Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D7

Translated by Peter Simpson

• q. 1: Utrum potentia generandi in Patre sit aliquid absolutum vel proprietasPatris
• q. 2: Utrum possint esse plures Filii in divinis

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem septimam quaero utrum potentia generandi in Patre sit aliquid absolutum vel proprietas Patris. Quod proprietas Patris, - probatio: Augustinus V De Trinitate cap. 6: ((Eo est Pater quo est ei Filius)), ergo eo est Pater quo generat; probatio consequentiae, quia generatione est ei Filius. Sed paternitate est Pater; ergo paternitate generat.	1. Concerning the seventh distinction I ask whether the power of generating in the Father is something absolute or a property of the Father. That it is a property of the Father, - proof: Augustine On the Trinity V ch.5 n.6: "He is Father by the fact he has a Son," therefore he is Father by the fact he generates; the proof of the consequence is that he has a Son by generation. But he is Father by paternity; therefore he generates by paternity.
2 $a Vel sic: 'paternitate est Pater, ergo paternitate generat'; vel sic: 'deitate generat, ergo deitate est Pater'. - Responsio: neutra consequentia valet, quia ablativus cum verbo significat principium agendi, cum adiectivo nomine vel concreto significat principium formale concernens. Nunc autem non oportet idem esse 'quo forƿmaliter tale' et 'quo elicitive agit', licet esse tale et agere convertantur respectu suppositi agentis; nec est idem additum, quia ablativus non potest construi cum hoc et illo uniformiter, sed est figura dictionis primo modo, quia 'similis terminatio' ostendit identitatem conceptus - cum hoc et cum illo - cum sit alius. a$	2. Or thus: 'he is Father by paternity, therefore he generates by paternity'; or thus: 'he generates by deity, therefore he is Father by deity'. - Response: neither consequence is valid, because the ablative when along with a verb ['he generates by paternity/deity'] signifies the principle of acting, when along with an adjectival or concrete name ['he is Father by paternity/deity'] signifies the formal concerning principal [e.g. as a white thing is white by whiteness]. But as it is, to be 'that by which he is formally such' should not be the same as to be 'that by which he elicitively acts', although to be such and to act are convertible with respect to the acting supposit; nor is the added phrase the same, because the ablative cannot be construed uniformly with the latter and the former statements, but there is a figure of speech in the first mode , because 'similar termination' indicates identity of concept - with the latter and with the former - although the concept is different.
3 Item, per rationem: Actus proprius est a propria forma agentis; sed generare est actus proprius Patris; ergo etc. - Probatio maioris: tum quia propria forma dat esse, igitur et agere, - tum quia si forma communis, et effectus communis, quia causa et effectus correspondent sibi invicem, universalis universali et particularis particulari, II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae cap. 'De causa'.	3. Again, by reason: The act proper is from the proper form of the agent; but to generate is the act proper of the Father; therefore etc. - Proof of the minor: both because the proper form gives being, therefore it also gives acting, - and also because, if the form is common, the effect is common too, because cause and effect correspond to each other, universal to universal and particular to particular, Physics 2.3.195b25-27 and Metaphysics 5.2.1014a10-13.
4 Item, medium est eiusdem generis cum extremis; sed supposita, quae sunt extrema, sunt relativa; ergo illud quo suppositum agit quod est medium inter ea - est relativum.	4. Again, the middle term belongs to the same genus as the extremes; but the supposits, which are the extremes, are relatives; therefore that by which the supposit acts - which is the middle between them - is a relative.
5 Item, potentia est eiusdem generis cum actu, immo in divinis sunt idem; sed actus generandi est relatio; ergo et principium erit relatio, vel relativum.	5. Again, potency belongs to the same genus as act, nay in divine reality they are the same thing; but the act of generating is a relation; therefore the principle too will be a relation, or a relative.
6 Contra: Damascenus dicit: ((Generatio est opus naturae)); sed non ƿest opus naturae ut generantis, quia natura non generat; ergo est opus naturae ut principii generandi.	6. To the contrary: Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.8 says: "Generation is the work of nature" [I d.6 n.6]; but it is not of the nature as of the one generating, because the nature does not generate; therefore it is the work of the nature as of the principle of generating.
7 Item, Hilarius V De Trinitate f: ((Ex virtute naturae in eandem naturam nativitate subsistit Filius)).	7. Again, Hilary On the Trinity V ch.37: "From the virtue of the nature the Son by nativity subsists in the same nature."
8 Item, Magister in littera: ((Pater non est potens nisi natura)), et loquitur de potentia generandi; ergo etc.	8. Again, the Master [Lombard] in the text: "the Father is not powerful save by nature," - and he is speaking of the power of generating; therefore etc.
9 Hic est opinio talis, quod illud quo Pater generat, est essentia, - propter hanc rationem, quia generans assimilat sibi genitum in forma qua agit; Filius autem assimilatur Patri in essentia, non in proprietate; ergo etc.	9. There is here an opinion [Aquinas ST Ia q.41 a.5] of this sort, that that by which the Father generates is essence, - for the following reason, that the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts; but the Son is assimilated to the Father in essence, not in property; therefore etc.
10 Et declaratur ratio, quia sicut in creaturis proprietas individualis non est ratio agendi sed natura, in qua individua conveƿniunt, ita in divinis proprietas personalis - quae correspondet proprietati individuali in creaturis - non erit ratio agendi vel gignendi.	10. And there is a clarification of the reason, that just as in creatures the individual property is not the idea of the acting but the nature is, in which the individuals agree, so in divine reality the personal property - which corresponds to the individual property in creatures - will not be the idea of the acting or generating.
11 Contra istud arguitur multipliciter. - Primo sic: omnis forma sufficienter elicitiva alicuius actionis, si per se est, per se agit illa actione (exemplum: si calor est sufficienter potentia calefactiva, calor separatus calefacit); ergo si deitas sit potentia generativa, et constat quod sufficiens, - sequitur quod si per se sit deitas, quod per se generabit. Deitas autem prius est in se - aliquo modo - quam intelligitur esse in persona, quia deitas ut deitas est per se esse, ita quod tres personae ipsa deitate per se sunt et non e converso (VII Trinitatis cap. 8: 'ad se subsistit Deus'; et infra: ((hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere))): ergo in illo primo signo naturae in quo intelligitur, antequam intelligatur in persona, generabit, - et ita deitas sic considerata distinguitur a genito.	11. Against this [n.9] there are multiple arguments. - First thus: every form sufficiently elicitive of some action, if it exists per se, acts per se with that action (example: if heat is a sufficiently heating power, separated heat heats); therefore if deity is the generative power, and it is agreed that it is sufficient, - it follows that if deity exists per se then it will per se generate. But deity exists in itself - in some way - before it is understood to exist in a person, because deity as deity is per se being, such that the three persons exist per se by deity itself and not conversely (Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9, ch.5 n.10: "God subsists for himself;" and later: "for God to exist is this, to subsist"); therefore in the first moment of nature in which deity is understood, before it is understood in a person, it will generate, - and thus deity considered as such is distinguished from the generated.
12 Si dicatur quod deitas non habet 'per se esse' nisi in persona, et ideo non per se agit sed persona per se agit,- contra: argumentum probat oppositum, quia si calor habens per se esse participatum per miraculum esset per se, posset per se operari illa operatione cuius est principium; ergo ipsa essentia, quae est 'per se esse' ex se ƿ(non autem participat 'per se esse'), poterit per se esse agens illa actione cuius est principium elicitivum in supposito, et ita stat argumentum.	12. If it be said that deity does not have ' per se being' save in a person, and therefore it does not per se act but the person per se acts, - on the contrary: the argument proves the opposite, that if heat, having per se participated being, were, by a miracle, to exist per se, it could per se operate with the operation of which it is the principle; therefore the essence itself, which is 'per se being' of itself (it does not, however, participate 'per se being'), will be able per se to be an agent with the action of which it is the elicitive principle in the supposit, and so the argument [n.11] stands.
13 Secundo sic: producentis et formae qua producit eadem est relatio ad productum. Hoc accipitur a Philosopho II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod ad idem genus causae pertinet ars et aedificator. Ergo ad idem genus principii pertinent producens et id quo producens producit, et ita si essentia sit qua Pater generat, habebit essentia realem relationem ad genitum: hoc est falsum, ergo etc.	13. Second thus: the producer and the form by which it produces have the same relation to the product. This is taken from the Philosopher Physics 2.3.195b21-25, Metaphysics 5.2.1013b30-33, where he means that art and the builder pertain to the same genus of cause. Therefore the producer and that by which the producer produces pertain to the same genus of principle, and so, if the essence is that by which the Father generates, the essence will have a real relation to the one generated; this is false, therefore etc.
14 Item, tertio: forma in quantum est in qua assimilantur generans et genitum, non habet unitatem nisi rationis, ergo nec entitatem nisi rationis; ergo, secundum hoc, non est principium elicitivum actionis realis.	14. Again, third: the form, insofar as it is that in which the generator and the generated are assimilated, only has the unity of idea, therefore it only has the being of idea; therefore, according to this, it is not the elicitive principle of real action.
15 Item, quarto: forma non est principium agendi nisi in quantum agens est in actu per eam, non est autem in actu per ipsam nisi in quantum est in ipso; ut autem est in ipso, est 'haec'; ergo ut 'haec' est principium. ƿ	15. Again, fourth: the form is only the principle of acting insofar as the agent is in act by it, but the agent is not in act by it save insofar as it is in the agent; but as it is in the agent it is a 'this'; therefore it is principle as a 'this'.
16 Item, productio per prius est distinctiva quam assimilativa quod patet (omnis enim productio est distinctiva, non autem omnis est assimilativa) - ergo forma quae est principium productionis prius est principium eius in quantum forma est distinctiva quam in quantum est assimilativa; ipsa est distinctiva in quantum 'haec', assimilativa in quantum 'forma'; ergo prius est principium productivum in quantum 'haec' quam in quantum 'forma' .	16. Again, production distinguishes before it assimilates - as is plain (for every production distinguishes but not every production assimilates) - therefore the form which is the principle of production is first a principle of it insofar as form distinguishes before it is a principle of it insofar as form assimilates; the form distinguishes insofar as it is a 'this', and it assimilates insofar as it is a 'form'; therefore it is a productive principle insofar as it is a 'this' before it is so insofar as it is a 'form'.
17 Item, instatur contra probationem argumenti positionis: tum quia brutum generans brutum assimilatur ei in specie, et tamen forma specifica bruti non est principium generandi, sed potentia vegetativa, - ergo maior videtur esse falsa; tum quia in augmentatione carnis calor est principium activum (secundum Philosophum II De anima), et tamen generatur caro animata, similis generanti in forma vegetativae.	17. Again, there is an instance against the proof of the argument for the position [n.9]: both because when a brute generates a brute it is assimilated to it in species, and yet the specific form of the brute is not the principle of generating, but the vegetative power is, - therefore the major ['the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts', n.9] seems to be false; and also because in the increase of flesh heat is the active principle (according to the Philosopher On the Soul 2.4.416a13-14), and yet animated flesh is generated, being similar to the generator in form of vegetative [soul].
18 Aliter dicitur quod generationis in divinis oportet dare aliquod principium positivum, quia actio est positiva; non sunt autem positiva in divinis personis nisi essentia et relatio, - relatio autem non potest esse principium illius productionis, quia relatio ƿnon est principium nec terminus motus, ex V Physicorum; ergo essentia. Sed essentia, secundum se considerata, est indeterminata ad plures personas et ad actiones plurium personarum, ergo oportet quod ad hoc quod ipsa sit principium determinatae actionis, quod determinetur: determinatur autem relatione, - et ideo relatio ponitur principium non elicitivum sed determinativum.	18. In another way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that for generation in divine reality one must give some positive principle, because action is positive; but the only positive principles in the divine persons are essence and relation, - but relation cannot be a principle of the production, because relation is not a principle or a term of motion, Physics 5.2.225v11-13; therefore essence is. But essence, considered in itself, is indeterminate to several persons and to the actions of several persons, therefore, in order for it to be principle of determinate action, it must be determined; but it is determined by relation, - and therefore relation is posited as a principle, not an elicitive principle but a determinative one.
