Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D8/Q4

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 4
157 Quaero utrum cum simplicitate divina possit stare aliquo modo distinctio perfectionum essentialium praecedens aliquo modo omnem actum intellectus. Arguo quod non: Augustinus XV De Trinitate 5: ((Non sicut in creatura sapientia et iustitia sunt duae qualitates, ita in Deo, sed quae iustitia, ipsa est et bonitas)). Ex hoc arguo: praedicatio in abstracto non est vera nisi sit 'per se primo modo'; ergo ista 'sapientia est veritas', est per se primo modo, et ita nullo modo distinctio inter subiectum et praedicatum, sed subiectum per se includet praedicatum, quia hoc pertinet ad per se primo modo; ergo etc.	157. I ask whether along with the divine simplicity there can in any way stand a distinction of essential perfections preceding every act of the intellect. I argue that there cannot: Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.7: "Wisdom and justice are not two qualities in God as they are in creatures, but that which is justice is itself also goodness." From this I argue: predication in the case of something abstract is only true if it is 'per se in the first mode'; therefore this proposition 'wisdom is truth' is per se in the first mode, and so there is in no way a distinction between the subject and the predicate, but the subject per se includes the predicate, because this is what belongs to per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37]; therefore etc.
158 Contra: Damascenus libro I cap. 4: ((Si iustum, si bonum et si quod tale dixeris, - non naturam dicis Dei, sed quae circa naturam)). ƿDicis autem aliquid quod praecedit actum intellectus: ergo ante omne opus et actum intellectus, est aliquid in Deo quod non est natura formaliter.	158. On the contrary: Damascene On the Orthodox Faith I ch.4: "If you say just or good or anything of the like, - you are not stating the nature of God but something in respect of the nature." But you are stating something that precedes the act of the intellect; therefore, before every work and act of the intellect, there is something in God which is not the nature formally.
159 In ista quaestione sunt multae opiniones, quas non omnes intendo recitare. Sed duae sunt tenentes conclusionem negativam, quae tamen inter se contradicunt: utraque ponit quod cum simplicitate Dei non stat distinctio aliqua attributorum, nisi tantum rationis, sed prima ponit quod nec illa potest haberi nisi per actum intellectus 'intelligentis ipsum Deum per respectum ad extra', secunda ponit istam distinctionem rationis posse haberi 'absque respectu ad extra'.	159. On this question there are many opinions, all of which I do not intend to recite. But there are two holding to the negative conclusion that nevertheless contradict each other; each posits that along with the simplicity of God no distinction of attributes stands save only a distinction of reason, but the first [from Thomas of Sutton] posits that it cannot be had save through an act of the intellect 'understanding God himself in an outward respect', - the second [from Henry of Ghent] posits that this distinction of reason can be had 'without any outward respect'.
160 Prima innititur isti rationi: ((quandocumque in uno extremo est differentia rationis cui correspondet in alio extremo differentia realis, distinctio vel differentia rationis sumitur per comparationem ad distincta realiter (exemplum de ƿdistinctione secundum rationem, dextri et sinistri in columna, quae sumitur per respectum ad distinctionem realem eorum in animali, similiter, de distinctione rationis in puncto ut est principium et finis, quae distinctio sumitur per respectum ad lineas realiter diversas); sed divina attributa habent in creaturis aliqua re distincta sibi correspondentia, ut bonitas bonitatem et sapientia sapientiam, et alia quae vere dicuntur attributa (per quae excluduntur quaedam proprietates divinae, ut sempiternitas et aeternitas, quae proprie non sunt attributa); ergo etc.)).	160. [Exposition of the opinion] - The first rests on this reasoning: "whenever there is in one extreme a difference of reason to which a real difference corresponds in the other extreme, the distinction or difference of reason is taken by comparison with things really distinct (an example of a distinction according to reason is of the right and left side of a column, which is taken by respect to the real distinction of these in an animal, - likewise, an example of a distinction of reason is in a point as it is the beginning and end, which distinction is taken by respect to lines really diverse); but the divine attributes have in creatures certain things really distinct corresponding to them, as goodness to goodness and wisdom to wisdom, and other things that are really called attributes (by which are excluded certain divine properties, as everlastingness and eternity, which are not properly attributes); therefore etc."
