Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D28/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question Two Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality
6 Iuxta hoc quaero utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas constitutiva primae personae in divinis. Quod sic: Damascenus libro I cap. 8: Omnia sunt unum ((praeter ƿingenerationem et generationem et spirationem)). Constat autem quod non excludit omnes proprietates personales (quia tunc in Patre non esset aliqua proprietas nisi innascibilitas), ergo excludit 'omnia alia' in ratione proprietatis personalis constitutivae; ergo oportet omnes istas, et solas, esse tales relationes; ergo ingeneratio est proprietas constitutiva primae personae.	6. Next after this I ask whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality. That it is: Damascene ch.8 says that everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides nongeneration and generation and inspiriting.” But it is clear that he is not excluding all the personal properties (because then in the Father there would only be the property of not being able to be born), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in the idea of constitutive personal property; therefore all these, and only these, must be such relations; therefore non-generation is a property constitutive of the first person.
7 $a Item, sapientia est bonitas; igitur innascibilitas est paternitas.	7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore not able to be born is paternity.
8 Item, Praepositinus sic arguit: ((Quo Pater est Pater, est haec persona, - quo est haec persona, est innascibilis)).	8. Again, Praepositinus [Summa I q.14] argues thus: “By that by which the Father is Father he is this person, – by that by which he is this person he is unable to be born.”
9 Item, dignius est habere non ab alio quam communicare alii. a$	9. Again, it is more worthy to have something not from another than to communicate it to another.
10 Oppositum: Sicut secunda persona ad filiationem, ita prima persona ad paternitatem; sed filiatione constituitur secunda persona; ergo et prima 'paternitate'.	10. The opposite: As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but the second person is constituted by filiation; therefore the first person too is constituted by paternity.
11 Ad primam quaestionem duo sunt videnda, - primo qualiter ingenitum soli Patri conveniat, et secundo quomodo possit esse proprietas cum videatur tantum negationem importare. ƿ	11. To the first question there is need to see two things, – first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation. A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone
12 Quantum ad primum dico quod omne nomen, compositum ex aliquo multiplici et particula privativa, est dupliciter multiplex, tum ex multiplicitate affirmationis oppositae, tum ex multiplicitate privationis, - sicut patet per Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. 'De potentia', ubi 'impotentiam' distinguit secundum multiplicitatem potentiae, et praeter hoc, secundum multiplicitatem privationis, quae ponitur in cap. 'De privatione', V Metaphysicae; ita hoc nomen 'ingenitum' erit multiplex, et multiplicitate eius quod est 'genitum' et multiplicitate particulae privativae.	12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation – as is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, ibid., 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.
13 Quantum ad primum, genitum dicitur proprie 'productum per generationem' ut primus terminus; extendendo autem, dicitur ƿgenitum 'communicatum per generationem', quod est terminus formalis generationis (sicut dicit Hilarius, quod nihil habet Filius ((nisi natum))); tertio modo, extenditur genitum ad productum sive ad praeexigens generationem, licet ipsum in se non sit terminus generationis, nec primus nec formalis.	13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary On the Trinity IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.
14 Privatio etiam multipliciter potest distingui: in privationem proprie dictam, puta quando aliquid caret eo quod ipsum natum est habere, et quando, et ut, etc.; et in privationem communius dictam, quando aliquid caret eo quod ipsum natum est habere, non tamen secundum condiciones praedictas; et adhuc communius, quando caret eo quod ipsum natum est habere, non tamen secundum se sed secundum genus (sicut talpa dicitur caeca, quia visio - qua privatur per caecitatem - non repugnat animali secundum genus, licet repugnet talpae secundum se). Et isto modo, tanto generalius, quanto habitus - cuius est privatio - natus est competere communiori, convenienti ipsi privato: puta, communius diceretur 'privatum' aliquid quod non haberet illud quod ƿnatum est sibi competere secundum rationem corporis, quam quod natum est sibi competere secundum rationem animalis, et adhuc communius quod natum esset habere secundum rationem substantiae, quam quod natum esset habere secundum rationem corporis, - et communissime, si natum est habere illud secundum rationem entis. ƿ	14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision – of which it is deprived by blindness – is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit – of which it is the privation – is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal – and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body – and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.a b
15 Negatio etiam distinguitur per negationem extra genus, quae contradicit affirmationi, - et illa vera est de quolibet de quo falsa est affirmatio, sive de ente sive de non ente; alia est 'negatio in genere', et illa supponit naturam generis de qua dicatur, - et illa potest intelligi multipliciter, secundum multiplex genus, communius et minus commune.	15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, – and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, – and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.
