Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D28/Q3

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 3	Question Three Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person
52 Ultimo quaero utrum persona prima divina constituatur in esse personali aliqua relatione positiva ad secundam personam. Quod non: Quia prima persona praeintelligitur in esse personali anteƿquam generet: agere enim est suppositi; ergo praeintelligitur esse suppositum antequam agat. Si autem constitueretur relatione ad secundam personam, cointelligeretur - cum ipsa exsistente - secundam personam esse, et per consequens secunda persona praeintelligeretur esse antequam prima generet, et ita secunda persona non esset terminus illius generationis.	52. Lastly I ask whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person. That he is not: Because the first person is pre-understood in personal being before he begets; for to act belongs to a supposit; therefore he is understood to be a supposit before he acts. But if he were constituted by a relation to the second person, the existence of the second person would be co-understood – along with his own existence – and consequently the second person would be pre-understood before the first person begets him, and so the second person would not be the term of generation.
53 Confirmatur ratio, quia quaecumque sunt simul natura, quocumque unum est prius, et alterum; relativa sunt simul natura; ergo si persona prima formaliter constituatur in esse personali per relationem ad secundam, quocumque prima prior est in esse personali, eo et secunda. Sed generatione, quae est actio primae personae, videtur prima persona prior esse in esse personali, ergo et secunda; et ut prius, tunc non erit terminus formalis generationis.	53. A confirmation of the reason is that as to all things that are simultaneous in nature, by whatever it is that one is prior the other is too; relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore if the first person is formally constituted in personal existence through a relation to the second, by whatever the first is prior in personal being by that the second is too. But by generation, which is an act of the first person, the first person seems to be prior in personal being, therefore the second is too; and as before [n.52], he will not then be the formal term of generation.
54 Praeterea, in omni ordine primum videtur esse absolutissimum, sicut apparet percurrendo in quibuscumque ordinibus; ergo sic erit in ordine personarum quod prima erit absolutissima, et ita non constituetur per relationem ad secundam.	54. Further, in every order the first seems to be the most absolute, as is clear from running through the point in the case of any order whatever; therefore so will it be in the order of persons, that the first will be the most absolute, and so it would not be constituted by a relation to the second.
55 Contra: Prima persona non constituitur in esse personali deitate, quia non est incommunicabilis, - nec spiratione activa, quia communis ƿest sibi et Filio, - nec innascibilitate, ex quaestione praecedente; ergo per viam divisionis, aliqua relatione positiva ad secundam.	55. On the contrary: The first person is not constituted in personal being by deity, because deity is not incommunicable, – nor by active inspiriting, because this is common to him and the Son, – nor by being unable to be born, from the preceding question [n.47]; therefore, by way of division, by some relation to the second person.
56 Hic communiter conceditur pars affirmativa quaestionis, sed propter difficultatem primi argumenti, distinguitur de ipsa relatione constituente primam personam.	56. Here the affirmative part of the question is commonly conceded, but because of the difficulty of the first argument [nn.52, 67], a distinction is made about the relation that constitutes the first person.
57 Uno modo, quod 'ipsa potest considerari ut proprietas, vel ut relatio; ut proprietas, praecedit generationem, - ut relatio, sequitur': et tunc, secundum quod constituit, non oportet secundam personam simul esse cum prima, licet secundum quod est relatio - quasi consequens generationem - oporteat secundam simul esse cum ea.	57. In one way [from Aquinas], that ‘it can be considered as a property or as a relation; as a property it precedes generation, – as a relation it follows’; and then, according to what it constitutes, the second person need not be simultaneous with the first, although according to its being a relation – consequent, as it were, to generation – the second should be simultaneous with it.
58 Contra istud: Proprietas 'ut proprietas' est aliqua entitas, alioquin non constituit aliquod ens. Aut ergo entitas ad se, aut ad alterum, aut neutrum: entitatem aliquam esse singularem, quae nec sit entitas ad se nec ad alterum, non videtur intelligibile; ergo oportet quod ƿista entitas formaliter vel sit ad se, et tunc constituet personam absolutam, - vel ad alterum, et tunc 'ut proprietas' erit relatio; et tunc non evaditur difficultas, licet alia sit ratio considerandi eam ut proprietas, et alia ut relatio.	58. Against this: A property ‘as property’ is some entity, otherwise it would not constitute any being. Either therefore it is a being to itself or to another or neither; that some entity is singular, that is neither an entity to itself nor to another, does not seem intelligible; therefore this entity should be formally to itself, and then it will constitute an absolute person – or to another, and that ‘as a property’ it will be a relation; and then the difficulty is not avoided, even though there is one way of considering it as a property and another as a relation.
59 Et potest confirmari ratio per exemplum, quia etsi albedo possit considerari ut albedo vel ut qualitas (et si consideretur ut albedo, hoc est secundum propriam rationem suam specificam, si autem ut qualitas, hoc est secundum rationem 'imperfecti' sui generis), tamen quidquid constituitur albedine non constituitur aliqua entitate quae non est qualitas, quia albedo etiam 'ut albedo' essentialiter includit qualitatem et est essentialiter qualitas, ita quod albedo non potest constituere aliquid nisi in esse qualitativo. Ita videtur in proposito, de proprietate relativa sic et sic considerata.	59. And the reason can be confirmed by an example, because although whiteness can be considered as whiteness or as a quality (and if it be considered as whiteness, that is according to its proper specific reason, – but if as quality, this is according to the idea of an ‘imperfect’ instance in its genus), yet whatever is constituted by whiteness is not constituted by any entity that is not a quality, because whiteness even ‘as whiteness’ essentially includes quality and is essentially quality, so that whiteness cannot constitute anything save in qualitative being. So does it seem in the issue at hand, about a relative property considered in this way and in that [n.57].
60 Praeterea, iste dicit alibi quod 'in divinis non potest esse ordo' (quia nec essentiae ad relationes, nec relationum inter se), 'quia relativa sunt simul natura'. - Quod si proprietas possit considerari eo modo quo non esset relatio (et hoc modo non oportet quod haberet correlativum simul natura), argumentum eorum non valeret.	60. Further, he [Aquinas, Roger Marston] says elsewhere that ‘in divine reality there cannot be order’ (because neither in the case of the essence to the relations, nor in the case of the relations among themselves), ‘because relatives are simultaneous in nature’. – But if a property can be considered in the way in which it would not be a relation (and in this way it need not have a correlative simultaneous in nature), their argument would not be valid.
61 Aliter distinguitur de relatione, ut relatio est et ut origo est: et ponitur quod constituit ut origo (non autem ut relatio), quia ratio originis aliquo modo praecedit et in ea quasi fundatur ƿrelatio; prima autem persona constituitur per primam relationem ibi, per quam distinguitur.	61. A distinction is drawn in another way about relation, as it is relation and as it is origin; and the position is that it constitutes as origin (but not as relation), because the idea of origin in some way precedes and the relation is as it were founded in it; but the first person is constituted by the first relation there, by which it is distinguished [Roger Marston].
