Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D21

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Single Question Whether this Proposition is true, 'Only the Father is God'
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam primam quaero utrum haec sit vera 'solus Pater est Deus'. Quod sic: Solus Deus qui est Pater, est Deus, ergo solus Pater est Deus. Antecedens patet, quia solus Deus qui est Pater, est Trinitas. Consequentia probatur per simile, quia sequitur ' solum animal quod est homo, currit, ergo solus homo currit'.	1. That it is true: Only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God. - The antecedent is plain because only God who is Father is the Trinity. The inference is proved by taking a like case, because this follows: 'only the animal that is man runs, therefore only man runs'.
2 Item, solus Deus est Pater, ergo solus Pater est Deus. - Antecedens patet per exponentes. Consequentia probatur per conversionem exclusivae.	2. Again, only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God. The antecedent is plain from the expositors. The inference is proved by conversion of an exclusive proposition [sc. 'only...'].
3 Item, solus Deus est Deus, ergo solus Pater est Deus. - Consequentia probatur, tum quia 'Deus' in antecedente stat personaliter (quia est indefinita), tum quia antecedens infert utramque exponentem consequentis.	3. Again, only God is God, therefore only the Father is God. - The proof of the inference is both that 'God' in the antecedent stands for a person (because it is indefinite), and that the antecedent implies each exponent of the consequent.
4 Quod inferat exponentem affirmativam, probatio, quia sequiƿtur 'solus Deus est Deus, ergo omnis Deus est Deus', et ita Pater est Deus; ergo sequitur affirmativa exponens consequens.	4. But the proof that an affirmative exponent is implied is that this inference follows, 'only God is God, therefore every God is God', and accordingly the Father is God; therefore a consequent that is an affirmative exponent follows.
5 Sequitur etiam 'solus Deus est Deus, ergo non alius a Deo est Deus', et ultra 'ergo non alius a Patre est Deus'. - Probatio consequentiae: hic videtur fallacia consequentis 'alius a Deo, ergo alius a Patre'; ergo negative arguendo eodem ordine, erit bonum argumentum. Probatio assumpti, quia si 'alius a Deo' inferret 'alium a Patre', hoc esset propter distributionem termini relationis diversitatis; sed non distribuitur, - probatio, quia tunc esset omnis propositio falsa ubi praedicaretur relativum diversitatis de aliquo, puta quaecumque talis 'homo est diversus vel aliud': datur enim hic intelligi correlativum primum huius relativi et per consequens significatur quod homo sit 'alius ab alio', et si terminus relationis distribuatur sequitur quod sit 'aliud a quocumque alio', ergo 'aliud a se'.	5. This inference too holds, 'only God is God, therefore no one other than God is God', and the further inference, 'therefore no one other than the Father is God'. - Proof of the inference: to argue 'other than God, therefore other than the Father' seems to be a fallacy; so if one argues in the same pattern negatively [sc. 'other than God, therefore not other than the Father'] the argument will be good. Proof of the assumption, because if 'other than God' entailed 'other than the Father' this would be because the term of the relation of diversity [sc. 'God'] was distributed [sc. taken wholly]; but it is not distributed, - the proof being that then every proposition would be false when the relative term in the diversity was predicated of something, to wit, any such proposition as 'man is diverse or other'; for what is given here to be understood is the first of the correlatives of this relation [sc. 'man' as the first correlative of the relation 'other'], and consequently the signification is that man is 'other than something else', and if the term of the relation [sc. 'something else'] is distributed, the result is that man is 'other than anything else whatever' and so that he is 'other than himself.(a) (a) [Note by Duns Scotus] Again, a negative that excepts something and an affirmative taken in exclusion of the excepted part are convertible; Matthew 11.27: "No one knows the Father but the Son," [sc. which as converted to an affirmative will read 'only the Son knows the Father'] -therefore only the Son knows, therefore only he is God. Again, On the Trinity VI ch.7: "The Father is as great as are the Father and the Son together;" therefore only the Father is so great, therefore only the Father is God. - To the first: 'No one' - no man; God is called 'man' ("he gave a marriage feast for his Son", Matthew 22.2). Therefore let 'common to God' be taken, let 'no God' or 'no intellectual being' be taken so as to be a substantive, let '[no one] but the Father knows' be conceded, - and thus no intellectual being other than the Father [knows], because 'other' indicates an otherness in the thing signified by its substantive [sc. here 'the Father']; thus universally, wherever there is a substantive common to the three persons, the proposition is true with 'only' and with 'no one'. The response to the second is plain through the second: 'only' is taken in a syncategorematic sense.
