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| 106 Tertio principaliter, ad solutionem difficultatis huius quaestionis, videndum est quomodo relatio et essentia possunt esse in eadem ƿpersona quin essentia sit materiale respectu relationis, cum nulla relatio sit materiale respectu eius.
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106. Third principally, to the solution of the difficulty of this question, one must see how relation and essence can exist in the same person without the essence being material with respect to the relation, since no relation is material with respect to it.
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| 107 Et sunt hic quattuor difficultates. Prima, qualiter persona divina est una, nisi hoc actus sit et illud potentia.
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107. And there are four difficulties.
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| 108 Ad quod dico sic: Primo, quod quiditas creata est quo aliquid est ens quiditative, et hoc non est imperfectionis: competit enim quiditati ex ratione quiditatis.
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108. To this I say as follows: First, created quiddity is that in which something is a being quidditatively, and this is not a mark of imperfection; for it belongs to quiddity from the idea of quiddity.
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| 109 Ipsa tamen, puta humanitas, quia est imperfectae actualitatis, ideo est divisibilis per illud quod contrahit ad individuum, puta per proprietatem individualem - quaecumque sit, dicatur a - et recipit ab a aliquam actualitatem (sive etiam unitatem, sive etiam indivisibilitatem), quam habet in individuo et non habet ex se, ita quod illud contrahens (ut a) non tantum est in Socrate 'quo Socrates est formaliter Socrates', sed est aliquo modo formale respectu naturae, et natura est aliquo modo potentia respectu illius: unde secundo, natura contrahitur et determinatur per ipsum a.
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109. Created quiddity, however, for example humanity, because it is of imperfect actuality, is therefore divisible by that which contracts it to an individual, namely by the individual property - whatever it be, let it be a - and it receives from a some actuality (whether also unity or also individuality), which it has in the individual and does not have from itself, so that the contracting thing (as a) is in Socrates not only that 'by which Socrates is formally Socrates', but is formal in some way with respect to the nature, and the nature is in some way potency with respect to it; hence, secondly, the nature is contracted and determined by that very a.
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| 110 Et tertio: tamen humanitas in Socrate est aliquis actus, et praecise accipiendo humanitatem et a distinguendo contra se, humanitas ƿest perfectior actus quam sit ipsum a, licet a sit magis proprius actus et aliquo modo actus naturae in quantum determinat naturam.
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110. And third; but humanity in Socrates is some act, and precisely by taking humanity and by distinguishing a from it, humanity is a more perfect act than is a itself, although a is a more proper act and in some way the act of nature insofar as it determines nature.
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| 111 Applicando haec tria ad divina, relinquatur illud quod est imperfectionis.
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111. When applying these three things [nn.108-110] to divine reality, let that be left behind which belongs to imperfection.
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| 112 Quoad primum. Deitas de se est qua Deus est Deus, et etiam qua subsistens 'cuius proprium est a' est formaliter Deus, quia esse 'quo' hoc modo non est imperfectionis in creatura, sed competit quiditati unde quiditas.
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112. As to the first point [n.108]. Deity is of itself that by which God is God, and also that by which the subsistent thing 'whose property is a' is formally God, because to be 'by this' in this way is not a feature of imperfection in the creature, but belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity.
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| 113 Quoad secundum. Est dissimile, quia deitas ipsa per proprietatem personalem non determinatur nec contrahitur, nec aliquo modo actuatur, quia hoc erat imperfectionis et potentialitatis in ƿnatura creata; similiter, deitas de se est 'haec', et ita sicut habet ultimam unitatem de se, ita et actualitatem. Est ergo proprietas personalis ita proprius actus personae, quod tamen non est actus ipsius naturae divinae aliquo modo perficiens vel informans eam.
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113. As to the second point [n.109]. There is a dissimilarity, because deity itself is not determined or contracted by the personal property, nor in any way actuated by it, because this was a feature of imperfection and of potentiality in created nature; likewise, deity is of itself a 'this', and thus, just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so it has actuality too. The personal property therefore is the proper act of the person such that it is yet not an act of the divine nature itself in any way perfecting or informing it.
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| 114 Quoad tertium. Est aliquo modo simile, quia relatio etsi sit proprius actus personae, et essentia non sit proprius actus personae sed aliquis actus, tamen essentia est formaliter actus infinitus; relatio autem non est ex ratione sua formali actus infinitus.
