Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D6

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 1
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem sextam quaero utrum Deus Pater genuit Deum Filium voluntate. Quod sic: Richardus VI De Trinitate cap. 17, post alia tractata de productione personarum, dicit: ((Vultis super his quae diximus audire verbum abbreviatum? Ingenitum velle habere de se conformem atque condignum, idem mihi videtur quod gignere Filium, et tam genitum quam ingenitum velle habere condilectum, idem videtur quod producere Spiritum Sanctum)). Sic, Patrem velle habere conformem, est gignere: ergo sicut voluntate vult habere conformem, ita voluntate genuit.	1. Concerning the sixth distinction I ask whether God the Father generated God the Son by will. That he did: Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity VI ch.17, after the other treatments of the production of the persons, says: "Do you wish to hear a brief word about what he have said? The fact that the ungenerated wishes to have from himself someone who is of the same form and dignity seems to me to be the same as that he generates a Son; and the fact that both generated and ungenerated wish to have someone of the same love seems to be the same as that they produce the Holy Spirit." Thus, that the Father wants to have someone of the same form is to generate; therefore just as he wants by will to have someone of the same form, so he generated by will.
2 $a Ex eadem auctoritate arguitur sic, aliter: eodem modo concedit quod 'velle ut Patris' se habet ad gignere sicut 'velle ut est Patris et Filii' se habet ad spirare; nunc autem Spiritus Sanctus spiratur voluntate formaliter 'ut est Patris et Filii'; ergo etc. a$ ƿ	2. From the same authority there is the following argument: in the same manner Richard concedes that 'willing as it is of the Father' is related to generating in the way that 'willing as it is of the Father and Son' is related to inspiriting; but now the Holy Spirit is inspirited formally by the will 'as it is of the Father and Son'; therefore etc.
3 Item, Augustinus Contra Maximinum libro III cap. 1 (et ponitur distinctione 20 I Sententiarum): ((pater si non genuit Filium sibi aequalem, aut non voluit, aut non potuit; si non voluit, ergo invidus fuit)). - Ex hoc sic: invidia enim non pertinet nisi ad illa quae voluntate subtrahuntur et voluntate possunt communicari, sicut non sum invidus si non facio te sapientem quia non possum facere scientiam in anima tua; ergo Pater voluntate genuit Filium aequalem, quia secundum auctoritatem praedictam esset invidus si non generaret Filium aequalem.	3. Again, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.7 (and the quote is placed in [Lombard's] Sentences I d.20 ch.3 n.189) says: "If the Father did not generate the Son equal to himself, either he did not want to or he was not able to; if he did not want to, then he was envious." - From this as follows: for envy only pertains to those things that are taken away by will and can be communicated by will, just as I am not envious if I do not make you wise because I cannot make science to be in your soul; therefore the Father generated an equal Son by will, because according to the aforesaid authority he would be envious if he did not generate an equal Son.
4 Item, V Metaphysicae cap. 'De necessario': ((Omne involuntarium est triste)); nihil est triste in divinis, ergo nihil involuntarium; ergo Filius voluntate generatur.	4. Again, Metaphysics 5.5.1015a26-30: "Everything involuntary is painful;" there is nothing painful in divine reality, therefore there is nothing involuntary there; therefore the son is generated by will.
5 $a Item, Verbum est amor, patet, - et productus, quia secundum Hilarium ((nihil nisi natum habet Filius)); principium amoris producti est voluntas; ergo etc. Si dicatur quod concomitanter est amor, quia primo est ƿnotitia producta: - et idem est principium respectu primi termini formalis et cuiuscumque concomitantis istum terminum. a$ Contra:	5. Again, the Word is love, as is plain, - and it is produced, because according to Hilary On the Trinity IV ch.10: "the Son has nothing save what is born;" the principle of produced love is the will; therefore etc. If it be said that it is love concomitantly, because first it is produced knowledge; -there is the same principle with respect to the first formal term as to anything concomitant with that term.
