Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D35

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Thirty Fifth Distinction Single Question Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem trigesimam quintam quaero utrum in Deo sint relationes aeternae ad omnia scibilia ut quiditative cognita. Quod sic: Augustinus 83 Quaestionum quaestione 46: 'Ideae sunt formae aeternae et incommutabiles in mente divina'; non absolutae, ergo respectivae, - et non nisi ad alia a se ut quiditative cognita; quare distinguentur secundum distinctionem illorum.	1. About the thirty fifth distinction I ask first whether in God there are eternal relations to all knowables as quidditatively known. That there are: Augustine 83 Questions q.46 n.2: “Ideas are eternal and immutable forms in the divine mind;” not absolute forms, so respective ones, – and only to things other than himself as quidditatively known; which is why they are distinguished according to the distinction of these other things.
2 Item, Avicenna VIII Metaphysicae cap. 7 (vel ultimo) concedit in Deo esse relationem Dei, ut intelligentis, ad formas intellectas.	2. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.7 (100vb-101rb) concedes that in God there is a relation of God, as intellecting, to the understood forms.
3 Item, Deus novit distincte alia a se, ergo per aliquas distinctas rationes cognoscendi; et illae non possunt esse absolutae, ergo relativae.	3. Again, God knows distinctly things other than himself, therefore through some distinct principles of knowing; and these cannot be absolute, therefore relative.
4 Item, secundum Augustinum V Super Genesim 7: 'Omnia in ƿDeo sunt vita'; et ita videtur dicere Super Ioannem: 'Omnia in ipso vita erant', et hoc 'vita aeterna, non creata sed creatrix'. Hoc non est verum loquendo de ipsis obiectis formaliter in se, - ergo de ipsis rationibus formalibus quibus cognoscuntur.	4. Again, according to Augustine On Genesis V ch.14 n.31: “All things in God are life;” and thus does he seem to say On John tr.1 nn.16-17: “All things in him were life,” and this, “eternal life, not created but creative.” This is not true when speaking of these objects formally in themselves, – therefore of the very formal reasons by which they are known.
5 Contra: Ergo illae relationes essent reales, quod est contra dicta distinctione 30. Probatio consequentiae, quia Deus prius intelligit alia a se quam intelligat se intelligere illa, quia actus reflexus praesupponit actum rectum; ergo illae relationes quae essent in Deo ad alia, essent in Deo ex natura rei et non per actum intellectus considerantis illam intellectionem: sed quod est ibi ex natura rei, et non in obiecto ut cognitum est, est reale.	5. On the contrary: Then those relations would be real, which is contrary to what was said in distinction 30 nn.49-51. Proof of the consequence [n.1], because God understands things other than himself before he understands that he understands them, because the reflex act presupposes the direct act; therefore the relations that would be in God to other things would be in God from the nature of the thing and not by act of the intellect considering that intellection; but what is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the object as it is known, is real.
6 Praeterea, qua ratione essent relationes aeternae in Deo ad omnia cognita, pari ratione ad omnia volita ut volita, et tunc illae relationes essent reales, quia prius vult alia a se quam intelligat se velle illa, - et ita relatio voluntatis eius ad alia erit realis, quia non in obiecto ut cognitum est. ƿ	6. Further, a reason by which eternal relations to all known things would exist in God would be as equal reason for eternal relations to all willed things as willed, and then those relations would be real, because he wills things other than himself before he understands that he wills them, – and thus the relation of his will to other things will be real, because not in the object as it is known. I. To the Question
7 Supposito quod Deus sit intelligens (ex distinctione 2), et quod essentia sua sit primum obiectum in ratione sui (ex quaestione 'De subiecto theologiae'), et quod intellectus suus sit omnium intelligibilium, non quasi potentia sed actu et simul (ex distinctione 2), et hoc distincte (quia imperfectionis est in intelligente confuse intelligere), - circa istam quaestionem notandum est quod ad intellectionem alicuius tria videntur concurrere, videlicet obiectum cognoscibile, intellectus ipse et ratio cognoscendi.	7. On the supposition that God is a thing that understands (from distinction 2 nn.75-78), and that his own essence is the first object in his reason (from the question ‘About the subject of theology’ [Prol. nn.152, 200-201]), and that his intellect is of all intelligibles, not quasi in potency but in act and all at once (from distinction 2 nn.98-101), and this distinctly (because to understand confusedly is a mark of imperfection in a thing that understands, ibid. nn.105-110), – one must note about this question that for the intellection of something three things seem to come together, namely the knowable object, the intellect itself, and the reason of knowing.
8 In intellectu autem ut potentia est, non oportet ponere distinctionem ad hoc ut distincte intelligat, quia intellectus noster omnino indistinctus secundum rationem potentiae - potest plura intelligere. Ergo si est distinctio, quaeratur in obiecto, vel in ratione cognoscendi obiectum, vel in ipsa intellectione.	8. But in the intellect as it is a power there is no need to posit a distinction that it understand distinctly, because our intellect – altogether indistinct according to idea of power – can understand many things. Therefore if there is a distinction [sc. in God’s intellect for understanding many things], let it be looked for in the object, or in the reason of knowing the object, or in the intellection itself.
9 Ponitur ergo relationes aeternas esse in Deo ad alia a se, cognita simplici intelligentia, et quod istae relationes sint in essentia ut est ratio cognoscendi, propter hoc quod nihil est ratio cognoƿscendi plura nisi ut illa ratio appropriatur aliquo modo illis pluribus obiectis cognitis.	9. The position then is that the relations to things other than himself are eternal in God, known by simple intelligence, and that the relations are in the essence as it is the reason of knowing, because of the fact that nothing is a reason of knowing several things save as that reason is appropriated in some way to those several known objects.
10 Quod etiam confirmatur, quia cognitio fit per simile; ergo oportet rationem cognoscendi habere aliquam rationem propriam similitudinis ad ipsum cognitum.	10. There is a also a confirmation, that knowledge happens by likeness; therefore the reason of knowing should have some proper reason of likeness to the thing known.
11 Propter ergo istam determinationem et istam assimilationem rationis cognoscendi ad obiectum, ponuntur relationes aeternae tamquam rationes determinantes essentiam ut est ratio intelligendi, et quibus ipsa essentia sit distincte similis obiectis cognitis.	11. So because of this determination and this assimilation of the reason of knowing to the object, eternal relations are posited as reasons determining the essence as it is a reason of understanding, and by these the essence is distinctly like the known objects.
12 Aliter ponitur quod istae relationes sunt in essentia divina ut est obiectum cognitum omnino primum: intelligitur quidem 'intellectione omnino prima' ut penitus indistincta, sed ad hoc ut intelligatur creatura, prius intellectus comparat ipsam - primo ƿcognitam - ad creaturam, sub ratione imitabilis, et tunc intelligendo essentiam ut imitabilem, intelligit creaturam per illud obiectum primum, sic sub tali relatione rationis consideratum.	12. Another position is that these relations are in the divine essence as it is the altogether first know object; the divine essence indeed is understood ‘by an intellection altogether first’ as completely without distinction, but so that creatures may be understood the intellect first compares the essence – known first – to creatures under the idea of its being imitable, and then, by understanding the essence as imitable, it understands creatures through that first object, thus considered under such a relation of reason.
