Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D5/P2-IV
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IV. To the Arguments
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| 150 Cum arguitur ad principale, per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 11, respondeo: Augustinus subdit ibidem: ((quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, et aliud persona)). Similiter, concedo quod non proprie dicitur aliqua persona esse de essentia absolute, sed addendo cum substantia personam aliquam originantem bene dicitur quod persona aliqua originata est de substantia illius personae, ita quod haec 'Filius est de essentia divina' non est ita concedenda sicut haec 'Filius est de substantia Patris', quia per secundam exprimitur consubstantialitas et originatio, propter genitivum constructum cum casuali praepositionis, - per primam autem non notatur aliquid originans. | 150. [To the Principal Arguments] - When it is argued to the principal from Augustine On the Trinity [n.46] I reply: Augustine subjoins in the same place: "as if one thing there were substance and another were person." Likewise, I concede that a person is not properly said to be from the essence absolutely, but when adding along with the substance some originating person it is well said that some originated person is of the substance of that person, such that this proposition 'the Son is from the divine essence' is not to be conceded in the way that this proposition is 'the Son is from the substance of the Father', because by the second is expressed consubstantiality and origination, on account of the genitive ['of the Father'] construed with the causal case of the preposition ['from the substance'], - but by the first nothing originating is indicated. |
| 151 Ad aliud dicendum quod licet Augustinus dicat Filium esse 'Filium substantiae Patris' (XV De Trinitate cap. 19), et doctor quidam dicat illam esse propriam, - tamen videtur probaƿbilius quod quandocumque relativum construitur cum aliquo in tali habitudine casuali in qua natum est aliquid terminare illam relationem ut correlativum, tunc construitur cum illo praecise ut cum correlativo. - Exemplum. 'Pater' construitur cum relativo in habitudine genitivi, 'simile' in habitudine dativi, 'maius' in habitudine ablativi. Secundum communem sermonem, videtur quod cum quocumque construitur 'tale relativum' expresse in 'tali habitudine casuali', illud notatur esse correlativum huius relativi: non enim dicimus 'iste canis est filius hominis', quia est filius, et est hominis ut domini canis ita quod ly 'hominis' construatur cum ly 'canis' ex vi possessionis vel possessoris, sed videtur signare quod construatur cum ly 'canis' in ratione relativi, ut 'patris'. | 151. To the other [n.47] one must say that although Augustine says the Son is 'Son of the substance of the Father' (On the Trinity XV ch.19 n.37, n.49), and a certain doctor [Henry] says this proposition is a proper one, - yet it seems more probable that whenever a relative ['Son'] is construed with something ['substance'] in that sort of causal relationship ['of] in which something naturally terminates the relative as its correlative, then it is construed with it ['Son of the substance'] precisely as with its correlative ['Son of the Father']. - An example. 'Father' is construed with the relative in the genitive case ['of the father'], 'similar' in the dative case ['similar to...'], 'greater' in the ablative case ['greater than...']. According to common speech, it seems that with whatever 'such a [determinate] relative' is construed in 'such a causal [genitive] case', it is indicated to be the correlative of the relative [sc. 'son of the father/of man/of substance']; for we do not say 'this dog is the son of a man' because it is a son and is of a man as of the dog's master, such that 'of a man' is construed with 'dog' by force of possession or possessor, but 'of a man' seems to indicate that it is construed with 'dog' in the idea of relation, as with 'of the father'.[1] |
| 152 Ita igitur in ista 'Filius essentiae', videtur essentiam accipi ut correlativum eius relativi, cum quo construitur. - Et tunc auctoritas Augustini De Trinitate XV cap. 19 debet exponi sicut ipse exponit: ((Filii caritatis suae, - id est 'Filii sui dilecti')). ƿ | 152. Thus therefore in the phrase 'the Son of the essence', it seems that essence is taken as the correlative of the relative with which it is construed. - And then the authority of Augustine [n.151] ought to be expounded as he himself expounds it [sc. and not as Henry does, n.49]: "'of the Son of his charity,' - that is 'of the Son of his delight'." |
| 153 Et tunc ad argumentum istud: cum arguitur quod ad istam 'de essentia, sequitur ista quod est essentiae', - nego consequentiam, quia consequens notat relationem esse inter Filium et essentiam sicut suum correlativum; quod non notat antecedens, sed tantum notat consubstantialitatem in essentia, cum originatione, notata in illo quod construitur cum essentia. | 153. And then to this argument [n.151]: when it is argued that on the phrase 'from the essence' follows the phrase that he is 'of the essence', - I deny the consequence, because the consequent indicates that the relation between the Son and the essence is like that of a correlative; and this the antecedent does not indicate, but it only indicates consubstantiality in the essence, along with origination, indicated in the thing that is construed with essence. |
| 154 Ad ultimum dico quod 'de' non notat tantum identitatem, sed notat identitatem sui casualis (et hoc in ratione formae) et distinctionem illius quod additur suo casuali, ut principii originantis, sicut dictum est prius. | 154. To the final one [n.48] I say that 'from' [as in 'the Son is from the substance of the Father'] does not indicate only identity, but it indicates identity of the noun it governs ['substance'] (and this in the idea of form) and distinction of that which is added to that noun ['of the Father'] as originating principle, in the way said before [n.99]. |
| 155 Ad argumenta in oppositum: Ad illud de XV De Trinitate responsum est. | 155. [To the arguments for the opposite] - To the arguments for the opposite: To that from On the Trinity XV [n.49] the response has been given [n.152]. |
| 156 Ad illud Contra Maximinum patet etiam, ex dictis. | 156. To the one from AgainstMaximinus [n.50] the response is plain too from what has been said [nn.98-101]. |
| 157 Ad ultimum, de 'filio in creaturis - quod est de substantia patris, - patet responsio ex dictis in solutione quaestionis, quia illud 'de', quod pertinet ad rationem filiationis, non dicit circumstantiam causae materialis, sed magis sufficit si illud de quo est filius sit forma communis patri et filio et sit non subiectum generationis sed terminus formalis eiusdem. | 157. To the final one [n.51], about 'son' in the case of creatures, - the response is plain from what was said in the solution of the question, because the 'from', which pertains to the idea of filiation, does not state the idea of material cause [n.104], but rather it is enough if that from which the son is be a form common to father and son and be, not the subject of generation, but the formal term of it [n.105]. |
Notes
- ↑ In other words [to quote the note of the editors of the Vatican edition], although we can say that a dog is a son [of some dog] and is of a man [as of its master], common speech does not allow us to go on to say 'the dog is a son of a man' because here 'of a man' indicates paternity and not, as it did originally, mastership.