6 Oppositum patet per Augustinum VI De Trinitate cap. 8. ƿ	6. The opposite is plain from Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.9 n.10
7 Ad quaestionem potest fieri distinctio (sicut distinguitur communiter, et bene), quod 'solus' potest teneri categorematice vel syncategorematice. 'Solus' enim significat idem quod 'non cum alio', sicut patet per Philosophum I Elenchorum. Ista autem negatio ƿassociationis potest intelligi determinare aliquid in se sive ex natura rei, vel determinare aliquid ut est extremum compositionis in habitudine ad aliud extremum, puta negando associationem alterius ƿab isto in recipiendo praedicationem talis praedicati. Primo modo non admittitur in divinis hoc nomen 'solus', quia nihil est ibi solitarium. Secundo modo conceditur quandocumque non associatur subiecto aliquis, de quo dicatur idem praedicatum; ita non est praedicando essentiale de personali, quia essentiale convenit alii ab illo incluso, - et ideo talis propositio negatur.	7. As to the question,(a) a distinction can be made (the way it is commonly, and well, made), that 'only' can be taken as categorematic and as syncategorematic. For 'only' signifies the same as 'not along with another', as is plain from the Philosopher Sophistical Refutations 2.22.178a39-b1. But this negation of association can be understood either to determine something in itself or in its nature, or to determine something as it is an extreme in composition relative to the other extreme, namely by denying that what is other than it is associated with it in receiving the predication of the relevant predicate. In the first way the word 'only' is not admitted in divine reality, because nothing is solitary there. In the second way the word is conceded whenever someone, of whom the same predicate is said, is not associated with the subject; so it is not conceded when the essential is predicated of the personal, because the essential belongs to the other excluded by the first extreme - and therefore such a proposition [sc. 'only the Father is God'] is denied. a. [Note by Duns Scotus] There are three opinions as to this question: First opinion: the correlative is not excluded because it belongs to the understanding of what is included (response: not what this is, but to what or of what this is); again, this consequence holds: 'only the Father is, therefore the Father is', and further 'therefore the Son is' -therefore 'the Son is' is included, and consequently that he is God is included (deny the consequence, because they are opposites in the subject term. On the contrary: a syncategorematic term [sc. 'only'] makes a disposition about the categorematic concept [sc. 'the Father']; again, it would rule out, in respect of any predicate, 'only the Father is Father'. Therefore in another way: the correlative is formally excluded; thanks to the matter the predicate does not follow about the excluded correlative, because correlatives go together, and therefore opposites go together in the antecedent); again, when the accident is included the subject is not excluded (response: true about a concrete, because it is predicated of a subject; false about an abstract - hence 'only... whiteness' is contradictory). - To the contrary, in three ways: Physics 1, "only the principle is" [n.13 below]; again, opposites are such that it is impossible for this one to be that one (any 'not-this' is excluded); again, the whole concept does not allow of being expressed, because nothing can be attributed precisely to a relation, not even a proper difference; still a relation can be understood. In another way: [the substantive is] one thing, [the adjective attaching to it] is another. -To the contrary: the adjective conforms to the substantive in its mode of signifying, therefore so does anything included in the adjective, and the same of the converse 'no non-Father...'; the substantive states a whom, not a what. In another way third: composition and division. - To the contrary, as argued above. Solution: 'only' - not along with another (SophisticalRefutations [n.7 above]). When 'only' is taken categorematically, 'solitary' is what is per se predicated. When taken syncategorematically it makes a disposition as to an extreme term in the intellect combining the terms, and it states the mode under which the extreme is taken in the combined proposition - but this in two ways: either to the extent that (as reduplicative) it states a disposition in relation to the predicate, because it states the per se reason for the inherence of the predicate, - or it states the formal reason according to which the subject is taken in itself, not that it is the formal reason for the inherence of the predicate. Thus the subject can be taken in itself precisely, and something can be said about the subject so taken, - in another way the subject can be taken precisely in its order to the predicate as the predicate is asserted of it; in the first way 'only' indicates that the subject is in itself precise, whatever may agree with it in respect of the predicate, - in the other way it indicates the subject precisely, whether the subject is precise in itself or not: taken in the first way is Augustine's "so great is the Father only", that is the Father precisely taken truly has the predicate "so great [is he]" (we speak like this in other cases: "You only will count for 10,000" is true; even if there are many other lords who would count for so many servants, yet 'You' precisely taken will so count, and yet not as solitary or on its own but as existing among others; hence 'only' here is not a categorical, because neither is it a predicable but a co-predicable); taken in the second way Augustine's proposition is false, as is proved above and by its consequences. But an instance is made in objection to the remark from On Interpretation [see n.11 below] by taking what is distinct 'in the respect in which it is dependent': this sequence is true, 'only man or non-man is non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man,' - the inferences 'therefore no non-man is non-identical with man or non-man, therefore no entity [sc. no man or non-man] is not identical [sc. with non-man], therefore every entity is identical [sc. with man]', and 'nothing non-identical with man or non-man is a non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is not a man', these inferences do not hold, because then every such thing [sc. everything identical with man or non-man] is a man. - I concede the point; the inference from the negative to the affirmative in the case of a subject that includes contradictories is not valid; the term 'non-identical with man or non-man' is such a subject. This as to consistency in the subject term, namely that what is taken here on the part of the subject should be capable of being a subject, that is, should not include contradictories, because contradictories make no single term, Metaphysics 5 "what is in itself false is false of everything," and so too every predicate is false of it, because it is repugnant to itself and to each of its parts. -To the contrary: to which affirmative is this negative reduced from such an antecedent (reduced to it enthymematically)? Response: to affirmatives about its parts.
