Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D42

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Forty Second Distinction Single Question Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam secundam quaero utrum Deum esse omnipotentem possit probari naturali ratione. Quod sic: Richardus De Trinitate I: 'Ad omnia quae fide tenemus' etc.	1. About the forty second distinction I ask whether it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent. That it can be: Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity I ch.4: “For everything we hold by faith [sc. there are probable, even necessary arguments].”
2 Praeterea, ratione probatur Deum esse potentiae infinitae (sicut probatur VIII Physicorum et XII Metaphysicae); potentia autem infinita nota est esse omnipotentia; ergo etc.	2. Besides, it is proved by reason that God is of infinite power (as is proved in Physics 8.10.266a10-24 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13); but infinite power is known to be omnipotence; therefore etc.
3 Probatio minoris, quia notum est potentia infinita non posse aliquam aliam maiorem cogitari sine contradictione; quacumque autem potentia quae non est omnipotentia, potest cogitari maior sine contradictione (probatio: sine contradictione potest cogitari omnipotentia sub ratione omnipotentiae; ipsa autem maior cogitatur quacumque alia quae non esset omnipotentia). ƿ	3. Proof of the minor, because it is known that no greater power than infinite power can be thought of without contradiction; but a greater power than any power that is not omnipotence can be thought of without contradiction (proof: one can without contradiction think of omnipotence under the idea of omnipotence; but it is thought of as greater than any other power that would not be omnipotence).
4 Si dicas quod non potest naturaliter probari omnipotentiam esse cogitabilem sine contradictione, - contra: omnipotentiam esse in entibus verum est, ergo omnis ratio probans impossibilitatem omnipotentiae sophistica est; omnis ratio sophistica potest per intellectum ex puris naturalibus solvi; ergo intellectus talis potest ex puris naturalibus cognoscere nullum impossibile sequi ex omnipotentia, et scit quod illud est possibile ad quod nullum sequitur impossibile; cognoscit ergo Dei omnipotentiam esse possibilem.	4. If you say that it is not possible to prove naturally that omnipotence is thinkable without contradiction – on the contrary: that omnipotence exists among beings is true, therefore any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical; every sophistical reason can be solved by the intellect through purely natural means; therefore such an intellect can through purely natural means know that nothing impossible follows from omnipotence, and knows that that is possible on which nothing impossible follows; therefore it knows that the omnipotence of God is possible.
5 Ex isto autem potest fieri ratio per se, quia si naturaliter potest probari omnipotentiam esse possibilem (quia non impossibilem), ergo naturaliter potest probari eam esse necessariam, quia non potest esse nisi posset esse necessaria; et quod potest esse necessarium, est necessarium; igitur etc.	5. But from this a reason per se can be given, because if it can naturally be proved that omnipotence is possible (because it is not impossible [n.4]), then it can naturally be proved that it is necessary, because it cannot be unless it could be necessary; and what can be necessary, is necessary; therefore etc.
6 Contra: Nulli philosophi utentes naturali ratione, etiam quantumcumque perfecte considerarent Deum sub ratione efficientis, concesserunt eum esse omnipotentem secundum intellectum catholicorum.	6. On the contrary: No philosopher by the use of natural reason, however perfectly he would consider God under the idea of efficient cause, has conceded that he is omnipotent according to the Catholic sense [nn.9-13].
7 Confirmatur etiam, quia articulus fidei est, in Symbolo apostolorum: ((Credo in Deum, Patrem omnipotentem)) etc.	7. There is also a confirmation, because there is an article of faith, in the Apostles’ Creed: “I believe in God, the Father almighty etc.”
	I. To the Question
8 Hic responderi posset, distinguendo, quod 'omnipotens' aut potest dici agens quod potest in omne possibile, mediate vel immeƿdiate, - et hoc modo est potentia activa primi efficientis omnipotentia, prout extendit se ad omnem effectum in ratione causae proximae vel remotae; et sic, cum naturaliter possit concludi aliquod esse primum efficiens (sicut ostensum est supra distinctione 2), naturaliter potest concludi ipsum esse omnipotens, hoc modo loquendo.	8. One can respond here by drawing a distinction that in one way the ‘omnipotent’ can be said to be an agent that has power for everything possible, mediately or immediately – and in this way the active power of the first efficient cause is omnipotence, insofar as it extends itself to every effect in idea of proximate or remote cause; and thus, since it can be naturally concluded that there is a first efficient cause (as was shown above in distinction 2 [nn.43-59]), it can be naturally concluded that it is omnipotent, in this way of speaking.
