Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D26

Translated by Peter Simpson

Twenty Sixth Distinction. Single Question: Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin

Principal arguments

Latin	English
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam sextam quaero utrum personae constituantur in esse personali per relationes originis. Quod non: Relationes originis sunt alterius rationis, sicut relationes specie differentes in creaturis; quod apparet: plus enim differunt paternitas et filiatio vel paternitas a filiatione, quam filiatio a filiatione vel paternitas a paternitate; ergo constituta ex eis formaliter differrent specie. Personae ergo differrent specie, et ita generatio est aequivoca in divinis, - quae improbata sunt distinctione 7.	1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin. That they are not: Relations of origin are of different ideas, just as are relations differing by species in creatures; the point is clear, for paternity and filiation differ more, or paternity differs more from filiation, than filiation differs from filiation or paternity from paternity; therefore things constituted formally by these relations differ in species. The persons therefore differ in species, and so generation is equivocal in divine reality – all which was disproved in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50].
2 Item, qua ratione relationes originis constituunt personas, eadem ratione relationes communes constituunt eas, et ita eadem persona constitueretur duplici formali constitutivo, - quod est inconveniens. Consequentia probatur per hoc quod relationes communes aequalem distinctionem requirunt in extremis et eodem modo stant cum unitate essentiae; ergo aequaliter distinguunt.	2. Again, the idea by which the relations of origin constitute persons is the same idea by which common relations constitute them, and so the same person would be constituted by a double formal constitutive feature, – which is unacceptable. The inference is proved by the fact that common relations require equal distinctness in the extremes, and they in the same way stand along with unity of essence; therefore they distinguish equally [sc. as the relations of origin do].
3 Praeterea, relationes oppositae de secundo modo relativorum possunt fundari in eodem, sicut voluntas movet se; relatio autem ƿmoventis et moti pertinet ad secundum modum relativorum; ergo pari ratione relationes producentis et producti, quae pertinent ad eundem modum, possunt esse in eodem, - et ita non distinguent supposita.	3. Further, opposite relations of the second kind of relatives [sc. relations of active and passive, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32] can be based on the same thing, the way the will moves itself; but the relation of mover and moved pertains to the second mode of relatives; therefore by parity of reasoning the relations of producer and produced, which pertain to the same mode, can exist in the same thing, – and so they will not distinguish opposites.
4 Confirmatur ratio per Boethium, qui in fine libri sui De Trinitate dicit quod relatio ista est 'quasi eiusdem ad se'. Ergo relationes istae non distinguunt.	4. The reason is confirmed by Boethius, who at the end of his book On the Trinity ch.6 says that this relation is as it were ‘of the same thing toward itself’. Therefore these relations are not distinct.
5 Contra: Boethius, ibidem: ((Essentia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem)).	5. On the contrary: Boethius, ibid.: “The essence contains the unity, the relation multiplies the trinity.”

I Opinions of Others

(A) First opinion

Latin	English
6 Responsio quorumdam est - sicut Praepositini - quod personae se ipsis distinguuntur, et ita non est quaerere quo formaliter distinguuntur vel quibus constituuntur, quia non habent constitutivum.	6. The response of some – as of Praepositinus – is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and so there is no need to ask by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive element.
7 Confirmatur ratio ista, quia persona divina est aeque simplex sicut essentia; essentia autem, propter sui simplicitatem, se ipsa distinguitur a quocumque; ergo et persona.	7. A confirmation of this reason is that a divine person is as equally simple as the essence; but the essence, because of its simplicity, is distinct by itself from anything else; therefore the person is too.
8 Item, abstractum et concretum idem significant, - igitur paternitas et Pater. Ergo dicere Patrem distingui paternitate, est dicere ipsum distingui se ipso. ƿ	8. Again, abstract and concrete signify the same thing, – therefore paternity is the Father. Therefore to say the Father is distinct by paternity is to say that he is distinct by himself.
9 Contra istud arguitur sic: Quaecumque non sunt primo diversa, aliquo sui distinguuntur, quia quae se totis distinguuntur sunt primo diversa (si enim non sunt primo diversa sed aliquid idem entia, tunc non eo distinguuntur quo sunt idem, sed aliquo sui quo non sunt idem); personae autem divinae non sunt primo diversae, quia sunt eiusdem essentiae; ergo adhuc est quaerere quo distinguuntur.	9. Argument against this as follows: Things that are not primarily diverse are distinct by some part of themselves, because things that are wholly distinct are primarily distinct (for if they are not primarily diverse but are beings in some way the same, then they are not distinct by that by which they are the same but by something of themselves by which they are not the same); but the divine persons are not primarily diverse, because they belong to the same essence; therefore one must still ask by what they are made distinct.
10 Item, plures proprietates sunt in eadem persona, sicut in Patre innascibilitas et generatio actio; sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 6, ubi vult quod si Pater non esset ingenitus, posset tamen esse Pater, et e converso; ergo etsi - per impossibile - una non distingueret Patrem ab aliquo, posset alia distinguere, et e converso. Ergo est quaerere quo distinguitur Pater a Filio.	10. Again, there are many properties in the same person, as not being begotten and action-generation in the Father; but they are distinct, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, where he means that if the Father were not unborn yet he could be Father, and conversely; therefore although – per impossibile – one property would not distinguish the Father from anything, the other property could distinguish him, and conversely. Therefore one must ask by what the Father is distinct from the Son.
11 Item, in Patre est generatio activa et spiratio activa; spiratio activa non distinguit a Filio, quia illa est in Filio; ergo Pater non se ipso toto aeque primo distinguitur, sed aliquo quod est in eo.	11. Again, in the Father there is active generation and active inspiriting; active inspiriting does not distinguish him from the Son, because it exists in the Son; therefore the Father is not equally primarily distinguished by his whole total self but by something that is in him.
12 Item, in Praefatione de Trinitate dicitur ((in personis proprietas)); non autem persona est in se ipsa hoc modo sicut proprietas intelligitur esse in persona; ergo aliquo modo persona dici potest distingui proprietate formaliter, quo modo non distinguitur se ipsa primo.	12. Again, in the Preface about the Trinity, “a property in the persons” is spoken of; but a person is not in itself in the way that a property is understood to be in a person; therefore a person can be said to be distinguished formally by a property in a way that a person is not distinguished first in itself.
13 Arguitur etiam contra ipsum, quia si Pater se toto distinguitur a Filio, pari ratione et a Spiritu Sancto, - et sequitur e converso; et si eodem distinguitur ab utroque, ergo eandem habitudinem habet ad utrumque: igitur et e converso, uterque eandem habitudinem habet ad ipsum, et habitudinem eiusdem rationis (sicut si Paulus est similis Petro et Lino, ergo Petrus et Linus habent eandem similitudinem et relationem eiusdem rationis ad ƿPaulum), et tunc Filius videretur distingui a Patre relatione eiusdem rationis cum ea qua distinguitur Spiritus Sanctus a Patre.	13. There is also argument against this opinion [n.6] that if the Father is distinct in his totality from the Son then also by parity of reason he is distinct in his totality from the Holy Spirit, – and the converse inference holds; and if he is distinct from both by the same thing, then he has the same relation to both; therefore conversely too, each of them has the same relation to him, and a relation of the same idea (just as if Paul is like Peter and Linus, then Peter and Linus have the same likeness and a relation of the same idea to Paul), and then the Son would seem to be distinguished from the Father by a relation of the same idea as that by which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father.
14 Sed forte istud argumentum non concludit, quia quocumque Pater constituitur in esse personali, eo distingueretur personaliter a Filio et Spiritu Sancto; nec tamen sequitur e converso quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus distinguerentur aliquo eiusdem rationis a Patre.	14. But perhaps this argument is not conclusive, because whatever be way the Father is constituted in personal being, he would be distinguished personally from the Son and the Holy Spirit; yet it does not follow conversely that the Son and Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Father by something of the same idea.