13 Et differt haec opinio a prima sicut isti duo modi dicendi, quorum unus poneret 'speciem eandem' esse rationem cognoscendi et principium et conclusionem, non tamen nisi ut sub distinctis relationibus rationis, correspondentibus istis cognitis sub propriis rationibus, - alius vero diceret 'ipsum principium cognitum' esse rationem cognoscendi conclusionem, et hoc non ut principium absolute intellectum sed in comparatione sive in relatione ad conclusionem.	13. And this opinion differs from the first [n.9] as the two ways of speaking differ, one of which would posit ‘the same species’ to be the reason of knowing both the principle and the conclusion, only however as under distinct relations of reason corresponding to those known things under their proper ideas – but the other would say that ‘the known principle itself’ is the reason of knowing the conclusion, and this not as a principle absolutely understood, but in comparison or relation to the conclusion.
	B. Rejection of the Opinions 1. Against the Common Conclusion
14 Contra opiniones istas, - et primo contra conclusionem in qua concordant istae opiniones, scilicet quod illae relationes rationis sint necessario ponendae in Deo ad hoc quod creaturae intelligantur distincte, secundum rationem, a Deo, in ratione obiectorum: Arguitur primo sic: illae rationes sunt cognoscibiles ab intellectu divino. Quaero, qua ratione cognoscendi? Si aliis rationibus, ƿdeterminantibus essentiam ut est ratio vel determinantibus essentiam ut est primum obiectum respectu obiectorum secundariorum, procedetur in infinitum, quia iterum ad illas rationes intelligendas praecedunt aliae, et sic numquam illae aliae rationes sunt intelligibiles a Deo, quia oportebit ipsum ante ipsas intellectas intelligere alias infinities infinitas. Ergo oportet stare quod illae rationes possunt intelligi a Deo per essentiam ut nude acceptam, sive ut per rationem sive ut illae cognoscantur per ipsam ut per primum obiectum cognitum absolute; et qua ratione ista poterunt cognosci per essentiam unde essentia nude, pari ratione et ipsa obiecta secundaria alia, quia ita videntur illae rationes habere rationes distinctorum obiectorum sicut et alia.	14. Against these opinions, – and first against the conclusion in which the opinions agree, namely that these relations of reason must necessarily be posited in God so that creatures be understood distinctly, according to reason, by God, in idea of objects. The first argument is as follows: these [ideal] reasons are knowable by the divine intellect. I ask, by what reason of knowing? If by other reasons, determining the essence as it is the reason of knowing [n.9] or determining the essence as it is the first object with respect to secondary objects [n.12], there will be a process ad infinitum, because other reasons will again precede for understanding those reasons, and thus those other reasons are never intelligible by God because he will have to understand other infinite reasons an infinite number of times before those reasons. Therefore a stand must be made that those reasons can be understood by God through his essence is it is taken bare, either as it is understood through reason [n.9] or as they are understood through the essence as through the first known object absolutely [n.12]; and the reason by which they will be able to be known by the essence whereby it is essence bare will be as equally reason whereby those other secondary objects will be able to be known, because those reasons thus seem to have the natures of distinct objects just as also do the other things.
15 Sed dices quod istae rationes cognoscendi cognoscuntur ab intellectu divino per ipsa obiecta ad quae sunt, ita quod essentia sub rationibus istis est ratio cognoscendi obiecta alia, et illa - cognita simul cum essentia sub diversis rationibus - sunt ratio cognoscendi illas rationes, sicut extrema relationis videntur esse ratio cognoscendi relationem. - Hoc videtur vilificare intellectum divinum, quia tunc erit passivus respectu obiectorum aliorum cognitorum per istas rationes, per quae actuabitur ad cognitionem istarum rationum. ƿ	15. But if you say that these reasons of knowing are known by the divine intellect through the objects themselves toward which they are, so that the essence under those reasons is the reason for knowing other objects, and they – known together with the essence under diverse reasons – are the reason of knowing those reasons, as the extremes of a relation seem to be the reason of knowing the relation. – This seems to cheapen the divine intellect, because then it will be passive with respect to the other objects known through those reasons by which it will be actuated for knowledge of those reasons.
16 Praeterea, secundo: cuiuscumque obiecti 'ratio aliqua cognoscendi determinate' potest esse aliquid limitatum ad illud, eiusdem potest esse aliquid illimitatum ad illud et ad aliud; sed si essentia esset limitata respectu alicuius unius determinati cognoscibilis, ipsa esset determinate ratio cognoscendi illud absque omni respectu rei et rationis; ergo si ipsa ponatur illimitata ratio respectu plurium cognoscibilium, potest ex se esse ratio cognoscendi quodcumque illorum et omnia illa, sine omni relatione rei et rationis.	16. Further, second: any object of which there is ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that can be a thing limited to it, can have ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that is a thing unlimited to that and to that; but if the essence were limited with respect to some one determinate knowable, it would be the reason of knowing that object determinately without any respect real or of reason; therefore if it is posited as an unlimited reason with respect to several knowables it can be of itself the reason of knowing any and all of them, without any relation real or of reason.
17 Probatio maioris: illimitatio non aufert ab aliquo perfectionem, sed stante perfectione quae erat ad aliquid, quasi ponit similem perfectionem ad aliud; et ideo, sicut dictum fuit distinctione 7 et distinctione 27, indeterminatum ex illimitatione (scilicet quod est indeterminatum ad plura positiva), ex se ipso est determinatum ad quodcumque illorum, determinatione repugnante indeterminationi ad contradictoria.	17. Proof of the major: unlimitedness does not take perfection away from anything, but, with the perfection that was to something remaining in place, it posits as it were a similar perfection to it; and therefore, as was said in distinction 7 nn.20-21 and distinction 28 nn.106-107, a thing indeterminate out of unlimitedness (namely which is indeterminate to several positive things) is of itself determinate to each of them, with determination being repugnant to indetermination to contradictories.
18 Probatio minoris: essentia ponitur propria ratio ad cognoscendum se ipsam, et hoc sive ut obiectum primum sive ut ratio cognoscendi obiectum. Et istud competit essentiae mere sub ratione absoluta, sine omni respectu reali, quia respectus realis non est in eadem persona ad se. Sine etiam omni respectu rationis, probatio: quia illa intellectio non est collativa vel comparativa, nec negotiativa; ergo per eam nulla relatio rationis causatur in aliquo.	18. Proof of the minor: the essence is posited as the proper reason for knowing itself, and this whether as first object or as reason of knowing the object. And this belongs to the essence purely under an absolute reason, without any real respect, because a real respect does not exist in the same person to itself. Also without any respect of reason, proof: because the intellection is not collative or comparative or negotiative; therefore no relation of reason is caused by it in anything.