16 Ad propositum ergo, loquendo de multiplicitate importata per hanc particulam 'in': licet fiat altercatio utrum importet negationem in genere vel privationem, tamen videtur quod idem sint in proposito, accipiendo negationem secundum genus communissime et privationem secundum genus communissime, quia negatio in apto nato est privatio (secundum Philosophum IV Metaphysicae), ita quod nihil addit privatio supra negationem nisi quod requirit naturam aptam, in qua sit. Ergo negatio in genere quomodocumque accipiatur genus - cum sit in apto nato aliquo modo (licet non secundum se apto), ipsa erit privatio aliquo modo secundum genus, licet non proprie in tali secundum quod tale. ƿ	16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus – however genus is taken – since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.a
17 Et si obicias contra hoc, quod nulla est privatio in divinis, quia privatum est imperfectum, respondeo quod hoc concludit de privatione secundum rationem propriam subiecti privati: si enim ipsum 'carens' natum esset secundum se habere illud, imperfectum esset, - sed si natum sit secundum rationem generis habere illud, non est imperfectum. Quod autem hoc modo etiam multae privationes accipiantur, patet non solum per illud Philosophi 'de talpa', sed etiam per communem divisionem 'communis' in habitum et privationem, - sicut 'animalis' in rationale et irrationale: 'irrationale' quidem dicit privationem in bove non eius quod natum est haberi in bove secundum speciem, sed eius quod natum esset haberi in 'eo quod est animal'; genus enim, quasi commune habitui et privationi, est illud cui convenit aptitudo ad utrumque.	17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect – but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophe says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation – as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.
18 In proposito autem extendendo illud quod est genus (sive ƿintelligamus pro privatione sive pro negatione secundum genus, per quae ambo idem intelligo), possum hic accipere 'quasi genus' hoc quod est commune ad tres personas, puta persona sive subsistens; et tunc dicamus Patrem privari aliquo secundum genus vel quod in Patre sit negatio aliqua secundum genus - alicuius quod natum est competere non tantum enti, sed supposito, quod est commune Patri et Filio.	18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus – or that in the Father there is some negation in genus – of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.
19 Et tunc hoc nomen 'ingenitus' poterit ad propositum quadrupliciter accipi: Uno modo propriissime, prout significat propriam eius carentiam quod proprie importatur per hoc nomen 'genitum', quod est primum productum per generationem, - et hoc modo non est in divinis, quia nihil ibi caret eo quod sibi natum est inesse. Secundo modo, prout significat carentiam communiter eius quod significatur proprie per 'genitum', et tunc connotat subsistens sive personam, et significat carentiam 'secundum genus' geniti proprie sumpti; et hoc modo videtur competere - de virtute sermonis - Patri et Spiritui Sancto, quorum uterque est subsistens et non est genitus (non sic convenit essentiae, quia ipsa licet sit ens et non genita, non tamen est per se subsistens et persona). Tertio modo - ut videtur - dicit carentiam secundum genus, et hoc 'geniti' secundo modo sumpti, scilicet pro communicato per generationem; et hoc modo essentia non dicitur ingenerabilis, removendo aptitudinem ad communicationem, - sed ut in Patre, potest dici non communicata, et ita ingenita, si hoc modo sumatur ingenitum. Quarto modo significat carentiam 'secundum genus' geniti communissime sumpti, et tunc idem est ƿingenitum' quod subsistens non productum; et hoc modo accipitur a sanctis, ita quod idem est in divinis quod 'improductum' proprie dictum; quod apparet per Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 26: ((Pater solus non est ab alio, et ideo solus appellatur ingenitus)), - et idem vult Ad Orosium 2.	19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways: In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, – and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong – by virtue of the terms – to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way – as it seems – it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be ungenerable, by removal of aptitude for communication – but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].
20 Dico ergo quod 'ingenitum' secundum usum sanctorum, prout scilicet significat negationem geniti communissime sumpti (id est producti) connotando subsistens in natura divina, sic convenit soli Patri, sicut patet per auctoritatem Augustini iam allegatam.	20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].