8 Declaratio istorum, scilicet qualiter syncategorema disponit extremum intellectus componentis et dividentis respectu alterius extremi et quomodo differt syncategorema ab intentione secunda, et quomodo diversae determinationes syncategorematicae differant inter se, longum tractatum requireret, - sed non oportet immorari, propter aliqua magis utilia et magis necessaria.	8. A clarification of these points - namely how a syncategorematic term disposes the extreme in the intellect as the intellect combines and divides it in respect of the other extreme, and how a syncategorematic term differs from a term of second intention [sc. a logical term], and how diverse syncategorematic determinations differ among themselves - would require a long treatise but, because of more useful and more necessary things, we should not delay over it.
9 Probatur etiam falsitas propositionis propositae, per illam regulam in 'Sophismatibus': 'affirmativa exclusiva infert universalem affirmativam de terminis transpositis'; ergo haec 'solus Pater est Deus', infert istam 'omnis Deus, vel omnis persona divina, est Pater'.	9. The falsity of the proposed proposition [sc. 'only the Father is God'] is also proved through the rule in the 'Sophisms', that 'an exclusive affirmative entails a universal affirmative about the terms when they are transposed' [Walter Burleigh, Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic tr.2 p.3 subpart.1 ch.1]; therefore this proposition 'only the Father is God' entails this other 'every God, or every divine person, is the Father'.
10 Regula illa probatur et ex ratione exclusionis, quae videlicet notat praecisionem in illo cui additur, respectu alterius extremi, sive praecisam commensurationem, scilicet quod alterum extremum non excedat illud: et hoc notat illa universalis affirmativa 'de terminis transpositis', et maxime in terminis communibus, ubi potest utrumque extremum accipi universaliter.	10. The rule is also proved by reason of exclusion, namely the exclusion that indicates precision in what it is added to with respect to the other extreme - or that indicates precise commensuration, namely that one extreme does not exceed the other; and this is what the universal affirmative 'about the terms when they are transposed' indicates, and especially in the case of common terms, where either extreme can be taken universally.
11 Probatur etiam logice per unam propositionem, quae expriƿmit totum intellectum exclusivae: ista enim 'tantum homo est risibilis' licet communiter ponatur habere duas exponentes, sufficienter tamen exponitur per istam 'nullus non homo est risibilis'; ex qua sequitur 'nullum risibile est non homo' (per conversionem), et ultra 'ergo nullum risibile non est homo' (per illud II Perihermeneias 'ex negativa de praedicato infinito, sequitur affirmativa de praedicato finito et negativa de praedicato negato', - quod probatur per primum principium 'de quolibet affirmatio' etc., et hoc in praedicatis simplicibus, quia negando illam consequentiam negarentur utraque opposita ab eodem), et ultra 'ergo omne risibile' per aequipollentiam, - ergo a primo etc.	11. The rule is also logically proved by a single proposition that expresses the whole understanding of the exclusive term; for this proposition 'only man is capable of laughter', although it is commonly posited as having two exponents, is nevertheless sufficiently expounded by this one, 'no non-man is capable of laughter'; from it there follows (by conversion) 'nothing capable of laughter is a non-man', and further that 'therefore nothing capable of laughter is not a man' (through the rule, in On Interpretation 2.10.95b-20b10, 'from a negative about an infinite predicate there follows an affirmative about a finite predicate and a negative about a denied predicate', -which is proved by the first principle 'an affirmation about anything whatever etc.' [Ord. prol n.89], and this in the case of simple predicates, because, when the consequence is denied, both opposites are denied of the same thing), and further 'therefore everything capable of laughter [sc. is a man]' by equivalence - therefore from the first etc.
