Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D5

Fifth Distinction Translated by Peter Simpson.

First Part: On the Generation of the Divine Essence

Single Question: Whether the divine essence generates is or generated

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ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quintam quaero primo utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur. Quod sic: Per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 4: ((Idem dici accipiamus cum dicitur Verbum ac si dicatur 'nata Sapientia', ut in uno eorum, quod est 'nata', et Verbum et Filius accipiatur et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia divina, quae ad se dicitur, - at in altero, quod est 'Sapientia', demonstretur essentia ac per hoc ad se dicitur)). Ergo expresse vult quod Sapientia ut Sapientia est et ad se dicitur, dicatur nata ut 'nata' est proprium Filii. ƿ	1. About the fifth distinction I ask first whether the divine essence generates or is generated. That it does: From Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: "Let us accept that when the Word is spoken of, it is just as if 'Wisdom born' were spoken of, so that in one of these, namely 'born', both Word and Son are taken, and so that in all these words there is not shown the divine essence, which is said in reference to itself, - but so that in the other term, namely 'Wisdom', the essence is shown, and in this respect it is said in reference to itself." Therefore he expressly intends that Wisdom, as it is Wisdom and said in reference to itself, is called born as 'born' is proper to the Son.
2 Item, Richardus VI De Trinitate cap. 22 videtur expresse loqui contra Magistrum Sententiarum: ((Multi)) - inquit ((temporibus nostris surrexere, qui non audent dicere substantiam genitam, quin semper potius (quod est periculosius et contra sanctorum auctoritates) audent negare et modis omnibus improbare quod substantia gignat substantiam. Pertinaciter negant, quod omnes sancti affirmant. Ad illud quod ipsi dicunt, auctoritatem invenire non possunt, - ad hoc quod dicimus, auctoritates multas ipsi etiam adducunt, in morem Goliae)) etc. Et quia Magister exponit illas auctoritates quas adducit contra se, de eo subdit Richardus: (('Bene', inquiunt, 'dicunt Patres quod subƿstantia substantiam gignit, nostra expositio contendit quod credamus quod substantia substantiam non gignit': - fidelis 'expositio', et omni laude digna, quia hoc quod omnes Patres clamant contendunt falsum esse, et quod nemo sanctorum asserit contendunt esse verum)). Haec ille. - Videtur deridere Magistrum, qui exponit quasi contra intentionem Patrum auctoritates quas adducit contra se, et asserit - ut videtur - oppositum illius quod tenet Magister esse verum et de intentione Patrum.	2. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity VI ch.22 seems expressly to speak against the Master of the Sentences [I d.5 ch.1]. "Many," he says, "have arisen in our times who do not dare to speak of generated substance, but always rather (which is more dangerous and against the authorities of the saints) dare to deny and in every way to disprove that substance generates substance. They stubbornly deny what all the saints affirm. For that which they themselves affirm they can find no authority, - for that which we say, even they themselves adduce many authorities, in the manner of Goliath [1 Kings [Samuel] 17.45-51]" etc. And because the Master expounds the authorities which he adduces against himself [those of Augustine and Hilary, I d.5 ch.1 nn.57-64], Richard subjoins about him: "They say [sc. the Master and his followers], 'The Fathers do well say that substance generates substance; our exposition contends that we believe substance does not generate substance': - a faithful 'exposition', and worthy of all praise, because that which the Fathers proclaim they contend to be false, and what none of the saints asserts they contend to be true." Thus Richard. - He seems to mock the Master in expounding as it were against the intention of the Fathers the authorities which he adduces against himself, and asserts - as it seems - the opposite of what the Master holds to be true and to be of the intention of the Fathers.
3 Item, per rationem: essentia communicatur, ergo producitur. Antecedens patet per Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 26: ((essentiam praestat Filio sine initio generatio)). Probatio consequentiae: tum quia communicare et communicari sunt relative opposita, et non dicunt nisi relationem originis (non enim dicunt relationes communes, ut patet; ergo dicunt relationes originis oppositas; ergo idem sunt quod producere et produci); tum quia si sint aliquae duae correlationes, si unum extremum unius sit idem uni extremo alterius, et reliquum reliquo. Exemplum: si a et b essent correlativa et c et d correlativa, si a et c sunt idem, b et d sunt idem, - probatio, quia alioquin idem diceretur ad plura correlativa, sicut a, ƿquod idem est cum ipso c, diceretur correlative ad b et d, quae per te sunt diversa; et haec est una combinatio relativorum huiusmodi, 'producens' et 'productum', et alia 'communicans' et 'communicatum': sed 'producens' et 'communicans' idem sunt, ergo et extrema eis correspondentia idem sunt.	3. Again, by reason: essence is communicated, therefore it is produced. The antecedent is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: "generation without beginning bestows essence on the Son." The proof of the consequence is both that to communicate and to be communicated are relational opposites, and only state a relation of origin (for they do not assert common relations, as is plain; therefore they assert opposite relations of origin; therefore they are the same as to produce and to be produced), and also that if there are two correlations, and if one extreme of one of them is the same as one extreme of the other, then the remaining extreme is the same as the remaining extreme. Example: if a and b were correlative and c and d correlative, then if a and c are the same, then b and d are the same, - the proof is that otherwise the same thing would be said with reference to several correlatives, as a, which is the same as c, would be said correlatively to b and d, which for you are diverse; and here is one combination of relatives of this sort, 'producing' and 'produced', and another 'communicating' and 'communicated'; but 'producing' and 'communicating' are the same, therefore the extremes corresponding to them are also the same.
4 Item, per argumenta logicalia: Quando praedicatum praedicatur per se de subiecto, potest supponere pro eo, - patet in superioribus de inferioribus; essentia praedicatur per se de Patre, 'Pater est essentia'; ergo etc. - Probatio minoris, quia non per accidens, quia nec unum accidit reliquo, nec ambo tertio: et isti sunt duo modi unitatis per accidens, qui ponuntur V Metaphysicae cap. 'De uno'. ƿ	4. Again, by logical arguments: When a predicate is predicated per se of a subject, it can supposit for it, - the thing is plain in superiors and inferiors; essence is predicated per se of the Father, 'the Father is essence'; therefore etc. - Proof of the minor, because it is not per accidens, because one is not an accident of the other, nor both of a third; and these are the two modes of unity per accidens that are posited in Metaphysics 5.6.1015b16-36, the chapter on 'one'.
5 Item, essentia est pater Filii, ergo essentia generat. Probatio antecedentis, per conversionem: pater Filii est essentia; ergo essentia est pater Filii. - Probatio consequentiae: essentia est pater Filii, ergo Filius est filius essentiae; probatio huius consequentiae, quia in relativis est consequentia mutua: a est pater b, ergo b est filius a; ergo si essentia est pater alicuius, ille est filius essentiae.	5. Again, essence is father of the Son, therefore the essence generates. Proof of the antecedent, by conversion: father of the Son is essence; therefore essence is father of the Son. Proof of the consequence: essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence; proof of this consequence, because in relatives the consequence is mutual: a is father of b, therefore b is son of a; therefore if essence is father of someone, this someone is son of essence.
6 Item, genitum in quantum genitum est aliquid, quia non est nihil, et inter nihil et aliquid non est medium; sed nihil in divinis est aliquid nisi sit essentia, ergo Filius in quantum genitus est essentia; ergo essentia generatur.	6. Again, the generated insofar as it is generated is something, because it is not nothing, and between nothing and something there is no middle; but nothing in divine reality is something unless it is essence, therefore the Son insofar as he is generated is essence; therefore essence is generated.
7 Contra est Magister in littera .	7. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard

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8 In ista quaestione erravit abbas Ioachim, cuius est ratio recitata Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica', ((Damnamus)) etc. Dixit enim magistrum Petrum esse haereticum, quia dixit rem esse in divinis quae nec producit nec producitur. Ex hoc enim intulit Ioachim, innuens quod Petrus posuerit quaternitatem in divinis: posuit enim tres res in divinis, rem generantem et rem geƿnitam et rem spiratam, - et posuit rem nec generantem nec genitam nec spiratam; igitur quattuor res.	8. On this question Abbott Joachim was in error, whose argument is reported in the Decretals of Gregory IX bk.1 tit.1 ch.2, 'On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith', "We condemn" etc. For he said that Master Peter [Lombard] was a heretic, because he said there was a thing in divine reality that neither produces nor is produced [I d.5 ch.1 n.54]. For Joachim made his inference from this, insinuating that Peter posited a quaternity in divine reality; for he posited three things in divine reality, a generating thing and a thing generated and a thing inspirited, - and he posited a thing neither generating nor generated nor inspirited [ibid. n.58]; therefore he posited four things.
9 Hoc igitur inconveniens quod sequi videbatur vitando, ponit Ioachim quod nulla una res est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, sed tantum dixit illas personas esse unam rem sicut multi fideles dicuntur 'una Ecclesia', propter unam fidem et caritatem; et istud probavit per illud Salvatoris (in Ioan.), orantis Patrem pro suis fidelibus: ut sint unum - inquit - sicut et nos. Intulit ergo Ioachim: cum fideles non sint unum unitate naturae, ergo nec Filius est una res cum Patre.	9. Joachim, avoiding this discordant result that seemed to follow, posited that no one thing is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but he only said that the persons were one thing in the way that many faithful are said to be 'one Church', because of one faith and one charity; and this he proved by the saying of the Savior (John 10.30) when praying for his faithful: "that they might be one," he says, "as we are one." Joachim therefore inferred: since the faithful are not one by unity of nature, therefore neither is the Son one thing with the Father.

B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim

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10 Istud secundum in opinione Ioachim est haereticum, scilicet quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non sint aliqua una res, quia sicut arguitur cap. praeallegato, 'Pater gignendo dedit essentiam suam Filio' (nullam enim aliam potuit dare qua Filius esset Deus), et simili ratione ambo dederunt essentiam suam Spiritui Sancto: 'non enim erat illa communicatio partis essentiae, quia essentia est simplex et indivisibilis, - ergo totius essentiae; ergo tota eadem essentia, quae est in Patre, est in Filio et in Spiritu Sancto, et propter simplicitatem divinam quaelibet persona est illa res, et omnes tres personae sunt illa res'. ƿ	10. This second thing in the opinion of Joachim is heretical, namely that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not some one thing, because as is argued in the afore cited chapter [of the Decretals, n.8], 'The Father by generating gave his essence to the Son' (for he could give nothing else by which the Son would be God), and for a like reason both gave their essence to the Holy Spirit; 'for the communication was not of part of the essence, because the essence is simple and indivisible, - therefore of the whole essence; therefore the whole same essence, which is in the Father, is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and, because of the divine simplicity, each person is that thing, and all three persons are that thing'.
11 Quod autem arguit de Evangelio, solvitur ibi, nam 'Salvator intelligit in oratione sua quod sui fideles sint unum unitate sibi proportionali, sicut Pater et Filius sunt unum unitate sibi proportionali, - hoc est, sicut Pater et Filius sunt unum unitate caritatis, quae est natura eorum, ita fideles sunt unum caritate participata'. - Et ista expositio probatur ibi per simile dictum Salvatoris (Matth. 5), dicentis discipulis suis: Estote perfecti sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est, scilicet essentiali bonitate; ubi non monuit quod simus ex nobis perfecti, naturaliter, sicut Pater caelestis est perfectus ex se naturaliter, naturalitate sibi competente essentialiter, sed ut essemus perfecti perfectione nobis competente, scilicet gratiae et virtutum.	11. Now as to what Joachim argued from the Gospel [n.9], it is there solved, for 'the Savior understands in his prayer that his faithful are one in a unity proportional to themselves, just as the Father and Son are one in a unity proportional to themselves, -that is, just as the Father and Son are one in the unity of charity which is their nature, so the faithful are one in participated charity'. And this exposition is there proved by the like saying of the Savior (Matthew 5.48) saying to his disciples: "Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect," namely with essential goodness; where he did not admonish that we be perfect of ourselves naturally, as the heavenly Father is perfect of himself naturally, with a perfection essentially belonging to himself, but that we be perfect with the perfection belonging to us, namely of grace and the virtues.