62 Contra hoc obicitur quia origo 'ut origo' non est forma: neque personae ad quam est, sed quasi via, - et tunc neque primae personae est forma, sed quasi praesupponit eam; nihil autem constituit aliquid in aliquo esse nisi in quantum est forma eius.	62. Against this it is objected that origin ‘as origin’ is not form; and not of the person to which it is, but as it were the way to it, – and then it is not of the first person as form but as it were presupposes it; but nothing constitutes anything in anything save insofar as it is its form.
63 Si tamen ista intelligatur de distinguere quasi principiative (correspondenter causae effectivae in creaturis, sicut expositum est distinctione 26), et non per modum principii formalis, tunc ista positio posset habere veritatem, nec hoc argumentum esset contra eam.	63. But if this opinion is understood of distinguishing as it were by way of principle (corresponding to efficient cause in creatures, as was expounded in distinction 26 [n.58]), and not by way of formal principle, then this position could have truth, and this argument would not be against it.
64 Alio modo dicitur quod sicut eadem actio potest diversimode intelligi - in quantum aptitudinalis vel in quantum potentialis, in quantum futura, in quantum in actu, in quantum praeterita - ita relationes 'fundatae super actionem' possunt diversimode accipi: ut sit relatio fundata super generationem ut quasi aliquo modo praeteritam, alio modo ut quasi praesentem, alio ƿmodo super eam ut quasi futuram, alio modo super eam ut quasi potentialem, et ulterius quasi aptitudinalem.	64. In another way it is said that just as the same action can be diversely understood – insofar as it is aptitudinal or insofar as it is potential, insofar as it is future, insofar as it is in act, insofar as it is past – so relations ‘founded on action’ can be diversely taken; so that relation is founded on generation as in some way past as it were, in other way as present as it were, in another way founded on it as future as it were, in another way founded on it as potential as it were, and further as aptitudinal.
65 Dicitur autem quod relatio sub prima ratione constituit personam; prima autem ratio est 'ratio aptitudinalis', quia illud sequitur ad aliud et non e converso; ergo generatio tali modo constituit Patrem, et hoc modo significatur per hoc quod est 'generativitas'.	65. But it is said that relation under the first idea constitutes a person; but the first idea is ‘aptitudinal idea’, because that follows on the other and not conversely; therefore generation in this sort of way constitutes the Father, and in this way it is signified by what is meant by ‘generativity’.
66 Contra istud: Prima persona non constituitur proprietate habente minus perfecte esse positivum quam habeat constitutiva secundae personae, quia tunc non viderentur esse aeque perfectae in esse personali; secunda autem persona constituitur - secundum istos filiatione ut filiatio est; ergo prima persona non constituetur relatione potentiali, quae minus perfectum esse habet de ratione relationis quam proprietas secundae personae. Sed relatio generativi ad generabile - quam ponunt esse primam et constitutivam - est relatio potentialis; ergo non constituit ita perfectam personam actualem, sicut secunda. ƿProbatio assumpti: nullum ens actuale exigit ens potentiale, quia ens potentiale est minus perfectum quam actuale, dummodo sint eiusdem rationis; relatio autem generativi requirit generabile, quod dicit relationem potentialem ex parte Filii; ergo relatio generativi in Patre non est relatio actualis.	66. Against this: The first person is not constituted by a property having something positive less perfectly than what is constitutive of the second person has it, because then they would not seem to be equally perfect in personal being; but the second person is constituted – according to them – by filiation as it is filiation; therefore the first person is not constituted by potential relation, which has a less perfect being from the nature of relation than the property of the second person has it. But the relation of the generative to the generable – which they posit to be first and constitutive – is a potential relation; therefore it does not constitute as perfect an actual person as the second does. Proof of the assumption: no actual being requires a potential being, because a potential being is less perfect than an actual one, provided they are of the same idea; but the relation of the generative requires the generable, because it states a potential relation on the part of the Son; therefore the relation of generative in the Father is not an actual relation.
67 Praeterea, contra istam opinionem (et contra duas praecedentes): Relatio, si constituit ibi personam, hoc non est nisi secundum quod in re, - alioquin non constitueret personam realem; non est autem in re nisi unica relatio primae personae ad secundam, nec est ibi nisi sub ratione actualissima, quomodocumque possit diversimode accipi; ergo sub ratione actualissima constituet illam personam, et sub ea ratione correspondet sibi relatio in secunda persona (non est aliqua in secunda nisi ut actualissima). Frustra ergo quaeritur distinctio quasi potentialis vel aptitudinalis, a ratione activi, quia ista distinctio in modis conceptibilibus nihil facit ad constitutivum primae personae quin prima persona semper exigat secum simul secundam; et tamen propter hanc difficultatem, ne poneretur prima persona habere secum simul secundam, quaeritur ista distinctio relationum actualium et aptitudiƿnalium et potentialium, ne ponatur Filius praecedere generationem Patris. Eodem modo posset argui contra primam opinionem et secundam, quia illa relatio - quomodocumque concipiatur - non est ibi nisi ut unica.	67. Further, against this opinion (and against the two preceding: Relation, if it constitutes a person there, is only according to what exists in reality, – otherwise it would not constitute a real person; but there exists in reality only a single relation of the first person to the second, and it is only there under the most actual idea, however diversely it can be taken; therefore under the most actual idea it will constitute that person, and under that idea a relation in the second person will correspond to it (there is not anything in the second person save what is most actual). In vain therefore is a quasi potential or aptitudinal distinction from the idea of what is active sought for, because this distinction in conceivable modes does nothing for what is constitutive of the first person without the first person always requiring the second person along with it at the same time; and yet because of this difficulty, lest the first person be posited as having the second along with it at the same time, this distinction of actual and aptitudinal and potential relations is sought for, lest the Son be posited as preceding the generation of the Father. – In the same way one could argue against the first and second opinion, because the relation – however it is conceived – is there only a single one.
68 Praeterea, contra omnes tres opiniones: Quia si Pater generat Filium per hoc quod actione Patris relatio Filii est in essentia divina, et actione sua - secundum istas opiniones - paternitas 'ut paternitas' est in essentia divina (quia secundum eos paternitas 'ut paternitas' tunc primo est quando filiatio est ut filiatio, licet prius praecesserit aliquid ut origo vel generativitas vel proprietas), ergo Pater ita generabit se Patrem sicut generabit Filium, aut saltem ita erit paternitas in Patre per generationem sicut filiatio in Filio, quod videtur absurdum.	68. Further, against all three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65]: Because if the Father generates the Son by the fact that by the action of the Father the relation of the Son is in the divine essence, and if by his action – according to these opinions – paternity ‘as paternity’ is in the divine essence (because according to them paternity ‘as paternity’ then first exists when filiation exists as filiation, even if something first precede as origin, whether generativity or the property) then the Father will generate himself as Father by generation in just the way filiation is in the Son, which seems absurd.