9 Alio modo 'omnipotens' accipitur proprie theologice, prout omnipotens dicitur qui potest in omnem effectum et quodcumque possibile (hoc est in quodcumque quod non est ex se necessarium nec includit contradictionem), ita - inquam - immediate quod sine omni cooperatione cuiuscumque alterius causae agentis; et hoc modo videtur omnipotentia esse credita de primo efficiente, et non demonstrata, quia licet primum efficiens habeat in se potentiam effectivam eminentiorem potentia cuiuscumque alterius causae effectivae, habeat etiam in se eminenter potentiam effectivam cuiuscumque alterius causae (sicut deductum est distinctione 2 et per hoc probatum est eum habere potentiam infinitam) et istud sit quasi ultimum ad quod ratio naturalis possit attingere, de Deo cognoscendum, tamen ex hoc non videtur concludi omnipotentia secundum secundum intellectum, quia etsi verum sit, non tamen ƿest manifestum naturali ratione quod habens causalitatem eminentiorem in se - et etiam causalitatem causae secundae eminentius quam illa causa habeat respectu sui effectus - possit immediate in effectum immediatum causae secundae: ordo enim causarum inferiorum et superiorum hoc non concedit, quia etsi sol haberet in se causalitatem eminentiorem quam bos (vel aliud animal), non tamen concederetur solem posse immediate generare bovem sicut potest mediante causa bove generare.	9. In another way ‘omnipotent’ is taken in a properly theological sense, insofar as he is called omnipotent who has power for all effects and for everything possible (that is, for everything that is not per se necessary or does not include a contradiction), and thus immediately – I say – because without the co-operation of any other agent cause; and in this way it seems that omnipotence is a thing believed about the first efficient cause, and not something demonstrated, because although the first efficient cause has in itself a more eminent efficient power than the power of any other efficient cause, it also has in itself eminently the effective power of any other cause whatever (as was proved in distinction 2 [nn.117-120] and is proved by the fact that it has infinite power), and this is as it were the ultimate that natural reason can attain to as to be known about God, although from this it does not seem one can prove omnipotence according to the second sense, because although it is true, yet it is not manifest by natural reason that what has a more eminent causality in itself – and even the causality of a second cause more eminently than that cause has with respect to its own effect – has power immediately for the immediate effect of a second cause; for the order of inferior and superior causes does not allow this, because although the sun has in itself a more eminent causality than an ox (or than any animal), yet the sun is not conceded to be able immediately to generate an ox the way it can do so through the medium of an ox-cause.
10 Et hoc maxime ponerent philosophi, quia non posuerunt causam secundam - necessario concurrentem - propter aliquam perfectionem addendam effectui, sed quasi propter imperfectionem addendam; sed magis, causalitas primae causae est immediate perfecta, et ideo posuerunt eam non posse immediate esse causam alicuius effectus imperfecti. Et ideo oporteret causam agentem aliam concurrere (imperfectiorem), ut illa prima non produceret secundum ultimum potentiae suae, sed cum illa causa agente secunda effectum deminutum et imperfectum produceret, - hoc est, non ita perfectum effectum produceret mediante causa secunda imperfecta sicut si immediate produceret.	10. And this above all would philosophers posit, because they did not posit the second – necessarily concurrent – cause on account of adding some perfection to the effect, but on account of adding some imperfection; but further, the causality of the first cause is immediately perfect, and so they posited that it could not immediately be the cause of any imperfect effect. And therefore some other agent cause (a more imperfect one) had to concur, so that the first cause would not produce according to the utmost of its power but would, along with that second agent cause, produce a diminished and imperfect effect – that is, it would not produce as perfect an effect by means of an imperfect second cause as it would if it produced it immediately.
11 Praeterea, si philosophi non potuerunt per rationem natuƿralem concludere Deum posse contingenter causare, quanto magis nec posse immediate in quemcumque effectum vel in quodcumque quod potest producere mediantibus aliis causis secundis?	11. In addition, the philosophers were not able by natural reason to conclude that God is able to cause contingently, how much more could they not conclude that it had power immediately for any effect at all or for anything that can be produced by means of other second causes?
12 Praeterea, si ipsi habuerunt quasi pro principio quod 'de nihilo nihil fit' (saltem in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus), non videtur Deum sic esse omnipotentem quod possit aliquem effectum totaliter producere sine omni alia causa concausante.	12. Further, if they had for principle as it were that ‘nothing comes from nothing’ (at any rate in generable and corruptible things), it does not seem that God was so omnipotent that he could totally produce any effect without any other joint causing cause.
