Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D27

Translated by Peter Simpson

One: Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection

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Quaestio 1	Twenty Seventh Distinction Question One Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam septimam quaero de verbo, et primo de verbo intellectus creati, utrum verbum creatum sit actualis intellectio. Quod non: Augustinus VIII Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 24: ((Phantasia Carthaginis, in memoria mea, hoc verbum eius)) est; phantasia illa sumitur ibi pro specie, non pro actuali imaginatione; ergo eodem modo verbum intellectuale est species intelligibilis et non intellectio actualis.	1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word, and first about the word of a created intellect, whether a created word is actual intellection. That it is not: Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.6 n.9: “the image of Carthage, in my memory, this is its word;” the image there is taken for the species, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same way the intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual intellection.
2 Item, Augustinus XV Trinitatis cap. lla vel 26: ((Verbum, quod foris sonat, signum est eius verbi quod intus lucet)); verbum autem exterius est signum rei et non intellectionis, - alioquin ƿquaelibet affirmativa esset falsa in qua non praedicatur idem de se, quia intellectio subiecti non est intellectio praedicati, licet res sit res; ergo verbum est obiectum et non actualis intellectio.	2. Again, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.11 n.20: “the word that sounds exteriorly is a sign of the word that shines interiorly;” but the external word is a sign of a thing not of an intellection, – otherwise any affirmative proposition in which the same thing is not predicated of itself would be false, because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection of the predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore the word is object and not actual intellection.
3 Praeterea, Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo: 'Verbum est proles et genitum a memoria'; actio autem non gignitur, sed est quo aliud gignitur; ergo verbum est aliquid formatum per actum intelligendi et non ipse actus.	3. Further, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “the word is offspring and thing born from memory;” but action is not born, but is that in which something else is born; therefore the word is something formed by an act of understanding and is not the act itself.
4 Contra: Ibidem vocat Augustinus verbum notitiam: ((Notitia eius, quod est proles eius)); et XV Trinitatis cap. 12 a, et 21: 'Est visio de visione et notitia de notitia'.	4. On the contrary: In the same place Augustine calls the word knowledge: “the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;” and On the Trinity XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: “It is vision from vision and knowledge from knowledge.”

Question Two: Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person

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Quaestio 2
5 Secundo quaero de verbo divino, an verbum in divinis dicat proprium personae genitae. Quod non: Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 25: ((Verbum est cum ƿamore notitia)); haec omnia, posita in definitione verbi, sunt essentialia; ergo et verbum.	5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person. That it does not: Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge along with love;” all these things [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is an essential too.a
6 Praeterea, XV Trinitatis cap. 7 'de magnis' et 22 et 28 'de parvis': 'Sicut Pater intelligit sibi et vult sibi et meminit sibi, ita Filius et Spiritus Sanctus', actus autem proprius intelligentiae ut intelligentia est, est verbum; igitur sicut in Patre est formaliter intelligentia ut intelligentia, ita in eo est verbum ut verbum. Assumptum probatur per hoc, quod illa trinitas quam assignat Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo ('mens, notitia et amor', quae notitia est verbum, secundum ipsum ibidem), et illa ƿassignata secundum eum X Trinitatis 10 ('memoria, intelligentia et voluntas'), correspondent sibi invicem, - prima pars primae parti, et secunda secundae, et tertia tertiae; ergo sicut non est perfecta voluntas sine amore formaliter, nec perfecta mens sine memoria formaliter, ita non est perfecta intelligentia - ut videtur - sine verbo formaliter.	6. Further, On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” but the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there formally exists intelligence as intelligence, so there exists in him word as word. The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to each other in turn, – the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is no perfect intelligence – as it seems – without the word formally.
7 Item, non sunt duo propria unius personae, quia unius constituti in esse est unum formale constitutivum; filiatio est proprietas constitutiva personae genitae (secundum Augustinum De fide ad Petrum cap. 2), non ergo verbum; non enim videntur ista dicere eandem proprietatem, quia non omnis filius est verbum nec omne verbum est filius.	7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is one formal constitutive property for one thing constituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine On the Faith to Peter [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.
8 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4: ((Eo verbum quo Filius)), et utrumque relative dicitur. ƿ	8. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: “He is word by that by which he is Son,” and each of these is said relatively.

Question Three: Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature

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Quaestio 3	Question Three Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature
9 Tertio quaeritur utrum verbum divinum dicat respectum ad creaturam. Quod sic: Augustinus VI Trinitatis cap. ultimo: ((Verbum est ars omnipotentis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium)); ars dicit respectum ad artificiatum; ergo et verbum ad creaturas.	9. Third the question is asked whether the divine word states a respect to the creature. That it does: Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: “the Word is the art of the almighty God, full of all living reasons;” art states a respect to the thing made by art; therefore word also states a respect to creatures.
10 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4, per idem quod prius; Filius non dicit respectum ad creaturas; ergo nec verbum, quia 'eo verbum quo Filius'.	10. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respect to creatures; therefore neither does the word, because “he is word by that by which he is Son.”

I. To the First and Second Questions

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

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11 Ad primam quaestionem dicitur quod verbum est intellectio actualis, et non quaecumque sed declarativa. ƿ	11. [To the first question] – To the first question it is said that the word is actual intellection, and not any intellection but a declarative one.
12 Ad quod intelligendum ponitur sic: Intellectus primo recipit simplicem impressionem ab obiecto (sive intellectionem), qua impressione recepta intellectus - ut activus est - convertit se supra se et super actum suum et obiectum, intelligendo se intelligere; tertio sequitur impressio notitiae declarativae in intellectum nudum conversum, et hoc ab intellectu informato notitia simplici, ita quod intellectus informatus tali notitia est ratio imprimendi notitiam declarativam, - et iste intellectus nudus conversus est proprium receptivum. Et inter has duas intellectiones, primam scilicet quae est ratio imprimendi et secundam quae est impressa, est habitudo media quae est actio de genere actionis, quae notatur per hoc quod est 'dicere': est enim 'dicere' istud, exprimere vel imprimere notitiam declarativam notitiae simplicis, - et ista 'notitia declarativa', impressa in intellectum nudum conversum et terminans istum actum dicendi, est verbum.	12. To understand this the position is set down as follows: The intellect receives first a simple impression (or intellection) from the object, by which received impression the intellect – as it is active – converts itself to itself and to its own act and object, by understanding that it understands; third, there follows an impression of declarative knowledge in the bare converted intellect, and this from the intellect informed with simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed by such knowledge is the reason for impressing declarative knowledge, – and the converted bare intellect is something properly receptive. And between these two intellections, namely the first, which is the reason for the impressing, and the second, which is the one impressed, there is a middle disposition that is an action in the genus of action, and it is marked by that which ‘to say’ is; for this ‘to say’ is to express or impress a declarative knowledge of simple knowledge, – and so this ‘declarative knowledge’, impressed on the converted bare intellect and being the term of the act of saying, is the word.
13 Non ergo quaecumque intellectio actualis est verbum, sed illa quae est declarativa, quae praesupponit intellectionem actualem simplicem et conversionem actualem super illam, et gignitur actu dicendi, cuius principium activum est notitia simplex et receptivum est intellectus nudus conversus.	13. Not any actual intellection, then, is the word, but the one that is declarative, that presupposes simple actual intellection and actual conversion to it, and is born in the act of saying, whose active principle is simple knowledge and whose receptive one is the converted bare intellect.
14 Huic concorditer respondetur ad secundam quaestionem, quod intellectus Patris primo inforƿmatur quasi notitia simplici essentiae, ad quam fuit quasi mere in potentia passiva, et factus in actu isto 'notitiae simplicis' ut nudus convertitur super se ipsum sic informatum; et in ipsum conversum, quasi in passivum dispositum, imprimitur notitia declarativa virtute notitiae actualis simplicis, quae notitia declarativa et terminus actus dicendi est verbum. Et secundum hoc patet quod verbum est terminus generationis sicut et Filius, et ita erit proprium secundae personae.	14. [To the second question] – In agreement with this, an answer is given to the second question [n.5], that the intellect of the Father is first informed with quasi simple knowledge of the essence, to which it was quasi merely in passive potency, and, when brought into this act of ‘simple knowledge’ as bare, it is converted to itself as thus informed; and on it when converted, as if on a passive disposed thing, there is impressed declarative knowledge by virtue of simple actual knowledge, which declarative knowledge and term of the act of saying is the word. And according to this, it is plain that the word is the term of generation as also of the Son, and so it will be proper to the second person.
15 Ista opinio recitata est supra distinctione 2, quaestione 'De duabus productionibus'.	This opinion was stated above in distinction 2 nn.273-277, 280, in the question ‘On the two productions’.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. As to the First Question