69 Praeterea, contra omnes opiniones est alia difficultas: quomodo essentia determinetur ad primam personam? Si enim ex se, ergo non videtur communis aliis personis, quia quandocumque aliquid determinatur ad aliud ex se, ubicumque est, habet illud, - et tunc essentia ubicumque esset, haberet personalitatem primae personae; si ab alio, hoc videtur esse contra rationem primae personae, quia tunc videretur esse originata, vel aliquo modo posse ab aliquo poni in tali subsistentia. ƿ	69. Further, there is against all the opinions another difficulty; in what way will the essence be determined to the first person? For if from itself, then it does not seem common to the other persons, because whenever something is determined to something other than itself, whenever it does so, it has it, – and then the essence, whenever it exists, would have the personality of the first person; if it does so from another, this seems to be against the idea of the first person, because then he would seem to be originated, or seem in some way able to be posited in such subsistence by something.
70 $a Praeterea, tertio: si determinetur ex se, quaero, rationem cuius principii habet essentia in determinando se ad proprietatem primam? Non materiae (distinctione 5); non formae, quia principiatio formae praeexigit principiationem producentis sicut de causa formali et efficiente; igitur essentia quasi productive se determinat, et ita prima persona erit aliquo modo producta. Nec potest dici quod proprietas ex se determinatur, quia impossibile - qualitercumque - duo esse omnino prima, sed omnis multitudo stat ad omnino unum; illud hic non est nisi essentia ut est pelagus; igitur ipsi attribuetur ratio principii aliqualis respectu cuiuscumque secundi.	70. Further, third: if it is determined of itself, I ask of what principle the essence has the reason when it determines itself to the first property? Not of matter (distinction 5 [nn.64-85]); not of form, because that which is the principle of form pre-requires that which is principle of the producer as from the formal and efficient cause; therefore the essence quasi productively determines itself, and so the first person will in some way be produced. Nor can it be said that the property is determined of itself, because it is impossible – in any way at all – for there to be two things altogether first, but every multitude comes to a stand at one thing; this here is only the essence as it is a sea; therefore there will be attributed to it the idea of some principle with respect to anything that is second.
71 Si quis vellet dicere quod essentia 'ut haec' per se est et ita per se agit (iuxta primum argumentum factum distinctione 7 contra Thomam), posset dicere quod 'haec essentia' communicat - quasi productive - se primae personae, et in prima communicat se secundae, et in prima et secunda tertiae, et sic tres productiones secundum triplex principium, scilicet: essentia ut essentia, ut intellectus, ut voluntas. ƿ	71. If someone wants to say that the essence ‘as a this’ exists per se and thus acts per se (according to the first argument made in distinction 7 against Thomas [n.11]), he could say that ‘this essence’ communicates itself – quasi productively – to the first person, and in the first person communicates itself to the second, and in the first and second to the third, and thus there are three productions according to a triple principle, namely: essence as essence, as intellect, as will.
72 Contra: Nihil producit se, - ergo est distinctio inter essentiam et primam personam. Confirmatur ratio per auctoritatem Magistri, qui - distinctione 5 - propter eam negat essentiam gignere vel gigni; pari ratione negandum videtur ab ipsa 'producere'.	72. On the contrary: Nothing produces itself – therefore there is a distinction between the essence and the first person. The reason is confirmed by the authority of the Master who – in distinction 5 [ch.1 n.58] – denies, because of this, that the essence generates or is generated; by parity of reason it seems one should deny that it produces ‘from itself’.
73 Item, haec productio non est generatio, quia 'Pater est ingenitus'; nec spiratio, patet, - nec sunt aliae in divinis.	73. Again, this production is not generation, because ‘the Father is unbegotten’; nor is it inspiriting, as is plain, – and there are no others in divine reality.
74 Item, actio est suppositi; ergo essentia est quartum suppositum.	74. Again, action is of a supposit; therefore the essence is a fourth supposit.
75 Potest dici quod aliquid producti bene potest producere totum, quando illud 'aliquid' est prius per se ens, et habens in virtute reliquum quod concurrit cum ipso in composito. Exemplum non est, in creaturis, in productione substantiali (quia ibi non praeest nisi materia, quae non habet virtualiter formam), sed bene est exemplum in productione accidentali: ubicumque subiectum habet active accidens, ipsum producit compositum illud, - sicut aqua, prius calefacta et postea sibi derelicta, producit aquam friƿgidam . Ita diceretur hic quod essentia ' per se ens ' in omnino primo signo - quando relatio pullulat - producit se in persona relativa, sive magis proprie: communicat se illi.	75. One could say that something belonging to the produced can well produce the whole, when that ‘something’ is first a per se being and in virtue possesses the rest of what concurs with it in the composite. There is no example, in the case of creatures, in substantial production (because there only matter pre-exists, which does not virtually have form), but there is very well an example in accidental production; wherever a subject has an accident actively, it produces the composite, – just as water, first made hot and afterwards left to itself, produces cold water. So one might say here that the essence, a ‘per se being’ in the altogether first moment – when relation is burgeoning – produces itself in a relative person, or more properly: communicates itself to it.
76 Ad formam rationis: conceditur antecedens, prout 'se' refert praecise idem, - et sic consequens, quod 'est distinctio' (hoc est, non omnimoda identitas essentiae ad personam relatam, quia ipsa includit aliquid praeter essentiam).	76. To the form of the reasoning [n.72]: the antecedent is conceded, insofar as ‘itself’ refers precisely to the same thing [sc. nothing produces itself], – and so the consequent is conceded, because ‘there is a distinction’ (that is, not a complete identity of essence with the related person, because it includes something in addition to the essence).
77 Ad secundum: haec potest dici 'generatio', et productio Verbi 'dictio', - sicut si ignis esset intelligens, igneitate gigneret et intellectu diceret.	77. To the second [n.73]: this production can be called ‘generation’, and the production of the Word ‘saying’, – just as if fire were intelligent, it would generate by firey-ness and would say by intellect.
78 Ad tertium: forma 'per se ens', id est non inhaerens ut accidens (vel forma substantialis vel quiditas) supposito, potest esse agens; nec tamen est suppositum, quia non est incommunicabilis. Sic videntur evadi tres rationes.	78. To the third [n.74]: form as ‘per se being’, that is not inhering as an accident (whether substantial form or quiddity) in a supposit, can be an agent; however it is not a supposit, because it is not incommunicable. Thus the three reasons seem to escape [nn.72-74].
79 Sed restant insolutae duae auctoritates: prima, confirmans rationem primam, scilicet auctoritas Magistri, - alia in secunda ratione, quod Augustinus dicit Patrem esse ingenitum. ƿ	79. But there remain two authorities unsolved: the first, confirming the first reason, namely the authority of the Master [n.72] – the other in the second reason, that Augustine says the Father is unbegotten [n.73].
