Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D8/Q3

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 3
39 Tertio quaero utrum cum simplicitate divina stet quod Deus, vel aliquid formaliter dictum de Deo, sit in genere. Quod sic: Quia Deus formaliter est ens, ens autem dicit conceptum dictum de Deo in 'quid' - et iste conceptus non est proprius Deo, sed communis sibi et creaturae, sicut dictum est distinctione 3; ergo oportet quod ad hoc quod fiat proprius, quod determinetur per aliquem conceptum determinantem; ille 'determinans' se habet ad conceptum entis sicut conceptus 'qualis' ad conceptum 'quid', et per consequens ut conceptus differentiae ad conceptum generis.	39. Third I ask whether along with the divine simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus. That it does: Because God is formally being, but being states a concept said of God in the 'what' - and this concept is not proper to God but is common to him and creatures, as was said in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.26-45]; therefore, in order that this might become proper, it must be determined by some determining concept; that 'determining' concept is related to the concept of being as the concept of 'what sort' to the concept of 'what', and consequently as the concept of difference to the concept of genus.
40 Praeterea, Avicenna II Metaphysicae cap. 1: 'ens in subiecto' et 'ens non in subiecto' non habent medium, - et videtur loqui secundum quod 'ens non in subiecto' est ratio substantiae et 'ens in subiecto' est ratio accidentis. Deus ergo cum sit ens formaliter, et non 'ens in subiecto', ergo est 'ens in non subiecto', - ergo est substantia: substantia autem ut substantia est genus.	40. Further, AvicennaMetaphysics II ch.1 (74vb): between 'a being in a subject' and 'a being not in a subject' there is no middle - and he seems to be speaking according to the fact that 'a being not in a subject' is the idea of substance and 'a being in a subject' is the idea of accident. Therefore God, since he is being formally and is not 'a being in a subject', therefore he is 'a being in a non-subject' - therefore he is substance; but substance as substance is a genus.
41 Praeterea, ubi est species ibi est genus - secundum Porphyƿrium - quia sunt correlativa; natura divina est species respectu personarum, secundum Damascenum cap. 50; ergo etc.	41. Further, where there is species there is genus - according to Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.3] - because these are relatives; the divine nature is a species with respect to the persons, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.48; therefore etc.
42 Item, sapientia formaliter dicitur de Deo, et hoc secundum eandem rationem secundum quam dicitur de nobis, quia illae rationes quae positae sunt distinctione 3 quaestione 1 de univocatione entis, concludunt de univocatione sapientiae; ergo secundum illam rationem secundum quam sapientia dicitur de Deo, est species generis: et hoc probatur per dictum antiquorum doctorum, qui dicunt quod species transfertur ad divina, quia dicit perfectionem, licet non genus, quia dicit imperfectionem, - ut 'scientia', non 'qualitas'.	42. Again, wisdom is formally said of God, and this according to the same idea by which it is said of us, because the reasons that were set down in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 nn.27, 35, 39] about the univocity of being conclude the same about the univocity of wisdom; therefore wisdom, according to the idea in which it is said of God, is a species of a genus [n.153]; and this is proved by the saying of the ancient doctors [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas], who say that species is transferred to divine reality, because it states a perfection, although not the genus, because it states an imperfection -as 'science' is transferred but not 'quality'.
43 Contra est Magister in littera, et adducit Augustinum, et ostendit per eum quod 'removentur a Deo illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae'. ƿ	43. To the contrary is the Master [Lombard] in the text, and he adduces Augustine [On the Trinity V ch.1 n.2] - and shows through him that 'from God are removed the categories of the art of dialectic.'
44 Hic sunt duae opiniones extremae. - Una negativa, quae dicit quod cum simplicitate divina non stat quod sit aliquis conceptus communis Deo et creaturae, de qua tactum est supra distinctione 3 quaestione 1.	44. Here there are two opinions, at either extreme. - One [Henry of Ghent] is negative, which says that with the divine simplicity does not stand the fact that there is some concept common to God and creatures, and it was touched on above in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 n.20].
45 Ad hoc ponuntur quaedam rationes prius non tactae. Prima est ista: illis quae sunt totaliter et immediate sub extremis contradictionis, nihil est commune univocum; Deus et creatura sunt totaliter et immediate sub extremis contradictionis - dependere et non dependere, causatum et non causatum, esse ab alio et non ab alio; ergo nihil est eis commune univocum.	45. For proof of this certain reasons are set down which were not touched on before [sc. not touched on by Scotus in I d.3 qq.1-3]. The first is this: there is for things that are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction no common univocal term; God and creatures are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction - to depend and not to depend, caused and not caused, to be from another and not to be from another; therefore there is for them no common univocal term.
46 Item, secundo sic, et est confirmatio alterius rationis: omnis conceptus communis est neuter respectu illorum quibus est communis; nullus est conceptus neuter respectu contradictoriorum, quia est alter eorum; ergo etc. ƿ	46. Again second thus, and it is a confirmation of the previous reason: every common concept is neutral with respect to the things to which it is common; no concept is neutral with respect to contradictories, because it is one or other of them; therefore etc.
47 Item, tertio sic: primo diversa in nullo conveniunt; Deus est primo diversus a quacumque creatura, alioquin haberet quo conveniret et quo differret, et ita non esset simpliciter simplex; ergo Deus in nullo convenit cum creatura, et ita nec in aliquo conceptu communi.	47. Again third thus: things primarily diverse agree in nothing; God is primarily diverse from any creature, otherwise he would have that in which he would agree and that in which he would differ, and so he would not be simply simple; therefore God agrees in nothing with the creature, and so neither in any common concept.
48 Item, ubi tantum est unitas attributionis, non potest esse unitas univocationis; sed oportet ponere unitatem attributionis creaturae ad Deum in ratione entis; ergo in hoc non est univocatio.	48. Again, where there is only the unity of attribution there cannot be the unity of univocity; but it is necessary to posit unity of attribution of the creature with respect to God in the idea of being; therefore there is in this no univocity.
49 Ad hoc adducitur intentio Dionysii De divinis nominibus, qui ponit tres gradus cognoscendi Deum - per eminentiam, causalitatem et abnegationem - et ponit illam cognitionem per abnegationem esse ultimam quando removentur a Deo omnia illa quae sunt communia creaturis: igitur non intelligit ipse quod aliquis conceptus qui est abstractus a creaturis, remaneat in ipso secundum quod fuit communis creaturae.	49. For this opinion [n.44] is adduced the intention of Dionysius [On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], who posits three grades of knowing God - by eminence, causality, and negation - and he posits that the knowledge by negation is the ultimate, when from God are removed all the things that are common to creatures; therefore he himself does not understand that any concept abstracted from creatures remains in God according to the respect in which it was common to creatures.
50 Ad hoc etiam est Augustinus VIII De Trinitate cap. 5 (in medio capituli): ((Cum audis bonum hoc et bonum illud (quae possent alias etiam dici non bona), si potueris sine illis quae participatione bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cuius participatione bona sunt (simul enim et ipsum intelligis cum audis hoc bonum ƿet illud bonum), si autem potueris illis detractis perspicere per se bonum, perspexeris Deum, et si amore adhaeseris, continuo beatificaberis)). Ergo vult dicere quod intelligendo hoc bonum et illud bonum, intelligo bonum cuius participatione illa sunt bona, hoc est 'bonum infinitum': ergo non habeo ibi tantum conceptum boni in communi sed etiam boni per essentiam.	50. For this opinion there is also Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3 n.5 (in the middle of the chapter): "When you hear of this good and of that good (which could elsewhere also be said to be not good), if you could without the things that are good by participation perceive the good itself, by participation in which they are good (for you also at the same time understand the good itself when you hear of this good and that good), but if you could, with these things taken away, perceive the good in itself, you would perceive God, and if you cleaved to him with love, you will at once be blessed." Therefore he intends that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good by participation in which they are good, and this is 'the infinite good'; therefore I do not have there only a concept of God in general [I d.3 n.192], but also a concept of the good through its essence.
51 Contra istam positionem sunt duae rationes, quae tactae sunt superius distinctione 3 quaestione praedicta. Una 'quia non posset conceptus iste proprius Deo causari naturaliter in intellectu nostro': quidquid enim est naturaliter movens intellectum nostrum pro statu isto, sive intellecƿtus agens sive phantasma sive species rei intelligibilis, habet pro effectu adaequato causare in nobis conceptum illius quiditatis et eorum quae continentur in tali quiditate essentialiter vel virtualiter; conceptus autem ille proprius neutro modo continetur in illa quiditate, nec essentialiter nec virtualiter (quod non essentialiter, patet, quia negans univocationem, - quod non virtualiter, quia perfectius numquam continetur in minus perfecto); ergo etc.	51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons, which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27]. [First reason] - One reason is 'that this concept proper to God could not naturally be caused in our intellect'; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for the present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or an intelligible species of the thing, has for adequate effect causing in us a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that it is not essentially is plain, because it denies univocity, - that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc.
52 Responsio aliquorum est quod ens ratum facit notitiam de se in quantum est ens ratum (hoc est, in quantum est relatum ad primum ens), et ita concipere illud sub ratione illa, non est concipere illud sub ratione absoluta, sed sub ratione relata ad primum ens; relatio autem habet causare in intellectu conceptum correlatiƿvum, sive relationis correspondentis, - et cum non concipiatur 'ut in se subsistens' relatio correspondens, concipietur tamen aliquo modo virtute fundamenti istius relationis.	52. The response of some people is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation -and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of 'as subsisting in itself, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.
53 Contra istud argumentum videtur stare, quod si est aliquid adaequatum obiecto naturaliter a nobis cognoscibili et intelligibili (qualitercumque sit praesens intellectui nostro), potest facere conceptum de se et de his quae includit essentialiter vel virtualiter, et secundum iam dicta nullo modo includitur illud absolutum quod est fundamentum relationis in Deo, ut probabo: ergo sequitur quod nullo modo fiat in nobis conceptus illius absoluti, et ita nullum conceptum alicuius absoluti poterimus de Deo habere naturaliter.	53. Against this argument [n.51] the fact seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object, the one naturally knowable and intelligible to us (whatever way it is present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], it in no way includes the absolute that is the foundation of the relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way is a concept of that absolute caused in us, and so we will not naturally be able to have any concept of anything absolute about God.
54 Probatio assumpti, quia licet dicta responsio supponat quod relatio in creaturis prius naturaliter concipiatur quam relatio sibi ƿcorrespondens vel fundamentum relationis correspondentis (quod credo esse dubium, quia terminus relationis naturaliter praeintelligitur relationi, sicut et fundamentum), - licet etiam supponat quod res creata rata non intelligitur a nobis nisi in quantum relata (quod improbatum est distinctione 3 quaestione 'De vestigio', et videtur esse contra Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 8: ((Omnis res ad se subsistit, - quanto magis Deus?)) - et loquitur Augustinus de subsistentia ut quo naturaliter non est res creata, et naturaliter in se subsistit, alioquin non esset argumentum 'si omnis res ad se subsistit, quanto magis Deus', si idem accipiatur in praemissis et in conclusione), - his, inquam, omissis, quae forte ab adversario negarentur, arguo sic: relatio in creatura licet habeat in virtute sua causare conceptum relationis sibi correspondentis, tamen illa relatio correspondens non includit in se aliquem conceptum absolutum in quo fundetur, quia relatio creaturae - e converso - ad Deum, quae est tantum rationis, non includit essentiam divinam vel aliquam perfectionem absolutam in Deo (quae perfectio est naturaliter ipsa), quam tamen essentiam vel perfectionem oportet ponere esse fundamentum relationis Dei ad creaturam; et ita non posset per relaƿtiones istas causari in nobis aliquis conceptus de perfectionibus absolutis nisi relatio altera haberet in se virtualiter illud absolutum quod est propria perfectio Deo, quod est impossibile.	54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], - because although the said response [n.52] supposes that a relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), - although it supposes too that a created thought-on thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question 'On the Footprint' [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9: "Each thing subsists to itself, - how much more God?" - and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as about that by which a created thing naturally is not, and which naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, 'if each thing subsists to itself, how much more God', would, if the same thing were taken in the premises as in the conclusion, not be an argument), - omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by the adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature is able, by its virtue, to cause a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself some absolute concept on which it is founded, because the relation of a creature - conversely - to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection it naturally is), which essence, however, or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not, by these relations, be caused in us any concept of absolute perfection unless another relation possessed in itself virtually that absolute which is the proper perfection of God, and that is impossible.
55 Istud etiam probatur, quia secundum eos essentia divina non est nata facere de se nisi conceptum unicum in intellectu,- ergo non est natus haberi de ea nisi unicus conceptus realis. Haec consequentia probatur, quia omnem conceptum realem quantum ad intelligentiam simplicem natum haberi de ea, ipsa nata est facere in intellectu (hoc non competit imperfectioribus obiectis). Ulterius infero: ergo quodcumque obiectum natum est facere de ista essentia aliquem conceptum realem, natum est facere illum unicum qui natus est haberi de ea, - quod si non illum, tunc nullum de ea; sed nulla creatura potest illum unicum causare, quia tunc ex creatura posset cognosci sub ratione qua est haec essentia singularis; ergo per nullam creaturam - secundum illam positionem - potest haberi aliquis conceptus singularis de essentia divina. ƿ	55. This point [sc. that nothing absolute is included in the concept we have of God] is also proved by the fact that, according to them [sc. those holding the opinion in n.53], the divine essence is of a nature only to cause, about itself, a single concept in the intellect, - therefore only a single real concept about it is of a nature to be possessed. The proof of this consequence is that the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that is, as to its simple understanding, of a nature to be possessed about it (and more imperfect objects are not capable of this). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause, about itself, some real concept, is of a nature to cause that single concept which is itself of a nature to be possessed about it -and, if it does not cause that concept, then it causes no concept about it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then the concept could, under the idea in which it is a singular essence, be understood from creatures; therefore through no creature according to this position [n.53] - can any singular concept be possessed about the divine essence.
56 Secunda ratio tacta in quaestione praedicta, erat de conceptu uno certo, et duobus dubiis, qui certus est communis illis.	56. [Second reason] - The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, where the certain concept is common to them.
57 Respondetur illi tripliciter. - Primo, quod aliquis conceptus est idem 'certus' et 'dubius': ut conceptus Socratis vel Platonis dubius est, conceptus alicuius hominis certus, - et tamen iste et ille idem.	57. To this there is a threefold response. - First, that there is some concept one and the same that is 'certain' and 'doubtful'; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, - and yet both this and that concept are the same.