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16 Contra istam opinionem - quantum ad primam quaestionem arguo primo, quia irrationabile videtur ponere eandem potentiam esse activam respectu unius actus sui et passivam respectu alterius actus, quia ex hoc videtur quod non est potentia eiusdem rationis. Quaecumque enim potentia unius rationis importat similem habitudinem potentiae ad obiectum: visus enim non est activus respectu unius actus videndi et passivus respectu alterius, unde quicumque actus unius potentiae habet similem habitudinem potentiae ad obiectum. Ergo si intellectus est tantum passivus respectu notitiae simplicis lapidis, et perfecte activus respectu conversionis quae est actus secundus - qua intelligit se intelligere lapidem, ƿnon erit (ut videtur) una potentia; videtur etiam inconveniens quod non possit habere aliquam activitatem respectu actus imperfectioris et tamen possit esse totale activum respectu actus perfectioris (ponitur autem a quibusdam quod conversio illa est actus perfectior intellectione simplici).	16. Against this opinion – as to the first question [n.12] – I argue first that it seems irrational to posit that the same power is active with respect to one of its acts and passive with respect to another of its acts, because from this it seems that it is not a power of the same nature. For any power of one nature involves a like disposition of the power to the object; for sight is not active with respect to one act of seeing and passive with respect to another; hence any act of one power has a like disposition of power to object. Therefore if the intellect is only passive with respect to simple knowledge of a stone, and perfectly active with respect to conversion – which is second act – whereby it understands that it understands a stone, it will (as it seems) not be one power; it also seems unacceptable that it would be unable to have some activity with respect to a more imperfect act and yet could be totally active with respect to a more perfect act (now it is posited by some people that that conversion is a more perfect act than simple intellection).
17 Quod postea additur quod intellectio actualis est ratio gignendi notitiam declarativam, hoc videtur esse inconveniens in nobis, quia forma imperfectior non potest esse ratio perfecta gignendi perfectum; illa autem notitia prima in nobis confusa est et imperfectior notitia distincta; igitur etc.	17. As to what is added afterwards, that actual intellection is the reason for generating declarative knowledge [n.12], this seems to be unacceptable in our own case, because a more imperfect form cannot be a perfect reason for generating something perfect; but the first knowledge in us is confused and more imperfect than distinct knowledge; therefore etc.
18 Praeterea, si prima est ratio gignendi notitiam secundam, aut quando prima non est, et tunc non ens erit ratio agendi, aut quando est, et tunc aut sunt eiusdem rationis aut alterius: si secundo modo, et prior est imperfectior secundo, ergo non est ƿprincipium gignendi secundum, quia imperfectius non est principium producendi perfectius (unde in productione aequivoca semper causa est perfectior effectu); si primo modo, tunc duo actus intelligendi eiusdem speciei erunt simul in eodem intellectu sive in eadem potentia (et respectu eiusdem obiecti), quia memoria et intelligentia sunt una potentia.	18. Besides, if first knowledge is the reason for generating second knowledge [sc. distinct or declarative knowledge] – then either when it is not first, and then a non-being will be the reason for acting, or when it is, and then they [sc. first and second knowledge] will be either of the same idea or of a different one; if the latter, and the prior is more imperfect than the second, then it is not a principle for generating the second, because the more imperfect is not a principle for producing a more perfect (hence in equivocal production the cause is always more perfect than the effect); if the former, then two acts of understanding of the same species will be in the same intellect or in the same power (and with respect to the same object), because memory and intelligence are one power.
19 Item, tunc non poneretur trinitas in mente secundum quod mens est, quia mens non habebit aliquam activitatem propriam secundum quod mens est, sed praecise secundum accidens eius per accidens (quod est notitia simplex), sicut nec lignum habet aliquam activitatem respectu calefactionis, quae attribuitur sibi per calorem qui est accidens eius per accidens; et ita videtur Augustinus frustra quaesivisse in mente 'secundum quod mens est' parentem et prolem, quia ratio parentis non videtur competere animae secundum aliquid in ea, sed secundum aliquod accidens praecise, quod imprimitur ei ab obiecto. ƿ	19. Again,a then a trinity would not be posited in the mind according as it is mind, because the mind will not have any proper activity according as it is mind, but precisely according to an accident of it through an accident (which is simple knowledge), just as neither does wood have any activity with respect to the heating that is attributed to it through the heat that is an accident of it through an accident; and so it seems Augustine sought in vain for parent and offspring in the mind ‘according as it is mind’, because the idea of parent does not seem to belong to the soul according to anything in it, but according to some accident precisely, which is imprinted on it by the object.
20 Praeterea, gignere verbum non est actus intelligentiae sed memoriae , secundum Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 14; omnis autem intellectio actualis est intelligentiae, non memoriae, secundum eum XIV Trinitatis cap. 17; igitur nulla actualis intellectio est ratio gignendi verbum.	20. Further, to generate a word is not an act of intelligence but of memory, according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.14 n.24; but every actual intellection belongs to intelligence, not to memory, according to him ibid. XIV ch.7 n.10; therefore no actual intellection is a reason for generating the word.
21 Praeterea, quod dicit de conversione quod illa sit necessario praevia gignitioni verbi, videtur esse contra Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 16 vel cap. 41, ubi videtur dicere quod verbum perfectissimum nostrum erit in patria respectu obiecti beatifici, - et tamen ille actus non erit conversivus, quia visio beatifica non habet aliquid creatum pro obiecto immediato (omnis autem actus conversivus in nobis, habet aliquid creatum pro obiecto, ut actum vel potentiam); nec illa visio praesupponit conversionem, quia si illa visio est effectus solius essentiae divinae (aut intellectus cooperantis essentiae divinae), praecedit naturaliter conversionem intellectus super suum intelligere.	21. Further, what it says about conversion, that it is necessarily previous to generation of the word [n.12], seems to be against Augustine ibid. XV ch.16 n.26, where he seems to say that our most perfect word will be in the fatherland with respect to the beatific object, – and yet that act will not be a convertive one, because the beatific vision does not have any created thing for immediate object (but every convertive act in us has something created for object, as the act or the power); nor does that vision presuppose conversion, because if that vision is the effect of the divine essence alone (or of the intellect cooperating with the divine essence), it naturally precedes the conversion of the intellect to its own understanding.a
22 Quod etiam dicit quod ut convertitur est mere activus et tamen ut conversus est mere passivus respectu notitiae genitae quae ƿest verbum, - videtur valde irrationabile quod idem sub ratione qua est 'activum' sit tantum passivum respectu actus eiusdem rationis, vel in quantum est mere 'passivum' sit activum respectu actus eiusdem rationis; intellectus autem in quantum recipiens notitiam simplicem est tantum passivus et in quantum convertens est tantum activus; ergo videtur quod inconveniens sit quod in quantum est convertens sit passivus respectu generationis verbi et in quantum habens notitiam simplicem sit activus respectu eiusdem generationis.	22. Also as to the statement that the intellect, as it is being converted, is purely active and yet, as converted, it is purely passive with respect to the generated knowledge which is the word, – it seems thoroughly irrational that the same thing under the idea under which it is ‘active’ is only passive with respect to an act of the same idea, or that insofar as it is purely ‘passive’ it is active with respect to an act of the same idea; but the intellect, insofar as it receives simple knowledge, is only passive and, insofar as it converts, it is only active; therefore it seems that it is unacceptable that insofar as it converts it is passive with respect to generation of the word, and insofar as it has simple knowledge it is active with respect to the same generation. b.