19 Ad hoc adducitur confirmatio ex creaturis, ubi eadem forma dat actum primum et secundum: sed determinatur ad hunc et illum ex diversis respectibus, quia ad primum determinatur ex respectu ad subiectum, ad secundum ex respectu ad obiectum. ƿ	19. To this there is adduced a confirmation from creatures, where the same form gives the first and the second act [sc. being and action, n.3]; but it is determined to the former and the latter by diverse respects, because to the first it is determined by respect to the subject, and to the second by respect to the object.
20 Contra. Indeterminatio, quaedam est 'potentiae passivae' et quaedam 'potentiae activae' illimitatae ad plures effectus (exemplum: sicut sol est indeterminatus ad producendum multa generabilia, non quod aliquam formam recipiat ut agat, sed quia habet virtutem productivam illimitatam). Quod est indeterminatum 'indeterminatione materiae' oportet quod recipiat formam ad hoc quod agat, quia non est in actu sufficiente ad agendum, sed quod est indeterminatum 'indeterminatione potentiae activae' est ex se sufficienter determinatum ad producendum quemcumque illorum effectuum: et hoc si passum dispositum sit approximatum, ubi requiritur passum, vel ex se ipso ubi passum non requiritur; probatio: si tale activum esset de se determinatum ad unum effectum, posset de se sufficienter producere illum, - sed si est indeterminatum ad hoc et ad aliud, ex tali illimitatione non tollitur perfectio causalitatis eius respectu talis effectus, sed tantum additur causalitas reƿspectu alterius; ita ergo potest istud producere, sicut si tantum esset istius, et ita non requiritur aliquod determinans.	20. To the contrary. Of indetermination one sort is of a 'passive power' and another is of an 'active power' unlimited to several effects (an example: as the sun is indeterminate to producing many generable things, not because it receives some form so as to act, but because it has an unlimited productive virtue). What is indeterminate by 'indetermination of matter' [sc. the first sort of indetermination] must receive a form so that it may act, because it is not in act sufficient for acting, but what is indeterminate 'by indetermination of active power' is of itself sufficiently determinate for producing any of the effects; and it is so if the passive disposed thing, when something passive is required, is close by, or of itself when something passive is not required; proof: if such an active thing was of itself determinate to one effect, it could of itself sufficiently produce it, - but if it is indeterminate to this and to that, the perfection of its causality with respect to such an effect is not taken away by such lack of limitation, but there is only added causality with respect to one or other of them; it can then produce it just as if it were of it alone, and so there is not required anything to determine it.
21 Ad propositum. Essentia divina non est principium indeterminatum 'indeterminatione materiae': ergo si est indeterminatum indeterminatione alterius quasi principii activi, erit simpliciter determinatum determinatione quae requiritur ad agendum, et ita non requiritur aliquid aliud. Confirmatur, quia talis indeterminatio activi licet sit ad disparata, non tamen est ad contradictoria, sed determinate ad alteram partem contradictionis respectu cuiuslibet illorum disparatorum; nulla autem indeterminatio prohibet ex se determinate agere, nisi quae aliquo modo esset ad contradictoria, ut ad agere et non agere; ergo etc.	21. To the intended proposition [n.18]. The divine essence is not a principle that is indeterminate by 'indetermination of matter'; therefore if it is indeterminate by the indetermination of something else as an active principle, it will be simply determined by the determination that is required for acting, and thus nothing else is required. A confirmation is that such indetermination of an active principle, although it is to disparate things, is yet not to contradictories, but it is determinately to one or other part of the contradiction with respect to any of the disparate things; but no indetermination prevents a thing acting determinately of itself save an indetermination that is in some way to contradictories, as to acting and not-acting; therefore etc.
22 Item, secundo sic: quando aliquod principium activum est indeterminatum ad duos effectus, non ex aequo sed secundum ordinem naturalem, - ex se sufficienter determinatum est ad primum illorum, et posito primo, ad secundum; essentia autem divina non est indeƿterminata ad istas duas productiones ex aequo, sed per prius se habet ad generationem; ergo est ex se sufficienter determinata ad utrumque, quia ex se, primo - ordine originis - ad primam, et illa posita, est determinata ad secundam, - et ita in nullo signo originis est indeterminata ad utramque quasi tunc eliciendam.	22. Again second thus: when some active principle is indeterminate to two effects, not equally so but according to a natural order, - it is sufficiently of itself determined to the first of them, and, once the first is in place, to the second; but the divine essence is not indeterminate equally to those two productions [sc. generation and inspiriting], but is related first to generation; therefore it is of itself sufficiently determined to both, because it is of itself determined first to the first - in order of origin - and, with that in place, it is determined to the second, - and so in no moment of origin is it indeterminate to each as each is then to be elicited.
23 Item, tertio: relatio est ratio suppositi agentis. Ergo si est determinativa principii 'quo', habebit duplicem rationem principii respectu generationis: unam in quantum est ratio agentis, et aliam in quantum est ratio determinativa principii agendi, - et ita mediabit inter se ipsam et actionem.	23. Again third: relation is the idea of the acting supposit. Therefore if the relation is determinative of the principle 'in which', it will have a double idea of principle with respect to generation: one insofar as it is the idea of the agent, and another insofar as it is the determinative idea of the acting principle, - and so it will mediate between itself and the action.
24 Quarto sic: natura ut natura ponitur principium elicitivum ƿillius actionis. Ipsa autem 'ut natura' non est determinabilis, secundum Damascenum cap. 50 ((Proprietates determinant hypostases, non naturam)) 'ut natura'. Ergo nullum est determinativum principii 'quo' ut est principium 'quo', sed tantum principii agentis.	24. Fourth thus: nature as nature is posited as the elicitive principle of the action. But nature 'as nature' is not determinable, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.50: "The properties determine the hypostases, not the nature" 'as nature'. Therefore nothing is determinative of the principle 'in which' as it is the principle 'in which', but only of the acting principle.
25 Item, relatio secundum te tantum differt ratione a fundamento: ergo non potest esse principium determinativum ad actum realem, aliquo modo distinctum ab essentia, quia nihil concurrit ad rationem alicuius principii respectu actionis realis nisi reale.	25. Again, relation according to you differs only in idea from the foundation; therefore it cannot be a determinative principle, in some way distinct from the essence, for a real act, because only something real concurs with the idea of some principle in respect of a real action.
26 Item, quod dicitur de relatione determinativa in creaturis, videtur esse falsum, quia calor ex se - non per aliquem respectum medium - est fundamentum respectus huius potentiae calefactivae; non oportet etiam quod determinatio ad actum primum et secundum fiat per respectus, quia eadem forma absoluta dat actum primum absolutum et non respectivum, et etiam principium agendi est absolutum et non respectivum. ƿ	26. Again, what is said of determinative relation in creatures [n.19] seems to be false, because heat of itself - not by some intermediate respect - is the foundation with respect to this heating power; also, it is not necessary that the determination to the first and the second act be done through respects, because the same absolute form gives a first absolute and not respective act, and the principle of acting too is absolute and not respective.
27 Ad quaestionem ergo respondeo, distinguendo primo de 'potentia'. Uno enim modo dicitur 'potentia logica', quae dicit modum compositionis factae ab intellectu, - et ista notat non repugnantiam terminorum; de qua dicit Philosophus V Metaphysicae cap. 'De potentia': ((Illud est possibile cuius contrarium non est necessitate verum)). - Et si hoc modo quaeratur de 'potentia' in divinis, dico quod ipsa est, comparando generationem ad quemcumque actum non repugnantem generationi: et tunc potentia, vel possibilitas, est Patris vel Dei ad hoc praedicatum quod est generare, quia isti termini non repugnant; impossibilitas autem est quod Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus generent, quia isti termini repugnant. Et si quaeratur quid est potentia generandi in divinis, hoc modo non oportet dare aliquod principium quo aliquis sit potens generare, sufficit enim sola non repugnantia terminorum: sicut si ante mundi creationem mundus non solum non fuisset, sed, per incompossibile, Deus non fuisset sed incepisset a se esse, et tunc fuisset potens creare mundum, - si fuisset intellectus ante mundum, componens hanc 'mundus erit', haec fuisset possibilis quia termini non repugnarent, non tamen propter aliquod principium in re possibili, vel activum, sibi correspondens; nec etiam modo ista 'mundus erit' fuit possibilis - formaliter loquendo - potentia Dei, sed potentia ƿquae erat non repugnantia terminorum istorum, quia isti termini non repugnarent licet istam non repugnantiam concomitaretur potentia activa respectu huius possibilis.	27. I respond to the question, then, by first making a distinction about 'power'. For in one way there is said to be 'logical power [possibility]', which states the mode of composition made by the intellect, - and this indicates the non-repugnance of the terms; about which the Philosopher says Metaphysics 5.12.1019b30-32: "That is possible whose contrary is not by necessity true." - And if in this way one asks about 'power' in divine reality I say that it exists by comparing generation to any act non-repugnant to generation; and then power, or possibility, is of the Father or of God to the predicate that is 'to generate', because these terms are not repugnant; but there is an impossibility that the Son or Holy Spirit generate, because these terms are repugnant. And if one ask what is the power of generating in divine reality, there is in this way [sc. of logical possibility] no need to give some principle by which someone is able to generate, - for the sole non-repugnance of the terms suffices; just as if, before the creation of the world, the world not only was not but, per incompossibile, God was not but began of himself to be, and then was able to create the world, - if there had been an intellect before the world combining the proposition 'the world will exist', this proposition would have been possible because the terms were not repugnant, not however because of any principle in possible reality, or any active principle, corresponding to it; nor even so was this proposition 'the world will be' possible - formally speaking - by the power of God, but by the possibility that was the non-repugnance of the terms, because the terms would be non-repugnant, although the non-repugnance would be concomitant with the power that is active in respect of this possibility.
28 Alio modo dicitur 'potentia, divisa contra actum', et ista non est in Deo.	28. In another way there is said to be 'power as divided against act' [Metaphysics 9.8.1050a15-16], - and this power is not in God.
29 Ergo relinquitur 'potentia realis' - quae dicitur 'principium agendi vel patiendi' - ut proximum fundamentum relationum, quia hoc nomen 'potentia' non est abstractum ultima abstractione, sed est concretum concretione ad fundamentum (licet non concretione ad subiectum), - de qua multiplici abstractione in relativis dictum est supra distinctione 5 quaestione 1. Hic autem quaeritur tantum de potentia agendi.	29. So there is left 'real power' - which is said to be 'principle of doing or suffering' [ibid. 5.12.1019a15-20; I d.2 n.262] - as the proximate foundation of relations, because this noun 'power' is not abstract with ultimate abstraction, but is concrete with concretion in a foundation (although not with concretion in a subject), - which multiple abstraction in relatives was spoken of above in distinction 5 [I d.5 n.21]. Here however the question is only about the power of acting.
30 Et tunc distinguo, quod hoc nomen 'potentia' potest sumi pro eo quod per se significat, vel pro eo quod denominat - quod est 'proximum fundamentum talis relationis'.	30. And then I draw a distinction, because this noun 'power' can be taken for that which it per se signifies, or for that which it denominates - which is 'proximate foundation of such relation'.
31 Primo modo accipiendo dico quod potentia significat relationem, sicut potentialitas sive principiatio, - et hoc modo quaestio non habet difficultatem, quia 'potentia generandi in divinis' dicit essentialiter relationem.	31. Power taken in the first way [n.30] I say signifies relation, just as does potentiality or being a principle, - and in this way the question has no difficulty, because 'the power of generating in divine reality' essentially states a relation.