6 Damascenus cap . 8: ((Generatio est opus naturae)); et Magister in littera, et est Augustini Ad Orosium: ((Praeire scientiam voluntas non potest)).	6. To the contrary: Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.8: "Generation is a work of nature;" and the Master [Lombard] in the text [I d.6 ch. un. n.69], and it is a quote from Augustine [Ps.-Augustine Dialogue on 65 Questions q.7]: "The will cannot precede knowledge."
7 In ista quaestione videntur duae difficultates: una, qualiter Pater generat Filium volens, - alia, quomodo salvetur quod Pater non generat Filium voluntate ut principio productivo.	7. In this question there seem to be two difficulties: one, in what way the Father generates the Son willingly, - the other how the fact may be saved that the Father does not generate the Son by the will as by productive principle.
8 Quantum ad primum arguitur quod non generat Filium 'volens', sed tantum necessitate naturali (sicut ignis calefacit), licet actu generandi quasi posito voluntas Patris quasi complaceat. ƿ	8. [The opinion of others] - As to the first article [n.7] the argument is given [from Godfrey of Fontaines] that the Father does not generate the Son 'willingly' but only by natural necessity (the way fire heats), although once the act of generating has been as it were posited the will of the Father is as it were much pleased.
9 Hoc arguitur sic: intellectio Patris praecedit aliquo modo voluntatem; sed intellectio Patris ut Patris videtur esse gignitio Verbi vel Filii; ergo gignitio Filii ut Filii praecedit quamcumque volitionem Patris. Prima est evidens, ex XV De Trinitate cap. 27. - Probo secundam, quia eiusdem potentiae non sunt duo actus, quia potentiae ƿdistinguuntur per actus, II De anima; gignere autem Filium sive dicere Verbum - quod idem est in Deo - est potentiae intellectivae, et intelligere similiter; ergo dicere est formaliter aliquod intelligere, et non nisi Patris ut Patris generantis; ergo etc.	9. The argument is as follows: the intellection of the Father precedes the will in some way; but the intellection of the Father as it is of the Father seems to be the generation of the Word as it is of the Son; therefore the generation of the Son as it is of the Son precedes any volition of the Father. The first proposition [the major] is evident from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.27 n.50. - I prove the second [the minor], because there are not two acts of the same power, for powers are distinguished by acts, On the Soul 2.4.415a18-20; but to generate the Son or to speak the Word - which is the same thing in God - belongs to the intellective power, and so similarly does to understand; therefore to speak is formally to understand something, and it only belongs to the Father as to the Father generating; therefore etc.
10 $a Ista ratio innititur minori falsae, scilicet de identitate intelligere et dicere,- et ex ipsa sequitur conclusio falsa, scilicet quod Pater non proprie volens dicit. Primo ergo ostendo falsitatem minoris, secundo quod illud 'consequens falsum' sequatur, tertio respondeo ad probationem minoris falsae, quarto, quomodo debet vitari illud consequens falsum, et oppositum teneri, quod est principale in isto articulo. a$ ƿ	10. [Against the opinion] - This reasoning rests on a false minor, namely on the identity of to understand and to speak, - and from it there follows a false conclusion, namely that the Father does not properly speak willingly. First then [nn.11-12] I show the falsity of the minor, second [n.13] that the 'false consequent [conclusion]' follows, third [n.14] I reply to the proof of the false minor, fourth [n.15] I show how the false consequent should be avoided and the opposite held, which is the principal point in this article [n.7].
11 De primo, contra identitatem istorum intelligere et dicere, arguo sic: Primo: intelligere est perfectio simpliciter; dicere non; igitur non sunt idem formaliter. Probatio primae: Pater, quantum ad intellectum, est formaliter beatus intellectione, - et quantum ad voluntatem, volitione; non est autem beatus nisi perfectione simpliciter; ergo etc. - Probatio secundae: tunc Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non essent simpliciter perfecti, quia non dicunt - accipiendo hoc modo dicere - quia non exprimunt verbum.	11. On the first point [the falsity of the minor, n.10], I argue against the identity of these two, to understand and to speak, as follows: First: to understand is a perfection simply; to speak is not; therefore they are not formally the same. Proof of the first proposition [the major]: the Father, as to intellect, is formally blessed by intellection, - and, as to will, by volition; but he is only blessed by perfection simply; therefore, etc. - Proof of the second proposition [the minor]: in that case [sc. if to speak were a perfection simply] the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be simply perfect, because they do not speak - taking to speak in this way - because they do not express word.