58 Hoc nihil est, quia licet conceptus idem possit diversificari penes modos grammaticales et logicales (penes grammaticales, ut penes quoscumque modos significandi; penes logicales, ut penes quoscumque modos diversos concipiendi, sicut penes universale et singulare, vel penes explicite et implicite: explicite, sicut definitio exprimit, - implicite, sicut definitum exprimit), et per istas diffeƿrentias possit poni non tantum certitudo et incertitudo, sed veritas etiam et falsitas, congruitas et incongruitas, - tamen quod idem conceptus eodem modo conceptus vel acceptus, secundum istos modos vel quantum ad istos modos sit certus et dubius, hoc est idem omnino affirmare et negare. Ergo si conceptus de ente est certus et conceptus de ente creato et increato est dubius (et non est hoc propter modos significandi grammaticales, nec penes modos concipiendi logicales), vel ergo erit simpliciter alius et alius conceptus, quod est propositum, - vel conceptus diversificatus penes modum concipiendi particularis et communis, quod est etiam propositum.	58. This is nothing, because although the same concept might be diversified in grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones as in any modes of signifying; logical ones as in any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as definition expresses it - implicitly as the defined thing expresses it), and not only could one posit certitude and incertitude by these differences, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, - yet the fact that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to, or as to, the modes mentioned, is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it in logical modes of conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended proposition - or there will be a concept diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended proposition.
59 Aliter dicitur quod sunt duo conceptus propinqui, tamen et propter istam propinquitatem videntur esse unus conceptus, - et videtur certus de 'uno', hoc est de illis duobus dubie conceptis, dubius autem de illis duobus distincte conceptis.	59. In a second way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that they are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept - and the concept about the 'one' seems to be certain, that is, about these two concepts when doubtfully conceived, while doubtful about the two concepts when distinctly conceived.
60 Contra. Quando non possunt aliqui conceptus concipi sub unitate aliqua nisi simul vel prius naturaliter concipiantur sub distinctione propria sibi, quae supponitur illi unitati, non potest intellecƿtus esse certus de eis in quantum habent illam unitatem et dubius de eis in quantum sunt distincti; vel sic: non potest intellectus esse certus de illa unitate illorum et dubius de distinctione eorum; vel sic: non potest intellectus esse certus de eis sub ratione illius unitatis et dubius de eis sub ratione alicuius propriae distinctionis. Sed intellectus concipiens ens dictum de Deo et creatura, - si sint duo conceptus, non potest habere conceptus istos secundum aliquam unitatem nisi prius naturaliter habeat eos sub ratione distinctorum, vel simul; ergo non potest esse certus de eis sub ratione unius, dubitando de eis sub ratione multorum.	60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of the unity and doubtful about hem under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving the being that is said of God and creatures - if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first, or at the same time, under their idea as distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of them as one and doubtful about them under the idea of them as many.
61 Probatio maioris, quia si certitudo esset de aliquo conceptu (vel de quibuscumque conceptibus) dubitando de a et b (vel cum dubitatione de a et b), ille unus vel illi duo conceptus concipiuntur prius naturaliter - sub ea ratione sub qua est certitudo de illo vel de illis - quam concipiantur a et b. ƿ	61. Proof of the major [n.60], that if there was certitude about any concept (or about all concepts whatever) while there was a doubting about a and b (or along with doubt about a and b), then this one concept or these two concepts [sc. which seem to be one] are conceived first naturally - under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them - before a and b are conceived [sc. but this is false].
62 $a Conceditur tamen quod praeconcipiuntur qui habent habitudinem. - Contra. Aut ut omnino disparati, - ergo non 'videntur' unus; aut ut habentes aliquam unitatem ordinis vel distinctionis contra se, vel quamcumque, - et tunc a$ probatio minoris: ens in Deo et ens in creatura, si sint duo conceptus habentes attributionem, non possunt concipi in quantum habent unitatem attributionis nisi prius natura - vel saltem simul - concipiantur iste et ille in quantum sunt distincti, puta iste sub propria ratione et ille sub propria ratione, quia isti sub propriis rationibus sunt fundamenta unitatis 'ordinis' et 'attributionis' .	62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. -On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, - therefore they do not 'seem' one; or conceived as having some unity, or any unity, of order or distinction among themselves, - and then comes the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are first - or at least at the same time - naturally conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its own proper idea and that one under its own proper idea, because these concepts under their own proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of 'order' or of 'attribution'.
63 Confirmatur istud per argumentum Philosophi II De anima, de sensu communi, quem concludit esse communem per cognitionem differentiae albi et nigri, ex cuius differentiae cognitione concludit quod cognoscit extrema. Si enim posset cognoscere ista sub ratione huiusmodi respectus qui est 'differentia', absque hoc quod cognosceret sub ratione propria, tunc argumentum suum non valeret. Ergo similiter in proposito, non possunt simul cognosci a et b sub ratione istius relationis - scilicet unitatis ordinis - nisi cognoscatur a sub propria ratione et b sub propria ratione (cum per te nihil sit eis commune), et ita quicumque intellectus concipit istos duos sub unitate ordinis. concipit eos ut distinctos in se. ƿ	63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher On the Soul 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which sense he concludes is common through its knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of which difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this respect which is 'difference', without knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the intended proposition, a and b cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation - namely of the unity of order - unless a is known under its own proper idea and b under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common between them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as in themselves distinct.
64 $a Melius arguitur sic, contra illud 'videntur unus conceptus': Conceptus duo simpliciter simplices non sunt in intellectu nisi uterque sit ibi distincte, quia talis conceptus aut omnino ignoratur aut totaliter attingitur (IX Metaphysicae cap. ultimo); ergo de illo non est intellectus certus secundum aliquid, et dubius vel deceptus secundum aliud. Formetur ergo ratio sic: intellectus habet duos conceptus; ergo aliquid sibi patet de utroque conceptu si 'videntur' unus, et aliquid non patet - constat - alioquin semper viderentur 'unus'; ergo neuter conceptus est simpliciter simplex, ergo non primo diversi et abstractissimi.	64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim 'they seem to be one concept' [n.59]: Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such a simply simple concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Form, then, a reasoning as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if 'they seem' to be one, something is plain to the intellect about each concept, and something else is not plain -clearly - otherwise they would always seem 'one'; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse or most abstract.
65 Item, intellectus habens conceptum distinctum potest illo distinguere 'obiectum cognitum' ab illo conceptu quem habet; hic non potest distinguere, quia non habet conceptum distinctum, ƿergo nee proprium, quia conceptus proprius est conceptus alii repugnans; ergo concipiens hunc, concipit repugnans alteri, verbi gratia, visus non videt aliquid repugnans nigro quin per illud distinguat illud a nigro. Conceptus voco obiecta formalia. - Quod enim duo obiecta sub propriis rationibus (quarum una est primo diversa ab alia) sint intellecta a me et non possum distinguere quid est hoe, ergo proprias rationes non intelligo; ergo nihil, vel aliquid commune.	65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it 'a known object' from the concept which it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, - therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore the intellect conceiving this proper concept conceives a something that is repugnant to another concept; for example, sight does not see something repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. I call concepts formal objects. - For because two objects under their proper ideas (one of which is diverse first from the other) are understood by me, and yet I cannot distinguish what this one is, then I do not understand their proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or I understand something common.
66 Item, cognito 'si est' restat quaestio 'quid est', II Posteriorum.	66. Again, when it is know 'if a thing exists', the question 'what it is' remains, Posterior Analytics 2.1.89b34.
67 Item, brevius arguitur sic: intellectus quando est certus, aut est certus de conceptu simpliciter uno, aut non, sed uno 'unitate analogiae'. Si primo modo, et non de hoc nec de illo (quia de utroque in particulari est dubius), ergo est certus de aliquo tertio simpliciter uno, quod est propositum. Si secundo modo, verum est, in quantum est sic unus, - sed de illo qui est sic unus arguo: non potest esse certus de uno 'unitate analogiae' nisi sit certus de duobus ut duo sunt; ergo illi duo non videntur intellectui esse 'unus', quia simul concipiuntur ut distincti conceptus.a$ ƿ	67. Again there is a more brief argument thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a concept one 'by unity of analogy'. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended proposition. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, - but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one 'by unity of analogy' unless it is certain about the two as they are two; therefore those two do not seem to the intellect to be 'one', because they are at once conceived as distinct concepts.
68 Tertio modo respondetur quod non est certitudo de conceptu aliquo uno, et dubitatio de duobus, sed certitudo de duobus disiunctis et dubitatio de alterutro illorum: ut puta, 'certus sum quod hoc est ens, hoc est substantia vel accidens, dubito tamen utrum sit determinate hoc ens, ut substantia, vel illud ens quod est accidens.	68. The response in the third way [nn.57, 59] is that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two concepts and doubt about one or other of them; as for example, 'I am certain that this is a being, that is, that it is a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.'
69 $a Contra. Illa certitudo praecedit omnem apprehensionem quorumcumque dividentium ipsum ens, ergo praecedit certitudinem 'de toto disiuncto'. - Antecedens probatur, quia non oportet in prima apprehensione qua 'hoc' scitur esse aliquid, vel ens, apprehendere a se vel ab alio, per se vel in alio, et sic de aliis disiunctis.	69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of anything whatever that divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude 'about the whole disjunct'. - The proof of the antecedent is that in the first apprehension by which 'this' is known to be something, or a being, there is no need to apprehend it from itself or from another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.
70 Contra istud etiam est confirmatio ad quartum argumentum supra dictum, quod erat de inquisitione intellectus ƿquam habemus de Deo per naturalem investigationem: in qua illas rationes creaturae quae dicunt imperfectionem de se separamus ab imperfectione cum qua sunt in creaturis, et eas secundum se acceptas consideramus ut indifferentes, et eis attribuimus perfectionem summam; et sic acceptas in summo, attribuimus eas Creatori ut proprias sibi.	70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] - Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which was about the inquiry of the intellect, which inquiry we make by natural investigation about God [I d.3 n.39]; here the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves are separated by us from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute to them supreme perfection; and, when thus taken as supreme, we attribute them to the Creator as proper to him.
71 Ita arguit Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 3 vel 6: ((Quoniam rebus creatis Creatorem sine dubitatione praeponimus, oportet eum et summe vivere, et cuncta sentire atque intelligere)). Hoc probat ipse ex hoc quod ((viventia non viventibus, sensu praedita non sentientibus, intelligentia non intelligentibus, immortalia mortalibus, bona malis praeferenda iudicamus)), - quod argumentum non videtur valere si talia, ut praeferuntur in creaturis, non essent eiusdem rationis cum illis quae talia in summo attribuuntur Deo.	71. Thus does Augustine argue On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: "Since we put the Creator without any doubt before created things, he must both supremely live, and perceive and understand all things." This he himself proves from the fact that "we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones," - which argument does not seem valid if such things, as they are displayed in creatures, were not of the same idea as those which, when such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.
72 Consimilia argumenta frequenter fiunt sive habentur a doctoribus et a sanctis. Ita enim formaliter ponitur in Deo intellectus et voluntas, et non tantum absolute sed cum infinitate, - ita potentia et sapientia; ita ponitur liberum arbitrium: et Anselmus De libero arbitrio ƿcap. 1 reprehendit illam definitionem quod liberum arbitrium 'est potestas peccandi', quia secundum eum tunc - secundum hoc - non esset in Deo liberum arbitrium, quod est falsum; quae improbatio nulla esset si secundum aliam rationem omnino diceretur liberum arbitrium de Deo et de creatura.	72. The like arguments [sc. taking creaturely imperfection away and attributing supreme perfection to God, n.71] are frequently made or held by the doctors and saints. For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, - thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm On Free Choice ch.1 blames the definition that says free choice 'is the power of sinning', because according to him free choice would then - according to this definition -not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.
73 Haec etiam est via Dionysii, quia quando per tertiam viam sive in tertio gradu, pervenerit ad illam 'cognitionem per remotionem', quaero an praecise cognoscatur ibi illa negatio, - et tunc non plus cognoscitur Deus quam chimaera, quia illa negatio est communis enti et non enti; aut cognoscitur ibi aliquod positivum, cui attribuitur illa negatio, - et tunc de illo positivo quaero quomodo conceptus eius habetur in intellectu: si per viam causalitatis et eminentiae non habetur aliquis conceptus, prius causatus in intellectu, nihil omnino cognoscetur positivum cui attribuatur illa negatio.	73. This is also the way of Dionysius [On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or on the third level, he has come to the 'knowledge by remotion' [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, - and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there to which the negation is attributed, - and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if no concept by way of causality and eminence is possessed, previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.
74 Confirmatur etiam ista ratio, quia non dicimus Deum formaliter lapidem, sed formaliter sapientem: et tamen si praecise consiƿderetur attributio conceptus ad conceptum, ita posset formaliter lapis attribui ad aliquid in Deo - ut ad ideam suam - sicut sapientia.	74. There is a conformation for this reason [n.70], that we do not say that God is formally a stone but we do say that he is formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept is precisely considered, stone could be formally attributed to something in God - as to his idea - just like wisdom is.
75 $a Respondetur quod Deus non dicitur sapiens quia est in eo idea sapientiae, sed quia est in eo talis perfectio simpliciter, licet alterius rationis a sapientia creata. Contra:	75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because such a perfection simply is in him, although of a different idea from created wisdom. On the contrary:
76 Illius 'sapientiae in Deo' est sapientia nostra quaedam participatio, similiter et ideae: idem autem non participat essentialiter nisi unicum perfectum.	76. Our wisdom is a certain participation in the 'wisdom in God', and likewise also in the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.
77 Item, relatio ideati ad ideam est relatio mensurati ad mensuram; sed unicum mensuratum non nisi ad unicam mensuram refertur, - idea est mensura eius; ergo cum sapientia, qua Deus est sapiens, sit mensura eiusdem, non distinguitur ab idea (responsio: idea est mensura propria et proprium participatum, vel magis, relatio mensurae et participati, - sapientia non sic, sed est fundamentum relationis mensurae et participati, et commune, non proprium, quia ita participat una creatura perfectionem illam sicut alia). a$ ƿ	77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, - the idea is its measure; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, -wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and is common, not proper, because one creature participates the perfection in just the way another does).