(B) Second opinion

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15 Alia est opinio, communis, quae dicit personas constitui per relationes.	15. There is another opinion, the common one, which says that the persons are constituted by relations.
16 Pro hac opinione allegatur auctoritas Christi in Evangelio (Matth. ultimo), sicut post tangetur, infra contra tertiam opinionem	16. For this opinion the authority of Christ is alleged in the Gospel (Matthew, last chapter), as will be touched on below against the third opinion.
17 Adducitur ad hoc Boethius, ubi videtur multa tangere dehoc.	17. For this opinion is adduced Boethius [n.5], where he seems to touch on many things about it.
18 Et Augustinus similiter, V De Trinitate cap. 10: ((Quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa sublimitas, substantialiter dicitur)); et paulo post: ((Quidquid ad se ipsos de singulis dicitur, non pluraliter in summa sed singulariter accipitur)). Et ibidem, cap. 12: ((Quidquid ad se dicitur de singulis personis, simul dicitur)). Et ƿibidem, cap. 14 a: ((Quod autem proprie singula in eadem Trinitate dicuntur, nullo modo ad se ipsa sed ad invicem - vel ad creaturam - dicuntur; et ideo relative, non substantialiter, ea dici manifestum est)). - In his expressissime videtur haberi quod omne dictum 'ad se' convenit tribus, et est commune tribus, et omne non commune tribus est relativum; constitutivum autem et distinctivum personae non est commune tribus; ergo est relativum.	18. And Augustine likewise, On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9: “Whatever that most outstanding sublimity is said to be in relation to itself, it is said to be substantially;” and a little later: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves, is not taken multiply in a sum but singly.” And ibid.: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves is said all at once.” And in ch.11 n.12: “But as to the individual things that are properly spoken of in the same Trinity, these are not in any way said in relation to themselves but to each other – or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that for that reason they are said relatively not substantially.” – In these words the view seems to be most expressly held that everything said ‘in relation to itself’ belongs to the three persons and is common to them, and everything not common to the three is a relative; but what is constitutive and distinctive of the person is not common to the three; therefore it is a relative.
19 Item, Augustinus XI De civitate cap. 10: 'Deus est quidquid habet, excepto quod una persona dicitur ad aliam et non est ipsa'.	19. Again, Augustine City of God XI ch.10 n.1: “God is whatever he has, save that one person is said in relation to another and is not the other.”
20 Et huic concordat Anselmus De processione Spiritus Sancti, quod omnia sunt unum in divinis ((ubi non obviat relationis oppositio)).	20. And with this agrees Anselm On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, that everything is one in divine reality “when the opposition of relation does not prevent it.”
21 Item, Damascenus cap. 8: Omnia sunt unum in divinis ((praeter generationem et ingenerationem et processionem; in his enim solis proprietatibus tribus differunt ab invicem sanctae tres hypostases)).	21. Again, Damascene ch.8: everything is one in divine reality “besides generation and non-generation and procession; for in these three properties alone do the three holy hypostases differ.”
22 Item, dic it idem cap. 51: ((In his solis tribus, incausabili paternali, filiali et processibili, cognoscimus)).	22. Again, he says in ch.51: “we recognize them in these three alone, paternal, filial, and processional incausability.”
23 Item, videtur Richardus dicere IV De Trinitate quod persoƿnae non distinguuntur in divinis nisi per modum habendi eandem naturam; igitur etc.	23. Richard of St. Victor seems to say in On the Trinity IV ch.19 that the persons are not distinguished in divine reality save by way of having the same nature; therefore etc.
24 Item, per rationem: Quia si per absolutum constituitur persona in divinis, absolutum additum absoluto necessario faciet compositionem; sed si in absoluto conveniunt personae divinae, constat quod non eodem absoluto quo conveniunt distinguuntur personaliter; igitur absoluto alio. Ergo est ibi absolutum additum absoluto, - igitur compositio. Hoc non sequitur de relatione, quia relatio nihil addit super fundamentum, nec facit compositionem cum eo.	24. Again, by reason: Because if a person is constituted in divine reality by something absolute, an absolute added to an absolute will necessarily produce composition; but if the divine persons come together in an absolute, clearly the absolute in which they come together is not the same absolute as that by which they are distinguished as persons; therefore they are distinguished by some other absolute. Therefore there is there an addition of absolute to absolute, – therefore composition. This consequence does not hold about relation, because relation adds nothing to the foundation nor does it make a composition with it.
25 Aliter confirmatur illa positio et ista ratio, quia relatio uno modo potest transire in substantiam et per hoc non facere compositionem cum absoluto, alio modo potest manere per comparationem ad oppositum et ita distinguitur realiter. Istae duae rationes non videntur competere absoluto, quia absolutum vel omni modo transit, vel omni modo manet: si omni modo transit, non distinguit (sicut nec essentia in quam transit), - si omni modo manet, ergo est compositio.	25. This position and this idea are confirmed in another way, that relation in one way can pass over into substance and to this extent does not make a composition with an absolute, and in another way it can remain because of comparison with its opposite and thus it is really distinct. These two ideas do not seem to belong to the absolute, because the absolute either passes over in every way or remains in every way; if it passes over in every way it does not distinguish (as neither does the essence into which it passes), – if it remains in every way then there is composition.
26 Item, eadem natura non potest esse in diversis suppositis absolutis nisi distinguatur in eis. Licet enim posset esse in diversis suppositis relativis (quia idem illimitatum potest esse fundamentum plurium relationum in diversis suppositis), non tamen in diversis suppositis absolutis videtur posse esse nisi distinguatur et numeretur in eis: si sint enim duo supposita absoluta, videtur quod quidquid sit in uno, sit aliud a quocumque quod est in alio; ergo essentia divina numeraretur in Deo, si personae divinae constituerentur per absoluta.	26. Again, the same nature cannot exist in diverse absolute supposits unless it is distinguished from them. For although it could exist in diverse relative supposits (because the same unlimited thing can be the foundation for several relations in diverse supposits), yet it does not seem able to do this in diverse absolute supposits unless it is distinct and separately counted up in them; for if there were two absolute supposits, it seems that whatever was in one would be other than whatever was in the other; therefore the divine essence would be separately counted up in God if the divine persons were constituted by absolutes.
27 Item, secundum omnes, relationes sunt in personis divinis. Ergo si non constituant personas, erunt ibi quasi accidentales et adventiciae personis constitutis (quod videtur esse contra simpliƿcitatem personarum divinarum), et etiam tales relationes - quae sunt propriae personis - erunt relationes rationis, quia relatio Dei ad creaturam ideo non est realis, quia praesupponit personam divinam in esse perfecto et non dependentem ad creaturam, nec naturaliter vel necessario coexigentem eam ad suum esse personale. Ergo a simili, idem videtur esse in proposito: si prima persona sit absoluta, non dependebit ad secundam, quia praeintelligitur perfecta in habitudine sua personali ante secundam personam, et per consequens non necessario coexigit secundam personam ad suum esse personale; ergo habitudo eius ad secundam personam erit tantum relatio vel habitudo rationis. ƿ	27. Again, according to everyone, relations exist in the divine persons. Therefore if they do not constitute the persons they will be there as it were accidental and additional to the constituted persons (which seems to oppose the simplicity of the divine persons), and also such relations – which are proper to the persons – will be relations of reason, because the relation of God to creatures is for this reason not real that it presupposes a divine person in perfect existence and not dependent on the creature, and not naturally or necessarily requiring the creature for its own personal existence. Therefore, by similarity, the same seems to hold of the matter at issue: if the first person is absolute, he will not depend on the second, because he is pre-understood to be perfect in his personal disposition before the second person, and consequently he will not necessarily require the second person for his personal existence; therefore his relation to the second person will be only a relation or disposition of reason.
28 Ponitur autem ulterius, in speciali, quod non quaecumque relationes constituunt - etiam reales - personas divinas nec eas distinguunt, sed relationes originis, quia illae primo pullulant in essentia divina: quia primo in essentia divina est duplex fecunditas, in quantum est intellectus infinitus et voluntas infinita, et mediantibus istis statim pullulant relationes originis pertinentes ad comƿmunicabilitatem naturae, quae natura vel essentia divina communicatur secundum illam duplicem fecunditatem iam dictam; quibus iam praeintellectis pullulant communes relationes, praesupponentes istas, et ideo tales relationes communes etsi sint reales, non tamen constituunt nec distinguunt personas.	28. But it is further posited, in particular, that not just any relations – even real ones – constitute the divine persons nor distinguish them, but relations of origin, because these burgeon first in the divine essence; because there is first in the essence a double fecundity, insofar as the intellect is infinite and the will infinite, and, by the mediation of these, there burgeon at once the relations of origin that pertain to the communicability of nature, which nature or divine essence is communicated according to the double fecundity just stated; when these are already pre-understood, the common relations, which presuppose them, burgeon, and so such common relations, although they are real, yet do not constitute or distinguish the persons.
29 Qualiter autem possit relatio constituere personas et eas distinguere, declaratur per hoc quod producens necessario distinguitur a suo opposito realiter, quia idem non producit se, secundum Augustinum I De Trinitate l; ergo erit aliqua distinctio realis aliquorum quae sunt in essentia divina: non autem possunt ibi esse aliquo modo per informationem, propter simplicitatem divinam, - ergo erit per se subsistens in illa natura; ergo erunt personae distinctae realiter.	29. Now the way that relation can constitute persons and distinguish them is made clear by the fact that the one who produces is necessarily really distinct from his opposite, because the same thing does not produce itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; therefore there will be some real distinction between some things that exist in divine reality; but these things cannot in any way be there by in-forming, because of the divine simplicity, – therefore the real distinction will be per se subsistent in the divine nature; therefore there will be persons really distinct.
30 Qualiter autem ex hoc non sequitur distinctio essentiae, in qua subsistunt, declaratur, quia idem illimitatum potest esse fundamentum relationum oppositarum, et tunc illa relatio dicitur uno modo manere et alio modo transire, - et circa hoc fiunt multae altercationes, secundum quam rationem relatio distinguat.	30. But as to how no distinction of the essence in which they subsist follows from this is made clear by the fact that the same unlimited reality can be foundation for opposite relations, and then the relation is said in one way to remain and in another way to pass over [into the essence] – and on this point there are many disputes as to what the idea is by which the relation distinguishes.
31 Sed breviter posset dici - secundum istam viam - quod relatio, in eo quod relatio est, non est formaliter essentia, quia secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 2, ((si essentia est ad aliud, iam non est essentia)); et potest argui e converso: 'si relatio formaliter est entitas ad se, ergo non est relatio'. Ipsa etiam - ex ƿhoc quod relatio - est oppositi ut termini, et ex hoc quod est oppositi, necessario distinguitur realiter ab eo; et tamen non oportet essentiam distingui formaliter, quia essentia non est formaliter relatio distincta. Nec oportet ibi esse compositionem, quia licet relatio maneat sic quod non est formaliter essentia, tamen relatio - propter infinitatem essentiae - transit in eam secundum perfectam identitatem ad eam. Manet ergo formaliter relatio, quia ratio eius secundum quam est formaliter, non est ratio essentiae, - et transit propter perfectam identitatem ad essentiam, licet non in identitatem formalem. Et illud 'manere sic' sufficit ad distinctionem formalem et realem, sine aliqua distinctione essentiae; et ex hoc quod essentia ista est simplex, ista distinctio non erit informantium sed subsistentium, - et ex hoc quod ista essentia est infinita, istud ' manere formaliter' erit sine compositione.	31. But in brief it can be said – in accord with the present way [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations] – that relation, in the respect in which it is relation, is not formally essence, because according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2, “if essence is in relation to another, it is now not essence;” and one can argue conversely: ‘if relation is formally an entity for itself then it is not relation’. Also relation – from the fact it is relation – is of its opposite as of its term, and from the fact that it is of its opposite it is necessarily really distinguished from it; and yet there is no need for the essence to be formally distinguished, because essence is not formally a distinct relation. Nor need there be composition there, because although the relation remain in the sense that it is not formally the essence, yet relation – because of the infinity of the essence – passes over into the essence according to perfect identity with it. Relation then remains formally, because the idea according to which it is formally is not the idea of the essence, – and it passes over, because of perfect identity, into the essence, though not into formal identity. And the ‘remaining in this sense’ suffices for formal and real distinction without any distinction of essence; and from the fact that this essence is simple, the distinction will not be of things that in-form but of things that subsist – and from the fact that this essence is infinite, the ‘remaining formally’ will be without composition.
32 Contra istam conclusionem arguitur quadruplici via: primo comparando relationem ad relatum, secundo comparando relationem ad originem, et tertio ex propria ratione ipsius constitutivi, et quarto per auctoritates.	32. Against this conclusion [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations and not by something absolute] there is argument in four ways: first by comparing relation to the related thing, second by comparing relation to its origin, third from the proper idea of the constitutive thing itself, and fourth by authorities.
33 Quantum ad primam viama arguitur sic: Relatione aliquid refertur formaliter (sicut albedine aliquis dealbatur), non ipsamet relatio refertur (quia secundum beatum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 2, ((omne relativum est aliquid excepta relatione)); et in principio cap. 3: ((Si Pater)) - inquit ((non est ad se, non erit aliquid quod refertur)); relatio enim non refertur, quia illud quod refertur relatione, non est aliquid postea, ƿnec simul natura, - ergo prius naturaliter); sed essentia non refertur realiter, ergo suppositum tantum refertur; ergo prius est ibi realiter suppositum et naturaliter quam relatio. Non ergo primo constituitur vel distinguitur suppositum divinum relatione.	33. [First way] – As regard the first the argument is as follows: Something is related formally by relation (as someone is made white by whiteness), but the relation itself is not related (because according to blessed Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2, “every relative is something when the relation is removed;” and: “If the Father,” he says, “does not exist to himself he will not be anything that is related;” for the relation is not related, because that which is related by a relation is not a something afterwards nor is it simultaneous in nature, – therefore it exists naturally prior); but the essence is not really related, therefore the supposit alone is related; therefore the supposit is really and naturally there prior to the relation. Therefore a divine supposit is not constituted or distinguished first by relation.
34 Probatio assumptorum: omne compositum de necessitate praeexigit partes et partium unionem, et hoc non tantum in composito per se uno, sed in composito per accidens uno; sicut enim essentia hominis praeexigit essentiam corporis et animae et unionem eorum, ita essentia hominis albi praeexigit esse hominis et albedinem et unionem eorum. Ergo esse alicuius relati, quod dicitur 'referri primo' sicut quasi totum, praeexigit relationem ut formam, et illud quod refertur relatione quasi subiectum, et unionem istorum. Prius ergo aliquid informatur relatione quam sit aliquid relativum quasi compositum, quod dicatur 'referri primo': illud prius, informatum relatione, potest dici referri, quia omne informatum aliqua forma potest dici tale.	34. Proof of the assumptions: everything composite of necessity pre-requires parts and the union of the parts, and this is so not only in a composite that is per se one but in a composite that is per accidens one; for just as the essence of man pre-exists the essence of body and soul and their union, so the essence of a white man pre-requires the being of man and whiteness and their union. Therefore the being of some related thing, which is said ‘to be related first’ as a quasi-whole, pre-requires relation as the form, and that which is related by the relation as the subject, and their union. Therefore something is first in-formed by relation before it is something relative as a composite, and this is said ‘to be related first’: that prior thing, in-formed by the relation, can be said to be related, because everything in-formed by some form can be said to be of the sort the form is.
35 Confirmatur ista ratio in simili, quia sicut homo non esset animatus primo nisi corpus esset per se animatum (quasi informatum anima), ita - ut videtur - erit in proposito, quia nihil erit relatum primo, quod constituitur formaliter in 'esse' primo per relationem, nisi aliquid prius sit relatum quasi denominative propter denominationem a relatione. ƿ	35. This reason is confirmed by a likeness, because just as man would not first be animated unless he were per se an animated body (being in-formed, as it were, by the soul), so will it be – as it seems – in the question at issue, because nothing that is not first constituted formally in ‘being’ by the relation will be first a related thing unless something is first related as it were denominatively on account of denomination from the relation.