12 Secundo sic, quia sicut in creaturis ratio actionis et factionis distinguuntur formaliter (quia actio est ultimus terminus, - factionis autem est alius terminus, productus per ipsam factionem), ita in divinis, operatio qua Pater formaliter operatur videtur distingui a productione qua formaliter producit: et hoc videtur, quia operatio habet obiectum quasi praesuppositum, productio autem habet terminum productum per ipsam. Ergo intelligere - quod est operatio Patris - non est formaliter dicere, quod est productio Filii a Patre.	12. Second thus: because just as in creatures the idea of action and of making are formally distinguished (because action is ultimate term, - but of making the term is other, the thing produced by the making), so in divine reality the operation by which the Father formally operates seems to be distinguished from the production by which he formally produces; and this seems so because operation has an object as it were presupposed, but production has a term that is produced by it. Therefore to understand - which is the operation of the Father - is not formally to speak, which is the production of the Son by the Father.
13 Ad secundum, quod etiam est confirmatio primi, arguo sic: ƿsicut in intellectu nostro habente naturaliter primam intellectionem - quae non est in potestate nostra - potest voluntas nostra complacere in illa intellectione iam posita, sed proprie loquendo non elicimus illam actionem volentes sed eam elicitam volumus esse, ita sequeretur, si formaliter intelligere esset dicere, quod Pater non gigneret formaliter volens, licet Patri ipsa gignitio quasi aliquo modo posterius complaceret.	13. To the second point [that the false consequent follows, n.10], which is also a confirmation of the first point, I argue thus: just as in the case of our intellect, when it naturally has its first intellection - which is not in our power -, the will is able to be much pleased in the intellection already posited, but properly speaking we do not elicit the act willingly but we will it to be, when it has been elicited, thus it would follow that, if to understand were formally to speak, the Father would not formally generate willingly, although the generating would later in some way much please the Father.
14 De tertio, ad illam propositionem 'potentiae distinguuntur per actus', - respondeo sic, quod actio in creaturis uno modo accipitur pro actione de genere actionis, alio modo pro actu secundo, qui est qualitas absoluta, sicut expositum est prius. Unius ergo potentiae tantum est unus actus loquendo de hoc actu tanƿtum, vel de illo actu tantum, - unius tamen bene potest esse duplex actus, quorum unus sit actio et alius sit de genere qualitatis: sicut intellectus noster, cuiusmodi est actio de genere actionis 'gignere verbum', habet tamen alium actum de genere qualitatis, scilicet illam notitiam genitam. Ita in proposito: intellectus divinus habet unum actum correspondentem intellectioni nostrae quae est qualitas, quo scilicet actu intellectus Patris formaliter intelligit, - habet etiam actum correspondentem actui de genere actionis, quo exprimit Verbum . - Aliter dicit quidam doctor quod intellectus ut est intellectus, habet illum actum qui est intelligere, - habet autem illum qui est dicere, secundum quod iam factus est in actu per intelligere: sed istud est improbatum distinctione 2, ubi arƿgutum est quod ille actus primus - qui est intelligere - non est ratio formalis gignendi Verbum.	14. About the third point [the proof of the false minor, n.10], to the proposition 'powers are distinguished by acts', - I respond thus, that action in creatures is taken in one way for action in the genus of action, in another way for second act, which is an absolute quality, as was expounded before [I d.3 nn.601-604]. Of one power, then, there is only one act when speaking of the latter act only or of the former act only - but of one power there can very well be a double act, one of which acts is an action and the other is in the genus of quality; just as our intellect, which is of the sort that 'to generate a word' is action in the genus of action, yet it has another act in the genus of quality, namely the generated knowledge. So in the proposed case: the divine intellect has one act corresponding to our intellection, which is a quality, namely the act by which the intellect of the Father formally understands, - it also has an act corresponding to act in the genus of action, by which it expresses the Word. - A certain doctor says otherwise, that the intellect as it is intellect has the act which is to understand, - but that it also has the act which is to speak, according to the fact it has already been made to be in act by understanding; but this was rejected in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.273-280, 290-296], where it was argued that the first act - which is to understand - is not the formal idea of generating the Word.