78 Et similiter, si dicas quod de Deo concludimus aliquid per rationem effectus, ubi sufficit tantum proportio et non similitudo, hoc non respondet, sed confirmat argumentum, quia considerando Deum sub ratione causae, ex creaturis bene cognoscitur proportionaliter, sed hoc modo non cognoscitur de Deo aliqua perfecti, quae est in creatura formaliter, sed causaliter, scilicet quod Deus sit causa talis perfectionis. Attributa autem sunt perfectiones simpliciter dictae de Deo formaliter, - ergo talia cognoscuntur de Deo non solum per viam proportionis sed etiam per viam similitudinis, ita quod oportet ponere aliquem conceptum communem in talibus Deo et creaturae, qualis non est communis in prima via cagnoscendo Deum per viam causalitatis.	78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of effects, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient - this does not reply to, but confirms, the argument [n.70], because, by considering God under the idea of cause, he is from creatures known proportionally well enough, but in this way there is not known about God any perfect thing's perfection that is in creatures formally, but only causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections stated simply of God formally - therefore such attributes are known about God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept in such attributes common to God and creatures, and the common concept in the first way, knowing God by way of causality, is not of this sort.
79 Ad istud est auctoritas Philosophi II Metaphysicae 2, qui arguens 'principia sempiternorum esse verissima', probat hoc per istam maiorem, quia 'unumquodque est maxime tale secundum quod aliis inest univocatio', et exemplificat de igne; et ex hoc concludit quod ' sempiternorum principia necesse est esse verissima'. Ista consequentia non valet nisi in virtute istius minoris, quod principia illa sempiterna 'sunt causa univoca veritatis in aliis'. ƿSi enim accipiatur in minore quod illa principia sunt aequivoca vel analoga, erunt quattuor termini in syllogismo Philosophi, quod non est verisimile.	79. For this argument [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that 'the principles of eternal things are most true', proves it through this major, that 'that thing is in each case maximally such whereby univocity is predicated in other things', and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that 'the principles of eternal things must be most true'. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of the following minor, that the eternal principles 'are the univocal cause of truth in other things'. For if in the minor the proposition is taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher's syllogism, which is not likely.
80 Ad argumenta opinionis oppositae. Ad primum. Aut intelligit in minore quod 'illa sunt sub extremis contradictionis totaliter', hoc est, quod praecise sunt illa extrema contradictionis, - et sic illa minor est falsa; Deus enim non est praecise hoc 'non ab alio', quia ista negatio dicitur de chimaera, nec creatura est praecise ista negatio 'non necesse esse', quia hoc convenit chimaerae, - sed tam Deus quam creatura est aliquid cui convenit alterum extremum contradictionis. Accipe tunc maiorem quod quaecumque sunt talia quibus conveniunt extrema contradictionis 'ipsa non univocantur in aliquo': ista maior ƿest falsa, nam omnia per se dividentia aliquod commune sunt talia quod de ipsis dicuntur extrema contradictionis, et tamen univocantur in ipso diviso. Ita in proposito: possunt ista secundum se tota recipere praedicationem contradictionis, et tamen possunt habere aliquid abstractum - vel substratum illis extremis illius contradictionis - quod est commune ambobus.	80. To the arguments for the opposite opinion [n.44]. To the first [n.45]. Either one understands in the minor the 'they are totally under the extremes of a contradiction', that is, that they are precisely under the extremes of a contradiction, - and thus the minor is false; for God is not precisely the extreme 'not from another', because this negation is said of a chimaera, nor is a creature precisely the negation 'not a necessary being', because this belongs to a chimaera, - but both God and a creature are something to which one or other side of a contradiction belongs. Take the major then to mean that whatever things are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction belong to them, that 'these things are not univocally spoken of in anything'; this major is false, for all things that per se divide something common are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction are said of them, and yet they are univocally spoken of in that division. So in the intended proposition: these things can all receive, according to themselves, the predication of a contradiction, and yet they can have something abstract -or some substrate of the extremes of the contradiction - which is common to both [sc. extremes].
81 Ad confirmationem 'de neutro' dico quod conceptus etiam communis duobus, est neuter formaliter, et ita concedo conclusionem quod conceptus entis non est formaliter conceptus creati nec increati; si autem intelligatur quod iste conceptus est ita neuter quod neutrum contradictoriorum dicatur de eo, falsum est. Ita est enim de rationali et irrationali, quod conceptus animalis est respectu eorum neuter formaliter, et tamen illud quod concipitur non est neutrum, sed vere est alterum istorum. Alterum enim contradictoriorum dicitur de quolibet, et tamen non oportet quemlibet conceptum esse formaliter alterum conceptum contradictoriorum.	81. As to the confirmation about the 'neutral' [n.46], I say that even a concept common to two things is neutral formally, and so I concede the conclusion that the concept of being is not formally the concept of something created or of something uncreated [I d.3 n.27]; but if the understanding be that this concept is neutral such that neither of the contradictories is said of it, it is false. For thus it is about rational and irrational, that the concept animal is formally neutral with respect to them, and yet that which is conceived is not neutral but is truly one or other of them. For one or other of the contradictories is said of any animal whatever, and yet it is not necessary that any concept whatever is formally one or other of the contradictories.
82 Ad tertium patebit in tertio articulo 'quia Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus'; sunt tamen primo diversa in realitate, quia in nulla realitate conveniunt, - et quomodo possit esse conceptus communis sine convenientia in re vel realitate, in sequentibus dicetur. ƿ	82. As to the third [n.47] the answer will be plain in the third article 'that God and creatures are not diverse first in their concepts' [nn.95-127]; they are, however, diverse first in reality, because they agree in no reality - and how there can be a common concept without agreement in thing or in reality will be said in what follows [nn.137-150].
83 Ad aliud, de attributione, dico quod attributio sola non ponit unitatem, quia unitas attributionis minor est unitate univocationis, et minor non concludit maiorem; tamen minor unitas potest stare cum maiore unitate, sicut aliqua quae sunt unum genere, sunt unum specie, licet unitas generis sit minor quam unitas speciei. Ita hic, concedo quod unitas attributionis non ponit unitatem univocationis, et tamen cum ista unitate attributionis stat unitas univocationis, licet haec formaliter non sit illa exemplum: species eiusdem generis habent essentialem attributionem ad primum illius generis (X Metaphysicae), et tamen cum hoc stat unitas univocationis rationis generis in ipsis speciebus. Ita - et multo magis - oportet esse in proposito, quod in ratione entis, in qua est unitas attributionis, attributa habeant unitatem univocationis, quia numquam aliqua comparantur ut mensurata ad mensuram, vel excessa ad excedens, nisi in aliquo uno conveniant. Sicut enim comparatio simpliciter est in simpliciter univoco (VII Physicorum), ita omnis comparatio in aliqualiter univoco. Quando enim dicitur 'hoc est perfectius illo', si quaeratur 'quid perfectius?', ibi oportet assignare aliquid commune utrique, ita quod omnis comparativi determinabile est commune utrique extremo comparationis; non enim homo est perfectior homo quam asinus, sed perfectius animal. Et ita, si ƿaliqua comparantur in entitate in qua est attributio unius ad alterum ('hoc perfectius est illo: quid perfectius? - ens perfectius'), oportet unitatem esse aliquo modo communem utrique extremo.	83. To the next one, about attribution [n.48], I say that attribution by itself does not posit unity, because the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocity, and the lesser does not include the greater; yet a lesser unity can stand along with a greater unity, just as things that are one in genus are one in species, although the unity of a genus is less than the unity of a species. So here, I concede that the unity of attribution does not posit unity of univocity, and yet this unity of attribution stands along with unity of univocity, although this unity is not formally that unity, example: the species of the same genus have an essential attribution to the first thing of that genus (Metaphysics 10.1.1052b18), and yet there stands along with this the unity of univocity of idea in those species. Thus -and much more so - must it be in the proposed case, that the attributes may have in idea of being, in which there is unity of attribution, a unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure, or as exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in some one thing. But just as comparison simply is in the univocal simply (Physics 7.4.248b6-7), so any comparison is in what is somehow or other univocal. For when it is said 'this is more perfect than that', if it is asked 'a more perfect what?', one must assign something common to both, so that the determinable of every comparative is common to each extreme of the comparison; for a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but is a more perfect animal. And so, if certain things are compared in being, where there is attribution of one to the other ('this is more perfect than that; a more perfect what? - a more perfect being'), there must be a unity in some way common to each extreme.
84 Ita etiam posset argui de numero vel de distinctione, quia omnia distincta vel numerata habent aliquid commune, sicut vult Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 7: $a ((Si tres personae dicantur, commune est eis id quod est persona)), - ita quod determinabile termini numeralis semper sit commune (secundum Augustinum) numeratis omnibus. - Et si instetur quod non est proprie numerus Dei et creaturae, arguo de diverso vel distincto vel alio, sic: Deus et creatura sunt diversa vel distincta, vel Deus est aliud vel alius a creatura. In omnibus istis determinabile distinctionis, sive expressae singularitatis vel pluralitatis, oportet esse commune utrique extremo, - patet in omnibus exemplis, quia homo non est 'alius homo ab asino', sed 'aliud animal'. Istud probatur ratione, quia in relationibus aequiparantiae extrema sunt eiusdem rationis; alietas est talis relatio; ergo in quibuscumque 'aliis' est alietas unius rationis, mutua, et per consequens determinabile alietatis erit unius ƿrationis. Huic non innitaris, quia concluderet quod fundamentum sit eiusdem rationis, unde minor est contra articulum 'de alio'. a$	84. Thus may it also be argued about number or about distinction, because all distinct or numbered things have something common, as Augustine means in On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7: "If three persons are spoken of, common to them is what a person is," - so that the determinable of a numerable term is always something common (according to Augustine) to all the numbered things. - And if it be instanced that there is properly no number of God and creatures, I argue about the diverse or the distinct or the other, thus: God and a creature are diverse or distinct, or God is something, or someone, other than a creature. In all these cases the determinable of the distinction, or of the stated singularity or plurality, must be common to each extreme - the point is plain in all examples, because a man is not 'another man than an ass' but 'another animal'. This is proved by reason, because in relations of equal comparison the extremes are of the same idea; otherness is such a relation; therefore in all things 'other' there is an otherness of the same idea, and consequently the determinable of otherness will be of one idea. Do not rely on this, because it would conclude that the foundation is of the same idea, hence the minor ['otherness is such a relation'] is contrary to the article about 'other'.
85 Cum arguitur de Dionysio, patet potius in tertio argumento, quod intentio Dionysii est ad oppositum, quia in tertio gradu non statur in sola negatione sed in aliquo conceptu accepto a creatura, cui attribuitur illa negatio.	85. As for the argument from Dionysius [n.49], it is clear rather in the third argument [n.73] that the intention of Dionysius is to the opposite, because at the third level a stand is not made at negation alone, but at some concept taken from creatures, to which that negation is attributed.
86 Ad Augustinum respondeo quod 'illud bonum cuius participatione alia bona sunt' (quod intelligitur intelligendo hoc bonum et illud), vel potest poni universale ad omnia bona, et tunc eius participatione sunt 'alia bona' (sicut species participat genus, vel aliquod inferius participat superius) vel potest intelligi bonum per essentiam, cuius ut causae participatione alia bona sunt, et tunc verum est quod intelligendo hoc bonum et illud bonum, intelligo bonum per essentiam, sed in universali, sicut intelligendo hoc ens intelligo ens ut partem conceptus, et in ente intelligo quodcumque ens in universali. Et cum subdit 'si potes illud per se nosse', dico quod ly 'per se' si referatur non ad actum cognoƿscendi sed ad obiectum, - puta quod cognoscam illud bonum, quod cognosco in universali, cum ista determinatione 'per se', ita scilicet quod concipiam bonum cum tali determinatione quod sit bonum non dependens et bonum per essentiam, - intelligo Deum non tantum in conceptu communi sed in conceptu proprio, et tunc per hoc quod dicitur 'per se' contrahitur bonum quod erat commune et fit proprium Deo: et isti inhaerendo per fruitionem, est beatitudo (loquendo de beatitudine viae), quia iste conceptus est perfectissimus quem possumus habere concipiendo naturaliter Deum.	86. To Augustine [n.50] I reply that 'the good by participation in which other things are good' (which good is understood by understanding this good and that) can either be posited as a universal to all goods, and then 'the other goods' are by participation in it (the way a species participates the genus, or as any inferior participates the superior), or it can be understood as the good in essence, by participation in which, as in their cause, the other goods are, and then it is true that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good in essence, but in the case of the universal I understand good the way that, when understanding this being, I understand being as part of its concept, and that in being I understand any being whatever universally. And when Augustine adds 'if you can know it in itself [n.50], I say that if the 'in itself is referred, not to the act of knowing, but to the object [sc. if 'in itself goes with 'it' not with 'know'], - to wit, that I know the good, which I know universally, with the determination 'in itself, namely that I conceive the good with the sort of determination that it is a non-dependent good and good in essence - then I understand God not only in a common concept but in a proper concept, and then, by the phrase 'in itself', the good that was common is contracted and becomes proper to God; and beatitude lies in cleaving to this good by enjoyment (speaking of the beatitude of the way [sc. as opposed to the beatitude of the heavenly fatherland]), because this concept is the most perfect we can have in conceiving God naturally.
87 Et ista apparet esse intentio Augustini De libero arbitrio, vel alias in eodem libro cap. 3, ubi dicit de veritate: ((noli quaerere quid veritas sit, quia statim obicient se phantasmata)), etc.; quod non esset verum si esset omnino alius conceptus entis vel boni, in Deo, a conceptu illorum in creatura. Tunc enim bene esset quaerendum 'quid veritas', quia tunc esset veritas quaerenda quae est propria Deo, nec obicerent se ibi phantasmata perturbantia conceptum veritatis ut est propria Deo quia ille conceptus non habet phantasma sibi correspondens. Perturbant autem conceptum veritatis ut convenit Deo, loquendo de veritate in communi, sicut alias est expositum. ƿ	87. And this appears to be the intention of Augustine in On Free Choice of the Will II chs.8-14 nn.23-28 - or elsewhere in the same book [On the Trinity VIII, n.50], where he says: "do not look for what truth is, because at once phantasms will present themselves, etc.;" which would not be true if there was a concept of being or of good in God altogether different from the concept of them in creatures. For then one well ought to look for 'what truth is', because then a truth would be looked for that is proper to God, nor would phantasms there present themselves to disturb the concept of truth as it is proper to God, because this concept does not have concepts corresponding to it. But they do disturb the concept of truth as it belongs to God when speaking of truth universally, as has been expounded elsewhere [I d.3 n.193].
88 Si autem aliqui proterviant, unum esse conceptum entis, et tamen nullum esse univocum isti et illi, - istud non est ad intentionem istius quaestionis, quia quantumcumque illud quod concipitur sit secundum attributionem vel ordinem in diversis, si tamen conceptus de se unus est ita quod non habet aliam rationem secundum quam dicitur de hoc et de illo, ille conceptus est univocus.	88. But there are some who shamelessly insist that there is one concept of being and yet none that is univocal to this thing and that, - this is not to the intention of this question, because, whatever it is that is conceived according to attribution or order in diverse things, yet if there is a concept of itself one, such that it does not have a different idea according as it is said of this and of that, that concept is univocal.