36 Item, relatio realis praeexigit distinctionem realem extremorum, ergo nulla relatio causat primo distinctionem realem extremorum; ergo nec hic . - Probatio antecedentis: Philosophus V Metaphysicae cap. 'De eodem' probat identitatem non esse relationem realem, quia non praeexigit distinctionem realem extremorum.	36. Again a real relation pre-requires a real distinction between the extremes, therefore no relation is first to cause the real distinction between the extremes; therefore not in the present case either. – Proof of the antecedent: the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.9.1018a2-4, about ‘the same’, proves that identity is not a real relation, because it does not pre-require a real distinction between the extremes.
37 Si dicatur quod illa non est realis quae nec praeexigit nec facit distinctionem extremorum realem, - contra: igitur istud argumentum 'extrema non sunt distincta realiter, ergo non est relatio realis' non valet. Aut enim accipitur in antecedente quod extrema non sunt distincta distinctione praecedente relationem, et tunc non sequitur 'ergo relatio non est realis', quia sic posset accipi in proposito; aut accipitur in antecedente quod extrema non sunt distincta distinctione facta hac relatione, - si sic accipis 'ideo non est facta distinctio extremorum per ista, quia ista non est relatio realis', ergo inferre ex antecedente sic sumpto relationem non esse realem, est inferre 'quia non est realis, ideo non est realis', quod nihil est. ƿ	37. If it be said that a relation is not real which neither pre-requires nor makes a real distinction between the extremes, – on the contrary: then this argument is not valid, ‘the extremes are not really distinct, therefore the relation is not real’. For either what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, and then the consequence ‘therefore the relation is not real’ does not hold, because so could it be taken in the question at issue; or what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction made by the relation, – if you thus take ‘therefore a distinction between the extremes is not made thereby [sc. by a distinction made by the relation], because it is not a real relation’, then to argue from the antecedent so taken that the relation is not real is to argue ‘because it is not real, therefore it is not real’, which is empty.
38 Ex secunda via arguitur sic: Relatio non potest originari nisi aliquo absoluto prius originato, aut in relato aut in termino; ergo persona divina quae primo originatur, non potest tantum esse relatio subsistens, sed oportet ponere aliquid absolutum quod primo originatur.	38. [Second way] – In the second way the argument is as follows: A relation cannot be originated save by something absolute previously originated, whether in the related thing or in the term; therefore the divine person that is first originated cannot be merely a subsistent relation, but one must posit something absolute that is originated first.
39 Et confirmatur ista ratio maxime si negetur essentiam esse forƿmalem terminum huius productionis: tunc enim nec originatum erit ad se, nec formalis terminus originationis, - quod videtur inconveniens.	39. This reason is also very much confirmed if one denies that the essence is the formal term of this production; for then neither will the originated thing exist toward itself nor will it be the formal term of the origination, – which seems to be unacceptable.
40 Item, tunc non erit aliud Patrem originare Filium, quam Patrem habere Filium correlativum; sed Pater ex se - eo quod Pater - habet Filium correlativum, quia in nullo instanti, nec originis nec naturae, potest intelligi Pater sine Filio vel nisi intelligitur habere Filium; ergo Pater ex se, sine originatione, habet Filium, ergo non originat eum si nihil originatur nisi correlativum.	40. Again, it will then be the case that for the Father to originate the Son is no other than for the Father to have the Son as correlative; but the Father of himself – by the fact he is Father – has the Son as correlative, because in no instant whether of origin or of nature can the Father be understood without the Son or without being understood to have the Son; therefore the Father of himself, without origination, has the Son, therefore he does not originate the Son if nothing is originated save the correlative.
41 Praeterea, tertio: omne relativum aeque naturaliter respicit suum correlativum, ergo aeque naturaliter spirans respicit spiratum sicut generans generatum. Ergo si productum utraque productione sit tantum relativum, utrumque aeque naturaliter producitur, et ita non erit in divinis duplex productio (per modum naturae et voluntatis), et tunc aeque vere potest dici quod Filius producitur per modum voluntatis et Spiritus Sanctus per modum naturae, sicut e contra, - quod est contra omnes.	41. Further, third: every relative equally naturally has regard to its correlative, therefore the inspiriter as equally regards the inspirited as the generator the generated. Therefore if what is produced by each production is merely relative, each is equally naturally produced, and so there will not in divine reality be a double production (by way of nature and by way of will), and then it can be said that the Son is produced by way of will and the Holy Spirit by way of nature as equally truly as the opposite, – which is against what everyone says.
42 Item, tunc nulla productio in divinis erit generatio, quia generatio est ad primam substantiam ut ad terminum productum; hic autem ponitur relatio vel relativum primum productum; ergo erit productio in genere relationis et non generatio. ƿ	42. Again, then no production in divine reality will be generation, because generation is to primary substance [n.60] as to the produced term; but here relation or the relative is posited as the first thing produced; therefore there will be production in the category of relation and there will not be generation.
43 Item, suppositum aliquo modo praeintelligitur actioni, quia prius intelligitur unumquodque per se esse quam quod per se agat: in illo priore si est suppositum ad se, habetur propositum; si non est suppositum ad se sed ad aliud - ut ad Filium - ergo simul intelligitur Filius, et ita Filius praeintelligitur generationi, et ita Filius non erit terminus generationis.	43. Again, a supposit is in some way pre-understood for action, because each thing is first understood to exist per se before understood to act per se; if in that prior understanding the supposit is for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. the persons are not constituted merely by relations]; if the supposit is not for itself but toward another – as toward the Son – then the Son is understood at the same time, and so the Son is pre-understood to generation, and so the Son will not be the term of generation.
44 Et confirmatur, quia quacumque prioritate unum correlativum praeintelligitur alicui, eadem prioritate reliquum correlativum praeintelligitur eidem, propter simultatem relativorum.	44. And there is a confirmation, because by whatever priority one correlative is pre-understood for something, by that same priority the latter correlative is preunderstood for it, because the of the simultaneity of relatives.
45 Quantum ad tertiam viam arguitur sic: Quidquid constituit in aliquo esse et in unitate correspondente tali esse, se toto primo repugnat distinctioni oppositae illi unitati (exemplum: si rationale primo constituat hominem in entitate et unitate specifica, se toto primo repugnat distinctioni specificae, ita quod circumscribendo per possibile vel impossibile quodcumque aliud a rationali, quod non est de intellectu eius, stante solo intellectu rationalis, repugnabit sibi divisio in diversas naturas specificas). Et probatur ista propositio, quia si toti constituto repugnat talis distinctio, ergo per aliquid sibi repugnat; sit illud a: si ipsi a se toto repugnat, habetur propositum, - si non, sed repugnat ipsi a per b, erit processus in infinitum, vel ubicumque stabitur, illud erit ultimum constituens in tali unitate et illi se toto repugnabit ƿdistinctio opposita tali unitati. Ergo si paternitas constituat primum suppositum in esse personali sub ratione incommunicabilis, oportet quod paternitati ex ratione sua primo repugnet communicabilitas.	45. [Third way] – As to the third way [n.32] the argument is as follows: Whatever constitutes existence in something, and in the unity corresponding to such existence, is wholly first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitutes man in his being and specific unity, rational is wholly first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, when removing if possible or per impossibile everything other than rational that is not part of the meaning of rational and keeping only the meaning of rational, a division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And the proof of this proposition is that if such a distinction is repugnant to the constituted whole, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that something be a; if it is wholly repugnant to the a itself then the intended conclusion is gained, – if not but it is repugnant to the a itself through b, there will be a process ad infinitum or, wherever a stand is made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such a unity and a distinction opposed to such unity will be wholly repugnant to it. Therefore if paternity constitutes the first supposit in its personal being under the idea of its being incommunicable, then communicability must of its own idea be first repugnant to paternity.
46 Sed hoc videtur falsum multipliciter: Primo, quia secundum illos qui tenent hanc opinionem, quiditas de se non est incommunicabilis; ergo nec paternitas.	46. But this seems false for many reasons: First because, according to those who hold this opinion [n.15], quiddity is not of itself incommunicable; therefore neither is paternity.
47 Secundo, quia paternitas non est de se 'haec', circumscripto omni eo quod non est de formali ratione paternitatis: circumscripta enim deitate, quae non est de formali ratione paternitatis (secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 2 et 4, 'non eo Pater quo Deus'), paternitas non est de se formaliter infinita, et per consequens nec est de se 'haec', - et si hoc, igitur nec multo magis erit de se incommunicabilis, quia incommunicabilitas praesupponit singularitatem.	47. Second because paternity is not of itself a ‘this’, when everything that is not of the formal idea of paternity has been removed; for when deity is removed, which is not of the formal idea of paternity (according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, ‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’), paternity is not of itself formally infinite, and consequently neither is it of itself a ‘this’ – and if so, then neither will it much more be of itself incommunicable, because incommunicability presupposes singularity.
48 Tum tertio, quia quaelibet relatio divina originis est aeque eadem essentiae divinae; ergo si ex illa contrahit aliquam incommunicabilitatem, quaelibet aequaliter eam contraheret: sed hoc est falsum, quia spiratio activa licet sit 'haec', non tamen incommunicabilis, quia est in duobus, Patre scilicet et Filio.	48. Next, third, because any divine relation of origin is equally the same as the divine essence; therefore if it contracts from it some incommunicability, any relation would contract it equally; but this is false, because active inspiriting, although it is a ‘this’, is yet not incommunicable, for it is in two things, namely the Father and the Son.
49 Et ex hoc quarto probatur quod cum opposita relativa videantur uniformiter se habere ad incommunicabilitatem et spiraƿtio activa non sit de se sic incommunicabilis, ergo nec spiratio passiva, sibi opposita; ergo nec sic constituet Spiritum Sanctum in esse personali, quod est falsum.	49. And from this result is proved, fourth, that since opposite relatives seem to be uniformly related to incommunicability, and since active inspiriting is not of itself thus incommunicable, then neither is passive inspiriting, which is the opposite of active inspiriting, incommunicable; therefore neither will passive inspiriting thus constitute the Holy Spirit in his personal being, which is false.
50 Tum quinto, quia etiam si ponerentur quaecumque positiones, impossibiles vel incompossibiles, stante intellectu 'rationalis', repugnaret sibi dividi in plures naturas specificas: puta si poneretur quod 'rationale' esset differentia coloris et quod ille color posset causare substantias de nihilo, vel quaecumque talia. Posita autem hac positione impossibili quod prior esset productio voluntatis quam intellectus, salvata ratione generationis et spirationis, spiratio activa esset in uno supposito et generatio activa tunc esset in duobus, quia tunc communicaretur Spiritui Sancto - in illo instanti in quo spiratur - vis generativa; ergo modo generationi activae in se non repugnat formaliter communicabilitas. ƿ	50. Next, fifth, because even if certain positions are set down, impossible or incompossible when the understanding of ‘rational’ is in place, it would be repugnant for it to be divided into several specific natures; for example if it were set down that ‘rational’ were the difference of color and that the color could produce substances from nothing, or any suchlike things. But once this impossible position is set down, that the production of the will is prior to that of the intellect, then, when preserving the ideas of generation and inspiriting, active inspiriting would be in one supposit and active generation would then be in two, because there would be communicated to the Holy Spirit – in the instant in which he is inspirited – generative force; therefore now communicability is not formally repugnant to active generation in itself.
51 Item, arguitur secundo sic principaliter, quantum ad istam viam: ab ultimis constitutivis et distinctivis aliquorum non potest abstrahi aliquid commune dictum in 'quid' de eis; probatio: quia si est aliquid commune eis, illo communi non distinguuntur primo, sed aliquo contrahente distinguuntur, et ita non sunt prima distinctiva; si ergo sunt prima distinctiva, nihil est commune eis dictum in 'quid'. A paternitate autem et filiatione abstrahitur hoc quod est relatio, quae videtur esse commune eis et univoce: potest enim intellectus certus esse de relatione et dubius de hac relatione et illa. Ergo ista a quibus abstrahitur, non sunt primo distinctiva. ƿ	51. Again, an argument as to this way [n.32] is made, second, principally as follows: from the ultimate constitutive and distinctive elements of certain things there cannot be abstracted something common that is predicated in the ‘what’ of these things; proof: because if there is something common to them, they are not first distinguished by that common thing, but they are distinguished by something that contracts them, and so they are not the first distinctive elements; if then they are first distinctives, nothing predicated in the ‘what’ is common to them. But from paternity and filiation is abstracted that which relation is, and this seems to be something common to them and univocal; for the intellect can be certain about relation and doubtful about this relation and that. Therefore the things from which relation is abstracted are not first distinctives.
52 Item, tertio: primum constitutivum suppositi in aliqua natura videtur facere per se unum cum illa natura, quia non videtur quod per accidens possit esse 'primum simpliciter' in aliquo genere, secundum Philosophum II Physicorum; sed sicut in creaturis relatio est alterius generis ab absoluto, et ideo non facit unum per se cum eo, ita in divinis non videtur esse unus conceptus per se absoluti et relationis; ergo si persona ista duo includat essentialiter, scilicet essentiam et relationem, non videtur esse per se suppositum et primum talis naturae, sed quasi suppositum per accidens, et ita videtur quod possit dari aliquid prius constitutivum per se suppositi in illa natura. ƿ	52. Again, third: the first constitutive element of a supposit in any nature seems to make something that is per se one with that nature, because it does not seem that the per accidens could be ‘first simply’ in any genus, according to the Philosopher Physics 2.1.192b20-23; but just as in creatures relation is of a different kind from the absolute and so does not make something per se one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept per se of the absolute and of relation; therefore if person includes these two things, namely essence and relation, essentially, then person does not seem to be a supposit per se and first of such a nature but is a supposit as it were per accidens, and so it seems that some prior thing could exist that is constitutive per se of the supposit in that nature.
53 Ex quarta via arguitur per auctoritates: Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 2: ((Omne relativum est aliquid excepto relativo)) etc. Ergo, sicut deduxit prima ratio, videtur concedere quod illud quod refertur est aliquid ad se. ƿ	53. [Fourth way] – In the fourth way the argument is from authorities: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: “Every relative is something when the relative is removed etc.” Therefore, as was deduced by the first reason [n.33], he seems to concede that that which is related is something in itself.
54 Item, in eodem, cap. 8: ((Omnis res ad se subsistit, quanto magis Deus?)). Et loquitur de 'subsistere' quod convenit substantiae prout graeci accipiunt substantiam: accipiunt autem ipsi (secundum eum) substantiam sicut nos personam; ergo 'subsistere' quod convenit personae in quantum persona, quod numeratur in tribus (prout scilicet dicuntur 'tres subsistentes'), illud est ad se, secundum eum, et inconveniens est personam divinam subsistere ad aliud, hoc modo accipiendo 'subsistere'.	54. Again, ibid. ch.4 nn.8-9: “Every being subsists for itself, how much more God?” And he speaks of ‘subsist’ which pertains to substance in the way the Greeks take substance; but they (according to him) take substance the way we take person; therefore the ‘subsist’ which belongs to a person insofar as it is person, which is counted up in the three (namely the way we speak of ‘three subsistents’), that ‘subsist’ exists for itself, according to him, and it is unacceptable for a divine person to subsist toward another when taking ‘subsist’ in this way.
55 Item, tertio: omnia quae ponuntur in definitione personae, sive a Boethio De duabus naturis sive a Richardo IV De Triniƿtate cap. 22, sunt absoluta, ita quod nullum illorum includit relationem essentialiter; et definitio debet exprimere intrinsecam quiditatem definiti, - ergo etc.a.	55. Again, third: all the things put in the definition of person, whether by Boethius De Persona ch.3 or by Richard of St. Victor On the Trinity IV ch.22, are absolute, such that none of them includes relation essentially; and a definition ought to express the intrinsic quiddity of the defined thing, – therefore etc.

