Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D43

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Forty Third Distinction Single Question Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of God or of the Makeable Thing
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam tertiam - ubi Magister improbat opiniones aliorum - quaero utrum prima ratio impossibilitatis rei fiendae sit ex parte Dei vel rei factibilis. Quod ex parte Dei, probatio: Magister arguit, distinctione sequente cap. 1, quod universum potuit fieri melius: 'quia si non, aut hoc esset propter hoc quod nullum bonum sibi deesset, et tunc esset Deus'; 'aut quia aliquid sibi deesset, sed non esset capax ad illud recipiendum', et tunc arguit quod 'melius fieret si daretur sibi capacitas a Deo ad illud'. Ita arguo in proposito: si aliquid sit infactibile, ergo si daretur sibi capacitas a Deo, posset fieri; illo ergo modo non potest fieri, quia non datur sibi capacitas; ergo ista impossibilitas videtur primo esse ex parte Dei, non potentis dare capacitatem.	1. About the forty third distinction – where the Master rejects the opinions of others – I ask whether the first reason for the impossibility of a thing to be made is on the part of God or on that of the makeable thing. Proof that it is on the part of God: The Master argues [d.43 ch.1 nn.390-398] that the universe could be made better: ‘because if not, this would either be because of the fact no good is lacking to it, and then it would be God’, ‘or because something is lacking to it but it is not capable of receiving it’, and then he argues that ‘it would become better if capacity for it were given to it by God’. So I argue in the issue at hand: if something is un-makeable, then if capacity were given it by God, it could be made; therefore in this way can it not be made, that capacity is not given to it; therefore this impossibility seems to be first on the part of God, not being able to give it the capacity.
2 Contra: Anselmus De casu diaboli cap. 3: 'Quia Deus dedit perseveƿrantiam bono angelo, ideo bonus angelus habuit, - et non quia Deus non dedit malo angelo, non ideo non habuit, sed quia malus non accepit', quia non fuit capax.	2. On the contrary: Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.2: ‘Because God gave perseverance to the good angel, that is why the good angel had it – and it is not because God did not give it to the bad angel that the bad angel did not have it, but because he was bad he did not take it’, because he was not capable of it [n.19].
	I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent
3 Hic dicitur ab Henrico VI Quodlibet quaestione 3, - cuius oppositum, manifeste, quaere VIII Quodlibet quaestione 3. ƿ	3. This is said by Henry Quodlibet VI q.3 – for the opposite, manifestly, of which see Quodlibet VIII q.3.
4 Contra istam secundam sententiam, sive sit dicta retractando primam sententiam de isto articulo, sive sit dicta ut retractata per primam, - non oporteret tamen arguere contra eum nisi ex verbis suis propriis, quae implicant manifeste opposita.	4. Against this second opinion [sc. that the first reason is on the part of God], either it was said with retraction from that article of the first opinion or it was itself retracted by the first opinion, – but one should not argue against him save from his own words, which manifestly imply opposites.
5 Tamen specialiter arguo sic contra eam: nihil est simpliciter impossibile nisi quia simpliciter repugnat sibi esse; cui autem repugnat esse, repugnat ei ex se primo, et non propter respectum aliquem affirmativum vel negativum eius ad aliquid aliud primo. Repugnantia enim quaecumque est extremorum ex ratione sua formali et per se essentiali, circumscripto quocumque alio respectu utriusque extremi - positivo vel negativo - ad quodcumque aliud, sicut album et nigrum per se ex suis rationibus formalibus contrariantur et habent repugnantiam formalem, circumscribendo per impossibile omnem respectum ad quodcumque aliud. Illud ergo est simpliciter impossibile cui per se repugnat esse, et quod ex se primo est tale quod sibi repugnat esse, - et non propter aliquem respectum ad Deum, affirmativum vel negativum; immo repugnaret sibi esse, ƿsi per impossibile Deus non esset. Videtur igitur prima sententia probabilior secunda.	5. However, I specifically argue against him thus: nothing is simply impossible save because being is simply repugnant to it; but what being is repugnant to, to that it is repugnant of itself first and not because of any affirmative or negative respect of it to something else first. For any repugnance is of the extremes by their formal and per se essential idea, with removal of any other respect of either extreme – positive or negative – to anything else, just as white and black are contraries and have a formal repugnance by their own formal ideas, with removal, per impossibile, of any respect to anything else. That thing is then simply impossible for which being is per se impossible, which is of itself first such that being is repugnant to it, – and not because of any respect to God, affirmative or negative; nay being would be repugnant to it if per impossibile God did not exist. Therefore it seems the first opinion is more probable than the second [sc. that the first reason is on the part of the thing and not of God].