89 Si etiam alio modo proterviat aliquis, quod conceptus denominativus non est univocus, quia ratio subiecti non est ratio praedicati, - haec videtur instantia puerilis, quia uno modo praedicatum denominativum est medium inter praedicatum univocum et aequivocum, alio modo aequivocum et univocum sunt immediata apud logicum. Primum verum est accipiendo praedicatum univocum quod univoce praedicatur, hoc est quod scilicet ratio eius sit ratio subiecti, et isto modo denominativum non est univocum. Secundum verum est intelligendo de unitate rationis eius quod praedicatur; sic univocum est cuius ratio est in se una, sive illa ratio sit ratio subiecti sive denominet subiectum, sive per accidens dicatur de subiecto, aequivocum autem cuius ratio est alia, quomodocumque illa ratio se habeat ad subiectum. Exemplum: animal est univocum, non tantum ut dicitur de speciebus suis sed ut determinatur per differentias, quia habet unum conceptum determinabilem per eas, et tamen non dicitur de differentiis univoce, ita quod in 'quid', ita quod ratio eius sit ratio differentiarum, quo modo dicitur univoce de speciebus. Ista etiam altercatio nihil est ad propositum, quia si ens dicatur secundum unum conceptum sui de Deo et creatura, oportet dicere quod ratio entis est ratio subiecti: dicetur enim de utroque in 'quid', et ita erit univocum utroque modo. ƿ	89. Also if anyone in any way shamelessly insists that a denominative concept is not univocal, because the idea of the subject is not of the idea of the predicate, - this instance seems puerile, because in one way a denominative predicate is a middle between a univocal and an equivocal predicate, in another an equivocal and a univocal predicate are, in logic, immediate [extremes]. The first is true when taking a univocal predicate which is univocally predicated, that is because, namely, its idea is the idea of the subject, and in this way a denominative predicate is not univocal. The second is true when understanding it of the unity of the idea which is predicated; thus a univocal concept is that whose idea is in itself one, or the idea is the idea of the subject, whether it denominates the subject or is said per accidens of the subject, but an equivocal concept is that whose idea is different, however that idea is disposed to the subject. An example: animal is univocal, not only as said of its species but also as determined by its differences, because it has one concept determinable by them, and yet it is not said univocally of the differences, such that it is predicated in their 'what' - such that its idea is the idea of the differences, the way it is said of the species. Also, this dispute is nothing to the purpose, because if being is said about God and creatures according to a single concept of itself, one must say that the idea of being is the idea of the subject; for it will be said of both in the 'what', and so it will be univocal in both ways.
90 Alia est opinio affirmativa, in alio extremo, quae ponit Deum esse in genere, - et habent pro se etiam auctoritatem Damasceni, in Elementario cap. 10: ((Substantia)) etc.	90. The other opinion is affirmative, at the other extreme [n.44], which posits that God is in a genus - and they [sc. those who hold this opinion] have also on their behalf the authority of Damascene Elementary Instruction on Dogmas ch.7: "Incorporeal substance etc."
91 Item, Boethii, in libello De Trinitate, ubi videtur dicere quod duo genera manent in divinis. Hoc non potest intelligi tantum secundum modum aliquem similem praedicandi, quia XV De Trinitate cap. 6 dicit Augustinus sic: ((Si dicatur Deus bonus, iustus, spiritus)) etc., ((solum ultimum quod dixi, substantiam significare videtur, et reliqua qualitates)); item, V De Trinitate 11, videtur dicere quod actio propriissime conveniat Deo. Ergo non tantum manent modi praedicandi similes duobus istis generibus, et ita videtur quod oporteat intelligere Boethium 'de illis duobus generibus' auod in se maneant. ƿ	91. Again Boethius in his little book On the Trinity ch.4, where he seems to say that two genera remain in divine reality. This cannot be understood only according to some similar mode of predicating, because Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.8 speaks thus: "If God be called good, just, spirit" etc., "only the last one I mentioned seems to signify substance, and the rest qualities;" and On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 he seems to say that action most properly agrees with God. Therefore it is not merely the modes of predicating similar to those genera that remain, and in this way does it seem one should understand Boethius 'about those two genera' that in themselves remain.
92 Tertio, ad hoc videtur auctoritas Averrois X Metaphysicae commento 7 (et incipit textus ((Et ens dicitur))), ubi Philosophus dicit 'aliquam esse unam primam substantiam', quae sit mensura aliarum. Commentator vult quod illa sit primus motor. Ergo sicut in aliis generibus 'primum' est aliquid illius generis, ita primus motor est aliquid de genere substantiae.	92. Third for this opinion seems to be the authority of Averroes Metaphysics X com.7 (and the text begins "And being is said"), where the Philosopher says that "there is some one first substance," which is the measure of the others [Metaphysics 10.2.1054a8-9, 11-13]. The Commentator wants this first substance to be the prime mover. Therefore, just as in the case of other genera the 'first' is something of that genus, so the first mover is something of the genus of substance.
93 Ad hoc ratio prima ponitur talis, quia potest concipi substantia creata et substantia increata, et neuter conceptus est simpliciter simplex. Ergo resolvendo, remanebit ratio substantiae, indifferens ad utrumque contrahens, - et sic indifferenter accepta videtur esse ratio generis.	93. A first reason set down for this opinion is of the following sort, that created substance can be conceived from uncreated substance, and that neither concept is simply simple. Therefore, by resolution, the idea of substance will remain, indifferent to each contracting instance - and the idea of genus seems to be thus indifferently taken.
94 Secunda ratio est, quia multa entia simplicia ponuntur in genere, ƿsicut angeli, secundum ponentes eos esse immateriales, - accidentia etiam, secundum ponentes ea esse simplicia. Ergo simplicitas Dei non excludit rationem generis ab eo.	94. A second reason is that many simple entities are placed in a genus, such as angels, according to those who posit them to be immaterial - accidents too, according to those who posit them to be simple. Therefore the simplicity of God does not exclude from him the idea of genus.
95 Teneo opinionem mediam, quod cum simplicitate Dei stat quod aliquis conceptus sit communis sibi et creaturae, - non tamen aliquis conceptus communis ut generis, $a quia nec conceptus dictus in 'quid' de Deo, nec qualitercumque formali praedicatione dictus de ipso, est per se in aliquo genere. a$	95. I hold a middle opinion, that along with the simplicity of God stands the fact that some concept is common to him and to creatures - not however some common concept as of a genus, because the concept is not said of God in the 'what', nor is it, by whatever formal predication said of him, per se in any genus.
96 Prima pars probata est arguendo contra primam opinionem.	96. The first part was proved when arguing against the first opinion [nn.44, 51-79].
97 Secundam partem probo per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 8: ((Manifestum est Deum abusive dici 'substantiam')). - Ratio sua est ibi, quia substantia dicitur eo quod substat accidentibus; absurdum est autem dicere quod Deus substet alicui accidenti; ergo etc. Haec ratio sic tenet: non intelligit quod ratio substantiae sit 'substare accidentibus ut substantia est genus', quia praemisit ƿibi quod ((absurdum est ut substantia relative dicatur)) . Sed substantia, ut est genus, est limitata, sicut statim post probabitur; omnis autem substantia limitata capax est accidentis; ergo substantia quaecumque quae est in genere, potest substare alicui accidenti, Deus non, ergo etc.	97. The second part I prove by Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.5 n.10: "It is manifest that God is improperly called a 'substance'." - His reason there is that substance is said to be that which stands under the accidents; but it is absurd to say that God stands under any accident; therefore etc. This reason holds in this way: Augustine does not understand that the idea of substance is 'to stand under accidents as substance is a genus', because he has given there as premise that "it is absurd that substance be said relatively." But substance, as it is a genus, is limited, as will be immediately proved next [nn.101-107]; but every limited substance is able to receive an accident; therefore any substance that is in a genus can stand under some accident, - God does not so stand, therefore etc.
98 Item, arguit Avicenna VIII Metaphysicae cap. 4, quod Deus non est in genere, quia genus est 'pars'; Deus autem simplex est, non habens partem et partem; ergo Deus non est in genere.	98. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb) argues that God is not in a genus, because a genus is a 'part'; but God is simple, not possessing part and part; therefore God is not in a genus.
99 Istae duae probationes sunt simul verae per auctoritatem et rationem.	99. These two reasons [nn.97-98] are true by authority and reason together.
100 Nunc ostendo propositum duobus mediis (et declarantur ex his quae sunt propria Deo): primo, ex ratione infinitatis, - secundo, ex ratione necesse esse.	100. I now show the intended proposition [n.95] by two middle terms (and they are made clear from things proper to God): first from the idea of infinity, - second from the idea of necessary existence.
101 Ex primo arguo dupliciter. Primo sic: conceptus habens indifferentiam ad aliqua ad quae non potest conceptus generis esse indifferens, non potest esse conceptus generis; sed quidquid communiter dicitur de Deo et creatura, est indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, loquendo de essentialibus, - vel saltem ad finitum et non finitum, loquendo de quiƿbuscumque, quia relatio divina non est finita; nullum genus potest esse indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, ergo etc.	101. [From the idea of infinity] - From the first I argue in two ways. First as follows: a concept having an indifference to certain things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus; but something commonly said of God and creatures is indifferent to the finite and infinite, speaking of essential features, - or at any rate indifferent to the finite and non-finite, speaking of any feature whatever, because divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to the finite and infinite, therefore etc.
102 Prima pars minoris patet, quia quidquid est in Deo perfectio essentialis, est formaliter infinitum, - in creatura, finitum.	102. The first part of the minor is plain, because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, - in creatures it is finite.
103 Secundam partem minoris probo, quia genus sumitur ab aliqua realitate quae secundum se est potentialis ad realitatem a qua accipitur differentia; nullum infinitum est potentiale ad aliquid, ut patet ex dictis in quaestione praecedente. $a Probatio ista stat in compositione speciei et potentialitate generis, sed utraque removetur a Deo, propter infinitatem. a$	103. I prove the second part of the minor by the fact that a genus is taken from some reality which, in itself, is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is plain from what was said in the preceding question. This proof stands on the composition of species and the potentiality of genus, but both these are removed from God, because of infinity.
104 Assumptum hoc patet auctoritate Aristotelis VIII Metaphysicae: ((Oportet terminum)) (id est definitionem) ((esse propositionem longam)), ((eo quod significat aliquid de aliquo, ita quod oportet illud esse materiam, illud vero formam)).	104. This assumption [n.103] is plain from the authority of Aristotle Metaphysics 8.3.1043b25-26: "The term" (that is, the definition) "must be an extended proposition," "because of the fact that it signifies something of something, so that the latter is matter and the former is form."
105 Apparet etiam per rationem, quia si illa realitas, a qua accipiƿtur genus, esset vere tota quiditas rei, solum genus complete definiret, - genus etiam et differentia non definirent, quia ratio ex eis composita non indicaret primo idem definito: unaquaeque enim res est semel ipsa, et ideo illa ratio quae bis exprimeret eam, non indicaret primo idem quiditati illius rei.	105. The same assumption is also apparent by reason, because if the reality from which the genus is taken were truly the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would completely define it, - also genus and difference would not define it, because the account composed of them would not indicate what is first the same as the thing defined; for each thing is itself once, and therefore an account that would express it twice would not indicate what is first the same as the quiddity of the thing.
106 Hanc rationem aliqualiter pertractando intelligo sic, quod in aliquibus creaturis genus et differentia accipiuntur ab alia et alia realitate (sicut ponendo plures formas in homine, animal accipitur a sensitiva et rationale ab intellectiva), et tunc illa res, a qua accipitur genus, vere est potentialis et perfectibilis ab illa re a qua accipitur differentia. Aliquando, quando non sunt ibi res et res (sicut in accidentibus), saltem in una re est aliqua propria realitas a qua sumitur genus et alia realitas a qua sumitur differentia; dicatur prima a et secunda b: a secundum se est potentiale ad b, ita quod praecise intelligendo a et praecise intelligendo b, a ut intelligitur in primo instanti naturae - in quo praecise est ipsum - ipsum est perfectibile per b (sicut si res esset alia), sed quod non perficitur realiter per b, hoc est propter identitatem a et b ad aliquod totum, ƿcui realiter primo sunt eadem, quod quidem totum primo producitur et in ipso toto ambae istae realitates producuntur; si tamen altera istarum sine altera produceretur, vere esset potentialis ad eam et vere esset imperfecta sine illa.	106. Treating further in some way of this reasoning [n.105], I understand it thus, that genus and difference are, in the case of some creatures, taken from one and another reality (as, by positing there to be several forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellective form), and then the thing from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by the thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there is not there thing and thing (as in the case of accidents), at any rate there is in the one thing some reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called a and the second b; a is in itself potential to b, so that, by understanding a precisely and b precisely, in the way a is understood in the first instant of nature - the instant in which it is precisely itself - it is perfectible by b (as if it were another thing), but the fact that it is not perfected really by b is because of the identity of a and b with some whole with which they are first really the same, and this whole is indeed what is first produced and in this very whole both those realities are produced; but if either of them were produced without the other, it would be truly potential to it and truly imperfect without it.
107 Ista compositio realitatum - potentialis et actualis - minima est, quae sufficit ad rationem generis et differentiae, et ista non stat cum hoc quod quaelibet realitas in aliquo sit infinita: realitas enim si esset de se infinita, quantumcumque praecise sumpta, non esset in potentia ad aliquam realitatem; ergo cum in Deo quaecumque realitas essentialis sit formaliter infinita, nulla est a qua formaliter possit accipi ratio generis.	107. This composition of realities - of potential and actual - is the least that is sufficient for the idea of genus and difference, and it does not stand along with the fact that some reality is infinite in something; for if the reality were of itself infinite, however much it is precisely taken, it would not be in potency to any reality; therefore since in God any essential reality is formally infinite, there is none from which the idea of genus can formally be taken.
108 Secundo, ex eodem medio, arguo sic: conceptus speciei non est tantum conceptus realitatis et modi intrinseci eiusdem realitatis, quia tunc albedo posset esse genus, et gradus intrinseci albedinis possent esse differentiae specificae; illa autem per quae commune aliquod contrahitur ad Deum et creaturam, sunt finitum et infinitum, qui dicunt gradus intrinsecos ƿipsius; ergo ista contrahentia non possunt esse differentiae, nec cum contracto constituunt conceptum ita compositum sicut oportet conceptum speciei esse compositum, immo conceptus ex tali contracto et contrahente est simplicior quam possit esse conceptus speciei.	108. [Again from the idea of infinity] - Second, from the same middle [n.100], I argue as follows: the concept of a species is not only the concept of a reality and of a mode intrinsic to the same reality, because then whiteness would be a genus and the degrees of intrinsic whiteness could be the specific differences; but those things by which something common is contracted to God and creatures are the finite and infinite, which state intrinsic degrees of it; therefore the contracting things cannot be the differences, nor do they constitute with the contracted thing a composite composed in the way the concept of a species should be composed, nay the concept from such a contracted and contracting thing is simpler than the concept of a species could be.