19 Praeterea, tertio: unius operationis oportet dare principium 'quo' per se unum et obiectum per se unum, et hoc maxime in simpliciter prima operatione, qualis est intellectio divina; relatio autem ratioƿnis et ens reale nihil 'per se unum' faciunt, quia non possunt etiam habere unitatem secundi modi per se, quae minor est quam unitas essentialis (non enim potest relatio rationis consequi rem ex natura rei, et ideo non potest esse passio eius); ergo essentia - sive ut obiectum sive ut ratio intelligendi - et illa relatio rationis non sunt 'unum per se' obiectum, nec una ratio intelligendi. Ergo oportet dare alterum praecise in ratione primi obiecti vel ut rationem 'quo'. Non praecise illam relationem rationis, quia ipsa non est primum obiectum cognitum, quo cognito cognoscatur aliquid aliud ad quod est ille respectus; nec etiam est ratio qua intellectus divinus habeat intellectionem huiusmodi obiecti, quia intelligere lapidem est perfectio simpliciter, ita quod intellectus divinus non esset omnino perfectus intellectus si non intelligeret lapidem: nulla autem relatio rationis videtur esse ratio inhaerentiae alicuius perfectionis simpliciter. Ergo oportet dare praecise essentiam - quae subest isti relationi - tamquam primum obiectum, quo cognito cognoscatur lapis, vel tamquam rationem formalem intelligendi lapidem.	19. Further, third: to one operation should be given a principle ‘by which’ that is per se one and an object that is per se one, and this especially in the simply first operation, of which sort is the divine intellection; but a relation of reason and a real being make nothing ‘per se one’, because they cannot even have the unity of the second mode of per se (Metaphysics 5.6.1015b36-16b3), which is less than essential unity is (for a relation of reason cannot follow a thing from the nature of the thing, and therefore it cannot be a property of it); therefore the essence – whether as object or as reason of understanding – and the relation of reason are not ‘one per se’ object, nor one reason of understanding. Therefore one must grant a second thing precisely in reason of first object or as reason ‘by which’. Not precisely the relation of reason, because this is not the first object known by which, when known, something else is known to which the respect is; nor even is it the reason by which the divine intellect may have intellection of this sort of object, because to understand a stone is a perfection simply, so that the divine intellect would not be altogether a perfect intellect if it did not understand a stone; but no relation of reason seems to be a reason of inherence of any perfection simply. Therefore one must grant precisely the essence – which is under this relation – to be as it were the first object, which, when known, a stone would be known, or to be as it were the formal reason of understanding a stone.
20 Et ex hoc ultra: frustra ponitur talis relatio determinans ipsam essentiam divinam; nam sub respectu rationis est forma infinita, quia intellectus quomodocumque comparet essentiam et per hoc causet in ea relationem rationis, non comparat eam nisi ut est formaliter infinita, et ita ut est sub tali ratione, formaliter est infinita, - et per consequens ita indeterminata ut est sub illa ratione, ƿsicut secundum se; et ita ut est sub prima ratione, potest fundare aliam (propter sui infinitatem), sicut secundum se potest; ergo per relationem rationis non determinatur.	20. And from this further: in vain is such a relation determining the divine essence itself posited; for under a respect of reason it is an infinite form, because the intellect, however it compares the essence and thereby causes in it a relation of reason, does not compare it save as it is formally infinite, and so as it is under such reason it is formally infinite – and consequently it is, as it is under that reason, as indeterminate as it is in itself; and it can, as it is under the first reason, found another (because of its infinity) just as it can in itself; therefore it is not determined by a relation of reason.
	2. Against the First Opinion
21 Item, contra primam opinionem specialiter videtur sequi quod illae relationes sint reales, quia ratio intelligendi ut est ratio, praecedit naturaliter intellectionem, - et per consequens quoad nihil quod est eius ut est ratio intelligendi, causatur per intellectionem, nec sequitur intellectionem; si ergo sub relatione rationis est ratio intelligendi lapidem, illa relatio rationis non producitur in essentia intellectione lapidis, quia praecedit naturaliter illam intellectionem. Ergo illa producetur per aliam. Sed illam non praecedit nisi illa quae est essentiae ut essentia; hac autem non producitur (quod concedunt - ubi minus videtur - 'de personis divinis et de principiis producendi eas'); ergo illa relatio erit in essentia ut est ratio, et non per aliquam actionem intellectus.	21. Again, against the first opinion [n.9] specifically, it seems to follow that the relations are real, because the reason of understanding as it is reason naturally precedes intellection, – and consequently as to nothing of it as it is the reason of understanding is it caused by intellection, nor does it follow intellection; if then the reason of understanding a stone is under a relation of reason, that relation of reason is not produced in the essence by intellection of a stone, because it naturally precedes the intellection. Therefore the relation is produced by some other intellection. But only that which is essence as essence precedes it; but by this it is not produced (which they concede – where it seems less to be so – ‘about the divine persons and about the principles of producing them’); therefore the relation will be in the essence as it is reason, and not by some action of the intellect.
22 Praeterea, secundum aliquos istorum, ad distinctionem realem in principiatis sufficit distinctio rationis in principiis; ƿergo ista distinctio rationis ut est ratio intelligendi a et b, sufficiet ad distinctionem realem a ab b (et e converso), ita quod una ratio ad distinctionem a et alia ad distinctionem ipsius b.	22. Further, according to some of them [sc. of those who hold the two opinions, nn.9, 12], a distinction of reason in the principles suffices for a real distinction in what is from the principles; therefore this distinction of reason as it is the reason of understanding a and b will suffice for a real distinction between a and b (and conversely), so that one reason will suffice for the distinction of a and another for the distinction of b.
23 Praeterea, res extra immediate intelligitur, quia tota distinctio quae ponitur, praecedit intellectionem; nihil ergo intra terminat intellectionem quasi obiectum secundarium.	23. Further, an external thing is immediately understood [sc. according to the first opinion], because the whole distinction that is posited precedes intellection; nothing internal then as it is a secondary object is term of intellection.
24 Contra secundam positionem: Omnis relatio rationis, quae est in obiecto ex hoc quod comparatur per intellectum ad aliud, est in eo praecise ut ens deminutum, habens esse in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente; et posset esse in eo, si per impossibile illud non haberet esse exsistentiae, dum tamen haberet simili modo esse in intellectu comparante. Ergo illae relationes essent vel erunt in essentia divina praecise ut habet esse deminutum in intellectu, comparante ipsam ad creaturam, et non ut essentia est aliquid in se; et ultra, essent in essentia si per impossibile essentia non esset, dum tamen ab aliquo intellectu intelligente compararetur ad eosdem terminos; et ultra, si per impossibile essent duo Dii, essent in intellectu Dei huius comparante Deum illum ad creaturam, et non in illo Deo in se.	24. Against the second opinion [n.12]: Every relation of reason, which is in the object from the fact that it is compared by the intellect to something, is in the object precisely as a diminished entity, have being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and it could be in the object if per impossibile it did not have the being of existence, provided however it have being in a like way in the comparing intellect. Therefore those relations would be or will be in the divine essence precisely as it has diminished being in the intellect, as it compares it to the creature, and not as the essence is something in itself; and further, they would be in the essence if per impossibile the essence did not exist, provided however it be compared to those terms by some thinking intellect; and further, if per impossibile there were two Gods, the relations would be in the intellect of this God comparing that God to the creature, and not in that God in himself.