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114. As to the third point [n.110]. There is in some way a similarity, because although relation is the proper act of the person, and essence is not the proper act but an act of the person, yet the essence is formally infinite act; but the relation is not of its formal idea infinite act.
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| 115 Sed quomodo possunt isti duo actus concurrere ad constitutionem unius, si neutrum sit actus alterius? $a Oportet enim unum esse in alio, quia si non, ergo utrumque est per se subsistens, et ita non erunt in eodem per se subsistente; similiter, unitas qualitercumque distinctorum non videtur secundum Aristotelem esse nisi per rationem actus et potentiae. a$
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115. But how can these two acts come together to constitute one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For one must be in the other, because if not then each is per se subsistent, and thus they will not be in the same per se subsistent thing; likewise, the unity of things distinct in any way at all does not seem, according to Aristotle [Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-10, 23-25], to exist except by reason of act and potency.
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| 116 Respondeo. Unitas compositi necessario est ex ratione actus et potentiae, sicut assignat Philosophus VII Metaphysicae cap. 7, et VIII libro cap. ultimo. Sed persona in divinis non est composita, nec quasi composita, sed est simplex, - et ita vere simplex sicut ƿest essentia ipsa secundum se considerata, nullam habens compositionem nec quasi compositionem in re: et tamen formalis ratio essentiae divinae non est formalis ratio relationis, nec e converso, sicut dictum est supra distinctione 2 quaestione 1 'De Trinitate', in solutione quaestionis.
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116. I reply. The unity of the composite is necessarily by reason of act and potency, as is assigned by the Philosopher, ibid. and 7.13.1039a4-5. But the person in divine reality is not composite, nor quasi-composite, but simple, - and as truly simple as the essence itself considered in itself, having no composition nor quasi-composition in reality; and yet the formal idea of the divine essence is not the formal idea of relation, nor conversely, as was said above [I d.2 nn.388-395, 403-406].
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| 117 Qualiter autem stat quod ratio relationis in re non sit formaliter eadem rationi essentiae et tamen in eodem concurrentes non constituunt compositum, - hoc ideo est, quia illa ratio est perfecte eadem illi: propter infinitatem enim unius rationis, quidquid potest esse cum ea, est perfecte idem sibi. Perfectio ergo identitatis excludit omnem compositionem et quasi compositionem, quae identitas est propter infinitatem, - et tamen infinitas non tollit formales rationes quin haec formaliter non sit illa.
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117. But how it stands that the idea of relation in the thing is not formally the same as the idea of the essence and yet, when they come together in the same thing, they do not constitute a composite, - the reason for this is that the former idea is perfectly the same as the latter; for because of the infinity of the one idea [sc. of the essence, nn.67, 114, 127], whatever can exist along with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore the perfection of identity excludes all composition and quasi-composition, which identity exists because of the infinity, - and yet infinity does not take away from the formal ideas that the one is not formally the other.
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| 118 Non est ergo ex istis quasi compositum. Et ideo nihil est ex eis tamquam compositum ex actu et potentia, sed est unum simplicissimum ex istis, quia una ratio est perfecte - immo perfectissime eadem alteri, et tamen non formaliter eadem: non enim sequitur 'sunt perfecte eadem etiam identitate simplicitatis, ergo sunt formaliter eadem', sicut tactum est de identitate in quaestione praeallegata, et tangetur inferius distinctione 8. Et eadem perfecta ƿidentitas excludit omnem aggregationem, quia idem non aggregatur cum se ipso. ƿ
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118. So there is no quasi-composite made from them. And therefore nothing from them is as composite of act and potency, but there is from them one most simple thing, because one idea is perfectly - nay most perfectly - the same as the other, and yet is not formally the same; for this does not follow 'they are perfectly the same even by identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same', as was touched on about identity in the pre-cited question [in n.116], and as will be touched on below in distinction 8 [nn.209, 217]. And the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated with itself.[1]
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| 119 $a Et quod additur quod 'unum oportet esse in alio', concedo ut relatio est in fundamento sive radice, sed hoc non est ut actus in potentia sed ut identice continentur in pelago infinito.
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119. And as to what is added that 'one must be in the other' [n.115], I concede that the relation is in the foundation or the root, but this is not as act is in potency but as identically contained in the infinite sea [sc. the divine essence, n.131].