b. As to the Second Question

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23 Contra etiam illud quod dicit ad secundam quaestionem videtur posse obici per idem, quia intellectus Patris 'ut convertitur' est mere activus et 'ut habens notitiam simplicem' est mere passivus, secundum eum; ergo videtur inconveniens quod 'ut conversus' sit illud ut de quo gignitur verbum et 'ut noscens notitia simplici' sit ratio gignendi verbum quasi active.	23. Also against what it says to the second question the same objection, it seems, can be made, that the intellect of the Father ‘as it is converting’ is purely active and ‘as having simple knowledge’ it is purely passive, according to him [Henry of Ghent]; therefore it seems unacceptable that ‘as converted’ it is that as from which the word is generated, and that ‘as knowing with simple knowledge’ it is the reason for generating the word quasi actively.
24 Praeterea, aliqui dicunt conversionem istam intellectus esse quasi dispositionem materiae, - quod videtur inconveniens, quia dispositio materiae non est perfectior neque aeque perfecta cum ƿforma activa agentis; haec autem conversio est actus aeque perfectus cum notitia simplici, vel perfectior; igitur etc.	24. Further, some say that this conversion of the intellect is a quasi disposition of matter, – which seems unacceptable, because the disposition of matter is not more perfect nor as equally perfect as the active form of the agent; but this conversion is as equally perfect as simple knowledge, or more perfect; therefore etc.
25 Praeterea, ista conversio est respectu primi actus ut obiecti, ergo est notitia declarativa illius actus, sicut omnis notitia declarat obiectum cuius est; ergo ante gignitionem verbi quae sequitur istam conversionem (secundum eum), habetur notitia declarativa primi actus, et ita verbum ante verbum!	25. Further, this conversion is with respect to first act as object, – therefore it is declarative knowledge of that act, just as any knowledge declares the object of which it is; therefore, before the generation of the word that follows this conversion (according to him [Henry]), there is had a declarative knowledge of first act, and so a word before the word!
26 Item, ista opinio quantum ad hoc quod ponit intellectionem Patris esse rationem gignendi verbum, improbata est supra distinctione 2, quaestione praedicta 'De productionibus', et quantum ad hoc quod ponit intellectum Patris esse illud de quo gignitur, improbata est ibidem et etiam distinctione 5; et repeto unum argumentum ibi tactum: Quia intellectus ut conversus, est alicuius suppositi; conversio enim ista est secundum eum quaedam actio intelligendi, et actus sunt suppositorum; ergo conversio ista est alicuius suppositi. Quaero cuius suppositi est ut convertitur? Si verbi, et 'ut convertitur' praecedit gignitionem (secundum eum), ergo praecedit verbum, et ita verbum est ante verbum! Si Patris est ista converƿsio, et cuius est 'ut convertitur' eius est ut de quo generatur per impressionem, et cuius est 'ut de quo generatur aliquid per impressionem' eius est ut illud impressum est in ipsum et per consequens eius est 'ut habet illud impressum', - ergo, a primo ad ultimum, sequitur quod intellectus Patris 'ut Patris' formaliter habet notitiam genitam impressam sibi, et ita Pater formaliter intelliget notitia genita, contra Augustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 3.	26. Again, this opinion, as to the fact it posits the intellection of the Father to be the reason for generating the word, was refuted above in distinction 2 nn.291-296, in the aforesaid question ‘About productions’, and as to the fact that it posits the intellect of the Father to be that from which the word is generated, it was refuted in the same place, nn.283, 285, and also in distinction 5 nn.72-75; and I repeat one of the arguments touched on there. Because the intellect as converted belongs to some supposit; for the conversion is, according to him, a certain action of understanding, and acts belong to supposits; therefore the conversion belongs to some supposit. I ask whose supposit it is as it is converted? If the Word’s, and ‘as it is converted’ it precedes generation (according to him [n.25]), then it precedes the Word, and so the Word exists before the Word! If the conversion is the Father’s, and whose it is ‘as it is converted’ is his as from whom generation happens by impression, and whose it is ‘as from whom something is generated by impression’ is his as the impressed thing exists in him and consequently is his ‘as he has that impressed thing’ – then, from first to last, it follows that the intellect of the Father ‘as Father’ formally has generated knowledge impressed on it, and so the Father formally understands by generated knowledge, contrary to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2.
27 Respondetur quod sicut in generatione in creaturis est distinguere tria signa naturae, primum in quo materia est sub forma corrumpenda, secundum in quo materia est sub nulla forma sed quasi nuda et in proxima potentia ad formam generandam, et tertium in quo est sub forma geniti, - ita correspondenter potest dici in divinis quod intellectus in primo signo, ut est in Patre, sic convertitur super se, et ista conversio est quasi dispositio materiae ad generationem Filii; in secundo signo, in quo est quasi nullius personae, tunc est in potentia proxima ad terminum generationis; et in tertio signo, in quo est sub proprietate personae genitae, est tunc illius personae. ƿ	27. The response made is that, just as in generation in creatures there are three moments of nature to distinguish, the first moment in which matter is under the form that is to be corrupted, the second in which the matter is under no form but is quasi bare and in proximate potency to the form that is to be generated, and the third in which it is under the form of the generated thing, – so it can correspondingly be said in divine reality, that the intellect in the first moment, as it is in the Father, is thus being converted to itself, and this conversion is a quasi disposition of the matter for the generation of the Son; in the second moment, in which it belong as it were to no person, it is then in proximate potency to the term of generation; and in the third moment, in which it is under the property of the generated person, it belongs then to that person.
28 Exemplum ponitur: si vinum sit in potentia proxima ad acetum (ita quod forma vini praeexigitur ordine naturali in materia, ad hoc quod sit in potentia proxima respectu aceti), si cum hoc materia vini esset illimitata ad istas duas formas et per consequens neutra inducta expelleret aliam, et si cum hoc utraque esset hypostatica, dans esse personale, - tunc acetum generaretur de materia 'ut fuit vini' quasi de materia disposita dispositione praevia necessario praecedente formam istam. Sed si quaereretur cuius est ut immediate acetum generatur de ea, - responsio, quod nullius, sed generatur de ea immediate ut materia est sub neutra forma hypostatica.	28. An example is set down: if wine is in proximate potency to vinegar (so that the form of wine is pre-required in the matter in natural order for its being in proximate potency with respect to vinegar), if along with this the matter of wine were not limited to these two forms and consequently neither of them, when introduced, would expel the other, and if along with this each is hypostatic, bestowing personal existence – then vinegar would be generated from matter ‘as it was the matter of the wine’ as if from matter disposed with a previous disposition necessarily preceding this form. But if it be asked whose it is as vinegar is immediately generated from it, – the response is that it is no one’s but is generated from it immediately when matter is under neither hypostatic form.
29 Per hoc ad formam argumenti hic in proposito: conceditur quod est Patris, sicut materia est vini ut est disposita ad formam aceti.	29. Hereby response is given to the argument here in the matter at issue; the concession is made that it is the Father’s, the way the matter is the wine’s as it is disposed to the form of vinegar.
30 Et cum arguitur 'ergo ut est Patris recipit notitiam genitam', negatur consequentia; immo per hoc quod recipit notitiam genitam, est alterius subsistentiae, et etiam de quo immediate generatur verbum, non ut Patris, sed ut conversus.	30. And when it is argued ‘therefore as it is Father’s it receives generated knowledge’, the consequence is denied; nay, by the fact that it receives generated knowledge it belongs to another subsistent, and even that from which the word is immediately generated does not exist as the Father’s but as converted.
31 Et si contra hoc obiciatur quod non magis generatur de intellectu ut est Patris, quam de intellectu ut est Filii et Spiritus Sancti, - negatur consequentia, quia est ibi duplex 'ut'. Unum quod notat rationem immediati principii 'de quo', - et sic generatur de eo verbum ut nullius, quasi de immediato receptivo, quod notat rationem dispositi ad illam formam quae est terminus, licet non sit ratio immediati receptivi absolute; ergo verbum geneƿratur de intellectu ut nullius, - ut tamen praefuit Patris et prius exsistens in Patre, ita quod neutra reduplicatio est praecise sine altera. Et tamen per hoc quod verbum generatur de eo, non est in subsistentia verbi neque Patris, neque nullius.	31. And if it be objected against this that generation is not from the intellect as it is the Father’s more than from the intellect as it is the Son’s and the Holy Spirit’s, – the consequence is denied, because there is a double ‘as’ there. One that indicates the idea of the immediate principle ‘from which’ – and thus the word is generated from it as it is no one’s, as from the immediate receptive thing, which indicates the idea of what is disposed to the form that is the term, although it is not the idea of the immediate receptive thing absolutely; therefore the word is generated from the intellect as it is no one’s – as however it was first the Father’s it was also first existing in the Father, so that neither reduplication [sc. of ‘as’] is precisely without the other. And yet by the fact the word is generated from it [sc. the intellect], it is not in the subsistent of the word but of the Father and not no one’s.
32 Additur autem quod decipiuntur aliqui, arguentes contra istam opinionem 'de quo, quasi de materia vel quasi materia', quasi imaginantes ibi esse distinctionem quasi potentiae passivae ab actu, - quod non est verum, sicut tenetur generaliter a quibusdam de attributis; sed tantum, sicut est ibi sapientia formaliter et bonitas formaliter, sine distinctione, ita ponitur quod ibi est vere impressio et vere imprimens, - et omnia quae dicuntur ibi, esse sine distinctione: distinctio autem istorum non est nisi per actum intellectus negotiantis circa idem unum quod est in re.	32. But the addition is made that some people are deceived when they argue against this opinion ‘from which, as from matter or quasi-matter’, as if they imagine that there is there [sc. in God] a distinction of a quasi-passive potency from act, – which is not true, the way it is held generally by certain people about the attributes; but only, just as there is there wisdom formally and goodness formally, without distinction, so it is posited that there is truly impression there and truly the one impressing, – and everything that is said there to be without distinction; but a distinction of these things is only by act of intellect busying itself about the same one thing that exists in reality.
33 Contra ista: Generatio in creaturis videtur esse mutatio formaliter, pro eo quod materia ut nullius prius, postea autem intelligitur sub forma geniti: per hoc enim intelligitur transmutari a privatione ad formam, quae transmutatio est formaliter generatio mutatio. Ergo si sub hac ratione ponatur potentia passiva in divinis, erit tunc in divinis vera mutatio. ƿ	33. Against these arguments [nn.27-32]: Generation in creatures is a change formally, for the reason that the matter, belonging to nothing before, is afterwards understood to be under the form of the generated thing; for by this it is understood to be changed from privation to form, which change is formally generation-change. Therefore if under this idea passive potency is posited in divine reality, then there will be true change in divine reality.a
34 Confirmatur ratio in exemplo eorum, quia etsi vinum non corrumperetur in generatione aceti, vere tamen illa generatio esset mutatio a privatione ad formam, licet non concurreret illa alia mutatio 'a forma ad privationem', sicut accidit modo communiter quando unum generatur et aliud corrumpitur: tunc enim concurrunt communiter ibi duae mutationes et quattuor termini (duae formae et duae privationes), sed - circumscripta altera mutatione et terminis eius - nihil minus esset reliqua mutatio; ergo ita erit in proposito, quod illud in quantum est prius nullius - et ita sub privatione termini 'ad quem' et post sub illo termino mutatur.	34. The reason is confirmed by the example they give [n.28], that although the wine is not corrupted in the generation of vinegar, yet the generation would be truly a change from privation to form, although there not go along with it the other change, ‘from form to privation’, as now commonly happens when one thing is generated and another corrupted; for in this case there commonly come together there two changes and four terms of change (two forms and two privations), but – after removing one of the changes and its terms – the other change would no less exist; therefore so will it be in the proposed case, that insofar as it belongs to nothing before – and so is under privation of the term ‘to which’ and is later under that term – it changes.
35 Praeterea, si primo est Patris et secundo nullius, et tertio est Filii per hoc quod recipit notitiam illam impressam (ergo per hoc quod est Filii, quia est quasi potentiale, recipiens formale Filii), et est Filii ut terminus formalis communicatus Filio per generationem (sicut ostensum est distinctione 5), - ergo Filius duplici modo habendi habebit intellectum, ita quod utrolibet illorum duorum modorum circumscripto nihil minus haberet alio modo ƿhabendi: sicut in creaturis materiam compositum habet ut aliquid sui, et vere habet, licet non sit formalis terminus generationis; idem etiam compositum habet formam ut aliquid sui, et vere habet, licet non sit subiectum generationis.	35. Further, if first it belongs to the Father and secondly to nothing, and third belongs to the Son by the fact that it receives the impressed knowledge (so by the fact it belongs to the Son, because it is quasi-potential, it receives the formal feature of the Son [nn.27, 30]), and belongs to the Son as the formal term communicated to the Son by generation (as was shown in distinction 5 nn.64-85), – then the Son will have intellect in a double way of having it, such that, when either of these ways is removed, it would no less have it in the other way of having; just as in creatures the composite has matter as something of itself, and truly has it, although it is not the formal term of generation; also the same composite has the form as something of itself, and truly has it, although the form is not subject of generation.
36 Consequens autem illatum, scilicet quod Filius duplici modo habendi habeat essentiam, videtur impossibile, tam in re quam in consideratione intellectus negotiantis. Probatur etiam per hoc, quod illud quod est materiale generationis, est in potentia ad formalem terminum eiusdem generationis; idem autem, sub eadem ratione, nec in re nec in intellectu est in potentia ad se; ergo nec intellectus erit simul potentia receptiva et terminus formalis eiusdem generationis.	36. But the inferred consequence, namely that the Son has the essence in two ways of having, seems impossible, both in reality and in the consideration of the busying intellect. There is proof also through this, that what is material in generation is in potency to the formal term of the same generation; but the same thing, under the same idea, is neither in reality nor in the intellect in potency to itself; therefore neither will the intellect be at the same time a receptive potency and the formal term of the same generation.
37 Et quod additur de duplici 'ut' ex parte materiae, quasi ad illud 'ut' quod est ratio proximi susceptivi, necessario praeexigatur illud 'ut' quod est eiusdem 'ut' sub forma ordinata ad formam generandi, - videtur non esse per se in creaturis, quia si poneretur materia illa quae est sub forma vini absque omni forma et agens creatum posset agere in illud sicut denudatum a forma, ipsum esset proximum receptivum cuiuscumque formae natae imprimi in materiam puram, et ab agente quocumque sufficiente posset talis forma induci. Ergo secundum 'ut' praecise sufficit in creaturis ad potentiam proximam, licet frequenter modo concomitetur ille ordo, quia numquam materia est sine forma et ut est sub forma non transmutatur indifferenter a quacumque in quamƿcumque - per agens creatum - sed a determinata in determinatam; istud probatur, quia quando intelligitur ut nullius, tunc non est sub forma priore, quae ponitur quasi dispositio ad formam generandi: tunc ergo ordo eius ad illam formam non est nisi relatio posterioris ad prius, quae forte non est relatio positiva (quia terminus 'ad quem' tunc non est ex natura rei), aut si est relatio realis, non videtur esse ratio propria in materia recipiendi formam inducendam. - Ex his ad propositum videtur quod licet oporteat intellectum prius origine esse in Patre quam in Filio, tamen si poneretur receptivus notitiae genitae, poneretur talis non essentialiter propter aliquem talem ordinem ad exsistentiam in Patre, sed secundum quod nullius est praecise et secundum quod ipsi dicunt 'quasi nullius'.	37. And as to what is added about the double ‘as’ on the part of the matter, as if there is pre-required for the ‘as’ which is the idea of the proximate susceptive factor the ‘as’ which is the same ‘as’ under the form ordered to the form of generating [n.31], – this does not seem to exist per se in creatures, because if the matter which is under the form of wine is posited to be without any form and a created agent can act on it as it is denuded of form, then it would be the proximate receptive factor of any form that is of a nature to be impressed on pure matter, and such a form could be induced by any sufficient agent at all. Therefore the second ‘as’ is precisely sufficient in creatures for proximate potency, although frequently now its ordering is concomitant with it, because matter is never without form and is, as it is under form, not changed indifferently from any form to any form – by a created agent – but from a determinate form to a determinate form; the proof is that when it is understood to belong to nothing, then it is not under the prior form, which is posited as the disposition for the form of what is to be generated [nn.27-29]; its order then to that form is only a relation of posterior to prior, which perhaps is not a positive relation (because the term ‘to which’ is not then of the nature of the thing), or if it is a real relation, it does not seem to be the proper reason in the matter for receiving the form to be induced. – Applying this to the issue at hand, it seems that although the intellect should in origin be in the Father before it is in the Son, yet, if it were posited as receptive of generated knowledge, it would not be posited to be such essentially because of some order to existence in the Father, but according as it belongs precisely to nothing and, according to the way they themselves say precisely, to ‘quasi nothing’.
38 Quod etiam additur ad excludendum deceptionem, videtur esse dictum decepti, quia illud dictum videtur in se absurdum et se ipsum interimere.	38. What is added to exclude a deception [n.32], seems to be the remark of someone deceived, because that remark seems in itself absurd and to destroy itself.
39 Primum probatur per hoc quia tunc ita vere in natura rei intellectus est potentia passiva et ita vere recipit, sicut Deus ex natura rei vere est actus et sapiens et bonus, - quod videtur absurdum, quia quod in creaturis necessario habet imperfectionem annexam vel est imperfectio (sicut est ratio potentiae passivae, quia semper dicit imperfectionem prout dividit ens contra potentiam activam), ponitur ita veraciter in Deo sicut illud quod est perfectio simpliciter!	39. The first point is proved by the fact that the intellect in the nature of the thing is as truly a passive potency and as truly receptive as God is from the nature of the thing truly act and wise and good, – which seems absurd, because what in creatures necessarily has imperfection annexed to it or is an imperfection (as is the nature of passive potency, because it always states an imperfection the way it divides being against active potency) is posited to exist as truly in God as what is a perfection simply!
40 Et si dicas, immo potentia passiva dicit perfectionem, licet ƿnon distinctam ab actu, - hoc videtur esse fictio, quia nihil est in creaturis inferius ratione potentiae passivae: haec enim ratio vere competit materiae primae, quae ponitur infima entium; ergo verius potest dici quod sit formaliter lapis quam potentia passiva, si propter perfectionem aliquam in ratione potentiae passivae debet ibi poni formaliter potentia passiva.	40. And if you say that rather passive potency states a perfection, although one not distinct from act, – this seems to be a fiction, because there is nothing lower in creatures than the idea of passive potency; for this idea belongs truly to prime matter, which is posited as the lowest of beings; therefore more truly can it be said that God is formally a stone than passive potency, if it is because of some perfection in the idea of passive potency that passive potency should be formally posited there.
41 Secundo probo quod hoc dictum interimat se ipsum, quia non videtur intelligibile quod ibi sint relationes oppositae, quin sicut sunt relationes oppositae, ita sint relationes distinctae (si reales, realiter, - si rationis, ratione); ergo si ibi est ex natura rei imprimens et quod imprimitur et illud cui imprimitur (quae non possunt intelligi sine relatione), ponere ibi ista ex natura rei sine omni distinctione, est contradictio.	41. Second I prove that the remark destroys itself [n.38], because it does not seem intelligible that there be opposite relations there without there also being distinct relations (if real, really, – if of reason, by reason) just as much as opposite ones; therefore if there is there from the nature of the thing something that impresses and something that is impressed and something on which it is impressed (which cannot be understood without relation), then to posit that they are there from the nature of the thing without any distinction is a contradiction.