25 Praeterea, Deus prius naturaliter est imitabilis a creatura quam ƿintelligatur imitabilis: quia enim est imitabilis, ideo vere comparatur ut imitabilis a creaturis, ut videtur, et non e converso; ergo ante illam comparationem factam per intellectum, essentiae ut imitabilis, est in essentia imitabilitas. Sed secundum aliquos istius viae relatio aptitudinalis est eadem cum actuali (propter quam identitatem in Deo dicunt non esse aliquam relationem novam nec antiquam, aliam, creativi et creantis); ergo istae relationes in essentia ut in obiecto comparato, non erunt primae ad extra, sed erunt aliae priores et reales, ut videtur, quia ante omnem actum intellectus comparantis.	25. In addition, God is naturally imitable by the creature before he is understood to be imitable; for because he is imitable, therefore he is truly compared as imitable by creatures, as it seems, and not conversely; therefore, before the comparison of the essence as imitable is made by the intellect, there is imitability in the essence. But according to some of those who follow this way [n.12], aptitudinal relation is the same as actual (because of which identity in God they say that there is no new relation, nor another old one, of the creative and the creating [n.11]); therefore these relations in the essence as in the compared object will not be first outwardly directed, but there will be other and prior relations, as it seems, because they will be before any act of the comparing intellect.
26 Praeterea, etsi essentia 'ut cognita' sit ratio deveniendi in notitiam lapidis, tamen videtur postea quod intellectus divinus possit cognoscere lapidem in se et non praecise per hoc quod comparat essentiam suam ad lapidem, quia sic, sine comparatione tali alterius ad ipsum, possumus nos intelligere lapidem. In ista intellectione lapidis quaero, in quo est relatio rationis ad lapidem? Non in essentia ut in obiecto comparato, quia in isto obiecto ut sic, non est 'intelligere' ut obiectum comparatum; ergo oportet quaerere eam in intellectione vel in ratione intelligendi, et tunc redibit ad aliquam aliarum opinionum. ƿ	26. Besides, although the essence ‘as known’ is the reason of coming to the knowledge of a stone, yet it seems afterwards that the divine intellect could know a stone in itself and not precisely by the fact that it compares its essence to a stone, because thus can we, without such comparison of something else to it, understand a stone. In the case of this understanding of a stone, I ask what the relation of reason to a stone is in? Not in the essence as in the object compared, because in this object as such ‘to understand’ does not exist as compared object; therefore one has to look for the relation of reason in intellection [sc. the third opinion] or in the reason of understanding [sc. the first opinion], and then return will be made to one of the other opinions [sc. the first or third].
	C. Scotus’ own Response
27 Potest dici ad quaestionem quod relationes tertii modi differunt per se ab aliis aliorum duorum modorum, quia in tertio modo non est mutuitas sicut in aliis duobus modis, - et ex hoc sequitur (sicut deductum est distinctione 30 quaestione 1) quod terminus relationis est absolutum quid, ut absolutum. Sicut ergo obiectum intellectionis nostrae terminat relationem ipsius in quantum mere absolutum est, et sic ipsa est mensurata per ipsum, ita - videtur cum intellectio divina simpliciter sit mensura omnium aliorum a se intellectorum, sequitur quod alia praecise referantur ad intellectionem divinam, et ipsa terminabit relationem istam sub ratione mere absoluti; hoc confirmatur, quia omnino prima intellectio divina, quae est beatifica, est essentiae ut essentia est, sine omni respectu rei et rationis, et hoc propter perfectam identitatem realem intellectus ad essentiam obiectam.	27. One can say to the question [n.1] that relations of the third mode differ per se from the others of the other two modes, because in the third mode there is no mutuality as there is in the other two modes, – and from this follows (as was deduced in distinction 3 question 1 n.31) that the term of the relation is something absolute as absolute. As therefore the object of our intellect is the term of the relation of the intellect insofar as it is purely absolute, and thus the intellect is measured by it, so – it seems – since the divine intellect simply is measure of all understood things other than itself, it follows that the other things are referred precisely to divine intellection, and this will be the term of the relation under the idea of a pure absolute; this is confirmed by the fact that the altogether first divine intellection, which is beatific, is of the essence as it is essence, without any respect real or of reason, and this because of the perfect real identity of the intellect with the essence as object.
28 Non oportet ergo propter intellectionem alicuius obiecti praecise, quaerere relationem, nec in utroque extremo nec in altero, ergo oportet aliquid aliud addere, propter quod sit relatio in utroque vel in altero; illud autem non videtur esse nisi vel mutua coexigentia, si est relatio mutua, - vel dependentia in altero extremo, si non est mutua; hic autem quando Deus intelligit aliud a se, non potest poni mutua coexigentia in utroque extremo, ut videtur, ƿergo praecise sufficit ponere relationem in altero extremo, ubi est dependentia: illud est obiectum ut cognitum.	28. One need not then, because of the intellection of any object precisely, look for a relation, either in both extremes or in one of them, – therefore one must, because of the fact that a relation exists in both or one of them, add something else; but that addition seems to be only either a mutual co-requirement, if the relation is mutual, – or a dependence in one of the extremes, if it is not mutual; but here, when God understands something other than himself, no mutual co-requirement can be posited in either extreme, as it seems, – therefore it is enough precisely to posit a relation in one of the extremes, where there is dependence; that is the object as known.
29 Praeterea, voluntas amando finem vel fruendo, non producit aliud ab ipso in esse volito, amando finem in ordine ad aliud sive comparando ipsum ad aliud amabile, sed magis comparando aliud amabile ad istum finem, ita quod relatio causata per comparationem voluntatis videtur esse in alio 'amato ad finem'; nulla autem comparatio per voluntatem videtur esse in fine amato; ergo a simili, in intellectu cognoscente primum obiectum et ex eius cognitione cognoscente obiectum secundarium, nulla videtur relatio produci in ipso primo obiecto ad obiectum secundarium, sed e converso.	29. In addition, the will when loving or enjoying the end, does not produce something other than itself in willed being by loving the end in an order to something else or by comparing it to another lovable thing, but rather by comparing another thing to the end, so that the relation caused by the comparison of the will seems to exist in another thing ‘willed for the end’; but no comparison by the will seems to be in the willed end; therefore, by similarity, there does not seem to be in the intellect knowing the first object, and knowing, from that knowledge, a secondary object, a relation produced in that first object to the secondary object, but conversely.
30 Praeterea, sicut argutum est, non videtur posse poni quo actu intellectus illa relatio produceretur: non primo, propter perfectionem absolutam illius actus; Si secundo, ergo non est principium illius actus secundi, et in illo secundo actu perfecte cognoscitur creatura; ergo in nullo actu erit talis relatio quasi ratio prior creatura in ratione obiecti.	30. Besides, as was argued [nn.18-19], it does not seem one can lay down what the act of intellect is by which the relation would be produced; not by first act, because of the absolute perfection of that act; if by second act, then the relation is not the principle of that second act, and in that second act the creature is perfectly known; therefore in no act will such relation be as it a were a reason prior to the creature in idea of object.
31 Concedi potest conclusio trium rationum factarum contra duas opiniones communes, superius recitatas, et concedi possunt istae ƿrationes hic iam factae; et, secundum hoc, potest concedi quod sunt relationes aeternae in Deo ad cognita, sed non priores naturaliter ipsis cognitis in ratione obiectorum.	31. The conclusion of the three reasons given can be conceded against both common opinions reported above [nn.14, 16, 19], and the reasons now given here can be conceded [nn.27-30]; and in this respect one can concede that there are eternal relations in God to known things, but not naturally prior to those known things in idea of objects.
