Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D5/P1

First Part: On the Generation of the Divine Essence

Single Question: Whether the divine essence generates is or generated

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ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quintam quaero primo utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur. Quod sic: Per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 4: ((Idem dici accipiamus cum dicitur Verbum ac si dicatur 'nata Sapientia', ut in uno eorum, quod est 'nata', et Verbum et Filius accipiatur et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia divina, quae ad se dicitur, - at in altero, quod est 'Sapientia', demonstretur essentia ac per hoc ad se dicitur)). Ergo expresse vult quod Sapientia ut Sapientia est et ad se dicitur, dicatur nata ut 'nata' est proprium Filii. ƿ	1. About the fifth distinction I ask first whether the divine essence generates or is generated. That it does: From Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: "Let us accept that when the Word is spoken of, it is just as if 'Wisdom born' were spoken of, so that in one of these, namely 'born', both Word and Son are taken, and so that in all these words there is not shown the divine essence, which is said in reference to itself, - but so that in the other term, namely 'Wisdom', the essence is shown, and in this respect it is said in reference to itself." Therefore he expressly intends that Wisdom, as it is Wisdom and said in reference to itself, is called born as 'born' is proper to the Son.
2 Item, Richardus VI De Trinitate cap. 22 videtur expresse loqui contra Magistrum Sententiarum: ((Multi)) - inquit ((temporibus nostris surrexere, qui non audent dicere substantiam genitam, quin semper potius (quod est periculosius et contra sanctorum auctoritates) audent negare et modis omnibus improbare quod substantia gignat substantiam. Pertinaciter negant, quod omnes sancti affirmant. Ad illud quod ipsi dicunt, auctoritatem invenire non possunt, - ad hoc quod dicimus, auctoritates multas ipsi etiam adducunt, in morem Goliae)) etc. Et quia Magister exponit illas auctoritates quas adducit contra se, de eo subdit Richardus: (('Bene', inquiunt, 'dicunt Patres quod subƿstantia substantiam gignit, nostra expositio contendit quod credamus quod substantia substantiam non gignit': - fidelis 'expositio', et omni laude digna, quia hoc quod omnes Patres clamant contendunt falsum esse, et quod nemo sanctorum asserit contendunt esse verum)). Haec ille. - Videtur deridere Magistrum, qui exponit quasi contra intentionem Patrum auctoritates quas adducit contra se, et asserit - ut videtur - oppositum illius quod tenet Magister esse verum et de intentione Patrum.	2. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity VI ch.22 seems expressly to speak against the Master of the Sentences [I d.5 ch.1]. "Many," he says, "have arisen in our times who do not dare to speak of generated substance, but always rather (which is more dangerous and against the authorities of the saints) dare to deny and in every way to disprove that substance generates substance. They stubbornly deny what all the saints affirm. For that which they themselves affirm they can find no authority, - for that which we say, even they themselves adduce many authorities, in the manner of Goliath [1 Kings [Samuel] 17.45-51]" etc. And because the Master expounds the authorities which he adduces against himself [those of Augustine and Hilary, I d.5 ch.1 nn.57-64], Richard subjoins about him: "They say [sc. the Master and his followers], 'The Fathers do well say that substance generates substance; our exposition contends that we believe substance does not generate substance': - a faithful 'exposition', and worthy of all praise, because that which the Fathers proclaim they contend to be false, and what none of the saints asserts they contend to be true." Thus Richard. - He seems to mock the Master in expounding as it were against the intention of the Fathers the authorities which he adduces against himself, and asserts - as it seems - the opposite of what the Master holds to be true and to be of the intention of the Fathers.
3 Item, per rationem: essentia communicatur, ergo producitur. Antecedens patet per Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 26: ((essentiam praestat Filio sine initio generatio)). Probatio consequentiae: tum quia communicare et communicari sunt relative opposita, et non dicunt nisi relationem originis (non enim dicunt relationes communes, ut patet; ergo dicunt relationes originis oppositas; ergo idem sunt quod producere et produci); tum quia si sint aliquae duae correlationes, si unum extremum unius sit idem uni extremo alterius, et reliquum reliquo. Exemplum: si a et b essent correlativa et c et d correlativa, si a et c sunt idem, b et d sunt idem, - probatio, quia alioquin idem diceretur ad plura correlativa, sicut a, ƿquod idem est cum ipso c, diceretur correlative ad b et d, quae per te sunt diversa; et haec est una combinatio relativorum huiusmodi, 'producens' et 'productum', et alia 'communicans' et 'communicatum': sed 'producens' et 'communicans' idem sunt, ergo et extrema eis correspondentia idem sunt.	3. Again, by reason: essence is communicated, therefore it is produced. The antecedent is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: "generation without beginning bestows essence on the Son." The proof of the consequence is both that to communicate and to be communicated are relational opposites, and only state a relation of origin (for they do not assert common relations, as is plain; therefore they assert opposite relations of origin; therefore they are the same as to produce and to be produced), and also that if there are two correlations, and if one extreme of one of them is the same as one extreme of the other, then the remaining extreme is the same as the remaining extreme. Example: if a and b were correlative and c and d correlative, then if a and c are the same, then b and d are the same, - the proof is that otherwise the same thing would be said with reference to several correlatives, as a, which is the same as c, would be said correlatively to b and d, which for you are diverse; and here is one combination of relatives of this sort, 'producing' and 'produced', and another 'communicating' and 'communicated'; but 'producing' and 'communicating' are the same, therefore the extremes corresponding to them are also the same.
4 Item, per argumenta logicalia: Quando praedicatum praedicatur per se de subiecto, potest supponere pro eo, - patet in superioribus de inferioribus; essentia praedicatur per se de Patre, 'Pater est essentia'; ergo etc. - Probatio minoris, quia non per accidens, quia nec unum accidit reliquo, nec ambo tertio: et isti sunt duo modi unitatis per accidens, qui ponuntur V Metaphysicae cap. 'De uno'. ƿ	4. Again, by logical arguments: When a predicate is predicated per se of a subject, it can supposit for it, - the thing is plain in superiors and inferiors; essence is predicated per se of the Father, 'the Father is essence'; therefore etc. - Proof of the minor, because it is not per accidens, because one is not an accident of the other, nor both of a third; and these are the two modes of unity per accidens that are posited in Metaphysics 5.6.1015b16-36, the chapter on 'one'.