161 ((Adhaerentes huic rationi dicunt quod distinguuntur attributa per respectum ad intellectum nostrum in tantum quod illis correspondentibus circumscriptis non nisi unicus conceptus et simplex posset formari de essentia divina (quae unico nomine expriƿmeretur, nam alia nomina si imponerentur, aut essent nomina synonyma, quia idem re et ratione esset correspondens eis, - aut vana, quia nihil eis corresponderet))).	161. "The adherents of this reasoning say that the attributes are distinguished with respect to our intellect in that, once the corresponding attributes have been removed, only a single and simple concept can be formed about the divine essence (which would be expressed in a single name for, if other names were imposed, either they would be synonymous names, because the same thing in reality and in reason would correspond to them - or they would be empty, because nothing would correspond to them)."
162 ((Modus ergo eorum ponendi est talis: rationibus omnibus attributorum (quae scilicet dicunt perfectionem in Deo et in creaturis) correspondet in Deo unitas essentiae, non secundum esse quod absolute habet)) - ut dictum est - ((sed secundum respectum quem habet ad creaturam; non in genere causae efficientis (sic enim nullum sumitur attributum, ut sapientia quia sapientiam facit), nec etiam ad removendum aliquid a Deo - quos duos modos videntur dicere Avicenna et Rabbi Moyses - sed in quantum essentia divina comparatur secundum rationem causae formalis ad creaturas, integritatem omnis perfectionis in se continens quae disperse et imperfecte est in creaturis, et per hoc est essentia illa ab omnibus diversimode imitabilis. - Ultra: pluralitas perfectionum attributalium, ut est in essentia divina, est quasi in potentia, ut autem est in conceptu intellectus, est quasi in actu (exemplum, de universali in re et intellectu). Sed diversimode habent esse ista plura in diversis intellectibus: in divino quidem et beato creato ex plenitudine perfectionis illius essentiae simplicis, ipsa concipitur secundum diversas rationes et ex hoc provenit multitudo concepƿtionum secundum actum in intelligentia, sed ab intellectu naturali lumine intelligente concipiuntur a posteriori, in quantum ex perfectionibus realiter diversis in creaturis format conceptiones et perfectiones correspondentes in Deo, proportionales; nullus tamen intellectus sine respectu ad illa proportionalia eas actu intelligit, sive ab illis proportionalibus intelligat eas, ut tertius intellectus, sive non, sed ex essentia, ut primus intellectus et secundus. - Limitatae perfectiones in quantum actu in intelligentia, dicuntur rationes, et dicitur hic ratio conceptio perfectionis determinatae, ex respectu ad determinatam in creatura sibi correspondentem )).	162. "Their mode, then, of positing attributes is of the following sort: to all the ideas of the attributes (namely those that state a perfection in God and in creatures) there corresponds in God the unity of essence, not according to the being which he has absolutely" - as was said - "but according to the respect which he has to creatures; not in the genus of efficient cause (for no attribute is thus taken, as wisdom because he causes wisdom), nor even to remove something from God - which two modes seem to be the ones asserted by Avicenna [Metaphysics VIII chs.4 and 7 (99ra, 101rb)] and Rabbi Moses [Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed p.1 chs. 53, 55-60] - but insofar as the divine essence is compared to creatures according to the idea of formal cause, containing in itself the completeness of every perfection which is dispersed and imperfect in creatures, and in this respect the divine essence can in diverse ways be imitated by everything. - Further: the plurality of attribution-al perfections, as it exists in the divine essence, is as it were in potency, but as it is in a concept of the intellect it is as it were in act (example about the universal in the thing and in the intellect). But this plurality has a diverse existence in diverse intellects; in the divine intellect, indeed, and in a creature made blessed by the fullness of the perfection of the simple essence, it is conceived according to diverse ideas, and from this comes the multitude of conceptions in act in the intelligence, but by an intellect understanding with natural light they are conceived a posteriori, insofar as this intellect forms, from perfections really diverse in creatures, corresponding conceptions and perfections proportional in God; yet no intellect actually understands them without respect to those they are proportional to - whether it understand them from those they are proportional to, as does the third intellect [an intellect understanding with natural light], - or not, but from the essence, as does the first and the second intellect [sc. the divine intellect and the intellect of a blessed creature]. -Limited perfections insofar as they are actually in the intelligence are called reasons, and reason here is said to be the conception of a determinate perfection, from its respect to the determinate perfection corresponding to it in creatures."
