Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D4
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Fourth Distinction. Translated by Peter Simpson.
Single Question: Whether this proposition is true ‘God generates another God’
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| Quaestio 1 | |
| ƿ1 $a Alia quaestio, de 'alius'. - Habetur in quaestione cantabrigiensi, sed sic: sicut in omnibus concretis, sive substantivis sive adiectivis, - quare non numerantur sicut habens formam. Alia quaestio, communis, 'an Deus generet Deum', cuius illa cantabrigiensis potest esse articulus. ƿ | 1. There is another question, about 'other' [Parisian Reportatio IA d.4 n.1] - It is contained in the Cambridge question [Reportatio IC], but in this way [sc. as opposed to the way it is contained in Reportatio IA]: as it is in the case of all concrete terms, whether substantives or adjectives - wherefore they are not numbered the way something having a form is.[1] Another question, the common one, 'whether God generates God', of which the Cambridge question can be the article.[2] |
| 2 Argumenta 'pro' et 'contra' quaere Parisius. | 2. For the arguments 'pro' and 'con' see the Parisian [Reportatio IA d.4 nn.2-5]. |
| 3 Solutio. Cuicumque entitati correspondens est aliquod ens vel aliquis, sicut suo 'quo'; deitas est de se 'haec', ergo Deus de se 'hic'; ergo repugnat sibi non identitas in se: illam circa ipsum ponit 'alius', quia est determinabile eius. | 3. Solution. There is, corresponding to any entity, some thing or someone, as its 'in which'; deity is of itself a 'this', therefore God is of himself a 'this'; therefore non identity is in itself repugnant to him; 'other' posits non-identity about him, because it is a determinable of him [IA d.4 n.6]. |
| 4 Haec tria distinguuntur - alius a Deo, alius deitate, alius in deitate: prima duo non ponit haec locutio 'alium Deum' sed tertium. | 4. These three phrases are distinguished - other than God, other by deity, other in deity: the locution 'another God' does not posit the first two but the third. [IA d.4 nn.7-10]. |
| 5 Contra: 'alium' connotat extrema esse eadem in forma determinabili. - Responsio: aliter eadem, aliter alia, in illa forma. | 5. On the contrary: 'other' connotes that the same extremes are in a determinable form. - Response: they are the same in one way in that form, different in another [IA d.4 n.10]. |
| 6 Aliud dubium, eundem Deum et alium Deum: utrobique eodem modo intelligitur ly 'Deum', ut comparatur ad subiectum et ad determinationem, alioquin in una propositione idem terminus intelligeretur sub oppositis modis intelligendi; ergo si habet personalem, non simplicem distinctionem respectu subiecti, habet eandem respectu ly 'alium'. a$ ƿ | 6. Another doubt, same God and other God: the term 'God', as it is compared to subject and determination, is understood in the same way in both cases, otherwise in one proposition the term would be understood under opposite modes of understanding; therefore if it has a personal and not a simple distinction with respect to the subject, it has the same distinction with respect to the term 'other' [IA d.4 n.13]. |
Single Question: Whether this proposition is true ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’
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| Quaestio 2 | |
| 7 Circa secundam partem distinctionis quartae quaero de veritate huius 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'. Videtur quod non sit vera, quia eius contradictoria videtur esse vera 'nullus Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus', quia quaelibet singularis est vera - quia nec Pater, nec Filius, nec Spiritus Sanctus. | 7. About the second part of the fourth distinction I ask about the truth of this proposition 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'. It seems that it is not true, because its contradictory seems to be true 'no God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', because each singular is true - because God is not Father and not Son and not Holy Spirit. |
| 8 Contra: Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus - haec est vera, ergo et eius convertens. Antecedens patet per Augustinum De Trinitate, in multis locis. | 8. On the contrary: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God - this proposition is true, therefore also its converse. The antecedent is plain from Augustine On the Trinity, in many places. |
I. To the Question
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| 9 Respondeo quod propositio est vera, quia terminus quod primo significat, hoc primo ponit in oratione, et si illi alterum extremum sit idem, propositio affirmativa denotans talem identiƿtatem vera est; 'Deus' autem significat naturam divinam ut nata est praedicari de supposito, et illud significatum est idem tribus personis; ergo propositio hoc significans est vera. | 9. I reply that the proposition is true, because the term puts first in the sentence what it first signifies, and if one or other extreme is the same as it, the affirmative proposition denoting such identity is true: but 'God' signifies the divine nature as it is naturally predicated of a supposit, and the thing signified is the same for the three persons; therefore the proposition signifying this is true.[3] |