15 Dico ergo de quarto, quod hoc modo Pater gignit volens, quia in primo signo originis Pater intelligit formaliter, et tunc etiam potest habere actum volendi formaliter; in secundo signo originis gignit Filium: nec tamen vult illam gignitionem volitione sequente illam gignitionem, sed volitione habita in primo signo originis, qua Pater formaliter vult, praesupponendo iam aliquo modo intellectionem qua Pater intelligit, non autem gignitionem Verbi. ƿ	15. I say then about the fourth point [avoiding the false consequent, n.10] that the Father does in this way willingly generate, - because in the first moment of origin the Father understands formally, and then also he can have the act of willing formally; in the second moment of origin he generates the Son; and he does not will the generating by a volition that follows the generating, but by a volition possessed in the first moment of origin, by which the Father formally wills, presupposing already in some way the intellection by which the Father understands, but not presupposing already the generating of the Word.
16 Quantum ad secundum articulum videtur quod Pater non producit Filium voluntate tamquam principio productivo, quia principium productivum unius rationis in divinis non potest habere duas productiones; nulla enim productio est ibi unius rationis nisi unica, quia adaequata; cum ergo Spiritus Sanctus producatur per modum voluntatis ut principii productivi, Filius non sic producetur.	16. As to the second article [n.7], it seems that the Father does not produce the Son by will as by productive principle, because a productive principle of one idea in divine reality cannot have two productions; for there is no production of one idea there save a single production, because it is an adequate production; since therefore the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will as of productive principle, the Son will not be thus produced.
17 Sed in isto articulo est difficultas, propter verbum Augustini, quia videtur attribuere gignitionem voluntati in nobis, ut principio productivo: IX De Trinitate cap. 8: ((verbum amore concipitur)); et eodem, cap. 11: ((notitia placita digneque amata verbum est)); et XI De Trinitate cap. 3 vel 4, vel 8: ((Voluntas ipsa quomodo obiecto sensum formandum admovebat formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi ad memoriam convertebat)); et in eodem: ((Voluntas illa, quae hac atque illac fert et refert aciem formandam coniungitque formatam)). Sunt etiam multa similia. - Ergo vult quod voluntas habeat rationem convertentis aciem ante gignitionem et retinentis eam in actu.	17. But in this article there is a difficulty, on account of the word of Augustine, because he seems to attribute generation to will in us as to productive principle, On the Trinity IX ch.7 n.13: "the word is conceived in us by love;" and by the same, ch.11 n.16, ch.3 n.6: "The will itself, in the way it was moving the sense to be formed by the object and, when it was formed, uniting it, so in this way it was converting the mental vision of the remembering soul to memory;" and in the same, ch.4 n.7: "The will, which brings hither and thither and brings back the mental vision that is to be formed and conjoins it when it is formed." There are also many similar passages. - Therefore he intends that will have the idea of turning back mental vision before generation, and of retaining it in act.
18 Ita ergo videtur in Trinitate - cuius imago est in anima - quod ƿvoluntas ibi habeat aliquam rationem principii respectu productionis vel gignitionis, vel rationem alicuius superioris applicantis principium proximum ad actum suum, sicut in nobis. $a Confirmatur consequentia, quia sic coniungere convenit voluntati ex perfectione sua, in quantum scilicet primum in regno animae; ergo maxime convenit nobilissimae voluntati. a$	18. Thus then it seems that in the Trinity - whose image is in the soul - the will has there some idea of principle with respect to production and generating, or has the idea of some superior applying a proximate principle to its act, just as it does in us. The consequence is confirmed, because thus to conjoin belongs to the will from its perfection, insofar namely as it is first in the kingdom of the soul; therefore it belongs most of all to the most noble will.