109 Ex istis mediis de infinitate, habet evidentiam ratio illa Augustini supra dicta 'de substare accidentibus'. Habet etiam evidentiam ratio Avicennae VIII Metaphysicae 'de partialitate generis' supra tacta, quia numquam est genus sine aliqua partiali realitate in specie, quae non potest esse in vere simplici.	109. From these middles about infinity, the reasoning of Augustine stated above about 'standing under the accidents' [n.97] gets its evidence. Thence too does Avicenna's reasoning get its evidence, in Metaphysics VIII 'about the partial nature of genus' touched on above [n.98], because a genus is never without some partial reality in the species, which reality cannot be in something really simple.
110 Arguo tertio ex secundo medio, scilicet ex ratione necesse esse, - et est argumentum Avicennae VIII ƿMetaphysicae cap. 4: si necesse esse habet genus, ergo intentio generis vel erit ex se necesse esse, vel non. Si primo modo, ((tunc non cessabit quousque sit differentia)); hoc intelligo sic: genus tunc includet differentiam, quia sine illa non est in actu ultimo et 'necesse ex se' est in actu ultimo (si autem genus includit differentiam, tunc non est genus). Si detur secundum membrum, sequitur quod necesse esse erit constitutum ab eo quod non est necesse esse)).	110. [From the idea of necessary existence] - I argue, third, from the second middle, namely from the idea of necessary existence [n.100], - and it is the argument of Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb): if necessary existence has a genus, then the intention of the genus will either be from necessary existence or not. If in the first way, "then it will only cease at the difference;" I understand this as follows: the genus will in that case include the difference, because without it the genus is not in ultimate act and 'necessary existence of itself is in ultimate act (but if the genus includes the difference, then it is not the genus). If the second way be granted, then it follows that "necessary existence will be constituted by that which is not necessary existence."
111 $a Sed haec ratio probat quod necesse esse nihil commune habet cum alio, quia illa intentio communis est 'non necesse esse'; unde respondeo: intentio intellecta nec includit necessitatem nec possibilitatem, sed est indifferens; illud autem in re quod correspondet intentioni, in 'hoc' est necesse esse, in 'illo' possibile (hoc improbatur si intentioni generis correspondet propria realitas, et non sic alii intentioni communi, - sicut dicitur. a$~1 ƿ	111. But this reasoning [n.110] proves that necessary existence has nothing common with anything, because the common intention is 'non-necessary existence'; hence I respond: the intention as understood includes neither necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; but as to that in the thing which corresponds to the intention, it is in 'this thing' necessary existence, and in 'that thing' it is possible existence (this is rejected if to the intention of the genus a proper reality corresponds, and if it does not thus correspond to the common intention, - as is said [later, n.139].
112 Quoad illud quod additur in quaestione 'de quocumque formaliter dicto de Deo', dico quod nihil tale est in genere, propter idem, quia nihil dicitur formaliter de Deo quod est limitatum; quidquid est alicuius generis, quomodocumque sit illius generis, est limitatum necessario.	112. [As to 'whatever is said formally of God'] - As to that which is added in the question 'about whatever is formally said of God' [n.39], I say nothing such is in a genus, for the same reason [nn.95-111], that nothing which is limited is said formally of God; whatever is of some genus, in whatever way it is of that genus, is necessarily limited.
113 Sed tunc est dubium, qualia sunt illa praedicata quae dicuntur de Deo, ut sapiens, bonus, etc. Respondeo. Ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem praedicamenta, quia alterum istorum, scilicet 'finitum', ƿest commune ad decem genera; ergo quaecumque conveniunt enti ut indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus sed ut prius, et per consequens ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus. Quaecumque sunt communia Deo et creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indifferens ad finitum et infinitum: ut enim conveniunt Deo, sunt infinita, - ut creaturae, sunt finita; ergo per prius conveniunt enti quam ens dividatur in decem genera, et per consequens quodcumque tale est transcendens.	113. But then there is a doubt, as to what sort the predicates are which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc. I reply. Being is divided first into finite and infinite before it is divided into the ten categories, because one of them, namely 'finite', is common to these ten genera; therefore anything that agrees with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite, or as proper to infinite being, agrees with being, not as it is determined to a genus, but as prior, and consequently as it is transcendent and outside every genus. Anything that is common to God and creatures is such as to agree with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite; for as it agrees with God it is infinite, - as it agrees with creatures, it is finite; therefore it agrees with being before being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent.
114 Sed tunc est aliud dubium, quomodo ponitur sapientia 'transcendens' cum non sit communis omnibus entibus. Respondeo. Sicut de ratione 'generalissimi' non est habere sub se plures species sed non habere aliud supraveniens genus (sicut hoc praedicamentum 'quando' - quia non habet supraveniens genus - est generalissimum, licet paucas habeat species, vel nullas), ita transcendens quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo contineatur. Unde de ratione transcendentis est non habere praedicatum supraveniens nisi ens, sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc accidit.	114. But then there is another doubt, as to how 'wisdom' is set down as transcendent although it is not common to all beings. I reply. Just as the idea of 'most general' is not the having of several species under it but the not having any genus above it (just as this category 'when' - because it does not have a genus above it - is most general, although it has few or no species), so the transcendent is whatever has no genus under which it is contained. Hence it is of the idea of the transcendent to have no predicate above it save being; but the fact it is common to many inferiors is accidental to it.
115 Hoc patet ex alio, quia ens non tantum habet passiones simplices convertibiles, - sicut unum, verum et bonum - sed habet aliquas passiones ubi opposita distinguuntur contra se, sicut necesse ƿesse vel possibile, actus vel potentia, et huiusmodi. Sicut autem passiones convertibiles sunt transcendentes quia consequuntur ens in quantum non determinatur ad aliquod genus, ita passiones disiunctae sunt transcendentes, et utrumque membrum illius disiuncti est transcendens quia neutrum determinat suum determinabile ad certum genus: et tamen unum membrum illius disiuncti formaliter est speciale, non conveniens nisi uni enti, - sicut necesse esse in ista divisione 'necesse esse vel possibile esse', et infinitum in ista divisione 'finitum vel infinitum', et sic de aliis. Ita etiam potest sapientia esse transcendens, et quodcumque aliud, quod est commune Deo et creaturae, licet aliquod tale dicatur de solo Deo, aliquod autem de Deo et aliqua creatura. Non oportet autem transcendens, ut transcendens, dici de quocumque ente nisi sit convertibile cum primo transcendente, scilicet ente.	115. This is plain from another fact, that being not only has simple properties convertible with it, - as one, true, good - but also it has some properties where there are opposites distinguished against each other, as necessary existence or possible existence, act or potency, and the like. But just as the convertible properties are transcendent, because they follow being insofar as it is not determined to any genus, so the disjunct properties are transcendent, and each member of the disjunct is transcendent because neither determines its determinable to a definite genus; and yet one member of the disjunct is formally specific, agreeing with only one being, - as necessary existence in this division 'necessary existence or possible existence', and as infinite in this division 'finite or infinite', and so on in other cases. Thus too can wisdom be transcendent, and anything else that is common to God and creatures, although some such be said of God only, and some other such be said of God and a creature. But it is not necessary that a transcendent, as transcendent, be said only of whatever being is convertible with the first transcendent, namely with being.
116 Aliqui probant, quarto modo, Deum non esse in genere quia ((continet in se perfectiones omnium generum)). Sed istud argumentum non valet, quia continens aliquid, continet illud per modum sui. Substantia etiam, ƿquae modo est genus generalissimum, ut accipitur pro omnibus speciebus inferioribus continet virtualiter omnia accidentia: ita quod si Deus sola individua substantiarum causaret, illa haberent in se virtualiter unde causarent omnia accidentia, et tamen propter hoc non negarentur substantiae creatae esse in genere quia continent virtualiter accidentia per modum sui, non per modum accidentium. Ita igitur ex hoc solo quod Deus continet perfectiones omnium generum, non sequitur ipsum non esse in genere, quia sic continere non excludit finitatem (ista enim 'virtualiter continere', non est 'esse infinitum'), sed ex absoluta infinitate Dei sequitur hoc, sicut prius deductum est.	116. [Some people's proof] - Some people prove it in a fourth way [nn.101, 108, 110], that God is not a genus because "he contains in himself the perfections of all genera." [Refutation of the proof] - But this argument is not valid, because what contains something contains it in its own way. Substance too, which is now the most general genus, contains, as it is taken for all inferior species, all the accidents virtually; so that, if God were to cause only the individuals of substances, they would have in themselves the wherewithal to cause all accidents, and yet created substances would not be denied, because of this, to be in a genus, because they contain accidents virtually in their own way and not in the way of accidents. So, therefore, from the fact alone that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that he is not in a genus, because containing them in this way does not exclude finitude (for this 'to contain virtually' is not 'to be infinite'), but from God's absolute infinity this does follow, as was deduced before [nn.101-109].
117 Sed contra hoc instatur quod infinitas simpliciter non concludit propositum, quia Philosophus V Topicorum increpat definitionem lineae rectae (hanc scilicet, 'recta linea est cuius medium non exit extrema'), per hoc, quod si infinita linea esset, recta esse posset, - tunc autem non haberet medium, nec extrema sive fines; non est autem aliqua definitio increpanda quia non convenit illi cui incompossibile est esse in genere; ergo ƿnon est incompossibile lineam infinitam esse in genere, et per consequens infinitas non necessario excludit a genere.	117. [Instances from infinite line] - But against this [sc. the last clause of n.118] an instance is made that infinity simply does not prove the intended proposition [sc. that God is not in a genus], because the Philosopher Topics 6.11.148b23-32 takes exception to the definition of straight line (namely this definition, 'a straight line is that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes'), for this reason, that if there were an infinite line it could be straight, - but then it would not have a middle, nor extremes or ends; but a definition is not to be taken exception to because it does not agree with that to which being in a genus is incompossible; therefore it is not incompossible for an infinite line to be in a genus, and consequently infinity does not necessarily prohibit being in a genus.
118 Respondeo, primo ad intentionem auctoritatis, - quia linea recta est totum per accidens, et si hoc totum definiatur, assignabitur una definitio correspondens lineae et alia correspondens rectae. Illud quod correspondebit 'rectae' loco definitionis, non contradicet formaliter infinito (quia rectum non contradicit formaliter infinito), et cuicumque repugnat formaliter definitio, et eidem repugnabit definitum; quod autem in definitione illa quam increpat Philosophus assignatur tamquam definitio recti (hoc est, habere medium inter extrema), istud formaliter repugnat infinito: ergo oporteret quod si ista definitio esset bona, quod rectum formaliter repugnaret infinito, - sed hoc est falsum, licet virtualiter repugnet infinito, quatenus subiectum suum - scilicet linea - repugnat formaliter infinito. Non ergo intendit Philosophus dicere quod linea infinita potest esse in genere, sed quod rationi recti non formaliter repugnet infinitas, - et ideo illa definitio cui formaliter repugnat infinitas, non est 'recti in quantum rectum': non enim increpasset istam 'linea recta est longitudo sine latitudine, cuius extrema ƿsunt duo puncta aeque protensa', quia hic aliquid esset repugnans infinitati, sed illud assignaretur tamquam ratio lineae, non tamquam ratio recti, - et tunc bene assignaretur quia illi lineae repugnat infinitas.	118. I reply, first to the intention of the authority [sc. of Aristotle, n.117], -because a straight line is a whole per accidens, and, if this whole be defined, it will be assigned one definition corresponding to line and another corresponding to straight. That which corresponds to 'straight' in the place in the definition does not formally contradict the infinite (because straight does not formally contradict the infinite), and what a definition is formally repugnant to, the thing defined will also be repugnant to; but that there is assigned in the definition, which the Philosopher takes exception to, a definition as it were of straight (that is, to have a mean within the extremes), this is formally repugnant to the infinite; therefore, if this definition were good, it has to be that straight would be formally repugnant to the infinite, - but this is false, although straight is, as to its subject, formally repugnant to the infinite. The Philosopher, then, does not intend to say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that infinity is not formally repugnant to the idea of straight, - and therefore the definition to which infinity is formally repugnant is not a definition 'of straight insofar as it is straight'; for he would not have taken exception to this definition 'a straight line is length without breadth, whose extremes are two points equally extended', because here something would be repugnant to infinity, but it would assigned as the idea of line, not as the idea of straight, - and then it would be well assigned because infinity is repugnant to that line.
