed, per impossibile, that there are two Gods (as was made clear in I d.2 n.180), but it is not valid of two persons who are equal in power.
38 Cum probatur primo per hoc quod 'una persona posset facere aliam nullipotentem, volendo omnia possibilia et ponendo ea in esse', dico quod non potest velle illa nisi alia persona volente illa, et ita non ponuntur in esse ab una persona, alia persona non ponente ea in esse, sed sicut in eodem instanti naturae intelliguntur tres habere principium sufficiens ponendi ea in esse, ita in eodem instanti etiam intelliguntur habere actum quo ponuntur illa in esse. Sed si ponerentur duo Dii, unus propria actione posset ponere omnia in esse sive producere ea in esse, alius autem non posset producere illa, eadem actione; ergo vel nulla actione posset ƿea producere, et ita non esset omnipotens, - vel posset ea producere alia actione, et ita idem posset bis accipere esse, quod est impossibile.	38. When proof is given, first, through the fact that 'one person could make another person nulli-potent by willing all possible things and bringing them into existence' [n.5], I say that he cannot will them save with the other person also willing them, and so they are not brought into existence by one person while the other person is not bringing them into existence, but just as the three persons are in the same moment of nature understood to have a sufficient principle for bringing these things into existence, so they are also in the same moment understood to have the act by which these things are brought into existence. But if two Gods were posited, one of them could by its own action bring everything into existence or produce everything into existence while the other could not produce them by the same action; therefore either he could not produce them by any action, and thus he would not be omnipotent, - or he could produce them by another action, and thus the same thing could receive existence twice, which is impossible.
39 Ad secundam probationem, quod 'unus omnipotens posset impedire omnia volita ab alio', dico quod illa probatio bona est de duabus voluntatibus, quia - per impossibile - habens suam voluntatem, posset uti ea contingenter ad quodlibet obiectum aliud a se; non sic autem de duobus habentibus eandem voluntatem, quia propter eandem necessitatem est unus usus voluntatis propter quam est voluntas una, et ita non potest una persona ista voluntate velle et alia non velle, sicut nec una persona potest habere illam voluntatem et alia non habere illam.	39. To the second proof, that 'one omnipotent could prevent everything that was willed by another omnipotent' [n.4], I say the proof is good about two wills, because per impossibile - what has its own will could use it contingently as to any object other than itself; but the proof is not good about two persons who have the same will, because by the same necessity by which there is one will there is also one use of the will, and so it cannot be the case that one person wills with this will and the other does not, just as neither can one person have this will and the other not have it.
40 Cum obicitur - contra istam responsionem - de forma quae est in duobus, quod sit 'principium operandi eodem modo utrique sicut si esset in uno solo', concedo quod Filius non quasi naturaliter vel coacte vult voluntate ista, quasi Pater volens praedeterminaverit Filium ad volendum idem et non sit in potestate Filii illud velle sicut in potestate erat Patris, sed in eodem instanti naturae Pater et Filius intelliguntur habere eandem voluntatem et aeque libere quemlibet actum volendi habere - ut est huius obiecti sicut si alius non haberet illam voluntatem. Est ergo ista forma, cuilibet habenti, principium uniformiter operandi, sicut esset si iste solus haberet eam; sed non est alicui habenti principium operandi et alii principium non operandi, operatione quae est eadem isti ƿvoluntati, sicut ista non est eadem 'voluntas' et 'non voluntas'. Unde necessitas istius consequentiae 'si Pater vult hoc, Filius vult hoc' non est contra libertatem volitionis Filii, sicut nec contra libertatem volitionis meae est ista consequentia 'si volo, volo'; ita nec ibi 'si Pater vult a, Filius vult a', quia idem velle est Patris et Filii.	40. When - against this response - an objection is made about the form that exists in the two of them, that 'the principle of operating exists in each of them the way it would if it existed in one alone' I concede that the Son does not as it were naturally or by coercion will with this will, as if the Father by willing has predetermined the Son to will the same thing and the willing is not in the Son's power the way it was in the Father's, but rather the Father and the Son are in the same moment of nature understood to have the same will and to have any act of will - as the act is of this object - in as equally free a way as if one of them did not have the will. This form, then, is as much a principle for operating uniformly for any person who has it as it would be if he alone had it; but it is not a principle of operating for one possessor of it and a principle of not operating for the other, with an operation that is the same as the will, just as this same will is not both 'a will' and 'not a will'. Hence the necessity of the inference 'if the Father wills this, the Son wills this' is not against the freedom of the Son's volition, just as neither is the inference 'if I will, I will' against my volition's freedom; thus it is not in this case either, 'if the Father wills a, the Son wills a', because the Father's and the Son's act of will is the same.
41 Ad aliud, de causa prima et secunda, responsum est distinctione 12, quod illa propositio veritatem habet propter aliam virtutem sive vim causandi in causa priore et posteriore, - et illa quae est prioris, est principalior; hoc autem fallit in principio prioris secundum originem, et posterioris, in quibus est vis eadem vel virtus causandi respectu tertii, - cuiusmodi vis est in proposito, et ideo in proposito non valet.	41. As to the other argument about first and second causes [n.6], the response has been given in distinction 12 n.68, because the proposition in question gets its truth from the fact that there is a different virtue or power of causing in the prior cause than in the posterior - and that what the prior has is more principal; but the proposition is false of a principle belonging to a prior in origin and to a posterior, where they have the same power or virtue of causing in respect of a third - and of this sort is the power in the issue at hand, and so in this case the argument is not valid.