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| 120 Aliter potest dici quod omnes istae sunt verae, 'deitas est in Patre, paternitas est in Patre', 'Pater est in deitate sive natura divina, paternitas est in deitate', et tamen nullum 'in' est ibi ut actus in potentia.
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120. In another way [sc. to the issue in n.119] it can be said that all these propositions are true, 'deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father', 'the Father is in deity or in the divine nature, paternity is in deity', and yet no 'in' there is as act in potency.
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| 121 Nam prima est vera ut natura est in supposito, habente 'esse' quiditativum ea (quia hoc convenit quiditati unde quiditas est), sed non propter hoc est forma informans suppositum, etiam in creaturis.
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121. For the first proposition is true as nature is in the supposit, having quidditative 'being' by it (because this belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity [n.112]), but not for this reason is it a form informing the supposit, even in the case of creatures [nn.132, 138].
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| 122 Secunda est vera ut forma hypostatica est in hypostasi, - sed nec informat ipsam: tam enim quiditas quam forma hypostatica, etiam in creaturis, licet sit forma suppositi, non tamen est forma informans, sed ibi quasi pars, hic autem quasi una ratio formalis concurrens cum alia, formaliter, ad idem simplex sed habens in se plures rationes formales. ƿ
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122. The second [n.120] is true as the hypostatic form is in the hypostasis, - but it does not inform it; for as well the quiddity as the hypostatic form, even in the case of creatures, although it is the form of the supposit, yet is not an informing form, but is there [in creatures] as a part [sc. as Socrateity-humanity is in Socrates], while here it is as one formal idea concurring with another [sc. as paternity-deity], formally, to the same simple thing that yet has in it several formal ideas.
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| 123 Tertia est vera ut suppositum est in natura, - patet quod non ut informans.
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123. The third [n.120] is true as the supposit in the nature, - plainly not as informing it [n.147].
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| 124 Quarta est vera eodem modo 'in', quia quo modo totum est primo in aliquo, eodem modo pars est per se sed non primo in eodem, - patet de esse in loco; ergo si Pater primo est in natura, ut suppositum naturae, paternitas 'per se erit in eadem natura' eodem modo essendi 'in' licet non primo.
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124. The fourth [n.120] is true in the same way of 'in' [sc. the same as in in.123], because in the way a whole is first in something, in the same way the part is per se but not first in the same thing, - it is plain about being in place; therefore if the Father is first in nature, as the supposit of nature, paternity 'will be per se in the same nature' in the same way of being 'in', although not first.
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| 125 Ultra hoc, prior responsio dat modum 'in' - qui est relationis in fundamento - qui non reducitur ad esse formae in materia nisi ubi fundamentum est limitatum, in tantum quod non habet perfecte identice in se ipsam relationem. a$
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125. In addition to this, the prior response [n.119] gives the manner of 'in' -which is that of relation in the foundation - which is not reduced to the being of form in matter save where the foundation is limited, in that it does not have the relation perfectly identically in itself.
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| 126 Secunda difficultas est, quomodo relatio possit esse distinguens personam, et essentiam non distinguens, quin relatio habeat rationem actus, - quia actus est distinguere, VII Metaphysicae.
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126. [Difficulty 2] - The second difficulty is how relation can distinguish the person and not distinguish the essence without the relation having the idea of act, -because it belongs to act to distinguish, Metaphysics 7.13.1039a7.
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| 127 Respondeo. Concedo relationem esse actum personalem, non actum quiditativum, - quia personaliter distinguit et non quiditative. Essentia autem est actus quiditativus et quiditative distinguens: actus autem quiditativus est simpliciter perfectus, quia ƿinfinitus, - non sic autem est actus personalis de se formaliter infinitus.
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127. I reply. I concede that relation is a personal act, not a quidditative act, -because it distinguishes personally and not quidditatively. But the essence is quidditative act and distinguishes quidditatively; but the quidditative act is simply perfect, because infinite, - but the personal act is not thus of itself formally infinite.
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| 128 Et si dicis quod 'actus distinguens est actus eius quod non distinguit', falsum est, nisi illud quod non distinguit distinguatur per actum distinguentem, sicut in creaturis: humanitas distinguitur in Socrate et Platone per a et b, et ideo ibi actus distinguens - etiam individualiter - est actus eius quod non distinguit, quia actus ille distinguens distinguit ipsam naturam, quae non distinguit. Non ita hic, quia proprietas personalis non distinguit essentiam, nec contrahit nec determinat.