B. Scotus’ own Response

1. To the First Question

Latin	English
42 Ad quaestiones ergo istas respondeo aliter. Ad primam. - Quia rationem verbi praecipue accipimus ab Augustino libro De Trinitate, supponenda sunt quaedam certa ƿquae secundum ipsum conveniunt verbo; ex illis investigandum est quid est in intellectu cui potissime conveniant illa, et illud ponendum est verbum.	42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions. To the first. – Because we chiefly take the idea of the word from Augustine’s book On the Trinity, certain definite things must be supposed that according to him belong to the word; from these we must investigate what in the intellect they most belong to, and that thing must be set down as the word.
43 Verbum secundum ipsum non est sine actuali cogitatione, sicut patet XV Trinitatis cap. 38 vel cap. 15.	43. The word according to hima is not without actual cognition, as is plain from ibid. XV ch.15 n.25.
44 Verbum etiam genitum est de memoria vel de scientia, vel de obiecto relucente in scientia, sicut patet per ipsum XV Trinitatis cap. 24: ((Formata cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, est verbum)); et cap. 36: ((Verbum nostrum de nostra scientia nascitur, ƿquemadmodum verbum Dei de Patris sola scientia natum est)). Et ista omnia sunt eadem, quia secundum ipsum IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo 'ex cognoscente et cognito simul, paritur notitia', quae duae sunt una causa integralis respectu notitiae genitae, sicut dictum est distinctione 3 quaestione 2.	44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science, or from the object shows itself in the science, as is plain from ibid. XV ch.10 n.19: “The word is thought formed from the thing we know;” ch.14 n.24: “Our word is born from our science in the way the word of God the Father is born by science alone.” And all these things are the same, because according to ibid. IX ch.12 n.18: “from the knower and known together knowledge is born,” which two things are one integral cause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said in distinction 3 question 2 n.494.a
45 Tertio, verbum ab eo inquiritur propter imaginem in mente et ponitur secunda pars imaginis (scilicet proles), sicut patet per ipsum IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo vel cap. 32: ((Est quaedam imago Trinitatis: ipsa mens, et notitia eius (quae est proles eius ac de se ipsa verbum eius), et amor tertius)).	45. Third, the word is investigated by him because of the image [sc. of the Trinity] in the mind and is set down as the second part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plain from ibid. IX ch.32: “There is a certain image of the Trinity; the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring and its word from itself), and love third.”
46 Posset ergo describi verbum, quod verbum est actus intelligentiae productus a memoria perfecta, non habens esse sine actuali intellectione, repraesentans verbum divinum (propter illud enim Augustinus inquisivit de verbo nostro).	46. The word may therefore be described as: the word is an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not having existence without actual intellection, representing the divine word (because for this reason Augustine inquired into our word).
47 Ex his apparet quod verbum nihil est pertinens ad voluntatem, neque ad memoriam (quia est secunda pars imaginis, non prima nec tertia), et per consequens non est species intelligibilis nec habitus, nec aliquid pertinens ad memoriam; est ergo aliquid pertinens ad intelligentiam. ƿ	47. From these it is plain that the word is nothing pertaining to the will, nor to memory (because the word is the second part of the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is not the intelligible species nor the habit, nor anything pertaining to memory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