6 Sed contra illam primam sententiam arguo primo sic: Potentia activa qua Deus dicitur omnipotens, non est formaliter intellectus, sed quasi praesupponit actionem intellectus, sive illa omnipotentia sit voluntas sive alia potentia exsecutiva; sed lapis est possibilis esse ex se formaliter; ergo et reducendo quasi ad primum extrinsecum principium, intellectus divinus erit illud a quo est prima ratio possibilitatis in lapide. Non ergo illa potentia activa a qua Deus dicitur omnipotens, est prima ratio possibilitatis in lapide.	6. But against this first opinion I argue first as follows: The active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not formally the intellect but presupposes as it were the action of the intellect, whether the omnipotence is will or some executive power; but a stone is possible of itself formally; therefore too by reducing it to the first extrinsic principle as it were, the divine intellect will be that from which comes the first idea of possibility in a stone. Therefore the active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not the first idea of possibility in a stone.
7 Probatio assumpti: possibile, secundum quod est terminus vel obiectum omnipotentiae, est illud cui non repugnat esse et quod non potest ex se esse necessario; lapis, productus in esse intelligibili per intellectum divinum, habet ista ex se formaliter et per intellectum principiative; ergo est ex se formaliter possibilis et quasi principiative per intellectum divinum.	7. Proof of the assumption: the possible, according as it is the term or object of omnipotence, is that to which being is not repugnant and that which cannot of itself exist necessarily; a stone, produced in intelligible being by the divine intellect, has these features of itself formally and from the intellect as principle; therefore it is of itself formally possible and is from the divine intellect as it were from a principle.
8 Male ergo videtur illa prima sententia ponere quod 'omnipoƿtentia in Deo sit illa potentia quae est potentia activa, a qua est primo possibilitas in creatura', et hoc si loquamur de illa potentia activa a qua Deus dicitur omnipotens et respectu cuius illa dicitur potentia passiva in creatura.	8. The first opinion [n.3] seems badly to posit that ‘omnipotence in God is the power that is active power, from which comes first possibility in a creature’, and this if we speak of the active power by which God is called omnipotent and with respect to which passive power in a creature is spoken of.
9 Confirmatur illa ratio: potentia activa 'quae est omnipotentia' non dat alicui aliquod esse nisi producendo illud, quia illa est potentia productiva rei ad extra; sed ante omnem productionem rei ad extra, res habet possibile esse, quia - sicut probatum est distinctione 36 - rem produci in esse intelligibili non est rem produci in esse simpliciter, et si esset, non esset per illam potentiam qua Deus dicitur omnipotens; non ergo per illam potentiam 'quae est omnipotentia' est res - alia a Deo - primo possibilis.	9. Confirmation of the reason [n.6]: the active power ‘which is omnipotence’ does not give any being to anything save by producing it, because it is a power productive of a thing outwardly; but before any production of a thing outwardly, the thing has possible being, because – as was proved in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 36 – that a thing is produced in intelligible being is not that it is produced in being simply, and if it were, it would not be by the power by which God is called omnipotent; a thing is not first possible, then, by the power ‘that is omnipotence’.
10 Item, in causis praecisis si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, et negatio negationis est causa (secundum quod dicit Philosophus I Posteriorum), sicut si habere pulmonem est causa respirandi et non habere pulmonem est causa non respirandi; ergo si potentia activa, quae est omnipotentia in Deo, esset praecisa causa possibilitatis ƿin creatura, negatio potentiae activae in Deo esset causa negationis 'possibilis esse' in creatura, quod ipse negat (et bene quantum ad hoc, quia illa impossibilitas in creatura est propter formalem repugnantiam partium).	10. Again, in precise causes if affirmation is cause of affirmation and negation is cause of negation (according to what the Philosopher says Posterior Analytics 1.13.78b20-21), just as if having lungs is cause of breathing and not having lungs is cause of not breathing, then if the active power, which is omnipotence in God, were the precise cause of possibility in a creature, negation of active power in God would be cause of the negation of ‘possible being’ in a creature, which he himself [Henry] denies (and well to this extent [sc. as concerns impossibility on the part of the makeable thing], that the impossibility in a creature is because of the formal repugnance of the parts [nn.5, 15-17]).