12 Hic aliqui instant quod uno relativo incluso aliud non excludatur, quia unum est de intellectu alterius, quia 'posita se ponunt' etc. et sunt etiam 'simul natura'. ƿ	12. Here some people object that when one relative is included the other is not excluded, because the one is included in the understanding of the other [see note n.7], because 'things posited are posited (and things taken away are taken away [Peter of Spain, Logical Summaries tr.3 n.21])' and also relatives are 'by nature together' [Categories 7.7b15].
13 Sed hoc est contra intentionem Philosophi I Physicorum, arguentem ibi: ((Si tantum principium est, ergo principiatum non est)). Ergo correlativum non est de intellectu relativi sicut aliquid eius (puta sicut pars essentialis vel integralis), sed sicut aliquid ad quod determinatur eius intellectus, - et tale est sufficienter diversum ab incluso, quanta diversitas requiritur ad hoc quod ipsum excludatur.	13. But this is contrary to the Philosopher's intention in Physics 1.2.185a3-5 when he argues there: "If only the principle is, then what is from the principle is not." Therefore a correlative is not included in the understanding of its relative as something belonging to it (to wit as an essential or integral part), but as something to which the understanding of it is determined - and such is diverse enough from what is included in the relative that it has as much diversity as is required for being excluded from it. II. To the Principal Arguments
14 Ad primum argumentum. Antecedens distinguitur secundum compositionem et divisionem, sicut illa 'omnis homo qui est albus, currit'. Sensus compositionis falsus est, quia ibi 'Deus' determinatur ad standum pro Patre, per illam implicationem 'qui est Pater', sicut determinatur 'homo' ad standum pro homine albo in sensu compositionis, ibi 'homo qui est albus', - et tunc consequentia tenet. Sensus divisionis verus est, quia tunc enuntiantur duo praedicata de eodem subiecto, de quo ambo sunt vera, scilicet de Deo 'esse Patrem' et 'esse Deum' (quasi enuntiarentur illa duo in duabus propositionibus categoricis, copulatis sibi invicem, quarum neutra specificaret alteram), et tunc consequentia non valet ab inferiore ad superius cum exclusione. ƿ	14. To the first argument [n.1]. The antecedent [sc. 'Only God who is Father is God'] is distinguished into a composite and a divided sense, as with 'every man who is white runs'. The composite sense is false, because in that case 'God' is made to stand for the Father, through the implied 'who is Father', just as 'man' is made to stand for white man in the composite sense in 'man who is white' - and then the inference [sc. 'only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God'] holds. The divided sense is true because then two predicates are asserted of the same subject, of which subject both predicates are true, namely of God that 'he is Father' and that 'he is God' (as if the two predications were made in two categorical propositions joined to each other by 'and', neither of which propositions would specify the other), and then an inference from the inferior term to the higher [sc. from 'Father' to 'God'], along with exclusivity [sc. 'only the Father is God'], is false.(a) a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The inference can be allowed to be absolutely true in both senses, because the term 'God' is not contracted [sc. as a universal to a singular]; it is a 'this' ['this God' or 'this deity', see n.31 below].
15 Et si obicias quod similis consequentia tenet in creaturis in sensu divisionis, respondeo: Si commune idem - numeratum - possit competere pluribus inferioribus, non tenet illa consequentia in sensu divisionis: tenet enim praecise quod illud animal quod est rationale dividendo, non est aliud ab animali quod est rationale in componendo; in proposito autem ista ratio non tenet, quia ille idem Deus qui est Pater in sensu compositionis, est Filius qui distinguitur a Patre, et ita Deus qui est Pater in sensu divisionis, potest dici vere de aliquo de quo non dicitur in sensu compositionis; non sic autem est de animali quod est homo, quia illud in sensu divisionis de nullo vere praedicatur de quo non vere praedicatur idem in sensu compositionis (nec e converso), et ideo ibi praedicatur indifferenter, - non sic hic.	15. And if you object that a like inference holds of creatures in the divided sense, I reply: If the same common thing - a numbered thing - may belong to several particulars under it, that inference does not hold in the divided sense; for it holds precisely because the animal that is rational, taken in the divided sense, is not other than the animal that is rational taken in the composite sense; but in the issue at hand the reasoning does not hold, because the same God who is Father in the composite sense is the Son who is distinct from the Father, and so the God who is Father in the divided sense can be asserted truly of anything of which he is not asserted in the composite sense; but it is not so with the animal that is man, because this is truly predicated in the divided sense of nothing of which the same is not truly predicated in the composite sense (but not conversely), and so the predication is made indifferently in this case - not so in the case of God.