21 De secundo articulo dicunt aliqui quod cum ingenitum dicat tantum privationem in genere vel tantum negationem, et per consequens ex ratione sua formali non dicat aliquam dignitatem nec aliquid ad dignitatem pertinens, et nihil possit poni proprietas personae divinae nisi sit aliquid pertinens ad dignitatem, ergo oportet quod ingenitum connotet aliquid positivum, ratione cuius connotati sit proprietas; hoc autem positivum poƿnitur ab eis esse fontalis plenitudo, quae est in solo Patre, - in quo est omnis fecunditas, tam ad intra quam ad extra.	21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, – in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.
22 Sed contra istud: Primo, quia ista fontalis plenitudo non intelligitur ad extra, quia talis fecunditas est communis tribus. Sed ad intra non est in Patre nisi duplex fecunditas, scilicet ad generandum et spirandum: haec autem fecunditas non est aliquid unum positivum in Patre nisi essentia, - essentiam autem non connotat, ut propter hoc dicatur esse proprietas Patris. Quod autem ista fontalis plenitudo non sit aliqua relatio positiva una in Patre, patet, quia tunc in Patre essent tres relationes positivae, scilicet generatio activa et spiratio activa, et illa relatio quam circumloquitur hoc quod est 'fontalis plenitudo' fecunditatis, licet sit innominata; et tunc essent sex notiones, quod non conceditur communiter, saltem non conceduntur in Patre tres proprietates relativae et positivae.	22. But against this: First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, – but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, – at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.
23 Praeterea, ingenitum non videtur connotare illam fontalem plenitudinem, quia non primam fecunditatem, - quia secundum ƿAugustinum V Trinitatis cap. 6, ((etsi non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum esse ingenitum)); ergo ingenitum potest praecedere generationem activam. Multo magis etiam non connotat secundam fecunditatem, quia si per impossibile non posset esse productio per modum voluntatis, adhuc tamen esset status in generatione ad aliquam personam ingenitam. Igitur videtur quod illa fontalis plenitudo, quae nihil dicit nisi duplicem fecunditatem, non potest connotari per hoc quod est 'ingenitum'.	23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, – because according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if per impossibile there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.
24 Tertio: ratio eorum non videtur valere, quia si proprietas personae diceret dignitatem simpliciter, ergo illa persona quae non haberet illam, non haberet omnem dignitatem simpliciter, quod est inconveniens.	24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, – which is unacceptable.
25 $a Aliter dicitur quod hoc positivum est esse ex se (et dicitur esse intentio Richardi), et quod 'esse a se' est proprium positivum circumlocutum per 'ingenitum', et praecedit relationem ad Filium. Quia enim aliquid est a se, ideo oportet - secundum Richardum - quod ab ipso sit omne esse et omne exsistere.	25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence – according to Richard [On the Trinity V ch.4] – ought to come from it.
26 Contra: 'a se', si est positivum, - aut absolutum, et erit commune tribus; aut relativum, et non ad prius (quia non est nisi ƿnegatio relationis ad prius), ergo erit ad Filium. Itaque 'a se' vel dicit filiationem, si est positivum, - vel si dicat habitudinem ad praecedens, erit negatio relationis, et ita negatio sicut 'ingenitum'; ergo non est proprium positivum illius. a$	26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].
27 Ideo videtur dicendum quod ingenitum sub propria ratione sua (ut significat 'non habere genitorem'), est personalis proprietas Patris, et sufficienter importat dignitatem, id est non indignitatem; hoc enim sufficit ad proprietatem personalem quod non sit indignitas, sicut et personalia in divinis non dicuntur esse imperfectiones (nec tamen perfectiones simpliciter, hoc est universaliter in quolibet).	27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).