5 Item, essentia est pater Filii, ergo essentia generat. Probatio antecedentis, per conversionem: pater Filii est essentia; ergo essentia est pater Filii. - Probatio consequentiae: essentia est pater Filii, ergo Filius est filius essentiae; probatio huius consequentiae, quia in relativis est consequentia mutua: a est pater b, ergo b est filius a; ergo si essentia est pater alicuius, ille est filius essentiae.	5. Again, essence is father of the Son, therefore the essence generates. Proof of the antecedent, by conversion: father of the Son is essence; therefore essence is father of the Son. Proof of the consequence: essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence; proof of this consequence, because in relatives the consequence is mutual: a is father of b, therefore b is son of a; therefore if essence is father of someone, this someone is son of essence.
6 Item, genitum in quantum genitum est aliquid, quia non est nihil, et inter nihil et aliquid non est medium; sed nihil in divinis est aliquid nisi sit essentia, ergo Filius in quantum genitus est essentia; ergo essentia generatur.	6. Again, the generated insofar as it is generated is something, because it is not nothing, and between nothing and something there is no middle; but nothing in divine reality is something unless it is essence, therefore the Son insofar as he is generated is essence; therefore essence is generated.
7 Contra est Magister in littera .	7. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard

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8 In ista quaestione erravit abbas Ioachim, cuius est ratio recitata Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica', ((Damnamus)) etc. Dixit enim magistrum Petrum esse haereticum, quia dixit rem esse in divinis quae nec producit nec producitur. Ex hoc enim intulit Ioachim, innuens quod Petrus posuerit quaternitatem in divinis: posuit enim tres res in divinis, rem generantem et rem geƿnitam et rem spiratam, - et posuit rem nec generantem nec genitam nec spiratam; igitur quattuor res.	8. On this question Abbott Joachim was in error, whose argument is reported in the Decretals of Gregory IX bk.1 tit.1 ch.2, 'On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith', "We condemn" etc. For he said that Master Peter [Lombard] was a heretic, because he said there was a thing in divine reality that neither produces nor is produced [I d.5 ch.1 n.54]. For Joachim made his inference from this, insinuating that Peter posited a quaternity in divine reality; for he posited three things in divine reality, a generating thing and a thing generated and a thing inspirited, - and he posited a thing neither generating nor generated nor inspirited [ibid. n.58]; therefore he posited four things.
9 Hoc igitur inconveniens quod sequi videbatur vitando, ponit Ioachim quod nulla una res est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, sed tantum dixit illas personas esse unam rem sicut multi fideles dicuntur 'una Ecclesia', propter unam fidem et caritatem; et istud probavit per illud Salvatoris (in Ioan.), orantis Patrem pro suis fidelibus: ut sint unum - inquit - sicut et nos. Intulit ergo Ioachim: cum fideles non sint unum unitate naturae, ergo nec Filius est una res cum Patre.	9. Joachim, avoiding this discordant result that seemed to follow, posited that no one thing is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but he only said that the persons were one thing in the way that many faithful are said to be 'one Church', because of one faith and one charity; and this he proved by the saying of the Savior (John 10.30) when praying for his faithful: "that they might be one," he says, "as we are one." Joachim therefore inferred: since the faithful are not one by unity of nature, therefore neither is the Son one thing with the Father.

B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim

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10 Istud secundum in opinione Ioachim est haereticum, scilicet quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non sint aliqua una res, quia sicut arguitur cap. praeallegato, 'Pater gignendo dedit essentiam suam Filio' (nullam enim aliam potuit dare qua Filius esset Deus), et simili ratione ambo dederunt essentiam suam Spiritui Sancto: 'non enim erat illa communicatio partis essentiae, quia essentia est simplex et indivisibilis, - ergo totius essentiae; ergo tota eadem essentia, quae est in Patre, est in Filio et in Spiritu Sancto, et propter simplicitatem divinam quaelibet persona est illa res, et omnes tres personae sunt illa res'. ƿ	10. This second thing in the opinion of Joachim is heretical, namely that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not some one thing, because as is argued in the afore cited chapter [of the Decretals, n.8], 'The Father by generating gave his essence to the Son' (for he could give nothing else by which the Son would be God), and for a like reason both gave their essence to the Holy Spirit; 'for the communication was not of part of the essence, because the essence is simple and indivisible, - therefore of the whole essence; therefore the whole same essence, which is in the Father, is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and, because of the divine simplicity, each person is that thing, and all three persons are that thing'.
11 Quod autem arguit de Evangelio, solvitur ibi, nam 'Salvator intelligit in oratione sua quod sui fideles sint unum unitate sibi proportionali, sicut Pater et Filius sunt unum unitate sibi proportionali, - hoc est, sicut Pater et Filius sunt unum unitate caritatis, quae est natura eorum, ita fideles sunt unum caritate participata'. - Et ista expositio probatur ibi per simile dictum Salvatoris (Matth. 5), dicentis discipulis suis: Estote perfecti sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est, scilicet essentiali bonitate; ubi non monuit quod simus ex nobis perfecti, naturaliter, sicut Pater caelestis est perfectus ex se naturaliter, naturalitate sibi competente essentialiter, sed ut essemus perfecti perfectione nobis competente, scilicet gratiae et virtutum.	11. Now as to what Joachim argued from the Gospel [n.9], it is there solved, for 'the Savior understands in his prayer that his faithful are one in a unity proportional to themselves, just as the Father and Son are one in a unity proportional to themselves, -that is, just as the Father and Son are one in the unity of charity which is their nature, so the faithful are one in participated charity'. And this exposition is there proved by the like saying of the Savior (Matthew 5.48) saying to his disciples: "Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect," namely with essential goodness; where he did not admonish that we be perfect of ourselves naturally, as the heavenly Father is perfect of himself naturally, with a perfection essentially belonging to himself, but that we be perfect with the perfection belonging to us, namely of grace and the virtues.