| 10 Sed numquid eadem veritas est eius et huius 'deitas est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'? Respondeo. Sicut praedicatio in divinis distinguitur in veram formaliter et veram per identitatem, ita haec 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt Deus' vera est formaliter, et haec per identitatem 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt deitas', non autem formaliter; ergo et ista 'Deus est Pater' etc. habet aliquam veritatem - loquendo de praedicatione formali - quam non habet ista 'deitas est Pater' etc. ƿ | 10. But is it the case that it has the same truth as this one 'deity is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit'? I reply. Just as predication in divine reality is distinguished into formally true and true by identity,[4] so this proposition 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are God' is true formally, and this proposition is true by identity 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are deity', but not formally; therefore this proposition too 'God is Father' etc. has some truth - speaking of formal predication - which this other one 'deity is Father' etc. does not have. |
| 11 Sed pro quo supponit 'Deus', intelligendo illam veritatem esse quasi praedicatione formali? Respondeo. Unicuique 'quo' correspondet proprium 'quod' vel 'quis', et ideo deitati ut deitas est, respondet 'quod' vel 'quis'. Primo 'Deus' deitate est ens ut deitas est, et sicut deitas de se est 'haec', ita Deus - qui est Deus deitate - est de se 'hic', et in isto conceptu non includitur incommunicabilitas, nec ratio personae, quia deitas communicabilis est, - et ideo Deus ut 'deitate Deus est' non includit aliquid incommunicabile formaliter. Isti ergo sic intellecto, absque conceptu personarum seu personalium, vere possunt competere aliqua praedicata realia, quae videlicet non competunt naturae ut exsistenti in ratione suppositi, sed exsistenti in hac natura in quantum exsistens in ea: hoc modo forte ista est vera 'Deus creat', et similes, intelligendo subiectum pro 'hoc Deo' exsistente in natura divina, non intelligendo aliquod suppositum, neque aliquod incommunicabile in ista natura, quia incommunicabilitas non est ratio talium actuum; et ita potest poni quod ista 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus' est vera, quatenus 'Deus' stat pro 'hoc Deo' - in quantum est per se ens deitate non autem pro aliquo supposito proprie dicto, in quo est natura ƿdivina, quia quando est veritas pro primis significatis terminorum non oportet quaerere veritatem pro aliis, in quibus includuntur illa prima significata, - sicut quando consequens habet propriam veritatem, non oportet quaerere veritatem eius praecise pro aliquo antecedente. | 11. But for what does 'God' supposit, understanding that truth ['God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'] to be quasi-formal predication? I reply. To each 'in which' there corresponds a proper 'what' or 'who', and therefore to deity as deity there responds a 'what' or a 'who'. First 'God' by deity is a being as deity is, and just as deity is of itself a 'this', so God - who is God by deity - is of himself a 'this' [n.3], and in this concept there is not included incommunicability or idea of person, because deity is communicable, - and therefore God as 'by deity God is' does not include anything formally incommunicable. To this concept then as so understood, without conception of persons or of personal features, some real predicates can belong, namely those which do not belong to the nature as existing in idea of supposit, but to this nature as existing in this nature, insofar as it exists in it; in this way perhaps this proposition is true 'God creates', and the like, understanding the subject to be 'this God' existing in divine nature, and not understanding any supposit, nor anything incommunicable in the nature, because incommunicability is not the idea of such acts; and thus one can posit that this proposition 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit' is true, insofar as 'God' stands for 'this God' - insofar as he is by deity a per se being - but not for any supposit properly said, in which the divine nature exists, because when there is truth in the things first signified by the terms, one should not look for truth in others in which those things first signified are included, - just as when the consequent has its own truth, one should not look for its truth precisely in any antecedent. |
| 12 Exemplum huius: color 'hic', singularis exsistens, non determinat sibi rationem suppositi (quia ratio suppositi propria non est in accidentibus), et licet sit in supposito substantiae, tamen in quantum intelligitur absque illa substantia in supposito - ut hic color' exsistens - potest esse principium operationis realis, sicut si eadem albedo esset in tribus superficiebus, haberet unum actum realem, scilicet unam rationem disgregandi. Et si quaeras a me, de veritate huius propositionis 'hic color disgregat', pro quo supponit ly 'color', - dico quod supponit pro primo significato suo, puta pro 'hoc colore' exsistente, non autem pro aliquo colore inferiore ad hunc colorem, puta pro 'hoc colore' in hac superficie vel illa, quia illa contrahentia colorem non sunt causae veritatis huius propositionis, sed est vera propter prima extrema. | 12. An example of this: 'this' color, an existing singular, does not determine for itself the idea of supposit (because the proper idea of supposit is not in accidents), and although it exists in a supposit of substance, yet insofar as it is understood without the substance in the supposit - as 'this existing color' - it can be the principle of a real operation, just as, if the same whiteness were in three surfaces, it would have one real act, namely the one idea of diffusing sight. And if, about the truth of this proposition 'this color diffuses sight', you ask me for what the term 'color' supposits, - I say that it supposits for its first signified thing, namely for 'this existing color', but not for any color inferior to this color, namely for 'this color' in this surface or in that, because the things that contract color are not the causes of the truth of this proposition, but it is true because of the first extreme terms. |