28 Et si omnino fiat altercatio quod omnino oportet proprietatem dicere dignitatem, non absolutam sed personalem, - potest dici quod ingenitum, in quantum negat 'habere genitorem', dicit dignitatem personalem primae personae in divinis, quia sicut dignitatis est in secunda persona habere principium originans, ita est dignitatis in prima non habere; et tamen ista dignitas non oportet quod sit formaliter dignitas alicuius positivi proprii, connotati per hoc quod est 'ingenitum'. Unde negatio potest ƿdici esse dignitatis in aliquo pro quanto indignitatis esset si affirmatio poneretur in eo, - sicut dignitatis est in rege quod non sit ribaldus. ƿ	28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing, connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, – the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.a
29 Ad argumenta huius quaestionis. Ad primum nego minorem. Cum probatur per Philosophum II Perihermeneias, dico quod illa consequentia Philosoƿphi tenet per veritatem primi principii, huius scilicet 'a quo removetur unum contradictoriorum, de eodem dicitur reliquum': ut sic autem, non potest concludi affirmativa de praedicato infinito sequi ad negativam de praedicato finito, nisi ut illud praedicatum infinitum significat negationem extra genus, contradictoriam affirmationi (quia 'negatio in genere' non contradicit affirmationi), et tunc non sequitur 'non est genitum, ergo est non genitum', nisi de negatione extra genus; et hoc modo non genitum non convertitur cum ingenito, licet convertatur accipiendo non genitum prout dicit negationem in genere, quo modo intelligit Augustinus.	29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4]. To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in De Interpretatione, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.
30 Ad secundum concedo quod nulla proprietas personae - secundum viam communem - dicit aliquid ad se. Nec tamen oportet omnem proprietatem dicere relationem positive, sed sufficit quod vel positive vel negative: si enim relatio sit personalis et propria alicuius personae, negatio etiam relationis erit personalis ƿpropria alii personae, et ita non ad se nec communis tribus; et hoc modo - scilicet negative - ingenitum dicit relationem, sicut patet per Augustinum V Trinitatis cap. 8. Et tunc ista est falsa 'omne non genitum est relatum', - et tamen non sequitur 'ergo non genitum dicit aliquid ad se', sed sequitur quod vel dicat aliquid ad se, vel negationem relationis propriae sive 'relationem negative'.	30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person – according to the common way [d.26 n.15] – states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way – namely negatively – unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], – and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.
31 Ad tertium dicitur quod inspirabile non dicit aliquam dignitatem, sicut dicit ingenitum, et ita non est notio. - Sed hoc videtur falsum in se, quia aequalis dignitatis est in Patre et Filio non spirari, sicut in Patre non generari; et etiam ad propositum non videtur valere, quia non videtur necessarium ad proprietatem (sive ad notionem) dicere propriam dignitatem.	31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. – But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].
32 Aliter potest dici quod ingenitum dicit non productum (sicut expositum est in primo articulo solutionis), et hoc modo inspirabile - quia continetur in eo - non est alia notio ab eo; sequitur enim 'non productum, ergo non spiratum', et non e converso; ergo non est alia notio.	32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspiritable – because it is contained in it – is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.
33 Contra: ingeneratio est tantum in Patre, inspiratio est in Patre et Filio, ergo haec notio non est illa.	33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.
34 Si ista consequentia sit concedenda, erunt sex notiones, nisi alia ratio assignetur quare inspirabilitas non sit notio. Etsi videatur absurdum ponere sex notiones (quia communiter non ƿponuntur tot), posset dici quod locus ab auctoritate non tenet negative: 'hoc non dicitur, ergo hoc non est'. Tempore enim Ambrosii non videntur fuisse usitatae tres notiones in Patre, quia noluit uti hoc nomine 'ingenitus'; tempore etiam Anselmi non videntur fuisse usitatae duae notiones positivae in Patre, quia non utitur ipse 'vi spirativa', sed pro illa accipit 'deitatem', communem Patri et Filio. Etsi a principio non fuerunt notae nisi tres proprietates, scilicet paternitas et filiatio et spiratio (et hoc ex verbo Salvatoris in Evangelio et Ioannis in canonica sua), tamen postea per investigationem innotuerunt aliae notiones et proprietates, quae prius erant in re, licet non prius notae; et ita, sicut posteriores concesserunt plures notiones quam priores (non tamen priores eas negaverunt, licet non eas dixerunt), ita non videtur inconveniens de posterioribus ad illos doctores, dum tamen possint illas concludere ex dictis priorum.	34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiriting force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiriting (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, Matthew 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, I John 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.
35 Ad ultimum - de Ambrosio - patet per Magistrum quod illud vocabulum 'ingenitus' non erat tempore suo ita notum, nec etiam ita necessarium ad expressionem fidei quod oporteret omnem catholicum eo uti; et primam personam illa proƿprietate exprimere, erat etiam occasio errandi simplicibus, quia videtur dicere aliquid ad se, quia non ita manifeste importat relationem sicut importat 'genitum': et ideo cautum erat simplicibus fidelibus non uti isto vocabulo, propter haereticos malignantes, licet vocabulum in se proprie et primo conveniat Patri.	35. To the final argument [n.4] – from Ambrose – the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.