16 Tamen sicut antecedens secundum compositionem et divisionem, distinguunt etiam aliqui principalem propositionem, quasi ista 'solus Pater est Deus' possit habere sensum compositionis falsum et sensum divisionis verum, - adducentes illud Prisciani II Constructionum: Inter exigens et exactum cadit 'qui est' medium. ƿ	16. However, just as the antecedent is distinguished into a composite and divided sense, so some also distinguish the principal proposition in like manner, as if this proposition 'only the Father is God' could have a false composite sense and a true divided sense - adducing the remark of Priscian Constructions 2 (or Grammatical Instruction 18) ch.1 nn.6-7, that '.. .who is' falls in the middle between a qualified and a qualifying term.
17 Sed istud nec est logice dictum, nec grammatice. Non logice, quia tunc non posset aliquid contrahi vel determinari per aliquam contractionem vel determinationem: quantumcumque enim immediate adderetur alicui determinatio categorematica vel syncategorematica (ut 'homo albus currit' vel 'omnis homo albus currit'), adhuc restaret distinguere sicut hic, in sensu compositionis et divisionis, et in utroque sensu restaret ulterius distinguere, et sic in infinitum, - nec posset aliquis sensus determinate concipi vel exprimi. Nec docuit Philosophus in talibus multiplicitatem secundum compositionem et divisionem, sed tantum in illis ubi eadem materialia composita et divisa diversum sensum faciunt; ista autem materialia 'omnis homo currit' - composita et divisa - nullum alium sensum faciunt, $a nec possunt dividi, quia syncategorema tantum consignificat cum categorematico; a$ secus est ƿhic 'iste videt nunc me currere', componendo 'nunc' adverbium cum verbo praecedente vel sequente. Nec etiam est dictum grammatice, quia 'exigens' et 'exactum' dicuntur constructibilia talia quorum alterum dicitur a Prisciano regere alterum ex vi aliqua; non est autem syncategorematicum constructibile respectu categorematici, quasi unum regat aliud ex aliqua vi, et ideo licet hic cadat implicatio media 'cappa Socratis' (hoc est 'cappa quae est Socratis'), non tamen hic 'homo albus' et 'omnis homo'.	17. But this is neither logically nor grammatically said. Not logically, because then nothing could be limited or determined by any term of limitation or determination; for however immediately any categorematic or syncategorematic determination is added to something (as 'a white man runs' or 'every white man runs'), there would still be space to distinguish, as here, a composite and a divided sense, and so on ad infinitum - nor could any sense be determinately conceived or expressed. Nor did the Philosopher [Sophistical Refutations 1.4.162a6-38] teach that there was in such cases a multiplicity according to composition and division, but only in those cases where the same materials create, when composed and divided, a diversity of senses; but these materials 'every man runs' create - when composed and divided - no difference of sense, nor can they be divided, because syncategorematic terms [sc. here 'every'] only have a signification along with the categorematic term [sc. here 'man']; but it is otherwise with 'he sees that I am running now', as one combines the adverb 'now' either with the preceding or the following verb [sc. 'he now sees that I am running' or 'he sees that I am now running']. Neither even is it grammatically said, because 'qualified' and 'qualifier' are called construables of the sort that one of them is said by Priscian to govern the other by some force of grammar; but a syncategorematic term is not construable with respect to a categorematic term as if one of them ruled the other by some force of grammar, and therefore although an implied relative falls in the middle in the case of 'Socrates' cloak' (that is, 'the cloak which is of Socrates'), yet it does not do so in the case of 'white man' or 'every man'.