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128. And if you say that 'the distinguishing act is an act of what does not distinguish', it is false, unless what does not distinguish is distinguished by a distinguishing act, as it is in creatures; humanity is distinguished in Socrates and Plato by a and b, and therefore the distinguishing act there - even distinguishing individually - is an act of what does not distinguish, because the distinguishing act distinguishes the nature itself, which does not distinguish. It is not so here [sc. in divine reality], because the personal property does not distinguish the essence, nor does it contract or determine it.
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| 129 Tertia difficultas est, quomodo potest esse relatio, nisi requirat propriam rationem fundamenti. Fundamentum enim videtur esse prius relatione, et quasi perfectibile per eam, et non e converso: relatio enim non videtur perfici a suo fundamento, quia tunc praesupponeretur suo fundamento. Ergo cum essentia sit fundamentum istarum relationum, videtur esse quasi materia.
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129. [Difficulty 3] - The third difficulty is how a relation can exist without requiring the proper idea of foundation. For the foundation seems to be prior to the relation and is as it were perfectible by it, and not conversely; for a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would be presupposed to its foundation. Therefore since the essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems to be quasi-matter.
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| 130 Respondeo. In creaturis ordo generationis et ordo perfectionis contrarii sunt, sicut patet IX Metaphysicae, quod ((illa quae sunt priora generatione, sunt posteriora perfectione)); et ratio est, quia creaturae procedunt de potentia ad actum, et ideo de imperfecto ad perfectum, - et ideo prius pervenitur via generationis ad ƿimperfectum quam ad perfectum. Sed eundo ad simpliciter primum, oportet quod 'idem' sit simpliciter primum et origine et perfectione (etiam secundum Philosophum, ibidem), quia totus ordo generationis reducitur ad aliquid primum perfectionis, sicut ad primum originis totalis. In divinis ergo simul debent intelligi ordo generationis et ordo perfectionis.
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130. I reply. In the case of creatures the order of generation and the order of perfection are contraries, as is clear from Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-5, because "things that are prior in generation are posterior in perfection;" and the reason is that creatures proceed from potency to act, and so from the imperfect to the perfect, - and therefore by way of generation the imperfect is reached before the perfect is. But, when going to what is simply first, it must be the case that the 'same thing' is simply first both in origin and in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, ibid), because the whole order of generation is reduced to some first thing of perfection, as to the first thing of the whole origin. In divine reality, therefore, the order of generation and the order of perfection must be understood together.
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| 131 Sicut ergo in creaturis, si concurrerent isti duo ordines semper uniformiter, non quaereremus primo materiam quae substaret formae, et secundo formam, sed quaereremus primo formam quae nata esset dare actum materiae et secundo quaereremus materiam quae nata esset recipere esse per illam formam, vel suppositum quod natum est subsistere per illam formam, - ita in divinis. Incipiendo a primo signo naturae, omnino primo occurrit essentia divina ut est esse per se et ex se, quod non competit alicui naturae creatae, quia nulla natura creata habet esse prius naturaliter quam in supposito. Ista autem essentia - secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate - est qua Pater est et qua Filius est, licet non sit qua Pater est Pater et Filius est Filius. Isti ergo essentiae, abstractissime consideratae, ut prior omnibus personalibus, competit esse per se, et in isto primo occurrit non ut aliquid receptiƿvum alicuius perfectionis, sed ut infinita perfectio, potens quidem in secundo signo naturae communicari alicui: non ut forma informans, materiae, sed ut quiditas communicatur supposito, tamquam formaliter exsistenti per eam. Et ita 'pullulant' - ut quidam dicunt - ex ea relationes, et in ea personae; non ut quasi quaedam formae, dantes esse sibi, vel quasi quaedam supposita, in quibus recipiat esse quod sit simpliciter eius, sed quibus suppositis dat 'esse' ut quo formaliter illa supposita sunt, et quo sunt Deus: et ita relatio illa pullulans - si sit per se subsistens - ipsa pullulat non ut forma essentiae sed ut nata esse Deus ipsa deitate formaliter, licet non ut informante ipsam sed ut exsistente eadem sibi, perfectissima identitate; nullo autem modo, e converso, relatio est essentiae ut quo formaliter essentia est determinata vel contracta, vel aliquo modo actuata per ipsam, quia haec omnia repugnant infinitati essentiae ut primo occurrit sub ratione actus infiniti.