C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard

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12 Quantum tamen ad primum articulum, in quo Ioachim dixit magistrum Petrum esse haereticum, contradicit sibi Papa: ((Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod scilicet una summa res est essentia vel natura divina, quae nec generat nec ƿgeneratur; nec tamen sequitur quod sit quaternitas, quia illae tres res - Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus - sunt una illa res)). Quaternitas autem esse non posset nisi esset quartum, realiter distinctum a primis tribus.	12. [As to the reality of the question] - However as to the first article [n.9], in which Joachim said that Master Peter was heretical, the Pope contradicts him [Innocent III, 4th Lateran Council, 1215AD]: "But we, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], namely that one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things - Father and Son and Holy Spirit - are that one thing." But there cannot be a quaternity unless there is a fourth, really distinct from the first three.
13 Pro ista ergo opinione, sic sollemniter approbata, adducitur talis ratio: res generans generat aliquam rem, et realiter distinctam, quia ((nulla res se ipsam gignit ut sit)), I De Trinitate l; essentia autem in divinis est penitus indistincta; ergo nec generans nec generata, quia qua ratione generans, et generata.	13. For this opinion, then, thus solemnly approved, there is adduced this sort of reason: a generating thing generates something, and generates a really distinct thing, because "nothing generates itself so as to exist," On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; but essence in divine reality is altogether indistinct; therefore it is neither generating nor generated, because there is a generating by the same reason that there is a generated.
14 Ad hoc reducuntur rationes Magistri in littera quia essentia 'referretur ad se' et 'distingueretur a se'; tertia autem ratio est quod Pater esset formaliter eo quo generat, quia est formaliter ipsa essentia quae est in Filio, propter indistinctionem ipsius essentiae, - et si ipsam generaret, non esset ea formaliter, quia illa esset distincta ab eo et posterior origine.	14. To this are reduced the reasons of the Master in the text, that essence 'would be referred to itself and 'would be distinguished from itself [I d.5 ch.1 n.55]; but a third reason is that the Father would exist formally by that by which he generates, because he is formally the very essence that is in the Son, because of the lack of distinction of the essence, - and if he were to generate it, he would not formally be it, because it would be distinct from him and posterior in origin.
15 Additur etiam alia ratio, quia in creaturis forma non generat nec generatur, sed compositum; deitas autem se habet quasi forma in persona; ergo ipsa nec generat nec generatur. ƿIsta ratio minorem habet evidentiam hic quam in creaturis, quia ibi forma non est aliquid per se exsistens ut possit esse operans; hic autem deitas, non cointelligendo proprietates personales, est de se ens in actu.	15. There is added too another reason, that in creatures form does not generate nor is generated, but the composite is; now deity is disposed as form in a person; therefore it neither generates nor is generated. This reason has less evidence here than in creatures, because in creatures form is not something per se existing so that it could be operator; but here deity, without co-understanding the personal properties, is of itself a being in act [d.4 n.11].
16 Tamen confirmatur ratio, quia operatio quae necessario est distincti operantis, non potest esse eius quod hic est ut forma, quia ipsa per se est indistincta in tribus; talis autem operatio est personalis, ut generare. Haec quantum ad realitatem huius quaestionis dicta sint.	16. The reason is however confirmed, because operation, which belongs necessarily to a distinct operator, cannot belong to that which here exists as form, because form is per se indistinct in the three; but such operation is personal, as to generate is. Let this be said as to the reality of this question.
17 Sed loquendo de logica, quare non potest haec esse vera 'essentia generat' ut essentia supponat ibi pro persona, sicut ista est vera 'Deus generat' quia Deus supponit pro Patre, - et tamen Deus non distinguitur a se, nec Deus est formaliter is qui generatur licet Deus generet Deum?	17. [As to the logic of the question] - But speaking of the logic, why cannot this proposition 'essence generates' be true as essence supposits there for a person, just as this proposition is true 'God generates' because God supposits for the Father, - and yet God is not distinguished from himself, nor is God formally he who is generated although God does generate God?
18 Respondeo, et facio ad propositum talem rationem: quandocumque subiectum est abstractum ultimata abstractione et praeƿdicatum ex ratione sua non potest praedicari nisi formaliter, non potest propositio esse vera de talibus terminis nisi sit per se primo modo; subiectum hic, scilicet deitas sive essentia divina, est abstractum ultimata abstractione, et praedicatum, scilicet generans, de ratione sua non potest praedicari nisi formaliter; ergo propositio non posset esse vera nisi per se primo modo: sic autem non est vera, quia praedicatum non est de per se intellectu subiecti ((omne enim quod dicitur ad aliquid, est aliquid praeter relationem)) (VII De Trinitate 2), ita quod relatio non est intra conceptum illius absoluti.	18. I reply and give the following reason for the intended proposition: whenever a subject is abstracted with ultimate abstraction and the predicate of its idea cannot be predicated save formally, the proposition cannot be true of such terms save per se in the first mode; the subject here, namely deity or the divine essence, is abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and the predicate of its idea, namely generating, cannot be predicated save formally; therefore the proposition could not be true save per se in the first mode; but in this way it is not true, because the predicate is not per se in the understanding of the subject - "for everything that is said in relation to something is something beside the relation" (On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2), such that the relation is not within the concept of the absolute thing.
19 Huius syllogismi maiorem declaro sic: In substantiis, $a quamvis in eadem realiter - etiam quamvis simplici - possint esse perfectiones multae substantiales formaliter distinctae et ibi una formalis ratio possit abstrahi ab alia remanente adhuc concretione utriusque formalitatis ad sua propria supposita (verbi gratia, licet haec sit vera 'substantia intellectiva est volitiva' - ubi est praedicatio concretiva perfectionis unius substanƿtialis de alia - tamen haec negatur 'intellectus est voluntas', quia ista significant perfectiones illas ut abstractas a se invicem, et hoc secundum proprias formalitates earum; tamen adhuc ista sic abstracta concernunt propria supposita, quia hic 'intellectus' est intellectus), accipiendo tamen substantiam sive simplicem sive compositam praecise secundum unam rationem formalem quiditativam, a$ tantum est abstractio a supposito propriae naturae communiter, quia non sunt natae concernere aliquid alterius naturae; ideo prima ista abstractio est maxima. Abstrahendo enim naturam humanam a suppositis quae sunt vere illius naturae - sicut abstrahitur cum concipitur humanitas - non remanet ulterius alia abstractio: et istud ut sic conceptum, est praecise ipsummet, quia cuilibet alii extraneum, - sicut dicit Avicenna V Metaphysicae, quod 'equinitas est tantum equinitas' et nihil aliud.	19. The major of this syllogism I declare in this way: In the case of substances, although there can be in the same one really - even if it is simple - many substantial perfections formally distinct, and although there one formal idea could be abstracted from another, while the concretion of each formality with their own proper supposits still remains (for example, although this proposition is true 'the intellective substance is volitional' - where there is a concretive predication of the perfection of one substantial feature about another - yet this proposition is denied 'the intellect is will', because these terms signify the perfections as abstract from each other, and that according to their proper formalities; however these thus abstract terms still concern the proper supposits, because here 'intellect' is an intellect), yet, by taking the substance, whether simple or composite, precisely according to one formal quidditative idea, there is only abstraction from the supposit of the proper nature in common, because the substances do not naturally concern anything of another nature; therefore this first abstraction [n.20 for the second abstraction] is the greatest. For by abstracting human nature from the supposits that truly are of that nature - as humanity is abstracted when it is conceived - there does not remain any further abstraction; and this thing as thus conceived is precisely its very self, because extraneous to anything else, - as Avicenna says Metaphysics 5 ch.1 that 'equinity is only equinity' and nothing else.