11 Praeterea, iste respectus qui consequitur potentiam activam in Deo in quarto instanti, aut est realis aut non. Si realis, et ad extra, hoc est improbatum distinctione 30. Si rationis, ergo in tertio instanti terminatur possibilitas ad Deum sub ratione absoluta, - quod non infero sicut in se inconveniens, sed tamquam a pluribus concedendum (si detur), et saltem non habendum pro inconvenienti ab eis qui tenent opinionem illius doctoris, ex quo sequitur ad eam.	11. Further, the respect that follows active power in the fourth instant, is either real or not. If real and outward, this was rejected in distinction 30 nn.49-51. If it is a respect of reason then in the third instant the possibility has God as term under an absolute idea – which I do not infer as in itself unacceptable, but as to be conceded by many people (if it be granted), and at any rate as not to be held as unacceptable by those who hold the opinion of this doctor [Henry], because it follows on that opinion.
12 Similiter, propter idem ex ista positione infero aliam conclusionem, scilicet quod non est aliquis respectus prior ex parte causae quam ex parte causati: immo ab ipsa causa sub ratione absoluti, est ipsum causatum sub ratione absoluta, et postea - tertio sequitur respectus in causato, et quarto in causa ad causatum. Iste ergo ordo absolutorum et relativorum, quem hic concedit, numquam vel nusquam debet teneri inconveniens tenentibus eum. ƿ	12. Likewise, for the same reason I infer from this position another conclusion, namely that there is no respect on the part of the cause prior to one on the part of the caused; nay from the cause itself under the idea of an absolute it is caused under an absolute idea, and later – third – a respect follows in the caused, and fourth a respect in the cause to the caused. This order of absolutes and of respects, then, which he concedes, must never and nowhere be held as unacceptable by those who hold it.
13 Tertium similiter infero, quod omnipotentia ut est attributum divinum et dicit perfectionem simpliciter, non dicit aliquem respectum ad creaturam (quod ipse probat in prima sententia, VI Quodlibet quaestione 3), quia nulla perfectio divina et simpliciter, dependet a creatura (hoc autem probat Anselmus Monologion cap. 15). Cum illa 'relatio ad creaturam' non dicat perfectionem simpliciter etiam in Deo, quia Deus non esset talis si creatura non esset (est autem perfectum omni perfectione simpliciter, ex se et ex natura sua, et non ex aliquo respectu ad creaturam), hoc igitur illatum - quod puto esse verum (sicut et alia duo) - non debet respui sicut inconveniens ab aliquibus tenentibus dicta eius. ƿ	13. Third I infer likewise that omnipotence as it is a divine attribute and states a perfection simply, does not state any respect to a creature (which he himself proves in the first opinion, Quodlibet VI q.3), because no divine perfection simply depends on a creature (Anselm proves this in Monologion ch.15). Since that ‘relation to a creature’ does not state a perfection simply even in God, because then God would not be such if the creature did not exist (but God is something perfect with all perfection simply, of himself and of his nature, and not by any respect to a creature), this inference then – which I think to be true (as also the other two inferences [nn.11-12]) – should not be rejected by any who hold to his opinion [sc. Henry’s].