| 13 Multo magis esset hoc verum si hic color ut 'hic' esset per se ens. Deitas autem est per se esse, et ideo Deus in quantum est Deus deitate, est per se ens, quia VII Trinitatis 'Pater eodem est ƿquo est Deus, licet non eodem sit et Pater sit'; et ita 'huic Deo', non intelligendo aliquam rationem suppositi sive personae - immo rationem 'huius Dei' - potest attribui 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'. | 13. Much more would this be true if this color as 'this' were a per se being. But deity is per se existence, and so God insofar as he is God by deity is a per se being, because On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11: 'the Father is by the same thing by which he is God, although it is not that he is and that he is Father by the same thing'; and so to 'this God', without understanding any idea of supposit or person - nay, by understanding the idea of 'this God' - can be attributed 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit'. |
II. To the Principal Argument
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| 14 Ad rationem in oppositum dico quod illa non est eius contradictoria si praecise fiat distributio pro personis, quia tunc non negatur quod primo affirmatur in affirmativa; si autem illa neget praedicatum a primo significato Dei, ab hoc scilicet Deo, falsa est illa. - Et hoc est quod usitate dicitur, quod talis 'universalis negativa non contradicit termino habenti suppositionem simplicem, licet contradicat habenti suppositionem personalem'; hoc autem videtur probabile si illa maxima sophistarum est vera 'quando in aliqua dictione officiali includuntur duo, ad nihil refertur unum ad quod non alterum': in hoc autem signo 'nullus' includitur negatio et distributio, ergo cum distributio praecise reƿspiciat supposita talis naturae, negatio etiam praecise erit pro eisdem, - et tunc illa negatio universalis est vera; sed non esset contradictoria primae, sed ista 'Deus non est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus', ubi idem negatur quod prius affirmatur, - et ista est falsa pro eodem, in subiecto, pro quo affirmativa est vera. | 14. To the argument for the opposite [n.7] I say that that proposition is not the contradictory if the distribution be taken precisely for the persons, because then what is first affirmed in the affirmation is not denied [n.9]; but if it negate the predicate from the first thing of God signified, namely from this God [n.11], it is false. - And this is what is usually said, because 'such a universal negative does not contradict the term having simple supposition, although it do contradict the term having personal supposition'; but this [contradicting the term having simple supposition] seems probable if the maxim of the sophists is true - 'when two things are included in any well-formed phrase, one of them is not referred to anything that the other is not referred to';[5] but in this quantifier 'no' there is included negation and distribution, therefore when the distribution has regard precisely to the supposits of such a nature, the negation too will have regard to the same, - and then the universal negation is true; but it would not be the contradictory of the first proposition, but this would be 'God is not Father and Son and Holy Spirit', where the same thing is denied as was first affirmed, - and this negation is false of the same thing, in the subject, of which the affirmation is true.[6] |
Notes
- ↑ Reportatio IC d.4 p.1 q. un: "...but in a thing which is a 'this' no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say 'another entity' or 'another deity', one could not there say 'another God', for 'God' in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity... Hence when it is said 'Socrates is other than Plato in humanity', there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposits, therefore this proposition is false 'the Father is other than the Son in deity'."
- ↑ See appendix point A. The Vatican editors opine that Scotus intended the lacunas in the Ordinatio to be supplied from materials in the two Reportationes. Hence they include the relevant sections of the Cambridge Reportatio in an appendix (the Parisian Reportatio is already in the process of being edited and published in separate volumes by the same Vatican editors).
- ↑ See appendix point B.
- ↑ An interpolated text is worth noting here: "namely, that formal predication is when the predicate agrees formally with the subject, - predication by identity when, because of the divine simplicity, the predicate is the same as the subject though not formally."
- ↑ Peter of Spain Logical Summaries tr.12 n.32: "Hence the ancients say that the premises are double but the conclusion is not, because of a certain reason of this sort that they give: 'whenever negation and distribution are included in the same phrase or single term, to whatever one of them is referred the other is too.' Hence when a distribution, set down obliquely, does not reach the verb, neither does the negation, as in this case: 'no thing seen is something seen'." This sentence trades on a sophism, as if to see a no thing were like seeing a blue thing, so that to see nothing is really to see something. But 'no' is a negation and it is negating the word 'seen', not qualifying the word 'thing', so that 'no thing seen' means 'not seeing'. In any event the sentence is false.
- ↑ See appendix point C.