32 Secundo modo est difficultas quaestionis, inquirendo quid sit illud 'absolutum', quod est fundamentum proximum istius relationis. Et tunc (loquendo semper praecise de potentia activa sive proƿductiva, de qua est modo sermo) distinguo ulterius, quod 'potentia denominative sumpta' aliquando sumitur pro suo fundamento praecise, aliquando autem pro illo cum omnibus aliis quae concurrunt ad hoc ut possit elicere actum, quae scilicet requiruntur ad rationem potentiae propinquae, - cuiusmodi sunt in creaturis approximatio passi et impedimenti remotio.	32. In the second way [n.30] the question does have a difficulty when one inquires what that 'absolute' is which is the proximate foundation of this relation. And then (speaking always precisely of active or productive power, which is what the discussion is now about [n.29]) I draw a further distinction that 'power denominatively taken' is sometimes taken for the foundation precisely, but sometimes for the foundation along with all the other things that come together so that it can elicit the act, namely the things that are required for the idea of proximate power - of which sort in creatures are the coming near of the passive thing and the removal of an impediment.
33 Ista distinctio ultima potentiae, acceptae pro fundamento praecise vel pro ipso cum aliis concurrentibus, accipitur a Philosopho V et IX Metaphysicae. Definitio enim potentiae activae quam ponit V et IX Metaphysicae, est potentiae primo modo sumptae. Potentiam autem secundo modo sumptam, exprimit ipse manifeste IX Metaphysicae 3 vel 4: ((Quoniam)) - inquit - ((possibile, aliquid possibile, et quando, et quomodo et quaecumque alia necesse est adesse in definitione)); et subdit: ((tales potentias)) (scilicet irrationales) ((necesse est, quando ut possint activum et passivum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere, hoc pati)). Et si obiciatur contra eum quod istae irrationales possunt impediri, hoc excludendo dicit: ((Nullo exteriore prohibente, adiungere nihil adhuc oportet, potentiam enim habet ut est potentia faciendi: est autem non omnino ƿsed habentium aliquo modo, in quibus excluduntur quae exterius prohibent; removent enim hoc, eorum - quae in determinatione ponuntur - quaedam)) (vult dicere quod 'quaedam' pertinentia ad definitionem potentiae activae et possibilis, excludunt impedimentum, sed 'potentia activa' ibi - secundum eum - accipitur 'cum omnibus concurrentibus ad possibilitatem propinquam agendi').	33. This last distinction of power, of power taken for the foundation precisely or for the foundation along with the other concurring things, is taken from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15-16 and 9.1.1046a10-11. For the definition of power that he there sets down is of power taken in the first way. But power taken in the second way he himself manifestly expresses in Metaphysics 9.5.1047b35-8a2, 5-7, 16-21: "Since," he says, "the possible is something possible, and when, and how, and anything else that must be present in the definition;" and he subjoins: "in the case of such powers" (namely the irrational powers) "it must be that, when they approach each other so that they can be active and passive, the former must act and the latter must undergo." And if it be objected against Aristotle that these irrational powers can be impeded, he says excluding this: "When no outside thing impedes, there is no need to add anything further, - for it has power as it is a power of making; now it is not present absolutely but in things that are disposed in some way, where what hinders from outside is excluded; for these - some of the things placed in the definition - remove it" (he means to say that 'some of the things' pertaining to the definition of active and possible power exclude impediment, but 'active power' here - according to him - is taken 'along with all the things that come together for proximate possibility of acting').
34 $a Item, tertio, 'potentia generandi' significat principium actus eliciendi a supposito habente istud principium. Ergo duplicem relationem connotat, unam principii ad actum, aliam connotat actus ad suppositum, - quod est dicere: notat relationem principii 'quo' ad actum et connotat relationem actus ad principium 'quod'; et forte, tertio, connotat relationem principii 'quo' ad principium 'quod'. Sive sint duae sive tres relationes, nulla est nisi rationis, propter indistinctionem extremorum (prima competit vere paternitati ut fundamento proximo). - Quod ergo dicit Boethius, quod 'ad intra' est ratio principii originalis, verum est respectu personae originatae, sed non respectu originis sive actus originandi nisi secundum rationem tantum. a$ ƿ	34. Again, third, 'power of generating' signifies the principle of eliciting the act by the supposit that has the principle. Therefore it connotes a double relation, one the relation of principle to act, and another the relation of act to supposit, - which is to say: it notes the relation of the principle 'in which' to the act and it connotes the relation of the act to the principle 'which'; and perhaps, third, it connotes the relation of the principle 'in which' to the principle 'which'. Whether there are two relations or three, they are only relations of reason, because of the lack of distinction of the extremes (the first [sc. the relation of principle to act] belongs to paternity as to proximate foundation). - What Boethius says, then, that the idea of original principle is directed 'within', is true in respect of the person originated, but not in respect of the origin or act of originating, save according to reason only.
35 Loquendo tunc de potentia, id est de proximo fundamento istius relationis praecise sumpto, - dico quod potentia generandi Patris non est relatio, sed aliquid absolutum.	35. Speaking then of power, that is, of the proximate foundation precisely taken of this relation, - I say the Father's power of generating is not a relation but something absolute.
36 Partem negativam probo: Primo, quia omnis relatio videtur aeque naturaliter respicere suum proprium correlativum, igitur relatio spirativi aeque naturaliter respiciet suum correlativum sicut relatio generantis suum; non distinguuntur autem in divinis productiones per modum naturae et voluntatis, nisi quia principium 'quo producens producit' aliter se habet ad productionem et ad productum, quia huius naturaliter et illius libere; ergo non essent tunc duae productiones formaliter distinctae, per modum naturae et voluntatis.	36. [Proof] - The negative part I prove: First, because every relation seems to regard equally naturally its proper correlative, therefore the relation of inspiriting will equally naturally regard its correlative just as the relation of generating will regards its own; but in divine reality productions are not distinguished by way of nature and will, except because the principle 'by which the producer produces' is disposed differently to the production and to the product, because it is of this one naturally and of that one freely; therefore they would not then be two productions formally distinct by way of nature and of will.
37 Secundo, quia tunc eadem relatio esset principium sui ipsius, quia in Patre non est nisi unica relatio ad Filium, et illa est 'quo' respectu generationis, - quae est eadem relatio, licet aliter nominata; ergo etc.	37. Second, because then [sc. if the Father's power were a relation] the same relation would be the principle of itself, because there is in the Father only a single relation to the Son, and it is the principle 'by which' with respect to generation, -which is the same relation, although differently named; therefore etc.
38 Tertio, quia tunc paternitas esset simpliciter perfectior filiatione. - Probatio consequentiae, dupliciter. Primo, quia illud quo producens producit, si non est eiusdem rationis cum forma proƿducti, continet eam virtualiter et est perfectior ea: ergo si paternitas est quo Pater agit, et non est eiusdem rationis cum filiatione, continet filiationem virtualiter et est perfectior ea. Secundo, quia filiatio non dat Filio quod agat: nihil enim, nec ad intra nec ad extra, producit Filius filiatione; ergo si Pater paternitate agit formaliter, paternitas erit aliquid perfectius filiatione.	38. Third, because then paternity would be simply more perfect than filiation. Proof of the consequence, in two ways. First, because that by which the producer produces, if it is not of the same idea as the form of the product, contains the form virtually and is more perfect than it; therefore if paternity is that by which the Father acts, and it is not of the same idea as filiation, it contains filiation virtually and is more perfect than it. Second, because filiation does not give to the Son what it does; therefore if the Father acts by paternity formally, paternity will be something more perfect than filiation.
39 Partem affirmativam solutionis probo sic: Quod est perfectionis in principio productivo, non tollit ab aliquo rationem principii productivi; sed communicare se in identitate numerali, et adaequata communicatione sibi, ponit perfectionem in principio productivo: igitur hoc non tollit ab aliquo rationem principii productivi. Sed si Deus per incompossibile generaret alium deum, et ille alius tertium, deitas poneretur principium productivum alterius et non relatio; et tunc deitas non communicaret se in identitate numerali, nec communicaret se communicatione adaequata sibi in ratione principii productivi, quia deitas posset esse principium alterius communicationis, puta factae - per incompossibile - a secundo deo. Ergo cum modo deitas communicetur in identitate numerali et communicatione adaequata sibi, ita quod deitate non potest esse alia communicatio numero, eiusdem rationis cum ista, - sequitur quod multo magis nunc ponetur 'absolutum' esse principium productivum quam tunc poneretur.	39. The affirmative part of the solution [that the Father's power is something absolute, n.35] I prove thus: What is of perfection in the productive principle does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything; but to communicate itself in numerical identity, and with a communication adequate to itself, posits a perfection in the productive principle; therefore this does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything. But if God, per incompossibile, were to generate another God, and that other a third, deity would be posited as the productive principle of the other [sc. the third] and not as a relation of it; and then deity would not communicate itself in numerical identity, nor would it communicate itself with a communication adequate to itself in idea of productive principle, because deity would be able to be the principle of another communication, namely the one done -per incompossibile - by the second god. Therefore since, as things are now, deity is communicated in numerical identity and with a communication adequate to itself, such that by deity there cannot be a numerically further communication of the same idea as the first, - it follows that the productive principle should now much more be posited as absolute than it would then be posited as being.
40 $a Breviter: si forma communicaretur non eadem numero nec ƿadaequate, ipsa poneretur principium communicandi; ergo si modo perfectius communicetur, ipsa - vel aliquid perfectius - erit principium communicandi, illo modo. a$	40. In brief: if a form were communicated that was not the same in number, nor communicated adequately, it would be posited as the principle of communicating; therefore if now it is more perfectly communicated, it – or something more perfect - will be the principle of communicating in this more perfect way.
41 Exemplum istius est, si calor in igne communicaret se eundem numero ligno, et communicatione adaequata, ita quod iste calor non posset esse principium alterius calefactionis, non negaretur calorem ignis esse principium productivum caloris in ligno, cum modo de facto ponatur calor esse principium illius, et hoc cum duplici imperfectione, opposita duplici perfectioni hic suppositae (quia nunc est ibi diversitas caloris communicati et communicatio non adaequata, tunc autem esset identitas caloris communicati et communicatio adaequata); et tamen - illa hypothesi posita lignum calore non posset calefacere: non enim se, quia accipit calorem calefactione quae est ab hoc calore, et tunc prius haberet calorem quam haberet calorem, - nec aliud, quia ista calefactio ligni ponitur adaequata illi calori in ratione principii activi. - Ita intelligendum est in proposito, quod illud quod poneretur esse principium alterius calefactionis si communicatio fieret in diversitate numerali et non adaequata, idem debet modo poni principium quando fit communicatio eiusdem, adaequata principio productivo.	41. An example of this is if heat in fire were to communicate itself the same in number to a piece of wood, and with an adequate communication, such that the heat could not be the principle of another heating, one would not deny that the heat of the fire was the productive principle of heat in the wood, since now in fact the heat is posited as the principle of it, and this with a double imperfection, opposed to the double perfection here supposed (because now there is here a diversity of communicated heat and the communication is not adequate, but then there would be an identity of communicated heat and the communication would be adequate); and yet - on the basis of this hypothesis - the wood would not be able to heat by heat; for it would not be able to heat itself, because it receives heat from the heating which comes from the heat in question, and so it would have heat before it had heat, - nor would it be able to heat something else, because the heating of the wood is posited as adequate, in idea of active principle, to the heat. - Thus must one understand things in the intended proposal, because that which would be posited as the principle of another heating, if the communication were made with numerical diversity and not adequately, this same thing should now be posited as the principle when a communication is made of the same thing and a communication adequate to the productive principle.