119 Sed alia est dubitatio, ad rem, utrum linea infinita possit esse in genere quantitatis, - et si sic, non videntur valere duae rationes sumptae ex infinitate. Respondeo. Numquam ad summum in inferiore sequitur summum in superiore nisi illud inferius sit nobilissimum contentum sub illo superiore, sicut non sequitur 'asinus perfectissimus, ergo perfectissimum animal', sed gratia materiae sequitur 'perfectissimus homo, ergo perfectissimum animal', quia homo est perfectissimus animalium; ergo non sequitur optimum sive perfectissimum ens ad perfectissimum aliquod eorum quae continentur sub ente, nisi illud sit simpliciter perfectissimum contentum sub ente: quantitas autem non est tale, nec aliquid alicuius generis - quia quodlibet est limitatum - immo nihil est tale nisi quod est perfectio simpliciter, quod ex se potest esse infinitum; et ideo non sequitur 'perfectissima quantitas, ergo perfectissimum ens', nec ita sequitur de aliqua re alicuius generis, sed tantum sequitur 'perfectissima veriƿtas vel bonitas, ergo perfectissimum ens'. Ita ergo a cum infinito, quod non tantum dicit perfectionem summam sed etiam non possibilem excedi, non sequitur infinitum ens nisi praecise ad infinitum tale quod est perfectissimum, in quo est ratio entis, quod scilicet dicit perfectionem simpliciter. Et ideo licet esset quantitas infinita in ratione quantitatis, cum tamen quantitas non sit perfectio simpliciter, non sequeretur quod sit ens infinitum, quia non sequeretur quod sit ens quod non potest excedi in perfectione. Esset igitur linea infinita in genere quantitatis, quia esset limitatum ens simpliciter et excessum simpliciter a simpliciter perfectiore ente, sed 'infinitum ens simpliciter' non potest esse in genere: et ratio est, quia prima infinitas non tollit omnem potentialitatem quam requirit ratio generis, sed tantum ponit infinitatem secundum quid alicuius imperfectae entitatis (in qua ut illa est, bene potest esse compositio, in quocumque gradu - ita ut illa - ponatur), secunda necessario tollit, sicut declaratum est prius. ƿ	119. But there is another doubt, concerning the thing, whether an infinite straight line could be in the genus of quantity, - and if it could, then the two reasons taken from infinity [nn.101, 108] do not seem to be valid. I reply. Never does the supreme in a superior follow on the supreme in an inferior unless the inferior is the most noble thing contained under the superior, just as 'the most perfect ass, therefore the most perfect animal' does not follow, but 'the most perfect man, therefore the most perfect animal' does, thanks to the matter, follow, because man is the most perfect of animals; therefore the best or most perfect being does not follow on the most perfect of the things that are contained under being unless it is the simply most perfect thing contained under being; but quantity is not such, nor anything in that genus -because anything in it is limited - nay, nothing is such save what is perfection simply, which can of itself be infinite; and so 'the most perfect quantity, therefore the most perfect being' does not follow, nor does it thus follow about anything in any genus, but only this follows, 'the most perfect truth or goodness, therefore the most perfect being'. So it is, then, with the infinite, that because it does not assert only supreme perfection but also a perfection that cannot be exceeded, infinite being does not follow save on such an infinite as is the most perfect thing in which there is the idea of being, namely which asserts perfection simply. And therefore, although there were a quantity infinite in idea of quantity, yet, since quantity is not a perfection simply, it would not follow that it was an infinite being, because it would not follow that it was a being which could not be exceeded in perfection. There might, then, be an infinite line in the genus of quantity, because it would be a simply limited being and exceeded simply by a simply more perfect being, but 'an infinite being simply' cannot exist in a genus; and the reason is that the first infinite [sc. that of a line] does not take away all the potentiality that the idea of genus requires, but it only posits an infinity in a certain respect of some imperfect entity (in which, as it is that thing, there can well be composition, in whatever degree it be put as long as it is that thing), but the second infinity necessarily takes away [that potentiality], as was made clear before [nn.106-107, 103].
120 Contra ista opponitur quod tunc ponerentur contradictoria, concedendo conceptum communem dictum in 'quid' de Deo et creatura et negando Deum esse in genere; omnis enim conceptus dictus in 'quid', si est conceptus communis, vel est conceptus generis vel definitionis, alioquin erunt plura praedicata quam docuit Aristoteles I Topicorum.	120. [Instance from the insufficiency of the categories of Aristotle] - Against this [n.119] it is opposed that then contradictories would be posited, by conceding a common concept said in the 'what' about God and creatures and denying that God is in a genus; for every concept said in the 'what', if it is a common concept, is either the concept of a genus or the concept of a definition, otherwise there will be more predicates than Aristotle taught in Topics 1.4.101b15-28.
121 Ad istud dico quod non sunt contradictoria. Quod patet auctoritatibus Augustini VII De Trinitate, ubi prius, - ubi Deum negat esse substantiam et concedit quod proprie et etiam vere est essentia. Sed si esset conceptus alius, aequivocus, essentiae ut convenit Deo et creaturae, ita posset esse conceptus aequivocus substantiae, - et ita tunc posset dici substantia, sicut essentia.	121. To this I say that they are not contradictories. The thing is plain from the authorities of Augustine given above [n.97], - where he denies that God is a substance and concedes that properly and even truly he is essence. But if there were a different, an equivocal, concept for essence as essence belongs to God and creatures, then there could thus be an equivocal concept of substance, - and so God could then be called substance just as he is called essence.
122 Similiter, Avicenna VIII Metaphysicae cap. 4, ubi negat Deum esse in genere, concedit eum ibi esse substantiam et ens non in ƿalio. Et quod accipiat 'ens' non aequivoce ab illo conceptu secundum quem dicitur in creatura, videtur per ipsum I Metaphysicae, ubi dicit quod ((ens in se non habet principia, quapropter scientia non inquiret principia entis absolute, sed alicuius entium)). Si autem ens haberet alium conceptum in Deo et creatura, bene entis esset principium secundum se, quia entis secundum unum conceptum esset ipsum ens principium secundum alium conceptum.	122. Likewise Avicenna in Metaphysics VIII ch.4 (99rb), where he denies that God is in a genus, concedes there that he is substance and being not in another. And that he is taking 'being' non-equivocally from the concept according to which it is said of creatures appears from himself in Metaphysics I ch.2 (71ra), where he says that "being in itself does not have principles, which is why science does not look for the principles of being absolutely, but of some being." But if being had a different concept in God and in creatures, there could well be a principle in itself of being, because of being according to one concept being itself according to another concept would be the principle.
123 Cum arguis 'si est dictum in quid, ergo est genus vel definitio', respondeo: Aristoteles VIII Metaphysicae docet quale 'praedicatum dictum in quid' sit definitio. Inducit enim ibi contra 'ideas' Platonis, dicta antisthenicorum, - quos in hoc approbat, dicentes, ((terminum esse rationem longam)). Et post subdit quod ((substantiae est cuius contingit esse terminum (puta compositae, sive sensibilis sive intellectualis), primorum autem ex quibus haec, non est)) (supple, definitio), - et subdit rationem: ((siquidem, aliquid de aliquo significans, est definitio)) (hoc debet intelligi virtualiter, non formaliter, - sicut alias dictum est); et subdit: ((oportet hoc quidem esse ut materiam, illud vero ut formam)). Ex quo videtur ibi arguere quod 'idea' si poneretur non esset definibilis, et si ratio sua aliquo modo valeat propter simplicitatem 'ideae', ƿmulto magis negaret ipse definitionem a Deo, cuius est summa simplicitas. Sequitur ergo ex auctoritate eius quod nihil est dictum de Deo in 'quid' ut definitio.	123. When you argue 'it is said in the 'what', then it is genus or definition' [n.120], - I reply: Aristotle Metaphysics 8.3.1043b23-32 teaches what sort of 'predicate said in the what' is a definition. For he introduces there, against the 'ideas' of Plato the sayings of the followers of Antisthenes, - whom to this extent he approves when they say, "a long account is a term." And afterwards he adds that "it is a feature of substance that of it there can be a term (to wit of composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible), but of the first elements from which these are, there is not" (supply, a definition), - and he adds the reason: "since a definition signifies something of something" (this needs to be understood virtually, not formally, - as was said elsewhere [I d.3 n.147]); and he adds: "this indeed must be as matter, but that as form." From which he seems there to be arguing that the [Platonic] 'idea', if it were posited, would not be definable, and so if, because of the simplicity of the 'idea', his own reasoning has validity in any way, he himself would much more deny a definition of God, whose simplicity is supreme. Therefore it follows from his authority that nothing is said of God in the 'what' as a definition.
124 Ex eodem sequitur quod nihil est dictum in 'quid' de Deo ut genus. Quidquid enim habet genus, potest habere differentiam et definitionem, quia (in VII Metaphysicae) genus 'aut nihil est praeter species, aut si est, est quidem ut materia', et tunc cuius est genus, oportet ponere ipsum posse habere differentiam tamquam formam. Si ergo aliquid est dictum de Deo in 'quid', arguendo ex auctoritate Aristotelis constructive, non destructive, sequitur quod illud non sit genus vel definitio; sed cum infers 'est genus vel definitio, quia Aristoteles non dixit alia esse praedicata dicta in quid, ergo non sunt alia', arguis ab auctoritate destructive, et est fallacia consequentis.	124. From the same it follows that nothing is said in the 'what' of God as a genus. For whatever has a genus can have a difference and a definition, because (Metaphysics 7.12.1038a5-6) genus 'either is nothing besides the species, or if it is, it is so indeed as matter', and then that of which there is a genus should be set down as being able to have a difference as form. If, therefore, something is said of God in the 'what', it follows, arguing constructively from Aristotle's authority not destructively, that that something is not a genus or definition; but when you infer 'it is a genus or definition, because Aristotle did not say that there were other predicates asserted in the 'what', therefore there are no other predicates' [n.120] - you are arguing from the authority destructively, and there is a fallacy of the consequent.
125 Sed dices: tunc Aristoteles non tradidit sufficienter omnia praedicata dicta in 'quid'. Respondeo. Philosophus in I Topicorum distinxit praedicata propter distinctionem problematum, quia diversa problemata habent diversum modum terminandi ex diversitate praedicatorum. Non ergo enumerat ibi omnia praedicata, quia non differentiam specificam (licet differentiam generalem collocaverit sub genere), et tamen differentia specifica habet propriam rationem praedicati; species autem etiam habet propriam rationem praedicati, aliam a ƿdefinitione, alioquin male poneret Porphyrius quinque universalia. Ideo ergo sufficienter distinxit ibi praedicata, quia distinxit omnia de quibus problemata quaerentia requirunt specialem artem terminandi, quam ibi intendebat tradere. - Transcendentia autem non sunt talia praedicata, quia non sunt de eis problemata specialia: problema enim supponit aliquid certum et quaerit dubium (ex VII Metaphysicae cap. ultimo), ens autem et res ((imprimuntur in anima prima impressione)) (secundum Avicennam I Metaphysicae cap. 5), et ideo de conceptibus illis communissimis non sunt problemata per se terminabilia. Non ergo oportuit ea numerari inter praedicata problematum.	125. But you will say: then Aristotle did not sufficiently hand on all the predicates said in the 'what'. I reply. The Philosopher in the Topics [n.120] distinguished predicates because of the distinction of problems, because diverse problems have, from the diversity of predicates, a diverse way of terminating. So he does not there number all the predicates, because he does not number specific difference (although he did include general difference under genus); and yet specific difference has the proper idea of a predicate; now species too has the proper idea of a predicate, different from definition, otherwise Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.1] would have been wrong to posit five universals. For that reason, therefore, Aristotle did sufficiently there distinguish the predicates, because he distinguished all those about which puzzling problems require a special way of terminating, which is what he was there intending to hand on. - But the transcendent ones are not such predicates, because there are no special problems about them; for a problem supposes something certain and inquires into what is doubtful (Metaphysics 7.17.1041b4-11), but being and thing "are impressed on the soul in first impression" (Avicenna Metaphysics I ch.6 (72rb)), and therefore about these most common concepts there are no per se terminable problems. It was not necessary, then, to number them among the predicates of problems.
126 Sed numquid Aristoteles ista praedicata generalia numquam docuit? Respondeo. Ex VIII Metaphysicae docuit nihil dici de Deo ut genus (ex auctoritate praeallegata), et tamen docuit univoce dici de Deo et creatura 'veritatem' II Metaphysicae, sicut supra allegatum est (ubi dicit 'principia sempiternorum esse verissima'); et in hoc docuit entitatem dici univoce de Deo et creatura, quia subdit ibi (II Metaphysicae) quod ((sicut unumquodque se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad veritatem)), patet etiam - secundum eum ƿquod si ens dicatur de Deo, hoc erit in 'quid'. Ergo implicite in istis docuit aliquod praedicatum transcendens dici in 'quid', et non esse genus nec definitionem, - et alia praedicata transcendentia dici in 'quale' (ut verum), et tamen non esse propria nec accidentia secundum quod ista universalia competunt speciebus aliquorum generum, quia nihil quod est species alicuius generis competit Deo aliquo modo.	126. But is it really the case that Aristotle never taught those general predicates [sc. the transcendent ones]? I reply. In Metaphysics 8 [n.123] he taught that nothing was said of God as genus (from the afore-mentioned authority [n.123]), and yet he did teach that 'truth' is said univocally of God and creatures in Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31, as was mentioned above (where he says that 'the principles of eternal things are most true' [n.79]); and by this he taught that entity is said univocally of God and creatures, because he adds there (sc. Metaphysics 2, ibid) that "as each thing is related to being, so is it related to truth;" it is also plain - according to him - that if being is said of God, it will be said in the 'what'. Therefore in these passages he implicitly taught that some transcendent predicate is said in the 'what', and that it is not genus or definition, - and that other transcendent predicates are said in the 'what sort' (like true), and yet that they are not properties or accidents in accord with the fact that these universals (sc. property and accident) belong to the species of some of the genera, because nothing which is a species of some genus belongs to God in any way.
127 Docuit etiam idem, aliquo modo, IV Topicorum in fine: ((Si sequitur)) - inquit - ((aliquid semper et non convertitur, difficile est separare quod non sit genus)). Et subdit postea: ((Uti ut genere eo quod semper est consequens, cum non convertatur)), quasi dicat, hoc expedit opponenti; et subdit: ((altero autem alteram partem dante, non in omnibus est obedire)), quasi dicat, hoc expedit respondenti, non concedere omne consequens non convertibile esse praedicatum ut genus, et si non loqueretur de praedicato dicto in 'quid', non haberet apparentiam illud quod docet, opponentem uti tali ut genere. Ergo innuit ibi quod aliquod est praedicatum commune dictum in 'quid', quod non est genus. Et quod loquatur de praedicatione in 'quid', videtur per exempla sua, 'tranquillitas est quies'. Praedicatio enim in abstractis, non est praedicatio in 'quale' vel denominativa. ƿ	127. He also in some way taught the same in Topics 4.6.128a38-39: "If something," - he says - "always follows and does not convert, it is difficult to separate it from being a genus." And he afterwards adds: "To use it as a genus by the fact that it always follows, although it does not convert," - as if he were saying that this is expedient for the opponent; and he adds: "when the other grants one of the two sides, one should not obey him in everything," - as if he were to say that this is expedient to the respondent, not to concede that every non-convertible consequent is a predicate as a genus; and, if he were not speaking of a predicate said in the 'what', there would be no plausibility to what he teaches, that the opponent is using such as a genus. Therefore he insinuates there that something is a common predicate said in a 'what' which is not a genus. - And that he is speaking of predication in the 'what' is seen from his examples, 'tranquility is quiet'. For predication in abstract things is not predication in the 'what sort' or a denominative predication.