(C) Third opinion

Latin	English
56 Tertio modo ponitur aliter, personas divinas esse absolutas. ƿ	56. [Exposition of the opinion] – In a third way the position is otherwise, that the divine persons are absolute.
57 Et ne videatur novum et extraneum, adducitur dictum cuiusdam antiqui doctoris, distinguentis 'aliquid dici dupliciter secundum substantiam'. Dicit enim sic: ((Intelligendum est quod - sicut dicit Richardus de Sancto Victore - 'dici secundum substantiam' est dupliciter: uno modo indicando substantiam secundum naturam communem, et sic dicitur 'homo' secundum substantiam; aut indicando substantiam ut suppositum certum, ut 'quidam homo'. Primo modo dicere substantiam (scilicet pro quiditate) est dicere 'quid', secundo modo est dicere 'aliquem')). Dicit ergo ulterius quod ((nomen essentiae vel substantiae (vel quiditatis) dicitur secundum substantiam quia indicat naturam communem, sed persona dicitur secundum substantiam quia indicat suppositum certum et distinctum: natura enim communis non multiplicatur, nec refertur, - et ideo quod dicit substantiam secundum naturam communem, ita dicitur 'ad se' quod nullo modo potest dici secundum relationem; suppositum autem (sive hypostasis) est natum plurificari et ad aliud comparari, et ita referri: et quod sic dicitur secundum substantiam, nihil impedit ratione relationis superadditae - dici secundum relationem. Et hoc vult Richardus de Sancto Victore)).	57. And lest it seem novel and out of the way, a certain older doctor’s saying is adduced who distinguishes ‘something said in twofold way according to substance.’ For he speaks thus [Bonaventure, Sentences I d.25 a.1 q.1]: “One must understand that – as Richard of St. Victor says [On the Trinity IV chs.6-7]—‘being said according to substance’ is double: in one way by indicating substance according to common nature, and thus ‘man’ is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a certain supposit, as in the case of ‘a certain man’. To say substance in the first way (namely as the quiddity) is to say a ‘what’, and in the second way it is to say a ‘whom’.” He says further that “the name of essence or substance (or of quiddity) is said according to substance because it indicates the common nature, but person is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit; for the common nature is not multiplied nor is it related, – and therefore what it calls substance according to common nature is in this way said to be ‘for itself’ because it can in no way be said according to relation;a but a supposit (or hypostasis) is of a nature to be multiplied and to be compared to another, and so to be related; and what is thus said according to substance in no way impedes – by reason of the superadded relation – its being said according to relation. And this is what Richard of Saint Victor means.” a. [Interpolation] “and in this way indeed it is divided from the opposite”
58 Idem etiam doctor - in quaestione illa 'An proprietates distinguant personas' - dicit quod 'secundum quod sunt habitudines, non distinguunt personas, sed secundum quod sunt origines'; quod verbum - licet ipse forte non sic intelligat - potest ƿexponi quod origines non distinguunt personas formaliter, sed quasi principiative: sicut motus in creaturis, et maxime si esset in movente et non in moto, non distingueret terminos motus formaliter sed effective, quod pertinet ad genus causae efficientis, quemadmodum etiam si natura humana poneretur in uno homine et ipsa non posset multiplicari nisi per generationem, posset dici quod generatio multiplicat homines, non quidem formaliter (quasi homines distinguerentur formaliter generationibus ut sunt generationes), sed quasi effective, quia generatio reducitur ad genus causae efficientis. Ita posset dici in proposito, quod natura divina non communicatur suppositis nisi per originem, et ita origine distinguuntur personae in natura quasi principiative, reducendo ad ipsum principians, quod distinguit non formaliter sed correspondenter distinguenti effective in creatura.	58. The same doctor also says – in the question ‘Whether the properties distinguish the persons’ – that ‘in the way that they are dispositions they do not distinguish the persons, but in the way that they are origins’; which statement – even if he himself perhaps not so understand it – can be expounded as that the origins do not distinguish the persons formally but as it were by way of principle; just as motion in creatures, and especially if the motion be in the mover and not in the moved, would not distinguish the terms of motion formally but effectively, which pertains to the genus of efficient cause, – in the way also that, if human nature were posited in one man and could not be multiplied save by generation, one could say that generation multiplies men, not indeed formally (as if men were distinguished formally by generations as they are generations), but as it were effectively, because generation is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. One could speak thus in the case of the issue at hand, that the divine nature is not communicated to the supposits save by origin, and thus it is that the persons are distinguished in nature by their origin as it were by a principle, reducing this to the principal source itself, which distinguishes not formally but in a way corresponding to what distinguishes effectively in creatures.
59 Secundum hoc ergo poneretur quod personae divinae constituerentur in esse personali - et distinguerentur - per aliquas realitates absolutas et quasi principiative, non formaliter distinguerentur 'personae productae' per origines; non tamen illa constituentia personas essent absoluta primo modo sed secundo modo, quia etsi non essent formaliter relationes, constituta tamen per ipsas essent referibilia. Iste posset esse modus ponendi.	59. Accordingly then the position would be that the divine persons would be constituted in personal existence – and distinguished – by absolute realities and as it were by way of principle, and the ‘produced persons’ would not be formally distinguished by origins; but the things constituting the persons would be absolute not in the first way but the second way, because although they would not formally be relations, yet the things constituted by them would be relatable. This could be a way of stating the position.
60 Solutio autem huius positionis non tantum probatur per illas quattuor vias tactas contra secundam opinionem, sed etiam per alias quasdam persuasiones. Primo quidem, quia prima substantia est maxime substantia, secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis, - et hoc non est imperfectionis; ergo videtur quod hoc modo posset poni prima subƿstantia in divinis, videlicet persona, cui maxime competat subsistere, hoc est 'per se esse'. Relatio autem non videtur formaliter posse constituere aliquid subsistens, nec per consequens primam substantiam.	60. [Proofs] – Now the solution given by this position is not only proved by the four ways touched on against the second opinion [nn.32-55], but also by certain other persuasive points. First indeed because primary substance is substance most of all, according to the Philosopher in Categories 5.2a11-14, – and this is not a mark of imperfection; therefore it seems that in this way one could posit that primary substance in divine reality, namely the person, to which it most belongs to subsist, that this is ‘to exist per se’. But relation does not seem to be able formally to constitute something subsistent, nor consequently to constitute primary substance.
61 Et confirmatur ista ratio, quia secunda substantia dicit totum 'quod quid est' primae substantiae, - igitur in prima substantia non concurrit aliqua distincta quiditas a quiditate secundae substantiae; ergo nec quiditas relationis, quae est distincta a quiditate essentiae, pertinet ad rationem primae substantiae.	61. There is a confirmation too for this reason, that secondary substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of primary substance, – therefore in primary substance there does not concur any quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance.
62 Confirmatur etiam, quia si oportet - in his quae sunt ad aliquid in divinis - non tantum ponere quiditatem, puta non tantum paternitatem sed hanc paternitatem, et hoc sub ratione incommunicabilis, et haec omnia competere sibi in quantum est ad aliud et ut non est formaliter illud quod est ad se, - quare non potest ita in eo quod est ad se, non per illud formaliter 'quod est ad aliud' haberi hoc quod est incommunicabile?	62. There is a confirmation too in that if it is necessary – in things that exist toward something in divine reality – not only to posit quiddity, namely not only paternity but this paternity, and that too under the idea of incommunicability, and to posit that all these things belong to it insofar as it exists toward another and as it is not formally that which is for itself, – that if so, why can this not hold of that which is for itself, namely that what it is to be incommunicable is not had through that which is formally ‘what exists toward another’?
63 Et confirmatur istud ultimo efficaciter, ut videtur, quia in substantia creata licet imperfectionis sit limitari ad unam subsistentiam sive ad unum esse perfectissimum quod nullo modo est determinabile nec contrahibile, nec potest esse aliquid alicuius, tamen quod natura ipsa possit habere ultimum esse, secundum quod non est natum contrahi aliquo alio, hoc non est alicuius imperfectionis, quia hoc conceditur substantiis et negatur accidentibus propter eorum imperfectionem; ergo videtur quod natura divina 'ut est ad se' habebit ex se ultimum esse actuale et ultimam unitatem absque limitatione ad unicum esse subsistentiae.	63. And this is ultimately confirmed efficaciously, as it seems, by the fact that in created substance, although it is a mark of imperfection to be limited to one subsistence or to one most perfect existence, which is in no way determinable or contractible and which cannot be anything of something else, yet the fact that nature itself can have ultimate existence, because of its being of a nature to be contracted by something else, this is not a mark of any imperfection, because this is conceded to substances and denied, because of their imperfection, to accidents; therefore it seems that divine nature ‘as it is for itself’ will have of itself ultimate actual existence and ultimate unity without limitation to a single being of subsistence.
64 Et tunc posset poni exemplum, quod sicut si anima intellectiva primo perficeret vel constitueret cor in esse suppositi et secundo cor animatum posset producere manum in esse suppositi, non essent aliqua distincta in natura animati nisi per origines, et tamen ƿformaliter essent aliqua absoluta, quorum unum producitur per alterum; in ipsis tamen vere essent relationes producentis et producti: non enim minus salvantur relationes - sed magis, ut videtur - ponendo aliqua absoluta quae possent referri, quam si non ponantur aliqua talia absoluta.	64. Then too one can set down an example, because just as if the intellective soul were first to perfect or constitute the heart in the being of supposit and just as if the animated heart were able, second, to produce the hand in the being of supposit, there would not be anything distinct in the nature of the animated whole save by their origins, and yet formally they would be certain absolute things one of which is produced by another; yet in them there would truly be relations of producer and produced; for relations are not less preserved – on the contrary they are more preserved, it seems – if one posits certain absolutes that can be related, than if any such absolute things are not posited.
65 Respondetur ad illa quae hic tacta sunt de prima substantia, quod relatio habet vim constituendi hic primam substantiam vel suppositum secundae substantiae. Quod confirmatur per hoc, quia quae sparsa sunt in inferioribus, unita sunt in superioribus, et ideo licet alio conveniant alicui in creaturis 'esse ad' et subsistere, tamen ista possunt eodem competere Deo vel personis divinis.	65. Response is made to what has been touched on here about primary substance [namely that relation cannot constitute it, n.60] that relation has here the force of constituting a primary substance or a supposit of secondary substance. The fact is confirmed by this, that what is scattered about in lower things is united in higher things, and that therefore, although ‘to exist toward’ and to subsist belong to a thing in the case of creatures through something different, yet they can both belong to God or to the divine persons through something the same.
66 Contra istud arguitur sic: quaero quam vim intelligis, aut vim causae efficientis aut formalis ? Si efficientis, quasi causabit ibi quamdam realitatem absolutam, quae formaliter constituet ibi primam substantiam, - et ita conceditur propositum, quod prima substantia constituitur aliqua realitate absoluta; et cum hoc, additur unum aliud impossibile, quod relatio possit causare illam personam absolutam. Si secundo modo, scilicet formaliter, cum nulla forma habeat vim constituendi aliquid formaliter nisi tale quale natum est esse aliquid tali forma (sicut albedo non habet vim conƿstituendi aliquid nisi album et quae includuntur in albo), sequitur quod relatio - quae est essentialiter habitudo 'ad aliud' - non habet vim constituendi aliquid 'ad se'. Confirmatio illa nihil videtur valere: ideo enim fit talis unio in Deo, propter infinitatem essentiae divinae, quae in se unitive includit omnem perfectionem simpliciter et etiam omnem realitatem sibi compossibilem; proprietas autem non est infinita formaliter, ergo non oportet in ea uniri omnem realitatem (et maxime non illam quae videtur sibi formaliter repugnare aut non posse in ea includi), quasi maiorem perfectionem diceret formaliter quam ista, vel non minorem.	66. Against this an argument is made as follows: I ask what force you mean, whether the force of an efficient or of a formal cause? If of an efficient cause, it will as it were cause there a certain absolute reality that will formally constitute there a primary substance, – and thus the point at issue is conceded, namely that primary substance is constituted by some absolute reality; and, along with this, there is added one other impossibility, that relation could cause that absolute person. If in the second way, namely formally, since no form has the force of constituting anything formally save such a thing as is of a nature to be something by such form (as whiteness does not have the force of constituting anything save what is white and what is included in white), the consequence is that relation – which is essentially a disposition ‘toward another’ – does not have the force of constituting anything ‘in itself’. The confirmation [n.65] seems to have no validity: because it is for this reason that such union is brought about in God, namely because of the infinity of the divine essence, which includes unitively in itself every perfection simply and also every reality compossible with itself; but a property is not infinite formally, and so there is no need for every reality to be united in it (and especially not that reality which seems to be formally repugnant to it or unable to be included in it), as if it were stating a greater perfection formally, or not a lesser perfection, than the essence does.