Latin	English
48 In intelligentia autem non videtur esse nisi vel actualis intellectio, vel obiectum terminans illam intellectionem, vel secundum alios species genita in intelligentia de specie in memoria, quae 'species in intelligentia' praecedit actum intelligendi, vel secundum alios aliquid formatum per actum intelligendi, vel quinto secundum alios ipsamet intellectio ut passio, quasi causata a se ut actio; et secundum haec quinque, possunt esse quinque opiniones de verbo.	48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object that is the term of that intellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generated in the intelligence from the species in the memory, which ‘species in the intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act of understanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellection itself as a passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.
49 Non est autem species in intelligentia prior actu intelligendi, quia talem speciem superfluum est ponere. Ipsa enim non perfectius repraesentaret obiectum quam species in memoria, et ƿsufficit habere unum perfecte repraesentans obiectum ante actum intelligendi.	49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because positing such a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.
50 Quod autem 'non perfectius', patet per Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 12: 'Nihil plus in prole quam in parente'.	50. But that it is not ‘more perfect’ is plain from Augustine ibid. XV ch.14 n.23: “There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent.”
51 Tunc etiam duae species eiusdem rationis essent in eadem potentia, quia istae duae species sunt eiusdem rationis; et ipse intellectus ut memoria et intelligentia, est una potentia, quia idem est actus primus, et quo habens operatur et quo habens actum primum est in actu secundo.	51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same power; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is pure act, and that by which the possessor operates and that by which it has first act is in second act.
52 Tunc etiam habitus non esset immediatum principium actus, nec habens habitum esset in potentia accidentali ad agendum secundum illum habitum, quia requireretur forma prior ipsa operatione, alia ab habitu.	52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental power to acting according to the habit, because a prior form would be required for the operation, different from the habit.
53 Nec ista 'species in intelligentia' posset poni gigni naturaliter, si numquam posset esse sine actuali intellectione, quia actualis intellectio subest imperio voluntatis; nec etiam posset dici gigni libere vel eius gignitio subesse imperio voluntatis - ut videtur - si ponatur species prior actu, quia videtur quod primum pertinens ad intellectum quod est in potestate nostra, est actualis intellectio. ƿ	53. Nor can the ‘species in the intelligence’ be posited as being born naturally, supposing it could never exist without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to the command of the will; nor even can it be said that it is born freely or that its generation is subject to the command of the will – as it seems – if it is posited as a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.
54 Nec ipsum obiectum potest poni verbum, sicut dicit alia opinio, quia obiectum secundum se non est aliquid productum virtute memoriae (sive alicuius in mente), quale est verbum, - nec ipsum obiectum 'ut in memoria' producitur virtute memoriae, ut patet; ipsum autem obiectum 'ut in intelligentia' non gignitur nisi quia aliquid prius gignitur in quo obiectum habet esse, quia sicut dictum est distinctione 3, istae actiones et passiones intentionales non conveniunt obiecto nisi propter aliquam actionem vel passionem realem, quae convenit ei in quo obiectum habet esse intentionale.	54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself is not anything produced by virtue of memory (or of anything in the mind), such as the word is, – nor is the object ‘as it is in the memory’ produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain; but the object ‘as it is in the intelligence’ is only generated because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.
55 Nec etiam est aliquis terminus productus per intellectionem, quia intellectio non est actio productiva alicuius termini: tunc enim incompossibile esset intelligere eam esse, et non esse termini, sicut incompossibile est intelligere calefactionem esse et non esse calorem ad quem sit calefactio. Non est autem impossibile intelligere intellectionem in se, non intelligendo quod sit alicuius termini ut producti per ipsam.	55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not the productive action of any term; for then it would be incompossible to understand it to exist and not to be of the term, just as it is incompossible to understand that there is heating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.
56 Confirmatur etiam, quia operationes tales debent esse actus ultimi, ex I Ethicorum et IX Metaphysicae. - De ista materia dictum est supra distinctione 3, qualiter est quaedam actio de genere actionis, et alia quae est qualitas, cuiusmodi est intellectio. ƿ	56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought to be ultimate acts, from Ethics 1.1.1094a3-5 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050a-b1. – This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort intellection is.
57 Improbatur etiam haec via - et sequens 'de intellectione passione' - per idem medium, quia tunc intelligentia gigneret verbum et non memoria, quod est contra Augustinum; intelligentia enim produceret illum terminum actionis intelligendi, si quis esset, - et intelligentia produceret intellectionem passionem, si qua esset.	57. This way – and the following one about intellection-passion – are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligence and not the memory would generate the word, which is contrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any – and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.
58 Ista etiam via 'de intellectione actione et passione' non videtur rationabilis, quia intellectio est forma una, quae licet possit comparari ad agens a quo est et ad subiectum in quo recipitur, tamen ex hoc non habet ipsa talem distinctionem ut possit esse quasi causa sui vel esse terminus actionis secundum hoc et non secundum illud; quia si est terminus actionis, hoc est secundum se, et nec secundum istum respectum nec secundum illum, sed concomitantur eam isti respectus.	58. Also this way ‘about intellection-action and passion’ [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it does not have from it such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. the subject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because if it is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not in accord with this respect or that, but those respects are concomitants of it.
59 Sequitur ergo, per viam divisionis, quod verbum est actualis intellectio.	59. It follows, therefore, by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].
60 Et confirmatur per Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 16 vel cap. 40: ((Cogitatio nostra perveniens ad illud quod scimus, atque inde formata, verbum nostrum est)). Idem etiam habetur ab eo XV Trinitatis cap. 10 vel cap. 24: ((Formata quippe cogitatio)) etc., ((verbum est)), sicut supra dictum est. ƿ	60. And there is confirmation from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and formed from it, is our word.” The same is held by him in ibid. ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc. “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].
61 Et confirmatur istud per simile de verbo vocali et imaginabili: formatur enim verbum vocale ad signandum et declarandum illud quod intelligitur, sed quod vox non statim formatur ab intelligente in quantum intelligens sed per aliam potentiam mediam (puta motivam), hoc est imperfectionis; si ergo statim gigneretur vel formaretur ut expressivum illius quod latet in intellectu, et hoc virtute intellectus intelligentis, non minus esset verbum. Obiectum autem habitualiter latet in memoria; si ergo virtute eius statim causetur aliqua intellectio actualis, quae genita exprimat et declaret illud obiectum ibi latens, - vere est verbum, quia expressivum latentis et genitum virtute eius ad exprimendum ipsum.	61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about the vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone who understands insofar as he understands but through some other middle power (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; if therefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the understanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, which once generated expresses and makes clear the object latent there, – truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent and generated by virtue of it to express it.

b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word

Latin	English
62 Sed restat dubitatio ulterior, utrum quaecumque intellectio actualis sit verbum.	62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actual intellection at all is the word.
63 Ad hoc dicitur quod non, sed oportet addere - quasi differentiam specificam - 'quae est declarativa'.	63. [Opinions of others] – To this a reply is given in the negative, and that one must add – as a specific difference – ‘intellection which is declarative’ [n.11].
64 Contra hoc arguo, quia in Patre est notitia declarativa formaliter, - nam intellectio quae est Patris 'in quantum est intelligentia', est declarativa Patris 'in quantum memoria', et ita perfecte, sicut actualis intellectio 'ut in Filio' declarat habitualem ut in memoria Filii; in Patre tamen non est verbum formaliter, sicut dicetur in solutione quaestionis. ƿ	64. I argue against this because in the Father there is declarative knowledge formally, – for the intellection that is in the Father ‘insofar as he is intelligence’ is declarative of the Father ‘insofar as he is memory’, and thus perfectly, just as actual intellection ‘as it is in the Son’ declares habitual knowledge as it is in the memory of the Son; but in the Father there is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution of the question [n.71].
65 Similiter, verbum declarat se, secundum Augustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 5 vel 16: ((si)), inquiens, ((hoc verbum quod nos proferimus, temporale, et se ipsum ostendit et illud de quo loquimur, quanto magis verbum Dei)) etc., et se ipsum ostendit? 'Declarare' ergo non dicit relationem realem, nec per consequens relationem geniti; verbum autem non est nisi intellectio genita (IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo), alioquin posset poni in Patre formaliter.	65. Likewise, the word declares itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.3 n.4: “If,” he says, “this word that we pronounce is temporal and manifests both itself and that of which we speak, how much more does the word of God etc.” and manifest itself? ‘To declare’ then does not state a real relation, nor consequently the relation of what is generated; but the word is nothing but generated intellection (ibid. IX ch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited formally in the Father.
66 Aliter dicitur, quantum ad istum articulum, quod verbum est notitia actualis 'quae est terminus inquisitionis'.	66. A reply is also given in another way as concerns this article [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge ‘that is the term of inquiry’.
67 Quod ostenditur per Augustinum IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo, ubi dicitur quod verbum est partum sive proles: est autem partum, quia est repertum, - non est autem repertum nisi quia inquisitum; unde vult quod partum istum mentis praecedit appetitus impellens ad inquirendum. ƿ	67. This is shown from Augustine ibid. when he says that the word is a thing born or an offspring; but it is a thing born because it is a thing found, – but it is not a thing found save because it is inquired into; hence Augustine means that this thing born of the mind is preceded by an appetite moving to inquiry.
68 Idem videtur velle XV De Trinitate cap. 15 vel 39, sic inquiens: ((Tunc fit verbum verum, quando illud quod nos dixi 'volubili quadam motione iactare', ad illud quod scimus pervenit atque inde formatur, eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens, ut quomodo quaeque res scitur, sic etiam cogitetur)); ipsa 'volubilis cogitatio' est inquisitio, qualis non erit in patria, sicut innuit cap. 41 vel 16: ((Fortassis non erunt ibi volubiles cogitationes)).	68. He seems to mean the same in ibid. XV ch.15 n.25 when he inquires as follows: “Then a true word comes to be when that which I said to us ‘spreads with a certain rapid motion’ comes to that which we know and is thence formed, taking on its likeness in every way, so that in whatever way each thing is known so too is it thought;” this ‘rapid thinking’ is inquiry, of the sort that will not exist in the fatherland, as he indicates [ch.41 or 16]: “Perhaps there will not be rapid thoughts there.”
69 Ponitur tunc quod post notitiam confusam sequitur inquisitio per divisionem et argumentationem, et ultimo devenitur ad perfectam notitiam, quae quasi gignitur ista inquisitione; et illa perfecta notitia, quae est terminus inquisitionis, est verbum.	69. The position then is that after confused knowledge there follows inquiry and argumentation, and finally one reaches perfect knowledge, which is as it were generated by that inquiry; and the perfect knowledge, which is the term of inquiry, is the word.
70 Contra istud arguo sic: si de ratione verbi sit 'gigni inquisitive', ergo Deus non habet verbum; secundo, igitur angelus non habet verbum de naturaliter sibi cognitis; tertio, igitur beaƿtus non habet verbum de essentia divina, nec de aliquo perfecte cognito sine inquisitione; quarto, igitur habens perfectum habitum scientiae, statim operans per illum habitum non potest habere verbum, - quae omnia videntur absurda.	70. Against this I argue as follows: if it belongs to the idea of the word that ‘it is born through inquiry’, then God does not have a word; second, in that case an angel does not have a word about things naturally known to him; third, then the blessed do not have a word about the divine essence, nor about anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth, therefore he who has the perfect habit of science and at once operates through the habit cannot have a word, – all which things seem absurd.
71 Ideo, istis opinionibus omissis, quoad istum articulum dico quod non quaelibet intellectio actualis est verbum (sicut probatum est contra illam viam quae ponit 'declarativum' esse proprium verbi), sed notitia genita; et ideo in Patre non est verbum formaliter.	71. [Scotus’ own opinion] – Therefore, setting these opinions aside, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actual intellection at all is the word (as was proved against the way that set down ‘declarative’ as proper to the word [nn.64-65]), but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father there is no word formally.
72 Quaelibet autem notitia genita - quam Augustinus vocat prolem - est verbum, non tamen eo modo quo Augustinus ponit verbum perfectum, quod scilicet repraesentet verbum divinum.	72. But any generated knowledge whatever – which Augustine calls offspring – is a word, though not in the way Augustine posits a perfect word, namely one that represents the divine word [nn.45-46].
73 Primum istorum declaro, quia quaelibet intellectio actualis gignitur de memoria, imperfecta de imperfecta sicut perfecta de perfecta; ergo quaelibet notitia est proles et expressiva parentis, et genita ad exprimendum parentem. - Et istud confirmatur primo per Augustinum IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel cap. 24: ((Omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur animo impressum, quamdiu de memoria definiri et proferri potest)); item, XV Triƿnitatis cap. 12 vel 32: ((Nec interest quando illud didicerit, qui quod scit loquitur: aliquando enim statim ut discit, hoc dicit)). Et breviter, quaecumque differentia inveniatur inter notitiam primam genitam 'imperfectam' et illam quae sequitur inquisitionem, non est differentia formalis, propter quam haec possit dici verbum et illa non, ut videtur.	73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generated knowledge is a word], because any actual intellection is generated from memory, imperfect from imperfect as perfect from perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring and expressive of the parent, and is generated to express the parent. – And this is confirmed first from Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “Everything known is said to be a word impressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory;” again ibid. XV ch.12 n.22: “Nor does it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it; for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it.” And briefly, whatever difference is found between the first generated imperfect knowledge and the knowledge that follows inquiry, there is no formal difference because of which the latter could be called word and the former not, as it seems.
74 Secundum declaro sic, quia intellectus noster non statim habet notitiam perfectam obiecti, quia secundum Philosophum I Physicorum innata est nobis via procedendi a confuso ad distinctum; et ideo primo, ordine originis, imprimitur nobis notitia obiecti confusa, prius quam distincta, - et ideo est inquisitio necessaria ad hoc ut intellectus noster veniat ad distinctam notitiam: et ideo est necessaria inquisitio praevia verbo perfecto, quia non est verbum perfectum nisi sit notitia actualis perfecta.	74. I make the second clear [sc. not any generated knowledge is the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does not immediately have perfect knowledge of the object, because according to the Philosopher Physics 1.1.184a16-23 what is inborn in us a way of proceeding from the confused to the distinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, there is impressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before a distinct one, – and therefore inquiry is necessary for our intellect to come to distinct knowledge; and therefore inquiry is necessary previous to the perfect word, because there is no perfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.
75 Sic ergo intelligendum est quod cognito aliquo obiecto confuse, sequitur inquisitio - per viam divisionis - differentiarum convenientium illi; et inventis omnibus illis differentiis, cognitio definitiva illius obiecti est actualis notitia perfecta et perfecte declarativa illius habitualis notitiae quae primo erat in memoria: et ista definitiva notitia, perfecte declarativa, est perfectum verbum. ƿ	75. So then one must understand that when some object is known confusedly inquiry follows – by way of division – into the differences that belong to it; and when all the differences have been found, definitive knowledge of the object is perfect actual knowledge and is perfectly declarative of the habitual knowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitive knowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.
76 Hoc dicit Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 24: ((Definio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc est verbum eius)); et ibidem praemisit Augustinus, in eodem capitulo, quod iam superius positum est: ((quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest)), - id est distincte et definitive actualiter cognosci, virtute eius quod est in memoria.	76. This is what Augustine says ibid. IX ch.10 n.15: “I define what temperance is, and this is its word;” and in the same place Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what he was already set down above: “as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” [n.73] – that is distinctly and definitively and actually known, by virtue of what is in the memory.
77 Non ergo est de ratione verbi gigni post inquisitionem, sed necessarium est intellectui imperfecto - qui non statim potest habere notitiam definitivam obiecti - habere notitiam talem post inquisitionem; et ideo verbum perfectum non est in nobis sine inquisitione. Et tamen quando verbum perfectum sequitur talem inquisitionem, illa inquisitio non est generatio ipsius verbi formaliter, sed quasi praevia ad hoc ut generetur verbum; quod bene innuit Augustinus in auctoritate praeallegata (libro XV cap. 39): ((Hac atque illac, volubili cogitatione)) etc., ((quando ad illud quod scimus pervenit atque inde formatur)), verbum est etc., - innuens quod ista iactatio (id est inquisitio) non est gignitio verbi formaliter, sed eam sequitur gignitio verbi de eo quod scimus, id est de obiecto in memoria habitualiter cognito.	77. It does not therefore belong to the idea of the word to be born after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect – which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of the object – to have such knowledge after inquiry; and therefore the perfect word does not exist in us without inquiry. And yet when a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is not the generation of the word itself formally, but is quasipreliminary to the word being generated; which Augustine well indicates in the afore cited authority [n.68] “hither and thither with a certain rapid motion” etc. “when it comes to that which we know and is thence formed,” it is the word etc., – indicating that this scattering about (that is, inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but is followed by the generation of the word from what we know, that is, form the object habitually known in the memory.
78 Et si obiciatur 'ad quid tunc est inquisitio necessaria?', - posƿset dici ad illud, quod motus necessarius est ad hoc ut inducatur forma perfecta (quae non posset statim in principio motus induci), vel inductio multarum formarum ordinatarum ad inductionem ultimae formae, et absque illo ordine formarum non posset ultima forma induci statim. Et secundum hoc ponitur iste ordo: primo est habitualis notitia confusa, secundo actualis intellectio confusa, tertio inquisitio (et in inquisitione multa verba de multis notitiis habitualibus virtualiter contentis in memoria), quam inquisitionem sequitur distincta et actualis notitia primi obiecti cuius cognitio inquiritur, - quae notitia 'actualis distincta' imprimit habitualem perfectam in memoriam, et tunc primo est perfecta memoria, et assimilatur memoriae in Patre; ultimo, ex memoria perfecta gignitur verbum perfectum, sine inquisitione mediante inter ipsam et verbum, - et ista gignitio assimilatur gignitioni verbi divini perfecti, ex memoria paterna perfecta. Nullum ergo verbum est perfectum, repraesentans verbum divinum (quod potissime investigat Augustinus), nisi istud quod gignitur de memoria perfecta sine inquisitione media inter talem memoriam et tale verbum, licet nec illa memoria possit haberi in nobis - propter imperfectionem intellectus nostri - nisi praecedat inquisitio.	78. And if it be objected ‘for what then is inquiry necessary?’ – one can say to this that motion is necessary for the introduction of perfect form (which could not be introduced at the beginning of the motion), or there is introduction of many forms ordered to the introduction of the final form, and without that order of forms the final form could not be at once introduced. And accordingly this order is posited: first there is habitual confused knowledge, second confused actual intellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many words from many habitual knowledges virtually contained in memory), which inquiry is followed by distinct and actual knowledge of the first object whose knowledge is being inquired into, – which ‘actual distinct’ knowledge impresses perfect habitual knowledge on memory, and then first there is perfect memory and it is likened to the memory in the Father; ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word, without inquiry coming between it and the word, – and this generation is likened to the generation of the perfect divine word, from perfect paternal memory. No word is perfect, then, representing the divine word (which is what Augustine is most investigating) save that which is born of perfect memory without inquiry coming between such memory and such word, although neither could that memory be had by us – because of the imperfection of our intellect – unless inquiry precede.