80 Propter primam posset dici quod in omnino primo signo non tantum est 'deitas, per se ens', sed 'hic Deus', et ille producit se Patrem; et tunc evaditur haec - logica - 'essentia producit', licet ille producat in quo nihil est nisi essentia. Sic corrigitur dicta via quantum ad summum.	80. Because of the first authority one can say that in altogether the first moment there is not only ‘deity, a per se being’, but ‘this God’, and he produces himself as Father; and then this – the logic – is avoided ‘the essence produces’, although it produce in something in which there is nothing but essence. Thus the first way [nn.70-71] is corrected as to its sum.
81 Propter secundam auctoritatem posset dici quod sancti supponentes primam proprietatem esse in essentia, undecumque pullulaverit (quia de hoc non quaerebant tunc), habuerunt primum suppositum et non loquebantur nisi de productione suppositi a supposito; ideo dixerunt illam personam esse improductam 'quae non producitur a supposito'. Consimiliter dixerunt relationes originis oppositas 'non posse esse nisi in distinctis suppositis', - quod verum est si utraque sit suppositi, sed non si una sit alicuius 'per se entis' singularis et non suppositi, puta 'huius Dei'. Et ratio est, quia 'singulare non suppositum' potest se communicare, et ita non distingui a producto: quia enim est 'singulare per se ens', ideo potest agere, - quia 'non suppositum', ideo communicari potest; suppositum autem numquam se communicat, et ideo si producit suppositum, producit distinctum, cuius ipsum nihil est.	81. Because of the second authority from Augustine one could say that the saints who suppose there is a first property in the essence, from wherever it burgeons (because they were not then investigating that), had a first supposit and were not speaking save of production of supposit by supposit; therefore they said that that person is unproduced ‘which is not produced by a supposit’ [n.19]. Likewise they said that the opposed relations of origin ‘could only be in distinct supposits’, – which is true if each relation belongs to a supposit but not if one belongs to another singular ‘per se being’ and not to a supposit, namely ‘to this God’. And the reason is that ‘a singular non-supposit’ can communicate itself, and so is not distinguished from the product; for because it is ‘a singular per se being’, therefore it can act, – because it is not a supposit, therefore it can be communicated; but a supposit never communicates itself, and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces a distinct one, nothing of which it is.
82 Qualiter improbatur haec phantasia, tam dissona dictis sanctorum? ƿQuamvis in divinis negetur omnis prioritas secundum naturam, et tantum concedatur prioritas originis communiter (vel prioritas secundum naturalem intelligentiam), tamen omni modo oportet aliquam prioritatem dare essentiae respectu relationis: tum quia fundamentum (secundum omnes), tum quia formaliter infinita, relatio non, - tum quia qualitercumque distinguantur, non sunt ex aequo omnino prima, nec relatio prior. Merito ergo quaeritur unde essentia determinat sibi proprietatem primam, et cum non inveniatur aliud determinans (quia semper est eadem quaestio unde essentia habet illud, nisi procedatur in infinitum), standum est quod essentia ex se praecise determinat in se ut in fundamento primam relationem. Falsa est ergo illa radix 'nullum indeterminatum ex se ad aliqua, determinat se ex se ad aliquod illorum', sicut bene habetur hic intra, de duplici indeterminato et duplici primitate, adaequationis et immediationis.	82. How is this phantasy to be refuted, so dissonant to the sayings of the saints [Augustine, Anselm, nn.79-81]? Although in divine reality all priority in nature is denied and only a priority of origin is commonly conceded (or a priority according to natural intelligence), yet there must in every way be some priority given to essence in respect of relation; both because it is the foundation (according to everyone), and because it is formally infinite but relation is not, – and because however they are distinguished they are not equally altogether first, nor is relation prior. Rightly then is the question raised [n.69] of whence essence determines the first property for itself – and since no other determining factor is found (because there is always the same question of whence the essence has it, unless one proceeds ad infinitum), one must stand at the fact the essence of itself precisely determines the first relation in itself as in a foundation. False then is this root claim that ‘nothing undetermined of itself to certain things determines itself of itself to any of them’, as is well maintained here, about the double indeterminate and the double primacy, of adequation and immediacy [nn.100-107].
83 Sed restat dubium: quam circumstantiam principii notat 'ex' vel 'de', cum dicitur 'essentia ex se determinat sibi proprietatem primam'? Et si fugias, quod ibi non dicit rationem principii alicuius sed excludit comparticeps principium, non obstat; quaero enim quomodo essentia determinat, in ratione cuius principii est respectu proprietatis? ƿEt dicit via hic sub, quod producentis, quia sine illa non est ratio principii formalis nec materialis, et quia forma activa 'per se ens' per se agit (de qua propositione quaere distinctione 7, extra), et propter congruentiam de triplici principio productivo (ex qua congruentia fit una instantia distinctione 2 quaestione 'De duabus productionibus'); sed corrigitur quod 'hic Deus' producit Patrem, non autem essentia, proprie loquendo.	83. But a doubt remains: what circumstance of the principle is indicated by ‘from’ or ‘of’ when it is said that ‘the essence of itself determines the first property for itself’? And if you would escape, because it does not state there the idea of any principle but excludes a principle that is a joint participant, that is no obstacle; for I ask how the essence determines, or by reason of what principle is it in respect of the property? And the way here [nn.70-71] says that it is by reason of the principle of the producer, because without it there is no idea of formal or material principle, and because active form as ‘per se being’ per se acts (about which proposition see distinction 7 n.74), and because of the congruence of the triple productive principle [n.71] (from which congruence an instance was made in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Two Productions’ [n.304]); but the correction is made that ‘this God’ produces the Father, but not the essence properly speaking [n.80].
84 Sed contra istam viam, hic ante fiunt tres rationes et tres auctoritates. Videntur omnes evadi aliqualiter. Sed quia male sonat primam personam esse productam, potest dici quod essentia determinat sibi primam proprietatem in ratione principii formalis, non quidem informantis sed sicut quiditas dicitur forma suppositi, et quod quiditas non causabilis necessario sic formaliter determinat sibi aliquod suppositum (sicut pagani ponerent de supposito absoluto, nos autem de primo relativo); et ratio est, quia talis quiditas se ipsa sistit se et se ipsa est alicuius quiditas.	84. But against this way three reasons and three authorities were here before brought forward. All seem to escape in some way [n.78]. But because it does not sound right that the first person is produced, one can say that the essence determines the first property for itself by reason of formal principle, not indeed as in-forming but as quiddity is said to be the form of the supposit, and that a non necessarily causable quiddity formally determines some supposit for itself (the way the pagans would posit it about an absolute supposit, but we about the first relative); and the reason is that such a quiddity itself stops itself and is itself the quiddity of something.
85 Tunc ad illa pro via alia Ad primum dico quod omnem formam informantem praecedit causa efficiens (ideo primum efficiens non habet sic formam), sed non omnem formam quiditativam ' dantem esse supƿposito' praecedit efficiens vel producens, quia hic non est causa et causa intrinseca compositi quas oportet uniri per agens, sed est perfecta entitas, quae se ipsa est entis in ipsa.	85. Then to the arguments for the other way [n.83]: To the first I say that every in-forming form is preceded by an efficient cause (and so the first efficient cause does not thus have the form), but not every quidditative form ‘giving being to a supposit’ is preceded by an efficient or producing cause, because here there is not a cause and a cause intrinsic to the composite that need to be united by the agent but there is perfect entity, which itself belongs in itself to being.