163 Alii declarant istam positionem sic, quod ((intellectus divinus, suam essentiam secundum rem unam et simplicem, virtualiter tamen omnium perfectiones ƿsimplices et absolutas continentem absque limitatione et defectu, apprehendens, ut propter eminentiam suae perfectionis eisdem perfectionibus eminentius est perfectus, intelligit illam essentiam ut unam secundum rem, multiplici perfectione secundum rationem differente perfectam; et si non apprehenderet quod creatura diversis perfectionibus realiter differentibus perficeretur in quantum est bona et sapiens, sive quod istae perfectiones diversa important in creatura, non apprehenderet se sub alia ratione perfectum sapientia et sub alia ratione perfectum bonitate, nec apprehenderet differentiam secundum rationem inter suam sapientiam et suam bonitatem nisi apprehenderet differentiam secundum rem sapientiae et ƿbonitatis in creatura, - alioquin de uno, eodem modo se habente secundum rem et secundum conceptum, sumeretur unitas et pluralitas. Cum ergo essentia divina ut in se consideratur non sit nisi quid indistinctum - omnino simplex - re et ratione, non potest dici quod absque comparatione eius ad aliqua in quibus invenitur diversitas rei vel rationis, talis distinctio possit esse, quia cum apprehenditur illud quod est omnino simplex et unicum sub ratione quae sibi competit secundum se et absque habitudine ad aliud in quo sit aliqua distinctio, sicut apprehensum non est nisi unum secundum rem, ita non potest apprehendi nisi secundum unam simplicem rationem)).	163. [Godfrey of Fontaine's clarification for the opinion] - Others clarify this position in the following way, that "the divine intellect, apprehending its own essence according to one simple reality, yet a reality virtually containing, without limitation and defect, the simple and absolute perfections of all things, insofar as it is more eminently perfect than the same perfections because of the eminence of its own perfection, understands that essence as one in reality, perfect with a multiple perfection that differs according to reason; and if it did not apprehend that the creature was perfected with diverse perfections really different insofar as the creature is good and wise, or because those perfections introduce diversities in the creature, it would not apprehend itself as perfect in wisdom under one reason and perfect in goodness under another reason, nor would it apprehend the difference in reason between its own wisdom and its own goodness unless it apprehended the difference in reality of wisdom and goodness in the creature, - otherwise unity and plurality would be taken from one thing disposed in the same way in reality and in concept. Since, therefore, the divine essence, as considered in itself, is something wholly without distinction - altogether simple - in reality and in reason, it cannot be said that, without a comparison between it and other things in which is found a diversity of reality and reason, such a distinction could exist, because, when that is apprehended which is altogether simple and single under the reason that belongs to it in itself without any relation to anything else in which there is some distinction, then, just as the apprehended is only one in reality, so it cannot be apprehended save as one simple reason."