C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard

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12 Quantum tamen ad primum articulum, in quo Ioachim dixit magistrum Petrum esse haereticum, contradicit sibi Papa: ((Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod scilicet una summa res est essentia vel natura divina, quae nec generat nec ƿgeneratur; nec tamen sequitur quod sit quaternitas, quia illae tres res - Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus - sunt una illa res)). Quaternitas autem esse non posset nisi esset quartum, realiter distinctum a primis tribus.	12. [As to the reality of the question] - However as to the first article [n.9], in which Joachim said that Master Peter was heretical, the Pope contradicts him [Innocent III, 4th Lateran Council, 1215AD]: "But we, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], namely that one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things - Father and Son and Holy Spirit - are that one thing." But there cannot be a quaternity unless there is a fourth, really distinct from the first three.
13 Pro ista ergo opinione, sic sollemniter approbata, adducitur talis ratio: res generans generat aliquam rem, et realiter distinctam, quia ((nulla res se ipsam gignit ut sit)), I De Trinitate l; essentia autem in divinis est penitus indistincta; ergo nec generans nec generata, quia qua ratione generans, et generata.	13. For this opinion, then, thus solemnly approved, there is adduced this sort of reason: a generating thing generates something, and generates a really distinct thing, because "nothing generates itself so as to exist," On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; but essence in divine reality is altogether indistinct; therefore it is neither generating nor generated, because there is a generating by the same reason that there is a generated.
14 Ad hoc reducuntur rationes Magistri in littera quia essentia 'referretur ad se' et 'distingueretur a se'; tertia autem ratio est quod Pater esset formaliter eo quo generat, quia est formaliter ipsa essentia quae est in Filio, propter indistinctionem ipsius essentiae, - et si ipsam generaret, non esset ea formaliter, quia illa esset distincta ab eo et posterior origine.	14. To this are reduced the reasons of the Master in the text, that essence 'would be referred to itself and 'would be distinguished from itself [I d.5 ch.1 n.55]; but a third reason is that the Father would exist formally by that by which he generates, because he is formally the very essence that is in the Son, because of the lack of distinction of the essence, - and if he were to generate it, he would not formally be it, because it would be distinct from him and posterior in origin.
15 Additur etiam alia ratio, quia in creaturis forma non generat nec generatur, sed compositum; deitas autem se habet quasi forma in persona; ergo ipsa nec generat nec generatur. ƿIsta ratio minorem habet evidentiam hic quam in creaturis, quia ibi forma non est aliquid per se exsistens ut possit esse operans; hic autem deitas, non cointelligendo proprietates personales, est de se ens in actu.	15. There is added too another reason, that in creatures form does not generate nor is generated, but the composite is; now deity is disposed as form in a person; therefore it neither generates nor is generated. This reason has less evidence here than in creatures, because in creatures form is not something per se existing so that it could be operator; but here deity, without co-understanding the personal properties, is of itself a being in act [d.4 n.11].
16 Tamen confirmatur ratio, quia operatio quae necessario est distincti operantis, non potest esse eius quod hic est ut forma, quia ipsa per se est indistincta in tribus; talis autem operatio est personalis, ut generare. Haec quantum ad realitatem huius quaestionis dicta sint.	16. The reason is however confirmed, because operation, which belongs necessarily to a distinct operator, cannot belong to that which here exists as form, because form is per se indistinct in the three; but such operation is personal, as to generate is. Let this be said as to the reality of this question.
17 Sed loquendo de logica, quare non potest haec esse vera 'essentia generat' ut essentia supponat ibi pro persona, sicut ista est vera 'Deus generat' quia Deus supponit pro Patre, - et tamen Deus non distinguitur a se, nec Deus est formaliter is qui generatur licet Deus generet Deum?	17. [As to the logic of the question] - But speaking of the logic, why cannot this proposition 'essence generates' be true as essence supposits there for a person, just as this proposition is true 'God generates' because God supposits for the Father, - and yet God is not distinguished from himself, nor is God formally he who is generated although God does generate God?
18 Respondeo, et facio ad propositum talem rationem: quandocumque subiectum est abstractum ultimata abstractione et praeƿdicatum ex ratione sua non potest praedicari nisi formaliter, non potest propositio esse vera de talibus terminis nisi sit per se primo modo; subiectum hic, scilicet deitas sive essentia divina, est abstractum ultimata abstractione, et praedicatum, scilicet generans, de ratione sua non potest praedicari nisi formaliter; ergo propositio non posset esse vera nisi per se primo modo: sic autem non est vera, quia praedicatum non est de per se intellectu subiecti ((omne enim quod dicitur ad aliquid, est aliquid praeter relationem)) (VII De Trinitate 2), ita quod relatio non est intra conceptum illius absoluti.	18. I reply and give the following reason for the intended proposition: whenever a subject is abstracted with ultimate abstraction and the predicate of its idea cannot be predicated save formally, the proposition cannot be true of such terms save per se in the first mode; the subject here, namely deity or the divine essence, is abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and the predicate of its idea, namely generating, cannot be predicated save formally; therefore the proposition could not be true save per se in the first mode; but in this way it is not true, because the predicate is not per se in the understanding of the subject - "for everything that is said in relation to something is something beside the relation" (On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2), such that the relation is not within the concept of the absolute thing.
19 Huius syllogismi maiorem declaro sic: In substantiis, $a quamvis in eadem realiter - etiam quamvis simplici - possint esse perfectiones multae substantiales formaliter distinctae et ibi una formalis ratio possit abstrahi ab alia remanente adhuc concretione utriusque formalitatis ad sua propria supposita (verbi gratia, licet haec sit vera 'substantia intellectiva est volitiva' - ubi est praedicatio concretiva perfectionis unius substanƿtialis de alia - tamen haec negatur 'intellectus est voluntas', quia ista significant perfectiones illas ut abstractas a se invicem, et hoc secundum proprias formalitates earum; tamen adhuc ista sic abstracta concernunt propria supposita, quia hic 'intellectus' est intellectus), accipiendo tamen substantiam sive simplicem sive compositam praecise secundum unam rationem formalem quiditativam, a$ tantum est abstractio a supposito propriae naturae communiter, quia non sunt natae concernere aliquid alterius naturae; ideo prima ista abstractio est maxima. Abstrahendo enim naturam humanam a suppositis quae sunt vere illius naturae - sicut abstrahitur cum concipitur humanitas - non remanet ulterius alia abstractio: et istud ut sic conceptum, est praecise ipsummet, quia cuilibet alii extraneum, - sicut dicit Avicenna V Metaphysicae, quod 'equinitas est tantum equinitas' et nihil aliud.	19. The major of this syllogism I declare in this way: In the case of substances, although there can be in the same one really - even if it is simple - many substantial perfections formally distinct, and although there one formal idea could be abstracted from another, while the concretion of each formality with their own proper supposits still remains (for example, although this proposition is true 'the intellective substance is volitional' - where there is a concretive predication of the perfection of one substantial feature about another - yet this proposition is denied 'the intellect is will', because these terms signify the perfections as abstract from each other, and that according to their proper formalities; however these thus abstract terms still concern the proper supposits, because here 'intellect' is an intellect), yet, by taking the substance, whether simple or composite, precisely according to one formal quidditative idea, there is only abstraction from the supposit of the proper nature in common, because the substances do not naturally concern anything of another nature; therefore this first abstraction [n.20 for the second abstraction] is the greatest. For by abstracting human nature from the supposits that truly are of that nature - as humanity is abstracted when it is conceived - there does not remain any further abstraction; and this thing as thus conceived is precisely its very self, because extraneous to anything else, - as Avicenna says Metaphysics 5 ch.1 that 'equinity is only equinity' and nothing else.
20 Sed in accidentibus, quanto plura possunt concernere, tanto plures possunt fieri abstractiones. Concernunt quidem accidentia supposita alterius naturae, et licet ab ipsis abstrahantur, tamen concernunt individua propriae naturae, - sicut album concernit lignum, et licet ab hoc abstrahatur albedo, tamen adhuc concernit hanc albedinem et illam. quae sunt individua sua. - Sed ulterius ƿest abstractio quiditatis a supposito qualis dicta est fieri in substantiis, et illam circumloquimur per hoc quod dicimus quiditas albedinis - et illa non concernit aliquod subiectum nec eiusdem naturae nec alterius.	20. But in the case of accidents, as many abstractions can be made as there can be many things they concern. Accidents indeed concern supposits of another nature, and although they are abstracted from them, yet they concern individuals of the proper nature, - just as white concerns wood, and although whiteness is abstracted from this, yet it still concerns this whiteness and that, which are its individuals. – But further, there is abstraction of quiddity from the supposit, which is the sort of abstraction said to happen in the case of substances [n.19], and we have a circumlocution for this by the fact we speak of the quiddity of whiteness - and this does not concern any subject whether of the same or different nature.
21 In relationibus etiam, quae plura concernunt, adhuc plures possunt esse abstractiones: concernit enim relatio suum proprium individuum et fundamentum et subiectum, - et licet abstrahatur a posteriore, non tamen a priore. Exemplum. Hoc concretum quod est 'causa', dicitur de igne, qui generat calorem in ligno. - Sed abstrahendo a subiecto, remanet adhuc concretio ad fundamentum, puta si dicatur 'potentia causandi'; calor enim est potentia causandi calorem, non tamen ignis est potentia causandi illum. - Adhuc potest fieri ulterior abstractio ad proprium genus, puta si dicatur 'causalitas', et tunc nec ignis nec calor recipit praedicationem ipsius: tamen haec causalitas est 'causalitas quae est ultima abstractio qualis est in substantiis' per hoc quod dicimus 'quiditas causalitatis', et haec de nullo alio praedicatur.	21. In relations too, that concern many things, there can still be many abstractions; for a relation concerns its proper individual, both foundation and subject, - and although it is abstracted from the latter yet it is not abstracted from the former. An example. This concrete term which is 'cause' is said of fire, which generates heat in wood. - But, abstracting from the subject, there still remains concretion with a foundation, to wit if one say 'the power of causing'; for heat is a power of causing heat, yet fire is not a power of causing it. - There can be still a further abstraction to the proper genus, to wit if one say 'causality', and then neither fire nor heat receives the predication of it; yet this causality is 'causality which is the ultimate abstraction of the sort that is in substances' [n.19] through the fact that we speak of 'quiddity of causality', and this is predicated of nothing else.
22 Ex istis monstratis vel narratis apparet quae sit ultima abstractio, quia 'quiditatis absolutissimae, sumptae ab omni eo quod ƿest quomodocumque extra rationem quiditatis', - et ex hoc apparet primus terminus maioris.	22. And, from the things thus shown or narrated, it is apparent what ultimate abstraction is, that it is 'of the most absolute quiddity, taken from everything that is in any way outside the idea of the quiddity', - and from this is apparent the first term of the major.
23 Circa alium terminum maioris, scilicet quod praedicatum 'de ƿquocumque praedicatur, de necessitate formaliter praedicatur', notandum est quod substantiva possunt dupliciter praedicari in divinis, quandoque formaliter et quandoque per identitatem; sed adiectiva si praedicantur, de necessitate formaliter praedicantur, et hoc quia sunt adiectiva, - nam ex hoc quod adiectiva sunt, significant formam per modum informantis: et ideo denominative dicuntur de subiecto, et per consequens per modum informantis subiectum, et ita de ipso formaliter dicuntur; talia sunt non tantum nomina adiectiva sed omnia participia et verba.	23. About the other term of the major, namely that the predicate 'is of necessity formally predicated about whatever it is predicated,' [n.18], one must note that substantives can be doubly predicated in divine reality, sometimes formally and sometimes by identity; but adjectives, if they are predicated, are of necessity formally predicated, and this because they are adjectives, - for, from the fact they are adjectives, they signify form by way of what informs; and so they are said denominatively of the subject, and consequently by way of what informs the subject, and thus they are said formally of it; of such sort are not only adjectival nouns but all participles and verbs.
24 His intellectis patet ista maior assumpta, quod 'quando aliquid est abstractum ultimata abstractione - ita quod est abstractum ab omni quod est extra rationem eius - et praedicatum non praedicatur de aliquo nisi formaliter, non est unio vera talium extremorum nisi sit formalis et per se primo modo'. Quia istud praedicatum praecise natum est praedicari formaliter, ideo non potest salvari veritas propter identitatem tantum, - et quia subiectum est ƿsumma abstractione abstractum, non potest stare pro aliquo qualitercumque alio a se sed praecise pro se formaliter, et ideo oporteret quod sua ratio praecise formaliter esset idem illi praedicato, quod non posset esse nisi illa ratio praecise includeret illud praedicatum: patet ergo illa maior. - Patet etiam minor, quod talia non sunt ista extrema 'essentia generat' vel 'deitas generat', quia 'deitas' est quid abstractum, summa abstractione; 'generat' autem est verbum, ideo non potest praedicari nisi formaliter.	24. With these things understood, the assumed major is plain, that 'when something is abstracted with ultimate abstraction - such that it is abstracted from everything which is outside its idea - and the predicate is not predicated of it save formally, there is no true union of such extremes unless it be formal and per se in the first mode'. Because this predicate is precisely of a nature to be predicated formally, therefore truth cannot be saved by identity alone, - and because the subject is abstracted with the highest abstraction, it cannot stand for anything in any way that is other than itself but precisely for itself formally, and so it would be necessary [for truth to be saved] that its idea were precisely formally the same as the predicate, which could not be unless the idea precisely included the predicate. - The minor too [n.18] is plain, because the extreme terms 'essence generates' or 'deity generates' [n.17] are not of such a sort, because 'deity' is something abstracted with highest abstraction; but 'generates' is a verb, therefore it cannot be predicated save formally.