42 Secundo probo idem: aliquid absolutum est terminus formalis generationis, ergo aliquid absolutum est ratio formalis qua agens agit. - Antecedens probatum est distinctione 5 quaestione 2, prima ratione contra primam opinionem.- Probo consequentiam, quia ƿimpossibile est 'agens' communicare terminum formalem productionis nisi agat forma aeque perfecta, si agat univoce, - vel perfectiore, si agat aequivoce; in divinis autem nihil est perfectius absoluto, quia 'absolutum' est formaliter infinitum, relatio autem non; ergo etc.	42. Second I prove the same: something absolute is the formal term of generation, therefore something absolute is the formal idea by which the agent acts. - The antecedent was proved in distinction 5 question 2, in the first reason against the first opinion [I d.5 nn.64-69]. - I prove the consequence by the fact that it is impossible for an 'agent' to communicate the formal term of production unless it act, if it acts univocally, by an equally perfect form, - or, if it acts equivocally, by a more perfect form; but in divine reality nothing is more perfect than the absolute, because the 'absolute' is formally infinite, but the relation is not; therefore etc.
43 Huic rationi instatur, quia consequentia tantum valet in generatione univoca. Haec autem probatur esse aequivoca, tum ex parte personarum, tum ex productionibus, tum ex ratione differentiae specificae:	43. [Instance] - Against this reason [n.42] it is instanced that the consequence is only valid in univocal generation. But this generation [sc. the one in divine reality] is proved to be equivocal, first on the part of the persons, second from the productions, and third from the idea of specific difference.
44 Prima via sic: paternitas et filiatio differunt specie, ergo personae constitutae per eas. - Antecedens probatur, quia differunt secundum quiditates, et talis est differentia specifica; tum quia sunt puri actus, differentia autem actus et formae est specifica. - Consequentia probatur: primo, quia non maior distinctio est in principiis quam in principiatis; secundo, quia eadem est differentia eorum ƿsecundum quae aliqua praecise differunt et ipsorum differentium; tertio, quia relationes sunt idem essentiae divinae sicut personae, ergo per istud non negabitur differentia specifica personarum, sicut nec relationum; quarto, quia eadem est differentia formalium constituentium et constitutorum.	44. The first way is as follows: paternity and filiation differ in species, therefore the persons constituted by them differ in species. - The proof of the antecedent is that they differ in their quiddities, and such difference is specific; and also that they are pure acts, but the difference of act and form is specific. - The proof of the consequence is, first, that there is no greater distinction in the principles than in the things they are principles of; second, the difference is the same for that in accord with which certain things are precisely different as it is for the differing things themselves; third, that the relations are the same for the divine essence as for the person, - therefore a specific difference will not by this be denied for the persons just as it is not denied for the relations either; fourth, that there is the same difference for the formal constituents as for the things constituted.
45 Secunda via (de productionibus) arguitur: in divinis productiones differunt genere, ergo et producta. - Antecedens patet, quia in divinis non est productio nisi unica unius rationis. - Consequentia probatur, tum quia aliter non esset proportio productionum ad producta; tum secundo, quia productiones sunt eiusdem rationis cum productis; tum tertio, quia potentiae alterius rationis requirunt obiecta alterius rationis, - igitur si producerent sua obiecta, producerent ea alterius rationis: ergo sicut voluntas et intellectus praesupponunt 'bonum' et 'verum' formaliter distincta, ita producent formaliter terminos distinctos, vel erunt quibus termini sic distincti producuntur.	45. In the second way (about productions) the argument is: in divine reality the productions differ in genus, therefore so do the products. - The antecedent is plain, because in divine reality there is no production of a single idea save a single one. -The proof of the consequence is, first, that otherwise there would not be a proportion of the productions to the products; also, second, that productions are of the same idea as the products; and, third, that powers of a different idea require objects of a different idea, - therefore, if they were to produce their own products, they would produce products of a different idea; therefore, just as will and intellect presuppose that 'good' and 'true' are formally distinct, so they will produce formally distinct termini, or they will be that by which such distinct termini are produced.
46 Tertia via (de differentia specifica) arguitur sic: differentia specifica videtur esse perfectior quam differentia numeralis, - quod probatur, quia distinctio specierum est de per se perfectione universi, non distinctio individuorum; igitur differentia specifica, sicut perfectior, videtur esse ponenda in divinis. ƿ	46. In the third way (about specific difference) the argument is as follows: specific difference seems to be more perfect than numerical difference, - the proof of which is that the distinction of species belongs to the perse perfection of the universe, but the distinction of individuals does not; therefore specific difference, in the way it is more perfect, seems it should be posited in divine reality.
47 Ad ista respondeo, quod sive generatio ponatur aequivoca sive univoca, ratio non impingitur, quia in generatione aequivoca oportet principium productivum esse perfectius forma terminante; nihil autem est perfectius absoluto, et specialiter nulla relatio est perfectior: absurdissimum enim videtur dicere quod relatio contineat virtualiter essentiam divinam.	47. [Against the instance] - To these arguments I reply that, whether generation is set down as equivocal or univocal, the argument is not affected, because in equivocal generation the productive principle must be more perfect than the terminating form; but nothing is more perfect than the absolute, and specifically no relation is more perfect; for it seems most absurd to say that relation virtually contains the divine essence.
48 Conclusio tamen ad quam inducunt istae rationes,scilicet de generatione aequivoca, videtur esse falsa, quia cum in primo termino generationis - scilicet in ipso producto - duo concurrant, scilicet natura et relatio propria ipsius producti qua est 'hoc', - aut generatio dicitur aequivoca vel univoca ab aliquo termino formali generationis, aut formali proprio ipsi supposito producto. Si primo modo, cum natura - quae est terminus formalis huius productionis - sit eadem in producente et producto, sequitur univocatio, quia perfectissima similitudo. Si secundo modo, ergo nulla generatio est univoca, quia nullum genitum in forma sua individuali assimilatur gignenti. - Hoc est, quod arguitur alio modo et est quasi idem, quia generatio et est distinctiva et assimilativa. Perfectior autem ratio in ea est quod sit assimilativa quam distinctiva, - quod patet, quia sic est a forma sub ratione formae, non sub ratione qua ƿ'haec', et ratio formae est perfectior in supposito ista differentia individuali. Si perfectius est in generatione ipsam esse assimilativam, ergo secundum hoc dicetur univoca vel aequivoca. Si enim diceretur talis vel talis in quantum est distinctiva, quaelibet esset aequivoca, quia quaelibet distinguit, - et haec est imperfectior ratio in generatione, quia convenit imperfectissimae generationi. Igitur per hanc non distinguitur univoca ab aequivoca.	48. The conclusion, however, to which these reasonings [n.43] lead, namely about equivocal generation, seems to be false, because since in the first term of generation - namely in the product itself - two things come together, namely nature and the relation proper of the product itself by which it is a 'this', -generation is called equivocal or univocal either by some formal term of generation, or by some formal term proper to the produced supposit itself. If in the first way, since nature -which is the formal term of this production - is the same in producer and produced, univocity follows, because the likeness is most perfect. If in the second way, then no generation is univocal, because nothing generated is assimilated in its own individual form to the one generating. - That is, and it is to argue in another and almost the same way, that generation both assimilates and distinguishes, - as is plain, because thus is generation from the form under the idea of form and not under the idea by which it is a 'this', and the idea of form is more perfect in the supposit than this individual difference is. If in the case of generation its being assimilative is more perfect, then it will according to this be called univocal or equivocal. For if it were said to be of the former or latter sort insofar as it distinguishes, any generation at all would be called equivocal, because any generation at all distinguishes, - and this idea of distinguishing is in generation more imperfect, because it belongs to the most imperfect generation. Therefore not by this is univocal generation distinguished from equivocal.
49 Igitur ad propositum. Cum generatio sit assimilativa quatenus eadem natura communicatur, distinctiva quatenus est geniti distincti a generante distincto, sequitur quod penes naturam gignentis et geniti sit univocatio et non penes distinctionem generantis et geniti.	49. Therefore to the intended proposal. Since generation assimilates insofar as the same nature is communicated, and distinguishes insofar as it is of a generated thing distinct from a generator that is distinct, it follows that univocity is located in the nature of the thing coming to be and come to be, and not in the distinction of generator and generated.
50 Secundo applicatur ad propositum, quia si illae differentiae individuales - quae sunt primo diversae - constituunt producta non primo diversa sed inter quae est generatio univoca (propter similitudinem in natura), si istae differentiae individuales essent species alterius generis, adhuc non constituerent 'distincta' tanta distinctione quanta esset eorum in suo genere, quia tunc differentiae individuales constituerent primo diversa. Quod autem 'constituta' modo non sunt primo diversa, hoc est propter naturam, in qua natura individua conveniunt: ita etiam tunc convenirent in eadem natura, licet differentiae constituentes essent species alterius generis. Ergo tunc constituta essent eiusdem speciei, sicut modo. ƿ	50. Second, one applies this to the intended proposal, that if the individual differences - which are diverse first - constitute products not diverse first but between which there is univocal generation (because of their likeness in nature), if these individual differences were species of a different genus, they would still not constitute things distinct with as much distinction as they would have in their own genus, because then the individual differences would constitute things diverse first. But that the things 'constituted' now are not diverse first is because of the nature, in which nature the individuals agree; so they would also then agree in the same nature, although the constituting differences would be species of a different genus. Therefore the constituted things would then be of the same species, as they now are.
51 Ad argumenta ergo 'in oppositum': Ad primum dicendum quod non est ibi proprie genus nec species, nec differentia specifica. Sed bene concedo quod paternitas et filiatio sunt relationes alterius speciei et alterius rationis, quia sunt oppositae et non fundatae super unitatem - et immediate sicut similitudo vel aequalitas; magis etiam distinguitur paternitas a filiatione, quam paternitas a paternitate. Sed cum infers 'ergo et constituta sunt alterius rationis quasi specifice', nego consequentiam.	51. So to the arguments for the opposite [sc. for the opposite conclusion, that the generation is equivocal, nn.43-46]: To the first [n.44] one must say that there is properly neither genus nor species there, nor specific difference. But I do well concede that paternity and filiation are relations of a different species and of a different idea, because they are opposites and are not founded on unity - even immediately - as are likeness and equality; there is also a greater distinction between paternity and filiation than been paternity and paternity. But when you infer that 'therefore the things constituted too are of a different idea quasi-specifically', I deny the consequence.
52 Et propter probationem consequentiae, intelligendum est quod aliqua dicuntur quandoque magis distingui propter maiorem repugnantiam vel incompossibilitatem eorum, sicut contraria dicuntur magis distingui, ut album et nigrum, quam disparata, ut homo et album, - et hoc modo non est proprie dictum 'aliqua magis distingui'; plus enim 'proprie distinguuntur' quae minus conveniunt in aliquo: et ita distincta genere generalissimo plus distinguuntur quam contraria quae sunt eiusdem generis, licet contraria magis repugnent.	52. And, on account of the proof of the consequence, one must understand that some things are sometimes said to be more distinguished because of a greater repugnance or incompossibility between them, as contraries are said to be more distinguished, like white and black, than disparate things are, like man and white, - and in this way it is not said properly that 'some things are more distinguished'; for those things are more 'properly distinguished' which agree less in some respect; and thus things distinct in the most general genus are more distinguished than contraries which are of the same species, even though contraries are more repugnant.
53 Unde universaliter: quanta est distinctio, id est repugnantia, constituentium vel formaliter distinguentium, tanta est et distinctorum, quia si album et nigrum sunt incompossibilia, et constituta per ea sunt incompossibilia. Et ita est in proposito: quanta est incompossibilitas paternitatis et filiationis - propter quam paterƿnitas non est filiatio - tanta est Patris et Filii, ita quod Pater non est Filius.	53. Hence universally: the distinction of distinct things is as great as is the distinction, that is, the repugnance, of what constitutes or formally distinguishes them, because if white and black are incompossible, the things constituted by them are also incompossible. And so it is in the intended proposal: the incompossibility of Father and Son, such that the Father is not the Son, is as great as is the incompossibility of paternity and filiation - because of which paternity is not filiation.