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131. Just as in creatures, then, if those two orders were always uniformly to come together, we would not seek first for the matter which underlies the form and then, second, for the form, but we would seek first for the form which would be of a nature to give act to the matter, and second we would seek for the matter which would be of a nature to receive being through that form, or the supposit which is of a nature to subsist through that form, - so it is in divine reality. Beginning from the first moment of nature, altogether first arises divine nature as it is being through itself and from itself, which does not belong to any created nature, because no created nature has being naturally before it is in a supposit. But this essence - according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11 -is that by which the Father is and that by which the Son is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father and the Son is Son. To this essence, then, considered in the most abstract way, as prior to all the personal features, there belongs being through itself, and in this first moment it arises not as something receptive of some perfection, but as infinite perfection, able indeed in the second moment of nature to be communicated to another; not communicated to matter as an informing form, but to supposit as quiddity, as to what exists formally through it. And thus do the relations - as some say - 'sprout up' from it and the persons 'sprout up' in it; not as certain quasi-forms, giving being to it, or as certain quasi-supposits, in which it receives the being which simply belongs to it, but as supposits to which it gives 'being' as that by which they are formally supposits, and by which they are God; and so the sprouting relation - if it is per se subsistent - sprouts up, not as form of the essence, but as naturally being God by the very deity formally, although not by deity as informing, but as existing the same with it, in the most perfect identity; but, conversely, in no way is the relation of the essence as being that by which essence is formally determined or contracted or in any way actuated by it, because all these thing are repugnant to the infinity of essence as it first occurs under the idea of infinite act.
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| 132 Concedo tunc quod essentia est fundamentum illarum relationum, sed non fundamentum quasi potentiale recipiens istas, sed fundamentum quasi per modum formae, in qua istae formae natae, sunt subsistere, - non quidem per informationem, sicut similitudo est in albedine, - sed sicut subsistens dicitur esse in natura, sicut Socrates dicitur subsistere in humanitate quia 'Socrates humanitate est homo'. Non ergo ex ratione fundamenti habebis rationem potentiae vel quasi potentialitatis, in essentia divina, sed praecise habebis rationem formae - ut qua relatio fundata in ea simpliciter est Deus. ƿ
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132. I concede then that essence is the foundation of these relations [n.129], but not a foundation quasi-potential receiving them, but foundation as by way of form, in which those forms are born and are to subsist, - not indeed by informing, as likeness does in whiteness, - but as the subsistent is said to exist in the nature, as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity, because 'Socrates is a man by humanity'. You will not then have from the idea of foundation the idea of potency or quasi-potentiality in the divine essence, but you will have precisely the idea of form - as that by which the relation founded in it simply is God.
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| 133 Exemplum istius potest accipi in creaturis, ponendo ibi quaedam 'per impossibile'. Augmentatio modo fit per hoc quod alimentum adveniens corpori corrumpitur, et materia eius recipit formam carnis, et sic informatur ab anima. Ponatur quod eadem materia manens nata sit recipere aliam partem formae (sicut ponitur in rarefactione), materia manet una, quae prius fuit formata et nunc nova forma formatur, - ipsa tamen formaliter est vere mutata, quia de privatione transit ad formam. - Ponamus, ex alia parte, quod anima eadem perficeret primo unam partem corporis (ut cor), postea adveniret alia pars corporis organici, perfectibilis ab anima, anima perficeret illam partem advenientem de novo, - et ipsa tamen non mutaretur, quia non esset in ea primo privatio et postmodum forma. Privatio enim est carentia, in apto nato recipere; anima autem primo non informans et postea informans non est nata aliquid recipere sed dare.
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133. An example of this can be taken in the case of creatures by positing there a certain 'per impossibile'. Increase happens now by the fact that food coming to the body is corrupted, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and is thus informed by the soul. Let it be posited that, while the same matter remains, it is of a nature to receive some part of the form [sc. of flesh] (as is posited in the case of rarefaction); the matter remains one, which was formed before and now is formed with a new form, - it itself however is formally truly changed, because it passes from privation to form. - Let us posit, on the other side, that the same soul would perfect first one part of the body (as the heart), but after another part of the organic body arrives, perfectible by the soul, the soul would perfect the part that de novo arrives, - and the soul itself would yet not be changed, because there would not be in it first privation and later form. For privation is a lack in that which is naturally apt to receive [what is lacked]; but the soul, first non-informing and later informing, is not of a nature to receive anything but to give something.