32 Hoc potest poni sic: Deus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam suam sub ratione mere absoluta; in secundo instanti producit lapidem in esse intelligibili et intelligit lapidem, ita quod ibi est relatio in lapide intellecto ad intellectionem divinam, sed nulla adhuc in intellectione divina ad lapidem, sed intellectio divina terminat relationem 'lapidis ut intellecti' ad ipsam; in tertio instanti, forte, intellectus divinus potest comparare suam intellectionem ad quodcumque intelligibile ad quod nos possumus comparare, et tunc comparando se ad lapidem intellectum, potest causare in se relationem rationis; et in quarto instanti potest quasi reflecti super istam relationem causatam in tertio instanti, et tunc illa relatio rationis erit cognita. Sic ergo non est relatio rationis necessaria ad intelligendum lapidem - tamquam prior lapide - ut obiectum, immo ipsa 'ut causata' est posterior (in tertio instanti), et adhuc posterior erit ipsa 'ut cognita', quia in quarto instanti.	32. Things can be set down as follows: God in the first instant understands his essence under a purely absolute reason; in the second instant he produces a stone in intelligible being and understands a stone, so that there is there a relation in the understood stone to the divine intellection, but no relation yet in the divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection is the term of the relation to it ‘of stone as understood’; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can compare its own intellection to any intelligible which we can compare to, and then by comparing itself to the understood stone the divine intellect can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant there can be as it were reflection on the relation caused in the third instant, and then the relation of reason will be known. Thus no relation of reason therefore is necessary for understanding a stone – as if prior to the stone – as object, nay this relation ‘as caused’ is posterior (in the third instant), and it will still be posterior as known, because in the fourth instant.a a. [Interpolation] According to this way [nn.31-32] it is plain of what the idea is; because it is of every secondary object (whether it be producible or co-producible), and one is singular and universal, and the others (universally) of an inferior and superior, – as you advance from the intellect [sc. the process described in n.32].
33 Et ista quarta via potest tenere illam propositionem - quae ƿvidetur probabilis - quod 'relatio naturaliter non cognoscitur nisi cognito termino' (sed nec intellectus comparat ad aliquid nisi naturaliter prius cognito termino), quam propositionem non potest alia via tenere, quia oportet quod dicat quod illa relatione qua comparat istam intellectionem, comparet essentiam ad aliquid non prius cognitum naturaliter.	33. And this fourth way [nn.31-32] can hold the proposition – which seems probable – that ‘a relation is not naturally known save when the term is known’ (but neither does the intellect make comparison with anything, save when the term is naturally first known), which proposition cannot be held by the other way [the second, [n.12], because it must say that by the relation by which it compares this intellection, it compares the essence to something not naturally first known.
34 Ista opinio 'de relationibus aliorum a Deo ut intellectorum, ad ipsum intellectum divinum ut absolutum' consimiliter confirmatur et intelligitur sicut illa supra - distinctione 30 - 'creaturarum intellectarum ad Deum'.	34. This opinion ‘about the relations to the divine intellect as absolute of things other than God as these are understood’ is confirmed and understood in a similar way to the one above – in distinction 30 nn.31-39 – ‘about the relations to God of understood creatures’.
	D. Instances against Scotus’ own Solution
35 Contra istud arguitur, et videtur quod destruat intentionem Augustini 83 Quaestionum quaestione 46, ubi dicit quod ((tanta est vis in ideis, ut, nisi ipsis intellectis, sapiens esse nemo possit)); secundum autem istam positionem sapientia perfecta Dei ad creaturas erit in secundo instanti, et praecedet naturaliter tam esse idearum quam cognosci earum. Ibidem etiam dicit quod ((istarum visione fiet anima beatissima)); quod non esset verum de beatitudine prima, quae est in Creatore, - nec de beatitudine secunda, quae est in creaturis. ƿ	35. There is argument against this view [nn.31-32], and it does seem to destroy Augustine’s intention 83Questions question 46 n.1, where he says that “there is so much force in the ideas that, unless they were understood, no one could be wise;” but according to the present position [n.32] the perfect wisdom of God to creatures will be in the second instant and it will naturally precede both the being of the ideas and the being known of them. In the same place too Augustine says that “by the vision of the ideas the soul is made most blessed;” which would not be true about the first beatitude, which is in the Creator, – nor of the second beatitude, which is in creatures.
36 Praeterea, arguitur: illa quae sunt divisa in inferioribus quae sunt alterius rationis, non reducuntur ad aliquid unum in superiore; sicut, licet potentiae cognitivae in nobis reducantur ad unam potentiam cognitivam in angelis, propter unitatem rationis omnium potentiarum cognitivarum, - tamen intellectus et voluntas, quae sunt in nobis alterius rationis, non reducuntur ad unam potentiam in angelo. Erit ergo in Deo intellectus sub ratione talis potentiae, distinctus a voluntate sub ratione talis potentiae, et intellectus 'ut in Deo' erit passivus; ergo oportet dare sibi aliquam formam antequam operetur actu, et per consequens ad hoc ut habeat distinctam operationem, oportebit dare sibi distinctam formam: non potest dari sibi aliqua forma distincta, si ideae ponantur sequi creaturarum intellectionem.	36. There is further this argument: things which are divided among inferiors that are of the same idea are not reduced to something one in the superior; just as, although the cognitive powers in us be reduced to one cognitive power in angels, because of the unity of idea of all the cognitive powers, – yet the intellect and will, which in us are of different ideas, are not reduced to one power in an angel. Therefore there will be in God an intellect under the idea of such power distinct from the will under the idea of such power, and the intellect ‘as it is in God’ will be passive; therefore one must give it some form before it is operative in act, and consequently, so that it may have a distinct operation, one will have to give it a distinct form; no distinct form can be given to it if the ideas are posited as following the understanding of creatures.
37 Praeterea, si propter illimitationem essentiae divinae ponatur ipsa 'ut omnino absoluta' esse ratio cognoscendi omnes creaturas, cum ita sit illimitata in quantum obiectum sicut in quantum ratio, sequitur quod ipsa sola cognoscetur sub ratione obiecti; aut si ponatur pluralitas ex parte obiectorum (non obstante infinitate unius obiecti), pari ratione videtur posse poni ex parte rationis intelligendi.	37. Further, if, because of the unlimitedness of the divine essence, it is posited to be ‘as altogether absolute’ the reason of knowing all creatures, since it is thus unlimited insofar as it is object just as it is insofar as it is reason, the consequence is that it alone will be known under the idea of object; or if a plurality on the part of the objects is posited (notwithstanding the infinity of the one object), by parity of reasoning it seems one can posit a plurality on the part of the reason of understanding.
38 Ad ista: Sententia Augustini, in illa quaestione, potest colligi in ista descriptione ideae: 'idea est ratio aeterna in mente divina, secundum quam aliquid est formabile ut secundum propriam rationem eius ' . ƿ	38. To these instances [nn.35-37]: The opinion of Augustine, in that question [n.35], can be collected from his description of the idea: “an idea is an eternal reason in the divine mind, according to which something is formable as it is according to its proper reason.”
39 Probatio primae particulae: Deus omnia causat vel causare potest, - non irrationabiliter, ergo rationabiliter; ergo habet rationem secundum quam format. Non autem eandem omnium, - ergo singula propriis rationibus format; non autem rationibus extra se (quia non eget in efficiendo aliquo alio a se), ergo rationibus in mente sua. Nihil autem in mente sua nisi incommutabile; ergo omne formabile potest formare secundum rationem propriam sibi, aeternam in mente sua: tale ponitur idea.	39. Proof of the first part: God causes or can cause everything, – not irrationally, therefore rationally; therefore he has a reason according to which he forms things. But not the same form for everything, – therefore he forms individual things by their proper reasons; but not by reasons outside himself (because he does not in his effecting need anything other than himself), therefore by reasons in his mind. But there is nothing in his mind save what is immutable; therefore he can form every formable thing according to a reason proper to it, eternal in his mind; such is posited as an idea.