II. To the Principal Arguments

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25 Ad argumenta in oppositum. - Ad primam auctoritatem Augustini - $a distinctione 21 cap. 2 'sermo auctoritatis occurrit' ƿMagister respondet distinctione 28 cap. 6, quod Sapientia stat pro hypostasi; (('demonstratur essentia', scilicet demonstratur quod Filius sit essentia)), quia nomen essentiale stans pro persona. Ratio huius dicitur: a$ sapientia licet abstrahatur a sapiente, quod est operans, tamen adhuc significat potentiam operativam vel principium operativum, et ideo non abstrahitur summa abstractione, quia potentia operativa aliquo modo concernit aliquid; et propter talem concretionem aliqualem aliqualiter conceditur quod Sapientia est nata, nullo autem modo quod essentia sit nata. Quod autem Augustinus dicit aliquando Filium esse essentiam de essentia, hoc exponitur in sequenti quaestione 'quia hoc non probat essentiam esse genitam vel generantem sed esse illud de quo Filius generetur'.	25. To the arguments for the opposite. - To the first authority of Augustine [n.1] -Sentences I d.21 ch.2 'the words of the authority occur...' - the Master [Peter Lombard] responds in d.28 ch.6, that Wisdom stands for the hypostasis; "'the essence is shown' [n.1], namely it is shown that the Son is essence," because the essential name stands for the person. The reason for this is stated: although wisdom is abstracted from the wise man, because he is the one operating, yet it still signifies the operative power or the operative principle, and therefore it is not abstracted with highest abstraction, because the operative power in some way concerns something; and, because of such sort of concretion, it is some way conceded that Wisdom is born, but not in any way that the essence is born. But as to Augustine sometimes saying that the Son is essence of essence, this is expounded in the following question 'because this does not prove that the essence is generated or generating, but that it is something from which the Son is generated' [nn.98, 101].
26 Ad dictum Richardi. Si intendit reprehendere Magistrum ibi, sicut ex verbis eius apparet, - cum doctrina Magistri, et praecipue ista, authenticetur per concilium generale in capitulo ƿpraeallegato, nego Richardum tenendo Magistrum . Et quod dicit Magistrum multas auctoritates adducere contra se, Magister bene exponit eas, sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione; non autem nullam habet pro se auctoritatem, sed habet illam universalis Ecclesiae in capitulo praeallegato, quae maxima est, quia dicit Augustinus Contra epistolam Fundamenti: ((Evangelio non crederem nisi Ecclesiae crederem catholicae)), - quae Ecclesia sicut decrevit qui sunt libri habendi in auctoritatem in canone Bibliae, ita etiam decrevit qui libri habendi sunt authentici in libris doctorum, sicut patet in canone, et post illam auctoritatem canonis non invenitur in Corpore iuris scriptum aliquod ita authenticum sicut magistri Petri in capitulo praeallegato.	26. To the statement of Richard [n.2]. If he intends to blame the Master there, as appears from his words, - since the doctrine of the Master, and this one especially, is confirmed by a General Council in the chapter cited above [n.12], I deny Richard by holding to the Master. And as to his saying that the Master adduces many authorities against himself, the Master well expounds them, as will be plain in the following question [n.100]; not, however, that he has no authority for himself, but he does have the authority of the Universal Church, which is the greatest, because Augustine says Letter against Fundamentus ch.5 n.6: "I would not believe the Gospel if I did not believe the Church," -which Church, just as it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the canon of the Bible, so too it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the books of the doctors, as is plain in the canon, and after the authority of the canon there is not found in the Corpus Iuris any writing as authentic as that of Master Peter in the chapter cited before.
27 Ad rationem illam de 'communicare' dico quod productio habet productum pro termino suo primo, et dico hic 'primum terƿminum' terminum adaequatum; et hoc modo dicit Philosophus VII Metaphysicae quod compositum primo generatur, quia est quod primo habet esse per productionem, hoc est adaequatum.	27. To the reason about 'communicating' [n.3] I say that production has the thing produced for its first term, and I say that this 'first term' is the adequate term; and in this way the Philosopher says Metaphysics 7.8.1033b16-18 that the composite is first generated, because it is what first has being through production, that is, adequate being.
28 In composito tamen forma est formalis terminus generationis, non autem terminus per accidens, - sicut apparet per Philosophum II Physicorum, ubi probat formam esse naturam per hoc quod 'generatio est naturalis quia est via in naturam, est autem via in formam, ergo etc.',- quae ratio nulla esset si forma tantum esset terminus per accidens generationis. Et in eodem etiam vult quod forma et finis coincidunt in idem, quod non est verum de fine geniti, sed generationis. Forma igitur vere est finis generationis.	28. However, in the composite the form is the formal term of generation, but it is not the term per accidens, - as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 2.1.193b12-18, where he proves that form is nature by the fact that 'generation is natural because it is the way to nature, but it is the way to form, therefore etc.', - which reason would be nothing if form were only the term per accidens of generation. And in the same way he intends that form and end coincide in the same thing, which is not true of the end of the thing generated, but is true of the end of generation. Therefore form is truly the end of generation.
29 Ipsum ergo generans unam habet habitudinem ad primum terminum - qui dicitur productus vel genitus - et aliam habet habitudinem ad formalem terminum. Et in creaturis utraque habitudo realis est, quia utraque habitudo habet terminos realiter distinctos et realis dependentia est utriusque producti ad ipsum producens. In proposito autem producens ad productum primum habet relationem realem, quia distinctionem realem et realem originem, ƿad terminum autem formalem in producto non habet relationem realem, quia non distinctionem realem, sine qua non est relatio realis. 'Producere' ergo in divinis dicit relationem realem, 'communicare autem dicit relationem originis et quasi rationis, concomitantem illam realem; $a exemplum huius de principio 'quo': in creaturis refertur realiter ad productum, sicut 'quod' (ad idem enim genus causae pertinet ars et aedificator, V Metaphysicae), sed hic 'quo', quia non distinctum, non habet relationem realem ad productum (distinctione 7), - ita nec e converso, terminus formalis ad producens. a$	29. The thing, then, that g30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], - I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.enerates has one relation to the first term - which term is called the thing produced or generated - and it has another relation to the formal term. And in creatures each relation is real, because each relation has terms really distinct, and there is a real dependence of each produced thing on what produces it. But in the proposed case [sc. of God] the producer has to the thing first produced a real relation, because it has a real distinction and a real origin, but to the formal term in the thing produced it does not have a real relation, because it does not have a real distinction, without which distinction there is no real relation. 'To produce' then in divine reality states a real relation, but 'to communicate' states a relation of origin, and as it were of idea, concomitant with that real relation; there is an example of this about the principle 'in which'; in creatures this principle is really referred to the product, just as the 'what' principle is (for the art and the builder are referred to the same genus of cause, Metaphysics 5.2.1013b30-33), but here [sc. the case of God] the 'in which', because it is not distinct, does not have a real relation to the thing produced (I d.7 n.13), - so not conversely either, the formal term not having a real relation to the producer.
30 Cum ergo dicit quod istae sunt relationes oppositae, communicare et communicari, - dico quod sunt relationes rationis, oppositae secundum proprias rationes suas, licet necessario concomitentur aliquas relationes reales oppositas, scilicet producere et produci; sed tamen non sunt istae et illae eorumdem relativorum formaliter.	30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], - I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.
31 Per idem ad secundum, quod nullum extremum unius correlationis est idem formaliter cum extremo aliquo alterius. Communicans enim et producens licet concurrant in eodem supposito (quia natura dicitur proprie communicans se sicut dicitur commuƿnicata), tamen communicans non dicit formaliter eandem relationem quam dicit producens ut producens, - communicari autem et produci nec eandem dicunt, nec idem primo denominant.	31. By this same fact is given an answer to the second [n.3], that no extreme of one correlation is formally the same as some extreme of another. For the communicator and the producer, although they come together in the same supposit (because the nature is said properly to be communicating itself just as it is said to be properly communicated), yet the communicating does not state formally the same relation as producing qua producing does, - for to be communicated and to be produced do not state the same either, nor do they first denominate the same.
32 Ad illa argumenta logicalia. Cum primo arguitur de praedicatione 'per se', dico quod essentia non praedicatur 'primo modo per se' de Patre, neque formaliter. - Cum probas 'quia non per accidens', dico quod sicut in creaturis, non omnis praedicatio est 'per se' vel 'per accidens', accipiendo accidens proprie, ut quando accidens praedicatur de subiecto: non enim genus praedicatur per se de differentia, nec sic per accidens, - quia neutrum neutri accidit, sed est ibi medium extraneum sive inferius, contrahens aliud, quod inferius potest dici 'accidentale' superiori, id est extraneum, sed non proprie 'accidens'; in divinis autem non omnia sunt eadem 'per se', id est ƿformaliter, nec tamen est aliquid alicuius 'per accidens' proprie, sed aliquid est idem alicui absoluta identitate, absque formali identitate, - et ita est in proposito.	32. To the logical arguments [nn.4-6]. When it is first argued about predication 'per se' [n.4], I say that essence is not predicated 'in the first mode per se' of the Father, nor is it predicated formally. - When you prove it 'because not per accidens' [n.4], I say that, as in creatures, not every predication is either ' per se' or ' per accidens' , taking accident properly, as when an accident is predicated of a subject; for the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, nor is it predicated per accidens, - because neither of them is accident of the other of them, but the difference is there a middle that is extraneous or inferior to the genus, and contracts it, which inferior can be called 'accidental' to the superior, that is, extraneous, but it is not properly an 'accident'; but in divine reality not everything is 'per se' the same, that is, formally, nor yet is anything of another 'per accidens' properly, but something is the same as something by absolute identity, without formal identity, - and thus it is in the intended proposition.
33 Ad aliud dico quod ista 'pater est essentia' potest distingui, quia 'pater' potest sumi adiective vel substantive. Secundo modo significat personam cuius est paternitas, et concedo eam esse veram per identitatem, quia substantivum potest praedicari de aliquo per identitatem. Primo modo significat ipsam proprietatem denominative, et hoc modo Magister exponit distinctione 27 quod idem est patrem esse et genuisse; hoc modo ista est falsa 'essenƿtia est pater', quia significat patrem formaliter praedicari desubiecto.	33. To the other I say that this proposition 'father is essence' can be distinguished, because 'father' can be taken adjectivally or substantively. In the second way it signifies the person to whom belongs paternity, and I concede that the proposition is true by identity, because a substantive can be predicated of anything by identity. In the first way it signifies the very property denominatively, and in this way the Master expounds [I d.27 ch.1 n.237] that to be father is the same as to have generated; in this way this proposition 'essence is father' is false, because it signifies that father is formally predicated of the subject.
34 Quando ergo arguis de subiecto et passione, dico quod quando passio potest praedicari praedicatione eiusdem rationis cum illa qua praedicatur subiectum, potest ex subiecto inferri passio quando habet similem modum praedicandi, - quando vero non, non. Hic subiectum - si sit subiectum - potest praedicari per identitatem, passio - si est passio - non potest, sed tantum formaliter, quia est adiectivum.	34. When therefore you argue about subject and property, I say that when the property can be predicated by a predication of the same idea as that by which the subject is predicated, the property can be inferred from the subject when it has the same mode of predicating [n.24], - but when not, not. Here the subject - if it is subject - can be predicated by identity, the property - if it is property - cannot be, but only formally, because it is an adjective [n.23].
35 Ad aliud, 'essentia est pater Filii': Quidam doctor repetit opiniones aliorum, primam magistri Alexandri (in I parte Summae distinctione 20, in responsione ad quintum argumentum), qui distinxit illam 'essentia est pater Filii' sicut iam distincta est illa praecedens, scilicet 'essentia est pater', - quod 'pater' potest sumi adiective vel substantive, et primo modo dicit eam esse falsam et consequentiam non vaƿlere, - secundo modo veram. Aliam magistri Praepositini, qui dicit eam simpliciter veram, ad quod habet Praepositinus duas rationes,- unam per conversionem (quia si convertens est vera, conversa erit simpliciter vera): ((haec est vera 'pater Filii est essentia', ergo essentia est pater Filii)); aliam, quia ((haec est simpliciter vera 'essentia est pater': aut ergo alicuius, aut nullius; si nullius, ergo omnino non est pater, - si alicuius, et non nisi Filii, ergo essentia est pater Filii)).	35. To the other, 'essence is father of the Son' [n.5]: A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] repeats the opinions of others, the first of Master Alexander [of Hales, ST Ia d.20 ad 5], who distinguished this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' in the way the preceding one, namely 'essence is father', was already distinguished [n.33], - because 'father' can be taken adjectivally and substantively, and in the first way he says it is false and the consequence ['therefore father of the Son is essence'] not valid, - in the second way he says it is true. Another opinion he repeats from Master Praepositinus, who says that it is simply true, for which Praepositinus has two reasons, - one by conversion (because if the converting proposition is true, the converted proposition will be simply true): "this proposition is true 'father of the Son is essence', therefore essence is father of the Son;" the other reason is that "this proposition is simply true 'essence is father': either then it is father of someone or of no one; if of no one, then there is altogether no father, - if of someone, and if of none but the Son, then essence is father of the Son."
36 Contra magistrum Alexandrum - immo contra utrumque - arguit sic et probat quod ((ly 'pater' tantum tenetur adiective, quoniam nomina quae imponuntur a potentia activa et ƿpassiva (ut sunt magister et discipulus, pater et filius, aedificator, etc.) sunt tantum significantia adiective, et hoc ex respectu quem habent ad aliud, quod respicit potentia a qua imponuntur. Sed quandocumque aliquid habet rationem adiectivi vel adiacentis ex respectu ad aliud, quanto magis est determinatus respectus eius tanto magis habet rationem adiacentis vel adiectivi, et tanto minus quanto magis indeterminatus, - sicut patet de respectu modi infinitivi, quem grammatici dicunt habere vel dicere infinitam inclinationem ad suppositum et magis posse supponere quam alios modos, quia alii etiam finitam habent inclinationem ad suppositum, iste vero habet infinitam; infinitivus vero et adiectivum in neutro genere potius substantivantur quam in masculino vel feminino. Ergo cum 'pater Filii' habeat finitam et expressam habitudinem - non sic autem cum per se ponitur ly 'pater' - ideo licet posset teneri substantive, dicendo 'essentia est pater', non tamen nisi adiective, dicendo 'essentia est pater Filii', et sic simpliciter est falsa ista 'essentia est pater Filii')). ƿ	36. Against Master Alexander - nay against both masters - he argues thus and proves "the term 'father' is only held adjectivally, since names that are imposed from an active and passive power (as are master and disciple, father and son, builder, etc.) are only significative adjectivally, and this from the respect that they have to something else, which is what the power from which they are imposed has regard to. But whenever something has the idea of adjective, or of adjacent, from a respect to something else, the more determinate its respect the more it has the idea of adjacent or of adjective, and the less it has this idea the more indeterminate it is, - as is plain about the respect of the infinitive mode, which grammarians say has or says an infinite inclination to the supposit and can supposit more than other modes can [Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae VIII ch.12 n.63, ch.13 n.69], because the others also have a finite inclination to the supposit, but the former has an infinite one; but an infinitive and an adjective in the neuter gender are more substantive than in the masculine or feminine. Therefore since 'father of the Son' has a finite and express relation - but it is not so when the term 'father' is posited per se - therefore, although it could be held substantively when saying 'essence is father', yet it is only held adjectively when saying 'essence is father of the Son', and thus this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' is simply false."
37 ((Patet etiam quod non valet primum argumentum Praepositini, 'pater Filii est essentia, ergo essentia est pater Filii', per conversionem, quia sic convertere debet: 'ergo aliquid quod est essentia, est pater Filii'; sicut ista 'individuum est homo', non sic convertitur 'ergo homo est individuum', sed sic 'ergo aliquid quod est homo, est individuum'. - Similiter secunda ratio non valet. Cum arguitur 'essentia est pater, ergo aut alicuius aut nullius', - dicendum quod non sequitur, propter fallaciam figurae dictionis (quia statim cum additur 'alicuius aut nullius' aliter copulat quam prius supponebat), et dicendum est quod nullius est pater, id est non alicuius est pater: et non sequitur ex hoc quod non sit pater, propter fallaciam figurae dictionis, sed tantum sequitur 'ergo non convenit ei proprietas paternitatis')).	37. "It is also plain that the first argument of Praepositinus is not valid, 'father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son', by conversion [n.35], because it should be converted in this way: 'therefore something that is essence is father of the Son'; just as this proposition 'an individual is man' is not converted in this way 'therefore man is an individual', but it in this other way 'therefore something that is a man is an individual'. - Likewise the second reason [n.35] is not valid. When it is argued 'essence is father, therefore father either of someone or no one', - one must say that it does not follow, because of the fallacy of figure of speech (because as soon as 'of someone or of no one' is added the combination is otherwise than was first being supposed), and one must say that it is father of no one, that is, it is not father of anyone; and it does not follow from this that it is not father, because of the fallacy of figure of speech, but there only follows 'therefore the property of paternity does not belong to it'."
38 Ideo respondet tertio modo, quod haec est simpliciter falsa ƿ'essentia est pater Filii', propter rationem praemissam, quia ly 'pater' ibi tantum tenetur adiective.	38. So he responds in a third way, that this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' is simply false, because of the aforesaid reason [n.36], because the term 'father' here is only held adjectivally.
39 Contra modum eius dicendi arguo sic: Quod includitur essentialiter in conceptu alicuius sicut pars conceptus, non potest ab eo excludi sub quocumque modo concipiatur, quia si sub aliquo modo concipiatur et illud non includatur, ƿtunc ille modus repugnat rationi conceptus qui concipitur. Cum igitur in conceptu relativi, ex hoc quod conceptus relativus - non ut hoc modo conceptus - necessario includatur correlativum eius ut terminus est (quia non potest esse nec intelligi sine eo, sicut nec sine termino), ergo quocumque modo concipitur, sive adiective sive substantive, semper includetur correlativum ut terminus, et ita nullo modo potest intelligi ut absolutum; confirmatur de filiatione.	39. Against his way of speaking [n.38] I argue thus: What is included essentially in the concept of something as a part of the concept cannot be excluded from it under whatever mode it is conceived, because if it is conceived under some mode and that part is not included, then the mode is repugnant to the idea of the concept which is conceived. When, therefore, in the concept of a relative [sc. father], from the fact that the concept is relative - not as conceived relatively - its correlative is necessarily included as its term (because it can neither be nor be understood without it, just as not without the term either), then in whatever way it is conceived, whether adjectivally or substantively, the correlative is always included as term, and so in no way can it be understood as absolute; the point is confirmed about filiation [sc. filiation is correlative in the same way].
40 Item, tunc ista esset incongrua 'pater Filii est essentia', et adiectivum non substantivatum non supponit congrue. Ibi quippe in subiecto determinatur pater per Filium, ad quem habet determinatum respectum. ƿ	40. Again, then [sc. if Henry's position is correct] this proposition 'father of the Son is essence' would be incongruous, and a non-substantive adjective does not supposit incongruously. Indeed in this case in the subject ['father of the Son'] father is determined by the Son, to whom it has a determinate respect [n.36].
41 Ideo teneo opinionem Alexandri, distinguendo sicut ipse distinguit, quod substantive est vera, adiective falsa.	41. Therefore I hold the opinion of Alexander, distinguishing as he does, that the substantive is true and the adjectival is false.
42 Ad rationes Praepositini: dico quod conversa vera est substantive, - adiective incongrua, quia masculinum non potest substantivari; ad secundam rationem eius dico quod essentia est pater, et alicuius, - et concedo etiam quod Filii.	42. To the reasons of Praepositinus: I say that the converse ['essence is father of the Son'; n35] is true substantively, - adjectivally it is incongruous, because the masculine [sc. 'father' in the converting proposition] cannot be made substantive; to his second reason [n.35] I say that essence is father, and of someone, - and I concede too that it is father of the Son.
43 Sed cum arguitur in ratione principali 'si essentia est pater Filii, ergo Filius est filius essentiae', nego consequentiam. Cum probatur per illam 'consequentiam mutuam' in relativis, dico quod illa consequentia mutua tenet in illis relativis quae sunt primo relativa; tenet etiam in his quae referuntur per relationes, si tamen dicantur formaliter relationes de eis, - sicut si formaliter Socrates est pater Platonis, e converso, formaliter Plato est filius Socratis. In his autem quae non referuntur primo nec etiam denominantur formaliter ab ipsis relationibus, sed relatio praedicatur de altero eorum per identitatem, non valet illa consequentia, quia ibi in consequente plus signatur quam in antecedente; in antecedente enim notatur identitas relationis ad aliquid de quo dicitur, sed in consequente signaretur illud aliud referri ad istud formaliter: cum enim diceretur 'Filius est filius essentiae', ex vi constructionis signaretur essentiam esse proprium correlativum eius quod ƿest Filius, et ita Filium formaliter esse filium essentiae; antecedens autem non signat relationem paternitatis formaliter convenire essentiae, sed tantum per identitatem.	43. But when it is argued in the principal reason 'if essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence' [n.5], I deny the consequence. When it is proved through that 'mutual consequence' in relatives, I say that the mutual consequence holds in those relatives that are first relatives [father-son]; it holds also of those that are referred through relations [paternity-filiation] - if they are said formally as relations of them, - just as if formally Socrates is father of Plato, then conversely, formally Plato is son of Socrates. But in those relatives that are not referred first nor are denominated formally from those relations, but the relation is predicated of one of them by identity, that [mutual] consequence is not valid, because in that case more is indicated in the consequent than in the antecedent; for in the antecedent is noted the identity of the relation with that of which it is said, but in the consequent is indicated that the other thing is formally referred to it: for since it is said 'the Son is son of essence', from the force of the construction there is indicated that the essence is the proper correlative of that which is the Son, and so the Son is formally son of essence; but the antecedent does not indicate that the relation of paternity agrees with the essence formally, but only by identity.
44 Ad ultimum dico: cum accipis 'genitum in quantum genitum, est aliquid', nego. Et cum dicis 'non est nihil', dico (ut saepe praedictum est): inter contradictoria est medium cum 'in quantum', ita quod neutrum inest cum 'in quantum', sicut homo neque 'in quantum homo' est albus, neque 'in quantum homo' est non albus; tamen non sunt duo contradictoria complexa simul falsa: illa enim contradictoria est vera, 'homo non in quantum homo, est albus'; ita hic, 'genitum non in quantum genitum, est aliquid', quia ratio gignitionis non est formalis ratio inhaerentiae praedicati, licet genitum - formaliter in se sumptum - sit per identitatem essentia.	44. To the final one [n.6] I say: when you take 'the generated insofar as it is generated is something', I deny it. And when you say 'it is not nothing', I say (as has often been said before, I d.1 n.58, d.2 nn.422-423, 431, d.3 n.326), that between contradictories there is a middle with 'insofar as', such that neither is present with 'insofar as', just as man 'insofar as he is man' is neither white nor 'insofar as he is man' is he non-white; but these two contradictory propositions are false together; for the true contradictory is 'man not insofar as he is man is white'; so here 'the generated not insofar as it is generated is something', because the idea of being generated is not the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate, although the generated - taken formally in itself - is essence by identity.
45 Quid ergo dicetur de 'genito in quantum genitum'? - Potest concedi quod 'genitum in quantum genitum' est persona, vel subsistens, sed non sequitur ulterius 'ergo in quantum genitum, est aliquid', accipiendo aliquid pro essentia, - propter non identitatem formalem rationis personalis cum essentia, etc. ƿ	45. What then should be said of 'generated insofar as generated'? - One can concede that 'generated insofar as generated' is the person, or subsisting, but it does not further follow 'therefore insofar as generated it is something', taking something for essence, - because of the formal non-identity of the idea of person with essence, etc. [I d.2 nn.388-410].