54 Sed secundo modo accipiendo, numquam distinguentia tantum conveniunt quantum conveniunt illa quae per illa distinguuntur, sicut patet discurrendo per omnia distinguentia. Differentiae enim specificae non includunt genus in quo conveniant, species autem distinctae per illas includunt genus in quo conveniant: et ratio est, quia distinguentia aliquid praesupponunt in ipsis distinctis quod ipsa distinguentia non includunt in intellectu suo, distincta tamen per illa includunt illud; ideo distincta conveniunt in eo, distinguentia autem non conveniunt in illo.	54. But in the second way of taking it [sc. 'more distinguished', n.52], never do the distinguishing things agree as much as do the things distinguished by them, as is plain by running through all the things that distinguish. For specific differences do not include the genus in which they agree, but the species distinguished by them do include the genus in which they agree; and the reason is that the distinguishing things presuppose something in the distinct things that the distinguishing things do not include in their understanding, but the things distinguished by them do include it; therefore the distinguished things agree in it, but the distinguishing things do not agree in it.
55 Per hoc patet ad argumenta et ad probationes. - Cum dicis 'de principiis et principiatis', dico quod maior distinctio - id est maior non convenientia (hoc est, in paucioribus convenientia) potest esse principiorum quam principiatorum, sicut differentiae specificae, quae sunt principia specierum, non conveniunt in genere, ƿin quo conveniunt ipsae species; et ita etiam est de differentiis individualibus et individuis, respectu naturae specificae.	55. From this [n.54] the response is plain to the arguments and the proofs [n.44]. -When you speak of 'the principles and the things they are principles of, I say that there can be a greater distinction - that is, a greater non-agreement (that is, an agreement in fewer things) - between principles than between the things they are principles of, just as specific differences, which are the principles of species, do not agree in the genus in which the species themselves agree; and so is it also in the case of individual differences and individuals in respect of the specific nature.
56 Per hoc apparet ad illud 'de formalibus constitutivis et de praecise distinctis': in omnibus enim falsum est quod quanta est distinctio vel differentia formalium constituentium, quod tanta sit differentia constitutorum.	56. From this [n.54] the answer is plain to what is said about 'formal constitutives and things precisely distinct' [n.44]; for, in the case of all of them, it is false that the difference of the things constituted is as great as the distinction or difference of the formal constituents.
57 Sed adhuc pondero argumentum: quia istae relationes - in proposito - sunt subsistentes, ergo tantam differentiam habent in quantum subsistentes quantam in rationibus propriis; subsistentes autem sunt personae, ergo tantam differentiam habent personae quantam habent relationes. - Et praeter hoc: aliqua differentia formali differunt personae, et non nisi differentia illa quae est relationum, quia nullam aliam habent; illa autem quae est relationum est specifica, - ergo ista erit specie, vel nulla.	57. But I consider the argument further: because these relations - those in the intended proposal - are subsistent, therefore they have as much difference insofar as they are subsistent as they have in their proper ideas; but the subsistent relations are persons, therefore the persons have as much difference as the relations have. - And in addition to this: the persons differ by some formal difference, and by none save by the difference that the relations have, because they have no other; but the difference the relations have is specific, - therefore the difference of the persons will be in species or in nothing.
58 Ad ista respondeo. - Ad primum, quod licet relationes sint subsistentes, tamen personae non tantum includunt relationes, sed ipsam naturam, in qua subsistunt, - relationes autem non includunt formaliter illam naturam. In aliquo ergo formaliter conveniunt personae in quo non conveniunt relationes formaliter, et ideo non est hic tanta distinctio quanta ibi.	58. To these arguments I reply. - To the first [n.57], that although the relations are subsistent, yet the persons do not only include the relations but also the very nature in which they subsist, - but the relations do not formally include the nature. The persons then formally agree in something in which the relations formally do not agree, and so there is not as great a distinction in the former as in the latter.
59 Ad secundum dico quod non sequitur: 'istis praecise distinƿguuntur, et ista distinguuntur specie, ergo personae distinguuntur specie', - sicut nec de differentiis individualibus respectu individuorum. Et cum dicis 'tunc nulla erit differentia distinctorum, cum non sit eorum illa quae est distinguentium, nec aliqua alia per illa', dico quod per illa potest esse distinctio distinctorum aliqua, alia quam sit ipsorum distinguentium, - et minor, sicut per differentias individuales est aliqua distinctio individuorum, alia quam ipsarum differentiarum, quia differentiae sunt primo diversae; sed 'distincta' non sunt primo diversa, sed tantum sunt distincta numero, in eadem specie. Ita hic, in proposito, per relationes distinctas specie, vel quasi genere (quibus tamen in quantum sunt distinctae accidit distingui specie), possunt aliqua distingui personaliter tantum, in eadem specie sive in eadem natura.	59. To the second [n.57] I say that this consequence does not follow: 'by these relations precisely are they distinguished, and the relations are distinguished in species, therefore the persons are distinguished in species', - just as neither does it follow about individual differences with respect to individuals. And when you say 'then there will be no difference between the distinct things, since what belongs to the distinguishing things does not belong to the distinct things, nor anything else that comes through them' [n.57], I say that through them there can be some distinction of the distinct things, different from the distinction of the distinguishing things, - and a lesser one, just as by the individual differences there is some distinction between individuals, different from the distinction of those individual differences, because the differences are diverse first; but the 'distinct things' are not diverse first, but they are only distinct in number within the same species. So here, in the intended proposal, by relations distinct in species, or in quasi-genus (to which, however, insofar as they are distinct, distinction in species is an accident), some things can be distinguished only in person within the same species or within the same nature.
60 Ad secundam viam, de productionibus, nego consequentiam, quia hic, ex perfectione naturae istius, possunt esse aliqua principia alterius rationis, communicativa tamen ipsius essentiae, quod non contingit in aliqua natura imperfecta. Et propter distinctionem istorum principiorum formalium, possunt productiones esse alterius rationis et tamen producta unius rationis, propter unitatem termini formalis, scilicet naturae quae communicatur.	60. As to the second way, about productions [n.45], I deny the consequence, because in divine reality there can, from the perfection of the divine nature, be some principles of a different idea yet communicative of the essence itself, - which does not happen in any imperfect nature. And because of the distinction of these formal principles, there can be productions of a different idea and yet products of the same idea, because of the unity of the formal term, namely of the nature which is communicated.
61 Cum probatur illa consequentia primo, per proportionem, ƿdico quod proportio illa 'productionis ad terminum formalem' est quod per ipsam communicatur terminus formalis. Sed non requiritur talis proportio quod productio sit unius rationis, si terminus formalis sit unius rationis, quia productiones possunt distingui per rationes suas aliter quam ex terminis formalibus, sicut hic, ex principiis formalibus. Exemplum huius est quandocumque eadem forma potest acquiri mutationibus alterius rationis, sicut idem 'ubi' per motum localem super magnitudinem rectam et circularem, qui motus ita sunt alterius rationis quod non sunt comparabiles, secundum Philosophum VII Physicorum; ita esset si eadem sanitas posset induci immediate ab arte et immediate a natura.	61. When the consequence is proved first, through proportion [n.45], - I say that the proportion 'of the production to the formal term' is that by it the formal term is communicated. But such proportion is not required for the production to be of one idea, provided the formal term is of one idea, because productions can be distinguished by their ideas otherwise than they are by the formal terms, as they are here [sc. in divine reality], by their formal principles. An example of this is whenever the same form can be acquired by changes of a different idea, just as the same 'where' can be acquired by straight or circular local motion over an extended magnitude, which motions are so of different idea that they are not comparable, according to the Philosopher Physics 7.4.248a10-b6, 5.4.228b19-21; so would it be if the same health could be induced immediately by art and immediately by nature.
62 Cum probatur illa consequentia secundo, per hoc quod 'productiones sunt eiusdem rationis cum productis', - dico quod quoad hoc sunt eiusdem rationis, quod sicut productiones sunt relationes, ita producta sunt relativa; sed quia producta sunt subsistentia in eadem natura, et productiones non sunt formaliter supposita subsistentia in illa natura, ideo producta possunt habere unitatem aliquam in natura formaliter - communicatam eis per productiones quam non habent formaliter productiones.	62. When this consequence is proved, second, by the fact that 'productions are of the same idea as their products' [n.45], - I say that to this extent are they of the same idea, that just as productions are relations so products are relatives; but because the products are subsistent in the same nature, and the productions are not formally supposits subsistent in that nature, therefore the products can have some unity formally in the nature - communicated to them by the productions - which the productions do not formally have.
63 Cum arguitur tertio de distinctione potentiarum et obiectorum distinctorum, quod similis est distinctio obiectorum ad potentias, - patebat responsio distinctione 2 quaestione 4, 'Utrum in divinis sint tantum duae productiones'. ƿ	63. When it is argued, third, about the distinction of powers and distinct objects, that the distinction of the objects is similar to that of the powers [n.45], - the response was plain from distincton 2 question 4, 'Whether there are in divine reality only two productions' [I d.2 nn.342-344].
64 De tertia via, scilicet 'de perfectione differentiae specificae', dico quod differentia specifica non est perfectior identitate specifica in divinis. Sed in creaturis est perfectionis. - Posita enim limitatione creaturarum, non potest esse tota perfectio in creaturis absque distinctione specifica, sed si in aliqua una natura esset perfectio infinita, ibi distinctio specifica non requiretur ad perfectionem simpliciter. In creaturis ergo differentia specifica est perfectio supplens imperfectionem, in divinis autem - ubi natura est simpliciter perfecta - non oportet ponere talem 'perfectionem supplentem imperfectionem', quia nulla est ibi imperfectio quae suppleretur. Exemplum: generatio in creaturis est 'perfectio supplens imperfectionem' in corruptibilibus, quae sine generatione non possent conservari nec idem numeraliter nec eiusdem speciei, - in divinis autem non oportet ponere talem 'perfectionem supplentem aliquam imperfectionem' quae sit ibi, nec in aliquo aeterno.	64. About the third way, namely 'about the perfection of the specific difference' [n.46], - I say that specific difference is not more perfect than is specific identity in divine reality. But in creatures it is a mark of perfection. - For once limitation in creatures is posited, there cannot be a total perfection in creatures without specific distinction, but if in some one nature there were an infinite perfection, specific distinction would not be there required for perfection simply. Therefore in creatures specific difference is a perfection supplying for an imperfection, but in divine reality - where nature is simply perfect - there is no need to posit such 'a perfection supplying for an imperfection', because there is no imperfection there for which it might supply. An example: generation in creatures is 'a perfection supplying for an imperfection' in corruptible things, which without generation could not be conserved either the same numerically or of the same species, - but in divine reality there is no need to posit such 'a perfection supplying for some imperfection' which may exist there, or exist in any eternal thing.
65 Ad formam autem quaestionis, qua quaeritur de potentia generandi 'an sit aliquid absolutum', - respondeo quod gerundivum constructum cum 'potentia', notat 'actum' ut egredientem ab eodem supposito cui attribuitur potentia. Similiter est de scientia et voluntate, quando construuntur cum gerundivo: tunc enim notant 'actum' ƿut egredientem ab illo supposito cui attribuitur scientia vel voluntas. Propter quod non ita conceditur ista 'Filius habet scientiam vel voluntatem generandi', quomodo conceditur quod 'Filius scit generationem Patris et vult eam'. - Immo, videntur illae primae negandae, sicut istae 'scit generare' et 'vult generare', - quia idem videtur esse velle agere et habere voluntatem agendi: sed non idem videtur esse istis 'velle actionem', quia hoc non includit velle eam ut actionem volentis, quod alia videtur figurari.	65. Now as to the form of the question, by which the question asked about the power of generating is 'whether it is something absolute' [n.1], - I reply that the gerundive construction [in Latin] with 'power' [sc. 'power of acting'] indicates the act as coming from the same supposit as the power is attributed to. The like is true of science and will when these are construed with the gerundive; for then they indicate the act as coming from the supposit that the science or will is attributed to. For which reason one does not allow the proposition 'the Son has the science or the will of generating' in the way one allows that 'the Son knows the generation of the Father and wills it'. - Nay, the first one seems it should be denied, just as also these, 'he knows how to generate' and 'he wills to generate', - because 'to will to act' seems to be the same thing as 'to have the will of acting'; but 'to will action' does not seem to be the same as these, because it does not include willing the action as action belongs to the one willing, which the other ['to will to act'] does seem to map out.