c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word

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79 Ultimum dubium istius quaestionis est, utrum ad rationem verbi concurrat voluntas, - puta utrum de ratione eius sit quod sit voluntarie genitum, sive voluntate agente 'copulante intelƿligentiam memoriae', secundum quod dicit Augustinus inmultis locis.	79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whether the will concurs in the idea of the word, – namely whether it belongs to its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by an agent will ‘joining the intelligence to memory’, according to what Augustine says in many places.
80 Istam quaestionem movet Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 a: ((Recte)) - inquit - ((quaeritur utrum omnis notitia sit verbum, vel tantum notitia amata)); et respondet: ((Non omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt, concipiuntur, sed alia ut tantum nota sint, nec tamen verba dicantur, - sicut illa quae displicent nec concepta nec parta dicenda sunt)); ((aliter omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur, quamdiu de memoria proferri vel definiri potest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat)). Et postea subdit: ((Verumtamen, cum illa quae odimus displicent, eorum notitia nobis non displicet)), - ita quod de ratione verbi non est gigni amore obiecti cogniti, sed nec etiam gigni amore notitiae quae est verbum.	80. This question is moved by Augustine in On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “Rightly,” he says, “is the question raised whether all knowledge is a word or only loved knowledge is;” and he replies: “Not everything words in any way touch upon is conceived, but some things are so in order only to be known and are yet not called words – as things that displease are said to be neither conceived nor brought to birth;” “in another way everything that is known is called a word, as long as it can be pronounced or defined from memory.” And afterwards he adds: “However, although the things we hate displease us, yet the knowledge of them does not displease us,” – such that it does not belong to the idea of the word that it is generated by love of the known object, nor does it even belong to the word to be born by love of the knowledge that is the word.
81 Tamen concomitatur perfectum verbum duplex actus voluntatis: unus praevius, quo imperatur actus ille et inquisitio praevia, sine quo non perveniretur ad verbum perfectum (sicut patet ƿIX Trinitatis cap. ultimo), et alius quo intellectus quiescit in intelligibili notitia iam habita, sine quo non permaneret intellectus in illa notitia. Non ergo actus voluntatis est de essentia verbi, nec formaliter nec ut causa, sed concomitatur necessario ad generationem eius in nobis propter inquisitionem eius praeviam et ad continuationem eius; similiter propter hoc quod intellectus - si voluntas non complaceret in ista notitia - non permaneret in ea, et ita ista notitia non haberet rationem verbi permanentis. Ista tamen permanentia non est de ratione perfectionis verbi intensive, quia non minus perfecta est albedo unius diei quam unius anni; voluntas autem respiciens obiectum - cuius est verbum non pertinet ad rationem verbi, nisi stricte sumendo verbum, quomodo Augustinus pertractat cap. praeallegato Nemo potest dicere 'Dominus Iesus' nisi in Spiritu Sancto (hoc 'dicere' includit acceptionem obiecti dicti et addit aliquid ultra rationem verbi absolute).	81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act of will: one is previous, whereby the act and the previous inquiry are commanded without which the perfect word would not be reached (as is plain in ibid. IX ch.12 n.18), and the other is that in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledge already possessed, without which the intellect would not persist in that knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not of the essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but is necessarily concomitant with the generation of it in us because of previous inquiry into it and for continuing it; likewise because of the fact that the intellect – if the will is not well pleased in the knowledge – would not persist in it, and so this knowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yet this permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of the word intensively, because a whiteness of one day is not less perfect than a whiteness of one year; but the will that has regard to the object – of which there is a word – does not pertain to the idea of the word save when taking word strictly, the way Augustine takes it in the afore cited chapter [n.80], “No one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ save with the Holy Spirit” (this ‘saying’ includes acceptance of the said object and adds something beyond the idea of word absolutely).