II What one should think about the third opinion

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67 Et si obiciatur contra istam viam quod ipsa non possit stare cum fide, quia Salvator exprimens totam veritatem fidei nominavit tres personas (Matth. ultimo) Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, et beatus Ioannes in canonica sua prima cap. 5, tres sunt, inquit, qui testimonium dant in caelo: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus, - et sancti tractantes de ista materia, postea, fundantes se in istis verbis canonis, videntur semper expresse dicere quod personae non distinguuntur formaliter nisi per relationes, sicut fuit argutum pro opinione secunda:	67. And if it be objected against this way [sc. the third] that it cannot stand along with the faith, because the Savior, when expressing the whole truth of the faith, named the three persons (Matthew 28.19) Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and blessed John in his first canonical letter 5.7 says ‘there are three who give testimony in heaven: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit’, – and the saints, when later treating of this matter, base themselves on these words of the canon [of Scripture] and seem always expressly to say that the persons are not distinguished formally save by relations, as was argued for the second opinion [nn.18-22]:
68 Hic posset dici quod Salvator vere docuit tres personas, et eas esse relativas istis relationibus, et personam accipere essentiam a persona, - et hoc quidem non negat ista opinio; non sequitur tamen 'Salvator non dixit personas divinas constitui per aliquid absolutum, ergo non constituuntur sic' (locus enim ab auctoritate non tenet negative), sicut non sequitur 'loquor cum episcopo et officiali et archidiacono, ergo isti distinguuntur in esse personali per istas relationes'. Et forte Salvator videns nos non posse concipere realitates proprias absolutas quibus constituuntur formaliter personae divinae in esse personali, si quae sint, voluit eas nobis ƿexprimere nominibus nobis intelligibilioribus; possumus enim aliquo modo istas relationes originis concipere ex relationibus originis in creaturis. Et forte posset assignari alia ratio, quia hic plus de veritate fidei simul exprimitur quam alio modo: Si enim sint personae absolutae et proprietatibus absolutis constitutae (a, b, c), et possent nominari nominibus, - si illa expressisset Salvator, praecise in hoc expressisset distinctionem personarum et non originem personae a persona; exprimendo autem personas istas nominibus relativis, istis utrumque expressit, scilicet distinctionem et originem.	68. One could here say that the Savior taught three persons and that they are relatives by these relations, and that a person receives essence from a person – and this indeed is not denied by the present opinion [n.56]; yet the inference does not follow that ‘the Savior did not say that the divine persons were constituted by anything absolute, therefore they are not so constituted’ (for the place taken from the authority does not hold negatively), just as the inference does not hold, ‘I speak with the bishop and the official and the archdeacon, therefore these are distinguished in their personal being by these relations’. And perhaps the Savior, seeing that we cannot conceive the proper absolute realities, if there are any, by which the divine persons are formally constituted in their personal being, wanted to express them to us by names more intelligible to us; for we can in some way conceive those relations of origin from relations of origin in creatures. And perhaps another reason could be assigned, that in this way [sc. through relations of origin] more of the faith is expressed at once than in the other way [sc. through absolutes]; for if the persons are absolute and are constituted by absolute properties (a, b, c) and can be named by their names – if the Savior had expressed them [sc. absolute names], he would precisely thereby have expressed the distinction of the persons and not the origin of person from person; yet, by expressing the persons with relative names, he expressed both facts by them, namely distinction and origin.
69 Quod autem possint divinae personae aliquibus nominibus absolutis nominari et exprimi, videtur posse monstrari per Scripturam, - sicut Prov. 30, ubi (post multas quaestiones motas de Deo) quaerit Salomon: Quod nomen eius, et quod nomen Filii eius, si nosti? - Si primum nomen Filii eius est 'Filius' (quod oportet, si constituatur in esse per filiationem), illa quaestio videtur nulla esse, quia omnis quaestio aliquid certum supponit et aliquid dubium quaerit (ex VII Metaphysicae, ultimo). Illa ergo nulla esset, quia idem supponeret et quaereret: supponit enim ipsum esse Filium et quaerit quod est nomen eius, - et consimiliter per naturam relationis supponit 'illud cuius est relativum' esse Patrem et quaerit illud nomen. Posset sibi responderi: tu quaeris nomen Patris et nomen Filii, et tu dicis nomina prima eorum!	69. But that the divine persons could be named and expressed by some absolute names seems able to be shown by Scripture, – as in Proverbs 30.4 where Solomon (after the many questions he moves about God) asks: “What is his name and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – If the first name of ‘his Son’ is ‘Son’ (which it should be, if he is constituted in being by filiation), this question seems to be empty, because every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from Metaphysics 7.17.1041a10-16). The question then would be empty, because it would suppose and ask about the same thing; for it supposes that he is Son and asks ‘what is his name’, – and likewise it supposes, through the nature of relation, that ‘that of which he is relative’ is the Father and asks about the name. One could reply to Solomon: you are asking about the name of the Father and of the Son, and you state their first names!
70 Videtur ergo posse dici quod si Scriptura Nova expresse velit istas esse personas relativas, et hoc sit de substantia fidei, tamen non invenitur expressum quod relationes sint primae formae, constituentes et distinguentes primo personas, - nec hoc declaravit Ecclesia. Neque in Symbolo apostolorum, neque in Symbolo Nicaeno, neque in concilio generali sub Innocentio III hoc declaratur (quoad istum articulum 'De Trinitate', ponitur Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica', ((Firmiter))); neque in concilio Lugdunensi ƿgenerali sub Gregorio X (quod, quoad istam materiam 'De Trinitate', ponitur Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica', ((Fideli)), et est hodie in sexto libro Decretalium), neque in aliquo alio concilio, quod adhuc manifeste videatur traditum in Scriptura aliqua authentica.	70. Therefore it seems one could say that if the New Scripture [Testament] expressly intends them to be relative persons, and that this is of the substance of the faith, yet nothing express is found that the relations are the first forms, constituting and distinguishing the persons first, – nor has the Church declared this. Neither in the Apostles’ Creed nor in the Nicene Creed nor in the General Council under Innocent III is this declared (as to the article ‘On the Trinity’, an ‘Extra’ is set down, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly”); nor in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X (which, as to the matter ‘On the Trinity’, is set down an ‘Extra’, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly”, and it is today in the sixth book of the Decretals), nor in any other Council is what may hitherto seem manifestly handed down in any authentic Scripture made clear.
71 Si ergo hoc Christus non docuit nec Ecclesia declaravit, scilicet personas relationibus primo distingui, non videtur tunc asserere hoc esse fidei, quia si istud non est verum, non videtur esse reverenter dictum de personis divinis quod non sint nisi 'relationes subsistentes'; Si tamen est verum, non tamen traditum est sicut verum certum, non videtur tutum esse asserere hoc tamquam verum certum tenendum. Et licet verum sit personas distingui relationibus (et stando in hoc generali, sancti laboraverunt qualiter possit stare distinctio personarum cum unitate essentiae), tamen non oportet negare quin aliqua distinctio quasi prior possit poni, quae etiam concedet istam distinctionem, - ita quod omnis via tenet istam affirmativam veram, quod scilicet personae divinae relationibus distinguuntur, licet aliqua via diceret quod istam distinctionem quasi praecederet aliqua distinctio realis. Nec oportet restringere articulum fidei traditum in generali, ad unum intellectum specialem, quasi non possit ille intellectus generalis esse verus nisi in isto speciali: et sicut istum articulum, quod 'Verbum Dei factum est homo', non oportet restringere ad unum modum determinatum (qui non est expressus in canone nec ab Ecclesia), ita quod non possit esse verus nisi ille modus esset verus; hoc enim est reducere articulum fidei ad incertitudinem, si aliquid sit incertum quod non est traditum sicut articulus fidei (videtur enim incertum quod non potest sine aliquo incerto teneri).	71. If therefore Christ did not teach this nor has the Church declared it, namely that the persons are first distinguished by relations, neither Christ nor the Church then seem to assert that this is of the faith, because, if is not true [sc. that the persons are distinguished first by relations], it is not reverently said of the divine persons that they are only ‘subsistent relations’ [Henry of Ghent]; if however it is true, yet it is not handed down as a certain truth, it does not seem safe to assert that this is to be held as a certain truth. And although it be true that the persons are distinguished by relations (and it is while holding to this in general that the saints have labored on how a distinction of persons can stand with unity of essence), yet one should not deny that any other distinction, which will also concede this distinction, may be posited as prior, – such that every way holds this affirmative to be true, namely that the divine persons are distinguished by relations, although some way says that this distinction is as it were preceded by some real distinction. Nor should one restrict an article of faith handed down in general to one particular meaning, as if the general meaning could not be true save in the particular one; and just as one should not restrict this article, that ‘the Word of God was made man’, to one determinate mode (which is not expressed in the canonical Scripture or by the Church), such that it could not be true unless that mode were true; for this is to reduce an article of faith to incertitude, if anything is uncertain that has not been handed down as an article of faith (for what cannot be held without some uncertainty seems to be uncertain).
72 Si ista positio teneretur, diceretur quod ista realitas absoluta - constituens personam et distinguens eam - non esset realitas ad se sicut essentialia sunt ad se, sed realitas personalis et ad se secundo modo, secundum distinctionem illius magistri positam in principio opinionis. ƿ	72. If this position [n.56] be held, one should say that this absolute reality – constituting and distinguishing the person – would not be a reality for itself as the essentials are for themselves, but a reality that is personal and for itself in the second way [n.59], according to the distinction of that master which was set down at the beginning of the opinion [n.57].