36 Ad secundam quaestionem videtur posse dici quod sic, hoc modo intelligendo, quod essentia divina antequam intelligatur communicata per productionem, videtur in aliquo intelligi ƿnon communicata actu, ut in prima persona; non quidem non communicabilis (quia non est non communicabilis), sed non actu communicata, quia non videtur posse alicui communicari quasi passive, nisi praehabeatur in aliquo, non communicata sibi quasi passive. Et in hoc primo signo, in quo tantum intelligitur essentia et ista negatio 'non communicata actu', videtur haberi intellectus alicuius incommunicabilis: si enim essentia 'ut non communicata actu' non esset incommunicabilis, ergo ipsa 'ut non communicata' posset esse in pluribus, - et tunc possent esse plures ingeniti, in quibus aeque primo esset essentia, et non esset status in aliquo primo; si autem habeatur aliquis incommunicabilis, subsistens in natura divina, tunc habetur persona; ergo ante omnem intellectum proprietatis positivae, intelligendo solam essentiam et ingenitum (hoc est non communicatum per generationem), habetur aliquis subsistens incommunicabilis in natura divina, qui est ingenitus proprie, accipiendo 'ingenitum' sicut potest accipi in divinis.	36. To the second question [n.6] it seems one can answer yes, – understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to have been communicated through production, seems to be understood to be non-communicated in act in something, as in the first person; not indeed to be incommunicable (because it is not incommunicable), but not actually communicated, because it does not seem possible for something to be communicated quasi-passively unless it is already possessed in something as not communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which only essence and this negation ‘non-communicated in act’ are understood, an understanding of something incommunicable seems to be had; for if essence ‘as noncommunicated in act’ were not incommunicable then ‘as non-communicated’ it could exist in several things, – and then there could be several unbegottens, in which the essence would exist equally primarily, and there woud not be a stand in someone first; but if someone incommunicable is had, subsisting in the divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.
37 $a Item, essentia, ut prior relatione, est non communicata et dans 'per se esse', - ergo hypostasi ingenitae. Antecedens probatur: 'ut prior' non est communicata, ergo est non communiƿcata; ut sic dat 'per se esse' (VII Trinitatis 9). Consequentia probatur: 'ut non communicata' non est communis pluribus suppositis; ergo in uno tantum, et non nisi in ingenito, quia in genito est communicata.	37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se existence’, – therefore it gives it to an unbegotten hypostasis. The proof of the antecedent: ‘as prior’ it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as such it gives ‘per se existence’ (On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11). Proof of the consequence: ‘as noncommunicated’ it is not common to several supposits; therefore it is one only, and only in the unbegotten, because it is communicated in the case of the begotten.
38 In hoc redit illud quod essentia 'per se ens' vel 'hic Deus' generat, in quantum habet principium formale et per se esse; et non praeintelligitur aliquid generationi nisi quod habet principium illud 'quo' non ab alio, et quasi exspectat relationem consequentem, quae consurgit termino iam posito.	38. To this returns the fact that the essence ‘per se being’ or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se existence; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were waiting for the consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up with the term [sc. Son] once it is posited.
39 Contra: ergo per generationem est proprietas positiva in Patre, sicut in Filio. - Potest concedi quod in neutro 'ut per se terminus' (nec primus, nec formalis), sed concomitans primum terminum qui est Filius, quia relationes mutuae concomitantur eundem 'per se terminum' qui est unum extremum. a$	39. On the contrary: then by generation there is a positive property in the Father as in the Son. – One can concede that it is in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor formal), but is concomitant to the first term who is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’, which is one extreme.
40 Et confirmatur ista opinio per Augustinum V Trinitatis cap. 6, ubi vult quod ((si Pater non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum esse ingenitum)), - ergo potest intelligi aliquis 'ingenitus', non praeintelligendo ipsum generasse; intelligendo autem ingenitum, intelligitur suppositum incommunicabile subsistens; ergo videtur quod per prius constituitur ibi persona per 'ingenitum' quam per aliquam proprietatem positivam.	40. And this opinion is confirmed from Augustine ibid. V ch.6 n.7 when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” – therefore some ‘unbegotten’ can be understood before understanding that he has generated; but when unbegotten is understood, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that the person is there first constituted by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.