66 Ad argumenta. Primo ad principalia. - Primo, ad Augustinum dico quod intelligit 'eo' formaliter, non 'eo' fundamentaliter seu causaliter; exemplum: dicimus quod Socrates est similis similitudine formaliter, sed dicitur similis albedine fundamentaliter sive causaliter. Ita in proposito, Pater generat generatione formaliter, sed hoc modo non quaerimus quo generat, sed quaerimus quo generatio elicitur ut principio formali elicitivo, quod scilicet sit fundamentum proximum istius relationis. Intendit ergo Augustinus quod 'eo est Pater quo est ei Filius', id est, illa notione, - hoc est, quod Pater non dicitur ad se Pater, sed ad Filium; non autem intelƿligit ibi, quo Pater sit Pater - sive generet - ut principio elicitivo generationis, sicut patet ibi ex iittera sua.	66. To the arguments. First to the principal ones [nn.1-5]. - First, as to Augustine [n.1], I say that he understands the 'by the fact that' formally, not foundationally or causally; an example: we say that Socrates is similar by similarity formally, but he is said to be similar by whiteness foundationally or causally. So in the proposal, the Father generates by generation formally, but we are not asking in this way by what he generates, but we are asking by what the generation is elicited as by formal elicitive principle, namely what is the proximate foundation of this relation. Therefore Augustine intends that 'he is Father by the fact he has a Son', that is, by that notion, - this is to say that the Father is not called Father in relation to himself but in relation to the Son; but Augustine does not there understand that by which the Father is Father - or that by which he generates - as the elicitive principle of generation, as is plain there from his text.
67 Ad secundum dico quod a forma communi primo modo est operatio communis, quia si formam aliquam in universali acceptam consequatur aliqua operatio in universali, quamlibet formam singularem sub illa consequetur operatio singularis eiusdem rationis, nisi aliqua forma singularis sit imperfecta. Si autem loquamur de secunda communitate, quae est formae respectu participantium ipsam, dico quod non oportet quod forma communis sit principium operationis communis, et maxime quando habetur a pluribus suppositis secundum ordinem, ita quod uni communicatur ab alio, et hoc communicatione adaequata, sicut fuit declaratum in exemplo adducto in prima ratione ad partem affirmativam solutionis.	67. To the second [n.3] I say that from a form common in the first mode there is a common operation, because if some form taken universally is followed by some operation taken universally, any singular form under it will be followed by a singular operation of the same idea, unless some singular form is imperfect. But if we are speaking of the second kind of community, which is of the form with respect to what participates it, I say that it is not necessary that the common form be the principle of a common operation, and especially when it is possessed by many supposits in order, such that it is communicated to one by another, and this by adequate communication, as was made clear in the example adduced in the first reason to the affirmative part of the solution [n.41].
68 Ad propositum dico quod maior est falsa 'operatio propria est a forma propria', loquendo de appropriatione secundo modo, ƿqualis appropriatio - vel saltem non alia - potest intelligi in proposito.	68. To the proposal I say that the major 'the operation proper is from the proper form' [n.3] is false, when speaking of appropriation in the second mode [n.67], which is the sort of appropriation - or at least no other one - that can be understood in the proposal.
69 Et cum probatur prima propositio, primo quia ((est propria forma, ergo quia dat esse dat agere)), - nego consequentiam; multae enim sunt formae dantes esse, quae tamen non sunt activae et quae nullo modo dant actum secundum: et talis est paternitas, sicut et filiatio.	69. And when the first proposition is proved, first because "it is the proper form, therefore, because it gives being, it gives acting" [n.3], - I deny the consequence; for there are many forms giving being which yet are not active and which in no way give second act; the such is paternity, just as also filiation.
70 Quae autem sit ratio quare quaedam formae sunt activae et quaedam non? Difficile est assignare rationem communem, quia aliquae formae substantiales sunt activae, et aliquae qualitates sunt activae, aliquae autem formae substantiales et aliquae qualitates non sunt activae, et tamen plus conveniunt qualitates et qualitates in aliquo conceptu communi quam qualitates et substantiae. Similiter, aliquae formae substantiales imperfectiores sunt activae, sicut elementares, et perfectiores non sunt activae, sicut mixtorum, sicut lapidis et aliorum inanimatorum, - aliquae etiam mixtorum et perfectorum sunt activae, sicut animatorum; aliquae tamen perfectiores non sunt communicativae sui, sicut formae corporum caelestium et formae angelicae. Non videtur ergo ratio quare aliquae formae in communi sunt activae, et aliquae non, - sicut in speciali, non videtur aliqua ratio quare calor est calefactivus nisi quia calor est calor; et ita ƿvidetur quod haec sit immediata 'calor est caloris effectivus'. Ita etiam videtur quod omnes formae de genere quantitatis, et omnes relationes (de quibus est modo sermo), non sunt activae, et de talibus non valet 'si dant actum primum, ergo dant actum secundum'.	70. But what is the reason for some forms being active and others not? It is difficult to assign a common reason, because some substantial forms are active, and some qualities are active, but some substantial forms and some qualities are not active, - and yet qualities and qualities agree more in some common concept than do qualities and substances. Likewise, some of the more imperfect substantial forms are active, such as the elementary ones, and some of the more perfect ones are not active, as the forms of mixed things, as of stone and other inanimate objects, - some forms too of the mixed and perfect things are active, as the forms of animate things; however some of the more perfect forms are not communicative of themselves, as the forms of celestial bodies and angelic forms. There does not then seem to be a reason why some forms in general are active and some not - just as, in a specific case, there does not seem to be any reason why heat heats save that heat is heat; and thus it seems that this proposition is immediate 'heat is effective of heat'. Thus too it seems that all forms of the genus of quantity, and all relations (about which the discussion now is), are not active, and about such it is not valid that 'if they give first act therefore they give second act'.
71 Cum probatur consequentia secunda, per Philosophum II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae, - dico quod loquitur de universali et particulari loquendo primo modo de 'communi', non autem accipiendo secundo modo, scilicet prout eadem forma numero est communis participantibus eam: ista enim communitas non est in creaturis, nec communitas 'universalis' ad participantia sine communitate 'universalis' primo modo dicta.	71. When the second consequence is proved through the Philosopher in the Physics and Metaphysics [n.3], - I say that he is speaking of universal and particular speaking in the first mode of 'common', but not taking it in the second mode, namely insofar as the same form in number is common to the things that participate it; for this commonness is not in creatures, nor a 'universal' commonness to the things that participate without a 'universal' commonness said in the first way [n.67].
72 Cum arguitur tertio de potentia et actu, dico quod aequivocatur de potentia. Vera est enim maior ut potentia est differentia entis, condividens ens contra actum, quia sic ens in communi non tantum dividitur per actum et potentiam, sed etiam quodcumque genus entis et quaecumque species et individuum, quia sic albedo eadem primo est in potentia et postea in actu, - et hoc modo ad idem genus pertinent actus et potentia; et hoc modo, loquendo proprie, non est potentia generandi in divinis, quae scilicet oppoƿnatur actui, quia illa generatio est simpliciter necessaria et in actu, et ideo non in potentia ut potentia repugnat actui. Sed hic est sermo de potentia ut potentia est principium, et hoc modo illa propositio est falsa quae dicit quod 'potentia est eiusdem generis cum actu'; potest enim forma substantialis esse principium actionis de genere actionis, et actionis de genere qualitatis, - sicut tactum est supra distinctione 3 quaestione 'de notitia genita', quod subiectum est per se causa propriae passionis.	72. When the argument is given, third, about potency and act [n.5], I say that there is an equivocation about potency. For the major is true as potency is a difference of being, dividing it jointly against act, because thus not only is being in general divided into act and potency, but also thus divided is any genus of being and any species and any individual, because thus is the same whiteness first in potency and later in act, - and in this way act and potency belong to the same genus; and in this way, properly speaking, there is no potency of generating in divine reality, namely a potency which may be opposed to act, because that generation is simply necessary and in act, and therefore it is not in potency as potency is repugnant to act. But here the discussion is about potency or power as it is a principle, and in this way the proposition is false which says that 'power is of the same genus as act'; for a substantial form can be a principle of action in the genus of action and of action in the genus of quality - as was touched on above in distinction 3 question on 'generated knowledge' [I d.3 n.518], and this subject [sc. substantial form] is the per se cause of its proper passion.
73 Cum arguitur 'de medio et extremis', dico quod quoddam est medium per participationem utriusque extremi, sicut fuscum est medium inter album et nigrum, quod est medium ex natura rei, et de tali verum est quod est in eodem genere cum extremis, sicut probat Philosophus X Metaphysicae. Aliud est medium aliquo modo accidentaliter sumptum, sicut operatio inter operans et terminum: istud non oportet esse eiusdem generis cum extremis, quia quando anima intelligit se, intellectio eius est qualitas, et tamen operans et obiectum sunt substantiae; tale medium accipitur - in proposito videlicet - ipsum 'quo' inter suppositum generans et genitum. Vel aliter potest dici quod ipsum 'quo' non est medium proprie, sed tenet se ex parte alterius extremi, scilicet generantis; proprium autem medium, si quod detur, potest dici generatio, et de illa verum est quod est eiusdem rationis cum extremis, quia ipsa est relatio, sicut extrema sunt relativa. ƿ	73. When the argument is made 'about the middle and the extremes' [n.4], I say that there is a thing which is a middle by participation in each extreme, as grey is a middle between white and black, which middle is from the nature of the thing, and of such a middle it is true that it is in the same genus as the extremes, as the Philosopher proves Metaphysics 10.7.1057a18-26. Another middle is in a way taken accidentally, as is operation between the operator and the term; this middle need not be of the same genus as the extremes because, when the soul understands itself, its understanding is a quality, and yet the operator and the object are substances; such a middle is what is taken -namely in the intended proposition - as the 'by which' between the generating supposit and the generated supposit. Or one can in another way say that the 'by which' is not properly a middle but keeps itself to the side of one of the extremes, namely of the generator; but the proper middle, if it be granted, can be said to be generation, and about this it is true that is of the same idea as the extremes, because it is a relation, just as the extremes are relatives.
74 Quia autem aliqua argumenta 'contra primam opinionem' sunt contra me, respondeo ad illa. Ad primum, quod illa maior $a habet hic maiorem probabilitatem quam in creaturis, quia ista forma sic per se est quod illi correspondet proprium 'quod', potens agere, - puta 'hic Deus', qui quodammodo praecedit relationes et sic agit: patet, quia sic primo intelligit et vult; ergo videtur quod possit in omnem actionem cuius suum 'quo ' est proprium principium formale, et ita 'hic Deus' generat primo. a$	74. Now because some of the arguments 'against the first opinion' are against me, I respond to them. To the first [n.11] I reply that the major proposition has a greater probability in divine reality than in creatures, because the form in question is per se such that there corresponds to it its proper 'what', and this has the power to act, - to wit 'this God', who in some way precedes the relations and so acts; the thing is plain because he thus first understands and wills; therefore it seems he would have power for every action of which his 'in what' is the proper formal principle, and so 'this God' generates first.