40 Secundum autem istam descriptionem videtur quod 'lapis intellectus' possit dici idea: ipse enim habet omnes istas condiciones, quia est ratio propria 'factibilis extra', - sicut 'arca in mente' potest dici ratio respectu arcae in materia et est propria ratio secundum quam 'arca in materia' formatur. Et ista 'ratio aeterna' est in mente divina ut cognitum in cognoscente, per actum intellectus divini; quidquid autem est in Deo, secundum quodcumque esse (sive rei sive rationis), per actum intellectus divini, est aeternum, sicut declaratum fuit distinctione 30 quod nulla relatio potest esse nova in Deo per actum intellectus divini. ƿ	40. But according to this description it seems that ‘an understood stone’ can be called an idea; for an understood stone itself has all those conditions, because it is the proper reason of ‘something extrinsically makeable’ – just as ‘a box in the mind’ can be called the reason according to which ‘the box in matter’ is formed. And this ‘eternal reason’ is in the divine mind as a known in the knower, by act of the divine intellect; but whatever is in God, according to any existence (whether real or of reason) through act of the divine intellect, is eternal, as was made clear in distinction 30 nn.41-43, because no relation can be new in God by act of the divine intellect.
41 Istud etiam videtur concordare cum dicto Platonis (a quo accepit Augustinus nomen ideae). Ipse enim posuit ideas esse quiditates rerum: per se quidem exsistentes, et male, secundum Aristotelem, - secundum Augustinum in mente divina, et bene; unde aliquando loquitur de mundo intelligibili, secundum eum. Sicut ergo ponerentur ideae secundum illam impositionem Aristotelis quiditates rerum, ita ponuntur secundum Platonem ut dicunt quiditates habentes esse cognitum in intellectu divino.	41. This also seems to agree with a saying of Plato’s (from whom Augustine takes the name of idea). For he himself posited the ideas to be the quiddities of things; per se existing indeed, and badly posited, according to Aristotle – in the divine mind, according to Augustine, and well posited; hence Augustine sometimes speaks of the intelligible world according to him. Just as, therefore, the ideas would be posited as the quiddities of things, according to the imposition of Aristotle, so they are, according to Plato, posited as they state quiddities with cognized being in the divine intellect.
42 Hoc posito, non oportet laborare circa relationes aliquas formaliter (sive in essentia ut obiectum, sive in essentia ut ratio, sive ƿin essentia ut intelligere divinum), quae relationes dicantur ideae, immo ipsum obiectum cognitum est idea, secundum istud.	42. On the basis of this position, one should not labor over any relations formally (whether in the essence as object, or in the essence as reason, or in the essence as divine understanding [nn.12, 9, 26]), as that to which relations are called ideas; rather the known object itself is the idea, according to this view.
43 Et tunc concedi possunt auctoritates Augustini adductae: Quod ((nisi cognitis ideis, sapiens nemo esse potest)), quantum scilicet ad omnem plenitudinem sapientiae. Licet enim Deus principaliter sit sapiens sapientia essentiae suae ut obiecti, tamen non omni modo, si non saperet creaturam, - quae creatura 'ut intellecta ab ipso' est idea, et ita non intellectis ideis, sapiens omnino esse non potest; ponitur enim esse sapiens perfectissime in primo instanti, sed non 'sapiens omnino' in primo instanti sine secundo. Si autem ideae ponerentur quaedam relationes rationis in Deo, non videtur formaliter esse sapiens intellectione earum, quia etiam ibi essent ut rationes intelligendi antequam ipsae intelligerentur.	43. And then the authorities adduced from Augustine can be conceded [n.35]: That “save when the ideas are known, no one can be wise,” namely as to all fullness of wisdom. For although God principally is wise by the wisdom of his essence as object, yet he is not so in every way if he does not know the creature – which creature ‘as understood by him’ is an idea, and so when the ideas are not understood he cannot be completely wise; for he is posited as being wise most perfectly in the first instant, but not ‘altogether wise’ in the first instant without the second [n.32]. But if the ideas were posited as certain relations of reason in God, it does not seem that he is formally wise by intellection of them, because they would also be there as reasons of understanding before they were understood.
44 Similiter alia auctoritas Augustini, ((harum visione fit anima beatissima)): si ideae ponantur esse quiditates ut cognitae, exponenda est de beatitudine quae potest haberi in creaturis ut in obiectis, quia certum est quod non est perfectissima beatitudo nisi in essentia absoluta (secundum ipsum libro V Confessionum: ((Beatus est qui te et illa novit, nec propter illa beatior))). Sed intelligendum est 'beatissima', hoc est totali beatitudine possibili beata; ƿnon quidem formaliter beata in eis, sed in obiecto (cuius cognitio praesupponitur 'cognosci' illorum), et quasi concomitanter in illis, in quibus aliqua beatitudo est, licet non prima.	44. Likewise the other authority of Augustine, “by vision of these the soul becomes most blessed” [n.35]: if the ideas are posited to be quiddities as known, the authority must be interpreted about the beatitude that can be had in creatures as objects, because it is certain that there is only most perfect beatitude in the absolute essence (according to him in Confessions V ch.4 n.7: “blessed is he who knows you and them, but he is not more blessed because of them”). But ‘most blessed’ needs to be understood, that the soul is blessed by total possible beatitude; not indeed formally blessed in them, but in the object (knowledge of which is presupposed to ‘knowing’ them), and as it were concomitantly in them, in which there is some beatitude, though not first.
45 Et si Augustinus alibi loquatur aliter de ideis, quasi sint rationes cognoscendi aliquid, cum tamen hic non dicat ipsas esse nisi rationes 'secundum quas formantur quae formantur', potest - inquam - exponi illud dictum eius (si alibi dicatur): 'secundum quas', non quod ly 'secundum' notet rationem formalem intelligendi, sed 'secundum quas' ut secundum obiecta; non prima, nec moventia intellectum, sed secundum obiecta secundaria, terminantia intellectum.	45. And if Augustine speaks otherwise elsewhere about the ideas, as if they were reasons of knowing something, since however he says only that they are reasons ‘according to which the things which are formed are formed’ [n.1], that saying of his (if it is said elsewhere) can – I say – be interpreted: ‘according to which’, not that the ‘according to’ indicates the formal reason of understanding, but ‘according to which’ as according to the objects; not first, not moving the intellect, but according to secondary objects, which are terms of the intellect.
46 Ad secundum: Qualiter intellectus est passivus in se et qualiter est passivus respectu intellectionis suae, dictum est distinctione 3. Sed posito quod sit passivus in nobis et quasi passivus in Deo, et quod debeat hic assignari forma vel quasi forma, ut qua operetur, - potest dici quod illud est essentia sub ratione qua essentia, quae sub ratione absoluta est ratio cognoscendi non tantum ipsammet, sed omne aliud, sub quacumque ratione cognoscibile.	46. To the second [n.36]: How the intellect is passive in itself and how it is passive with respect to its own intellection was stated in distinction 3 nn.537-542. But when it is posited that the intellect is passive in us and quasi passive in God, and that a form or quasi form, as that by which the intellect operates, needs to be assigned here, – one can say that it is the essence under the reason by which it is essence, which is, under the absolute reason, the reason of knowing not only itself but everything else, under whatever reason it is knowable.