164 ((Nec illa etiam - scilicet intelligibile et intelligens - potest circa essentiam suam apprehendere ut differentia quaedam ex comparatione eorum ad invicem vel ut mutuo se respicientia, nisi iam in sua differentia exsistere supponantur sive quamdam differentiam importantia. Quae enim apprehenduntur ut quaedam differentia mutuo se respicientia, et quae etiam operatione intellectus ut differentia quaedam ad invicem comparantur, iam in sua differentia exsistere supponuntur; quae autem operatione rationis vel intellectus non habent quod sint quaedam entia secundum rationem et ad invicem ratione differentia, non possunt dici constitui in tali esse suo et habere differentiam hanc secundum rationem, ex comparatione eorum inter se per operationem rationis vel intelƿlectus, immo ista secunda operatio primam necessario supponit, ita quod primo per operationem unam rationis in tali esse distincto constituuntur, et secundo per operationem aliam intellectus sic distincta ad invicem comparantur: sicut enim cum res naturae absolutae ad invicem comparantur supponuntur habere esse distinctum secundum rem, sic etiam cum res rationis ad invicem comparantur supponuntur habere esse distinctum secundum rationem. Ergo si intellectus divinus apprehendit suam essentiam ut differentem secundum rationem ab attributis et etiam apprehendit ipsa attributa ut differentia secundum rationem, et sub ista hac differentia ad invicem comparantur, in ipsa secundum se actualiter sunt ista ut sic differentia, et sub sua actuali distinctionequam sic habent secundum se - movent intellectum divinum ut ipsa sic distincta concipiat et ad invicem comparet. Hoc autem non videtur conveniens)).	164. "Nor can it - namely the intelligible and the intelligent - apprehend in its essence certain things as differing in their comparison with each other or as having a mutual relation with each other, unless these things are supposed already to exist in their own difference, or to be introducing a certain difference. For things which are apprehended as certain different things having a mutual relation to each other, and which are also, by the operation of the intellect, compared as differing from each other, these are also supposed to exist in their own difference; but things that, by the operation of reason or intellect, do not possess what makes them to be beings according to reason, and to differ by reason from each other, these cannot be said to be constituted in their own such being and to have this difference according to reason through comparison of them with each other by the operation of reason or the intellect; nay this second operation necessarily presupposes the first, such that, first, they are by one operation of reason constituted in such distinct being, and, second, by another operation of the intellect they are compared as thus distinct from each other; for just as things of absolute nature, when they are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being in reality, so too beings of reason, when these are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being according to reason. Therefore, if the divine intellect apprehends its own essence as different in reason from the attributes, and if it also apprehends the attributes as different in reason, and if the attributes are compared with each other under this very difference, they are of themselves in it actually as so differing, and under their own actual distinction - which they thus have of themselves - they move the divine intellect so that it conceive them as so distinct and compare them with each other. But this does not seem to be concordant."
165 Ratio ista confirmatur sic: ((Quaecumque enim differunt aut habent differentiam secundum se vel ex se ipsis formaliter per illud quod sunt secundum se ipsa absque comparatione ad alia differentia, talia differunt secundum rem. Alia autem sunt, quae habent pluralitatem sive differentiam ex comparatione ad aliqua realiter differentia, et ista differunt ratione: et hoc patet in creaturis, nam ƿsupposita unitate formae specificae secundum rem, in illa distinguit intellectus rationem generis et differentiae - quae dicuntur non diversae res - sed haec diversitas non posset accipi in aliqua re una et simplici nisi per intellectum compararetur ad aliqua realiter differentia et secundum quemdam ordinem illi unicae rei convenientia; unum et idem etiam non haberet diversas rationes veri et boni nisi intelligere et velle illud 'unum et idem' essent alicui subiecto actus realiter diversi et ad invicem ordinati. Hoc patet etiam in Deo, quia circumscripta comparatione omnimoda ad diversas essentias creaturarum realem diversitatem importantium, essentia divina non apprehenderetur ab intellectu divino sub ratione diversarum idearum (vel formarum) sola ratione differentium sed sub una ratione simplici omnino indistincta)).	165. This reasoning is confirmed as follows: "For all things that differ, or have a difference, formally in themselves or from themselves through what they are in themselves, without comparison to other differing things, all such things differ in reality. But there are other things that have plurality or difference from comparison with other things that really differ, and these things differ by reason; and this is plain in creatures, for once unity of specific form in reality is presupposed, the intellect distinguishes in it the idea of genus and difference - which are said not to be diverse things - but this diversity could not be taken in any single and simple thing unless it were compared by the intellect to some things really different and, according to some order, agreeing with that single thing; one and the same thing would not have diverse reasons of true and good unless to understand and to will the 'one and the same thing' were, for some subject, acts really diverse and ordered with respect to each other. This is plain also in God, because, when every kind of comparison to the diverse essences of creatures introducing a real diversity has been stripped away, the divine essence would not be apprehended by the divine intellect under the reason of diverse ideas (or of forms), differing by reason alone, but under one simple altogether indistinct reason."