18 Ad secundum dico quod illa non est conversio, nec illa consequentia tenet, sed est fallacia consequentis, quia - sicut probatum est in solutione quaestionis - exclusiva est convertibilis cum universali affirmativa 'de terminis transpositis'; ergo inferre ƿexclusivam ex exclusiva 'de terminis transpositis', aequivalet illationi universalis affirmativae ex universali affirmativa 'de terminis transpositis': in tali autem illatione universalis ex universali est fallacia consequentis, ut hic 'omnis homo est animal, ergo omne animal est homo', a superiore ad inferius affirmando.	18. To the second [n.2] I say that neither the conversion [sc. 'only God is the Father' to 'only the Father is God'] nor the inference [sc. 'only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God'] holds, but there is a fallacy of the consequent, because - as was proved in the solution to the question [n.9] - an exclusionary proposition [sc. 'only...'] is convertible with a universal affirmative proposition 'about the terms when transposed' [sc. 'only man runs' is equivalent to 'everything that runs is a man'];a therefore to infer an exclusionary proposition from an exclusionary proposition 'about the terms when transposed' [sc. to infer 'only the Father is God' from 'only God is the Father'] is equivalent to inferring a universal affirmative from a universal affirmative 'about the terms when transposed' [sc. inferring 'all B is A' from 'all A is B']; but in such an inference of a universal from a universal there is a fallacy of the consequent, as in the case of 'all men are animals, therefore all animals are men', by affirming from higher to lower [sc. by affirming the predicate, the higher term, universally of the subject, the lower term]
19 Ita est in proposito. Et probatur, quia semper - ex vi sermonis - proceditur ab inferiore ad superius cum distributione: praedicatum enim universalis affirmativae non notatur esse convertibile, sed stat quasi sit superius ad subiectum; ergo ex distributione subiecti universalis talis non sequitur distributio praedicati respectu eiusdem, nec potest sequi distributio praedicati respectu inferioris ad aliquid, si non sequatur distributio praedicati respectu superioris ad illud. Arguendo ergo sic 'omne b est a, ergo omne a est b' est fallacia consequentis, quia ex distributione eius quod notatur esse inferius, non sequitur distributio superioris (et hoc respectu praedicati quod notabatur esse inferius ad praedicatum superius), sed est fallacia consequentis, sicut si argueretur 'omnis homo est animal, ergo omne animal est Socrates'.	19. So it is of the issue at hand [sc. 'only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God']. There is a proof too, because the procedure with distribution - by the force of the words - is always from the inferior [sc. the subject] to the superior [sc. the predicate]; for the predicate of a universal affirmative is not marked as being convertible, but stands as it were superior to the subject; therefore from the distribution of the such a universal subject the distribution of the predicate with respect to the same thing does not follow, nor can the distribution of the predicate follow with respect to something if the distribution of the predicate does not follow with respect to what is superior to that something. Arguing then like this, 'all b is a, therefore all a is b' is the fallacy of the consequent, because from the distribution of a term that is marked as lower the distribution of the superior term does not follow (the same too in respect of a predicate marked as lower to a superior one), but it is the fallacy of the consequent, as if one were to argue, 'every man is an animal, therefore every animal is Socrates'.
20 Sed cum probatur illa consequentia per conversionem propositionis exclusivae, respondeo: Non omnis illatio 'in terminis transpositis' est conversio, quae ƿvidelicet notat tantam unionem extremorum conversam quanta potest haberi virtute primae; unde universalis negativa non convertitur in particularem negativam 'in terminis transpositis', licet inferat eam.	20. But when proof is given of the inference by the conversion of an exclusionary proposition [n.2, 'only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God'], I reply: Not every inference 'when the terms are transposed' is conversion simply, namely a conversion that indicates as great a union of terms when it is converted as could be had by virtue of the first [unconverted] proposition; hence a universal negative is not converted to a particular negative 'when the terms are transposed', although it implies it.
21 Ad propositum dico quod illa 'de terminis transpositis', quae tantum capit de intellectu exclusivae affirmativae quantum aliqua potest capere 'de terminis transpositis', est universalis affirmativa, sicut probatum est in secunda ratione ad principalem solutionem; ergo talis affirmativa exclusiva convertitur in universalem affirmativam, et pari ratione e converso, universalis affirmativa in exclusivam affirmativam.	21. As to the issue at hand I say that that proposition 'when the terms are transposed', which receives only as much of the understanding of the exclusionary affirmative as any proposition can receive 'when the terms are transposed', is the universal affirmative, as was proved in the second reason for the principal solution [n.9]; therefore such an exclusionary affirmative is converted to a universal affirmative, and contrariwise, by parity of reasoning, a universal affirmative is converted to an exclusionary affirmative.
22 Et si obicias 'ergo Aristoteles male docuit et insufficienter conversiones, non docendo universalem affirmativam esse convertendam in exclusivam affirmativam', respondeo: conversiones docuit propter perficiendam imperfectionem imperfectorum syllogismorum: non autem exclusiva alium locum teneret in perficiendo syllogismum imperfectum, quam aliqua indefinita non exclusiva, quia non aliam conclusionem inferret quam prius infereƿbatur in syllogismo imperfecto; et ideo bene et sufficienter docuit conversiones, quatenus necessarium ibi fuit ad propositum suum.	22. And if you object 'therefore Aristotle was mistaken and incomplete in his teaching about the conversions [of propositions], by not teaching that the universal affirmative is to be converted to an exclusionary affirmative', I reply that he taught the conversions with a view to making perfect the imperfection of the imperfect syllogisms; but an exclusionary proposition would, in completing an imperfect syllogism, occupy no other place than some non-exclusionary indefinite proposition would occupy, because it entails no conclusion other than what was already entailed in the imperfect syllogism; and so Aristotle was, in teaching about conversions, correct and complete as far as was necessary for his intention there.