41 Praeterea, in omni ordine essentiali negatio ordinis ad prius ƿvidetur immediatius consequi primum quam ordo eius ad secundum, quia illa negatio videtur immediate consequi ipsum in quantum tale; igitur similiter in ordine personarum, prius conveniet primae personae negatio ordinis ad priorem, quam ordo eius ad secundam personam; ergo prius intelligitur ingenita quam generans, et in illo priore intelligitur persona incommunicabilis in natura divina.	41. Further, in every essential order the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first thing than does its order to the second thing, because that negation seems to follow it immediately insofar as it is such; therefore likewise in the order of persons, the negation of order to a prior will more belong to the first person than his order to the second person; therefore he is first understood to be unbegotten before generating, and in that prior moment he is understood to be incommunicable in divine nature.
42 Praeterea, si secundum imaginationem philosophorum in divinis non esset nisi unum suppositum absolutum, ipsum constitueretur per essentiam, absque proprietate positiva, - et si aliqua concurreret, non esset nisi ista negativa, quae est 'non esse ab alio'; ergo videtur quod - cum origo posita in divinis nihil auferat ipsi essentiae, nec etiam huic proprietati negativae 'non esse ab alio' - poterit modo per ista duo aliqua persona constitui. ƿ	42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without any positive property, – and if any property were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that – since origin when posited in divine reality takes nothing from the essence itself, neither does it take anything from this negative property ‘not being from another’ – it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].
43 Et si obiciatur 'quomodo poterit sola negatio constituere personam divinam?', - respondetur quod persona includit essentiam, quae est communicabilis, et cum hoc aliquid quo est incommunicabilis; per hoc ergo quod habet naturam in se, habet omnem perfectionem positivam quae potest poni in ipsa; per negationem autem cointellectam potest habere rationem incommunicabilis, et hoc maxime si incommunicabilitas non dicit nisi aliquam negationem in genere.	43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ – the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by the fact, then, that it has the nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can exist in it; but by the counderstood negation it can have the idea of being incommunicable, and especially so if incommunicability only states some negation in genus.
44 Contra istam viam arguitur sic: Nulla negatio est de se incommunicabilis, quia sicut non est de se una neque indivisibilis aliqua indivisione, sic non est de se haec et incommunicabilis, sed tantum per affirmationem, cui primo repugnat dividi, - et per hoc competit negationi non dividi; et ita etiam videtur de esse incommunicabili, quia communicari non repugnat negationi de se, sed tantum per affirmationem aliquam, cui primo competit incommunicabilitas; igitur negatio non erit prima ratio incommunicabilitatis. ƿ	44. Against this way the argument is as follows: No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or individisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, – and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommicability.a
45 Praeterea, nulla negatio est propria alicui subiecto nisi per aliquam affirmationem propriam ei, quam consequatur talis negatio; ergo primae personae non est propria ista negatio 'non esse ab alio' nisi quia eidem propria est aliqua affirmatio prior, quam consequatur ista negatio; illa 'affirmatio prior' non potest esse essentia, - ergo proprietas aliqua positiva.	45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, – therefore some positive property.
46 Praeterea, si prima persona sit incommunicabilis formaliter per negationem, et secunda est incommunicabilis relatione positiva (scilicet filiatione) et tertia similiter (scilicet spiratione passiva), - ergo non uniformiter se habent istae personae in ratione personalitatis: nec sunt aeque positivae, nec aeque perfectae (in quantum personae), quia non est aeque perfecta personalitas negatio et proprietas aliqua positiva. ƿ	46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiriting), – then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.
47 Istae rationes licet forte non convincerent adversarium quin possent solvi, tamen quia non videtur probabile personam primam sola negatione formaliter esse personam, ideo potest concedi conclusio istarum rationum.	47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.
48 Ad argumentum in oppositum dico - sicut dictum est distinctione 26 - quod haec dictio exclusiva 'praeter' non excludit aliqua personalia, sed excludit essentialia, et includit in proprietate inclusa omne esse personale illius personae; unde 'ingeneratione' includitur tam paternitas quam spiratio activa, ut est in Patre. Quod etiam probatur per eum alibi, ubi nominat paternitatem et filiationem et processionem. - Ergo non intendebat in primo loco solas illas tres esse proprietates personales (nec intendebat etiam illas tres esse personales constitutivas), sed per illas intendebat omnes alias et quod omnia essentialia - quae excluduntur per ly 'praeter' - sunt unum in tribus. ƿ	48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say – as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] – that this exclusive word ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential features, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active inspiriting as it exists in the Father. The point is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. – Therefore he was not intending in the first place that those three properties alone were personal ones (nor was he intending that those three were personal constitutive properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essential features – which are excluded by the ‘besides’ – are one in the three persons.