20 Sed in accidentibus, quanto plura possunt concernere, tanto plures possunt fieri abstractiones. Concernunt quidem accidentia supposita alterius naturae, et licet ab ipsis abstrahantur, tamen concernunt individua propriae naturae, - sicut album concernit lignum, et licet ab hoc abstrahatur albedo, tamen adhuc concernit hanc albedinem et illam. quae sunt individua sua. - Sed ulterius ƿest abstractio quiditatis a supposito qualis dicta est fieri in substantiis, et illam circumloquimur per hoc quod dicimus quiditas albedinis - et illa non concernit aliquod subiectum nec eiusdem naturae nec alterius.	20. But in the case of accidents, as many abstractions can be made as there can be many things they concern. Accidents indeed concern supposits of another nature, and although they are abstracted from them, yet they concern individuals of the proper nature, - just as white concerns wood, and although whiteness is abstracted from this, yet it still concerns this whiteness and that, which are its individuals. – But further, there is abstraction of quiddity from the supposit, which is the sort of abstraction said to happen in the case of substances [n.19], and we have a circumlocution for this by the fact we speak of the quiddity of whiteness - and this does not concern any subject whether of the same or different nature.
21 In relationibus etiam, quae plura concernunt, adhuc plures possunt esse abstractiones: concernit enim relatio suum proprium individuum et fundamentum et subiectum, - et licet abstrahatur a posteriore, non tamen a priore. Exemplum. Hoc concretum quod est 'causa', dicitur de igne, qui generat calorem in ligno. - Sed abstrahendo a subiecto, remanet adhuc concretio ad fundamentum, puta si dicatur 'potentia causandi'; calor enim est potentia causandi calorem, non tamen ignis est potentia causandi illum. - Adhuc potest fieri ulterior abstractio ad proprium genus, puta si dicatur 'causalitas', et tunc nec ignis nec calor recipit praedicationem ipsius: tamen haec causalitas est 'causalitas quae est ultima abstractio qualis est in substantiis' per hoc quod dicimus 'quiditas causalitatis', et haec de nullo alio praedicatur.	21. In relations too, that concern many things, there can still be many abstractions; for a relation concerns its proper individual, both foundation and subject, - and although it is abstracted from the latter yet it is not abstracted from the former. An example. This concrete term which is 'cause' is said of fire, which generates heat in wood. - But, abstracting from the subject, there still remains concretion with a foundation, to wit if one say 'the power of causing'; for heat is a power of causing heat, yet fire is not a power of causing it. - There can be still a further abstraction to the proper genus, to wit if one say 'causality', and then neither fire nor heat receives the predication of it; yet this causality is 'causality which is the ultimate abstraction of the sort that is in substances' [n.19] through the fact that we speak of 'quiddity of causality', and this is predicated of nothing else.
22 Ex istis monstratis vel narratis apparet quae sit ultima abstractio, quia 'quiditatis absolutissimae, sumptae ab omni eo quod ƿest quomodocumque extra rationem quiditatis', - et ex hoc apparet primus terminus maioris.	22. And, from the things thus shown or narrated, it is apparent what ultimate abstraction is, that it is 'of the most absolute quiddity, taken from everything that is in any way outside the idea of the quiddity', - and from this is apparent the first term of the major.
23 Circa alium terminum maioris, scilicet quod praedicatum 'de ƿquocumque praedicatur, de necessitate formaliter praedicatur', notandum est quod substantiva possunt dupliciter praedicari in divinis, quandoque formaliter et quandoque per identitatem; sed adiectiva si praedicantur, de necessitate formaliter praedicantur, et hoc quia sunt adiectiva, - nam ex hoc quod adiectiva sunt, significant formam per modum informantis: et ideo denominative dicuntur de subiecto, et per consequens per modum informantis subiectum, et ita de ipso formaliter dicuntur; talia sunt non tantum nomina adiectiva sed omnia participia et verba.	23. About the other term of the major, namely that the predicate 'is of necessity formally predicated about whatever it is predicated,' [n.18], one must note that substantives can be doubly predicated in divine reality, sometimes formally and sometimes by identity; but adjectives, if they are predicated, are of necessity formally predicated, and this because they are adjectives, - for, from the fact they are adjectives, they signify form by way of what informs; and so they are said denominatively of the subject, and consequently by way of what informs the subject, and thus they are said formally of it; of such sort are not only adjectival nouns but all participles and verbs.
24 His intellectis patet ista maior assumpta, quod 'quando aliquid est abstractum ultimata abstractione - ita quod est abstractum ab omni quod est extra rationem eius - et praedicatum non praedicatur de aliquo nisi formaliter, non est unio vera talium extremorum nisi sit formalis et per se primo modo'. Quia istud praedicatum praecise natum est praedicari formaliter, ideo non potest salvari veritas propter identitatem tantum, - et quia subiectum est ƿsumma abstractione abstractum, non potest stare pro aliquo qualitercumque alio a se sed praecise pro se formaliter, et ideo oporteret quod sua ratio praecise formaliter esset idem illi praedicato, quod non posset esse nisi illa ratio praecise includeret illud praedicatum: patet ergo illa maior. - Patet etiam minor, quod talia non sunt ista extrema 'essentia generat' vel 'deitas generat', quia 'deitas' est quid abstractum, summa abstractione; 'generat' autem est verbum, ideo non potest praedicari nisi formaliter.	24. With these things understood, the assumed major is plain, that 'when something is abstracted with ultimate abstraction - such that it is abstracted from everything which is outside its idea - and the predicate is not predicated of it save formally, there is no true union of such extremes unless it be formal and per se in the first mode'. Because this predicate is precisely of a nature to be predicated formally, therefore truth cannot be saved by identity alone, - and because the subject is abstracted with the highest abstraction, it cannot stand for anything in any way that is other than itself but precisely for itself formally, and so it would be necessary [for truth to be saved] that its idea were precisely formally the same as the predicate, which could not be unless the idea precisely included the predicate. - The minor too [n.18] is plain, because the extreme terms 'essence generates' or 'deity generates' [n.17] are not of such a sort, because 'deity' is something abstracted with highest abstraction; but 'generates' is a verb, therefore it cannot be predicated save formally.