47 Et hoc isto modo intelligendo: per hoc enim quod intellectus divinus est in actu per essentiam suam ut est ratio intelligendi, ƿhabet actum primum sufficientem ad producendum omne aliud in esse cognito, et producendo illud in esse cognito, producit ipsum habens dependentiam ad ipsummet ut intelligentiam (et per hoc intellectio est eius, quod illud aliud dependet ad istam intellectionem ut ad absolutum), sicut in aliis dicetur quod causa sub ratione mere absoluta est actus primus a quo procedit effectus, et effectus productus habet relationem ad causam, - quandoque ut ad absolutum, quandoque autem mutuo est relatio effectus ad causam et e converso; numquam tamen ex parte causae requiritur relatio prius quam effectus sit positus in esse.	47. And understanding it in this way: for by the fact that the divine intellect is in act through its essence as the essence is the reason of understanding, it has a sufficient first act for producing everything else in known being, and, by producing it in known being, it produces it as having dependence on itself as intelligence [n.32] (and by this it is intellection of the fact that that other thing depends on this intellection as something absolute), as will be said in the case of other things, that the cause under a purely absolute reason is the first act from which the effect proceeds, and the produced effect has a relation to the cause – sometimes as to what is absolute, but sometimes there is a mutual relation of effect to cause and cause to effect; however never on the part of the cause is there required a relation before the effect is posited in being.
48 Quod nunc breviter suadetur, eo quod nihil habens perfectius esse in aliquo genere, ad illud quod minus habet perfectum esse (in aliquo tali), dependet; ergo relatio actualis non dependet ad aliquid quod tantum est ens potentiale, et non actuale, - ergo omnis relationis actualis terminus est aliquod ens actu. In quocumque ergo instanti naturae causa refertur actu ad effectum, tunc est in termino esse actuale; potest autem istud 'absolutum' terminans esse, sine respectu ad ipsum, - ergo ita est simul cum isto respectu quod est prius naturaliter eo; ergo non potest esse aliqua relatio in causa ante naturaliter quam istud 'absolutum' sit, ad quod debet esse ista relatio. ƿ	48. This is now in brief made plausible by the fact that nothing which has a more perfect being in any genus depends on that which has a less perfect being (in anything of that sort); therefore the actual relation does not depend on anything that is only a potential being and not an actual one, – therefore every actual term of a relation is some being in act. In whatever instant of nature, then, that the cause is referred in act to the effect, it is then actual being in the term; but that ‘absolute’ can be the term without a respect to it [sc. without a relation of the absolute to the effect], – therefore it is thus simultaneous with the respect because it is naturally prior to it; therefore there cannot be any relation in the cause naturally before the ‘absolute’ exists to which this relation must exist.
49 Et ita, intelligo quod in primo instanti est a sub ratione absoluti; in secundo est b sub ratione absoluti, habens esse per a; in tertio b refertur ad 'a sub ratione absoluti', si est relatio non mutua, - vel a et b referuntur relationibus mutuis. Hic ergo, in primo instanti intellectus est in actu per essentiam ut mere absolutam, tamquam in actu primo, sufficiente ad producendum quodlibet in esse intelligibili; in secundo instanti producit lapidem in esse intellecto, ita quod terminus ille est et habet respectum ad intellectionem divinam: nullus autem est respectus e converso in intellectu divino, quia respectus non est mutuus.	49. And so [according to n.48] I understand that in the first instant there is a under the reason of the absolute; in the second there is b under the reason of the absolute, possessing being through a; in the third b is referred to ‘a under the idea of the absolute’, if the relation is not mutual – or a and b are [mutually] referred when the relations are mutual. Here, then, in the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as purely absolute, as if in first act, sufficient for producing anything in intelligible being; in the second instant it produces a stone in understood being, so that it is the term and has a respect to the divine intellection; but there is no respect back the other way in the divine intellect, because the respect is not mutual.
50 Istud quod dictum est, relationem prius non esse in causa quam in causato, - habet instantias, de quibus alias.	50. What has been said, that the relation cannot be in the cause before it is in the caused [nn.48-49], has objections to it, about which elsewhere [II d.1 q.2 nn.1, 8].
51 $a Secundum istud posset dici quod intellectio infinita se sola, sine omni respectu eius ad aliud vel e converso, est omnium obiectorum, - sicut absolutum prius habet esse per absolutum quam relatio intelligatur hinc vel inde; quod probatur, quia in illo signo naturae in quo ponitur a esse intellectum per essentiam intellectam, ponitur intelligere esse huius, et tamen tunc non intelligitur aliqua relatio - etiam ipsius a - quia absolutum praecedit relationem: ergo ista est falsa 'intellectio non est distincte huius obiecti ƿnisi simul natura sit relatio aliqua intellectionis ad hoc obiectum, vel e converso' (vera tamen est de 'simul duratione', si istud esset), nec oportet ponere relationem in intellectione, nec in obiecto. Probatur istud, quia 'intellectio sui' est sine omni relatione (sicut deducitur in solutionel), ergo propter 'intellectionem esse huius' nulla requiritur relatio: si propter aliud, ergo vel coexigentiae vel dependentiae. Intelligere Dei ad lapidem non habet coexigentiam (patet), nec dependentiam, nec e converso. Probatio: obiectum nihil est; item, nec habet relationem realem (patet), nec rationis, quia prius intelligitur quam comparetur ad aliud; item, si habet relationem rationis (vel esse in ratione, sicut hic habetur), prius intelligitur sub ratione absoluta quam sub aliqua ratione respectus ad intelligere. Ergo sicut asino posito, non propter hoc intellectio mea habet aliquod esse rei vel rationis (absolutum vel relativum), sed tantum in potentia, - sic illa intellectione posita, non propter hoc obiectum habet quodcumque esse nisi in potentia; nec est differentia nisi quod illa intellectio dicitur nunc actu esse huius obiecti, obiectum autem non dicitur nunc esse obiectum intellectionis meae. Quae ratio differentiae? - Responsio. a$ ƿ	51. According to this view [nn.48-49] one can say that infinite intellect itself alone, without any respect of it to anything else or conversely, is of all objects, – just as the absolute has being first through the absolute before a relation is understood from this side and from that; which is proved by the fact that in the moment of nature in which* a is posited to be understood through the understood essence, the essence is posited to understand the being of a, and yet no relation – even of a itself – is then understood, because the absolute precedes relation; therefore this proposition is false ‘intellection is not distinctly of this object unless simultaneously in nature there is some relation of the intellection to this object, or conversely’ (yet it is true of ‘simultaneously in duration’, if this existed), nor must one posit a relation in the intellection or in the object. The proof of this is that ‘intellection of itself’ is without all relation (as was concluded in the solution [n.18]), therefore no relation is required because ‘intellection is of this’; if a relation is required because of something else, then either relation either of corequirement or of dependence. God’s understanding does not have a co-requirement for a stone (as is plain), nor dependence on it, nor conversely. Proof: the object is nothing; again, it does not have a real relation (as is plain), nor a relation of reason, because it is understood before it is compared to anything else; again, if it has a relation of reason (or being in a relation, as is possessed here [sc. above at *]), it is understood under the absolute reason before it is understood under any reason of respect to understanding. Therefore just as, when an ass is posited, not for this reason does my intellection have any real being or being of reason (absolute or relative), but only in potency, – so, when this intellection is posited, not for this reason does the object have any being save in potency; nor is there any difference save that the intellection is said now to be actually of this object, but the object is not said now to be the object of my intellection. What is the reason for the difference? – Response.