86 Quod si obicias ' vel essentiam informare proprietatem, vel e converso', - responsum est distinctione 5: ((Neutrum est, sed est perfecta identitas)), quae identitas non habet principium efficiens, sed habet quiditatem in ratione principii formalis, illius cui se ipsa primo est eadem.	86. But if you object that ‘either the essence in-forms the property or conversely’, – a response was given in distinction 5 n.137: “Neither is the case, but there is perfect identity,” which identity does not have an efficient principle, but it has the quiddity, in idea of formal principle, of that with which it is itself first identical.
87 Ad secundum quaere responsionem distinctione 7.	87. As to the second [n.83], seek the response in distinction 7 n.75.
88 Ad tertium: ista via bene salvat congruentiam, quia essentiae, ut essentia et ut prior omni ratione potentiae, est dare esse formaliter, et sic determinat se; ut autem talis et talis potentia, eius est principiare. Itaque duo principia productiva, - unicum non productivum ex se solo, sed dativum esse formaliter primo supposito.	88. As to the third: this way [n.84] well preserves congruence, because the essence as essence and as prior to every idea of power exists to give being formally, and thus it determines itself; but as it is such and such a power, to be principle belongs to it. Therefore there are two productive principles – a single one non-productive from itself alone, but giving of being formally to the first supposit.
89 Aliter ponitur, tenendo conclusionem oppositam istis tribus opinionibus, - quia prima persona non constituitur relatione aliqua ad secundam personam (et hoc, loquendo de primo constitutivo illius personae in esse personali), sed aliqua realitate ƿabsoluta non quiditativa, sicut tactum est in opinione tertia distinctionis 26.	89. Another position is set down by holding a conclusion opposite to these three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65], – because the first person is not constituted by any relation to the second person (and this when speaking of what is first constitutive of that person in personal being), but by some absolute non-quidditative reality, as was touched on in the third opinion in distinction 26 nn.56-59.
90 Pro hac opinione arguitur specialiter de prima persona, quia ingenitum praeintelligitur paternitati et ingenito videtur praeintelligi aliqua realitas propria primae personae; ergo cum illa non possit esse realitas relativa, erit aliqua absoluta, propria illi personae. Probatio assumpti: tum per Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 6, ((si non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum esse ingenitum)); tum quia fecunditas ad aliquam productionem in divinis non intelligitur 'quasi potentia proxima' nisi ut est in non habente illam fecunditatem per actum illius fecunditatis, sicut voluntas non intelligitur fecunda ad spirandum 'ut in aliqua persona' nisi in qua est ut non communicata fecunditate voluntatis. Et ideo videtur communiter concedi quod vi spirativae in Patre et Filio praeintelligitur non haberi voluntatem per spirationem; ergo a simili hic, fecunditati generandi 'ut est quasi potentia propinqua' videtur praeintelligi innascibilitas, quae notat eam non haberi per actum fecunditatis intellectus, scilicet generationis. - Probatio secundi, ex improbatione opinionis praecedentis in quaestione praecedente. ƿ	90. For this opinion argument is given in particular about the first person, because unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity, and to unbegotten seems to be pre-understood some reality proper to the first person; therefore since it cannot be a relative reality, it will be some absolute one, proper to that person. Proof of the assumption: both from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “if he had not generated, nothing would have prevented him from being unbegotten;” and because fecundity for some production in divine reality is not understood as ‘quasi proximate power’ save as it is in something that does not have that fecundity through an act of that fecundity, just as the will is not understood to be fecund for inspiriting ‘as it is in some person’ save in a person in whom it exists as non-communicated by fecundity of the will. And therefore it seems to be commonly conceded that it is pre-understood to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son that the will is not had through inspiriting; therefore by similarity here, being unable to be born seems to be preunderstood to the fecundity of generating ‘as it is a quasi proximate power’, and this being unable to be born indicates that it is not had by act of fecundity of the intellect, that is by act of generation. – Proof of the second assumption, from the rejection of the preceding opinion in the preceding question [nn.44-46].
91 Praeterea, nulla relativa primo referuntur invicem, ita quod relatum 'ut relatum' terminet primo relationem (patet in creaturis), quia relatum 'ut relatum' requirit illud ad quod refertur ad sui esse et ad sui definitionem; ergo illud ad quod refertur est aliquo modo prius relato ut relatum. Similiter e converso, ipsum ut terminans referretur; ergo pari ratione tequireret illud ad quod refertur propter esse sui et definitionem sui. Ergo circulus esset in coexigendo, ex hoc quod utrumque exigeret alterum sicut prius essentialiter se, ut definiens se; sed circulum esse in prioritate essentiali est impossibile; ergo impossibile est relativum 'ut relativum' - eo quod dependet a correlativo ut ad terminum - esse terminum dependentiae alterius correlativi. Et a simili videtur in proposito, quod relativum non refertur primo ad relativum ut ad terminum; ergo secunda persona si referatur ad primam, oportet ponere aliquod absolutum ut terminum huius relationis: non est autem illud absolutum essentia, quia sicut non refertur, ita non terminat relationem, quia non distinguitur; ergo est absolutum personale, quod potest distingui a secunda persona.	91. Further, no relatives are first referred to each other, such that a related thing ‘as related’ is the first term of the relation (the thing is plain in creatures), because the related thing ‘as related’ requires that to which it is referred for its being and for its definition; therefore that to which it is referred is in some way prior to the related thing as related. Likewise conversely, it would be referred as being the term; therefore by parity of reasoning it would require that to which it is referred for its being and its definition. Therefore there would be a circle in joint requirement, from the fact that each would require the other as essentially prior to itself, as defining it; but a circle in essential priority is impossible; therefore it is impossible for a relative ‘as relative’ – by the fact it depends on its correlative as term – to be the term of dependence of the other correlative. And by similarity so does it seem in the issue at hand, that a relative is not first referred to the relative as to the term; therefore the second person, if he is referred to the first, should posit some absolute thing as the term of this relation; but that absolute thing is not the essence, because as the essence is not referred, so it is not the term of a relation, because it is not distinguished; therefore there is some personal absolute thing which can be distinguished from the second person.
92 Contra istam opinionem arguitur quasi esset haeretica, sed tacta sunt argumenta et responsiones distinctione 26, modo transeo. ƿ	92. Against this opinion [n.89] an argument is given that it is quasi heretical, but the arguments were touched on and responses given in distinction 26 [nn.60-64, 73-83], – now I pass them over.