166 ((Et haec est intentio Commentatoris XII Metaphysicae commento 39, ubi loquens de hac materia dicit quod vita, sapientia, etc., dicuntur de Deo proprie, quia Deus dicitur proprie et vere vivens et sapiens, etc. Talia autem et consimilia, quae significantur per modum dispositionis et dispositi, in rebus immaterialibus "reducuntur ad unum in esse et ad duo in consideratione: intellectus enim natus est dividere adunata in esse, sed in rebus ƿcompositis - cum disponit compositum vel habentem formam per formam - intelligit utraque adunata aliquo modo et differentia aliquo modo; quando autem fuerint considerata dispositum et dispositio in immaterialibus, tunc reducuntur ad unam intentionem omnino, et nullus modus erit quo praedicatum distinguatur a subiecto extra intellectum, scilicet in esse rei. Sed nullam differentiam intelligit intellectus inter ea in essendo, nisi secundum acceptionem, scilicet quod idem recipit dispositum et dispositionem ut duo, quorum proportio est ad invicem sicut proportio praedicati ad subiectum; intellectus enim potest intelligere idem secundum similitudinem ad propositionem categoricam, in rebus compositis, sicut intelligit multa secundum similitudinem")).	166. "And this is the intention of the Commentator in Metaphysics XII com.39 where, speaking of this matter, he says that life, wisdom, etc. are said properly of God, because God is properly and truly said to be alive and to be wise etc. But such and the like things, which are signified by way of disposition and thing disposed, 'are reduced' in material things 'to one thing in being and to two things in consideration; for the intellect is of a nature to divide things united in being, but in composite things - when it disposes the composite, or what has a form, through the form - it understands both the things that are united in some way and different in another way; but when the disposed thing and the disposition have been considered in immaterial things, then they are reduced to altogether one intention, and there will be no mode by which the predicate is distinguished from the subject outside the intellect, namely in the being of the thing. But the intellect understands no difference between them in being, save according to way of taking them, namely because the same thing receives the disposed thing and the disposition as two, the proportion of which to each other is as the proportion of predicate to subject; for the intellect can, in the case of composite things, understand the same thing according to likeness to a categorical proposition, just as it understands many things according to likeness'."
167 Contra istam positionem primo arguitur sic: ((quidquid est perfectionis simpliciter in creatura, principalius et ex se est in Deo, et non respetu alterius)); attributum est simpliciter perfectionis in creatura, ita quod simpliciter 'melius est ipsum quam non ipsum'; ergo etc. Probatio maioris: ((perfectum semper independens est ab imperfecto, sicut imperfectum est dependens a perfecto)); attributalis perfectio in Deo est perfecte, in creatura imperfecte. - Similiter, ƿnon esset infinitae perfectionis simpliciter nisi esset continens omnem perfectionem simpliciter sine respectu ad aliud extra. Minor declaratur sic: quia enim quodlibet creatum in esse quiditativo est limitatum et quaelibet perfectio eius, sibi essentialis, ideo a nulla tali sumitur attributum (pari enim ratione a qualibet essentia creata sumeretur attributum, sed ab illo quod est perfectio accidentalis creaturae - sive in bene esse - sumitur attributum, quae dicit perfectionem simpliciter in subiectam substantiam, quia licet ut natura quaedam habeat gradum limitatum, tamen ut perficiens aliud in bene esse eius, nullam limitationem importat, et sic est attributum. Sic etiam in Deo, non notat perfectionem propriam sed quasi accidentalem, in bene esse, - XV Trinitatis cap. 5: ((Si dicimus sapiens, potens, speciosus, spiritus, quod novissimum posui videtur significare substantiam, cetera vero huius substantiae qualitates)).	167. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this position I argue first thus: "whatever is a mark of perfection simply in a creature is more principally and of itself in God, and not with respect to another;" an attribute is a mark of perfection simply in a creature, such that 'it rather than not it' is simply 'better' [n.22]; therefore etc. Proof of the major: "the perfect is always independent of the imperfect, just as the imperfect is dependent on the perfect;" an attributal perfection is in God perfectly, in creatures imperfectly. - Likewise it would not be of infinite perfection simply unless it contained all perfection simply without respect to anything external. The minor is made clear thus: for because any created thing, and any perfection of it essential to it, is limited in quidditative existence, therefore from nothing of this sort is an attribute taken (for by parity of reason an attribute might be taken from any created essence), but an attribute is taken from that which is an accidental perfection in a creature - or in its existing well - and which states a perfection simply in the subject substance, -because, although as a certain nature it has a limited rank, yet as perfecting another in its existing well it indicates no limitation, and thus it is an attribute. Thus too in God it does not indicate a proper perfection but as it were an accidental one, in his existing well, - On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.8: "If we say wise, powerful, beautiful, spirit, what I put last seems to signify substance, but the rest qualities of this substance."