75 De principio $a autem a$ elicitivo falsa est, quando principium elicitivum - si per se exsistit - non potest esse propinqua potentia ad operandum. Exemplum: species - si ponatur principium elicitivum operationis videndi in oculo - si per se exsisteret, non posset esse principium illius operationis, et ratio esset, quia non posset esse in potentia propinqua ad agendum quia non posset habere passum approximatum, quia approximatio - ut dictum est prius requiritur ad rationem potentiae propinquae. Sicut autem approxiƿmatio in creaturis vel amotio impedimentorum requiritur, ita dictum est quod in proposito requiritur suppositum conveniens ad agendum. Ergo forma, quae esset principium actionis in supposito distincto, si esset per se exsistens, non esset suppositum nec principium distinctum, nec in supposito distincto convenienti generationi, et ex quo illud suppositum requiritur ad potentiam propinquam agendi, non poterit talis forma per se agere. 'Essentiale' autem si per se exsistat in aliquo instanti naturae antequam intelligatur esse in supposito vel persona, in illo priore non est suppositum agens in potentia propinqua ad agendum; ista enim actio distinctionem requirit aliquorum in ista natura, quae non potest esse nisi suppositorum. Ergo suppositum conveniens huic actioni, est suppositum distinctum, exsistens in ista natura: in nullo tali est natura in quantum intelligitur per se esse, etsi per se sit aliquo modo antequam in persona, - et ideo non poterit 'per se agere' ista actione.	75. But about the elicitive principle the major is false, since the elicitive principle - if it exists per se - cannot be the proper power for operation. An example: the visible species - if one posits an elicitive principle for the operation of seeing in the eye - could not, if it per se existed, be the principle of that operation, and the reason would be that it could not be in proximate potency to acting because it could not have the thing that undergoes the act near to it, for coming near to - as was said before [n.32] - is required for the idea of proximate power. But just as there is required in creatures a coming near and a removal of impediments, so has it been said that in the intended proposition there is required a supposit suited to acting [n.32]. Therefore the form, which would be the principle of action in a distinct supposit, if it was per se existent, would not be a supposit or a distinct principle, nor would it be in a distinct supposit suited to generation, and, from the fact that that supposit is required for proximate potency to act, such a form could not act per se. But something 'essential', if it were to exist per se in some instant of nature before it was understood to exist in a supposit or a person, it is not in that prior instant an acting supposit in proximate potency to acting; for the act requires a distinction of certain things in the nature, which distinction can only be of supposits. Therefore a supposit suited to this action is a distinct supposit, existing in this nature; in no such thing does nature exist insofar as nature is understood to be per se, although it would in some way be per se before it was in a person - and therefore it will not be able 'to act per se' by this action.
76 $a Nota, tripliciter potest intelligi 'forma per se esse': uno modo quod 'per se' excludat 'inesse formae' materiae, sive formae accidentalis sive substantialis, alio modo 'inesse quiditatis sive naturae' ipsi supposito, et hoc actuale; tertio modo, 'aptitudinale' et 'potentiale' - utrumque inesse. ƿ	76. Note that 'a form existing per se' can be understood in three ways: in one way such that 'per se' excludes 'the being in of a form' in matter, whether the being in is of an accidental or a substantial form; in another way 'the being in of a quiddity or a nature' in the supposit itself, and this actually so; in a third way 'aptitudinal' or 'potential' - each a case of being in.
77 Tertius modus ponit illud quod sic est per se esse complete suppositum, et ideo sic accipere in maiore, est accipere contradictoria, quia forma, quae habenti est principium quo agat, non potest sic per se esse. Ergo intelligitur 'per se', in maiore, duobus primis modis, - et sic probo maiorem, quia ad 'agere' non requiritur nisi actualitas et 'per se esse': primum habetur aeque in forma inhaerente et per se ente, secundum habetur sufficienter si duobus primis modis per se sit (alioquin anima separata non esset agens).	77. The third way sets down what is to be thus per se a complete supposit, and therefore to take it like this in the major [nn.74-75] is to take contradictories, because the form, which is, for the thing that has the form, the principle by which it acts, cannot thus be per se. Therefore per se in the major is understood in the first two ways, - and thus do I prove the major, because there is only required for 'acting' actuality and 'per se existence'; the first is possessed equally in an inherent form and in a per se being, the second is possessed sufficiently if it is per se in the first two ways (otherwise the separated soul would not be an agent).
78 Confirmatur etiam, quia si natura assumpta a Verbo dimitteretur absque omni actione positiva circa ipsam, ipsa non esset per se tertio modo (quia tunc esset inassumptibilis, ut sic), et tamen 'hic homo' agere posset omnem actum quem habet modo Verbum mediante ista natura, - immo si secundum articulum distinctionis primae III, nihil positivum constituit suppositum creatum, certum est quod ratio suppositi nihil dat alicui positivum ad agendum; sed nec ordinem ad alia passa, sicut fingitur ab Averroe VII Metaphysicae, quod idea non posset movere corpus nec materiam, propter defectum ordinis. ƿ	78. There is also a confirmation, because if the nature assumed by the Word were let go without any positive action concerning it, it would not be per se in the third way (because then it would be un-assumable, as such), and yet 'this man' could do every act which the Word now possesses by means of this nature, - nay if, according to the article of the first distinction in book 3 (III d.1 q.1 nn.6,9], nothing positive constitutes the created supposit, it is certain that the idea of the supposit gives nothing positive to anything for acting; but neither does it give order in relation to other passive things, as Averroes imagines in Metaphysics VII com.31, that a [Platonic] idea cannot move a body or matter because of lack of order.
79 Contra hoc, quia ordo agentis ad patiens prout consequitur 'hoc exsistens ' accidit quod 'incommunicabiliter'. Ideo responderi potest aliter, quod maior est vera quia forma est activa respectu termini distincti a se (non autem quando respectu termini indistincti, quia tunc licet possit esse quo suppositum producat, non potest tamen esse producens, quia nec distingui a termino, quod requiritur ad hoc quod sit producens; non autem requiritur hoc, ad hoc ut sit 'quo').	79. Against this [sc. what Averroes says, n.78], that it is accidental that the order of agent to patient insofar as it is consequent to 'this existent' exists 'incommunicably'. Therefore one can reply in another way, that the major [nn.74-75] is true, because the form is active with respect to a term distinct of itself (but not when it is with respect to a term not distinct, because then, although it could be that by which the supposit produces, it cannot however be the producer, because it is not distinct from the term, which is required for it to be producer; but this is not required for it to be that 'by which').
80 Planius dicitur quod maior est vera de actione immanente et factione, et universaliter productione termini distincti a forma productiva. Hic terminus est indistinctus a forma qua produit.	80. More plainly said, the major is true of immanent acting and making, and universally of the production of a term distinct from the productive form. Here the term is not distinct from the form by which it produces [sc. therefore the major is not true here].
81 Contra. Si deitas vel 'hic Deus' creat, ergo agit illa actione quae necessario praecedit creare: huiusmodi est generare. Probatio primae consequentiae: quod est simpliciter primum, non requirit aliquod 'posterius agere' ad hoc ut ipsum possit in actionem sibi propriam; 'hic Deus' est aliquo modo prius persona relativa; igitur etc. ƿ	81. On the contrary. If deity or 'this God' creates, therefore it acts by the action that necessarily precedes creating; of this sort is generating. Proof of the first consequence: what is simply first does not require any 'acting later' for it to have power for an action proper to itself; 'this God' is in some way prior to the relative person; therefore etc.
82 Hoc argumentum requirit quod ponatur ordo quomodo 'hic Deus' prius est in personis quam possit potentia propinqua creare; non propter impotentiam 'huius Dei' ad creandum (etiam si, secundum imaginationem gentilium, non esset in personis), sed propter maiorem propinquitatem personarum ad essentiam quam creationis, secundum illam regulam antiquam: 'de quibuscumque duobus, comparatis secundum ordinem ad idem primum, potentia propinqua non est ad secundum nisi primo posito'.	82. This argument requires one to posit an order by which 'this God' is in the persons before there can be a power proximate for creating; not because of impotence in 'this God' for creating (even if, as the gentiles imagine, he did not exist in persons), but because of a greater closeness of the persons than of creation to the essence, according to that ancient rule: 'about any two things, compared according to an order to some same first thing, the power is not proximate to the second unless the first has already been posited'.
83 Itaque 'hic Deus' intelligit etiam non praecise ut in personis, quia actio essentialis quasi prius relatione, et ita immediatius, omnino primo; secundo, 'hic Deus' est per se exsistens illimitatum, et in illo signo naturae est primo in tribus personis (illud tamen habet signa originis); in tertio signo naturae 'hic Deus' habet potentiam propinquam ad extra.	83. Therefore 'this God' understands too not precisely as he is in the persons, because essential action is as it were prior to relation, and so is more immediate, - nay altogether first; second, 'this God' is per se unlimited existence, and in the [second] moment of nature [n.82] is first in the three persons (that moment does however have the signs of origin); in the third moment of nature 'this God' has power proximate for action outwardly.
84 Itaque negatur minor, quia deitas numquam per se est ita quod non in supposito, nisi apud intellectum.	84. Therefore let the minor [n.81] be denied, because deity never exists per se in such a way that it is not in a supposit, except in the intellect.
85 Contra. Quod competit primo ex se formaliter, est aliquo modo prius extra intellectum illo quod non competit sibi ex se formaliter; (a) deitas est omnino prima, quia 'pelagus', et (b) illi competit ex se formaliter per se esse; (c) non autem ex se formaliter' ƿest in hoc supposito relativo, ergo per prius per se est quam sit in isto. b probatur, quia idem est per se esse trium personarum, - VII Trinitatis; nihil est commune tribus nisi quod est primo essentiae. c probatur, quia fundamentum aliquo modo praecedit relationem, saltem non ex ratione sua formali habet relationem, quia est aliquid praeter eam, - VII Trinitatis, 2 et 3; probatur etiam, quia aliter in quolibet haberet illam relationem, quia ubique habet illud quod competit sibi ex ratione sua formali. a$	85. On the contrary. What belongs to something first of itself formally is in some way prior outside the intellect to that which does not belong to it from itself formally; (a) deity is altogether first, because it is a 'sea' [I d.8 n.200], and (b) to it belongs of itself formally per se existence; (c) but it is not of itself formally in this relative supposit, therefore it is first per se before it is in this supposit. The proof of (b) is that the same thing is the per se existence of the three persons, - On the Trinity VII ch.4 nn.7-8; there is also the proof that otherwise it would have that relation in anything, because it has everywhere what belongs to it from its own formal idea.
86 Ad aliud, de 'quod' et 'quo', dico quod illud dictum Philosophi verum est in causa et causato, quia ibi est distinctio realis causae et principii quo causat ab ipso causato; dependentia etiam essentialis est causati ad causativum sicut et ad causam, et ratio est ibi, quia principium causativum non est nisi unicum, in uno supposito. In proposito autem est oppositum, quia suppositum producens est distinctum, quo autem producit est indistinctum, et ideo productum non refertur realiter ad principium 'quo' sicut refertur ad principium quod producit, et ideo in proposito non est relatio realis principii productivi ad productum; sed producentis ƿest relatio realis, principii autem productivi est relatio rationis, sicut prius dictum est de communicato et communicante distinctione 5 quaestione 1.	86. To the other, about 'what' and 'by which' [n.13], I say that the saying of the Philosopher is true of the cause and the thing caused, because there is a real distinction there of the cause, and of the principle by which it causes, from the thing caused; there is also essential dependence there of the caused thing on the causative thing just as also on the cause, and the reason there is that the causative principle is only single, in one supposit. In the proposed case, however, things are the opposite, because the producing supposit is distinct, but that by which it produces is not distinct, - and so the product is not referred really to the principle 'by which' as it is referred to the principle 'which' produces, and therefore in the proposed case there is no real relation of the productive principle to the product; but of the producer there is a real relation, while of the productive principle a relation of reason, as was said before about the communicated and the communicating in distinction 5 question 1 [I d.5 n.29].