19 Hoc etiam arguitur in nobis, quia si gignitio nostra esset mere naturalis, nullo modo esset in potestate voluntatis, - et ita semper haberemus idem verbum, de eodem obiecto, fortius movente intellectum.	19. The fact is also argued for in us, because if our generating were merely natural, it would in no way be in the power of the will, - and so we would always have the same word, about the same object, which is more strongly moving the intellect.
20 Quantum ad istum articulum, etsi aliqui distinguant quod ƿly 'voluntate' potest teneri adverbialiter, ut sit sensus, 'voluntate genuit', id est 'voluntarie genuit', - aut potest teneri ablative, et tunc notat causam et principium elicitivum respectu gignitionis, et tunc est falsa, - quidquid autem sit de ista distinctione, non videtur concedendum quod Pater Filium produxerit voluntate, ita quod voluntas sit principium proximum vel remotum. Quod non proximum, probatum est, quia principium unius rationis non est nisi principium unius productionis; quod etiam non remotum, patet, quia sicut voluntas ut est principium operativum aliquo modo, posterius operatur quam intellectus, - ita ut est principium productivum aliquo modo, posterius producit quam intellectus, et ita non erit causa superior neque prior in productione, quae est proprie intellectus.	20. As to this article, although some [Henry] make a distinction that the 'by will' can be held adverbially, so that the sense is 'he generated by will', that is 'he generated willingly', - or it can be held ablatively, and then it indicates the cause and elicitive principle with respect to generating, and then the proposition is false, - but however it may be with this distinction, it does not seem that one should concede that the Father has produced the Son by will such that the will is the proximate or remote principle. That it is not the proximate principle has been proved [n.16], because a principle of one idea is only principle of one production; but that it is also not the remote principle is plain, because just as the will, as it is the operative principle in some way, operates posteriorly to the intellect, - so, as it is in some way the productive principle, it produces posteriorly to the intellect, and thus it will be a superior or prior cause in a production that belongs properly to the intellect.
21 Propter istas tamen auctoritates Augustini, intelligendum est quod in nobis non est tantum unicus actus intelligendi (accipiendo 'actum' de genere qualitatis), neque tantum unicus actus gignendi (accipiendo 'actum' pro actione de genere actionis), quia si esset tantum unicus actus iste et tantum unicus ille, et iste et ille ƿessent idem, - voluntas nostra nullam causalitatem haberet, neque respectu actus intelligendi qui est de genere qualitatis, neque respectu actus gignendi qui est de genere actionis. In divinis ergo, cum non sit in Patre nisi unicus actus intelligendi, respectu illius actus voluntas Patris non habebit aliquam rationem principii vel causae, - cum etiam non sit nisi unicus actus dicendi, respectu illius voluntas non habebit rationem principii, quia voluntas - sicut operando ita principiando - sequitur aliquo modo intellectum: actus igitur dicendi praecedit omnem principiationem voluntatis. Potest tamen voluntas ut complacens - non ut principians - habere actum respectu illius gignitionis, ex hoc quod voluntas, ut operans in Patre, non praesupponit gignitionem sed tantum intellectionem illam qua Pater formaliter intelligit.	21. However, because of the authorities of Augustine [n.17], one must understand that in us there is not only a single act of understanding (taking 'act' in the genus of quality), nor only a single act of generating (taking 'act' for action in the genus of action), because if there were only the single latter act and only the single former act, and the latter and the former act were the same, - our will would have no causality, either with respect to the act of understanding which is of the genus of quality, or with respect to the act of generating which is of the genus of action. In divine reality, therefore, since there is in the Father only a single act of understanding, with respect to that act the will of the Father will not have any idea of principle or cause, - since too there is only one act of speaking, the will with respect to it will not have the idea of principle, because the will -being principle in the way it is operator - in some way follows the intellect; therefore the act of speaking precedes every way of the will's being a principle. But the will can have, as being well pleased - not as being principle -, an act with respect to the generating, from the fact that the will, as operating in the Father, does not presuppose the generating but only the intellection by which the Father formally understands.
