Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D27/QQ1-3

One: Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection

Latin	English
Quaestio 1	Twenty Seventh Distinction Question One Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam septimam quaero de verbo, et primo de verbo intellectus creati, utrum verbum creatum sit actualis intellectio. Quod non: Augustinus VIII Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 24: ((Phantasia Carthaginis, in memoria mea, hoc verbum eius)) est; phantasia illa sumitur ibi pro specie, non pro actuali imaginatione; ergo eodem modo verbum intellectuale est species intelligibilis et non intellectio actualis.	1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word, and first about the word of a created intellect, whether a created word is actual intellection. That it is not: Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.6 n.9: “the image of Carthage, in my memory, this is its word;” the image there is taken for the species, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same way the intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual intellection.
2 Item, Augustinus XV Trinitatis cap. lla vel 26: ((Verbum, quod foris sonat, signum est eius verbi quod intus lucet)); verbum autem exterius est signum rei et non intellectionis, - alioquin ƿquaelibet affirmativa esset falsa in qua non praedicatur idem de se, quia intellectio subiecti non est intellectio praedicati, licet res sit res; ergo verbum est obiectum et non actualis intellectio.	2. Again, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.11 n.20: “the word that sounds exteriorly is a sign of the word that shines interiorly;” but the external word is a sign of a thing not of an intellection, – otherwise any affirmative proposition in which the same thing is not predicated of itself would be false, because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection of the predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore the word is object and not actual intellection.
3 Praeterea, Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo: 'Verbum est proles et genitum a memoria'; actio autem non gignitur, sed est quo aliud gignitur; ergo verbum est aliquid formatum per actum intelligendi et non ipse actus.	3. Further, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “the word is offspring and thing born from memory;” but action is not born, but is that in which something else is born; therefore the word is something formed by an act of understanding and is not the act itself.
4 Contra: Ibidem vocat Augustinus verbum notitiam: ((Notitia eius, quod est proles eius)); et XV Trinitatis cap. 12 a, et 21: 'Est visio de visione et notitia de notitia'.	4. On the contrary: In the same place Augustine calls the word knowledge: “the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;” and On the Trinity XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: “It is vision from vision and knowledge from knowledge.”

Question Two: Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person

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Quaestio 2
5 Secundo quaero de verbo divino, an verbum in divinis dicat proprium personae genitae. Quod non: Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 25: ((Verbum est cum ƿamore notitia)); haec omnia, posita in definitione verbi, sunt essentialia; ergo et verbum.	5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person. That it does not: Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge along with love;” all these things [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is an essential too.a
6 Praeterea, XV Trinitatis cap. 7 'de magnis' et 22 et 28 'de parvis': 'Sicut Pater intelligit sibi et vult sibi et meminit sibi, ita Filius et Spiritus Sanctus', actus autem proprius intelligentiae ut intelligentia est, est verbum; igitur sicut in Patre est formaliter intelligentia ut intelligentia, ita in eo est verbum ut verbum. Assumptum probatur per hoc, quod illa trinitas quam assignat Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo ('mens, notitia et amor', quae notitia est verbum, secundum ipsum ibidem), et illa ƿassignata secundum eum X Trinitatis 10 ('memoria, intelligentia et voluntas'), correspondent sibi invicem, - prima pars primae parti, et secunda secundae, et tertia tertiae; ergo sicut non est perfecta voluntas sine amore formaliter, nec perfecta mens sine memoria formaliter, ita non est perfecta intelligentia - ut videtur - sine verbo formaliter.	6. Further, On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” but the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there formally exists intelligence as intelligence, so there exists in him word as word. The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to each other in turn, – the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is no perfect intelligence – as it seems – without the word formally.
7 Item, non sunt duo propria unius personae, quia unius constituti in esse est unum formale constitutivum; filiatio est proprietas constitutiva personae genitae (secundum Augustinum De fide ad Petrum cap. 2), non ergo verbum; non enim videntur ista dicere eandem proprietatem, quia non omnis filius est verbum nec omne verbum est filius.	7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is one formal constitutive property for one thing constituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine On the Faith to Peter [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.
8 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4: ((Eo verbum quo Filius)), et utrumque relative dicitur. ƿ	8. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: “He is word by that by which he is Son,” and each of these is said relatively.

Question Three: Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature

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Quaestio 3	Question Three Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature
9 Tertio quaeritur utrum verbum divinum dicat respectum ad creaturam. Quod sic: Augustinus VI Trinitatis cap. ultimo: ((Verbum est ars omnipotentis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium)); ars dicit respectum ad artificiatum; ergo et verbum ad creaturas.	9. Third the question is asked whether the divine word states a respect to the creature. That it does: Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: “the Word is the art of the almighty God, full of all living reasons;” art states a respect to the thing made by art; therefore word also states a respect to creatures.
10 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4, per idem quod prius; Filius non dicit respectum ad creaturas; ergo nec verbum, quia 'eo verbum quo Filius'.	10. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respect to creatures; therefore neither does the word, because “he is word by that by which he is Son.”