23 Ad tertium dico quod ex negativa exponente antecedens non sequitur negativa exponens consequens.	23. To the third [n.3, 'only God is God, therefore only the Father is God'] I say that from a negative proposition expounding the antecedent [sc. 'none other than God is God'] a negative expounding the consequent [sc. 'none other than the Father is God'] does not follow.
24 Cum probatur quia 'non sequitur alius a Deo, ergo alius a Patre', nego, quia illa consequentia est bona.	24. When it is proved on the ground that 'the inference "other than God, therefore other than the Father" does not follow', I deny it, because that inference is good.
25 Et cum ulterius probatur quod 'terminus huius alietatis non distribuitur, quia tunc esset incompossibilitas enuntiandi tale relativum de aliquo', respondeo quod in omnibus relativis aequiparantiae commune secundum se acceptum - ut commune est non refertur, quia, ex quo ut commune est, abstrahitur ab omnibus relatis sive terminis relationum, et relatio realis non est nisi distincti ad distinctum; si ut sic referretur, oporteret ibi dare terminum 'sic relatum' distinctum, et ideo non referretur ad aliquid eiusdem rationis cum relato, sed referretur ad aliquid alterius rationis. Refertur ergo tale relativum tantum pro suo inferiore, sicut simile non refertur pro 'simili in communi' ad simile, sed pro aliquo inferiore, quod potest distingui a simili ad quod refertur; ita etiam est de differente: non enim refertur ad differens in communi, tamquam ad primum correlativum (quasi essent duo extrema prima relationis et utrumque communissimum ad omne differens), sed differens est differens ab hoc differente.	25. And when proof is further given that [n.5] 'the term of this relation of diversity is not distributed because then there would be an incompossibility in asserting such a relative term of anything', I reply that in all relatives involving equivalence the common genus, when taken by itself - as it is common -, is not in relation to anything, because, from the fact that it is common, it abstracts from all related terms or terms of relations, and there is no real relation save of a distinct thing to a distinct thing; but if the common genus were in relation as such to something, then one would have to give for it some 'thus related' distinct term, and so it would not be related to anything of the same idea as the particular related thing, but it would be related to something of a different idea. Such a relative then is only related to a particular contained under it, just as the like is not as 'like in general' related to the like but as some particular under the like in general, which something can be distinguished from the like that it is related to; the same is true of the different; for the different is not related to a different thing in general as to its first correlative (as if there were two first extremes in the relation and each extreme was the most common genus for any particular different), but the different is different from this different.
26 Et si obicias quod relativum dat primo intelligere suum correlativum commune, respondeo: ƿNon est correlativum eius 'ut commune' nisi ipsum ut sumptum pro aliquo inferiore, pro quo distingui potest a relato. Exemplum huius est in rebus, quia si tota natura ignis esset in uno individuo, illud individuum non posset generare (quia si sic, tunc generaret alium ignem in quo esset tota natura ignis, et essent quasi duae species ignis, quod est impossibile), et tamen nunc in uno individuo natura est ratio generandi, quia habet unitatem sufficientem pro principio activo et distinctionem sufficientem. Ita hic: similitudo bene est ratio alicui referendi vel terminandi relationem, sed nec refertur nec terminat nisi accipiatur pro distincto in quo sit, ita quod nec unitas nec distinctio est per accidens sed utrumque per se respectu talis relationis, sicut dictum est in quaestione 'De circumincessione' ; non enim sequitur 'non alius a Deo, ergo non alius a Patre' (sed affirmative est consequentia bona ratione distributionis termini huius relationis), propter negationem inclusam in ratione alietatis.	26. And if you object that a relative gives to understand first its own common correlative, I reply: The correlative is not its correlative 'as something common' unless it is taken for some particular under the common, as which particular it can be distinguished from the related term. There exists an example of this fact in real things, because if the whole nature of fire existed in one individual, that individual could not generate fire (because if it could, then it would generate another fire in which the whole nature of fire would exist, and there would as it were be two species of fire, which is impossible), and yet, as it is now, the nature in one individual fire is the principle of generating fire, because it has enough unity for being an active principle and enough distinctness [sc. enough distinctness as this individual fire to be capable of generating another distinct individual fire]. So it is here in the present case: likeness is indeed a principle in something for forming a relation, or being the term of a relation, but it neither forms nor is a term unless it is taken for a distinct thing in which it may exist, such that neither unity nor distinctness is accidental but both are essential in respect of such a relation, just as was said in the question 'About Circumincession' [d.19 n.62]; for 'not other than God, therefore not other than the Father' does not follow (however in the affirmative the inference is good [n.24], by reason of the distribution of the term in the relation), because of the negation included in the idea of otherness.