52 Ad tertium, de obiecto illimitato, respondeo: obiectum in quantum motivum et in quantum primo terminativum (et per hoc dupliciter necessario requisitum vel coexactum ad actum), est aeque illimitatum, - ideo nihil aliud est sic obiectum; tamen aliud est obiectum secundario terminans . Nec oportet 'obiectum illimitatum' esse praecise terminans quomodocumque actum, sicut praecise est movens et ratio actus, quia aliquid potest sequi terminum primum et esse terminus secundus. Nihil potest esse secundario movens ad actum: ratio est, quia qualitercumque praecedit actum, non quomodocumque terminans praecedit, nec coexigitur ad actum; sed 'secundo terminans' sequitur actum, sicut mensuratum et causatum, - sicut intellectio in nobis sequitur obiectum.	52. To the third, about unlimited object [n.37], I reply: the object insofar as it moves and insofar as it is first term (and this doubly, necessarily required or co-required for act) is equally unlimited, – therefore nothing else is thus object; yet something else is an object as secondary term. Nor need ‘the unlimited object’ be precisely term in whatever way it is act, as it is precisely mover and reason of the act, because something can follow the first term and be the second term. Nothing can be secondarily mover to act; the reason is that however much it precedes act, it does not precede in whatever way it is term, nor is it co-required for act; but ‘what is secondarily term’ follows act, as being measured and caused by it, – the way intellection in us follows the object. II. To the Principal Arguments
53 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad illud de 83 Quaestionum patet quomodo loquitur de idea.	53. To the principal arguments [nn.1-4]. To that from 83 Questions [n.1], it is plain how Augustine speaks about the idea [n.38].
54 Ad Avicennam: concedo quod in Deo potest esse relatio intelligentis, vel ut hoc quod est 'intelligens' terminat relationem intellecti (sicut 'dominum esse' est appellatio nova), vel prout ƿ'intelligens' dicit relationem rationis, sed tunc non est hoc in primo instanti, nec in secundo, sed in tertio.	54. To Avicenna [n.2]: I concede that in God there can be a relation of understanding, either as what it is ‘to understand’ is the term of the relation of the intellect (as ‘to be lord’ is a new appellation), or as ‘to understand’ states a relation of reason, but then it is not this in the first instant, nor in the second, but in the third.
55 Ad aliud patet ex dictis, quia eadem 'ratio intelligendi illimitata' potest esse propria ratio intelligendi quodcumque eorum - ad quae est illimitata - sicut si esset limitata ad illud solum, et maxime respectu istius actus qui est 'intelligere', in quo non requiritur semper univoca cum cognito (alioquin nihil posset cognosci per causam, nec conclusio per principium), sed sufficit ratio eminentior, continens perfecte similitudinem virtualem cogniti.	55. To the other the answer is plain from what has been said, that the same ‘unlimited reason of understanding’ can be the proper reason of understanding any of the them – to which it is unlimited – just as if it were limited to that one alone, and especially in respect of the act which is ‘to understand’, in which there is not always required a reason univocal with the thing known (otherwise nothing could be known by a cause, nor a conclusion by the principle), but a more eminent reason suffices, containing perfectly a virtual likeness of the thing known.
	III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion
56 Et quod arguitur pro prima opinione, quod oporteat illam rationem indeterminatam determinari, - dico quod ipsa est ex se determinata, determinatione opposita 'indeterminationi quae est ad contradictoria', licet non sit ex se determinata determinatione limitationis; nec hoc oportet, ad hoc ut per ipsam obiectum determinate intelligatur.	56. And as to what is argued for the first opinion, that the indeterminate reason needs to be made determinate [n.11], – I say that it is determinate of itself, with a determination opposite ‘to the indetermination which is to contradictories’ [n.17], although it is not of itself determinate with a determination of limitation; nor is this necessary so that by it the object may be determinately understood.
57 Et si dicas 'quantumcumque sit excedens medium, non est ratio intelligendi hoc in particulari nisi determinetur ad illud per aliquid aliud', - respondeo quod semper, ab antecedente ad consequens ƿarguendo cum distributione, est fallacia consequentis, ex forma. Tenet autem gratia materiae, quando consequens illud non potest esse nisi numeretur in pluribus; et per hoc tenet ista forma arguendi Augustini VII De Trinitate 'si duo homines, et duo animalia', sed hoc est ex imperfectione et limitatione consequentis ad antecedens. Unde non sequitur 'si Pater, ergo Deus, - si Filius, ergo Deus, - ergo si Pater et Filius sunt duo, ergo duo Dii'. Ita dico quod ad intellectionem 'huius' oportet dare rationem qua intelligatur, et propriam (vel formaliter, vel eminenter continentem quidquid est perfectionis in propria ratione), et ad intelligendum 'illud' oportet habere propriam et determinatam rationem; sed inferendo 'ergo ad intelligendum aliud et aliud oportet habere aliam et aliam rationem determinatam', fallacia consequentis est, quia hoc consequens - scilicet 'habere determinatam rationem intelligendi' illimitatum est ad alia antecedentia.	57. And if you say ‘whatever exceeds the middle term is not a reason for understanding this thing in particular unless it is determined to it by something else’, – I reply that always, when arguing from the antecedent to the consequent along with distribution [sc. of the terms], there is a fallacy of the consequent, from the form of arguing. But it holds by reason of the matter when the consequent cannot exist unless it is counted up in several things; and, because of this, the form of arguing by Augustine in On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7 ‘if two men, then two animals’ holds, but this is from the imperfection and limitation of the consequent to the antecedent. Hence this inference does not follow ‘if the Father, then God, – if the Son, then God, – therefore if the Father and the Son are two, then two Gods’. So I say that to the intellection of ‘this thing’ one must give a reason by which it is understood, and a reason that is proper (either formally, or eminently containing whatever there is of perfection in the proper reason), and for understanding ‘that thing’ one must have a proper and determinate reason; but to infer ‘therefore for understanding one thing and another thing one must have one determinate reason and another determinate reason’ is a fallacy of the consequent, because this consequent – namely to have a determinate reason of understanding – is unlimited as to other antecedents [sc. so it is not distributed, or counted up, as they are]
58 Quod additur ibi etiam pro illa prima opinione, quod ratio intelligendi est similitudo 'intelligibilis', - respondeo: non similitudo formalis, sed vel illa vel aliud simile analogice, hoc est continens perfecte similitudinem formalem, secundum omne illud perfectionis quod est in ea in quantum ipsa est relatio vel ratio intelligendi, - et sic est in proposito.	58. As to what is added there for the first opinion, that the reason of understanding is an ‘intelligible’ likeness [n.10], – I reply: not a formal likeness, but either that or something else analogically alike, that is, containing the formal likeness perfectly, according to everything of perfection that is in it as it is the relation or reason of understanding – and so it is in the issue at hand.