II. To the Principal Arguments

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25 Ad argumenta in oppositum. - Ad primam auctoritatem Augustini - $a distinctione 21 cap. 2 'sermo auctoritatis occurrit' ƿMagister respondet distinctione 28 cap. 6, quod Sapientia stat pro hypostasi; (('demonstratur essentia', scilicet demonstratur quod Filius sit essentia)), quia nomen essentiale stans pro persona. Ratio huius dicitur: a$ sapientia licet abstrahatur a sapiente, quod est operans, tamen adhuc significat potentiam operativam vel principium operativum, et ideo non abstrahitur summa abstractione, quia potentia operativa aliquo modo concernit aliquid; et propter talem concretionem aliqualem aliqualiter conceditur quod Sapientia est nata, nullo autem modo quod essentia sit nata. Quod autem Augustinus dicit aliquando Filium esse essentiam de essentia, hoc exponitur in sequenti quaestione 'quia hoc non probat essentiam esse genitam vel generantem sed esse illud de quo Filius generetur'.	25. To the arguments for the opposite. - To the first authority of Augustine [n.1] -Sentences I d.21 ch.2 'the words of the authority occur...' - the Master [Peter Lombard] responds in d.28 ch.6, that Wisdom stands for the hypostasis; "'the essence is shown' [n.1], namely it is shown that the Son is essence," because the essential name stands for the person. The reason for this is stated: although wisdom is abstracted from the wise man, because he is the one operating, yet it still signifies the operative power or the operative principle, and therefore it is not abstracted with highest abstraction, because the operative power in some way concerns something; and, because of such sort of concretion, it is some way conceded that Wisdom is born, but not in any way that the essence is born. But as to Augustine sometimes saying that the Son is essence of essence, this is expounded in the following question 'because this does not prove that the essence is generated or generating, but that it is something from which the Son is generated' [nn.98, 101].
26 Ad dictum Richardi. Si intendit reprehendere Magistrum ibi, sicut ex verbis eius apparet, - cum doctrina Magistri, et praecipue ista, authenticetur per concilium generale in capitulo ƿpraeallegato, nego Richardum tenendo Magistrum . Et quod dicit Magistrum multas auctoritates adducere contra se, Magister bene exponit eas, sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione; non autem nullam habet pro se auctoritatem, sed habet illam universalis Ecclesiae in capitulo praeallegato, quae maxima est, quia dicit Augustinus Contra epistolam Fundamenti: ((Evangelio non crederem nisi Ecclesiae crederem catholicae)), - quae Ecclesia sicut decrevit qui sunt libri habendi in auctoritatem in canone Bibliae, ita etiam decrevit qui libri habendi sunt authentici in libris doctorum, sicut patet in canone, et post illam auctoritatem canonis non invenitur in Corpore iuris scriptum aliquod ita authenticum sicut magistri Petri in capitulo praeallegato.	26. To the statement of Richard [n.2]. If he intends to blame the Master there, as appears from his words, - since the doctrine of the Master, and this one especially, is confirmed by a General Council in the chapter cited above [n.12], I deny Richard by holding to the Master. And as to his saying that the Master adduces many authorities against himself, the Master well expounds them, as will be plain in the following question [n.100]; not, however, that he has no authority for himself, but he does have the authority of the Universal Church, which is the greatest, because Augustine says Letter against Fundamentus ch.5 n.6: "I would not believe the Gospel if I did not believe the Church," -which Church, just as it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the canon of the Bible, so too it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the books of the doctors, as is plain in the canon, and after the authority of the canon there is not found in the Corpus Iuris any writing as authentic as that of Master Peter in the chapter cited before.
27 Ad rationem illam de 'communicare' dico quod productio habet productum pro termino suo primo, et dico hic 'primum terƿminum' terminum adaequatum; et hoc modo dicit Philosophus VII Metaphysicae quod compositum primo generatur, quia est quod primo habet esse per productionem, hoc est adaequatum.	27. To the reason about 'communicating' [n.3] I say that production has the thing produced for its first term, and I say that this 'first term' is the adequate term; and in this way the Philosopher says Metaphysics 7.8.1033b16-18 that the composite is first generated, because it is what first has being through production, that is, adequate being.
28 In composito tamen forma est formalis terminus generationis, non autem terminus per accidens, - sicut apparet per Philosophum II Physicorum, ubi probat formam esse naturam per hoc quod 'generatio est naturalis quia est via in naturam, est autem via in formam, ergo etc.',- quae ratio nulla esset si forma tantum esset terminus per accidens generationis. Et in eodem etiam vult quod forma et finis coincidunt in idem, quod non est verum de fine geniti, sed generationis. Forma igitur vere est finis generationis.	28. However, in the composite the form is the formal term of generation, but it is not the term per accidens, - as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 2.1.193b12-18, where he proves that form is nature by the fact that 'generation is natural because it is the way to nature, but it is the way to form, therefore etc.', - which reason would be nothing if form were only the term per accidens of generation. And in the same way he intends that form and end coincide in the same thing, which is not true of the end of the thing generated, but is true of the end of generation. Therefore form is truly the end of generation.