27 Ad aliam probationem, cum dicitur 'solus Deus, ergo solus Pater vel solus Filius', respondetur quod subiectum exclusivae potest comparari ad exclusionem vel ad praedicatum: primo modo habet suppositionem simplicem, quia exclusio fit ab eo ratione significati; secundo modo habet suppositionem personalem quia praedicatum attribuitur sibi pro supposito. ƿ	27. To the other proof, when it is said 'only God, therefore only the Father or only the Son' [n.3, and footnote], the response is that the subject of an exclusionary proposition [e.g. 'only God'] can be taken in comparison to the exclusion or to the predicate; in the first way it is has simple supposition, for exclusion is made by it because of what is signified; in the second way it has personal supposition, because the predicate is attributed to it as to a supposit.
28 Contra istud: unum extremum in uno actu componendi et dividendi habet unam rationem secundum quam accipitur respectu alterius extremi, quia diversae rationes accipiendi idem extremum respectu eiusdem non videntur stare cum unitate actus componendi.	28. Against this: one extreme in one act of combining and dividing has one idea according to which it is taken in respect of the other extreme, because diverse ways of taking the same extreme in respect of the same other extreme do not seem to cohere with unity of combining act.
29 Et si dicatur quod respectu exclusionis supponet sub una ratione, et ut accipitur sub exclusione respectu praedicati supponet sub alia ratione, - contra: subiectum non supponit respectu suae dispositionis, sed respectu praedicati, et ita praecise habet illam suppositionem quam intelligitur habere respectu praedicati ut accipitur sub sua dispositione.	29. And if it be said that, in respect of exclusion, the extreme supposits under one idea, and that as taken under exclusion in respect of the predicate it supposits under another idea, - on the contrary: the subject does not supposit in respect of its own disposition but in respect of the predicate, and so it does precisely have the supposition [sc. personal supposition] that, as taken under its own disposition, it is understood to have in respect of the predicate.
30 Ideo dico aliter quod subiectum exclusivae affirmativae supponit confuse tantum, sicut praedicatum universalis affirmativae (quod probatur ex convertibilitate earum $a et quia respectu eiusdem extremi, stantis eodem modo, distributive arguere ex parte alterius a confusa ad distributivam, est figura dictionis), a$ et sub termino sic stante - scilicet confuse tantum - non licet descendere.	30. Therefore I say that the subject of an exclusionary affirmative supposits only confusedly, just as does the predicate of a universal affirmative (which is proved from the fact that they are convertible, and because to give, in respect of the same extreme existing in the same way, a distributive argument on the part of the other extreme from a confused to a distributive supposition, is the fallacy of figure of speech), and one is not permitted to proceed downwards under a term that so stands - namely confusedly.
31 Posset tamen in proposito dici aliter quam in creaturis, quod videlicet 'Deus' sub exclusione stat pro 'hoc Deo', qui communis est tribus personis (quae responsio tacta est distinctione 4), pro quo stet ibi subiectum 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sancƿtus'; et posset etiam valere distinctione 30, quod sit illud subiectum cui primo convenit agere respectu creaturarum (quia 'hic Deus', ut est 'hac deitate' Deus, non intelligendo aliquam proprietatem personalem), licet omne praedicatum quod verum est de hoc praedicato, verum sit de Patre per se, sed non de solo Patre sed de Filio et Spiritu Sancto.	31. However, one could also say that in the proposition in question things are otherwise than they are in creatures, namely because 'God' under exclusion [sc. 'only God'] stands for 'this God', who is common to the three persons (which response was touched on in d.4 nn.11-13), and for this God the subject there, 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', stands; and this point could also be valid by d.30 qq.1-2, that he [sc. God as this God] is the subject to which action in respect of creatures first belongs (because he is 'this God', as he is God 'by this deity', without understanding any personal property), although every predicate which is true of this predicate [sc. the predicate 'acting in respect of creatures'] is true of the Father per se, yet not only of the Father but of the Son and Holy Spirit too.