	B. Scotus’ own Opinion
14 Aliter dico a prima sententia (quantum ad illud quod probant illa duo argumenta), quia licet potentia Dei ad se - id est aliqua perfectio absoluta qua Deus formaliter est potens - sit in Deo in primo instanti naturae, sicut et quaelibet alia perfectio simpliciter (sicut calorem consequitur esse potentiam calefaciendi, qui tamen calor est absoluta forma), tamen per ipsam potentiam 'sub ratione qua est omnipotentia' non habet obiectum quod sit primo possibile, sed per intellectum divinum, producentem illud primo in esse intelligibili, et intellectus non est formaliter potentia activa qua Deus dicitur omnipotens; et tunc res producta in tali esse ab intellectu divino - scilicet intelligibili - in primo instanti naturae, habet se ipsa esse possibile in secundo instanti naturae, quia formaliter non repugnat sibi esse et se ipso formaliter repugnat sibi habere esse necessarium ex se (in quibus duobus stat tota ratio omnipotentiae, correspondens rationibus potentiae activae). Non est ergo possibilitas in obiecto aliquo modo prior quam sit omnipotentia in Deo, accipiendo omnipotentiam pro perfectione absoluta in Deo, sicut nec creatura est prior aliquo absoluto in Deo. Si tamen res intelligatur esse possibilis antequam Deus per omnipoƿtentiam producat, illud sic est verum, sed in illa possibilitate non est simpliciter prius, sed producitur ab intellectu divino.	14. I speak in a way different from the first opinion (as to what the two arguments prove [nn.6, 9]), that although the power of God to himself – that is any absolute perfection by which God is formally powerful – is in God in the first instant of nature, as is also any perfection simply (just as being a power for heating is consequent to heat, which heat however is an absolute form), yet by the power itself ‘under the idea in which it is omnipotence’ it does not have an object that is first possible save through the divine intellect producing it first in intelligible being, and the intellect is not formally the active power by which God is called omnipotent; and then the thing produced in such being by the divine intellect in the first moment of nature – namely intelligible being – has itself to be possible in the second instant of nature, because being is not formally repugnant to it, and having necessary being of itself is formally repugnant to it (on which two points stands the whole idea of omnipotence, corresponding to these ideas of active power). Therefore possibility is not in the object in any way before omnipotence is in God, taking omnipotence for an absolute perfection in God, just as the creature is not prior to anything absolute in God. If however a thing is understood to be possible before God by his omnipotence produces it, this understanding is in this way true, but the thing is not simply prior in that possibility but is produced by the divine intellect.
15 Quantum autem ad impossibilitatem, dico quod illa non potest esse primo ex parte Dei, sed ex parte rei (sicut dicit prima sententia), et hoc propter rationem factam contra secundam sententiam, quia ipsa est impossibilis propter repugnantiam eius ut fiat.	15. But as to impossibility, I say that it cannot be first on the part of God but on the part of the thing (as the first opinion says), and this for the reason given against the second opinion, because the thing is impossible for the reason that coming to be is repugnant to it.
16 Quod intelligo sic: 'impossibile simpliciter' includit incompossibilia, quae ex rationibus suis formalibus sunt incompossibilia, et ab eo sunt principiative incompossibilia, a quo principiative habent suas rationes formales. Est ergo ibi iste processus, quod sicut Deus suo intellectu producit possibile in esse possibili, ita producit duo entia formaliter (utrumque in esse possibili), et illa 'producta' se ipsis formaliter sunt incompossibilia, ut non possint simul esse unum, neque aliquid tertium ex eis; hanc autem incompossibilitatem, quam habent, formaliter ex se habent, et principiative ab eo - aliquo modo - qui ea produxit. Et istam incompossibilitatem eorum sequitur incompossibilitas totius figmenti, includentis ea, et ex ista impossibilitate figmenti in se et ex incompossiƿbilitate partium suarum est incompossibilitas eius respectu cuiuscumque agentis; et ex hoc habet compleri totus processus impossibilitatis rei, quasi ultimus gradus incompossibilitatis vel impossibilitatis sit negatio respectus ad quodcumque agens. Nec oportet habere aliquem respectum negativum ex parte Dei, nec ex parte cuiuscumque alterius (nec est aliquis, forte, in natura rei), licet intellectus possit comparare Deum - vel aliud agens - ad istud sub negatione respectus.	16. Which point I understand thus: ‘impossible simply’ includes incompossibles that, by their formal ideas, are incompossible, and they are incompossible from that thing as principle from which as principle they have their formal ideas. So there is here this process, that as God by his intellect produces a possible in possible being, so he also produces two entities formally (each in possible being), and these ‘produced’ things are of themselves formally incompossible, so that they cannot be together one thing nor can any third thing come from them; but the impossibility that they have, they have formally from themselves, and from him as from a principle – in some way – who produced them. And on this incompossibility of theirs there follows the incompossibilty of the whole imagined construct that includes them, and from the impossibility of the imagined construct in itself and from the incompossibility of their parts there comes its incompossibility with respect to any agent; and from this must the whole process of the impossibility of the thing be completed, as if the ultimate degree of incompossibility or impossibility is the negation of a respect to any agent. Nor does it need to have any negative respect on the part of God, nor on the part of anything else (nor is there, perhaps, any negative respect in the nature of the thing), although the intellect can compare God – or any agent – to it under the negation of respect.