168 Item, illa non distinguuntur per respectum ad extra quorum quodlibet continet essentiam secundum rationem omnem idealem; sed ((quodlibet attributum continet essentiam secundum omnem rationem perfectionis idealis)); ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia ratio idealis correspondet perfectioni: creaturae in quantum ea perficitur in esse quiditativo, et per consequens sub ratione illa qua essentia illa est limitata (unde et secunƿdum diversos gradus limitationis distinguuntur), non autem in quantum illa essentia est perfecta simpliciter, quia sic correspondet omnibus unum attributum in Deo, ut bonum vel perfectum; ex hoc apparet probatio minoris: quia enim quodlibet attributum est perfectio simpliciter (ex declaratione minoris primae probationis), sequitur quod quodlibet est imitabile ab omni gradu limitato. Probatio maioris est, quia continens omnem ideam, aequaliter videtur respicere omne ideatum, et ita per respectum ad nullum potest distingui ab alio, quia similiter respicit quodlibet; unde sapientia attributum non magis respicit sapientiam ideatam quam colorem ideatum, quia utrumque aeque est limitatum, nec ab uno magis sumitur attributum quam ab alio.	168. Again, those things are not distinguished by respect externally of which any one contains essence according to every ideal reason; but "any attribute contains essence according to every reason of ideal perfection;" therefore etc. The proof of the minor is that the ideal reason corresponds to the perfection of the creature insofar as it is perfected in quidditative existence and, consequently, under the idea by which the essence is limited (hence also creatures are distinguished according to diverse degrees of limitation), but not insofar as the essence is perfect simply, because thus one attribute in God, as good or perfect, corresponds to all of them; from this the proof of the minor is apparent: for because any attribute is a perfection simply (from the clarification of the minor of the first proof [n.167]), it follows that any one of them is imitable by every limited grade. The proof of the major is that what contains every idea seems to regard equally everything patterned after the idea, and so in regard to none of them can it be distinguished from another, because it similarly regards any one at all; hence the attribute wisdom does not more regard wisdom patterned after the idea than color patterned after it, because both are equally limited, nor is the attribute taken more from one than from the other.
169 Item, ((distinctio attributorum est fundamentum distinctionis emanationum personalium, quia Filius procedit nascendo ut verbum in intellectu, Spiritus Sanctus spirando ut amor in voluntate, et non ut verbum, - quod non posset esse nisi esset aliqua distinctio intellectus et voluntatis ad intra)), sic ut productio personarum ad nihil extra necessario comparatur; ergo etc.	169. Again, "the distinction of attributes is the foundation of the distinction of the personal emanations, because the Son proceeds by being born as the word in the intellect, the Holy Spirit by being inspirited as love in the will, and not as the word, - which could not be unless there were some distinction of intellect and will internally," such that the production of the persons is compared necessarily to nothing external; therefore etc.