2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

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82 Ad argumenta huius quaestionis. Ad primum patet quod illa auctoritas indiget expositione. Dicit enim ibi: ((Ipsa phantasia eius)) (scilicet Carthaginis) ((in memoria mea verbum eius)) est; patet autem - secundum eum ƿXV Trinitatis cap. 38 - verbum non esse formaliter in memoria; ergo oportet quod intelligatur causaliter, non formaliter.	82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3]. As to the first [n.1] it is plain the authority needs interpretation. For Augustine says there: “the image itself of it” (namely of Carthage) “in my memory is its word;” but it is clear, according to him On the Trinity XV ch.15 n.25, that the word is not formally in the memory; therefore it must be understood in a causal way and not a formal one.
83 Ad secundum. Licet magna altercatio fiat de 'voce', utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus, tamen breviter concedo quod illud quod signatur per vocem proprie, est res. Sunt tamen signa ordinata eiusdem signati littera, vox et conceptus, sicut sunt multi effectus ordinati eiusdem causae, quorum nullus est causa alterius, ut patet de sole illuminante plures partes medii; et ubi est talis ordo causatorum, absque hoc quod unum sit causa alterius, ibi est immediatio cuiuslibet respectu eiusdem causae, excludendo aliud in ratione causae, non tamen excludendo aliud in ratione effectus immediatioris. Et tunc posset concedi aliquo modo effectum propinquiorem esse causam effectus remotioris, non proprie, sed propter prioritatem illam quae est inter tales effectus ad causam; ita potest concedi de multis signis eiusdem signati ordinatis, quod unum aliquo modo est signum alterius (quia dat intelligere ipsum), quia remotius non signaret nisi prius aliquo modo immediatius signaret, - et tamen, propter hoc, unum proprie non est signum alterius, sicut ex alia parte de causa et causatis.	83. To the second point [n.2]. Although there has been a lot of dispute about ‘vocal sound’, whether it is a sign of a thing or a concept, yet I concede in brief that what is signified properly by a vocal sound is a thing. However letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing, just as there are many ordered effects of the same cause none of which is cause of the other, as is plain about the sun illuminating many parts of the medium; and where there is such an order of caused things, apart from one being cause of the other, there is an immediacy of any effect with respect to the same cause, excluding anything else in the idea of cause but not excluding anything else in the idea of a more immediate effect. And then one could concede that in some way a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properly but because of the priority that exists between such effects in relation to the cause; thus one can concede about many ordered signs of the same signified thing that one of them is in some sense sign of the other (because it gives to understand it), for a remoter sign would not signify before a more immediate one in some way signified first, – and yet, for this reason, one is not properly sign of the other, just as is true on the other side about cause and things caused.
84 Ad tertium concedo quod notitia est proles et vere genita, scilicet actualis intellectio, - sed illa non est actio de genere actionis (quia, ut dictum est supra, actualis intellectio non est actio ƿde genere actionis), sed est qualitas nata terminare talem actionem, quae signatur per hoc quod est 'dicere' et - in communi - per hoc quod est 'elicere'. Non ergo verbum est aliquid productum actione quae est intellectio, quia ipsa intellectio non est productiva alicuius, sed ipsa est producta actione quae est de genere actionis, sicut dictum est supra.	84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is offspring and truly generated, namely actual intellection, – but it is not an action in the genus of action (because, as said above d.3 nn.600-604, actual intellection is not action in the genus of action), but it is a quality of a nature to be the term of such an action, which is signified by what it is to ‘say’ and – in general – by what it is to ‘elicit’. A word, then, is not something produced by an action that is intellection, because the intellection itself is not productive of anything but is itself produced by an action that is in the genus of action, as was said above [ibid.]

3. To the Second Question

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85 Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod idem per se significant concretum et abstractum, licet alio modo significandi, sicut filius et filiatio, - quia sicut filiatio significat relationem de genere relationis, ita filius (per modum tamen denominantis suppositum relativum), et si accipiatur substantive, idem significat cum tali subsistente. Ita ergo idem significant verbum et abstractum eius: eius autem abstractum - si esset nominatum - esset 'verbatio', quae notat relationem formaliter (idem enim significat quod expressio passiva alicuius de intellectu); sed sicut filius connotat naturam viventem, in qua est talis relatio, ita verbum connotat notitiam actualem, cuius est talis expressio; ergo cum in divinis 'intellectualiter exprimi' sit proprietas secundae personae, sequitur quod verbum sit ibi mere personale, et significat proprietatem personalem.	85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete and abstract per se signify the same thing, although in a different way of signifying, as son and filiation, – because just as filiation signifies a relation in the genus of relation, so does son (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit), and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies the same as such subsistent thing. Thus therefore word and the abstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract – if it were named – would be ‘word-ness’, which indicates a relation formally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression of something of the intellect); but just as son connotes a living nature, in which there is such relation, so word connotes actual knowledge, of which it is such expression; therefore since in divine reality ‘to be intellectually expressed’ is the property of the second person, it follows that the word is there purely personal, and it signifies a personal property.
86 Patet etiam quod ratio gignendi verbum non est Pater ut actu intelligens, sed Pater ut memoria perfecta (scilicet ut intellectus ƿhabens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens), sicut declaratum est supra distinctione 2, quaestione 'De productionibus'.	86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is not the Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfect memory (namely as intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ [nn.291-293, 221, 310].
87 Patet etiam quod verbum non habet aliquid de quo producatur, ex distinctione 5, - quia si principium productivum habeat virtutem sufficientem ad producendum per se subsistens, producit tale, et maxime si tale non sit natum alicui inhaerere; notitia autem ista expressa non est nata alicui inhaerere, ergo est nata per se subsistere: et principium productivum eius est sufficientis virtutis, ergo etc.	87. It is plain also that the word does not have anything from which it is produced, from distinction 5 nn.80-82, – because if the productive principle have virtue sufficient for producing a per se subsistent, it produces such a subsistent, and especially if such subsistent is not of a nature to inhere in anything; but the expressed knowledge is not of a nature to inhere in anything, therefore it is of a nature to subsist per se; and the productive principle of it possesses sufficient virtue, therefore etc.

4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

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88 Ad argumenta. Cum primo arguitur per Augustinum, ((Verbum est cum amore notitia)), dico quod per hoc quod dicit ((cum amore)), circumloquitur in nobis notitiam genitam, quia amor non habet causalitatem respectu verbi nisi ut imperat gignitionem ipsius, sicut dictum est quaestione praecedente. In divinis autem verbum est notitia naturaliter expressa, quia quod in nobis voluntas habeat causalitatem respectu verbi gignendi per imperium eius, hoc est imperfectionis in intellectu, quia non statim habet verbum perfectum; et de hoc, quomodo voluntas se habeat in Deo et in nobis, dictum est distinctione 6.	88. To the Arguments [nn.5-7]. When it is argued first from Augustine “the word goes with known love” [n.5], I say that his using the phrase ‘with love’ is a circumlocution for generated knowledge in us, because love does not have causality with respect to the word save as it commands its generation, as was said in the preceding question [n.81]. But in divine reality the word is knowledge naturally expressed, because the fact that the will has causality in us with respect to generating the word through its command is a mark of imperfection in our intellect; because it does not immediately have a perfect word; and as to how the will is disposed in God and in us, this was stated in distinction 6 nn.16-29.
89 Ad aliud - de XV Trinitatis - concedo in Patre esse intelliƿgentiam formaliter, sed nego istam quod 'omnis actus intelligentiae formaliter est verbum', quia hoc non est verum nisi de intelligentia illa quae potest habere aliquem actum genitum vel notitiam genitam; talem actum non potest intelligentia ut Patris est, habere, quia Pater est a se et nihil habet per generationem. Tamen potest concedi quod intellectio actualis Patris est quasi genita virtute memoriae ut in Patre, sed non vere genita, quia non distincta.	89. To the other – from On the Trinity XV [n.6] – I concede that in the Father there is intelligence formally, but I deny the proposition that ‘every act of intelligence is formally a word’, because this is not true save of the intelligence that can have some generated act or generated knowledge; such an act cannot be had by the intelligence as it belongs to the Father, because the Father is form himself and has nothing by generation. Yet one can concede that the actual intellection of the Father is as it were generated by virtue of memory as it is in the Father, but it is not truly generated, because it is not distinct.
90 Ad tertium dico quod non sunt duo propria, sed idem, quia eandem relationem per se significant filius et verbum, licet alia connotent (scilicet filius naturam viventem, in communi, et verbum notitiam actualiter expressam). Ista connotata non semper sunt eadem, sed relatio passiva - significata - semper est eadem.	90. To the third [n.7] I say that they are not two properties but the same, because the son and word signify per se the same relation, although they connote something different (namely the son connotes living nature, in general, and the word connotes actually expressed knowledge [n.85]). These connotations are not always the same, but passive relation – when signified – is always the same.

II. To the Third Question

A. The Opinion of Others

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91 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicitur quod sic, propter auctoritatem Augustini 83 Quaestionum quaestione 63, ubi loquens ƿde principio evangelii Ioannis ait: ((Logos melius hoc loco 'verbum' interpretamur)) (quam si 'rationem'), ((ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam quae per verbum facta sunt operativa potentia)).	91. To the third question an answer given is yes [sc. that the divine word does state a respect to creatures], because of the authority of Augustine 83 Questions question 63, where he speaks of the beginning of John’s Gospel and says: “Logos is better translated by us in this place as ‘word’” (instead of as ‘reason’), “so that there may be signified not only a respect to the Father but also to the things that are made through the word by his operative power.”
92 Additur etiam quod verbum dicit proprium respectum ad creaturam, quia verbum ex ratione sui est notitia declarativa; ergo competit sibi ex ratione sui 'declarare'.	92. There is added too that the word states a proper respect to creatures, because word, of its idea, is declarative knowledge; therefore it belongs to it in its idea ‘to declare’ things.
93 Appropriatur etiam Filio relatio ad creaturas: appropriatio autem non fit nisi propter convenientiam talis appropriati ad proprietatem personae cui illud appropriatur. Et declaratur illud per simile de dono. ƿ	93. There is also appropriated to the Son a relation to creatures: but the appropriation is only made because of the agreement of such appropriated thing to the property of the person to which it is appropriated. And it is made clear by a likeness about gift.
94 Et simili modo ponitur quod sicut ibi donum ut connotat relationem aptitudinalem pertinet ad proprietatem Spiritus Sancti, ita verbum ut dicit relationem aptitudinalem - non actualem nec habitualem - pertinet ad secundam personam.	94. And in a similar way is set down that just as there gift, as it connotes an aptitudinal relation, pertains to the property of the Holy Spirit, so the word, as it states an aptitudinal relation – not an actual or habitual one – pertains to the second person.