Second Part: On the Generation of the Son

Single Question: Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father

Latin	English
46 Secundo quaeritur de secunda parte distinctionis quintae, utrum Filius generetur de substantia Patris. Quod non: Quia VII De Trinitate cap. 11: ((Tres personas ex eadem substantia non dicimus )); substantia autem uniformiter videtur se habere ad quamlibet personam; ergo nulla persona est de illa substantia.	46. Second a question is raised about the second part of the fifth distinction, whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father. That he is not: Because On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11: "We do not say three persons out of the same substance;" but substance seems to be disposed uniformly to any of the persons; therefore no person is from the substance.
47 Item, constructio alicuius cum genitivo non notat maiorem distinctionem constructibilium quam praepositio cum suo casuali quando additur eidem constructibili; ergo non maior distinctio notatur hic 'Filius essentiae Patris' quam 'Filius de essentia Patris'; sed non conceditur quod sit 'Filius essentiae Patris', quia tunc essentia Patris generaret Filium.	47. Again, the construal of something with the genitive does not indicate a greater distinction of construable parts than does a preposition with its own case when it is added to the same construable; therefore no greater distinction is indicated in 'the Son is of the essence of the Father' than in 'the Son is from the essence of the Father'; but it is not conceded that 'the Son is of the essence of the Father' [n.43], because then the essence of the Father would generate the Son.
48 Item, cum dicitur Filius esse de substantia Patris, aut ly 'de' ƿnotat distinctionem, aut non: si sic, propositio falsa, quia essentia non distinguitur realiter a Filio; si non, ergo haec est vera 'Pater est de essentia Filii vel de essentia Patris', quod non conceditur.	48. Again, when the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, either the 'from' indicates a distinction or it does not; if it does the proposition is false, because essence is not really distinguished from the Son; if it does not, then this proposition is true 'the Father is from the essence of the Son or from the essence of the Father', which is not conceded.
49 Oppositum: XV De Trirlitate cap. 19, Augustinus, tractans illud ad Colossenses, transtulit nos in regnum Filii caritatis suae: ((quod dictum est)) - inquit - ((Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud est quam Filii substantiae suae)); ergo Filius est de substantia Patris.	49. To the opposite: Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.19 n.37 treating the saying in Colossians 1.13 'he has translated us to the kingdom of the Son of his charity' says: "what is called 'Son of his charity' is nothing other than Son of his substance;" therefore the Son is from the substance of the Father.
50 Praeterea, ad hoc est auctoritas Augustini Contra Maximinum, et ponitur in littera: ((Nullo modo verum Filium Dei cogitatis, si hunc de substantia Patris esse negatis)).	50. Further, there is for this the authority of Augustine AgainstMaximinus II ch.14 n.2, and it is in the text: "In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father."
51 Item, filius in creaturis non est nisi qui gignitur de substantia patris: ideo enim in inanimatis non est paternitas nec filiatio, quia generant de materia aliena, - sicut ignis generat ignem de materia aeris; ergo non est vera filiatio nisi ubi substantia patris, vel aliquid de substantia patris, est materia respectu filii. ƿ	51. Again, a son in creatures is only he who is generated from the substance of the father; for that is why there is in inanimate things no paternity and no filiation, because they generate from foreign matter, - just as fire generates fire from the matter of air; therefore there is no true filiation save where the substance of the father, or something of the substance of the father, is the matter with respect to the son.

I. The Opinion of Others

Latin	English
52 In ista quaestione dicitur quod sicut in substantia creata generabili aliquid est potentiale, quod praesupponitur generationi, ut materia, - et aliquid inductum per generationem, ut forma, - et ex eis productum, quod est generatum, ita proportionaliter correspondent quasi tria similia in divinis: persona quippe est quasi compositum, et relatio quasi forma, et essentia quasi materia. Est ergo Filius genitus de substantia Patris sicut de quasi materia.	52. On this question it is said that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, presupposed to generation, as matter, - and something introduced by generation, as form, - and something from these the product, which is generated, so proportionally in divine reality there correspond as it were three similar things; the person to be sure is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasi-matter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter.
53 Istud probatur per rationem Augustini Contra Maximinum, quae ponitur in littera. Filius enim nullo modo est de nihilo: neque negative, ut aliquis dicitur 'loqui de nihilo' quando non loquitur; neque affirmando ly 'de' ut sit nota materialitatis vel quasi materialitatis, quia nihil non potest esse materia alicuius; ƿneque affirmando ly 'de' originaliter vel ordinaliter, id est post nihil. Quos tres modos intelligendi 'aliquid esse de nihilo' ponit Anselmu s Monologion cap. 8. Si nullo modo Filius est de nihilo, ergo de aliquo; ergo cum non de alio quam de substantia Patris, patet ergo quod est de substantia Patris.	53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine Against Maximinus, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: "but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance"]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, whether negatively, as when someone says he is speaking 'of nothing' when he is not speaking, or whether by affirming the 'from' so as to make it a mark of materiality or quasi-materiality, because nothing cannot be the matter of anything, or whether by affirming the 'from' by way of origin or order, that is in the sense of after nothing. Which three ways of understanding 'something is from nothing' are put down by Anselm Monologion ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than the substance of the Father, then plainly he is from the substance of the Father.
54 Et si respondeatur sicut Magister videtur respondere in littera, quod est de substantia Patris, id est de Patre, qui est substantia,- arguitur quod ista expositio non sit sufficiens, quia tantum exponit 'de' ut notet rationem principii originantis vel efficientis; et posito quod hoc modo sit de Patre, adhuc restat quaestio utrum de aliquo vel de nihilo sicut de materia vel de quasi materia, et cum non de nihilo sit (quia hoc modo creatura est de nihilo), ergo de aliquo, et stat argumentum.	54. And if one respond as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, - the argument is that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the 'from' as it indicates the idea of originating or efficient principle; and once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), therefore from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.
55 Ad hoc etiam adducitur auctoritas Augustini VII De Trinitate cap. 4, quod Filius est 'Sapientia nata'. ƿ	55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is 'born Wisdom'.
56 Si arguatur contra istam opinionem quod 'actus purus non potest esse quasi materia respectu generationis, quia nullo modo est in potentia', et praeterea, per rationem Magistri, 'cum sit una essentia trium personarum, generaretur Filius de essentia trium', - respondetur ad primum, dicendo quod ((aliquid est in potentia ad aliquid quod est absolutum, et differt ab ipso re vel intentione, et vadit de potentia in actum per motum et transmutationem rei vel rationis; alio modo aliquid est in potentia ad aliquid quod est respectus tantum, et differt ab ipso sola ratione, numquam vadens per transmutationem quamcumque de potentia in actum, sed semper naturaliter coniunctum actui. Primo modo, in creaturis, materia est in potentia ad formam tamquam ad differens re ab ipsa, et transiens de potentia ad actum per realem transmutationem in materia, - et similiter, forma generis est in potentia ad formam differentiae tamquam ad differens intentione ab ipsa, et transiens de potentia ad actum per transmutationem rationis: nullo tali modo divina essentia est in potentia ad aliquid, et de ista potentia habet veritatem medium in argumento, quia ista repugnat actui puro. Non sic est de potentia secundo modo, quia de ƿnatura formae divinae in quantum est actus purus, est etiam quod sit - secundo modo - in potentia ad plures respectus.	56. If one argue against this opinion [n.52] that 'pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because it is in no way in potency', and further, by the reason of the Master, 'since there is one essence of three persons, the Son is generated from the essence of the three', - the response to the first is by saying that "something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of the thing or the idea; in another way something is in potency to something which is a respect only, and it differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing really from it, and it passes from potency to act by a real transmutation in the matter, - and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something different in intention from it, and it passes from potency to act by change of idea; in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and it is about potency in this sense that the middle term in the argument is true, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. Things are not like this of potency in the second way, because it is from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act; it is also the case that - in the second way - it is in potency to several respects."
57 ((Differt ergo productio divina summe a productione naturali, quia in illa itur per transmutationem ad perfectionem, et ibi distat potentia ab actu, in ista autem nequaquam. Differt autem ista specialiter a productione naturali quae est generatio, quia illa est de imperfecto substantialiter, ista vero est de perfecta substantia, in quo plus convenit cum productione quae est alteratio, quia in illa subiectum - quod est in potentia 'secundum quid' - est aliquid exsistens in actu; sed differt in hoc quod subiectum in alteratione est in potentia ad aliquid absolutum, re differens ab ipso, in productione autem divina nequaquam, - et in hoc divina productio convenit plus cum productione speciei ex genere (sed differt), quia in hac productione genus est sicut subiectum et materia, et est in potentia ad aliquid absolutum, ut ad differentiam, quae tamen sola intentione differt ab ipso: hic autem subiectum est in potentia ad aliquid respectivum, quod differt ab ipso sola ratione; et ita licet illa productio speciei ex genere sit magis similis divinae quam alia, in multis tamen differt, quia productio speciei ex genere procedit ab esse incompleto ad completum, assumendo complementi determinationem per differentiam, ut secundum aliud et aliud re ƿdescendat in aliam et aliam speciem et sit tantum unum commune secundum rationem. In productione autem divina subiectum non est aliquid incompletum, determinatum per assumptam proprietatem, sed unum et idem esse singulare totaliter habet esse - per productianem - in diversis proprietatibus relativis, quod est commune non secundum rationem sed secundum communicationemn.	57. "Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs specifically from the natural production which is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject - which is in potency 'in a certain respect' - is something existing in act; but it differs in this respect that the subject in the case of alteration is in potency to something absolute, really differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, - and in this regard divine production agrees more with the production of the species from the genus (but it differs), because in the case of this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but in divine production the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it only in idea; and so, although the production of the species from the genus is more like divine production than any other one is, yet it differs in many respects, because the production of the species from the genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, taking up the determination of the complement through the difference, so that according to this and that really different thing it descend to this and that different species and is in idea only one common thing. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, determined by the assumption of a property, but one and the same singular being has being totally - through production - in diverse relative properties, which is something common not in idea but in communication."
58 Ad secundum dicitur quod non est de substantia in quantum est trium, sed ut est substantia Patris.	58. To the second [n.56] it is said that the Son is not from the substance insofar as it is the substance of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.
59 Huic opinioni additur ab aliis quod essentia divina dicitur generari subiective. Quod enim subicitur generationi, potest dici subiective generari, per Philosophum V Physicorum, ubi arguit quod generatio non est motus, per hoc argumentum: 'quod movetur, ƿest; quod generatur, non est; ergo quod generatur non movetur'. Accipit 'quod movetur' pro subiecto motus, non pro termino, quia dum motus est, terminus non est. Si autem acciperet 'quod generatur' pro termino generationis, non pro subiecto, argumentum non valeret, quia terminus motus non est: ergo oportet quod accipiat ibi 'quod generatur' pro eo quod subicitur generationi. Istud etiam probatur per Commentatorem, ibidem, commento 8 et 9 .	59. To this opinion [n.52] there is added by others [following Henry] that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subjected to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion through this argument: 'what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved'. He takes 'what is moved' for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while it is motion it is not the term. But if he were to take 'what is generated' for the term of generation, not for the subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore he must be taking 'what is generated' there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, at the same place, com.8-9.
60 Pro ista opinione adducuntur rationes tales: Illud dicitur vere generari subiective, sive esse subiectum generationis, quod manet idem sub utroque termino generationis; essentia autem divina manet eadem in Patre et Filio; ergo ipsa erit vere subiectum ipsius.	60. For this opinion these sort of reasons are adduced: That is said to be truly subjectively generated, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.
61 Confirmatur ratio, quia in eodem est transmutatio et terminus sicut dispositio et forma ad quam disponit; ergo cum in ƿessentia sit relatio, quae est quasi terminus generationis, in ipsa etiam erit ipsa generatio.	61. A confirmation of the reason is that transmutation and the term are in the same thing as the disposition and the form to which the disposition disposes; therefore since in the essence there is relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, there will be in it generation itself.
62 Praeterea, omni potentiae activae correspondet aliqua passiva; ergo fecunditati Patris quasi activae correspondet aliqua potentia quasi passiva, de qua possit producere.	62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the fecundity of the quasi-active Father there will correspond some quasi-passive power, from which it can produce.
63 Ultimo arguitur sic: Si ignis generaret ignem de sua substantia, adhuc substantia ignis generantis ita esset in potentia ad formam ignis generandi, sicut modo est materia aliena, de qua generat. Sic ergo in proposito, essentia Patris - de qua Pater generat- erit quasi materia respectu generationis 6.	63. Finally there is an argument like this: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So it is in the proposed case, the essence of the Father - from which the Father generates -will be the quasi-matter with respect to generation.
64 Contra istam opinionem arguo. Primo sic: essentia est terminus formalis productionis et generationis Filii, ergo non quasi materia. Probatio antecedentis:	64. [Rejection of the opinion] - I argue against this opinion [n.52]. First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter. Proof of the antecedent:
65 Ioan. 10: Pater quod dedit mihi maius est omnibus; 'maius omniƿbus' non est nisi aliquid infinitum; hoc non est nisi essentia, - illam ergo dedit.	65. John 10.29: "What the Father gave me is greater than all things;" something 'greater than all things' is only something infinite; this is only essence, - so he gave essence.
66 Hoc etiam vult Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 26: ((Sicut naturam praestat Filio sine initio generatio, ita et Spiritui Sancto praestat essentiam sine initio de utroque processio)). Non conceditur autem formam aliquam dari productione sive communicari, sive praestari per generationem, nisi illa forma communicata sit formalis terminus productionis.	66. This is also the intention of Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: "Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so procession from both also bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without beginning." But it is not conceded that any form was given or communicated by production or bestowed by generation unless the communicated form is the formal term of the production.
67 $aProbatur etiam alite illud antecedens: Primo, quia nulla entitas formaliter univoca, simpliciter perfectior formali termino, habetur per productionem; essentia est formaliter infinita, relatio non; igitur si relatio esset formalis terƿminus productionis, persona non haberet essentiam per productionem.	67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]: First, because no formally univocal entity, being simply more perfect than the formal term, is attained through production; the essence is formally infinite, the relation is not; therefore if the relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have the essence by production.
68 Secundo, quia in creaturis natura est formalis terminus productionis, non autem proprietas individualis vel hypostatica, - sicut patet II Physicorum, ubi habetur quod generatio est naturalis, sive dicitur natura, quia est ((via in naturam)). a$	68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, - as is plain in Physics 2.1.193b12-13, where it is held that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is "the way to nature" [n.28].
69 Similiter: aliter non esset ista productio generatio, sed magis esset mutatio ad relationem, quia productio ponitur in genere vel specie ex suo termino formali, sicut patet per Philosophum V Physicorum, - sicut alteratio ponitur in genere qualitatis, quia ibi est forma quae est formalis terminus alterationis; ergo si formalis terminus huiusmodi productionis esset relatio, ista productio poneretur in genere relationis et non esset generatio.	69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in a genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b6-8, - as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because quality is there the form which is the formal term of alteration; therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.
70 Probatio consequentiae primi enthymematis: Primo, quia illud quod est materia in generatione, est in potenƿtia ad terminum formalem, - et quod est quasi materia, est quasi in potentia; essentia nec vere nec 'quasi' est in potentia ad se ipsam; ergo etc.	70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]: First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, - and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc.
71 Similiter, probatur eadem consequentia, quia una persona tantum uno modo habendi habet essentiam, saltem non istis duobus modis habet eam - ut terminum formalem productionis et cum hoc quasi materiam et subiectum generationis. Probatio istius, quia si haberet eam ex vi productionis ut terminum formalem, haberet eam circumscripto omni alio; ergo non habet eam ut quasi materiam subiectam generationi: non enim habet deitatem aliquo modo, quo modo circumscripto haberet eam perfecte et esset verus Deus. Videtur etiam sequi quod habeat bis essentiam, et quod habeat eam prius naturaliter quam habeat eam si ratio quasi materiae praecedit aliquo modo rationem formalem termini generationis.	71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence in only one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes - as formal term of production and, along with this, as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is that, if by force of production, it had essence as formal term, it would have it when everything else is removed; therefore it would not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have essence in any way such that, with that way removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. The consequence also seems to be that it would have essence twice, and it would naturally have it before it has it, if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.
72 Item, secundo ad principale: essentiae ut de ea generatur ƿFilius necesse est assignare aliquod esse, quia principiare aliquod verum ens - in quocumque genere principii - non convenit alicui nisi realiter enti.	72. Again, second to the principal [n.52]: to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being - in whatever genus of principle - does not belong to anything save to a real being.
73 Quaero igitur, quod esse convenit essentiae ut ipsa est de quo per impressionem generatur Filius: aut praecise esse ad se, quod est essentiae ut essentiae, - et tunc Filius est de essentia ut essentia, et hoc modo est trium personarum; aut convenit sibi esse in aliqua subsistentia. Et tunc quaero, in qua: aut ingenita, - et si hoc, cum in intellectu eius quod est 'esse de quo aliquid producitur' includatur hoc quod est 'esse illud in quo forma inducitur', et in intellectu eius quod est esse in quo includatur habere illud quod est in eo, et per consequens esse formaliter per ipsum, ergo si essentia ut est in Patre sit de quo Filius generatur (et per ƿimpressionem, secundum eos), sequitur quod ipsa ut in Patre erit illud in quo notitia genita imprimitur, et ita essentia ut in Patre erit formaliter Verbum sive noscens notitia genita, quod est inconveniens; si autem essentia, ut est in alia subsistentia a Patre, est de qua generatur Filius et 'in quantum est de qua' praecedit aliquo modo terminum generationis, ergo ante terminum generationis sunt duae subsistentiae, quod est inconveniens.	73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son by impression is generated; either it is precisely being for itself, which is of essence as essence, - and then the Son is from the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or being in some subsistence belongs to it. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, - and if so, since in the understanding of that which is 'being from which something is produced' there is included that which is 'being that in which form is introduced', and in the understanding of that which is 'being in which' is included 'having that which is in it' and consequently 'being formally through it', -therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that essence as it is in the Father will be that in which generated knowledge is imprinted, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or generated knowledge knowing, which is discordant [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and in some way precedes, 'insofar as it is that from which', the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is discordant.
74 Si dicit 'in quantum est de qua generatur Filius' nullam habet exsistentiam in persona, sicut et materia 'in quantum est de qua generatur genitum' non habet esse in aliquo supposito, sed tantum habet esse in potentia in supposito generando, - hoc nihil valet, quia ut dictum est, principianti realiter aliquod ens in quocumque genere principii, oportet tribuere aliquod reale esse; et ideo materiae ut principiat compositum, licet sibi non competat esse compositi quod est eius participatione, tamen convenit sibi esse suum proprium, quod est prius naturaliter quam sit pars compositi. Ita ergo hic, oportet essentiae 'in quantum est de qua ƿFilius generatur' dare esse vel in supposito vel esse essentiae secundum se, et stat argumentum.	74. If essence 'insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated' has no existence in a person, just as matter too 'insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated' does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in the supposit to be generated, - this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, there must be attributed some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is principle of the composite, although there does not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participating it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which naturally is before it is part of the composite. So here, then, there must be given to the essence 'insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated' either being in a supposit or the being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].
75 Si dicatur aliter, quod 'in quantum est Patris' est illud de quo generatur Filius, et tamen per generationem, in quantum scilicet actu formatur notitia genita, est actu alterius suppositi, - hoc improbatum est in argumento, quia in intellectu eius quod est 'esse de quo' per impressionem, includitur 'esse in quo', et ita esse formaliter tale secundum impressum illud; similiter, tunc communicatio essentiae alteri supposito praecederet secundum intellectum productionem, ita quod communicatio non fieret per productionem, sed quasi fieret ante terminum productionis, - sicut illud quod est quasi materia generationis, praeintelligitur aliquo modo ipsi termino; similiter, licet aliquid quod non est de se alicuius suppositi in actu, per generationem fiat actu alicuius suppositi, sicut materia quae non est alicuius suppositi, fiat alicuius suppositi, - tamen quod illud quod est unius suppositi fiat alterius suppositi praecise per hoc quod est materia, videtur impossibile absque omni actione quae sit ad ipsam.	75. If it be said in another way that 'insofar as it is of the Father' it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation, namely insofar as generated knowledge is actually formed, it is actually of another supposit, - this has been rejected in the argument, because in the understanding of that which is 'to be from which' by impression there is included 'to be in which', and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed; likewise, in that case the communication of essence to another supposit would, in understanding, precede the production, such that the communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, - just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to its term; likewise, although something which is from itself not of some supposit in act may come by generation to be actually of some supposit, - just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, - yet that that which is of one supposit should come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter seems impossible without any action which is directed to the matter.
76 Praeterea, tertio: quando ad productionem effectus concurrunt activum et passivum, prior est naturaliter respectus activi ad passivum quam utriusque ad productum. ƿ	76. Further, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of the active to the passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.
77 Probatio, quia oportet causas diversas eiusdem prius naturaliter approximari ad invicem quam producant effectum, - et patet per exemplum de igne calefactivo et ligno calefactibili, et genito calore.	77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, - and it is plain from the example of heating fire and heatable wood and generated heat.
78 $a Item, isti respectus, videlicet activi ad passivum et eiusdem ad productum, non omnino ex aequo conveniunt activo, nec ille 'ad productum' est prior: ergo est posterior. - Antecedens huius enthymematis, quantum ad utramque partem, sic probatur, - quia activum agit in passivum se solo in ratione causae, non producit nisi alio concurrente in ratione concausantis; et si omnino neges prioritatem respectus ad respectum, non potes negare quin necessario sit respectus activi ad passivum non posterior respectu utriusque ad productum. a$ ƿ	78. Again, these respects, namely of the active to the passive and of the active to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active element, - and the respect to the product is not prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, - because the active acts on the passive by itself alone by reason of cause; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny that necessarily the respect of the active to the passive is not posterior to the respect of each to the product.
79 Ergo si in Patre est fecunditas activa et aliquid quasi materia concurrens ad productum, prior est respectus Patris ut productivi ad illud quasi materiam quam sit utriusque eorum ad Filium, aut saltem erit necessario concomitans; et ex hoc ultra: cum res non praeexigat naturaliter - nec necessario simul requirat - illud quod est praecise ens rationis, sequitur quod ista relatio quae naturaliter praeexigitur quasi activi ad passivum sit realis, et ita in Patre erit relatio realis ad aliquid in ipso, prior relatione eius ad Filium, vel saltem alia ab illa, quod videtur inconveniens.	79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and some quasi-matter that come together for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasi-matter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since the thing does not naturally pre-require - nor does it necessarily require at the same time - that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that the naturally pre-required relation of the quasi-active element to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in himself, prior to his relation to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems discordant.
80 Item, quarto: potentia prima causativa effective se sola causat, excludendo omnem aliam causam - eiusdem generis et alterius generis - in ratione causae materialis.	80. Again, fourth: the first power that is effectively causative causes by itself alone, excluding every other cause - both of the same genus and of a different genus - in idea of material cause.
81 Et ratio est, quia causalitas materialis non dicit perfectionem simpliciter; et ideo licet reductio fiat ad aliquod primum in illo genere, illud tamen non est simpliciter primum, sed totum illud genus reducitur ad aliquid primum in alio genere, quod non includit imperfectionem, - puta ad aliquid primum in genere efficientis. ƿPatet etiam hoc antecedens per hoc quod potentia creativa, per se, sine aliquo principio materiali ut 'quo', producit productum.	81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which something does not include imperfection, - to wit to something first in the genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power per se, without any material principle as the 'in which', produces the product.
82 Ex hoc infertur a simili quod potentia productiva prima se ipsa sola producit, et sine aliquo alio principio productivo concurrente, et sine alio quasi materia: similis enim ratio videtur de principio productivo et causativo, quia si poneretur aliquod principium quasi materiale, non esset - in quantum tale est - summae perfectionis, et ita videretur reducendum in ratione principii ad principium productivum active.	82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without any quasi-matter; for the reason seems similar about the productive and causative principle, that if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not be - insofar as it is such -of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to be needing to be reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.
83 Item, quinto, Augustinus Contra Maximinum libro III cap. 15: ƿ((Spiritus Sanctus non est de aliqua materia, vel de nihilo, sed inde est unde procedit )); ita ergo concedit Spiritum Sanctum non esse de nihilo sed de substantia Patris et Filii, sicut concedit Filium esse de substantia Patris.	83. Again, fifth, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.14 says: "the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but he is thence whence he proceeds;" so Augustine concedes, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not from nothing but from the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father.
84 Et hoc probatur ratione, quia simili modo, relatio Spiritus Sancti est in deitate sicut relatio Filii; sed essentia non se habet respectu relationis Spiritus Sancti quasi materia receptiva eius - ut videtur - secundum illam opinionem, quia ponit Verbum generari per impressionem in illud de quo gignitur, Spiritum autem Sanctum produci quasi per expressionem, vel exsufflationem sui, de voluntate formata de qua producitur. Quod autem producitur per expulsionem vel expressionem de aliquo 'de quo', non habet illud 'dequo' pro materia in productione sui, quia omnis materia - productionis et producti - est in qua recipitur forma producti, quod non est expulsione de illo. Est ergo Spiritus Sanctus non de nihilo, nec tamen de quasi materia suae productionis.	84. And this is proved by reason, that in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him according to that opinion - as it seems -, because it posits that the Word is generated by impression on that from which it is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exhalation of itself, from the formed will from which it is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some 'from which' does not have that 'from which' as the matter in its production, because all matter - of the production and of the product - is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. The Holy Spirit therefore is not from nothing, nor yet from the quasi-matter of its production.
85 Ergo propter hoc quod est Filium non esse de nihilo, vel relaƿtionem eius fundari in essentia, - non oportet essentiam ut est 'de qua Filius generatur' esse materiam respectu generationis Filii.	85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, - the essence as 'that from which the Son is generated' should not be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].
86 $a Item, ad idem: Filium esse de substantia Patris necessario requiritur ad hanc generationem quantum ad exsistentiam realem generationis; sed ad illam exsistentiam non necessario requiritur substantiam Patris esse quasi materiam; igitur etc.	86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry's opinion, n.52]: That the Son is from the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation, as to the real existence of generation; but for that existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter; therefore etc.
87 Patet maior, per Augustinum Contra Maximinum: ((Nullo modo verum Dei Filium cogitatis, si hunc esse de substantia Patris negatis)). Minor, - nullum ens rationis, praecise, necessario requiritur ad hanc generationem ut exsistentem; substantiam Patris esse materiam praecise dicit ens rationis circa substantiam, alioquin circumscripta negotiatione intellectus, erit ex se quasi materia, vel materia realiter, vel similitudo realis ad materiam.	87. The major is plain from Augustine AgainstMaximinus [ibid.]: "In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father [n.50]." The minor is plain, - no being of reason is precisely, necessarily required for this generation as it is existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the activity of our intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.
88 Item, nihil convenit illi essentiae in quo materia distinguitur ƿa forma, sed quodlibet conveniens sibi vel est proprium formae vel commune: ergo in nullo est ita quasi materia sicut quasi forma.	88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore it is in no respect quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.
89 Antecedens patet, quia esse idem in generante et genito non est proprium materiae: immo anima est eadem in corde generante et parte genita, - materia numquam, in creatura, quia sufficienter actuatur per unicam formam; in propagatione, materia geniti fuit aliquid, sed non fuit materia sub forma propagantis: hic est deceptio 'quia eadem materia est corrupti et geniti' - quasi ideo sit generantis et geniti eadem.	89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same thing in generator and generated is not proper to matter; nay rather the soul [sc. which is form of the body] is the same in the heart generating as in a part generated [n.135], - matter never, in the case of the creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by the single form; in propagation, the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the propagator; there is a deception here in the remark [from Henry] 'because there is the same matter of the thing corrupted and the thing generated' - as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.
90 Item, incompossibilia simpliciter non possunt esse actus eiusdem simpliciter: bene tamen 'idem' potest esse actus incompossibilium, sicut anima partium organicarum.	90. Again, things simply incompossible cannot be the act of something simply the same; however the 'same' can well be the act of incompossibles, as the soul is of the organic parts [n.133].
91 Item, compositum per hoc constituitur quia potentiale actuatur actu compositi et determinatur: ergo essentia referetur et determinabitur. - Confirmatur: sicut qualitas non est actus nisi secundum quam actuatum est 'quale', ita relatio nullius est actus nisi secundum quam ipsum refertur. Essentia non refertur. ƿ	91. Again, the composite is constituted by the fact that the potential is actuated and determined by the act of the composite; therefore the essence will be referred and determined [sc. to and by something else]. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save as the thing actuated is qualified, so the relation of anything is not actuated save as it is referred [to something]. Essence is not referred [to something].
92 Item, alia ratio - quae in tertia dubitatione in fine - quod suppositum diceretur relatum secundum illud fundamentum. - Instantia: 'secundum deitatem Pater est similis Filio'. Tamen haec relatio non est actus fundamenti ut est formaliter distincta a fundamento, secundum te. a$	92. Again, another reason - which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] - that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. - An instance [of Henry against this]: 'the Father is like the Son in deity'. However, this relation is not the act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry].