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| 134 In utroque extremorum istorum vere esset productio alicuius producti, sed in primo mutatio, in secundo non.
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134. In each of these extremes there is truly production of some product, but in the first there is change and not in the second.
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| 135 Aptius videtur exemplum, si ponamus materiam cordis animati posse eandem communicari diversis formis - puta manus et pedis et hoc virtute activa cordis animati, producentis composita ista ex materia sua communicata et ex formis istis, hic vere esset productio totorum habentium eandem materiam, et esset cum mutatione illius materiae; sed si, ex alia parte, ponamus animam - propter ƿsui illimitationem in ratione actus et formae - posse communicari multis et virtute animae in corde ipsam communicari manui et pedi, productis a corde animato, hic vere esset productio multorum consubstantialium in forma, absque mutatione illius formae.
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135. The example will seem more apt if we posit that the matter of the animated heart is able to be communicated the same to diverse forms - as of the hand and foot -and this by the active virtue of the animated heart producing those composites from its own communicated matter and from those forms; this would truly be production of all the things having the same matter, and it would go along with change of that matter; but if, on the other side, we posit that the soul - because of its lack of limitation in idea of act and form - can be communicated to many things and, by virtue of the soul in the heart, is communicated to hand and foot, produced by the animated heart, this would truly be production of many things consubstantial in form, without change of that form.
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| 136 In utroque exemplo ponantur producta esse per se subsistentia, non partes eiusdem, quia esse partem est imperfectionis. Hoc posito, secundus modus in utroque exemplo, qui est de communicatione formae ipsi producto, perfecte repraesentat productionem in Deo, non primus, qui est de communicatione materiae, - et hoc, adhuc addendo in positione, quod anima in corde et manu et pede non sit forma informans, quia componibilitas includit imperfectionem, sed sit forma totalis qua illa subsistentia sint et animata sint: ita quod intelligitur deitas non communicari quasi materia, sed relationibus subsistentibus - si personae ponantur relativae - communicatur deitas per modum formae, non informantis sed qua relatio vel relativum subsistens est Deus.
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136. In each example [nn.133, 135] let the products be posited to be per se subsistents, not parts of the same thing, because to be a part belongs to imperfection. With this posited, the second mode in each example, which is about the communication of form to the product, perfectly represents production in God, but not the first, which is about the communication of matter, - and this while still adding to the position that the soul in the heart and hand and foot is not the informing form, because being composable involves imperfection, but is the total form by which they are subsistent and are animated; so that deity is not understood to be communicated to quasi-matter; rather, to subsistent relations - if the persons are posited relatively - deity is communicated by way of form, not informing form, but form by which the relation or the subsisting relative is God.
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| 137 Nec igitur essentia informat relationem, nec e converso, sed est perfecta identitas. - Sed essentia habet modum formae respectu relationis, sicut natura respectu suppositi, in quantum ipsa est qua relatio subsistens est Deus. E converso autem, nullo modo relatio ƿest actus essentiae, quia sicut (dicit Damascenus) relatio 'non determinat naturam sed hypostasim', ita non est actus naturae sed hypostasis; similiter, quando relatio informat fundamentum, suppositum dicitur relatum per se secundo modo secundum illud fundamentum, sicut Socrates similis est secundum albedinem vel albedine: Pater autem non est Pater deitate, secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 4, - ergo hic non est talis modus relationis ad fundamentum qualis est in aliis, quia hic fundamentum non actuatur per relationem, sed illa est tantum actus suppositi vel suppositum.
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137. And the essence does not therefore inform the relation, nor conversely, but there is perfect identity. - But essence has the mode of form with respect to relation, just like nature with respect to the supposit, insofar as it is that by which the subsisting relation is God. Conversely, however, in no way is the relation an act of the essence, because just as relation (says Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.50) 'does not determine the nature but the hypostasis', so it is not an act of nature but of the hypostasis; likewise, when relation informs the foundation, the supposit is said to be related per se in the second mode according to that foundation, just as Socrates is alike in whiteness or by whiteness; but the Father is not Father by deity, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9, - therefore there is not here such a mode of relation to the foundation as there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated through the relation, but the relation is only the act of the supposit or is the supposit.