22 In nobis autem verae sunt auctoritates Augustini, quod voluntas movet aciem ad actum cognoscendi et tenet eam in eognitione, - quia posito primo actu nostro, sive de genere qualitatis sive de genere actionis, possumus habere alios actus posteriores ex imperio voluntatis; in Patre autem voluntas non admovet intelligentiam Patris ut formandam a memoria Patris, quia in Patre non est nisi unica intellectio formaliter, quae praecedit aliquo modo productionem Verbi, - nec admovet memoriam ipsi obiecto, ut gignatur Verbum. ƿ	22. But in us the authorities of Augustine are true, because the will moves mental vision to the act of knowing and holds it in knowing [n.17], - because once our first act has been posited, whether of the genus of quality or of the genus of action, we can have other later acts from the command of the will; but in the Father the will does not move the intelligence of the Father as needing to be formed by the memory of the Father, because there is in the Father only a single intellection formally, which precedes in some way the production of the Word, - nor does it move the memory with the object itself, so that the Word may be generated.
23 Contra illud arguitur, quod Augustinus non tantum intelligit in nobis sed etiam in Deo, quia Augustinus numquam videtur assignare actum voluntati ut est tertia pars imaginis, nisi illum qui est coniungere parentem cum prole, et hoc modo habet causalitatem aliquam respectu gignitionis prolis; ergo ista pars, ut est pars imaginis, nihil repraesentabit in prototypo nisi voluntas divina aliquo modo habeat sic coniungere.	23. Against this [nn.21-22] there is an argument that Augustine understands it not only in us but also in God, because Augustine never seems to assign an act to the will as it is the third part of the image [of God], save that which is conjoining the parent with the offspring, and in this way it has some causality with respect to the generating of the offspring; therefore this part, as it is part of the image, will represent nothing in the prototype unless the divine will in some way has to conjoin in this way.
24 Respondeo. Etsi frequenter assignet voluntati illum actum - ut est pars imaginis - tamen aliquando sibi assignat alium, videlicet 'dilectionem eiusdem obiecti' (quod est 'obiectum' memoriae et ƿintelligentiae), sicut apparet XV De Trinitate cap. 20 vel 62: ((Unde potest)) - inquit - ((sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici et concupisci)) (quae auctoritas posita est supra distinctione 3 quaestione ultima); ibi enim expresse ponit trinitatem ((in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate)) ut habent actum circa idem obiectum, scilicet veritatem increatam. Similiter, libro XIV cap. 8 ponit trinitatem in mente in quantum ((meminit sui, intelligit se et diligit se)). Utrumque etiam actum simul tangit XV De Trinitate cap. 3: ((Mens et notitia, qua se novit, - et amor, quo se notitiamque suam diligit)).	24. I reply. Although he frequently assigns that act to the will - as it is part of the image - yet sometimes he assigns another one to it, namely 'love of the same object' (which is the 'object' of the memory and intelligence), as is apparent in On the Trinity XV ch.20 n.39: "Hence it is possible," he says, "for eternal and immutable nature to be recollected, considered, and desired" (which authority is set down at distinction 3 of the last question, I d.3 n.591); for there he expressly posits a trinity "in memory, intelligence, and will" as they have an act about the same object, namely uncreated truth. Likewise in XIV ch.8 n.11 he posits a trinity in the mind insofar as "it remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself." He also touches on both acts in XV ch.3 n.5: "The mind and the knowledge, by which it knows itself, - and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge."
25 Et bene concurrunt isti duo actus in voluntate nostra, quia ipsa amans obiectum, amat etiam notitiam eiusdem obiecti, et ex amore obiecti movet intelligentiam ad intelligendum illud, copulans ipsam memoriae (de qua ipsa formatur), et tenens eam in tali coniunctione, et per hoc in actuali intellectione unius obiecti.	25. And these two acts come well together in our will, because in loving the object the will also loves the knowledge of the same object, and from love of the object it moves the intelligence to understanding it, uniting it to memory (from which it is formed), and holding it in such uniting, and by this in actual understanding of one object.