13 Praeterea, si philosophi posuerunt Deum esse necessario agentem (sicut videntur multi eorum sensisse et posuisse), si cum hoc ponerent quod esset omnipotens secundum istum intellectum secundum, haberent negare causalitatem omnem cuiuscumque causae secundae (quod est maximum inconveniens eis): nam causa 'necessario causans' in quocumque instanti comparatur ad effectum, necessario in eodem instanti 'necessario causat et agit'; igitur cum prius comparetur causa superior ad effectum quam causa inferior, et tunc per te necessario est omnipotens, ergo in illo instanti producit totum effectum; ergo in secundo instanti, in quo compaƿratur secunda causa ad eundem effectum, nihil intelligitur tunc causandum, - et ita agens secundum vel causa secunda nihil potest causare.	13. Besides, if the philosophers posited that God acted necessarily (as many of them seem to have thought and posited), and if along with this they posited that he was omnipotent according to the second sense [n.9], they would have to deny all causality to every second cause (which is especially unacceptable for them); for a cause that ‘necessarily causes’, in whatever instant it is compared to its effect, necessarily in that instant ‘causes and acts necessarily’; therefore since the superior cause is compared to its effect before an inferior cause is, and since in that case it is for you [sc. someone who thinks omnipotence can be proved by natural reason] necessarily omnipotent, then in that instant it produces every effect; then in the second instant, in which the second cause is compared to the same effect, nothing is then understood as causing, – and so a second cause or a second agent can cause nothing
14 Et ex hoc apparet quod haec propositio 'quidquid potest causa effectiva prima cum causa secunda, potest per se immediate' non est nota ex terminis, neque ratione naturali, sed est tantum credita; quia si ipsa omnipotentia - ex qua dependet - esset nota ratione naturali, facile esset probare ipsis philosophis multas veritates et propositiones quas ipsi negant, et facile esset probare eis saltem possibilitatem multorum quae credimus, quae ipsi negant.	14. And from this is plain that this proposition ‘whatever the first efficient cause can cause along with a second cause, it can per se cause immediately’ is not known from the terms, nor known by natural reason, but is only a thing believed; because if omnipotence itself – on which the proposition depends – were known by natural reason, it would be easy for those philosophers to prove many truths and propositions that they deny, and easy for them to prove at least the possibility of many things that we believe and that they deny.
15 Omnipotentia tamen, hoc modo sumpta, licet non sufficienter demonstraretur, probabiliter tamen potest probari sicut verum et necessarium, - et probabilius quam quaedam alia credita, quia non est inconveniens quaedam 'credita' esse evidentiora quam alia.	15. Omnipotence, however, taken in this way [sc. the second way], although it not be sufficiently proved, can however be proved probably as true and necessary – and more probably than certain other believed things, because it is not unacceptable for some ‘believed things’ to be more evident than others.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
16 Ad auctoritatem Richardi dico quod etsi sint necessariae rationes ad probandum omnipotentiam et quaedam alia credita, non tamen sunt evidenter necessariae et verae: sicut illa ratio quae probat Trinitatem, propter duplicem productionem ad intra in divinis, - quia licet sit ex necessariis, non tamen praemissae sunt ƿnecessario evidentes, quia non sunt notae ex terminis nobis notis; neque ex immediatis nobis notis possibile est hoc inferre, sicut dictum est distinctione 2 quaestione 2.	16. To the authority of Richard [n.1] I say that although there are necessary reasons for proving omnipotence, and any other believed things, they are not however evidently necessary and true; just as is true of the reason that proves the Trinity, because of the double production inwardly in divine reality [d.2 nn.300-303, 353-358, 370]) – because although the reason is from necessary things, yet the premises are not necessarily evident, because they are not known to us from the terms; nor is it possible from things immediately known to us to infer this, as was said in d.2 nn.26-29.
17 Ad secundum dico quod infinitam potentiam Dei etsi sit possibile concludi de Deo naturali ratione, non tamen omnipotentiam, secundum quod prorrie sumitur.	17. To the second [n.2] I say that the infinite power of God, although it can be concluded about God by natural reason, is yet not omnipotence in the way it is properly taken.
18 Et cum dicis quod 'infinita potentia nulla potest cogitari maior', verum est intensive; non tamen videtur contradictio quod sic cogitetur maior potentia, ad plura se extendens extensive. Vel diceretur quod etsi non sit contradictio omnipotentiam cogitari, quae ut sic - aliquo modo excedit infinitam potentiam 'non intellectam ut omnipotentia', non tamen est naturaliter notum potentiam sic intellectam esse omnipotentiam.	18. And when you say that ‘no power can be thought of greater than infinite power’ [n.3], this is true intensively; but there seems no contradiction in thinking of a greater power that extends itself to more things extensively. Or one might say that although it is not a contradiction for an omnipotence to be thought of, which – as such – in some way exceeds infinite power ‘not understood as omnipotent’, yet it is not naturally known that a power so understood is omnipotent.
19 Et cum dicit notum esse omnipotentiam proprie sumptam posse cogitari sine contradictione, hoc negatur.	19. And when you say [n.3] it is known that omnipotence properly taken can be thought of without contradiction, this is denied.
