Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D33
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| ƿ1 Circa distinctionem trigesimam tertiam, sine argumentis, quaero primo utrum proprietas sit idem cum persona; secundo, circa eandem distinctionem trigesimam tertiam, quaero - sine argumentis - utrum proprietas sit idem cum essentia; et circa distinctionem trigesimam quartam, sine argumentis, quaero an persona sit idem cum essentia. | 1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask -without arguments - whether the property is the same as the essence;a and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.[1] |
| 2 Circa istas quaestiones non oportet immorari, quia earum solutio patet ex dictis alibi, distinctione 2, quaestione illa 'Utrum cum unitate essentiae stet pluralitas personarum', - ubi ostensum est qualiter proprietas personalis non est eadem formaliter cum essentia; distinctione etiam 26, contra Praepositinum ostensum ƿest qualiter proprietas non est idem formaliter cum persona; illud etiam quod dictum est de non identitate formali proprietatis cum essentia, concludit quod persona non est idem primo formaliter cum essentia. Et quod aliqui distinguunt inter omnia ista, quod tantum differant ratione, improbatum est distinctione 2, et distinctione 8 (in simili, de attributis), et distinctione 13 (de distinctione emanationum in divinis), et alias. | 2. There is no need to dwell on these questions, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, in distinction 2 nn.388-410, the question 'whether along with unity of essence there may stand a plurality of persons', - where it was shown how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in distinction 26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what others distinguish about them, that they differ only in reason, was rejected in distinction 2 nn.389-395, and distinction 8 nn.177-190 (in a similar case, about the attributes), and in distinction 13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of the emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere. |
| 3 Et tamen cum hoc quod istud non est formaliter idem illi, stat quod vere et simpliciter est idem sibi; immo hoc est necessarium propter perfectam simplicitatem divinam, quae sequitur ex perfecta infinitate illius essentiae, - propter quam simplicitatem et infinitatem non potest illa essentia esse cum aliquo in eadem realitate, in eodem, nisi illa realitas sit perfecte eadem sibi. Et istud dictum confirmatum est per dictum commune antiquorum, qui concesserunt multas praedicationes esse veras in divinis per identitatem, non formales; quod non videtur intelligibile nisi per hoc quod praedicatum erat vere idem cum subiecto, et ex hoc, erat propositio affirmativa vera per identitatem et tamen praedicatum non erat formaliter idem subiecto, - et propter hoc non erat ibi praedicatio formalis. Et quae sit distinctio identitatis simpliciter ab identitate formali, tactum est distinctione 8 (in quaestione 'De attributis'), et alias frequenter, - ideo modo transeo. | 3. And yet along with the fact that this is not formally that, there stands the fact that it is truly and simply the same as it; nay this is necessary because of the perfect divine simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of that essence, - because of which simplicity and infinity that essence cannot exist along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as itself. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded that many predications were true in divine reality by identity, non-formal identities; which does not seem intelligible unless by the fact that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from the fact that an affirmative proposition was true by identity and yet the predicate was not formally the same as the subject - and for this reason the predication there was not formal. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in distinction 8 (in the question 'on the attributes' nn.191-122) and frequently elsewhere [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], - so now I pass it over. |
Notes
- ↑ a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] That the answer is no: On the Trinity V ch.5; one and many; in the essence; things the same as one thing, infinite; paternity, perfection simply; really; "he is wise not by that by which he is Word;" per se or per accidens.
On the contrary: there is something or nothing (something created?); again, in the person with the essence; again, four things (on the contrary: Extra: "We condemn").
Simplicity entails identity (City of God XI ch.10). Many contradictions imply some difference (Topics 7.1.152b34-35: "If one can be without the other it will not be the same").
Aquinas ST I q.28 a.2: "Relation is the same as the essence in reality," because it is not an accident but has the same being as the divine essence, - "and does not differ save by a reason of intelligence, insofar as in relation is involved a respect to the opposite that is not included in the name of essence." To the second: "In a creature, besides what is contained under the signification of the relative name, there is found another thing; in God not so, but one and the same, which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as if comprehended under the signification of such a name." To the third: "Just as in the perfection of the divine essence more is contained than what is signified by the name of wisdom," nay "than what can be comprehended under the signification of any name."
On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above the common element. - I respond in another way: a, b, c, where there is a greater distinction than among the attributes ('he is not Father by that by which he is God', as 'good', Augustine, ibid., VII ch.4 n.9).
Henry [of Ghent] Summa 56.4: "Reality of relation, as it regards the essence, it is different only in reason from that, and therefore the essence is not simpler than the person. Insofar, however, as relation is compared to opposite relation it posits a diversity of reality of the relation, not of reality of the substance; and thus they are in person and person, that is as something related to the opposite, both - essence and relation - as two things; essence as absolute thing, by which it is not distinguished, - relation as a thing of respect, by which it is distinguished. And thus although essence and relation, as they are compared among themselves, do not differ save in reason alone, yet as compared to opposites they differ in reality, but not simply but with the determination 'by reality of substance and by reality of relation', without any composition, because the difference of certain things in something does not make a composition unless it be of things compared among themselves in constituting one thing, in the way matter and form differ in constituting a natural composite."
On the contrary. Relation as it regards the essence or is compared to the opposite; and thus it differs in reality in both ways or not; then the relation is not compared. Again, relation as it constitutes regards the essence as what it is in; and because it is real, and thus it regards the foundation, for you; and because a third is not constituted unless as one thing in another; and as it constitutes it regards the opposite of the preceding term, because a person is formally relative, -therefore it is distinguished really and regards the essence under the same idea as that by which it constitutes; therefore composition!
Solution. Some distinction, not merely made by the intellect (a, b, c). How? Is it real? Henry concedes it. And Bonaventure [I Sent. d.33 a. un. q.2: "By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way of having it; in comparison with the opposite it states the thing;" to the second: "The property distinguishes in that it differs not in essence but in mode; which mode makes no composition, because it passes over into the substance, - nor does it only state an understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object."
It is shown in another way: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine ibid. VII ch.4 n.9), and a double predication; example: the identity non-adequate, not precise; 'this is that' (it is from the nature of the thing; not in potency, save only in virtue; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). Further, the distinction adds non-identity; and it is stated both virtually and non-formally.