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter

Latin	English
93 Ideo tenendo cum doctoribus antiquis - quia omnes a tempore Augustini usque ad istud non sunt ausi in divinis nominare materiam nec quasi materiam, cum tamen omnes concorditer dicerent cum Augustino quod Filius generatur de substantia Patris - dico quod Filius non generatur de substantia Patris sicut de materia nec quasi materia.	93. Therefore by holding with the ancient doctors - because they all from the time of Augustine up to the present did not dare to speak of matter or quasi-matter in divine reality, although all said in agreement with Augustine that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father - I say that the Son is not generated from the substance of the Father as from matter or quasi-matter.
94 Et hoc declarari potest sic: Generatio in creatura duo dicit, mutationem et productionem, et istorum formales rationes aliae sunt et sine contradictione separabiles ab invicem.	94. And this can be made clear as follows: Generation in the creature states two things, change and production; the formal ideas of these are different and separable from each other without contradiction.
95 Productio enim est formaliter ipsius producti, et accidit sibi quod fiat cum mutatione alicuius partis compositi, ut patet in ƿcreatione; mutatio formaliter est actus 'mutabilis' qui de privatione transit. Concomitatur autem mutatio productionem in creaturis propter imperfectionem potentiae productivae, quae non potest dare totale esse termino productionis, sed aliquid eius praesuppositum transmutatur ad aliam partem ipsius et sic producit compositum. Ergo sine contradictione possunt separari, et realiter separantur comparando ad potentiam productivam perfectam.	95. For production is formally of the product itself, and it is accidental to it that it is done with change of some composite part, as is plain in creation [sc. where there is production but not change]; change is formally the act of 'the changeable', which passes from privation. But change accompanies production in creatures because of the imperfection of the productive power, which cannot give total being to the term of the production, but something of it that is presupposed is changed to another part of it and thus it produces the composite. Therefore they can without contradiction be separated, and they really are separated in comparison to a perfect productive power.
96 Hoc etiam apparet in creatione, ubi propter perfectionem potentiae productivae ponentis primo in esse totum, vere est ratio productionis, in quantum per eam terminus productus accipit esse, sed non est ibi ratio mutationis, in quantum mutatio dicit aliquid substratum 'aliter nunc se habere quam prius', ex VI Physicorum. In creatione enim non est aliquid substratum.	96. This is also plain in creation, where, because of the perfection of the productive power setting it first in total being, there is truly the idea of production, insofar as through it the produced term receives being, - but there is not there the idea of change, insofar as change states that some substrate 'is otherwise disposed than it was before', Physics 6.3-4.234b5-7, 10-13. For in creation there is no substrate.
97 Ad propositum. Cum in divinis nihil ponendum sit imperfectionis, sed totum perfectionis, et mutatio de ratione sui dicit imperfectionem, quia potentialitatem, et hoc in mutabili,- et concomitanter etiam dicit imperfectionem potentiae activae in mutante, quia talis requirit necessario causam concausantem ad hoc ut producat (non autem fit ibi aliqua imperfectio, nec qualis est potenƿtiae passivae, nec etiam aliqua imperfectio potentiae activae, sed summa perfectio), - nullo modo ponetur ibi generatio sub ratione mutationis nec quasi mutationis, sed tantum generatio ut est productio, in quantum scilicet aliquid per eam capit esse, ponetur in divinis. Et ideo generatio ut est in divinis, est sine materia, - et ideo generationis ut est in divinis non assignabitur materia nec quasi materia, sed tantum terminus: et hoc vel totalis sicut primus, id est adaequatus - qui scilicet primo producitur in esse vel terminus formalis, secundum quem terminus primus formaliter accipit esse.	97. To the proposed case. Since in divine reality nothing of imperfection is to be posited but the whole of perfection, and since change in its idea states imperfection, because it states potentiality, and that in a changeable thing, - and concomitantly too it states imperfection of the active power in the changer, because such a changer necessarily requires a cause causing along with it so that it may produce (but no imperfection happens in divine reality, neither of the sort that is in the passive power nor any imperfection either of the active power, but supreme perfection), - in no way would generation be posited there under the idea of change or of quasi-change, but in divine reality would be posited only generation as it is production, namely insofar as something by it gets being. And therefore generation as it is in divine reality is without matter, - and therefore to generation as it is in divine reality there is not assigned matter or quasi-matter, but only the term; and this either total as first term, that is the adequate term -namely which is first produced in being [n.27] - or formal term, according to which the first term formally receives being [n.28].