87 Ad tertium dico quod forma 'secundum quod est illud in quo assimilatur generans generato' non est tantum ens rationis, sed habet aliquam unitatem praecedentem omnem actum intellectus, quia nullo actu intellectus exsistente ignis generaret ignem et corrumperet aquam, et hoc propter similitudinem naturalem hic et contrarietatem ibi. Hoc magis patebit in quaestione 'De individuatione'. - Ad Damascenum dico quod intelligit de communitate alicuius unius secundum naturam et secundum numerum (sicut essentia divina est communis tribus personis), sed modo nulla est communitas talis in creatura. Est tamen communitas alicuius unius unitate minore quam sit unitas numeralis.	87. To the third [n.14] I say that the form 'according to its being that in which the generator is assimilated to the generated' is not only a being of reason but also has some unity preceding every act of intellect, because in no existing act of intellect would fire generate fire and corrupt water, and this on account of the natural likeness here [sc. in the intellect] and the contrariety there [sc. in reality]. This will be plainer in the question about individuation [II d.3 q.1 nn.3-7]. - To Damascene [n.14] I say that he understands commonness of something one in nature and in number (just as divine essence is common to the three persons), but there is now no such commonness in the creature. There is however a commonness of something one by a unity less than numerical unity [II d.3 q.1 nn.8-9].
88 Ad illud 'forma est principium agendi in quantum est haec', concludit pro me, quia illud absolutum quod est Patri potentia generandi, non est potentia generandi Filio.	88. To the remark ' the form is the principle of acting insofar as it is a this' [n.15] - the conclusion is on my side, because the absolute thing that is the Father's power of generating is not a power of generating for the Son.
89 Et cum arguitur quod generatio prius est distinctiva quam assimilativa, et quod ex hoc forma sit prius elicitiva ut 'haec' quam ut forma, - respondeo quod 'prius' secundum consequentiam, non semper est 'prius' secundum causalitatem. Exemplum: sequitur ƿ'ignis, ergo calidus', et non e converso; igitur calidum est prius secundum consequentiam, et tamen ignis est prius secundum causalitatem ipso calore. Et ita concedo quod distinguere est prius in generatione quam assimilare, id est communius, quia multa distinguunt quae non assimilant, - sed distinguere non est perfectius in generatione quam assimilare, quia convenit generationi (etiam imperfectissimae) in quantum est a forma ut 'haec', assimilare convenit sibi in quantum est a forma absolute, et perfectior est ratio formae quam singularitatis.	89. And when it is argued that generation distinguishes before it assimilates, and that, from this, the form is elicitive first as a 'this' prior to being so as form [n.16], - I respond that 'prior' in consequence is not always 'prior' in causality. An example: this conclusion follows, 'fire, therefore hot', and not conversely; therefore hot is prior in consequence and yet fire is prior in causality to the heat. And thus I concede that to distinguish is prior to assimilate, that is, it is more common, because many things distinguish that do not assimilate, - but to distinguish is not more perfect in generation than to assimilate, because to distinguish belongs to generation (even the most imperfect) insofar as it is from a form as a 'this', and to assimilate belongs to it insofar as it is from a form absolutely, and the idea of form is more perfect than the idea of singularity.
90 Concedo argumentum 'contra opinionem ponentem tantum distinctionem rationis', quia non concludit contra me, sicut patebit distinctione 8.	90. I concede the argument 'against the opinion positing only a distinction of reason', because it does not conclude against me, as will be clear in distinction 8 [I d.8 n.169, 185].
91 Instantia illa 'de calore et vegetativa' non valet, quia ibi communicatur utraque forma - et forma principalis activa, et immediata: est enim caro genita animata, et habens calorem genitum ƿaliquem naturalem; utraque etiam forma est principium generationis, licet unum mediatum et aliud immediatum. Sed illa alia instantia 'de generatione bruti' difficilior videtur, si sensitiva non habeat ibi aliquam operationem sed vegetativa tantum.	91. The instance 'about heat and the vegetative soul' [n.17] is not valid, because there each form is communicated - both the principal active form [sc. the vegetative soul] and the immediate form [sc. heat]; for the generated flesh is animated, and it has some natural generated heat; also each form is a principle of generation, although one is mediate and the other immediate. But the other instance 'about the generation of the brute' seems more difficult, if the sensitive soul does not there have any operation but only the vegetative soul.
92 $a Utrum possint esse plures Filii in divinis. Argumenta.	92. Whether there can be several Sons in divine reality. Arguments.
93 Ponitur quod non, quia tota fecunditas exhauritur in uno actu; igitur non est ad alium. Contra. Exhauriri in corporalibus significat illud non manere in illo unde exhauritur; sic non potest hic intelligi, sed non manet ƿad alium actum. Ergo praemissa impropria, - et ut est vera, est eadem conclusioni.	93. It is posited [by Henry of Ghent] that there cannot be, because all the fecundity is used up in one act; therefore there is no fecundity for another one. On the contrary. To be used up signifies in bodily things that the source does not there remain which was used up; it cannot be thus understood here, but that the source does not remain for another act. Therefore the premise is improper, - and in the way it is true it is the same as the conclusion.
94 Ideo aliter - magis proprie - dicitur quod 'unica generatio' est actus adaequans potentiam generativam et semper stans, et unicus Filius terminus adaequans eam et semper in produci; ergo non potest esse alius.	94. Therefore it is said in another way - more properly - that a 'single generation' is an act adequate to the generative power and always stays in place, and that the single Son is a term adequate to the power and is always being produced; therefore there cannot be another one.
95 Contra. Aut intelligitur adaequatio intensiva, aut extensiva? Si secundo modo, est petitio principii. Si primo modo, ex adaequatione actus non sequitur propositum, quia ignis generans ignem aeque perfectum sibi - et ita adaequatum - adhuc potest alium ignem alias generare; ergo infertur consequens 'quia actus adaequatus semper stat', et per consequens potentia non est ex se determinata ad hunc actum, sed absolute posset esse ad alium, - sicut sol si semper staret, et ita unica illuminatione adaequata illuminaret medium sibi praesens, non posset in aliam, quia illa unica semper stat; sed ex hoc sequitur quod ex se posset in alium, - et pone istum non stare, exibit in alium.	95. On the contrary. Is the adequacy understood as intensive or extensive? If in the second way there is a begging of the question. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion does not follow from the adequacy of the act, because fire generating a fire as equally perfect as itself - and so adequate - can still generate another fire elsewhere; therefore the consequent is inferred 'that the adequate act always stays in place', and consequently the power is not of itself determined to this act but absolutely it would have power for another act, - just as if the sun were always staying in place and so were with a single adequate illumination to illuminate the medium present to it, it would not have power for another illumination, because that single illumination always stays in place; but from this it follows that of itself it would have power for another - and suppose that the first one does not stay in place, it will proceed to another.
96 Ita ergo potentia generativa Patris absolute potest esse alterius generationis principium: ergo alia est absolute possibilis, ergo alia est, - et ita statio istius 'adaequati' non prohibebit hic alium actum esse, quia quidquid est hic possibile ex natura rei, necessario est; non sic in sole, ubi medium est in potentia ad aliam illuminationem ab adaequata stante, sed illa alia si est possibilis, non sequitur quod sit necessaria.	96. Thus therefore the generative power of the Father can absolutely be the principle of another generation; therefore another is absolutely possible, therefore another one actually is - and so the staying in place of this 'adequate' act will not here prevent another act from being, because whatever is here possible from the nature of the thing necessarily is; it is not thus in the case of the sun, where the medium is in potency to an illumination other than the adequate one that stays in place, but if that other illumination is possible it does not follow that it is necessary.
97 Item, illud argumentum 'principium producit in quantum est prius' : ergo statio effectus positi nihil tollit ab illo ut est ƿprincipium; ergo si illo non posito vel non stante posset in alium, etiam illo stante poterit. - Sed licet appareat, concluderet contra solem adaequate illuminantem. Unde, solvendum est quaerendo unde actualis positio effectus adaequati limitat virtutem causae pro 'tunc' (licet ipsa absolute sit ad alia), et pro 'tunc' in sensu divisionis et pro 'alias' in sensu compositionis.	97. Again another argument. - 'A principle produces insofar as it is prior' [I d.2 n.308-309]; therefore the staying in place of the posited effect takes nothing away from the principle as it is a principle; therefore if, when the effect is not posited or not staying in place, the principle would have power for another, it will also have power for another when the effect is staying in place. - But although the argument [n.95] appears sound, it would conclude against the sun having an adequate illumination. Hence one should solve the argument by asking whence it is that the actual positing of the adequate effect limits the virtue of the cause to the 'then' (although absolutely it extends to other occasions), and to the 'then' in the sense of division and to the 'at another time' in the sense of composition.
98 Concedo tamen quod adaequatio, nec absoluta nec cum statione, concludit sufficienter unitatem generationis divinae, quia non concludit quod repugnet potentiae generativae absolute ex se esse principium alterius generationis, nec per consequens absolutam impossibilitatem alterius generationis, - immo absolutam possibilitatem, si haec esset praecisa ratio impossibilitatis, - quia ubi est ex ista ratione impossibilitas, ibi est absoluta possibilitas (patet inductive).	98. I concede, however, that adequacy, whether absolute or with a staying in place, does not sufficiently entail the unity of divine generation, because it does not entail that to be the principle of another generation is repugnant to the generative power absolutely of itself, nor consequently does it entail the absolute impossibility of another generation, - nay it entails the absolute possibility, if this [sc. the adequacy of the one generation] were the precise reason for the impossibility - because where there is an impossibility for this reason, there is there an absolute possibility (the result is plain from induction).
99 Oportet ergo aliam rationem quaerere, quae ostendat generativam determinari ex se ad hanc generationem, ita quod si per impossibile in hanc non exiret, vel haec non esset adaequata vel non semper staret, omnino in nullam aliam posset, sicut nec visus potest audire, - quemadmodum si hic Pater non esset in natura divina, omnino nulla persona posset ibi esse quae esset Pater: quia si ideo praecise non posset esse alius Pater, quia scilicet in essentia - quamvis indifferenti ad plures personas ingenitas - haec persona quasi subsisteret a se et adaequate essentiae, absolute tunc posset alius Pater esse, et si posset, esset. ƿ	99. One must then look for another reason so as to show that the generative power is determined of itself to this generation, such that if per impossibile it would not proceed to this generation, or if this generation were not adequate or were not always staying in place, it would altogether have power for no other, just as sight cannot hear, - in the way that, if the Father did not here exist in the divine nature, altogether no person could there be what the Father was; because if for this reason precisely there could not be another Father, namely because in the essence - although indifferent to several ungenerated persons - this person would as it were subsist by itself and adequately to the essence, then absolutely there could be another Father, and if there could be there would be.
100 Nec tantum istud improbat rationem 'de adaequatione', sed etiam si non esset de se hic Pater vel generatio sed essentia esset quasi indifferens ad plures Patres et potentia generativa ad plures generationes, non esset plus dare quare haec generatio esset in divinis quam quare illa, quia et illa esset adaequata, et ita casus quodista praevenit illam, quod omnino est impossibile; immo qua ratione una poneretur, et quaelibet, et qua ratione non illa, nec aliqua.	100. Not only does this argument [n.99] refute the reason 'about adequacy' [n.94], but also, if this Father or this generation were not by itself, but the essence were as it were indifferent to several Fathers and the generative power were indifferent to several generations, one would not be able to give more a reason for this generation existing in divine reality than for that one, because that one too would be adequate, and so for the case where this one prevents that one, which is altogether impossible; nay for what reason the one is posited, any at all might be posited, and for what reason the other is not posited, any other might not be posited.
101 Dico ergo. a$	101. I say therefore.