49 Ad argumenta pro opinione prima. Quando arguitur per Augustinum de prioritate ingeniti ad paternitatem, respondeo: aliquando privatio non connotat affirmationem, et tamen numquam inest nisi privato insit formaliter talis positio; exemplum: caecum esse non connotat nisi oculum (qui est commune subiectum caecitatis et visionis), et tamen numquam inest oculo per solam rationem oculi sed per aliquam entitatem positivam, quam consequitur ista privatio, - puta per talem mixtionem in oculo cum qua non possit stare visio. Ita potest dici hic quod licet ingenitum non connotet nisi aliquam personam subsistentem in essentia divina, tamen ista affirmatio non est tota ratio inhaerentiae huius negationis 'ingenitum', sed oportet in re aliquam proprietatem positivam aliquo modo praecedere ingenitum, per quam insit, licet non connotetur per 'ingenitum' tamquam aliquod proprium subiectum. Et secundum hoc, dictum Augustini debet intelligi quod quantum est de per se ratione ingeniti, non connotat Patrem; non tamen potest inesse in re nisi ista affirmatio (vel aliqua alia, absoluta vel relativa) sit quasi ratio inhaerentiae eius.	49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42]. When argument is made from Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet a privation is never present unless such a positive is formally present in the deprived thing; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never present in the eye by reason of the eye alone but through some positive entity which the privation follows, – to wit some mixture in the eye along with which there cannot be sight. So can it be said here that although unbegotten connotes some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole reason for the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but there must be in the thing some positive property that in some way precedes unbegotten by which it is present, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And in this respect, the statement of Augustine must be understood that insofar as it is about the per se idea of unbegotten it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) is as it were the reason for its inherence.
50 Ad secundum dicitur quod illa propositio vera est de ƿprimo in ordine quod est ad se, cuius scilicet 'esse' non est 'esse ad secundum'. Ita non est in ordine personarum habentium eandem naturam in tali habitudine ut in proposito, quia hic 'primam personam esse' est ordo ad secundam; et ideo ordo ad secundam quasi praecedit negationem principiati, sicut constitutivum formale alicuius entis positivi praecedit in eo negationem alicuius entis sibi repugnantis.	50. To the second [n.41] one statement is that the proposition is true of the thing first in order, that it exists to itself, of which namely the ‘being’ is not ‘to be to another’. It is not so in an order of persons having the same nature in such a disposition or in the issue at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to the second person; and therefore the order to the second person precedes as it were the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive feature of some positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.
51 Ad tertium. Si esset ita secundum imaginationem philosophorum gentilium, tunc essentia divina esset determinata ex se ad hanc subsistentiam, et constitueret 'hanc' non per aliquam negationem sed se ipsa (secundum eos), quia esset omni modo determinata ad hanc, sicut in creaturis 'haec natura' est omnino limitata ad hoc suppositum; nunc autem ponendo ibi esse originem, oportet essentiam non esse omni modo determinatam ad unam personam, et ideo non constituere per se aliquam personam. Et cum dicit 'ponere originem nihil aufert essentiae, nec illi quod per se constituitur', - verum est, nihil aufert: sed ponit oppositum illius hypothesis per quam essentia de se constiƿtueret personam, scilicet indeterminationem essentiae ad unicam subsistentiam, quia hypothesis auferret essentiae perfectionem (quia videretur ponere limitationem), sed oppositum illius hypothesis - ponens originem - non aufert perfectionem; aufert tamen illum modum impossibilem 'constitutivum personae', qui esset verus ex hypothesi. ƿ	51. To the third [n.42]. If things were there as they are according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but through itself (according to them), because it would be in every way determined to this, as in the case of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, the essence need not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore it need not by itself constitute some person. And when the argument says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that by which it is constituted’, – it is true that it takes nothing away; but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence of itself would constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take away perfection from the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis – positing an origin – does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.