17 Sic ergo impossihilitas prima est formaliter ex parte impossibilis et principiative in Deo; et si principiative reducatur ad aliquid, non tamen reducitur ad negationem possibilitatis in Deo: immo reducitur principiative ad intellectum divinum, principiantem illud in illo esse in quo partes illae formaliter repugnant, propter quam formalem repugnantiam totum ex eis est simpliciter impossibile.	17. So in this way the first impossibility is on the part of the impossible thing and in God as in the principle; and if it is reduced to anything as a principle, yet it is not reduced to a negation of possibility in God; rather it is reduced to the divine intellect as principle, which is the principle of it in that being in which the parts are formally repugnant, because of which formal repugnance the whole composed of those parts is simply impossible.
18 Et ex hoc apparet quod falsa est imaginatio quaerentium impossibilitatem aliquorum quasi in aliquo uno, quasi aliquid unum - vel intelligibile vel qualecumque ens - sit ex se formaliter impossibile sicut Deus ex se formaliter est necesse esse. Nihil enim est tale primum in non entitate, nec etiam entitatis oppositae tali non entitati est intellectus divinus ratio possibilitatis oppositae; nec etiam intellectus divinus est praecisa ratio possibilitatis oppositae de nihilo, quia tunc teneret illud argumentum 'de causis praecisis in affirmatione et negatione'. Sed omne 'simpliciter nihil' includit in se ratioƿnes plurium, ita quod ipsum non est primo nihil ex ratione sui, sed ex rationibus illorum quae intelligitur includere, propter formalem repugnantiam illorum inclusorum plurium; et ista ratio repugnantiae est ex rationibus formalibus eorum, quam repugnantiam primo habent per intellectum divinum.	18. And from this is clear that the imagination of those is false who look for the impossibility of anything in some one thing, as if some one thing – whether an intelligible or any sort of being – is of itself formally impossible as God is of himself formally necessary being. For nothing is such first in the being of non-entity, nor even is the divine intellect the reason for the opposite possibility of the entity that is opposed to such a nonentity; nor even is the divine intellect the precise reason for the opposite possibility about nothing, because then the argument ‘about precise causes in affirmation and negation’ [n.10] would hold. But everything ‘simply nothing’ includes in itself the idea of many things, such that it is not first nothing by its own idea but by the ideas of the things that it is understood to include, because of the formal repugnance of those several included things; and this reason for repugnance comes from the formal reasons, which repugnance they have first from the divine intellect.
	II. To the Principal Argument
19 Ad argumentum primum: tenet ratio Magistri, supponendo quod universum possit esse maioris perfectionis capax, quia tunc melius fieret si daretur sibi illa capacitas, quam fit sine illa capacitate, - ut si esset capax multorum aliorum, absolute tamen non tenet ratio Magistri, negato isto, scilicet quod potuit melius fieri, - sicut nec sequitur quod ignis 'manens ignis' possit fieri melior si fiat capax intellectus vel voluntatis, qui non potest esse illorum capax. Dico tunc ad formam argumenti, quod Deus non potest dare capacitatem nihilo factionis passivae; sed ista non est prima ratio, sed quia tale non potest habere talem capacitatem, - et ista ratio reducitur ad formalem repugnantiam partium, et ulterius ad intellectum divinum.	19. To the first argument [n.1]: the Master’s reason holds, on the supposition that the universe is capable of a greater perfection, because, if that capacity were given to it, it would be made to be better than it is made to be without that capacity, – as if it were capable of many additional things; but absolutely the Master’s reason does not hold if that supposition is denied, namely the supposition that it could become better, – just as neither does it follow that ‘what remains as fire’ could become better if it were made capable of intellect or will, because it is not capable of those things. I say then to the form of the argument, that God cannot give capacity to what is not receptive of being made; but the first reason for this is not this fact but rather that such a thing cannot have such a capacity – and this reason is reduced to the formal repugnance of the parts, and beyond this to the divine intellect.