III To the arguments for the second opinion when holding the third opinion

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73 Qui teneret hanc opinionem, posset respondere ad argumenta Augustini omnia pro opinione praeposita, huic contraria, per illam distinctionem illius doctoris, - quia ƿloquitur de his quae sunt ad se simpliciter, ita quod nec sunt relata nec referibilia, sed sunt opposita relationi, sicut patet per exempla sua ibi. Videtur enim ipsemet dicere ibi quod aliquid ƿest ad se licet sit referibile ad aliud, sicut expresse vult VII De Trinitate cap. 8, ubi tractans quomodo graeci dicunt tres esse substantias, vult quod subsistere - secundum quod competit substantiae ƿillo modo - sit ad se. Subdit enim ibi: ((Si aliud est Deo esse et aliud subsistere, sicut aliud est Deum esse et aliud Patrem esse, relative ergo subsistit, sicut relative gignit)); et ex hoc infert: ƿ((Itaque substantia iam non erit substantia, quia relativum)); et infra: ((Absurdum est autem ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim substantia ad se subsistit, quanto magis Deus))? - Quid expressius quam quod substantia, sicut graeci accipiunt eam (scilicet pro persona), sit substantia prima et non secunda, sit ad se et ad se subsistat, illo 'subsistere' quod competit substantiae sic dictae?	73. [To the authorities] – Someone who held this opinion [n.56] could respond to all the arguments of Augustine for the opinion put before [n.15], contrary to this opinion, through the distinction of the aforesaid doctor [n.57] – because he [Augustine] is speaking of things that are for themselves simply, such that they are neither related nor relatable, but are opposite to relation, as is plain from his examples there [On the Trinity V]. For he himself seems to say there that something is for itself although it is relatable to another, as is expressly intended by On the Trinity VII ch.4 nn.8-9 where, when treating of how the Greeks say that there are three substances, he means that to subsist – in the respect it belongs to substance in the way the Greeks say substance – is for itself. For he subjoins there: “If it is one thing for God to exist and another for him to subsist, just as it is one thing for him to be God and another to be Father, then he subsists relatively, just as he generates relatively;” and from this he infers: “therefore substance will not now be substance, because it will be a relative;” and later: “But it is absurd that substance be said relatively; for every substance subsists for itself, how much more God?” – What is more express than that substance, as the Greeks take it (namely for the person), is primary substance and not secondary substance, and exists for itself and subsists for itself, with the ‘to subsist’ which belongs to substance as so meant?
74 Et si obiciatur quod illa verba Augustini 'de substantia et de persona' non debent magis accipi de personali quam de essentiali, ƿquia dicit quod ' eodem est Deus et persona', - responsio: 'eodem', id est aliquo dicto ad se, distinguendo illud quod est 'ad se' contra illud quod est 'ad aliud', quia Pater non est persona Filii, sicut nec est Deus Filii, - quemadmodum Socrates non est Socrates alicuius, sicut nec est homo alicuius, intelligendo ut correlativi. Sed non oportet quod 'omnino eodem' sit Deus et persona, ita quod persona omnino ad se dicatur sicut Deus dicitur ad se, vel deitas, quia tunc sicut non sunt tres deitates et per hoc nec tres magnitudines, secundum eum (quia magnitudo omnino dicitur ad se sicut deitas), sic nec essent tres personae, quod ipse negat. Quae ergo omnino sunt ad se, non numerantur,- quae omnino ad alterum, non sunt communia tribus; quae autem ad se, sed non omnino ad se sed referibilia (quia non repugnat eis referri), sunt communia (sed numerantur), aut possunt dici propria, a quibus potest abstrahi aliquid commune numeratum.	74. And if it be objected that the words of Augustine ‘about substance and person’ [n.73] should not be more taken of the personal than of the essential, because he says that ‘God and person exist by the same thing’, – response: ‘by the same thing’, that is, by something said ‘in relation to another’, because the Father is not the person of the Son, just as neither is he the God of the Son, – the way that Socrates is not Socrates of anyone, just as neither is man of someone, understanding this as man of his correlative. But there is no need that he be God and person ‘by something altogether the same’, such that person be said to exist altogether to itself the way God, or deity, is said to exist to itself, because then, just as there are not three deities and thereby not three magnitudes either, according to Augustine (because magnitude, like deity, is said to exist altogether to itself), so neither would there be three persons, which he himself denies. Things then that exist altogether to themselves are not separately counted, – things that exist altogether to another are not common to the three persons; but things that exist to themselves though not altogether to themselves but are relatable (because it is not repugnant for them to be related) are common (but counted up), or can be said to be proper things from which some common and counted thing can be abstracted.
75 Ad Augustinum XI De civitate Dei, concedo quod est 'quidquid habet', excepto relativo quod habet et non est ipsum; habet quidem correlativum, sicut Pater habet Filium ut Filium. Et ideo concedo quod prima persona est 'quidquid habet' ad quod non refertur: non est autem secunda persona, quam habet ut correlativam, licet illa relatione non primo constitueretur.	75. As to Augustine On the City of God XI [n.19], I concede that ‘God is whatever he has’ save for the relative he has which is not him; he does indeed have a correlative, as the Father has the Son as Son. And therefore I concede that the first person is ‘whatever he has’ to which he is not related; but he is not the second person, which he has as correlative person, although he is not first constituted by that relation.
76 Ad Boethium, quando dicit quod ((relatio multiplicat trinitatem)) etc., dico quod doctor ille accipit relationem pro origine, et sic intelligendo accipitur 'multiplicare' non pro formaliter distinguere, sed quasi principiative, correspondenter principio effectivo; et hoc quidem non est extorquere verba: 'multiplicare' enim est multa facere, sicut Christus vere multiplicavit panes evangelicos et tamen ipse non fuit forma illa qua formaliter multipliƿcabantur illi panes, - et Deus creans multiplicat animas, non tamen est ipse forma qua formaliter animae distinguuntur.	76. As to Boethius, when he says that ‘relation multiplies the trinity etc.’ [n.17], I say that that doctor takes relation for origin, and, understanding it in this way, ‘to multiply’ is taken, not as to distinguish formally, but by way of principle as it were, correspondingly to effective principle [n.58]; and this indeed is not to twist the words; for ‘to multiply’ means to make many, as Christ truly multiplied the Gospel loaves (Matthew 14.13-21, 15.29-39), and yet he was not the form by which those loaves were formally multiplied, – and God by creating multiplies souls is yet not himself the form by which souls are formally distinguished.
77 Ad Ioannem Damascenum dico quod una auctoritas eius solvit aliam, quia cap. 8 praecise ponit ingenerationem et cap. 51 ponit paternalem proprietatem; istae autem duae proprietates sunt distinctae, secundum Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 6; ergo excludendo omnia alia in Patre - in cap. 8 - praeter ingenerationem, intelligit per ingenerationem esse personale Patris. Et ubicumque excludit ab aliqua proprietate alicuius suppositi omne aliud, per illam proprietatem inclusam includit omne aliud personale, et ita includeretur illa realitas absoluta, si qua esset: et maxime includeretur, ut videtur, quia in creaturis incluso accidente non excluditur subiectum, et ita inclusa relatione in persona divina non excluditur illud quod refertur ea, - sicut si diceretur quod sola paternitas est, non per hoc excluderetur Pater, qui paternitate est Pater.	77. As to John Damascene [nn.21-22], I say that one of his authorities solves the other, because precisely in ch.8 he posits [sc. in the Father] non-generation and in ch.52 he posits paternal property; but these two properties are distinct, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7; therefore by excluding everything else that is in Father – in ch.8 – besides non-generation, he understands by non-generation the personal being of the Father. And wherever he excludes all other things from some property of some supposit, through the property that is included he includes every other personal aspect, and so the absolute reality, if there is any, would be so included; and it is included most of all, as it seems, because when, in the case of creatures, an accident is included, the subject is not excluded, and so when relation is included in a divine person that which is related by it is not excluded, – just as, if it be said only paternity exists, the Father who by paternity is Father would not thereby be excluded.
78 Ad Richardum dico: quod modus exsistentiae alius est, hoc pertinet ad originem, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod originatum non sit aliquid subsistens ad se, distinctum aliqua realitate personali absoluta ab originante.	78. To Richard [n.23] I say: the fact that the mode of existence is different does pertain to origin, but it does not follow from this that the originated is not something subsistent to itself, distinct from the originating by some absolute personal reality.
79 Ad Anselmum similiter dico quod 'omnia sunt unum et eadem ubi non obviat relationis oppositio ' vel formaliter (sicut relatio obviat relationi) vel sicut natum referri relatione opposita: isto modo personae - si essent absolutae - distinguerentur, quia in eis sunt relationes principiantes.	79. To Anselm [n.20] I likewise say that ‘all things are one and the same where the opposition of relation does not prevent it’ either formally (as relation prevents relation) or as of a nature to be related by the opposite relation: this is the way the persons – if they were absolute – would be distinguished, because in them there are relations by way of principles.
80 Ad rationes pro secunda opinione. Ad primam dici potest quod si realitas aliqua absoluta constituat personas, non tamen faciet compositionem cum essentia divina, sicut nec relatio constituens faceret: quod confirmatur per locum 'a maiore', quia realitas propria subsistentiae in creatura non facit compositionem cum essentia, relatio autem in creatuƿris facit compositionem cum fundamento, ut alias declarabitur, ergo si hic relatio potest non facere compositionem cum essentia, multo magis nec realitas suppositi faciet compositionem cum realitate naturae.	80. [To the arguments] – To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.24-27]. To the first [n.24] one can say that if any absolute reality constitutes the persons, yet it will not make a composite with the divine essence, just as neither would the constituting relation do so; the fact is confirmed by the argumentative place ‘from the greater’, because a reality proper to subsistence in a creature does not make a composite with the essence, but relation in creatures makes a composite with the foundation, as will be explained elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6, nn.9, 11-12,15-16; d.1 q.4 nn.5-6, 26]; therefore if here [sc. in God] relation cannot make a composite with the essence, much more will the reality of a supposit also not make a composite with the reality of nature.
81 Et cum confirmatur ratio, quod absolutum 'aut omnino manet aut omnino transit', dico: sicut dictum est declarando secundam positionem, quod 'relatio manet ex hoc quod eius ratio non est formaliter ratio essentiae, et transit quia secundum perfectam identitatem est essentia', ita dici potest quod realitas absoluta si constituat personam - transit quidem propter perfectam identitatem ad essentiam, manet tamen quia non est formaliter realitas essentiae. Et confirmatur ista responsio, quia perfectiones attributales videntur esse absolutae et non relativae (sicut dictum est distinctione 8, quaestione 'De attributis'), et tamen et manent et transeunt, ita quod non faciunt compositionem nec sunt idem formaliter ipsi essentiae; et si aliqua illarum secundum rationem formalem haberet distingui realiter ab altera, illa distinctio esset per eam formaliter et non per essentiam, et tamen non esset compositio.	81. And when the reason is confirmed because the absolute ‘either altogether remains or altogether passes over’ [n.25], I say: as was said in making clear the second opinion, namely that ‘relation remains by the fact that its idea is not formally the idea of essence, and it passes over because it is essence according to perfect identity’, so can it be said that absolute reality – if it constitute the person – does indeed pass over to the essence because of perfect identity, but it remains because it is not formally the reality of the essence. And there is a confirmation for this reason, that the attributal perfections seem to be absolute and not relative (as was said in distinction 8, in the question ‘About the attributes’ [d.8 nn. 185, 209, 215-217, 220, 222]), and yet they both remain and pass over, such that they do not make a composite with the essence nor are they formally the same as the essence; and if any of them would, according to their formal reason, have to be distinguished really from another, the distinction would be formally through that formal reason and not through the essence, and yet there would be no composition.
82 Ad secundum argumentum dico quod ponendo personas relativas, oportet ponere eas vere subsistentes et in eis esse eandem naturam non divisam; hoc non potest poni propter aliquam imperfectionem personarum in subsistendo, quia ponuntur ita vere subsistentes sicut si essent absolutae; ergo oportet quod ponatur propter infinitatem essentiae quae est in subsistentibus: sed eadem esset infinitas essentiae si personae essent absolutae, - ergo non oportet tunc naturam dividi, sicut nec nunc proprietas. Probetur igitur ista 'omnis natura, communis suppositis absolutis, distinguitur in eis'! Haec quidem vera est in creaturis, sed in proposito petit conclusionem principalem.	82. To the second argument [n.26] I say that when positing relative persons one must posit them as truly subsistent and that in them there is the same undivided nature; one cannot do this because of any imperfection of the persons in subsisting, because they are posited as being as truly subsistent as they would be if they were absolute; therefore one must posit them because of the infinity of the essence that is in the subsistents; but there would be the same infinity of essence if the persons were absolute, – so the nature should not in that case be divided just as neither does the property now divide it. Let this then be proved, ‘every nature, common to absolute supposits, is distinct in those supposits’! [n.26]. This is indeed true in the case of creatures, but in the issue at hand it begs the principal conclusion.
83 Ad tertium instando dicitur quod Patri constituto in esse personali, et Filio etiam constituto in esse personali, quasi est adventicia proprietas spiratio activa - secundum aliquos - et tamen ƿnon est quasi accidentalis secundum eos, nec etiam relatio rationis. Quare ergo non posset ita intelligi in proposito, personam constitui realitate absoluta et ei - quasi constituto in tali realitate advenire secundum modum intelligendi relationem, et tamen non esse nec accidentalem nec rationis? Et cum probatur quod sit relatio rationis, per simile de relatione ad creaturam, dico quod non est simile; illa enim relatio ad creaturam non est ex necessitate naturae fundamenti, sicut est hic. ƿ	83. To the third [n.27] reply is made by instancing that to the Father when constituted in his personal existence, and to the Son too when constituted in his personal existence, active inspiriting is at it were an adventitious property – according to some people – and yet it is not quasi accidental according to them, nor is it even a relation of reason. Why then could it not be thus understood in the issue at hand, that the person is constituted by an absolute reality and that to the person – as constituted in such reality – the relation, according to mode of understanding, is adventitious and yet is neither accidental nor a thing of reason? And when the proof that it is a relation of reason is given through similarity with relation to creatures [n.27], I say that it is not similar; for the relation to creatures does not arise from any necessity in the nature of the foundation, the way it does arise here [sc. in God].