93 Ad quaestionem istam - cui non placet ultima opinio de personis absolutis - potest dici tenendo communem viam (supponendo scilicet personas esse relativas), quod prima persona eonstituitur relatione positiva ad secundam, quia nullo alio, sicut argutum est ad oppositum per viam divisionis. Nec oportet distinguere qualiter ista relatio consideretur ut est constitutivum; quomodocumque enim varietur secundum considerationem, eadem est in re, - et secundum quod est in re, constituit personam realem.	93. To this question [n.52] – for someone who does not like the last opinion about absolute persons [n.89] – one can say, by holding the common way (namely by supposing that the persons are relative), that the first person is constituted by a positive relation to the second, because by nothing else, as was argued for the opposite by way of division [n.55]. Nor is it necessary to distinguish how this relation may be considered as it is constitutive; for however it is may vary in consideration, it is the same in reality, – and according to what it is in reality, it constitutes a real person [n.67].
94 Nec est difficultas aliqua, nisi quomodo requirat secundam personam simul secum, cum tamen praecedat. Breviter dico quod simultas correlativorum - qua dicuntur esse 'simul natura' - est ista simultas, scilicet non posse esse 'sine invicem' sine contradictione, si sint relativa mutua: nam una relatio non potest esse sine termino, quia si posset esse sine eo, esset ens ad se; pari ratione, nec relatio alia sibi correspondens potest esse sine isto termino, quia tunc esset ad se; ergo istae duae relationes, quando sunt mutuae, non possunt esse 'sine invicem' sine contradictione. Omne autem 'prius natura' potest esse sine contradictione sine posteriore, ita quod si ponatur hoc esse sine ƿillo, non esset contradictio; patet per Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. 'De priore'.	94. Nor is there any difficulty save how it requires the second person to be simultaneous with it, although however it precedes him [n.52]. In brief I say that the simultaneity of correlatives – whereby they are said to be ‘together by nature’ [n.53] – is this simultaneity, namely not to be able to be ‘without each other’ without contradiction, if they are mutual relatives; for one relation cannot be without its term, because if it could be without it, it would be a being to itself; by parity of reason neither can the other relation corresponding to it be without the former term, because then it would exist to itself; therefore these two relations, when they are mutual, cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction. But everything ‘prior in nature’ can exist without a posterior without contradiction, such that if the former be posited without the latter there would be no contradiction; the thing is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.11.1019a1-4, the chapter ‘On the Prior’.
95 Isto modo concedo primam personam et secundam non posse esse 'sine invicem' absque contradictione (et non est contradictio ex aliquo extrinseco sed ex formali ratione istarum personarum), et tamen cum hoc stat prioritas originis, quod una sit ab altera. Quod declaratur primo, quia si Socrates sit pater Platonis, Socrates non est intellectus ut subiectum paternitatis sed ut sub paternitate, et Plato intellectus ut sub filiatione; ista sunt simul natura, quia sic intelliguntur ut correlativa, - et tamen ut sic, Socrates est prior origine Platone, quia sic intelligitur sub paternitate, quae est formaliter prioritas originis. Ergo videtur quod eodem quo aliquid est prius origine in creaturis, est etiam simul natura cum eodem, eo modo quo simultas naturae requiritur ad correlativa.	95. In this way I concede that the first person and the second person cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction (and the contradiction is not from something extrinsic but from the formal idea of these persons), and yet there stands along with this a priority of origin, because one is from the other. Which point is made clear first by the fact that if Socrates is father of Plato, Socrates is not understood as subject of paternity but as under paternity, and Plato is understood as under filiation; these exist together in nature, because they are thus understood as correlatives, – and yet as such Socrates is prior in origin to Plato, because he is understood thus under paternity, which is formally a priority of origin. Therefore it seems in the same way that what is prior in origin in creatures is also simultaneous in nature with the same thing, in the way that simultaneity of nature is required for correlatives.
96 Hoc etiam - secundo - persuadetur, quia prioritas naturae uno modo est prioritas secundum perfectionem, ita quod priora dicuntur esse perfectiora secundum naturam IX Metaphysicae cap. 7. Nunc autem cum simultate correlativorum secundum naturam, videtur posse stare prioritas secundum perfectionem in uno respectu alterius, - quia si genus relationis dividatur per proprias differentias oppositas sicut alia genera, una differentia divisiva erit dignior et alia indignior $a (quia duae species non sunt ƿaequales, VIII Metaphysicae), a$ et per consequens species constituta minus nobili differentia, erit minus nobilis; et cum duae species constitutae ex duabus differentiis oppositis possint referri sibi invicem $a (quia omnis relatio disquiparantiae est ad aliquid alterius speciei), a$ ergo relationum sibi correspondentium altera potest esse prior - id est perfectior - alia, et tamen simul natura, quantum ad hoc quod est 'non posse esse sine se invicem'. Igitur multo magis videtur etiam quod prioritas originis - qua scilicet extremum unum in natura non excedit aliud extremum, sed est 'a quo aliud' - possit stare cum illa simultate correlativorum.	96. The point is also made persuasive – secondly – by the fact that priority of nature is in one way priority according to perfection, such that prior things are said to be more perfect in nature, Metaphysics 9.8.1050a7-9. But now along with simultaneity of correlatives in nature it seems there can stand priority in perfection in one of them with respect to the other, – because if the genus of relation is divided through proper opposed differences as other genera are, one of the dividing differences will be more worthy and the other more unworthy (because two species are not equal, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32- 44a11), and consequently a species constituted by a less noble difference will be less noble; and since two species constituted from two opposed differences can be referred to each other (because every relation of inequality is referred to something of a different species), therefore in the case of relations corresponding to each other one can be prior – that is more perfect – than the other, and yet simultaneous in nature, as far as what is meant by ‘not able to be without each other’. Therefore much more does it also seem that priority of origin – namely by which one extreme in nature does not exceed the other extreme but is ‘from which another is’ – can stand along with simultaneity of correlatives.
97 $a Confirmatur per illud Augustini De quantitate animae ((aequalitatem inaequalitati iure praeponis)), - et loquitur non ratione fundamenti, quia ex nobilitate aequalitatis concludit fundamentum esse nobilius cui convenit quam illud cui non convenit (patet ibi de circulo et aliis figuris); igitur relatio habet propriam nobilitatem in suo genere. Sic una nobilior alia, et tamen duae species correlativae, quandocumque est relatio disquiparantiae. a$	97. There is a confirmation from the remark of Augustine On the Quantity of the Soul ch.9 n.15: “you rightly put equality before inequality,” – and he is speaking not by reason of foundation, because from the nobility of equality he concludes that the foundation to which it belongs is more noble than the foundation to which it does not belong (the thing is plain there about circle and other figures); therefore a relation has a proper nobility in its genus. Thus one relation is nobler than another, and yet they are two correlative species, whenever there is a relation of inequality.
98 Ad hoc etiam adducitur Avicenna VI Metaphysicae, ubi videtur velle quod causa 'in quantum causa' prior sit causato in quantum causatum, et tamen causa 'in quantum causa' simul est cum causato, simultate requisita ad correlativa. Ista autem prioritas ƿnaturae, quae est causae ad causatum, videtur magis repugnare simultati naturae correlativorum quam prioritas originis tantum!	98. For this is also adduced Avicenna Metaphysics VI ch.2 (91vb-92ra), where he seems to intend the cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ to be prior to the caused insofar as it is caused, and yet a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is simultaneous with the caused, with the simultaneity required for correlatives. But this priority of nature, which is of the cause to the caused, seems more repugnant to the simultaneity in nature of correlatives than is the priority of origin alone!