29 Ipsum ergo generans unam habet habitudinem ad primum terminum - qui dicitur productus vel genitus - et aliam habet habitudinem ad formalem terminum. Et in creaturis utraque habitudo realis est, quia utraque habitudo habet terminos realiter distinctos et realis dependentia est utriusque producti ad ipsum producens. In proposito autem producens ad productum primum habet relationem realem, quia distinctionem realem et realem originem, ƿad terminum autem formalem in producto non habet relationem realem, quia non distinctionem realem, sine qua non est relatio realis. 'Producere' ergo in divinis dicit relationem realem, 'communicare autem dicit relationem originis et quasi rationis, concomitantem illam realem; $a exemplum huius de principio 'quo': in creaturis refertur realiter ad productum, sicut 'quod' (ad idem enim genus causae pertinet ars et aedificator, V Metaphysicae), sed hic 'quo', quia non distinctum, non habet relationem realem ad productum (distinctione 7), - ita nec e converso, terminus formalis ad producens. a$	29. The thing, then, that g30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], - I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.enerates has one relation to the first term - which term is called the thing produced or generated - and it has another relation to the formal term. And in creatures each relation is real, because each relation has terms really distinct, and there is a real dependence of each produced thing on what produces it. But in the proposed case [sc. of God] the producer has to the thing first produced a real relation, because it has a real distinction and a real origin, but to the formal term in the thing produced it does not have a real relation, because it does not have a real distinction, without which distinction there is no real relation. 'To produce' then in divine reality states a real relation, but 'to communicate' states a relation of origin, and as it were of idea, concomitant with that real relation; there is an example of this about the principle 'in which'; in creatures this principle is really referred to the product, just as the 'what' principle is (for the art and the builder are referred to the same genus of cause, Metaphysics 5.2.1013b30-33), but here [sc. the case of God] the 'in which', because it is not distinct, does not have a real relation to the thing produced (I d.7 n.13), - so not conversely either, the formal term not having a real relation to the producer.
30 Cum ergo dicit quod istae sunt relationes oppositae, communicare et communicari, - dico quod sunt relationes rationis, oppositae secundum proprias rationes suas, licet necessario concomitentur aliquas relationes reales oppositas, scilicet producere et produci; sed tamen non sunt istae et illae eorumdem relativorum formaliter.	30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], - I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.
31 Per idem ad secundum, quod nullum extremum unius correlationis est idem formaliter cum extremo aliquo alterius. Communicans enim et producens licet concurrant in eodem supposito (quia natura dicitur proprie communicans se sicut dicitur commuƿnicata), tamen communicans non dicit formaliter eandem relationem quam dicit producens ut producens, - communicari autem et produci nec eandem dicunt, nec idem primo denominant.	31. By this same fact is given an answer to the second [n.3], that no extreme of one correlation is formally the same as some extreme of another. For the communicator and the producer, although they come together in the same supposit (because the nature is said properly to be communicating itself just as it is said to be properly communicated), yet the communicating does not state formally the same relation as producing qua producing does, - for to be communicated and to be produced do not state the same either, nor do they first denominate the same.
32 Ad illa argumenta logicalia. Cum primo arguitur de praedicatione 'per se', dico quod essentia non praedicatur 'primo modo per se' de Patre, neque formaliter. - Cum probas 'quia non per accidens', dico quod sicut in creaturis, non omnis praedicatio est 'per se' vel 'per accidens', accipiendo accidens proprie, ut quando accidens praedicatur de subiecto: non enim genus praedicatur per se de differentia, nec sic per accidens, - quia neutrum neutri accidit, sed est ibi medium extraneum sive inferius, contrahens aliud, quod inferius potest dici 'accidentale' superiori, id est extraneum, sed non proprie 'accidens'; in divinis autem non omnia sunt eadem 'per se', id est ƿformaliter, nec tamen est aliquid alicuius 'per accidens' proprie, sed aliquid est idem alicui absoluta identitate, absque formali identitate, - et ita est in proposito.	32. To the logical arguments [nn.4-6]. When it is first argued about predication 'per se' [n.4], I say that essence is not predicated 'in the first mode per se' of the Father, nor is it predicated formally. - When you prove it 'because not per accidens' [n.4], I say that, as in creatures, not every predication is either ' per se' or ' per accidens' , taking accident properly, as when an accident is predicated of a subject; for the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, nor is it predicated per accidens, - because neither of them is accident of the other of them, but the difference is there a middle that is extraneous or inferior to the genus, and contracts it, which inferior can be called 'accidental' to the superior, that is, extraneous, but it is not properly an 'accident'; but in divine reality not everything is 'per se' the same, that is, formally, nor yet is anything of another 'per accidens' properly, but something is the same as something by absolute identity, without formal identity, - and thus it is in the intended proposition.
33 Ad aliud dico quod ista 'pater est essentia' potest distingui, quia 'pater' potest sumi adiective vel substantive. Secundo modo significat personam cuius est paternitas, et concedo eam esse veram per identitatem, quia substantivum potest praedicari de aliquo per identitatem. Primo modo significat ipsam proprietatem denominative, et hoc modo Magister exponit distinctione 27 quod idem est patrem esse et genuisse; hoc modo ista est falsa 'essenƿtia est pater', quia significat patrem formaliter praedicari desubiecto.	33. To the other I say that this proposition 'father is essence' can be distinguished, because 'father' can be taken adjectivally or substantively. In the second way it signifies the person to whom belongs paternity, and I concede that the proposition is true by identity, because a substantive can be predicated of anything by identity. In the first way it signifies the very property denominatively, and in this way the Master expounds [I d.27 ch.1 n.237] that to be father is the same as to have generated; in this way this proposition 'essence is father' is false, because it signifies that father is formally predicated of the subject.
34 Quando ergo arguis de subiecto et passione, dico quod quando passio potest praedicari praedicatione eiusdem rationis cum illa qua praedicatur subiectum, potest ex subiecto inferri passio quando habet similem modum praedicandi, - quando vero non, non. Hic subiectum - si sit subiectum - potest praedicari per identitatem, passio - si est passio - non potest, sed tantum formaliter, quia est adiectivum.	34. When therefore you argue about subject and property, I say that when the property can be predicated by a predication of the same idea as that by which the subject is predicated, the property can be inferred from the subject when it has the same mode of predicating [n.24], - but when not, not. Here the subject - if it is subject - can be predicated by identity, the property - if it is property - cannot be, but only formally, because it is an adjective [n.23].