B. The Son is truly from the Substance of the Father

Latin	English
98 Secundo dico quod negata omni materialitate et quasi materialitate, vere tamen Filius est 'de substantia Patris', sicut dicunt auctoritates adductae in littera.	98. Second I say [n.93] that when all materiality and quasi-materiality have been denied, the Son is yet truly 'from the substance of the Father', as the authorities [Augustine, Hilary] adduced in the text [of Lombard] say.
99 Ubi per ly 'de' non notatur tantum efficientia vel originatio, quia si tantum efficientia, tunc creaturae essent de substantia Dei, nec notatur per illud 'de' tantum consubstantialitas, quia tunc Pater esset de substantia Filii, - sed notatur simul originatio et consubstantialitas: ut scilicet in casuali huius praepositionis 'de' notetur consubstantialitas, sic quod Filius habet eandem substantiam et quasi formam cum Patre, de quo est originaliter, - et per ƿillud quod in genitivo construitur cum isto casuali, notetur principium originans; ita quod totalis intellectus huius sermonis 'Filius est de substantia Patris' est iste: Filius est originatus a Patre ut consubstantialis ei.	99. Here by the 'from' is not indicated only efficient causality or origination [n.54], because if it were efficient causality alone then creatures would be from the substance of God, - nor is indicated by the 'from' only consubstantiality, because then the Father would be from the substance of the Son, - but there is indicated origination and consubstantiality at the same time; namely so that in the [ablative] case, governed by the preposition 'from', consubstantiality is indicated, so that the Son has the same substance and quasi-form together with the Father, from whom he is by way of origin, and by what is construed in the genitive case ['of the Father'] with this prepositional clause the originating principle is indicated; so that the total understanding of this phrase 'the Son is from the substance of the Father' is this: the Son is originated by the Father as consubstantial with him.
100 Et isto modo exponit Magister auctoritates in littera adductas, - non praecise per consubstantialitatem, nec praecise per originationem, sed per utrumque, sicut communiter apparet. ((De Patris substantia, hoc est de Patre, qui est eadem substantia)) per primum originatio, per secundum consubstantialitas habetur.	100. And in this way the Master [Lombard] expounds the authorities adduced in the text, - not precisely by consubstantiality, nor precisely by origination, but by both, as is generally apparent. "From the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is the same substance [n.54]" - by the first point origination is held to, by the second consubstantiality.
101 Et quod ista sit intentio Augustini in auctoritatibus eius Contra Maximinum quae ponuntur in littera, ex fine apparet auctoritatum, - nam in una auctoritate ponit Augustinus: ((Si aliam non invenis, Patris agnosce substantiam, et Filium cum Patre homousion confitere)); hoc ergo intellexit per 'Filium esse de substantia Patris', Filium sic esse de Patre, ut sit homousion cum Patre. Item, in alia auctoritate dicit: ((Si vero de Patris substantia, eadem tunc est substantia Patris et Filii)).	101. And that this is the intention of Augustine in his authorities Against Maximinus [n.53] that are put in the text, is apparent from the point of the authorities, -for in one authority Augustine sets down: "If you do not find another substance, recognize the substance of the Father, and confess the Son is homoousion (Greek: 'of the same substance') with the Father;" from this then he understood by 'the Son is from the substance of the Father' that the Son is so from the Father that he is homoousion with the Father. Again, in the other authority he says: "But if he is from the substance of the Father, then there is the same substance of Father and Son."
102 Ad intellectum autem istius affirmativae qua dicitur 'Filius est de substantia Patris', secundum intellectum praedictum, dico ƿquod intellectus ille vere salvat quod Filius non sit de nihilo, vere etiam salvat quod Filius est 'de' sicut requiritur ad filiationem.	102. But to understand this affirmative proposition by which it is said that 'the Son is from the substance of the Father' [n.98], according to the aforesaid understanding [n.101], I say that that understanding truly saves the fact that the Son is not from nothing, - it also truly saves the fact that the Son is 'from' in the way required for filiation.
103 Primum declaro, quia 'creatura genita' non est de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexsistit, ut materia. Ergo cum forma sit aliquid compositi et aliquid eius perfectius quam materia, si forma alicuius praeexsisteret et materia de novo adveniret et informaretur illa forma iam praeexsistente, ipsum productum non esset de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexstitisset, immo aliquid eius perfectius quam materia quae praeexsistit communiter. Ergo si Filius non diceretur esse de nihilo 'quia essentia eius secundum ordinem originis praefuit in Patre', et hoc si illa essentia esset quasi materia generationis Filii, multo magis nec Filius erit de nihilo si illa essentia 'prius origine exsistens in Patre' sit quasi forma communicata Filio.	103. I clarify the first point, because a 'generated creature' is not from nothing, because something of it pre-existed as matter. Therefore since the form is something of the composite, and something of it more perfect than matter, if the form of something pre-existed and matter came to it de novo and was informed by the already pre-existing form, the product itself would not be from nothing, because something of it would have pre-existed, nay something of it more perfect than the matter which commonly pre-exists. Therefore if the Son would not be said to be from nothing 'because his essence according to order of origin pre-existed in the Father', and this too if the essence were the quasi-matter of the generation of the Son, much more will the Son not be from nothing if the essence 'existing in the Father first by origin' is the quasi-form communicated to the Son.
104 Secundum declaro sic, scilicet quod istud 'de' sufficiat ad rationem filiationis, quia in animatis, ubi est paternitas et filiatio, videamus quis sit ille actus per quem generans dicitur formaliter 'pater'. Ille utique est actus decidendi semen, et si esset perfectum agens, ita quod nunc, quando decidit semen, posset immediate decidere prolem, vere esset pater, et multo perfectius quam modo sit, ubi requiruntur tot mutationes intermediae; sed nunc, in isto actu ƿdecidendi semen, illud quod erat substantia eius, vel aliquo modo aliquid eius, non est materia, sed est quasi terminus formalis, communicatus sive productus per istum actum, sicut esset proles si immediate decideretur a patre; ergo quod aliquid substantiae generantis sit terminus actionis suae, qua est pater, hoc vere salvat productum simile in natura 'esse de substantia eius', sic ut ipsum 'de' vere sufficit ad rationem patris et filii, - et quod illud 'decisum ut terminus' sit materia sequentium transmutationum, hoc accidit ipsi 'de' ut convenit patri et filio.	104. I clarify the second point [n.102] in this way, namely that the 'from' suffices for the idea of filiation, because in animate things, where paternity and filiation exist, we may see what the act is by which the generator is said to be formally 'father'. It is namely the act of depositing semen, and if it were a perfect agent, so that now, when it deposits semen, it could immediately deposit the offspring, it would be truly father and much more perfectly than is now the case when so many intermediate changes are required; but now, in the act of depositing semen, that which was the substance of it, or in some way something of it, is not matter, but is as it were the formal term, communicated or produced through the act, just as the offspring would be if it were immediately deposited by the father; therefore because something of the substance of the generator is the term of its act, by which it is father, this truly saves the fact that a product alike in nature 'is from the substance of it', so that the 'from' truly suffices for the idea of father and son, - and as to the thing 'deposited as term' being the matter of subsequent changes, this happens to the 'from' as it belongs to father and son.
105 Ergo Pater aeternus, non decidendo aliquid sui sed totam essentiam sui communicando, et hoc ut formalem terminum illius productionis, verissime producit Filium de se, eo modo quo esse 'de' pertinet ad patrem et filium; et licet esset ibi essentia 'de qua' sicut de quasi materia, illud 'de' non faceret aliquid ad rationem patris, sicut nec in creaturis si generans haberet semen suum et pro termino formali et pro materia suae actionis, non esset 'pater' in quantum semen suum esset materia subiecta suae actioni sed in quantum esset terminus illius actionis, quemadmodum et si pater creatus immediate decideret a se filium, vere esset pater, quia illud quod esset de ipso, esset terminus actionis, nullo autem modo materia.	105. Therefore the eternal Father, not depositing some part of himself but communicating his whole essence, and this as formal term of the production, most truly produces the Son from himself, in the way in which 'from' pertains to father and son; and although the essence be there the 'from which' as from quasi-matter, the 'from' would not do anything for the idea of father, - just as neither in creatures, if the generator had its semen both for the formal term and for the matter of its action, the father would not be 'father' insofar as his semen was the matter subject to his action, but insofar as it was the term of the action, in the way too that, if the created father deposited a son from himself, he would be truly father, because that which would be from him would be the term of the action, but in no way the matter.