99 Tunc breviter: prima persona constituitur in esse personali per relationem positivam ad secundam, et e converso, et impossibile est eas esse sine invicem; et tamen ipsa prima persona, constituta in tali esse, est prior origine persona secunda (ita quod prima persona, constituta in tali esse, est 'a qua originata est secunda') et ita prioritas originis non repugnat simultati relativorum.	99. Then briefly: the first person is constituted in personal being by a positive relation to the second, and conversely, and it is impossible for them to be without each other; and yet the first person himself, constituted in such being, is prior in origin to the second person (such that the first person, constituted in such being, is ‘from whom the second is originated’), and so priority of origin is not repugnant to simultaneity of relatives.
100 Sed aliud est dubium (quod tactum est contra illas tres opiniones), scilicet: quo essentia determinatur ad primam subsistentiam ? Ad hoc dico quod quandocumque aliquid est illimitatum in aliqua ratione causae, ita quod correspondent sibi plura in altero extremo (vel aliquid unum, continens plura), si inter illa plura sit aliquis ordo vel absolute vel in se, habendo ad illud illimitatum aliquem respectum, tunc non idem est 'primum' respectu talis illimitati - et hoc loquendo de primitate adaequationis - et 'primum' primitate immediationis.	100. But there is another doubt (which was touched on against the three opinions [n.69]), namely: by what is essence determined to the first subsistence? To this I say that whenever something is unlimited in some idea of cause, such that there correspond to it several things in the other extreme (or some one thing that contains many things), if there is some order among those several things, whether absolutely or in itself, having some respect to that unlimited thing, then what is ‘first’ with respect to such unlimited thing – and this when speaking of the primacy of adequacy – is not the same as what is ‘first’ with the primacy of immediacy.
101 Exemplum huius, - primo in causa efficiente, ubi est manifestius: Si sol 'ut causa' illuminet totum medium, et tamen est quasi agens illimitatum cui correspondent plures partes medii illuminatae, et inter istas partes est ordo aliquis, quia prius illuminatur pars propinquior quam remotior, - primum correspondens soli ƿut illuminanti est totum medium ut includit omnes partes: primum, inquam, quasi adaequatum; non tamen est primum ut immediatum, sed pars propinquior soli immediatius illuminatur quam pars remotior.	101. An example of this – first in the efficient cause, where it is more manifest: If the sun ‘as cause’ illumines the whole medium, and yet is a quasi unlimited agent to which many parts of the illumined medium correspond, and there is some order between these parts, because the first illumined part is closer than a more remote one, – the first thing corresponding to the sun as it illumines is the whole medium as it includes all the parts; first, I say, as adequate; however it is not first as immediate, but a part nearer the sun is more immediately illumined than a more remote part.
102 Ita in forma: Accipiendo animam intellectivam (quae est forma aliquo modo illimitata), correspondet sibi pro primo perfectibili corpus organicum, includens in se multas partes perfectibiles; primum ergo perfectibile animae intellectivae, id est adaequatum, est totum corpus organicum. Sed quia in partibus huius totius est ordo originis, vel in se vel in habendo animam (quia primum est cor, deinde aliae partes, - XVI De animalibus), ideo ista forma non primo - id est aeque immediate - perficit totum, sed sic primo perficit cor et mediante ipso alias partes. Si ergo anima esset tota essentia cordis et manus per identitatem, et tamen daret eis esse distinctum quale modo dat (licet in toto), et cum hoc cor et manus non essent partes eiusdem totius (quia hoc esset imperfectionis) sed essent supposita distincta, - esset adhuc anima propter sui illimitationem habens corpus organicum pro adaequato perfectibili (sive omnia habens illa tunc supposita, quae modo sunt partes corporis, pro uno adaequato), et tamen haberet unum illorum quod scilicet est primum origine - pro primo, scilicet immediate perfectibili.	102. So in the case of form: By taking the intellective soul (which is in some way an unlimited form), the organic body corresponds to it as the first perfectible thing, including in itself many perfectible parts; so the first perfectible thing, that is adequate thing, for the intellective soul is the whole organic body. But because in the parts of this whole there is an order of origin, either in itself or in having the soul (because the heart is first, then the other parts, Generation of Animals 2.4.740a1-30, 5-6.741b15-31), therefore this form does not first – that is equally immediately – perfect the whole, but it thus first perfects the heart and through its mediation the other parts. If then the soul were the whole essence of heart and hand by identity, and yet it were to give them a distinct being of the sort it now gives (although within the whole), and if along with this the heart and hand were not parts of the same whole (because this would be a mark of imperfection) but they were distinct supposits, – still the soul would, because of its unlimitedness, have the organic body for adequate perfectible (or would then have all those as supposits, which are now parts of the body, for its one adequate object), and yet it would have one of them – namely the one that is first in origin – for first object, namely for immediately perfectible.
103 Ita potest dici universaliter in omni illimitato, cui correspondent plura inter quae est aliquis ordo, propter quem, unum illorum immediatius respicitur ab illo illimitato quam alterum.	103. So can it be said universally in the case of every unlimited thing, to which there correspond several things between which there is some order, because of which order one of those things is more immediately regarded by that unlimited thing than another is.
104 Ita in proposito: essentia divina non habet aliquam subsistenƿtiam unam primam, id est adaequatam sibi (quia tunc non posset esse in alia), sed sic adaequantur tres subsistentiae illi naturae; tamen in istis tribus est ordo in habendo naturam, et ideo essentia una primitate - scilicet immediationis - respicit primum illorum ordinatorum, ita quod sicut essentia ex se primo esset in tribus si esset in eis sine ordine (et hoc tam primitate adaequationis quam primitate immediationis), ita nunc ex se est in tribus primitate adaequationis, - sed non immediationis, sed in primo illorum, et virtute illius in aliis, quibus communicatur ab illo primo.	104. So in the issue at hand: the divine essence does not have some one first subsistent, that is one that is adequate to itself (because then it could not be in another one), but three subsistents are in this way adequate to that nature; yet in those three there is an order in having the nature, and so the essence by one primacy – namely the primacy of immediacy – respects the first of those ordered things, such that just as the essence of itself would be first in the three if it were in them without order (and this both with the primacy of adequacy and with the primacy of immediacy), so now it is of itself in the three by primacy of adequacy – but not by primacy of immediacy, but thus it is in the first of them and by virtue of it in the others, to which it is communicated by that first one.