35 Ad aliud, 'essentia est pater Filii': Quidam doctor repetit opiniones aliorum, primam magistri Alexandri (in I parte Summae distinctione 20, in responsione ad quintum argumentum), qui distinxit illam 'essentia est pater Filii' sicut iam distincta est illa praecedens, scilicet 'essentia est pater', - quod 'pater' potest sumi adiective vel substantive, et primo modo dicit eam esse falsam et consequentiam non vaƿlere, - secundo modo veram. Aliam magistri Praepositini, qui dicit eam simpliciter veram, ad quod habet Praepositinus duas rationes,- unam per conversionem (quia si convertens est vera, conversa erit simpliciter vera): ((haec est vera 'pater Filii est essentia', ergo essentia est pater Filii)); aliam, quia ((haec est simpliciter vera 'essentia est pater': aut ergo alicuius, aut nullius; si nullius, ergo omnino non est pater, - si alicuius, et non nisi Filii, ergo essentia est pater Filii)).	35. To the other, 'essence is father of the Son' [n.5]: A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] repeats the opinions of others, the first of Master Alexander [of Hales, ST Ia d.20 ad 5], who distinguished this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' in the way the preceding one, namely 'essence is father', was already distinguished [n.33], - because 'father' can be taken adjectivally and substantively, and in the first way he says it is false and the consequence ['therefore father of the Son is essence'] not valid, - in the second way he says it is true. Another opinion he repeats from Master Praepositinus, who says that it is simply true, for which Praepositinus has two reasons, - one by conversion (because if the converting proposition is true, the converted proposition will be simply true): "this proposition is true 'father of the Son is essence', therefore essence is father of the Son;" the other reason is that "this proposition is simply true 'essence is father': either then it is father of someone or of no one; if of no one, then there is altogether no father, - if of someone, and if of none but the Son, then essence is father of the Son."
36 Contra magistrum Alexandrum - immo contra utrumque - arguit sic et probat quod ((ly 'pater' tantum tenetur adiective, quoniam nomina quae imponuntur a potentia activa et ƿpassiva (ut sunt magister et discipulus, pater et filius, aedificator, etc.) sunt tantum significantia adiective, et hoc ex respectu quem habent ad aliud, quod respicit potentia a qua imponuntur. Sed quandocumque aliquid habet rationem adiectivi vel adiacentis ex respectu ad aliud, quanto magis est determinatus respectus eius tanto magis habet rationem adiacentis vel adiectivi, et tanto minus quanto magis indeterminatus, - sicut patet de respectu modi infinitivi, quem grammatici dicunt habere vel dicere infinitam inclinationem ad suppositum et magis posse supponere quam alios modos, quia alii etiam finitam habent inclinationem ad suppositum, iste vero habet infinitam; infinitivus vero et adiectivum in neutro genere potius substantivantur quam in masculino vel feminino. Ergo cum 'pater Filii' habeat finitam et expressam habitudinem - non sic autem cum per se ponitur ly 'pater' - ideo licet posset teneri substantive, dicendo 'essentia est pater', non tamen nisi adiective, dicendo 'essentia est pater Filii', et sic simpliciter est falsa ista 'essentia est pater Filii')). ƿ	36. Against Master Alexander - nay against both masters - he argues thus and proves "the term 'father' is only held adjectivally, since names that are imposed from an active and passive power (as are master and disciple, father and son, builder, etc.) are only significative adjectivally, and this from the respect that they have to something else, which is what the power from which they are imposed has regard to. But whenever something has the idea of adjective, or of adjacent, from a respect to something else, the more determinate its respect the more it has the idea of adjacent or of adjective, and the less it has this idea the more indeterminate it is, - as is plain about the respect of the infinitive mode, which grammarians say has or says an infinite inclination to the supposit and can supposit more than other modes can [Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae VIII ch.12 n.63, ch.13 n.69], because the others also have a finite inclination to the supposit, but the former has an infinite one; but an infinitive and an adjective in the neuter gender are more substantive than in the masculine or feminine. Therefore since 'father of the Son' has a finite and express relation - but it is not so when the term 'father' is posited per se - therefore, although it could be held substantively when saying 'essence is father', yet it is only held adjectively when saying 'essence is father of the Son', and thus this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' is simply false."
37 ((Patet etiam quod non valet primum argumentum Praepositini, 'pater Filii est essentia, ergo essentia est pater Filii', per conversionem, quia sic convertere debet: 'ergo aliquid quod est essentia, est pater Filii'; sicut ista 'individuum est homo', non sic convertitur 'ergo homo est individuum', sed sic 'ergo aliquid quod est homo, est individuum'. - Similiter secunda ratio non valet. Cum arguitur 'essentia est pater, ergo aut alicuius aut nullius', - dicendum quod non sequitur, propter fallaciam figurae dictionis (quia statim cum additur 'alicuius aut nullius' aliter copulat quam prius supponebat), et dicendum est quod nullius est pater, id est non alicuius est pater: et non sequitur ex hoc quod non sit pater, propter fallaciam figurae dictionis, sed tantum sequitur 'ergo non convenit ei proprietas paternitatis')).	37. "It is also plain that the first argument of Praepositinus is not valid, 'father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son', by conversion [n.35], because it should be converted in this way: 'therefore something that is essence is father of the Son'; just as this proposition 'an individual is man' is not converted in this way 'therefore man is an individual', but it in this other way 'therefore something that is a man is an individual'. - Likewise the second reason [n.35] is not valid. When it is argued 'essence is father, therefore father either of someone or no one', - one must say that it does not follow, because of the fallacy of figure of speech (because as soon as 'of someone or of no one' is added the combination is otherwise than was first being supposed), and one must say that it is father of no one, that is, it is not father of anyone; and it does not follow from this that it is not father, because of the fallacy of figure of speech, but there only follows 'therefore the property of paternity does not belong to it'."
38 Ideo respondet tertio modo, quod haec est simpliciter falsa ƿ'essentia est pater Filii', propter rationem praemissam, quia ly 'pater' ibi tantum tenetur adiective.	38. So he responds in a third way, that this proposition 'essence is father of the Son' is simply false, because of the aforesaid reason [n.36], because the term 'father' here is only held adjectivally.