26 Istorum autem duorum actuum voluntatis, in nobis principalior est ille qui est 'dilectio obiecti', quia ille est causa quandoque dilectionis,- actus tamen alius, scilicet 'dilectio actus', est universalior, quia respectu etiam obiecti mali diligimus actum cognoscendi, licet non obiectum, sicut dicit Augustinus IX De Trinitate: ((Definio intemperantiam, et hoc est verbum eius; placet mihi definire, licet non placet mihi incontinentia)). ƿ	26. Now of these two acts of the will, the more principal one in us is that which is 'love of the object', because it is sometimes cause of love, - but the other act, namely 'love of the act', is more universal, because even in respect of a bad object we love the act of knowing, although not the object, as Augustine says IX ch.10 n.15: "I define intemperance, and this is the word for it; I enjoy defining, although I do not enjoy incontinence."
27 Voluntas ergo in nobis ut est pars imaginis repraesentat voluntatem in Deo non quantum ad actum istum copulandi, qui est voluntatis nostrae, sed quantum ad alium actum, in quantum scilicet voluntas nostra est principium producendi actum circa idem obiectum, quod fuit memoriae et intelligentiae nostrae, quia voluntas in divinis est principium producendi amorem adaequatum essentiae divinae, quae est obiectum primum memoriae divinae et intelligentiae et voluntatis, - et ille amor productus est Spiritus Sanctus, cui correspondet in nobis dilectio producta, quae dilectio frequenter ab Augustino vocatur voluntas; sed voluntas proprie in nobis - quae est potentia - non correspondet Spiritui Sancto, sed vi spirativae quae est in Patre et Filio, et hoc secundum illum actum quo voluntas in nobis habet producere amorem obiecti intellecti, non autem primo in quantum habet producere amorem notitiae genitae, nullo autem modo in quantum est causa superior notitiae genitae: siquidem, vis spirativa est principium producendi Spiritum Sanctum in divinis, qui est amor essentiae divinae, et etiam amor notitiae genitae, - licet forte secundum aliquem ordinem, - sed non est vis illa spirativa aliquo modo principium productivum notitiae genitae, quia etsi Pater in primo signo originis sit volens et in secundo gignat, tamen voluntas Patris non habet rationem principii respectu illius gignitionis Verbi. - Sic ergo patet quomodo Pater volens generat et tamen non voluntate ut principio formali elicitivo generationis.	27. The will then in us, as it is part of the image, represents will in God, not as to the act of uniting, which belongs to our will, but as to the other act, namely insofar as our will is the principle of producing an act about the same object as belonged to our memory and intelligence; for will in divine reality is a principle of producing love adequate to the divine essence, which is the first object of the divine memory and intelligence and will, -and the love produced is the Holy Spirit, to whom corresponds in us the love produced, and this love is frequently called will by Augustine; but will properly in us - which is a power - does not correspond to the Holy Spirit but to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son, and this according to the act by which the will in us has to produce love of the object understood, though not primarily, to the extent it has to produce love of generated knowledge, and in no way, moreover, to the extent it is a superior cause of generated knowledge; if indeed the inspiriting force is the principle of producing the Holy Spirit in divine reality, who is love of the divine essence and also love of generated knowledge, - although perhaps according to a certain order, - yet the inspiriting force is in no way the productive principle of generated knowledge, because although the Father in the first moment of origin is willing and in the second moment generates, yet the will of the Father does not have the idea of principle with respect to the generating of the Word. - Thus then is it plain how the Father willingly generates and yet not by will as formal elicitive principle of generation.