105 Cum ergo quaeris 'per quid est essentia in prima persona', dico quod ex se. Et si adhuc velis dicere quod non, sed per proprietatem determinantem, eadem quaestio est: 'per quid determinatur ad proprietatem determinantem', sive 'per quid pullulat primo in essentia divina illa proprietas'? Et tunc vel oportet procedere in infinitum, vel oportet stare ad hoc quod essentia de se sit primo (id est adaequate) in tribus, et esset de se immediate in tribus si non haberent ordinem, et quod ipsa est de se immediate in primo illorum trium habentium ordinem.	105. When therefore you ask ‘by what is the essence in the first person?’ [n.100], I say that it is so from itself. And if you still wish to say no, but that it is so through a determining property, there is the same question: ‘by what is it determined to the determining property?’, or ‘by what does that property first burgeon in the divine essence?’ And then either one must proceed ad infinitum or one must make a stand at the fact that the essence is of itself first (that is adequately) in the three, and that it is of itself immediately in the first of the three as they possess order.
106 Et si quaeras 'unde determinatur essentia ad primam personam, - et si ex se determinatur, igitur non potest esse in alia', respondeo: Determinatio duplex est, opposita duplici indeterminationi. Una est indeterminatio 'ad opposita contradictorie' (sicut materia indeterminata est ad formam et privationem), alia est ' ad ƿdiversa positiva', quae tamen stat cum determinatione ad alteram partem utriusque contradictionis (exemplum huius secundi: si sol est indeterminatus ad producendum vermem et plantam tamquam ad diversa positiva, cum tamen ex se sit determinatus ad alteram partem contradictionis - tam huius quam illius - sicut si esset agens particulare, tantum natum producere unum illorum). Tunc dico in proposito quod essentia ex se determinatur ad primam personam determinatione opposita indeterminationi primae, quae est ad contradictoria; non tamen determinatione opposita secundae indeterminationi, quia illa non staret cum illimitatione ad plura.	106. And if you ask ‘by what is the essence determined to the first person, – and if it is determined of itself, then it cannot be in another’, I reply: Determination is double, opposed to a double indetermination. One is indetermination ‘to contradictory opposites’ (as matter is indeterminate to form and privation), the other is indetermination ‘to diverse positives’, which however stand together with determination to one part of each contradiction (an example of the second: if the sun is indeterminate to producing a worm and a plant as to diverse positives, although however it is of itself determined to one part of the contradiction – both of the former and of the latter – just as if it were a particular agent only of a nature to produce one of them). Then I say in the case of the issue at hand that the essence is of itself determined to the first person by a determination opposed to the first indetermination, which is to contradictories; not however by a determination opposed to the second indetermination, because that does not stand along with unlimitedness to several things.
107 Et per hoc patet ad argumentum ' si ex se determinatur ad istam, ergo non potest esse in alia'. Consequentia tenet loquendo de determinatione secunda, quae opponitur illimitationi ad plura, - et hoc modo non determinatur essentia ad unam sed ad tres subsistentias, quia ista determinatio est ad 'primum' adaequatum; non autem tenet consequentia loquendo de determinatione primo modo, quia illa est ad 'primum' immediatum (non adaequatum), et stat cum illimitatione sic indeterminati ad plura. ƿ	107. And hereby is plain the answer to the argument ‘if it is determined of itself then it cannot be in another person’ [n.106]. The consequence holds when speaking of the second determination, which is opposed to unlimitedness to several things, – and in this way the essence is not determined to one subsistent but to three, because this determination is to an adequate ‘first’; but the consequence does not hold when speaking of determination in the first way, because that is to an immediate ‘first’ (not an adequate one), and it stands along with unlimitedness of such undetermined thing to several things.
108 Ad primum argumentum principale patet ex dictis, quia primum suppositum praecedit secundum origine, et tamen sunt simul natura sicut requiritur ad relativa.	108. To the first principal argument [n.52] the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.94-99], that the first supposit precedes the second in origin, and yet they are simultaneous in nature as is required for relatives.
109 Et cum tu arguis quod primum suppositum praecedit generationem, ergo et secundum, - respondeo quod in antecedente potest intelligi generatio activa et passiva. Si generatio activa, nego, immo primum suppositum est generatio activa subsistens; quia quomodocumque intelligatur ista relatio, non est differentia in re, dicendo 'Patrem subsistere', vel 'generationem subsistere', vel ' generativitatem subsistere ' . Si autem intelligatur in antecedente de generatione passiva, concedo quod prima persona sicut praecedit origine Filium, ita praecedet origine generationem passivam.	109. And you argue that the first supposit precedes generation, therefore the second does too [n.52], – I reply that in the antecedent both active and passive generation can be understood. If active generation, I deny the antecedent, nay the first supposit is subsistent active generation; because, however this relation is understood, there is no difference in reality when saying ‘the Father subsists’ or ‘generation subsists’ or ‘generativity subsists’. But if in the antecedent the understanding is about passive generation, I concede that the first person, as he precedes the Son in origin, so he precedes passive generation in origin.
110 Et cum arguis 'ergo Filius praecedit eandem generationem passivam, quia est simul cum Patre', - ista consequentia non valet, quia non est isto modo simul cum Patre, quo modo Pater est prior generatione passiva: Filius enim est simul natura cum Patre (sicut ƿpertinet ad correlativa), Pater autem praecedit generationem passivam non sic, sed origine. Nunc autem ista propositio 'quando aliqua sunt simul, quocumque est unum prius, et reliquum' falsa est, nisi intelligatur de simultate eiusdem rationis cum illa prioritate et posterioritate: sicut ista est falsa 'si aliqua sunt simul tempore, quidquid est prius natura uno, et altero'; sed ista est vera ' sunt simul tempore, - igitur quidquid est prius tempore, uno, et altero'.	110. And when you argue ‘therefore the Son precedes the same passive generation because he is simultaneous with the Father’ [n.53], – this inference is not valid, because he is not simultaneous with the Father in the way in which the Father is prior to passive generation; for the Son is simultaneous in nature with the Father (as pertains to correlatives), but the Father precedes passive generation not in this way but in origin. But now this proposition ‘when certain things are simultaneous, in whatever way one of them is prior the other is too’ [n.53] is false, unless it be understood of simultaneity of the same idea as the priority and posteriority; just as this proposition is false ‘if certain things are simultaneous in time, whatever is prior in nature to one is prior in nature also to the other’; but this proposition is true ‘they are simultaneous in time, – therefore what is prior in time to one is prior in time also to the other’.
111 Ad secundum argumentum dico quod vera est illa maior in ordine essentiarum, quia ibi intelligitur in perfectionibus quiditativis, et status est ad perfectionem quiditativam infinitam, quae est absoluta. Sed in personis habentibus eandem naturam, distinctis tantum per originem (sicut oportet intelligere in proposito, secundum communem opinionem), propositio maior est falsa, quia ibi 'primum' praecise est id quod est formaliter praecise ad secundum.	111. To the second argument [n.54] I say that the major is true in the order of essences, because there it is understood in quidditative perfections, and a stand is made at infinite quidditative perfection, which is absolute. But in persons that have the same nature, and are distinct only in origin (as one must understand in the issue at hand, according to the common opinion), the major proposition is false, because there ‘first’ is precisely that which is formally precise in relation to the second.