39 Contra modum eius dicendi arguo sic: Quod includitur essentialiter in conceptu alicuius sicut pars conceptus, non potest ab eo excludi sub quocumque modo concipiatur, quia si sub aliquo modo concipiatur et illud non includatur, ƿtunc ille modus repugnat rationi conceptus qui concipitur. Cum igitur in conceptu relativi, ex hoc quod conceptus relativus - non ut hoc modo conceptus - necessario includatur correlativum eius ut terminus est (quia non potest esse nec intelligi sine eo, sicut nec sine termino), ergo quocumque modo concipitur, sive adiective sive substantive, semper includetur correlativum ut terminus, et ita nullo modo potest intelligi ut absolutum; confirmatur de filiatione.	39. Against his way of speaking [n.38] I argue thus: What is included essentially in the concept of something as a part of the concept cannot be excluded from it under whatever mode it is conceived, because if it is conceived under some mode and that part is not included, then the mode is repugnant to the idea of the concept which is conceived. When, therefore, in the concept of a relative [sc. father], from the fact that the concept is relative - not as conceived relatively - its correlative is necessarily included as its term (because it can neither be nor be understood without it, just as not without the term either), then in whatever way it is conceived, whether adjectivally or substantively, the correlative is always included as term, and so in no way can it be understood as absolute; the point is confirmed about filiation [sc. filiation is correlative in the same way].
40 Item, tunc ista esset incongrua 'pater Filii est essentia', et adiectivum non substantivatum non supponit congrue. Ibi quippe in subiecto determinatur pater per Filium, ad quem habet determinatum respectum. ƿ	40. Again, then [sc. if Henry's position is correct] this proposition 'father of the Son is essence' would be incongruous, and a non-substantive adjective does not supposit incongruously. Indeed in this case in the subject ['father of the Son'] father is determined by the Son, to whom it has a determinate respect [n.36].
41 Ideo teneo opinionem Alexandri, distinguendo sicut ipse distinguit, quod substantive est vera, adiective falsa.	41. Therefore I hold the opinion of Alexander, distinguishing as he does, that the substantive is true and the adjectival is false.
42 Ad rationes Praepositini: dico quod conversa vera est substantive, - adiective incongrua, quia masculinum non potest substantivari; ad secundam rationem eius dico quod essentia est pater, et alicuius, - et concedo etiam quod Filii.	42. To the reasons of Praepositinus: I say that the converse ['essence is father of the Son'; n35] is true substantively, - adjectivally it is incongruous, because the masculine [sc. 'father' in the converting proposition] cannot be made substantive; to his second reason [n.35] I say that essence is father, and of someone, - and I concede too that it is father of the Son.
43 Sed cum arguitur in ratione principali 'si essentia est pater Filii, ergo Filius est filius essentiae', nego consequentiam. Cum probatur per illam 'consequentiam mutuam' in relativis, dico quod illa consequentia mutua tenet in illis relativis quae sunt primo relativa; tenet etiam in his quae referuntur per relationes, si tamen dicantur formaliter relationes de eis, - sicut si formaliter Socrates est pater Platonis, e converso, formaliter Plato est filius Socratis. In his autem quae non referuntur primo nec etiam denominantur formaliter ab ipsis relationibus, sed relatio praedicatur de altero eorum per identitatem, non valet illa consequentia, quia ibi in consequente plus signatur quam in antecedente; in antecedente enim notatur identitas relationis ad aliquid de quo dicitur, sed in consequente signaretur illud aliud referri ad istud formaliter: cum enim diceretur 'Filius est filius essentiae', ex vi constructionis signaretur essentiam esse proprium correlativum eius quod ƿest Filius, et ita Filium formaliter esse filium essentiae; antecedens autem non signat relationem paternitatis formaliter convenire essentiae, sed tantum per identitatem.	43. But when it is argued in the principal reason 'if essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence' [n.5], I deny the consequence. When it is proved through that 'mutual consequence' in relatives, I say that the mutual consequence holds in those relatives that are first relatives [father-son]; it holds also of those that are referred through relations [paternity-filiation] - if they are said formally as relations of them, - just as if formally Socrates is father of Plato, then conversely, formally Plato is son of Socrates. But in those relatives that are not referred first nor are denominated formally from those relations, but the relation is predicated of one of them by identity, that [mutual] consequence is not valid, because in that case more is indicated in the consequent than in the antecedent; for in the antecedent is noted the identity of the relation with that of which it is said, but in the consequent is indicated that the other thing is formally referred to it: for since it is said 'the Son is son of essence', from the force of the construction there is indicated that the essence is the proper correlative of that which is the Son, and so the Son is formally son of essence; but the antecedent does not indicate that the relation of paternity agrees with the essence formally, but only by identity.
44 Ad ultimum dico: cum accipis 'genitum in quantum genitum, est aliquid', nego. Et cum dicis 'non est nihil', dico (ut saepe praedictum est): inter contradictoria est medium cum 'in quantum', ita quod neutrum inest cum 'in quantum', sicut homo neque 'in quantum homo' est albus, neque 'in quantum homo' est non albus; tamen non sunt duo contradictoria complexa simul falsa: illa enim contradictoria est vera, 'homo non in quantum homo, est albus'; ita hic, 'genitum non in quantum genitum, est aliquid', quia ratio gignitionis non est formalis ratio inhaerentiae praedicati, licet genitum - formaliter in se sumptum - sit per identitatem essentia.	44. To the final one [n.6] I say: when you take 'the generated insofar as it is generated is something', I deny it. And when you say 'it is not nothing', I say (as has often been said before, I d.1 n.58, d.2 nn.422-423, 431, d.3 n.326), that between contradictories there is a middle with 'insofar as', such that neither is present with 'insofar as', just as man 'insofar as he is man' is neither white nor 'insofar as he is man' is he non-white; but these two contradictory propositions are false together; for the true contradictory is 'man not insofar as he is man is white'; so here 'the generated not insofar as it is generated is something', because the idea of being generated is not the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate, although the generated - taken formally in itself - is essence by identity.
45 Quid ergo dicetur de 'genito in quantum genitum'? - Potest concedi quod 'genitum in quantum genitum' est persona, vel subsistens, sed non sequitur ulterius 'ergo in quantum genitum, est aliquid', accipiendo aliquid pro essentia, - propter non identitatem formalem rationis personalis cum essentia, etc. ƿ	45. What then should be said of 'generated insofar as generated'? - One can concede that 'generated insofar as generated' is the person, or subsisting, but it does not further follow 'therefore insofar as generated it is something', taking something for essence, - because of the formal non-identity of the idea of person with essence, etc. [I d.2 nn.388-410].