20 Et cum probatur 'quia omnis ratio, probans impossibile ex ea sequi, est sophistica', - ad hoc dicitur quod est sophistica; non tamen potest solvi per rationem naturalem, quia prout est sophistica, est peccans in materia et habens aliquam praemissam falsam; et non potest solvi nisi per interemptionem illius praemissae, quae ƿtamen non potest cognosci interimenda per rationem naturalem, sicut non potest cognosci vera esse per rationem naturalem.	20. And when proof is given ‘any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical’ [n.3], – to this the response is it is indeed sophistical; but it cannot be solved by natural reason, because insofar as it is sophistical it errs in the matter and has a false premise; and it cannot be solved save by taking away that premise, which however cannot be known by natural reason as needing to be taken away, just as it cannot be known to be true by natural reason.
21 Sed contra ista arguo sic: Aut illa quae apparet vera et non apparet interimenda ex ratione naturali, apparet esse vera ex terminis tamquam immediata, aut apparet esse conclusa ex terminis immediatis. Si primo modo, ergo intellectus noster non potest esse certus de propositionibus immediatis, quae sit vera et quae non; apparent enim sibi verae tamquam propositiones immediatae, quae tamen sunt simpliciter falsae, et ita non erunt aliqua principia certa tamquam 'ianuae in domo' (contra Philosophum et Commentatorem, II Metaphysicae), circa quae non contingit errare. Si secundo modo appareat esse vera (tamquam conclusa ex terminis immediatis), tunc arguo de illo syllogismo sophistico sicut de isto, - aut peccat in materia, aut in forma: si in materia, tunc potest solvi, quia praemissa falsa 'peccans in materia' potest interimi; si in forma, adhuc potest solvi per artem logicam. Si autem dicatur quod peccat in forma et tamen non potest solvi ratione naturali, - istud videtur absurdum, quia sicut intellectus 'inclusus in naturalibus' tradidit omnem artem de syllogismo apparente, informi et defectuoso, sic; posset solvi per illam artem ad dissolvendum omnem talem syllogismum, apponendo talem artem ad talem paralogismum.	21. But against these points I argue thus: The proposition that appears true, and does not from natural reason appear that it should be taken away, either appears to be true from the terms as if immediate, or appears to be deduced from immediate premises. If in the first way then our intellect cannot be certain about the immediate propositions, which are true and which not; for things appear to them to be true as immediate propositions which however are simply false, and so there will not be any propositions as certain ‘as doors in a house’ (against the Philosopher and the Commentator Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5, Averroes ad loc.), about which it is not possible to err. If it appear true in the second way (that is as deduced from immediate terms), then I argue about this syllogism as about the former one, – either it errs in matter or in form; if in matter then it can be solved, because the false premise, ‘erring in matter’, can be taken away; if in form, still it can be solved by the art of logic. But if it be said that it errs in form and yet cannot be solved by natural reason, – this seems absurd, because as the intellect ‘contained in its natural conditions’ hands on the whole art about apparent syllogism, unformed and defective, thus could the argument be solved by the art for dissolving every such syllogism, by applying that art to that paralogism.
22 Ideo dico aliter quod etsi quicumque paralogismus, deducens ƿapparenter ad impossibile ex praemissa significante Deum esse omnipotentem, posset solvi per intellectum et rationem naturalem (sive peccet in materia sive in forma), et intellectus possit scire quemcumque talem paralogismum 'divisim factum' esse solubilem, non tamen sequitur quod sciat istud non esse impossibile; stat enim oppositum, scilicet quod dubitet istud esse oppositum primum ex repugnantia terminorum (ex quo tamen non possit sequi aliquod manifestius impossibile), aut quod dubitet utrum ex isto possit inferri aliquod impossibile aliud a quocumque illato, et illud argumentum 'inferens illud impossibile' sit insolubile, licet illud non sit aliquorum quae facta sunt, quorum cognoscit 'necesse solvere'.	22. Therefore I say in another way that although any paralogism, which apparently concludes to something impossible from a premise signifying that God is omnipotent, can be solved by the intellect and natural reason (whether it errs in matter or in form), and the intellect can know that any such paralogism ‘stated divisively’ is soluble, yet the conclusion does not follow that the intellect knows it to be impossible; for the opposite stands, namely either because the intellect doubts it to be a primary opposite from the repugnance of the terms (from which however something manifestly impossible cannot follow), or because it doubts whether something else impossible can be inferred from whatever is inferred, and the argument ‘entailing that impossible thing’ is insoluble, although it not be of any things that are done about which the intellect knows ‘one must solve them’.
23 Vel generaliter posset responderi ad illud argumentum (quod potest fieri generaliter ad omne creditum), quod illud sit necessarium ad omne possibile et credibile.	23. Or generally one can reply to the argument [n.4] (and this can be done generally for any believed thing) that it is necessary for anything possible or believable.