128 Ad argumenta pro secunda opinione. Ad Damascenum respondeo. Licet multa verba dicat, in diversis locis, quae videntur dicere Deum esse in genere, unum tamen verbum - quod dicit in Elementario cap. 8 - solvit omnia. Ibi enim dicit sic: ((Substantia, quae continet super substantialiter increatam deitatem, cognoscibiliter autem et contentive omnem creaturam, genus generalissimum est)). Non ergo dicit substantiam quae est generalissimum continere deitatem sicut continet creaturam, sed 'super substantialiter', hoc est, accipiendo illud quod perfectionis est in substantia secundum quod est genus, et relinquendo illud quod est imperfectionis, - quomodo dicit Avicenna IX Metaphysicae, Deum esse 'ens per se'.	128. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.90-94]. I respond to Damascene [n.90]. Although he says many words, in diverse places, which seem to say that God is in a genus, yet one word - which he says in Elementary Instruction on Dogmas ch.8 -solves everything. For there he says that "Substance, which contains the uncreated deity super-substantially, but the whole creation cognitively and content-fully, is the most general genus." Therefore he does not say that the substance which is the most general genus contains the deity as it contains the creature, but contains it 'super-substantially', that is, by taking that which is a matter of perfection in substance, as it is a genus, and leaving out that which is a matter of imperfection - in the way Avicenna says in Metaphysics VIII ch.4 [n.122] that God is 'being in itself.
129 Ad Boethium dico quod nusquam invenitur dicere in libello illo quod 'duo genera manent in divinis'. Nec, breviter, genera, nec modi generum, nec rationes eorum manent ibi, - quia sicut genera et ea quae sunt in eis, limitata sunt, ita et modi et rationes eorum (loquendo de rationibus primae intentionis, quae fundantur in istis), quia in limitato non potest aliquid fundari nisi limitatum.	129. As to Boethius [n.91] I say that nowhere in that little book is he found to say that 'two genera remain in divine reality'. In brief, neither genera, nor modes or genera, nor their ideas remain there, - because, just as genera and the things in them are limited, so also are their modes and ideas (speaking of ideas of first intention, which are founded on these), because nothing can be founded on a limited thing save a limited thing.
130 Dicit tamen Boethius - in libello suo De Trinitate cap. 1 quod (enumeratis praedicamentis) ((haec si quis in divinam praeƿdicationem converterit, omnia mutantur quae mutari possunt: 'ad aliquid' vero omnino non praedicatur aliquid)), - et infra, ((essentia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem)); et ex istis accipitur quod innuat substantiam et relationem manere in divinis. Sed expresse dicit ibi, quod nec substantia quae est genus, nec aliquid eius, manet ibi; dicit enim: ((Cum dicimus Deum, substantiam significare videmur, sed eam quae sit ultra substantiam)), quomodo Damascenus dixit substantiam ' super substantialiter'. Intendit ergo quod duo modi praedicandi sunt in divinis, scilicet praedicati relativi et essentialis, quos modos Augustinus magis exprimit - V De Trinitate 6 vel 10 - 'ad se' et 'ad aliud', et omnia praedicata formaliter dicta de Deo sub altero istorum membrorum continentur: sed sub primo membro continentur multa praedicata quae habent similem modum praedicandi qualitati et quantitati (non sola autem illa quae habent similem modum praedicandi illis quae sunt de praedicamento substantiae), sub secundo membro continentur omnia quaecumque habent similem modum praedicandi quibuscumque relativis, sive sint relativa proprie sive non.	130. Yet Boethius does - in his little book On the Trinity chs.4, 6 - say, after enumerating the categories, that "if anyone turns these toward divine predication, all that can be changed are changed; but a something is not at all predicated as 'a relation to something'," - and later, "essence contains the unity, relation multiplies the trinity;" and from these is taken the thought that he indicates substance and relation remain in divine reality. But he expressly says there that neither substance, which is a genus, nor anything of it, remains there; for he says "When we speak of God, we seem to signify substance, but a substance that is beyond substance," in the way Damascene spoke of substance 'super-substantially' [n.128]. Boethius intends, then, that there are two modes of predicating in divine reality, namely of relative predicate and essential predicate, which modes Augustine expresses rather as 'to itself and 'to another' - On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 - , and all the predicates said formally of God are contained under one or other of these two members; but under the first member [sc. 'to itself] are contained many predicates that have a mode of predicating like quality and quantity (and not only those that have a mode of predicating similar to the ones which are of the category of substance), and under the second member [sc. 'to another'] are contained all that have a mode of predicating similar to relatives, whether they are properly relatives or not.
131 Et quare omnia essentialia dicantur praedicari secundum subƿstantiam, et contra ea distinguantur praedicata dicta 'ad aliquid', cum tamen praedicata illa dicta 'ad aliquid' per identitatem transeant in substantiam sicut et alia, - ratio assignabitur in sequenti quaestione 'De attributis', dubitatione secunda contra solutionem principalem.	131. And as to why all essential predicates are said to be predicated according to substance, and why against them are distinguished the predicates said 'in relation to something', although however the predicates said 'in relation to something' pass over, by identity, into substance, just as the other predicates also do, - the reason for this will be assigned in the following question 'About attributes', in the second doubt against the principal solution [nn.215-216, 222].
132 Ad Averroem dico quod non videtur habere intentionem magistri, quia Aristoteles in 2 et 3 cap. illius X quaerit an in substantiis sit aliquid unum quod sit mensura aliorum, an hoc ipsum unum . Et probat - ex intentione contra Platonem quod non sit ipsum unum, sed aliquid cui convenit ipsum unum, sicut est in omnibus aliis generibus, loquendo de uno et de omnibus aliis mensuratis in illis generibus. Et concludit, in fine: ((Quare siquidem, in passionibus et qualitatibus et quantitatibus, ipsum unum aliquid unum, sed non hoc ipsius substantia; et in substantiis necesse est similiter se habere, - similiter enim se habet in omnibus)) (super quam litteram ponit Commentator verba praeallegata). Sed si primus motor poneretur mensura ipsius generis substantiae, hoc ipsum unum poneretur mensura, quia primus ƿmotor - propter simplicitatem suam - multo verius esset hoc ipsum unum quam idea Platonis.	132. As to Averroes [n.92] I say that he does not seem to have the intention of the master, because Aristotle, in Metaphysics 10.1.1052b18-1053b3, 2.1053b9-1054a19, asks whether in substances there is something one that is the measure of the others, and whether this is the one itself. And he proves - from his intention against Plato - that it is not the one itself, but something to which one itself belongs, just as with all other genera when speaking of one and of the other common things measured in the genera. And he concludes at the end: "Wherefore indeed, in properties and qualities and quantities one itself is something one but not the substance of it; and in substances things must be similarly disposed - for things are similar in everything" (about which text the Commentator set down the words afore mentioned [n.92]). But if the first mover is posited as the measure of the genus itself of substance, this one thing would itself be posited as the measure, because the first mover - on account of its simplicity - would much more truly be this one thing itself than the idea of Plato.
133 Quid ergo est mensura prima illius generis? Respondeo: aliqua substantia illius generis prima, cui convenit unitas. - Non est autem primus motor mensura intrinseca illius generis, sicut nec aliorum. Quatenus tamen est mensura extrinseca omnium, aliquo modo, est mensura immediatius substantiarum, quae sunt perfectiora entia, - quam accidentium, quae sunt remotiora ab ipso. Nullius tamen generis est mensura intrinseca.	133. What then is the first measure of the genus? I reply: some substance in that genus, to which unity belongs, is first. - But the first mover is not the intrinsic measure of that genus, just as not of the other genera either. Yet insofar as it is, in some way, the extrinsic measure of everything, it is more immediately the measure of substances, which are more perfect beings, than of accidents, which are more remote from it. It is, however, the intrinsic measure of no genus.
134 Ad rationem primam dico quod si substantiam contrahas cum creata et increata, non accipitur ibi substantia ut est conceptus generis generalissimi (increata enim repugnat substantiae hoc modo, quia substantia hoc modo includit limitationem), sed accipitur substantia ibi pro 'ente in se' et non 'ente in alio', cuius conceptus prior est et communior conceptu substantiae ut est genus, - sicut patuit per Avicennam ubi supra.	134. To the first reason [n.93] I say that if you contract substance with the difference of created and uncreated, then substance is not taken there as it is the concept of the most general genus (for uncreated is repugnant to substance in this way, because substance in this way involves limitation), but substance is taken there for 'being in itself and not 'being in another', whose concept is prior and more common than the concept of substance as it is a genus, - as was plain from Avicenna above [n.122].
135 Ad aliam rationem concedo quod compositio rei et rei non requiritur in ente 'in genere', sed requiritur compositio realitatis et realitatis, quarum altera - praecise sumpta in primo signo naturae - est in potentia ad alteram et perfectibilis per alteram: talis autem compositio non potest esse realitatis infinitae ad realitatem infinitam; omnis autem realitas in Deo est infinita formaliter, sicut supra declaratum est, - ergo etc. ƿ	135. To the other reason [n.94] I concede that the composition of thing and thing is not required for a being 'in a genus', but there is required composition of reality and reality, one of which - precisely taken in the first moment of nature - is in potency to the other and perfectible by the other; but such composition cannot be of infinite reality to infinite reality; but all reality in God is infinite formally, as was made clear above [n.107], - therefore etc.
136 Ad primum argumentum principale concedo quod iste conceptus dictus de Deo et creatura in 'quid' contrahitur per aliquos conceptus dicentes 'quale' contrahentes, sed nec iste conceptus dictus in 'quid' est conceptus generis, nec illi conceptus dicentes 'quale' sunt conceptus differentiarum, quia iste conceptus 'quiditativus' est communis ad finitum et infinitum, quae communitas non potest esse in conceptu generis, - isti conceptus contrahentes dicunt modum intrinsecum ipsius contracti, et non aliquam realitatem perficientem illum: differentiae autem non dicunt modum intrinsecum realitatis alicuius generis, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur animalitas, non propter hoc intelligitur rationalitas vel irrationalitas esse modus intrinsecus animalitatis, sed adhuc intelligitur animalitas in tali gradu ut perfectibilis a rationalitate vel irrationalitate.	136. [To the first] - To the first principal argument [n.39] I concede that this concept said of God and creatures in the 'what' is contracted by some contracting concepts that assert a 'what sort', but it is not the case either that this concept said in the 'what' is the concept of a genus, or that those concepts asserting a 'what sort' are concepts of differences, because this 'quidditative' concept is common to the finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus, - and those contracting concepts assert an intrinsic mode of the contracted thing itself, and not some reality perfecting it; but differences do not assert an intrinsic mode of reality of some genus, because, in whatever grade animality is understood, rationality or irrationality is not on this account an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is in that grade still understood as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.
137 Sed hic est unum dubium, quomodo potest conceptus communis Deo et creaturae 'realis' accipi, nisi ab aliqua realitate eiusdem generis, - et tunc videtur quod sit potentialis ad illam realitatem a ƿqua accipitur conceptus distinguens, sicut prius argutum est 'de conceptu generis et differentiae', et tunc stat argumentum superius factum pro prima opinione, quod si esset aliqua realitas distinguens in re, et alia distincta, videtur quod res sit composita, quia habet aliquid quo conveniat et quo differat.	137. But there is a doubt how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as 'real' save from some reality of the same genus, - and then it seems that it is potential to the reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was argued before 'about the concept of genus and difference' [n.39], and then the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that, if there were some reality in the thing that distinguishes and another reality in it that is distinguished, it seems that the thing is composite, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs [n.47].
138 Respondeo quod quando intelligitur aliqua realitas cum modo suo intrinseco, ille conceptus non est ita simpliciter simplex quin possit concipi illa realitas absque modo illo, sed tunc est conceptus imperfectus illius rei; potest etiam concipi sub illo modo, et tunc est conceptus perfectus illius rei. Exemplum: si esset albedo in decimo gradu intensionis, quantumcumque esset simplex omni modo in re, posset tamen concipi sub ratione albedinis tantae, et tunc perfecte conciperetur conceptu adaequato ipsi rei, - vel posset concipi praecise sub ratione albedinis, et tunc conciperetur conceptu imperfecto et deficiente a perfectione rei; conceptus autem imperfectus posset esse communis albedini illi et alii, et conceptus perfectus proprius esset.	138. I reply that when some reality is understood along with its intrinsic mode, the concept is not so simply simple that the reality cannot be conceived without the mode, but it is then an imperfect concept of the thing; the concept can also be conceived under that mode, and it is then a perfect concept of the thing. An example: if there were a whiteness in the tenth grade of perfection, however much it was in every way simple in the thing, it could yet be conceived under the idea of such an amount of whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived with a concept adequate to the thing itself, - or it could be conceived precisely under the idea of whiteness, and then it would be conceived with an imperfect concept and one that failed of the perfection of the thing; but an imperfect concept could be common to the whiteness and to some other one, and a perfect concept could be proper.
139 Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus communis et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem, - quae distinctio sufficit ad habendum ƿconceptum perfectum vel imperfectum de eodem, quorum imperfectus sit communis et perfectus sit proprius. Sed conceptus generis et differentiae requirunt distinctionem realitatum, non tantum eiusdem realitatis perfecte et imperfecte conceptae.	139. A distinction, then, is required between that from which a common concept is taken and that from which a proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, - which distinction suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept of the same thing, of which concepts the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concepts of genus and difference require a difference of realities, not just of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.
140 Istud potest declarari. Si ponamus aliquem intellectum perfecte moveri a colore ad intelligendum realitatem coloris et realitatem differentiae, quantumcumque habeat perfectum conceptum adaequatum conceptui primae realitatis, non habet in hoc conceptum realitatis a quo accipitur differentia, nec e converso, - sed habet ibi duo obiecta formalia, quae nata sunt terminare distinctos conceptus proprios. Si autem tantum esset distinctio in re sicut realitatis et sui modi intrinseci, non posset intellectus habere proprium conceptum illius realitatis et non habere conceptum illius modi intrinseci rei $a (saltem ut modi sub quo conciperetur, licet iste modus non conciperetur, sicut 'de singularitate concepta et modo sub quo concipitur' dicitur alibi), a$ sed in illo perfecto conceptu haberet unum obiectum adaequatum illi, scilicet rem sub modo.	140. This point [n.139] can be clarified. If we posit that some intellect is perfectly moved by color to understand the reality of the color and the reality of the difference, however much the intellect may have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality, it does not have in this concept a concept of the reality from which the difference is taken, nor conversely, - but it has there two formal objects which are of a nature to terminate distinct proper concepts. But if the distinction in the thing were only as of reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not both have a proper concept of the reality and not have a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing (at any rate as of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode itself would not be conceived, just as is elsewhere said 'about conceived singularity and the mode under which it is conceived' [I d.2 n.183]), but in the perfect concept it would have one object adequate to it, namely the thing under the mode.