B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus’ own Response

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95 Contra istud argui potest sicut supra argutum est de dono, quia nullus respectus ad creaturam est proprietas personae divinae nec per se includitur in aliqua proprietate personae divinae, et sicut ibi improbatur, ita potest hic improbari, - quod concedo.	95. Against this one can argue as was argued above about gift [in d.18, which is missing in the Ordinatio; see equivalent in d.18 of the Lectura and Reportatio], that no respect to creatures is a property of a divine person nor is per se included in any property of a divine person, and just as it was rejected there so it can be rejected here, – and this I concede.
96 Et tunc non est vis nisi de hoc nomine 'verbum'. Formaliter enim respectus notitiae expressae ad exprimentem alius est a respectu ipsius ad creaturam deelaratam; et non solum hoc, sed etiam respectus verbi expressi ad exprimentem et respectus eiusdem ut declarantis ad eundem ut declaratum sunt duo respectus, quia primus realis et secundus rationis. Isti autem duo non faciunt aliquid per se unum, quia res vera et ens rationis nihil 'unum per se' constituunt; et ideo si ambo isti respectus uno nomine significentur, non propter hoc faciunt 'unum per se' conceptum, sed alter eorum praecise est proprietas secundae personae (scilicet expresƿsio illa passiva, quae est respectus realis), alter autem - scilicet respectus declarativi - est tantum respectus rationis, sive sit ad Patrem declaratum sive ad creaturam declaratam. Quod aliqualiter tactum est supra per auctoritatem Augustini VII De Trinitate cap. 5, ubi vult quod verbum declarat se, - et idem XV Trinitatis cap. 14 vel 35: 'Pater est se ipsum perfecte dicens', hoc est se ipsum perfecte declarans etc.; ex quibus duabus auctoritatibus patet quod idem potest referri ad se ut declarans ad declaratum, et per consequens non est relatio realis.	96. And then there is no force [sc. to the question] save about the name ‘word’. For formally a respect of expressed knowledge to the one who expresses it is different from its respect to the creature that is declared; and not only this, but also the respect of the expressed word to the one who expresses it and the respect of the word as declaring something qua declared to the one who expresses it are two respects, because the first is real and the second of reason. But these two do not make anything per se one, because a true thing and a being of reason constitute nothing ‘per se one;’ and therefore if both these respects are signified by one name, they do not for this reason make a concept that is ‘one per se’, but one of them is precisely the property of the second person (namely the passive expression, which is a real respect), but the other – namely the respect of what is declarative – is only a respect of reason, or exists toward the declared Father or the declared creature. This was otherwise touched on above from the authority of Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.3 n.4 where he means that the word declares itself, – and the same ibid. XV ch.14 n.23: “The Father is perfectly a sayer of himself,” that is perfectly declares himself etc.;a from which two authorities is plain that the same thing can be referred to itself as declarer to declared, and consequently it is not a real relation.
97 Sed posito hoc de istis respectibus in se quod alter sit proprietas et alter non, quid dicetur de hoc nomine 'verbum', - numquid significat utrumque vel alterum? Et tunc quidem videtur quod verbum per se significet illum respectum realem et primo, quia eius abstractum - ut dictum est; - et concretum primo significant eundem, sed quia connotat notitiam perfectam, qua notitia habet respectum rationis ad cognita per eam, ideo etiam connotat - quasi adhuc remotius - rationem declarativi. Et ita verbum significabit proprietatem seƿcundae personae, licet connotet aliquid absolutum in illa persona (quod est quasi terminus formalis productionis illius personae), et mediante illo quasi remotius connotet respectum ad omne illud ad quod illud absolutum potest habere respectum rationis, scilicet ad omnia declarata.	97. And then indeed it seems that the word per se and first signifies that real respect, because its abstract – as was said [n.85] – and its concrete first signify the same thing; but because word connotes perfect knowledge, by which knowledge it has a respect of reason to the things known through it, therefore it also connotes – as if still more remotely – the idea of what is declarative. And so the word will signify the property of the second person, although it connotes something absolute in that person (which is as it were the formal term of the production of that person), and through it as means it will connote, as if more remotely, a respect to all that to which the absolute can have a respect of reason, namely to all things it declares.

C. To the Principal Argument

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98 Ad Augustinum VI Trinitatis concedo quod verbum sive Filius est ars Patris, ita etiam dicitur sapientia Patris et virtus, et tamen sicut Pater formaliter est sapientia et virtus, ita etiam Pater formaliter est ars: si enim Pater formaliter creat, et hoc ut artifex, creativa ratio formaliter est in Patre, - et ita ille respectus artis ad creaturas 'sicut ad artificiata' est communis tribus, licet approprietur Filio, sicut sibi appropriatur sapientia propter convenientiam cum productione sua.

98. To Augustine On the Trinity VI [n.9] I concede that the Word or the Son is the art of the Father; he is thus also called the wisdom and virtue of the Father [I Corinthians 1.23-24], and yet just as the Father is formally wisdom and virtue, so also is the Father formally art; for if he formally creates, and this as artisan, the creative principle is formally in the Father, – and so the respect of art to creatures ‘as to artifacts’ is common to the three, although it is appropriated to the Son, just as to him is appropriated wisdom because of its agreement with his own production.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

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99 Ad illud - pro opinione - de 83 Quaestionum quaestione 63 potest dici quod 'melius interpretatur logos (graece) per illud quod est 'verbum' quam per illud quod est 'ratio', quia ratio non ita significat respectum ad Patrem sicut verbum, nec ita connotat respectum ad declarata sicut verbum. Non autem vult Augustinus dicere quod verbum dicat essentialiter relationem ad ƿcreaturam sub ratione declarativi, quia dicit ((ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam quae per verbum facta sunt operativa potentia)); verbum autem non dicitur 'potentia operativa' Patris, nisi sicut dicitur sapientia Patris et ars, quae non sunt eius nisi secundum appropriationem. Aut si Augustinus intendat quod hoc nomen 'verbum' utrumque respectum significet, tunc non significat praecise proprietatem secundae personae, sed cum hoc alium respectum appropriatum; et tunc congrua est interpretatio logos in 'verbum', non in 'rationem', quia 'ratio' nec respectum proprium nec appropriatum ita significat. Vera est quidem interpretatio in 'verbum' (propterea plus dicit quam proprietatem personae), nec Augustinus dicit interpretationem esse in aliquid quod significat proprietatem secundae personae.	99. To the remark – on behalf of the opinion – from 83 Questions question 63 [n.91], one can say that logos (in Greek) is better translated through what is meant by ‘word’ than by what is meant by ‘reason’, because reason does not thus signify a respect to the Father as word does, nor does it thus connote a respect to what is declared as word does. But Augustine does not mean to say that word states essentially relation to the creature under the idea of what is declarative, because he says “so that not only is respect to the Father signified, but a respect to those things too that are made through the word by operative power;” but the word is not said to be ‘operative power’ of the Father save as it is said to be the wisdom and art of the Father, which are not the word’s save by appropriation. Or if Augustine intends this name ‘word’ to signify both respects, then it does not precisely signify the property of the second person but, along with this, another appropriated respect; and then the interpretation of logos as ‘word’ and not as ‘reason’ is fitting, because ‘reason’ does not thus signify either a proper or an appropriated respect. The interpretation as ‘word’ is indeed true (for that reason it asserts more than the property of a person), nor does Augustine say the interpretation is in something that signifies a property of the second person.
100 Cum additur quod dicit respectum ad creaturas, proprium sibi, - hoc videtur multo falsius quam conclusio opposita ei quam teneo, quia non tantum relatio ad creaturam non includitur in ratione essentiali alicuius personae, sed nec aliquo modo potest pertinere ad aliquam personam quin uniformiter pertineat ad totam Trinitatem, quia tota Trinitas uniformiter se habet ad omne aliud a se, secundum quodcumque esse, sive secundum esse in re sive secundum esse intelligibile.	100. When the addition is made that it asserts a respect to creatures, proper to the word [n92], – this seems much more false than the opposite conclusion that I maintain [nn.95, 98, 100], because not only is relation to creatures not included in the essential idea of any person, but it can also in no way pertain to any person without uniformly pertaining to the whole Trinity, because the whole Trinity is uniformly related to everything other than itself, according to any existence whatever, whether existence in reality or intelligible existence.
101 Et cum probatur per 'declarativum', dico quod intellectio actualis Patris est declarativa. Nec 'declarativum' est ratio propria verbi, sed notitiam expressam concomitatur declarativum, ƿquia illa expressio est notitiae actualis; et ideo sibi appropriatur declarativum, licet non sit proprium eius.	101. And when proof is given through the word’s being ‘declarative’ [n.92], I say that the actual intellection of the Father is declarative. Nor is ‘declarative’ the proper idea of word, but what is declarative is concomitant to expressed knowledge, because the expression is of actual knowledge; and therefore what is declarative is appropriated to word, although it is not proper to it.
102 Cum postea probatur quod 'appropriatio non fit nisi propter convenientiam cum proprio', non sequitur - ex hoc - quod appropriatum sit proprium, sed oppositum; et concedo quod proprium Filii - quod est 'exprimi' - habet convenientiam cum sapientia et declarativo, et cum arte, pro eo quod ista expressio est alicuius per modum intellectus et virtute intellectus; et talis expressio est actualis notitiae, cuius est declarare notitiam habitualem de qua exprimitur.	102. When proof is afterwards given that ‘appropriation is not made save because of agreement with what is proper’ [n.93], the inference does not hold – from this – that appropriated is proper, but the opposite holds; and I concede that what is proper to the Son – which is ‘to be expressed’ – has an agreement with wisdom and with what is declarative, and with art, because of the fact that this expression is of something by way of intellect and by virtue of intellect; and such expression is actual knowledge, to which it belongs to declare the habitual knowledge from which it is expressed [n.64].

E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word

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103 Hic tamen est difficultas (melior quam sit 'de ratione declarativi'), utrum verbum exprimatur virtute intellectus paterni non tantum de essentia divina quasi obiecto praesente intellectui Patris, sed de aliis intelligibilibus, ut sic habeat respectum ad creaturas non ut in se sunt sed ut habent esse in intellectu paterno prius origine (ut videtur) quam verbum exprimatur. Et tunc haberet ad illa relationem expressi; esset enim tunc verbum expressum non tantum de essentia ut est obiecta intellectui Patris, sed et de aliis intelligibilibus. - Sed de hac difficultate alias, in quaestione 'De uniformi habitudine Trinitatis ad alia a se'.

103. Here, however, a difficulty arises (a better one than is that ‘about the idea of declarative’), namely whether the word is expressed by virtue of the paternal intellect not only about the divine essence as object present to the intellect of the Father, but about other intelligibles, so that it should thus have a respect to creatures not as they are in themselves but as they have being first in origin in the paternal intellect (as it seems) before the word is expressed. And then it would have to them the relation of what is expressed; for then the word would be expressed not only about the essence as it is object of the intellect of the Father, but also about other intelligibles. – But about this difficulty elsewhere, in the question ‘On the Uniform Relation of the Trinity to what is Other than Itself’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.12-19].a a. .