170 Item, ((intelligit essentiam suam in quantum vera, non in quantum bona, - et vult eam in quantum bona, non in quantum vera)); ((ab aeterno etiam intellexit se intelligere essentiam suam et velle eam simpliciter, non in respectu ad extra)), quia iste actus ƿconsequitur immaterialitatem naturalem. Ergo sine tali respectu includit in essentia sua rationem veri et boni, et similiter rationem intelligentis et intellecti, volentis et voliti, formaliter distinctas; ergo etc.	170. Again, "he [God] understands his essence insofar as it is true, not insofar as it is good, - and he wills it insofar as it is good, not insofar as it is true;" "also from eternity he understood that he understands his essence and wills it simply, not in respect of something external," because this act follows natural immateriality. Therefore, without such respect, it includes in its essence the idea of true and good, and similarly the idea of understanding and understood, of willing and willed, as formally distinct; therefore etc.
171 Item, ((beatitudo divina consistit in eius actibus perfectis, intellectus et voluntatis, sed omnia attributa divina sese mutuo respiciunt in perficiendo actus illos)), ut patebit; beatitudo autem Dei a nullo respectu extra dependet; ergo etc.	171. Again, "divine beatitude consists in its perfect acts, of intellect and will, but all the divine attributes mutually regard each other in perfecting those acts," as will be plain [n.175]; but the beatitude of God depends on no extrinsic respect; therefore etc.
172 Contra rationem eius. Maior est falsa. Tum quia ita distinguitur essentia divina ratione ab attributo, sicut unum attributum ab alio: numquid ergo sequitur 'essentia ut essentia, non est ibi nisi ex respectu ad extra'? Tum quia verum et bonum in creatura distinguuntur distinctione rationis: a quibus ergo re distinctis sumitur haec distinctio? a nullis, sed a vero et bono in Deo, quae ratione differunt. - Tum tertio, quia ubi est ((mera distinctio rationis, non requiritur respectus ad aliquid extra)) (sicut est in definitione et definito): et talis est distinctio in attributis, ((quae sunt obiecta intelligentiae divinae, differentia ratione, licet sint unus actus intelligendi in Deo)). Quando enim requiritur respectus ad extra, tunc distinctio partim est ab intellectu et partim aliunde: et hoc vel a diversis circumstantibus ƿextra diversimode, ut patet in exemplis adductis de columna et puncto, - vel ab eodem diversimode circumstante, ut patet in secunda instantia contra maiorem.	172. Against the reasons for the opinion [n.160]. The major is false. First because the divine essence is distinguished by reason from the attribute, just as one attribute is from another; can it therefore follow that 'essence as essence is only there by outward respect'? - Second because true and good in creatures are distinguished by a distinction of reason; from which really distinct things, then, is this distinction taken? From none but from true and good in God, which differ in reason. - Next, third because where there is "a mere distinction of reason, no outward respect is required" (just as is the case with definition and defined); and such is the distinction in the case of attributes, "which are objects of the divine intelligence, different in reason, although they are one act of understanding in God." For when an outward respect is required, then the distinction is partly from the intellect and partly from elsewhere; and this either from diverse circumstances extrinsic in diverse ways, as is plain in the examples adduced of the column and the point [n.160], - or from the same thing diversely circumstanced, as is plain in the second instance [above, n.172] against the major.
173 Item, contra minorem illius rationis arguitur sic: ((cum omnia attributa pertineant ad intellectum et voluntatem - quae sunt principia emanationum - ad personas distinctas realiter potest reduci distinctio attributorum, ita quod illa quae pertinent ad intellectum, habent respectum ad gignitionem, - quae ad voluntatem, habent respectum ad spirationem; ut sicut intellectus naturalis haec et illa non distinguit nisi ex respectu ad aliqua in creaturis, ad quas omnem suum intellectum reflectit, - sic intellectus beatus de personis, ad quas omnem suum dirigit intellectum)).	173. Again, against the minor of the reason [n.160] there is this argument: "since all the attributes pertain to the intellect and the will - which are the principles of the emanations - the distinction of attributes can be really reduced to distinct persons, such that those which pertain to the intellect have respect to generation, - those which pertain to the will have respect to inspiriting; so that, just as the natural intellect does not distinguish these and those save by respect to things in creatures to which it turns back all its understanding, so the blessed intellect distinguishes them about the persons, to which it directs all its understanding."