C. How Relation and Essence can exist in the Same Person

Latin	English
106 Tertio principaliter, ad solutionem difficultatis huius quaestionis, videndum est quomodo relatio et essentia possunt esse in eadem ƿpersona quin essentia sit materiale respectu relationis, cum nulla relatio sit materiale respectu eius.	106. Third principally, to the solution of the difficulty of this question, one must see how relation and essence can exist in the same person without the essence being material with respect to the relation, since no relation is material with respect to it.
107 Et sunt hic quattuor difficultates. Prima, qualiter persona divina est una, nisi hoc actus sit et illud potentia.	107. And there are four difficulties.
108 Ad quod dico sic: Primo, quod quiditas creata est quo aliquid est ens quiditative, et hoc non est imperfectionis: competit enim quiditati ex ratione quiditatis.	108. To this I say as follows: First, created quiddity is that in which something is a being quidditatively, and this is not a mark of imperfection; for it belongs to quiddity from the idea of quiddity.
109 Ipsa tamen, puta humanitas, quia est imperfectae actualitatis, ideo est divisibilis per illud quod contrahit ad individuum, puta per proprietatem individualem - quaecumque sit, dicatur a - et recipit ab a aliquam actualitatem (sive etiam unitatem, sive etiam indivisibilitatem), quam habet in individuo et non habet ex se, ita quod illud contrahens (ut a) non tantum est in Socrate 'quo Socrates est formaliter Socrates', sed est aliquo modo formale respectu naturae, et natura est aliquo modo potentia respectu illius: unde secundo, natura contrahitur et determinatur per ipsum a.	109. Created quiddity, however, for example humanity, because it is of imperfect actuality, is therefore divisible by that which contracts it to an individual, namely by the individual property - whatever it be, let it be a - and it receives from a some actuality (whether also unity or also individuality), which it has in the individual and does not have from itself, so that the contracting thing (as a) is in Socrates not only that 'by which Socrates is formally Socrates', but is formal in some way with respect to the nature, and the nature is in some way potency with respect to it; hence, secondly, the nature is contracted and determined by that very a.
110 Et tertio: tamen humanitas in Socrate est aliquis actus, et praecise accipiendo humanitatem et a distinguendo contra se, humanitas ƿest perfectior actus quam sit ipsum a, licet a sit magis proprius actus et aliquo modo actus naturae in quantum determinat naturam.	110. And third; but humanity in Socrates is some act, and precisely by taking humanity and by distinguishing a from it, humanity is a more perfect act than is a itself, although a is a more proper act and in some way the act of nature insofar as it determines nature.
111 Applicando haec tria ad divina, relinquatur illud quod est imperfectionis.	111. When applying these three things [nn.108-110] to divine reality, let that be left behind which belongs to imperfection.
112 Quoad primum. Deitas de se est qua Deus est Deus, et etiam qua subsistens 'cuius proprium est a' est formaliter Deus, quia esse 'quo' hoc modo non est imperfectionis in creatura, sed competit quiditati unde quiditas.	112. As to the first point [n.108]. Deity is of itself that by which God is God, and also that by which the subsistent thing 'whose property is a' is formally God, because to be 'by this' in this way is not a feature of imperfection in the creature, but belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity.
113 Quoad secundum. Est dissimile, quia deitas ipsa per proprietatem personalem non determinatur nec contrahitur, nec aliquo modo actuatur, quia hoc erat imperfectionis et potentialitatis in ƿnatura creata; similiter, deitas de se est 'haec', et ita sicut habet ultimam unitatem de se, ita et actualitatem. Est ergo proprietas personalis ita proprius actus personae, quod tamen non est actus ipsius naturae divinae aliquo modo perficiens vel informans eam.	113. As to the second point [n.109]. There is a dissimilarity, because deity itself is not determined or contracted by the personal property, nor in any way actuated by it, because this was a feature of imperfection and of potentiality in created nature; likewise, deity is of itself a 'this', and thus, just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so it has actuality too. The personal property therefore is the proper act of the person such that it is yet not an act of the divine nature itself in any way perfecting or informing it.
114 Quoad tertium. Est aliquo modo simile, quia relatio etsi sit proprius actus personae, et essentia non sit proprius actus personae sed aliquis actus, tamen essentia est formaliter actus infinitus; relatio autem non est ex ratione sua formali actus infinitus.	114. As to the third point [n.110]. There is in some way a similarity, because although relation is the proper act of the person, and essence is not the proper act but an act of the person, yet the essence is formally infinite act; but the relation is not of its formal idea infinite act.
115 Sed quomodo possunt isti duo actus concurrere ad constitutionem unius, si neutrum sit actus alterius? $a Oportet enim unum esse in alio, quia si non, ergo utrumque est per se subsistens, et ita non erunt in eodem per se subsistente; similiter, unitas qualitercumque distinctorum non videtur secundum Aristotelem esse nisi per rationem actus et potentiae. a$	115. But how can these two acts come together to constitute one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For one must be in the other, because if not then each is per se subsistent, and thus they will not be in the same per se subsistent thing; likewise, the unity of things distinct in any way at all does not seem, according to Aristotle [Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-10, 23-25], to exist except by reason of act and potency.
116 Respondeo. Unitas compositi necessario est ex ratione actus et potentiae, sicut assignat Philosophus VII Metaphysicae cap. 7, et VIII libro cap. ultimo. Sed persona in divinis non est composita, nec quasi composita, sed est simplex, - et ita vere simplex sicut ƿest essentia ipsa secundum se considerata, nullam habens compositionem nec quasi compositionem in re: et tamen formalis ratio essentiae divinae non est formalis ratio relationis, nec e converso, sicut dictum est supra distinctione 2 quaestione 1 'De Trinitate', in solutione quaestionis.	116. I reply. The unity of the composite is necessarily by reason of act and potency, as is assigned by the Philosopher, ibid. and 7.13.1039a4-5. But the person in divine reality is not composite, nor quasi-composite, but simple, - and as truly simple as the essence itself considered in itself, having no composition nor quasi-composition in reality; and yet the formal idea of the divine essence is not the formal idea of relation, nor conversely, as was said above [I d.2 nn.388-395, 403-406].
117 Qualiter autem stat quod ratio relationis in re non sit formaliter eadem rationi essentiae et tamen in eodem concurrentes non constituunt compositum, - hoc ideo est, quia illa ratio est perfecte eadem illi: propter infinitatem enim unius rationis, quidquid potest esse cum ea, est perfecte idem sibi. Perfectio ergo identitatis excludit omnem compositionem et quasi compositionem, quae identitas est propter infinitatem, - et tamen infinitas non tollit formales rationes quin haec formaliter non sit illa.	117. But how it stands that the idea of relation in the thing is not formally the same as the idea of the essence and yet, when they come together in the same thing, they do not constitute a composite, - the reason for this is that the former idea is perfectly the same as the latter; for because of the infinity of the one idea [sc. of the essence, nn.67, 114, 127], whatever can exist along with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore the perfection of identity excludes all composition and quasi-composition, which identity exists because of the infinity, - and yet infinity does not take away from the formal ideas that the one is not formally the other.
118 Non est ergo ex istis quasi compositum. Et ideo nihil est ex eis tamquam compositum ex actu et potentia, sed est unum simplicissimum ex istis, quia una ratio est perfecte - immo perfectissime eadem alteri, et tamen non formaliter eadem: non enim sequitur 'sunt perfecte eadem etiam identitate simplicitatis, ergo sunt formaliter eadem', sicut tactum est de identitate in quaestione praeallegata, et tangetur inferius distinctione 8. Et eadem perfecta ƿidentitas excludit omnem aggregationem, quia idem non aggregatur cum se ipso. ƿ	118. So there is no quasi-composite made from them. And therefore nothing from them is as composite of act and potency, but there is from them one most simple thing, because one idea is perfectly - nay most perfectly - the same as the other, and yet is not formally the same; for this does not follow 'they are perfectly the same even by identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same', as was touched on about identity in the pre-cited question [in n.116], and as will be touched on below in distinction 8 [nn.209, 217]. And the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated with itself.
119 $a Et quod additur quod 'unum oportet esse in alio', concedo ut relatio est in fundamento sive radice, sed hoc non est ut actus in potentia sed ut identice continentur in pelago infinito.	119. And as to what is added that 'one must be in the other' [n.115], I concede that the relation is in the foundation or the root, but this is not as act is in potency but as identically contained in the infinite sea [sc. the divine essence, n.131].
120 Aliter potest dici quod omnes istae sunt verae, 'deitas est in Patre, paternitas est in Patre', 'Pater est in deitate sive natura divina, paternitas est in deitate', et tamen nullum 'in' est ibi ut actus in potentia.	120. In another way [sc. to the issue in n.119] it can be said that all these propositions are true, 'deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father', 'the Father is in deity or in the divine nature, paternity is in deity', and yet no 'in' there is as act in potency.
121 Nam prima est vera ut natura est in supposito, habente 'esse' quiditativum ea (quia hoc convenit quiditati unde quiditas est), sed non propter hoc est forma informans suppositum, etiam in creaturis.	121. For the first proposition is true as nature is in the supposit, having quidditative 'being' by it (because this belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity [n.112]), but not for this reason is it a form informing the supposit, even in the case of creatures [nn.132, 138].
122 Secunda est vera ut forma hypostatica est in hypostasi, - sed nec informat ipsam: tam enim quiditas quam forma hypostatica, etiam in creaturis, licet sit forma suppositi, non tamen est forma informans, sed ibi quasi pars, hic autem quasi una ratio formalis concurrens cum alia, formaliter, ad idem simplex sed habens in se plures rationes formales. ƿ	122. The second [n.120] is true as the hypostatic form is in the hypostasis, - but it does not inform it; for as well the quiddity as the hypostatic form, even in the case of creatures, although it is the form of the supposit, yet is not an informing form, but is there [in creatures] as a part [sc. as Socrateity-humanity is in Socrates], while here it is as one formal idea concurring with another [sc. as paternity-deity], formally, to the same simple thing that yet has in it several formal ideas.
123 Tertia est vera ut suppositum est in natura, - patet quod non ut informans.	123. The third [n.120] is true as the supposit in the nature, - plainly not as informing it [n.147].
124 Quarta est vera eodem modo 'in', quia quo modo totum est primo in aliquo, eodem modo pars est per se sed non primo in eodem, - patet de esse in loco; ergo si Pater primo est in natura, ut suppositum naturae, paternitas 'per se erit in eadem natura' eodem modo essendi 'in' licet non primo.	124. The fourth [n.120] is true in the same way of 'in' [sc. the same as in in.123], because in the way a whole is first in something, in the same way the part is per se but not first in the same thing, - it is plain about being in place; therefore if the Father is first in nature, as the supposit of nature, paternity 'will be per se in the same nature' in the same way of being 'in', although not first.
125 Ultra hoc, prior responsio dat modum 'in' - qui est relationis in fundamento - qui non reducitur ad esse formae in materia nisi ubi fundamentum est limitatum, in tantum quod non habet perfecte identice in se ipsam relationem. a$	125. In addition to this, the prior response [n.119] gives the manner of 'in' -which is that of relation in the foundation - which is not reduced to the being of form in matter save where the foundation is limited, in that it does not have the relation perfectly identically in itself.
126 Secunda difficultas est, quomodo relatio possit esse distinguens personam, et essentiam non distinguens, quin relatio habeat rationem actus, - quia actus est distinguere, VII Metaphysicae.	126. [Difficulty 2] - The second difficulty is how relation can distinguish the person and not distinguish the essence without the relation having the idea of act, -because it belongs to act to distinguish, Metaphysics 7.13.1039a7.
127 Respondeo. Concedo relationem esse actum personalem, non actum quiditativum, - quia personaliter distinguit et non quiditative. Essentia autem est actus quiditativus et quiditative distinguens: actus autem quiditativus est simpliciter perfectus, quia ƿinfinitus, - non sic autem est actus personalis de se formaliter infinitus.	127. I reply. I concede that relation is a personal act, not a quidditative act, -because it distinguishes personally and not quidditatively. But the essence is quidditative act and distinguishes quidditatively; but the quidditative act is simply perfect, because infinite, - but the personal act is not thus of itself formally infinite.
128 Et si dicis quod 'actus distinguens est actus eius quod non distinguit', falsum est, nisi illud quod non distinguit distinguatur per actum distinguentem, sicut in creaturis: humanitas distinguitur in Socrate et Platone per a et b, et ideo ibi actus distinguens - etiam individualiter - est actus eius quod non distinguit, quia actus ille distinguens distinguit ipsam naturam, quae non distinguit. Non ita hic, quia proprietas personalis non distinguit essentiam, nec contrahit nec determinat.	128. And if you say that 'the distinguishing act is an act of what does not distinguish', it is false, unless what does not distinguish is distinguished by a distinguishing act, as it is in creatures; humanity is distinguished in Socrates and Plato by a and b, and therefore the distinguishing act there - even distinguishing individually - is an act of what does not distinguish, because the distinguishing act distinguishes the nature itself, which does not distinguish. It is not so here [sc. in divine reality], because the personal property does not distinguish the essence, nor does it contract or determine it.
129 Tertia difficultas est, quomodo potest esse relatio, nisi requirat propriam rationem fundamenti. Fundamentum enim videtur esse prius relatione, et quasi perfectibile per eam, et non e converso: relatio enim non videtur perfici a suo fundamento, quia tunc praesupponeretur suo fundamento. Ergo cum essentia sit fundamentum istarum relationum, videtur esse quasi materia.	129. [Difficulty 3] - The third difficulty is how a relation can exist without requiring the proper idea of foundation. For the foundation seems to be prior to the relation and is as it were perfectible by it, and not conversely; for a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would be presupposed to its foundation. Therefore since the essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems to be quasi-matter.
130 Respondeo. In creaturis ordo generationis et ordo perfectionis contrarii sunt, sicut patet IX Metaphysicae, quod ((illa quae sunt priora generatione, sunt posteriora perfectione)); et ratio est, quia creaturae procedunt de potentia ad actum, et ideo de imperfecto ad perfectum, - et ideo prius pervenitur via generationis ad ƿimperfectum quam ad perfectum. Sed eundo ad simpliciter primum, oportet quod 'idem' sit simpliciter primum et origine et perfectione (etiam secundum Philosophum, ibidem), quia totus ordo generationis reducitur ad aliquid primum perfectionis, sicut ad primum originis totalis. In divinis ergo simul debent intelligi ordo generationis et ordo perfectionis.	130. I reply. In the case of creatures the order of generation and the order of perfection are contraries, as is clear from Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-5, because "things that are prior in generation are posterior in perfection;" and the reason is that creatures proceed from potency to act, and so from the imperfect to the perfect, - and therefore by way of generation the imperfect is reached before the perfect is. But, when going to what is simply first, it must be the case that the 'same thing' is simply first both in origin and in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, ibid), because the whole order of generation is reduced to some first thing of perfection, as to the first thing of the whole origin. In divine reality, therefore, the order of generation and the order of perfection must be understood together.
131 Sicut ergo in creaturis, si concurrerent isti duo ordines semper uniformiter, non quaereremus primo materiam quae substaret formae, et secundo formam, sed quaereremus primo formam quae nata esset dare actum materiae et secundo quaereremus materiam quae nata esset recipere esse per illam formam, vel suppositum quod natum est subsistere per illam formam, - ita in divinis. Incipiendo a primo signo naturae, omnino primo occurrit essentia divina ut est esse per se et ex se, quod non competit alicui naturae creatae, quia nulla natura creata habet esse prius naturaliter quam in supposito. Ista autem essentia - secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate - est qua Pater est et qua Filius est, licet non sit qua Pater est Pater et Filius est Filius. Isti ergo essentiae, abstractissime consideratae, ut prior omnibus personalibus, competit esse per se, et in isto primo occurrit non ut aliquid receptiƿvum alicuius perfectionis, sed ut infinita perfectio, potens quidem in secundo signo naturae communicari alicui: non ut forma informans, materiae, sed ut quiditas communicatur supposito, tamquam formaliter exsistenti per eam. Et ita 'pullulant' - ut quidam dicunt - ex ea relationes, et in ea personae; non ut quasi quaedam formae, dantes esse sibi, vel quasi quaedam supposita, in quibus recipiat esse quod sit simpliciter eius, sed quibus suppositis dat 'esse' ut quo formaliter illa supposita sunt, et quo sunt Deus: et ita relatio illa pullulans - si sit per se subsistens - ipsa pullulat non ut forma essentiae sed ut nata esse Deus ipsa deitate formaliter, licet non ut informante ipsam sed ut exsistente eadem sibi, perfectissima identitate; nullo autem modo, e converso, relatio est essentiae ut quo formaliter essentia est determinata vel contracta, vel aliquo modo actuata per ipsam, quia haec omnia repugnant infinitati essentiae ut primo occurrit sub ratione actus infiniti.	131. Just as in creatures, then, if those two orders were always uniformly to come together, we would not seek first for the matter which underlies the form and then, second, for the form, but we would seek first for the form which would be of a nature to give act to the matter, and second we would seek for the matter which would be of a nature to receive being through that form, or the supposit which is of a nature to subsist through that form, - so it is in divine reality. Beginning from the first moment of nature, altogether first arises divine nature as it is being through itself and from itself, which does not belong to any created nature, because no created nature has being naturally before it is in a supposit. But this essence - according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11 -is that by which the Father is and that by which the Son is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father and the Son is Son. To this essence, then, considered in the most abstract way, as prior to all the personal features, there belongs being through itself, and in this first moment it arises not as something receptive of some perfection, but as infinite perfection, able indeed in the second moment of nature to be communicated to another; not communicated to matter as an informing form, but to supposit as quiddity, as to what exists formally through it. And thus do the relations - as some say - 'sprout up' from it and the persons 'sprout up' in it; not as certain quasi-forms, giving being to it, or as certain quasi-supposits, in which it receives the being which simply belongs to it, but as supposits to which it gives 'being' as that by which they are formally supposits, and by which they are God; and so the sprouting relation - if it is per se subsistent - sprouts up, not as form of the essence, but as naturally being God by the very deity formally, although not by deity as informing, but as existing the same with it, in the most perfect identity; but, conversely, in no way is the relation of the essence as being that by which essence is formally determined or contracted or in any way actuated by it, because all these thing are repugnant to the infinity of essence as it first occurs under the idea of infinite act.
132 Concedo tunc quod essentia est fundamentum illarum relationum, sed non fundamentum quasi potentiale recipiens istas, sed fundamentum quasi per modum formae, in qua istae formae natae, sunt subsistere, - non quidem per informationem, sicut similitudo est in albedine, - sed sicut subsistens dicitur esse in natura, sicut Socrates dicitur subsistere in humanitate quia 'Socrates humanitate est homo'. Non ergo ex ratione fundamenti habebis rationem potentiae vel quasi potentialitatis, in essentia divina, sed praecise habebis rationem formae - ut qua relatio fundata in ea simpliciter est Deus. ƿ	132. I concede then that essence is the foundation of these relations [n.129], but not a foundation quasi-potential receiving them, but foundation as by way of form, in which those forms are born and are to subsist, - not indeed by informing, as likeness does in whiteness, - but as the subsistent is said to exist in the nature, as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity, because 'Socrates is a man by humanity'. You will not then have from the idea of foundation the idea of potency or quasi-potentiality in the divine essence, but you will have precisely the idea of form - as that by which the relation founded in it simply is God.
133 Exemplum istius potest accipi in creaturis, ponendo ibi quaedam 'per impossibile'. Augmentatio modo fit per hoc quod alimentum adveniens corpori corrumpitur, et materia eius recipit formam carnis, et sic informatur ab anima. Ponatur quod eadem materia manens nata sit recipere aliam partem formae (sicut ponitur in rarefactione), materia manet una, quae prius fuit formata et nunc nova forma formatur, - ipsa tamen formaliter est vere mutata, quia de privatione transit ad formam. - Ponamus, ex alia parte, quod anima eadem perficeret primo unam partem corporis (ut cor), postea adveniret alia pars corporis organici, perfectibilis ab anima, anima perficeret illam partem advenientem de novo, - et ipsa tamen non mutaretur, quia non esset in ea primo privatio et postmodum forma. Privatio enim est carentia, in apto nato recipere; anima autem primo non informans et postea informans non est nata aliquid recipere sed dare.	133. An example of this can be taken in the case of creatures by positing there a certain 'per impossibile'. Increase happens now by the fact that food coming to the body is corrupted, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and is thus informed by the soul. Let it be posited that, while the same matter remains, it is of a nature to receive some part of the form [sc. of flesh] (as is posited in the case of rarefaction); the matter remains one, which was formed before and now is formed with a new form, - it itself however is formally truly changed, because it passes from privation to form. - Let us posit, on the other side, that the same soul would perfect first one part of the body (as the heart), but after another part of the organic body arrives, perfectible by the soul, the soul would perfect the part that de novo arrives, - and the soul itself would yet not be changed, because there would not be in it first privation and later form. For privation is a lack in that which is naturally apt to receive [what is lacked]; but the soul, first non-informing and later informing, is not of a nature to receive anything but to give something.
134 In utroque extremorum istorum vere esset productio alicuius producti, sed in primo mutatio, in secundo non.	134. In each of these extremes there is truly production of some product, but in the first there is change and not in the second.
135 Aptius videtur exemplum, si ponamus materiam cordis animati posse eandem communicari diversis formis - puta manus et pedis et hoc virtute activa cordis animati, producentis composita ista ex materia sua communicata et ex formis istis, hic vere esset productio totorum habentium eandem materiam, et esset cum mutatione illius materiae; sed si, ex alia parte, ponamus animam - propter ƿsui illimitationem in ratione actus et formae - posse communicari multis et virtute animae in corde ipsam communicari manui et pedi, productis a corde animato, hic vere esset productio multorum consubstantialium in forma, absque mutatione illius formae.	135. The example will seem more apt if we posit that the matter of the animated heart is able to be communicated the same to diverse forms - as of the hand and foot -and this by the active virtue of the animated heart producing those composites from its own communicated matter and from those forms; this would truly be production of all the things having the same matter, and it would go along with change of that matter; but if, on the other side, we posit that the soul - because of its lack of limitation in idea of act and form - can be communicated to many things and, by virtue of the soul in the heart, is communicated to hand and foot, produced by the animated heart, this would truly be production of many things consubstantial in form, without change of that form.
136 In utroque exemplo ponantur producta esse per se subsistentia, non partes eiusdem, quia esse partem est imperfectionis. Hoc posito, secundus modus in utroque exemplo, qui est de communicatione formae ipsi producto, perfecte repraesentat productionem in Deo, non primus, qui est de communicatione materiae, - et hoc, adhuc addendo in positione, quod anima in corde et manu et pede non sit forma informans, quia componibilitas includit imperfectionem, sed sit forma totalis qua illa subsistentia sint et animata sint: ita quod intelligitur deitas non communicari quasi materia, sed relationibus subsistentibus - si personae ponantur relativae - communicatur deitas per modum formae, non informantis sed qua relatio vel relativum subsistens est Deus.	136. In each example [nn.133, 135] let the products be posited to be per se subsistents, not parts of the same thing, because to be a part belongs to imperfection. With this posited, the second mode in each example, which is about the communication of form to the product, perfectly represents production in God, but not the first, which is about the communication of matter, - and this while still adding to the position that the soul in the heart and hand and foot is not the informing form, because being composable involves imperfection, but is the total form by which they are subsistent and are animated; so that deity is not understood to be communicated to quasi-matter; rather, to subsistent relations - if the persons are posited relatively - deity is communicated by way of form, not informing form, but form by which the relation or the subsisting relative is God.
137 Nec igitur essentia informat relationem, nec e converso, sed est perfecta identitas. - Sed essentia habet modum formae respectu relationis, sicut natura respectu suppositi, in quantum ipsa est qua relatio subsistens est Deus. E converso autem, nullo modo relatio ƿest actus essentiae, quia sicut (dicit Damascenus) relatio 'non determinat naturam sed hypostasim', ita non est actus naturae sed hypostasis; similiter, quando relatio informat fundamentum, suppositum dicitur relatum per se secundo modo secundum illud fundamentum, sicut Socrates similis est secundum albedinem vel albedine: Pater autem non est Pater deitate, secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 4, - ergo hic non est talis modus relationis ad fundamentum qualis est in aliis, quia hic fundamentum non actuatur per relationem, sed illa est tantum actus suppositi vel suppositum.	137. And the essence does not therefore inform the relation, nor conversely, but there is perfect identity. - But essence has the mode of form with respect to relation, just like nature with respect to the supposit, insofar as it is that by which the subsisting relation is God. Conversely, however, in no way is the relation an act of the essence, because just as relation (says Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.50) 'does not determine the nature but the hypostasis', so it is not an act of nature but of the hypostasis; likewise, when relation informs the foundation, the supposit is said to be related per se in the second mode according to that foundation, just as Socrates is alike in whiteness or by whiteness; but the Father is not Father by deity, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9, - therefore there is not here such a mode of relation to the foundation as there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated through the relation, but the relation is only the act of the supposit or is the supposit.
138 Dico igitur breviter quod relatio et essentia ita sunt in persona quod neutrum est forma informans alterum, sed sunt perfecte idem, licet non formaliter. Ut tamen non sunt formaliter eadem, relatio nullo modo perficit essentiam, nec est terminus formalis receptus in essentia, sed essentia hoc modo est forma relationis, quia est qua relatio est et similiter Deus est, - et etiam, essentia est formalis terminus generationis, sicut in creaturis natura est formalis terminus generationis non autem actus individualis.	138. I say briefly that relation and essence are in the person such that neither of them is form informing the other, but they are perfectly the same, although not formally. But as they are not formally the same, the relation in no way perfects the essence, nor is it the formal term received in the essence, but the essence in this way is the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is and is likewise God, - and also, the essence is the formal term of generation [n.64], just as in creatures nature is the formal term of generation but not an individual act.
139 Contra istud obicitur, quia 'terminus formalis generationis communicatur, ergo praesupponit illud cui communicetur; essentia autem non praesupponit relationem, sed e converso, ergo ƿessentia non communicatur relationi', - et potest esse quarta difficultas: quia aliquid ibi communicatur, et illud erit formalis terminus, et illud praesupponet illud cui communicatur; essentia autem non potest praesupponere relationem cui ipsa communicetur, sed e converso, - ergo e converso, - et ita relatio communicatur essentiae, et tunc relatio erit terminus formalis productionis et essentia quasi materia.	139. [Difficulty 4] - Against this it is objected that 'the formal term of generation is communicated, therefore it presupposes that to which it is communicated; but the essence does not presuppose relation but conversely, therefore essence is not communicated to relation [from Henry]', - and it can be the fourth difficulty; because something is communicated there, and it will be the formal term, and it will presuppose that to which it is communicated; but essence cannot presuppose the relation to which it is communicated but conversely, - therefore conversely, - and so relation is communicated to essence, and then relation will be the formal term of production and essence the quasi-matter.
140 Respondeo. Productio quia est alicuius primi termini - id est adaequati - includentis aliquid in ratione termini formalis ipsius productionis et aliquid in ratione subsistentiae in tali termino, ideo contradictio est respectu productionis haec separari, terminum scilicet formalem et rationem subsistentiae, in quantum scilicet productione habent esse, licet absolute prioritas esset unius ad alterum (etiam ad 'separari sine contradictione'), considerando ipsa absolute, non in quantum per productionem habent esse, licet etiam esset ibi prioritas perfectionis, quod alterum esset altero perfectius, - quia natura perfectior est ratione subsistentiae (etiam in creaturis), et ex hoc sequitur quod natura est terminus formalis productionis, quia nulla entitas simplex perfectior formali termino productionis habet esse per productionem.	140. I respond. Because production is of some first term - that is of an adequate term - which includes in it something in the idea of formal term of the very production and something in idea of subsistence in such term [nn.27-28, 97], therefore it is a contradiction for these to be separated in respect of production, namely the formal term and the idea of subsistence, namely insofar as they have being by production, although absolutely there would be a priority of one to the other (even to the 'separated without contradiction'), considering them absolutely, not insofar as they have being through production, - although there would there too be a priority of perfection, because one would be more perfect than the other, - because nature is more perfect by reason of subsistence (even in creatures), and from this it follows that nature is the formal term of production, because no simple entity more perfect than the formal term of production has being through production [n.67].
141 Tunc ad formam argumenti dico quod communicatum 'in ƿquantum productione communicatur' non praesupponit illud cui communicetur, nec e converso, quia ista communicatio non est alicui iam exsistenti, sicut est in alteratione, - sed est alicui, ut simpliciter sit; ideo nec natura communicatur ante productionem suppositi (quia tunc communicaretur et non producto), nec e converso, licet absolute communicatum sit prius ratione propria suppositi - in prioritate perfectionis et in prioritate essendi sine invicem - in creaturis: primae prioritati in creaturis correspondet hic in Deo, quod essentia est formaliter infinita, relatio autem non.	141. Then to the form of the argument I say that the thing communicated 'insofar as it is communicated by production' does not presuppose that to which it is communicated, nor conversely, because the communication is not to something already existing, as it is in the case of alteration, - but it is to something so that it simply exist; therefore neither is nature communicated before the production of the supposit (because then it would be communicated also to something non-produced), nor conversely, although absolutely it is communicated first in the proper idea of supposit - in priority of perfection and in priority of being without each other - in the case of creatures; to the first priority in the case of creatures there corresponds here in God that the essence is formally infinite, the relation however is not.