28 Tamen, quantum ad intentionem Augustini 'de intentione coƿpulante parentem cum prole', dicit quidam doctor quod illa intentio copulans - loquendo respectu actus sentiendi - est 'inclinatio', facta in potentia per speciem sensibilem. Unde quinque quae ponit ille doctor (videlicet obiectum sensibile, speciem, et inclinationem factam, et potentiam sentiendi, et actum sentiendi), probat per unam auctoritatem Augustini, XII De Trinitate cap. 2, et cum Augustinus enumerat 'intentionem', ((sensum)) inquiens ((detinet oculorum 'animi intentio')): ((ecce)) - ait iste - ((tertium. Quod enim 'detinet' sensum, non est nisi illa excitatio per dictam inclinationem; vocat autem eam Augustinus)) (secundum eum) ((intentionem animi causaliter, quia per ipsam fit sensus animi intentus ad percipiendum obiectum)). ƿ	28. However, as to Augustine's intention 'about the intention of uniting the parent with the offspring' [n.23], a certain doctor says that the uniting intention -speaking in respect of the act of sensing - is 'inclination', made in the power by the sensible species. Hence the five things that that doctor posits (namely sensible object, species, and made intention, and power of sensing, and act of sensing), he proves by one authority of Augustine On the Trinity XI ch.2 n.2, - and when Augustine enumerates 'intention', saying that "'the intention of the spirit' detains the sense of the eyes;" "behold the third," says that doctor [Henry], "for what 'detains' the sense is not other than the excitation by the said inclination; but Augustine calls it" (according to him) "intention of the spirit causally, because by it the sense of the spirit becomes intent on perceiving the object."
29 Sed istud non est ibi ad intentionem Augustini, quia ibidem - distinguens ea ab invicem - de intentione dicit quod ((tertium solius animae est)): igitur, secundum eum, illa intentio quae erat 'tertium' non est illa excitatio vel inclinatio, per speciem; similiter, illud 'tertium' attribuitur voluntati illi de qua dicit inferius quod ((voluntas hac atque illac refert aciem)) etc., quod non est verum de inclinatione, sed tantummodo de voluntate et potentia animae.	29. But this is not to the intention of Augustine there, because in the same place -distinguishing these things from each other - he says of intention that "it is the third of the soul alone;" therefore, according to him, the intention which was 'the third' is not the excitation or inclination through the species; likewise, the 'third' is attributed to the will of which he says later that "the will carries the mental vision hither and thither" etc., -which is not true of inclination but only of will and the power of the soul.
30 Ad argumenta principalia. - Ad primum, cum dicit Richardus ((hoc mihi videtur)) etc., - non hoc 'videtur' Augustino, quod velle Patris sit formaliter gignere, quia dicit V De Trinitate quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit ((quomodo datus, non quomodo natus)), id est, per modum voluntatis, libere, et non per modum naturae; et ideo oportet exponere Richardum, quod intelligat 'concomitanter'.	30. To the principal arguments. - To the first, when Richard says "this seems to me" etc. [n.1], - this does not 'seem' to Augustine, that the to will of the Father is formally to generate, because he says On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15 that the Holy Spirit proceeds "in some way given, not in some way born," - that is, by way of will, freely, and not by way of nature; and therefore one should expound Richard to mean 'concomitantly'.
31 Ad secundum dico quod 'invidia' non tantum est in subtrahendo illa bona quae possunt communicari actu voluntatis, immediate, sed quaecumque 'volens' potest communicare: Pater autem ƿvolens generat, ut dictum est, et ideo tenet argumentum Augustini 'de invidia'.	31. To the second [n.3] I say that 'envy' exists in taking away not only goods that can be communicated by an act of will, immediately, but also anything that 'willing' can communicate; but the Father willing generates, as was said [n.15], and therefore the argument of Augustine about 'envy' holds.
32 Ad tertium dico quod nihil est ibi involuntarium, et ideo generatio Filii non est involuntaria (concedo), - sed non sequitur ultra 'ergo est voluntate ut principio elicitivo': multa enim facimus - sive voluntate praecedente sive voluntate concomitante - quorum principium immediatum non est voluntas, sed quorumdam natura, quorumdam necessitas, et quorumdam alia huiusmodi, etc.	32. To the third [n.4] I say that nothing is involuntary there, and therefore the generation of the Son is not involuntary (which I concede), - but it does not follow further 'therefore it is by will as by elicitive principle': for we make many things -whether with will preceding or with it being concomitant - of which the immediate principle is not will, but nature is in the case of some, necessity in the case of others, and others things of the sort in the case of others, etc.