IV To the reasons against the second opinion when holding the second opinion

Latin	English
84 Cui non placet ista opinio (quae tamen non videtur contradicere fidei, sicut tactum est declarando eam), si placet opinio seƿcunda magis (quae communis est), potest responderi ad rationes contra secundam opinionem: ƿAd primam respondetur negando illam propositionem 'omnis relatio praesupponit illud quod refertur'; haec enim propositio ƿfalsa est in relatione constituente suppositum, et vera est in aliis. ƿCum probatur per hoc quod 'relatio non refertur, sed aliquid, quod ƿnon est tantum relatio, refertur relatione', et cum dicitur ulterius 'illud relatum esse prius relatione' - negatur.	84. For someone who does not like this opinion (which, however, does not seem to contradict the faith, as was touched on when explaining it [nn.56, 68-71]), if he likes the second opinion more (which is the common one [n.15]), one can reply to the reasons against [nn.33-55] this second opinion: To the first [n.33] the response is by denial of the proposition ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and is true in the case of other ones. When it is proved by the fact that ‘a relation is not related, but something which is not merely relation is related by relation’, and when it is further said that ‘what is related is prior to relation’ [n.33], – it is denied.
85 Ad illam propositionem quae dicit quod 'omni composito oportet prius intelligere partes et unionem partium', tenentes quod relatio est in essentia quasi actus in susceptivo, oporteret quod dicerent quod in ipsa persona - quae est quasi tota - non oporteret praeintelligi informationem quasi partis a quasi parte antequam intelligatur totum, sed, si praeintelligatur quasi talis informatio, non tamen quasi per modum formae denominantis. Sed tenendo opinionem secundam, melius videtur dicendum quod relatio non est quasi forma vel actus respectu essentiae (sicut tactum est distinctione 5), sed magis essentia videtur esse quasi forma et actus, qua relatio subsistens est Deus. Et hoc videtur probari ex hoc quod quandocumque fundamentum est potentiale ad relationem, prius naturaliter informatur fundamentum relatione quam suppositum; conceditur etiam - ex hoc - ibi relatum 'esse ad' formaliter ipso fundamento sive secundum ipsum fundamentum, sicut conceditur Socratem esse album albedine sive secundum albedinem. Neutrum videtur dandum in proposito: nec quod paternitas prius insit essentiae quam Patri, - nec quod Pater deiƿtate sive secundum deitatem sit Pater formaliter, quia hoc videtur secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 4: 'alio est Pater, alio est Deus'; sed est Deus deitate formaliter, - non igitur est Pater deitate formaliter, sed alio, secundum Augustinum .	85.To the proposition that says ‘one must understand the parts and the union of the parts prior to any composite’ [n.34], if they hold that relation is not in the essence as an act in what receives act, they should say that in the person itself – which is a quasiwhole – one should not pre-understand an in-forming of a quasi-part by a quasi-part before the whole is understood, but one should if such a quasi-informing is preunderstood, though as by way of a denominating form. But when one holds the second opinion [n.15], it seems one should better say that relation is not a quasi-form or an act with respect to the essence (as was touched on in distinction 5 [d.5 nn.113,131, 137-138]), but rather the essence seems to be a quasi-form and quasi-act, whereby a subsistent relation is God. And this seems proved by the fact that whenever a foundation is potential to a relation, the foundation is in-formed by the relation before the supposit is; conceded too – as a result of this – is that in that case [sc. when the foundation is potential to a relation] the related thing is formally ‘being to’ by the foundation itself or in accord with the foundation itself, just as Socrates is conceded to be white by whiteness or in accord with whiteness. Neither seems it should be granted in the issue at hand: neither that paternity exists in the essence before in the Father, – nor that the Father by deity or in accord with deity is the Father formally, because this seems to accord with Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: ‘he is Father by one thing, he is God by another’; but he is God by deity formally – he is not therefore Father by deity formally, but by something else, according to Augustine.
86 Ideo aliter dici potest (tenendo secundam opinionem) quod etsi partes praeexigantur toti et unio partium, et quasi partes praeexigantur quasi toti et unio quasi partium, tamen ubi non est partialitas sed perfecta identitas eorum quae alias essent partes nisi alterum eorum esset infinitum, non oportet praeintelligi toti unionem talium, sed perfectam identitatem unius ad alterum. Et ita videtur in proposito, quod Patri - qui dicitur primo referri - praeintelligitur aliquo modo perfecta identitas relationis ad essentiam, sed non unio quasi formae, alicui quasi materiae vel quasi potentiali; nec talis perfecta identitas est ratio quod essentia formaliter denominatur a relatione.	86. Therefore one can speak differently (when holding the second opinion) that, although the parts and the union of the parts are pre-required for the whole, and quasiparts and the union of quasi-parts are pre-required for the quasi-whole, yet, where there is no partial-ness but perfect identity of the things that would otherwise be parts unless one or other of them were infinite, the union of such should not be pre-understood to the whole but rather the perfect identity of one thing with another should be pre-understood. And so it seems to be in the issue at hand, that to the Father – which is said to be first related – there is in some way pre-understood a perfect identity of the relation with the essence, but not the union of a quasi-form to some quasi-matter or quasi-potential; nor is such perfect identity a reason that the essence is formally denominated by the relation.
87 Si autem confirmetur ratio per hoc quod 'nihil est quantum primo et per se, nisi aliquid sit quantum per se et non primo, sed denominative', dico quod si quantitas possit esse eadem alicui quod alias esset susceptivum eius, et ita eadem quod non informaret illud, bene posset esse aliquod quantum primo et tamen nihil quantum per informationem (nec hoc videtur mirabile, quia 'primum' videtur posse separari ab eo quod est 'per se sed non primum'); ergo ita potest aliquid poni primo relatum, licet nihil sit relatum 'non primo sed per se', quasi informatum relatione. ƿ	87. But if the reason [n.34] be confirmed by the fact that ‘nothing is a quantity first and per se unless something is a quantity per se and not first but denominatively’ [cf. n.35, to which note however this confirmation does not entirely correspond], I say that if a quantity could be the same as something which would otherwise be susceptive of it, and the same could be such that it did not in-form it, then something could well be a quantity first and yet nothing would be a quantity by in-forming (nor does this seem remarkable, because the ‘first’ seems to be separated from that which is ‘per se and not first’); therefore in this way something can be posited as related first although nothing is related ‘not first but per se’, as if informed by the relation.
88 Ad secundum dico quod sicut quaelibet forma se ipsa est talis forma, nec est alia ratio intrinseca quare est talis forma, ita etiam relatio aliqua se ipsa est formaliter realis et aliqua relatio se ipsa formaliter est tantum rationis; tamen huius vel illius aliquando sunt causae extrinsecae effectivae vel materiales, aliquando etiam aliqua causata vel aliqua signa posteriora sunt ex quibus possunt haec inferri demonstratione 'quia'. Dico tunc quod identitas, quia identitas, est relatio rationis, nec est alia ratio formalis 'propter quid', - paternitas, quia paternitas, est relatio realis, nec est alia ratio formalis 'propter quid'. Tamen quia relatio realis nata est habere causas extrinsecas causantes eam, communiter loquendo in creaturis, sequitur ibi quod relatio quae non habet tales causas, non est realis, sicut ad destructionem causae sequitur destructio causati; similiter, relatio aliqua realis, si non habet talem distinctionem causarum priorem, saltem causat distinctionem. Et tunc ex remotione tam causae quam causati (quorum alterum correspondet relationi reali) potest concludi aliquam relationem non esse realem, ita quod sequetur 'haec relatio non praeexigit extrema distincta, nec facit ea esse distincta, ergo non est relatio realis', et unde praemissae sint verae, oportet quaerere media probantia; sed consequentia est bona, sicut ex destructione causae sequitur destructio causati et ex remotione causati sequitur remotio causae de eo, quia saltem alterum istorum oportet concurrere ad relationem realem, ita quod ubicumque utrumque removetur, sequitur - consequentia per extrinseca - remotio relationis realis. Cum dicitur ((ergo inferre 'relationem non esse realem, quia non est inter distincta', est inferre 'non est realis, quia non est realis')), ƿdico quod non, quia licet ideo non distinguat extrema 'quia non est realis', quia argumentando a causa ad causatum, - tamen sequitur 'non distinguit, ergo non est realis', sicut a causato ad causam (et hoc, addito isto 'quod non praeexigit distincta'), quia tunc concurrunt ibi et negatio causae relationis realis et negatio signi, ex quibus concurrentibus perfecte infertur negatio relationis realis. ƿ	88. To the second [nn36-37] I say that, just as any form is per se such a form, nor is there any intrinsic reason why it is such a form, so too some relation by its very self is formally real and some relation is by itself formally only a relation of reason; however sometimes there are extrinsic effective or material causes of the former or the latter, sometimes too there are some caused things or some posterior signs from which the relations mentioned can by inferred by a demonstration-‘that’. I say that identity, because it is identity, is a relation of reason, nor is there any other formal reason ‘because of which’ it is so, – paternity, because it is paternity, is a real relation, nor is there any other formal reason ‘because of which’ it is so. Yet because a real relation is of a nature to have extrinsic causes causing it, then, speaking generally in the case of creatures, the consequence here is that a relation that does not have such causes is not real, just as on the destruction of the cause there follows the destruction of the caused thing; likewise, some real relation, if it does not have such a prior distinction of causes, does at any rate cause a distinction. And then from the removal of both the cause and the caused (one of which corresponds to the real relation) the conclusion can be drawn that some relation is not real, such that the consequence holds that ‘this relation does not pre-require distinct extremes, nor does it make them to be distinct, therefore it is not a real relation’ [n.37], and then one must look for the middle terms that prove why the premises are true; but the consequence is good, just as from the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused, and from the removal of the caused follows the removal of the cause from it, because at least one of them should concur for a real relation, such that wherever either is removed there results – a consequence through extrinsic facts – the removal of the real relation. When it is said that “therefore to infer ‘the relation is not real because it is not between distinct things’ is to infer ‘it is not real because it is not real’” [n.37] I say no, because although it does not distinguish the extremes for this reason, namely that ‘it is not real’, because it is arguing from cause to caused – yet the consequence ‘it does not distinguish, therefore it is not real’ does follow, as from caused to cause (and this when the clause is added ‘because it does not pre-require distinct things’), because then there concur there both a denial of the cause of the real relation and a denial of the sign, from the concurrence of which the negation of the real relation is perfectly inferred.
89 Ad primum de secunda via dico quod falsa est illa propositio, quod 'relatio non potest esse terminus formalis originis', sicut patebit in materia 'De incarnatione'; et quidquid sit de causa formali, saltem relativum potest esse terminus primus productus, ita quod essentia 'ad se' - in relativo - sit formalis terminus, et hoc modo positum est in distinctione, in productione personae. Cum ergo dicit 'relatio non originatur nisi absolutum originetur', Si intelligas 'originari sicut primus terminus productionis', posset concedi de relatione, non de relativo, - si autem intelligas de 'originari sicut primus terminus formalis', posset simpliciter concedi; et neutro modo est contra propositum, quia nec ponitur relationem primo originari, sed suppositum, - nec ponitur relationem esse terminum formalem productionis, sed essentiam simpliciter absolutam.	89. To the first argument about the second way [n.38] I say that the proposition is false that ‘relation cannot be the formal term of origin’, as will be appear in the material ‘On the Incarnation’ [III d.1 nn.57-61]; and however it be with the formal cause, at least a relative can be the first produced term, such that the essence ‘to itself’ – in the relative – is the formal term, and thus was it posited in distinction 5, in the production of the person [d.5 nn.27-30, 64-71, 97]. When therefore the argument says ‘a relation is originated unless an absolute is originated’ [n.58], if you understand ‘to be originated as the first term of production’, one can concede it about a relation but not about a relative – but if you understand it about ‘to be originated as the first formal term’, then it can simply be conceded; and in neither way is it against the issue at hand, because neither is relation posited as what is first originated, but the supposit is – nor is relation set down as the formal term of production, but an essence simply absolute is.
90 Ad secundum dico quod 'Patrem originare Filium' est Patrem habere Filium pro correlativo (non quocumque, sed tali correlativo, quia talis correlatio est relatio originis), et istud est responsio ad quintum argumentum de ista via (scilicet de supposito quasi praeintellecto origini), et declarabitur distinctione 28.	90. To the second I say that ‘the Father originates the Son’ is for the Father to have the Son for correlative (not for any correlative, but for a correlative of this sort, because such co-relation is a relation of origin), and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about the supposit as if pre-understood to origin), and it will be made clear in distinction 28 nn.93-99, 108-110.a
91 Ad tertium videtur difficile eis respondere qui dicunt personas esse relativas et relationes esse principia agendi, quia tunc nec ex ƿparte agentis nec ex parte principii agendi potest esse libertas; sed licet teneatur opinio secunda quantum ad primum, secundum tamen negavi distinctione 7.	91. As to the third [n.41], it seems difficult to respond to those who say that the persons are relative and that relations are the principles of acting [e.g. Henry of Ghent], because then neither on the part of the agent nor on the part of the principle can there be liberty; but although the second opinion may be held as far as concerns the first, yet I have denied the second in distinction 7 [nn.20-26, 35-42].
92 Ad quartum dicitur quod 'est generatio', quia illa relatio habet vim constituendi substantiam primam in natura divina; et oportet dicere - tenendo istam viam - quod relatio ita potest esse proprietas personalis subsistentis in natura divina sicut si esset aliqua proprietas absoluta.	92. To the fourth [n.42] is said that ‘it is generation’, because this relation has the force of constituting primary substance in the divine nature [n.65]; and one must say – when holding this way – that relation can be the property of a personal subsistent in divine nature just as if it were some absolute property.a
93 Illa argumenta de tertia via videntur difficilia, et tamen solubilia si secunda opinio sit vera. Solvat ea qui scit.	93. The arguments about the third way [nn.45, 51-52] seem difficult, and yet they are soluble if the second opinion [n.15] is true. Let him solve them who knows [cf. Lectura I d.26 n.75].
94 Auctoritates de quarta via possunt aliqualiter exponi, sicut communiter auctoritates trahuntur ad unum sensum vel alterum. ƿ	94. The authorities about the fourth way can be expounded otherwise [sc. in favor of the second opinion], the way authorities are commonly drawn to one sense or another.a