III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others

Latin	English
142 Ad argumenta opinionis. - Ad primum, de Augustino Contra Maximinum: patet, quomodo Filius nullo modo est de nihilo, sed est vere de substantia Patris.	142. To the arguments for the opinion. To the first, from Augustine Against Maximinus [n.53]: it is plain how the Son is in no way from nothing, but is truly from the substance of the Father [nn.98-103].
143 Sed si quaeras, posita originatione et consubstantialitate, adhuc quaeritur: sicut de materia vel de quasi materia, de quo est Filius? Respondeo quod non est ibi materia nec quasi materia, et ideo non de aliquo sit. Et ultra - ergo de nihilo? - Non sequitur, sed sequitur: ergo de nulla materia. ƿSed dices, tunc est creatura. - Dico quod falsum est, quia creatura est post nihil, id est post non esse sui et cuiuscumque in ea; non ita Filius, - non tantum quia suum esse est aeternum, sed etiam quia sicut est secunda persona sic prius origine est suum esse formale in prima persona.	143. But if you ask, once origination and consubstantiality have been posited, there is still the question: is it as from matter or from quasi-matter that the Son is from? -I reply that there is no matter or quasi-matter there, and so let him not be from anything. And you ask further - therefore from nothing? - It does not follow; but what follows is that therefore he is not from any matter. But you will say, then he is a creature. - I say it is false, because a creature exists after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it; not so the Son, - not only because his being is eternal, but also because, as he is the second person, so his formal being is prior in origin in the first person.
144 Ad aliud, de Augustino VII De Trinitate cap . 4: nihil valet ad propositum, sicut in quaestione praecedente expositum est.	144. To the other, from Augustine On the Trinity [n.55]: it is of no value for the proposed position [n.46], as was expounded in the preceding question [n.25].
145 Quod alii arguunt 'essentiam subiective generari', ex falso infertur falsum.	145. As for the argument of others that 'essence is subjectively generated' [n.59], from the false is inferred the false.
146 Ad argumenta eorum: Ad primum dico quod hic non sunt termini aliqui correspondentes generationi ut mutatio est, quia nihil est hic quasi aliquo modo prius sub privatione et postea sub forma. Generationis vero termini sunt privatio et forma ut generatio est mutatio, generatio autem ut productio terminum habet ipsum productum: non autem generatio sic habet terminum 'a quo' nisi loquendo de principio productivo, et sic termini generationis sunt producens et productum; et ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquid sit quasi subiectum, sed sequitur ex hoc - si generatio est univoca - quod aliquid ƿsit commune gignenti et genito, et hoc concedo, sed non commune ut materia sed ut forma vel actus, in utroque.	146. To the arguments they give [n.145]: To the first [n.60] I say that here there are not any terms corresponding to generation as it is change, because there is nothing here that is as it were in any way first under privation and later under form. But the terms of generation as generation is change are privation and form, but generation as production has as term the product itself [n.95]; now generation does not thus have a term 'from which' except by speaking of the productive principle, and thus the terms of generation are producer and product; and from this it does not follow that something is a quasi-subject, but there follows from it - if generation is univocal - that something is common to the generating and the generated, and this I concede, but it is not common as matter but as form or act, in both of them.
147 Cum arguitur post 'de generatione et termino', patet responsio, quod relatio non est in substantia sicut forma in materia, sed si persona est ibi relativa, tunc relatio est in essentia sicut proprietas suppositi est in natura: esse autem in aliquo ut suppositum vel ƿrationem suppositi in natura nihil infert de esse 'in' ut forma est in materia, licet, quando natura est imperfecta, proprietas individualis aliquo modo informet naturam, sicut dictum est in tertio articulo solutionis, in prima difficultate.	147. When the argument is next put 'about generation and term' [n.61], the response is plain, that relation is not in substance as form in matter, but if the person there is relative, then relation is in essence as the property of the supposit is in nature [sc. as Socrateity is in Socrates, nn.109, 113, 124]; but to be in something as a supposit or idea of supposit in nature entails nothing about being 'in' as form is in matter, although, when nature is imperfect, the individual property in some way informs nature, as was said in the third article of the solution, in the first difficulty [n.109].
148 Cum tertio arguitur quod 'omni potentiae activae correspondet potentia passiva' etc., respondeo: primae potentiae activae non correspondet aliqua potentia passiva, sicut patet de potentia creandi, et hoc, loquendo proprie de potentia passiva, ut in qua vel de qua aliquid producitur; potentiae tamen activae correspondet aliqua potentia passiva, quam ipsi vocant 'potentiam obiectivam', - quae est potentia producibilis, - et hoc modo concedo quod si Pater est fecundus active, quod Filius est producibilis, sed ex hoc non sequitur aliqua potentia quasi materiae, sicut non sequitur in creatione.	148. When it is argued third that 'to every active potency there corresponds a passive potency' etc. [n.62], I reply: to the first active power there does not correspond any passive power, as is plain about the power of creating, - and this speaking properly of passive power as that in which, or from which, something is produced; however to the active power there corresponds some passive power which they [followers of Henry] call 'objective power', - which is producible power, - and in this way I concede that if the Father is actively fecund, that the Son is producible, but from this does not follow some power of quasi-matter, just as it does not follow in the case of creation.
149 Cum ultimo arguitur 'de igne', dico, quod si ignis generaret de se, communicaret genito suam formam ut formalem terminum generationis; non autem esset substantia sua in potentia ad formam ƿgenerandi, si ipse ignis esset perfecte quid productivum, - tunc enim non requireret aliquam aliam causam concausantem. Ita est in proposito: primum principium - nec aliud principium (in eodem genere principii, nec in alio) - non requirit aliud aliquod concurrens secum ad principiandum.	149. When finally it is argued 'about fire' [n.62], I say that if fire were to generate from itself, it would communicate to the thing generated its form as formal term of the generation; but its substance would not be in potency to the form of generating, if fire itself were perfectly something productive, - for then there would not be required another co-causing cause. So it is in the proposed case: the first principle - and not another principle (in the same not another genus of principle) - does not require something else concurring with it to be principle.

IV. To the Arguments

Latin	English
150 Cum arguitur ad principale, per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 11, respondeo: Augustinus subdit ibidem: ((quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, et aliud persona)). Similiter, concedo quod non proprie dicitur aliqua persona esse de essentia absolute, sed addendo cum substantia personam aliquam originantem bene dicitur quod persona aliqua originata est de substantia illius personae, ita quod haec 'Filius est de essentia divina' non est ita concedenda sicut haec 'Filius est de substantia Patris', quia per secundam exprimitur consubstantialitas et originatio, propter genitivum constructum cum casuali praepositionis, - per primam autem non notatur aliquid originans.	150. [To the Principal Arguments] - When it is argued to the principal from Augustine On the Trinity [n.46] I reply: Augustine subjoins in the same place: "as if one thing there were substance and another were person." Likewise, I concede that a person is not properly said to be from the essence absolutely, but when adding along with the substance some originating person it is well said that some originated person is of the substance of that person, such that this proposition 'the Son is from the divine essence' is not to be conceded in the way that this proposition is 'the Son is from the substance of the Father', because by the second is expressed consubstantiality and origination, on account of the genitive ['of the Father'] construed with the causal case of the preposition ['from the substance'], - but by the first nothing originating is indicated.
151 Ad aliud dicendum quod licet Augustinus dicat Filium esse 'Filium substantiae Patris' (XV De Trinitate cap. 19), et doctor quidam dicat illam esse propriam, - tamen videtur probaƿbilius quod quandocumque relativum construitur cum aliquo in tali habitudine casuali in qua natum est aliquid terminare illam relationem ut correlativum, tunc construitur cum illo praecise ut cum correlativo. - Exemplum. 'Pater' construitur cum relativo in habitudine genitivi, 'simile' in habitudine dativi, 'maius' in habitudine ablativi. Secundum communem sermonem, videtur quod cum quocumque construitur 'tale relativum' expresse in 'tali habitudine casuali', illud notatur esse correlativum huius relativi: non enim dicimus 'iste canis est filius hominis', quia est filius, et est hominis ut domini canis ita quod ly 'hominis' construatur cum ly 'canis' ex vi possessionis vel possessoris, sed videtur signare quod construatur cum ly 'canis' in ratione relativi, ut 'patris'.	151. To the other [n.47] one must say that although Augustine says the Son is 'Son of the substance of the Father' (On the Trinity XV ch.19 n.37, n.49), and a certain doctor [Henry] says this proposition is a proper one, - yet it seems more probable that whenever a relative ['Son'] is construed with something ['substance'] in that sort of causal relationship ['of] in which something naturally terminates the relative as its correlative, then it is construed with it ['Son of the substance'] precisely as with its correlative ['Son of the Father']. - An example. 'Father' is construed with the relative in the genitive case ['of the father'], 'similar' in the dative case ['similar to...'], 'greater' in the ablative case ['greater than...']. According to common speech, it seems that with whatever 'such a [determinate] relative' is construed in 'such a causal [genitive] case', it is indicated to be the correlative of the relative [sc. 'son of the father/of man/of substance']; for we do not say 'this dog is the son of a man' because it is a son and is of a man as of the dog's master, such that 'of a man' is construed with 'dog' by force of possession or possessor, but 'of a man' seems to indicate that it is construed with 'dog' in the idea of relation, as with 'of the father'.
152 Ita igitur in ista 'Filius essentiae', videtur essentiam accipi ut correlativum eius relativi, cum quo construitur. - Et tunc auctoritas Augustini De Trinitate XV cap. 19 debet exponi sicut ipse exponit: ((Filii caritatis suae, - id est 'Filii sui dilecti')). ƿ	152. Thus therefore in the phrase 'the Son of the essence', it seems that essence is taken as the correlative of the relative with which it is construed. - And then the authority of Augustine [n.151] ought to be expounded as he himself expounds it [sc. and not as Henry does, n.49]: "'of the Son of his charity,' - that is 'of the Son of his delight'."
153 Et tunc ad argumentum istud: cum arguitur quod ad istam 'de essentia, sequitur ista quod est essentiae', - nego consequentiam, quia consequens notat relationem esse inter Filium et essentiam sicut suum correlativum; quod non notat antecedens, sed tantum notat consubstantialitatem in essentia, cum originatione, notata in illo quod construitur cum essentia.	153. And then to this argument [n.151]: when it is argued that on the phrase 'from the essence' follows the phrase that he is 'of the essence', - I deny the consequence, because the consequent indicates that the relation between the Son and the essence is like that of a correlative; and this the antecedent does not indicate, but it only indicates consubstantiality in the essence, along with origination, indicated in the thing that is construed with essence.
154 Ad ultimum dico quod 'de' non notat tantum identitatem, sed notat identitatem sui casualis (et hoc in ratione formae) et distinctionem illius quod additur suo casuali, ut principii originantis, sicut dictum est prius.	154. To the final one [n.48] I say that 'from' [as in 'the Son is from the substance of the Father'] does not indicate only identity, but it indicates identity of the noun it governs ['substance'] (and this in the idea of form) and distinction of that which is added to that noun ['of the Father'] as originating principle, in the way said before [n.99].
155 Ad argumenta in oppositum: Ad illud de XV De Trinitate responsum est.	155. [To the arguments for the opposite] - To the arguments for the opposite: To that from On the Trinity XV [n.49] the response has been given [n.152].
156 Ad illud Contra Maximinum patet etiam, ex dictis.	156. To the one from AgainstMaximinus [n.50] the response is plain too from what has been said [nn.98-101].
157 Ad ultimum, de 'filio in creaturis - quod est de substantia patris, - patet responsio ex dictis in solutione quaestionis, quia illud 'de', quod pertinet ad rationem filiationis, non dicit circumstantiam causae materialis, sed magis sufficit si illud de quo est filius sit forma communis patri et filio et sit non subiectum generationis sed terminus formalis eiusdem.	157. To the final one [n.51], about 'son' in the case of creatures, - the response is plain from what was said in the solution of the question, because the 'from', which pertains to the idea of filiation, does not state the idea of material cause [n.104], but rather it is enough if that from which the son is be a form common to father and son and be, not the subject of generation, but the formal term of it [n.105].

Fifth Distinction