141 Et si dicas 'saltem conceptus communis est indeterminatus et potentialis ad specialem conceptum, ergo et realitas ad realitatem, ƿvel saltem non erit infinitus, quia nullum infinitum est potentiale ad aliquid', - concedo quod conceptus ille communis Deo et creaturae est finitus, hoc est non de se est infinitus, quia si esset infinitus, non esset de se communis finito et infinito; nec est de se positive finitus, ita quod de se includat finitatem, quia tunc non competeret infinito, - sed est de se indifferens ad finitum et infinitum: et ideo est finitus negative, id est non ponens infinitatem, et tali finitate est determinabilis per aliquem conceptum.	141. And if you say 'at any rate the common concept is indeterminate and potential with respect to the special concept, therefore the reality too is indeterminate and potential with respect to the reality, or at any rate the concept will not be infinite, because nothing infinite is potential with respect to anything', - I concede that the concept common to God and creatures is finite, that is, it is not of itself infinite, because, if it were infinite, it would not of itself be common to the finite and infinite; nor is it of itself positively finite, such that it of itself include finitude, because then it would not belong to the infinite, - but it is of itself indifferent to the finite and the infinite; and so it is finite negatively, that is, it does not posit infinity, and in such negative finitude it is determinable through some concept.
142 Sed si arguas 'ergo realitas a qua accipitur, est finita', - non sequitur; non enim accipitur ab aliqua realitate ut conceptus adaequatus realitati illi, sive ut perfectus conceptus illi realitati adaequatus, sed deminutus et imperfectus, in tantum etiam quod si illa realitas, a qua accipitur, videretur perfecte et intuitive, intuens ibi non haberet distincta obiecta formalia, scilicet realitatem et modum, sed idem obiectum formale, - tamen intelligens intellectione abstractiva, propter imperfectionem illius intellectionis, potest habere illud pro obiecto formali licet non habeat alterum.	142. But if you argue 'therefore the reality from which it [sc. the above concept] is taken is finite', - it does not follow; for it is not taken from any reality as a concept adequate to that reality, or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but it is diminished and imperfect, to such an extent even that if the reality from which it is taken were to be seen perfectly and intuitively, he who intuits it would not there have distinct formal objects, namely the reality and the mode, but one and the same formal object [n.140], - yet he who understands it with abstractive intellection can, because of the imperfection of the intellection, have it for formal object although he not have the other one.
143 $a 'concedo': Conceptus non actus ille est finitus, sed est obiecƿtum formale. Si est determinabile, ergo formaliter finitum et potentiale, ergo non commune rei infinitae. Ultima consequentia est neganda, quia res infinita imperfecte intelligitur in obiecto formali finito, pro quanto illud obiectum infinitum natum esset facere in intellectu tale obiectum formale, si deminute moveret, sicut et obiectum creatum deminute movens natum est idem facere; et ideo est commune utrique, quasi similitudo communis et imperfecta.	143. As to the 'I concede...' [n.141 near the middle]: the concept is not the finite act [sc. whereby we conceive] but is the formal object [n.65]. If it is determinable [n.141], then it is formally finite and potential, and then not common to an infinite thing. The final consequence [sc. the clause immediately preceding] is to be denied, because the infinite thing is in the formal finite object understood imperfectly to the extent that the infinite object would be of a nature to cause in the intellect such a formal object if it were to be moving it in diminished fashion [n.142], just as also a created object moving in diminished fashion is of a nature to do the same; and therefore it is common to both, as a sort of common and imperfect likeness.
144 Contra: res infinita non est aliquod finitum; Deus est illud obiectum si illud praedicatur in 'quid' de Deo, sicut 'homo est animal', similiter, Deus non est aliquid potentiale. Responsio. Quamvis compositio apud intellectum sit conceptuum, tamen est pro re extra. Sicut signa accipiuntur pro significatis, et sicut plures conceptus possunt esse signa eiusdem rei (licet unum commune, aliud proprium), ita compositio illorum conceptuum est signum identitatis significatorum per ipsos conceptus. Quia ergo significatum per conceptum finitum, ut per signum commune, est id ipsum quod significatum per conceptum Dei, ideo haec est vera 'Deus est ens', componendo conceptum finitum apud intellectum conceptui Dei; sed non est pro finito significato sic, sed pro infinito communiter significato.	144. To the contrary: an infinite thing is not anything finite; God is the object in question, if the object is predicated of God in the 'what', in the way 'man is an animal' -similarly, God is not anything potential. Response. Although there is in the intellect a composition of concepts, yet the conception is on behalf of the external thing. Just as signs are taken for the things signified, and just as several concepts can be the signs of the same thing (although one is common, another proper), so the composition of the concepts is a sign of the identity of the things signified by those concepts. Because, therefore, the thing signified by the finite concept, as by the common sign, is the very thing which is signified by the concept of God, therefore, by compounding the finite concept in the intellect with the concept of God, this proposition is true 'God is a being'; but the composition is not on behalf of the finite thus signified, but on behalf of the infinite signified in common.
145 Tunc ad illam propositionem 'Deus est hoc obiectum, ens', respondeo: Deus est illud quod in re per ens ut per signum comƿmune significatur, et ideo apud intellectum haec compositio est vera 'Deus est ens', quae compositio est signum illius identitatis.	145. Then to the proposition 'God is the object in question, a being' [n.144, init.], I reply: God is that which in reality is signified by being as by a common sign, and therefore in the intellect this composition is true 'God is a being', which composition is a sign of that identity.
146 Cum dicis 'Deus non est aliquod finitum', verum est, loquendo de identitate in re, quae scilicet est significata et significatorum; loquendo autem de esse ut est compositio apud intellectum, quod de Deo in compositione nihil potest praedicari quod est apud intellectum signum finitum, falsum est. Exemplum huius: 'homo est animal', - 'animal' apud intellectum, ut est ibi obiectum formale, est ens deminutum. Nullum ens deminutum est verum de Socrate exsistente in re.	146. When you say 'God is not anything finite' [n.144, init.], the statement is true, when speaking of identity in the thing, namely the identity which is signified and belongs to the signified things; but, when speaking of being as it is a composition in the intellect, the statement that nothing which in the intellect is a finite sign can be predicated of God in a composition is false. An example of this: 'a man is an animal', - in the intellect 'animal', as it is there the formal object, is a diminished being. But no diminished being is true of [the man] Socrates existing in reality.
147 Ergo haec est falsa 'Socrates exsistens est animal'? - Respondeo: semper compositio fit conceptuum, et est signum et significatorum; sed est pro obiectis materialibus, quae significantur per conceptus, et pro identitate, quae significatur per compositionem, ita quod si identitas est significatorum, scilicet obiectorum materialium, compositio est vera conceptuum, qui sunt obiecta formalia. a$	147. So this is false, then, 'Socrates existing is an animal'? - I reply: a composition is always made of concepts, and it is a sign and of things signified; but it is on behalf of material objects, which are signified by the concepts, and of identity, which is signified by the composition, such that if there is an identity of the things signified, namely of the material objects, the composition of the concepts, which are the formal objects, is true.
148 Istud etiam potest ulterius declarari. Si cuiuslibet universalis ponatur esse proprium individuum (puta in re, proprium individuum substantiae, proprium individuum animalis, proprium individuum hominis, etc.), tunc non tantum conceptus generis est potentialis ad conceptum differentiae, sed proprium individuum generis est potentiale ad proprium individuum differentiae. Si autem accipiamus proprium individuum huius conceptus 'ens' quod individuum est in Deo, et proprium individuum huius quod est 'infinitum', idem individuum est, nec est potentiale ad se ipsum. ƿ	148. The point [n.139, 140] can also be further clarified. If there is posited for any universal a proper individual (to wit in reality, a proper individual for substance, a proper individual for animal, a proper individual for man, etc.), then not only is the concept of genus potential to the concept of difference, but the proper individual of the genus is potential to the proper individual of the difference. But if we take the proper individual of this concept 'being' which is individual in God, and if we take the proper individual of this which is 'infinite', it is the same individual, and it is not potential to itself.
149 Sed saltem quaeres: quare entitas non habet proprium individuum in re, quod sit in potentia ad individuum determinantis, ut primo intelligatur 'hoc' ens quam 'infinitum'? Respondeo, quia quando aliquid est de se esse et non tantum capax ipsius esse, de se est habens quamlibet condicionem necessario requisitam ad esse; ens autem ut convenit Deo - scilicet ens per essentiam - est ipsum esse infinitum et non aliquid cui tantum convenit ipsum esse (ex se est 'hoc' et ex se 'infinitum'), ut quasi per prius intelligatur, aliquo modo, infinitas esse modus entis per essentiam quam ipsum intelligatur esse 'hoc': et ideo non oporteat quaerere quare 'hoc' ens sit infinitum, quasi prius conveniat sibi singularitas quam infinitas. Et ita est universaliter in his quae possunt esse entia per essentiam. Nihil per participationem tale primo determinatur ex se ut sit tale per essentiam, et ita ut sit infinitum tale et ut sit de se 'hoc'.	149. But you ask at any rate: why does entity not have a proper individual in reality, which individual would be in potency to the individual of the determining feature, so that 'this' being is first understood before 'infinite' being is? I reply, because when something is existent of itself, and is not merely capable of very existence, it has of itself whatever condition is necessarily required for existence; but being as it belongs to God - namely being through essence - is infinite existence itself and not something to which existence itself merely belongs (God is of himself 'this' and of himself 'infinite'), so that infinity is in some way as it were first understood to be a mode of being through essence before it is understood to be 'this'; and therefore one should not ask why 'this' being is infinite, as if singularity first belonged to it before infinity. And so is it universally in the case of things that can be beings through essence. Nothing such by participation is first of itself determined so as to be such by essence, both so as to be an infinite such and so as be of itself 'this'.
150 Et si arguas, individuum includit individuum, ergo commune includit commune, ergo si 'hoc' ens includit infinitatem 'hanc', et ens in communi includet infinitatem in communi, - respondeo quod consequentia non valet, quia individuum includit aliquam perfectionem quam non includit commune, et propter illam perfectionem potest formaliter includere infinitum, et tamen commune ex ratione conceptus communis - non includit ipsum ut conceptum inclusum, sed est aliquo modo determinabile per ipsum. ƿ	150. And if you argue that individual includes individual, therefore common includes common, therefore if 'this' being includes 'this' infinity, and if being in common includes infinity in common, - I reply that the consequence is not valid, because individual includes some perfection which common does not include, and on account of this perfection it can formally include the infinite, and yet the common - by reason of the common concept - does not include it as an included concept, but is in some way determinable by it.
151 Ad Avicennam II Metaphysicae, patet per ipsum VIII Metaphysicae, sicut dictum est.	151. [To the second] - As to AvicennaMetaphysics II [n.40], the answer is plain from himself in Metaphysics VIII, as was said [n.122].
152 Ad Damascenum 50 cap., patet per Magistrum 19 distinctione, quod ponit ibi speciem 'pro aliqua similitudine speciei ad individua'; est tamen maior dissimilitudo, secundum Augustinum, et ideo Augustinus De Trinitate negat ibi speciem, sicut et genus. Unde illa definitio Porphyrii 'species dicitur quod praedicatur de pluribus in quid', debet intelligi quod in illis pluribus plurificetur species secundum naturam, in personis autem divinis non plurificatur natura divina; species etiam secundum se habet realitatem correspondentem sibi, potentialem ad propriam realitatem individui, essentia autem divina nullo modo est potentialis ad relationem, sicut dictum est distinctione 5 quaestione 2.	152. [To the third] - As to Damascene [n.41], the answer is plain from the Master [Lombard] in distinction 19 [Sentences I d.19 ch.9 n.182], because he puts species there 'for some likeness of species to individuals'; there is however a greater unlikeness, according to Augustine, and therefore Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11 denies species there as he also denies genus. Hence the definition of Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.3] 'species is said to be that which is predicated of many things in the what' should be understood as meaning that the species in those many is multiplied as to its nature, but in the divine persons the divine nature is not multiplied; the species too has in itself a reality corresponding to it, potential to the proper reality of the individual, but the divine essence is in no way potential to the relation, as was said in distinction 5 question 2 [I d.5 nn.70, 113, 118-119, 132, 138].
153 Ad ultimum, de sapientia, dico quod non est species generis ut transfertur ad divina, nec secundum illam rationem transfertur, sed secundum rationem sapientiae ut est transcendens. Quomodo autem tale possit esse transcendens, dictum est in solutione principali, articulo tertio. ƿ	153. [To the fourth] - To the final one, about wisdom [n.42], I say that wisdom is not a species of a genus as it is transferred to divine reality, nor is it transferred according to that idea, but according to the idea of wisdom as it is transcendent. But how such a thing can be transcendent was said in the principal solution, the third article [nn.114-115].
154 Dubium tamen est de hac sapientia quae est in nobis, utrum sit individuum sapientiae transcendentis et qualitatis, an alterius tantum. Et quod non utriusque, videtur: Quia nihil idem continetur sub diversis praedicatis, dictis in 'quid' de eodem, non subalternis; sapientia autem transcendens et qualitas non sunt subalterna; ergo etc.	154. There is, however, a doubt about the wisdom which is in us, whether it is an individual of transcendent wisdom and of quality, or whether only of something else. And it seems not to be an individual of either. Because nothing contains the same thing under diverse predicates which are said in the 'what' about the same thing and are not subalternate; but transcendent wisdom and quality are not subalternate; therefore etc.
155 Item, sapientia transcendens est passio entis, - ergo ens non dicitur de ea in 'quid', nec e converso, ex distinctione 3; ergo nec aliquid in quo includitur sapientia transcendens includet ens in 'quid', quia tunc illud esset ens per accidens: includeret enim essentialiter rationem subiecti et passionis quae non faciunt aliquid unum per se, sed tantum per accidens.	155. Again, transcendent wisdom is a property of being, - therefore being is not said of it in the 'what', nor conversely, from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.131, 134-136]; therefore neither does anything in which transcendent wisdom is included include a being in 'what', because then it would be a being per accidens; for it would essentially include the idea of subject and property, and these do not make anything one per se but only per accidens.
156 Si haec argumenta valeant, et haec sapientia in nobis sit tantum individuum sapientiae transcendentis vel tantum generis qualitatis, - non videtur secundum dandum, quia tunc non esset in nobis perfectio simpliciter, quod videtur esse contra Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 3: 'Omnis circa nos creatura clamat' etc.; si primum detur, ergo non omnis habitus est formaliter in genere qualitatis, sed omnes sunt transcendentes qui important perfectionem simpliciter. ƿ	156. If these arguments [nn.154-155] are valid, and the wisdom in us is only an individual of transcendent wisdom or only an individual of the genus of quality - the second of these does not seem it should be granted, because then wisdom would not be in us a perfection simply, which seems to be contrary to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: 'Every creature around us cries out' etc. [n.71]; if the first of them is granted, then not every habit is formally in the genus of quality, but all that indicate perfection simply are transcendent.