V To the principal arguments

Latin	English
95 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum patet quomodo personae non differunt specie, neque etiam productio personae a persona est aequivoca, - ut tactum est de hoc distinctione 7.	95. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.1] it is plain how persons do not differ in species, nor also is the production of person by person equivocal – as was touched on about this in distinction 7 nn.51-64, 47-50.
96 Ad secundum dicitur (secundum tenentes secundam opinioƿnem) quod relationes communes non primo pullulant in essentia, sed prius pullulant in ea relationes originis. Tamen non videtur hoc posse probari, quia magnitudo magis pertinet ad essentiam ƿut intelligitur abstracta a personis, quam actio vel passio, quae non est nisi suppositi; ergo relationes consequentes magnitudiƿnem- cuiusmodi est relatio aequalitatis - magis possunt intelligi in essentia ut essentia, ut videtur abstracta a persona, quam relationes ƿoriginis. Consimiliter potest argui - in proposito - de similitudine, quae consequitur essentiam ut habet rationem formae, in qua supƿposita assimilantur. Ergo non prius pullulant istae quam illae, vel si prius pullulent, quae ratio ? Quod si relationes communes aeque ƿprimo, vel prius, pullulent, et istae possunt constituere, - ergo constituunt. Non est enim ibi possibilitas ad aliquid quod non est ƿin actu, nec forma aliqua potest constituere personam nisi actu constituat (si illa forma est actu), ut videtur, sicut nec forma aliqua ƿpotest constituere actu aliquid in specie quin ipsa - si sit et non habeat imperfectum esse - constituat aliquid in specie. ƿ	96. To the second [n.2] the response is (according to those who hold the second opinion) that common relations do not first burgeon in the essence, but that relations of origin first burgeon in it [n.28]. However it does not seem that this can be proved, because magnitude more pertains to essence as it is understood in abstraction from the persons than action or passion do, which belong only to a supposit; therefore relations that follow magnitude – of which sort is the relation of equality – can be more understood in the essence as essence, as it seems to be abstracted from person, than relations of origin can be. Similarly one can argue – in the case of the matter at issue – about likeness, which follows the essence as it has the idea of form, in which form the supposits are alike. Therefore the latter do not burgeon first before the former, or if they do burgeon first, what is the reason? But if common relations equally burgeon first or in advance, and these can constitute [sc. persons], – therefore they do constitute them. For there is no possibility there for anything which is not in act, nor can any form constitute a person unless it constitute in act (if the form is in act), as it seems, just as neither is any form able to constitute in act something in a species without – if it exist and not have imperfect existence – constituting something in a species.
97 Ad tertium responsum est distinctione 3, quod quaedam sunt relationes secundi modi incompossibiles in eodem, quae dicunt ordinem essentialem originis, - quaedam autem eiusdem modi non sunt incompossibiles, quia scilicet dicunt ordinem accidentalem, ut movens et motum. Motum enim non dependet a movente nisi per accidens, quo scilicet ad illum actum quem recipit ab eo, scilicet movere,- et ideo licet voluntas possit movere se, nullum tamen idem suppositum potest producere se; et ideo relationes producentis et producti sufficienter distinguunt realiter supposita. ƿ	97. To the third [n.3] response has been given in distinction 3 [nn.519-520], that there are certain relations of the second mode that are incompossible in the same thing, and that these relations state an essential order of origin, – but some relations of the same mode are not incompossible, because namely they state an accidental order, as mover to moved. For the moved does not depend on the mover save per accidens, namely as to the act which it receives from it, namely to move, – and therefore, although the will can move itself, yet no supposit the same can produce itself; and therefore the relations of producer and produced sufficiently distinguish the supposits really.
98 Ad Boethium respondeo quod intelligit de relatione identitatis secundum naturam, non formaliter, quasi dicat quod quaedam relationes necessario exigunt diversitatem naturae in extremis; ista autem relatio - quae est relatio originis - non ita exigit, sed compatitur secum identitatem naturae, et ideo est 'quasi eiusdem ad se' propter identitatem relatorum in natura, licet sit distincti ad distinctum loquendo de distinctione suppositorum.	98. To Boethius [n.4] I reply that he is thinking of a relation of identity according to nature, not formally, as if he were to say that certain relations necessarily require a diversity of nature in the extremes; but the relation in question here – which is a relation of origin – has no such requirement, but identity of nature is compatible with it, and therefore it is a relation ‘quasi of the same thing to itself’ because of the identity in nature of the things related, although it is a relation of a distinct thing to a distinct thing, speaking of the distinction of supposits.

VI To the arguments of the first opinion

Latin	English
99 Ad argumenta pro opinione Praepositini respondeo: Ad primum dico quod verum est quod 'persona est simplex sicut essentia'; persona tamen includit aliqua quorum unum non ƿest formaliter alterum, non ita includit essentia, et ideo se tota distinguitur licet persona non se tota distinguatur, propter essentiam, quae communis est: sufficit enim talis identitas non formalis, in aliquo, ad hoc ut uno distinguatur Filius et non altero.	99. To the arguments for the opinion of Praepositinus [nn.7-8] I reply: To the first [n.7] I say that it is true that ‘person is simple like the essence’; however person includes certain things one of which is not formally the other, the essence not so, and therefore the essence is itself totally distinct although person, because of the essence, which is common, is not itself totally distinct; for such a non formal identity is sufficient in something for the fact that the Son is distinguished by one and not by the other.
100 Ad secundum dico quod concretum - sive significet sive connotet - saltem dat intelligere subsistens in forma vel natura, abstractum autem praecise dat intelligere formam; in proposito autem subsistens, habens paternitatem, cum hoc etiam habet essentiam divinam, quae non est formaliter paternitas, nec e converso (prout dicitur VII De Trinitate cap. 2 et cap. 4), et ideo dicere 'Patrem distingui paternitate', accipiendo Patrem non adiective sed substantive, pro hypostasi (sicut Magister accipit distinctione 27), non est dicere 'Patrem se toto distingui' primo, sed aliquo quod est in eo, dans tamen intelligere totum.	100. To the second [n.8] I say that a concrete – whether it signifies or connotes – at any rate gives to understand a subsistent in form or nature, but an abstract precisely gives to understand form;a but in the matter at issue a subsistent, possessing paternity, has also along with this the divine essence, which essence is not formally paternity, nor conversely (as is said in On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3), and therefore to say ‘the Father is distinguished by paternity’, taking Father not adjectivally but substantively for a hypostasis (as the Master takes it in distinction 27 ch.2 n.238b), is not to say ‘the Father is himself wholly distinct’ first, but by something that is in him, yet giving to understand the whole.c