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| 138 Dico igitur breviter quod relatio et essentia ita sunt in persona quod neutrum est forma informans alterum, sed sunt perfecte idem, licet non formaliter. Ut tamen non sunt formaliter eadem, relatio nullo modo perficit essentiam, nec est terminus formalis receptus in essentia, sed essentia hoc modo est forma relationis, quia est qua relatio est et similiter Deus est, - et etiam, essentia est formalis terminus generationis, sicut in creaturis natura est formalis terminus generationis non autem actus individualis.
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138. I say briefly that relation and essence are in the person such that neither of them is form informing the other, but they are perfectly the same, although not formally. But as they are not formally the same, the relation in no way perfects the essence, nor is it the formal term received in the essence, but the essence in this way is the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is and is likewise God, - and also, the essence is the formal term of generation [n.64], just as in creatures nature is the formal term of generation but not an individual act.
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| 139 Contra istud obicitur, quia 'terminus formalis generationis communicatur, ergo praesupponit illud cui communicetur; essentia autem non praesupponit relationem, sed e converso, ergo ƿessentia non communicatur relationi', - et potest esse quarta difficultas: quia aliquid ibi communicatur, et illud erit formalis terminus, et illud praesupponet illud cui communicatur; essentia autem non potest praesupponere relationem cui ipsa communicetur, sed e converso, - ergo e converso, - et ita relatio communicatur essentiae, et tunc relatio erit terminus formalis productionis et essentia quasi materia.
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139. [Difficulty 4] - Against this it is objected that 'the formal term of generation is communicated, therefore it presupposes that to which it is communicated; but the essence does not presuppose relation but conversely, therefore essence is not communicated to relation [from Henry]', - and it can be the fourth difficulty; because something is communicated there, and it will be the formal term, and it will presuppose that to which it is communicated; but essence cannot presuppose the relation to which it is communicated but conversely, - therefore conversely, - and so relation is communicated to essence, and then relation will be the formal term of production and essence the quasi-matter.
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| 140 Respondeo. Productio quia est alicuius primi termini - id est adaequati - includentis aliquid in ratione termini formalis ipsius productionis et aliquid in ratione subsistentiae in tali termino, ideo contradictio est respectu productionis haec separari, terminum scilicet formalem et rationem subsistentiae, in quantum scilicet productione habent esse, licet absolute prioritas esset unius ad alterum (etiam ad 'separari sine contradictione'), considerando ipsa absolute, non in quantum per productionem habent esse, licet etiam esset ibi prioritas perfectionis, quod alterum esset altero perfectius, - quia natura perfectior est ratione subsistentiae (etiam in creaturis), et ex hoc sequitur quod natura est terminus formalis productionis, quia nulla entitas simplex perfectior formali termino productionis habet esse per productionem.
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140. I respond. Because production is of some first term - that is of an adequate term - which includes in it something in the idea of formal term of the very production and something in idea of subsistence in such term [nn.27-28, 97], therefore it is a contradiction for these to be separated in respect of production, namely the formal term and the idea of subsistence, namely insofar as they have being by production, although absolutely there would be a priority of one to the other (even to the 'separated without contradiction'), considering them absolutely, not insofar as they have being through production, - although there would there too be a priority of perfection, because one would be more perfect than the other, - because nature is more perfect by reason of subsistence (even in creatures), and from this it follows that nature is the formal term of production, because no simple entity more perfect than the formal term of production has being through production [n.67].
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| 141 Tunc ad formam argumenti dico quod communicatum 'in ƿquantum productione communicatur' non praesupponit illud cui communicetur, nec e converso, quia ista communicatio non est alicui iam exsistenti, sicut est in alteratione, - sed est alicui, ut simpliciter sit; ideo nec natura communicatur ante productionem suppositi (quia tunc communicaretur et non producto), nec e converso, licet absolute communicatum sit prius ratione propria suppositi - in prioritate perfectionis et in prioritate essendi sine invicem - in creaturis: primae prioritati in creaturis correspondet hic in Deo, quod essentia est formaliter infinita, relatio autem non.
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141. Then to the form of the argument I say that the thing communicated 'insofar as it is communicated by production' does not presuppose that to which it is communicated, nor conversely, because the communication is not to something already existing, as it is in the case of alteration, - but it is to something so that it simply exist; therefore neither is nature communicated before the production of the supposit (because then it would be communicated also to something non-produced), nor conversely, although absolutely it is communicated first in the proper idea of supposit - in priority of perfection and in priority of being without each other - in the case of creatures; to the first priority in the case of creatures there corresponds here in God that the essence is formally infinite, the relation however is not.
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