174 Est alia positio, quae dicit quod ((essentia divina absolute considerata, in quantum natura aliqua vel essentia, nullam habet distinctionem rationum nisi quasi in potentia, dicit enim Commentator XII Metaphysicae, quod ' multiplicitas rationum in Deo non est nisi in intellectu tantum, non in re'; considerata autem non in se sed in quantum veritas - prout scilicet habet esse in intelligentia - potest accipi dupliciter, aut in quantum movet intellectum quasi simplici intelligentia, et sic adhuc concipitur per rationem suae simplicitatis nec habet aliquam pluƿralitatem nisi quasi in potentia, - aut in quantum intelligentia post istam apprehensionem negotiatur circa ipsam pluralitatem attributorum, quasi reducendo ipsa de potentia ad actum. Primo modo intellectus naturalis ad ipsam non pertingit sed tunc tantum percipit de attributis, conceptis ex creaturis)), secundum istam opinionem; ((secundo modo intellectus beatus quasi prima actione intelligendi capit eam; tertio modo quasi - idem intellectus componens et dividens, et intellectus divinus unico simplici intuitu, distinguit rationes contentas in essentia, quae ex perfectione sua summa omnes perfectiones simpliciter sola operatione intellectus distinguendas continet)).	174. [Exposition of the opinion] - There is another position [Henry of Ghent's], which says that "the divine essence absolutely considered, insofar as it is a nature or essence, has no distinction of reasons save as it were in potency, - for the Commentator says Metaphysics XII com.39 that 'the multiplicity of reasons in God is only in the intellect alone, not in reality'; but the divine essence considered, not in itself, but insofar as it is truth - insofar namely as it has existence in the intellect - can be taken in two ways, either insofar as it moves the intellect as by simple intelligence, and thus it is still conceived by reason of its simplicity and does not have any plurality save as it were in potency, - or insofar as the intelligence, after this apprehension, busies itself about the very plurality of the attributes, as if reducing them from potency to act. In the first way [sc. the divine essence absolutely considered] the natural intellect does not attain it but then only perceives it from attributes conceived from creatures," according to this opinion; "in the second way [sc. the first way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the blessed intellect grasps it as if in the first action of understanding; in the third way [sc. the second way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the same intellect [sc. the blessed intellect] combining as it were and dividing, and the divine intellect in a single, simple intuition, distinguish the reasons contained in the essence, which essence contains, of its supreme perfection, all the perfections simply that are, by the sole operation of the intellect, to be distinguished."
175 ((Istae rationes attributorum, quas intellectus de simplici essentia per diversos conceptus format, non sunt nisi respectus fundati in essentia (quia conceptum plurium absolutorum intra eam impedit simplicitas), et sunt conceptus plures ne conceptus sint synonymi, et in essentia ne sint vani, sed non sunt respectus ad extra)) (ut probatum est), ((sed ad intra. Sic omnia attributa divina pertinent ad intellectum vel voluntatem, quae ad intra mutuo se respiciunt in quantum - haec et illa - omnia cadunt ex conƿgruentia sub apprehensione intellectus: qui intellectus, primo, simplici intelligentia concipit essentiam ut essentia est, deinde negotiando circa eam, concipit eam ut intellecta est et ut intelligens et ut ratio intelligendi, - ita quod essentia in quantum essentia, respicit alia ut in qua sunt fundata; ut vero concepta est et movens intellectum ad intelligendum, dicitur veritas, cuius propria ratio est ut respiciat essentiam in quantum essentia est sicut illud cuius est declarativa, et intellectum ut cui habet declarare, et actum intelligendi ut quo habet declarare, et sapientiam ut habitum quo intellectus est habilis ut sibi fiat declaratio. Ipsa vero essentia ut per actum intelligendi est conceptiva sui ipsius, est intellectus, et respicit verum ut per quod manifestetur essentia quae concipitur)), - similiter de actu, etc. - Sic etiam de pertinentibus ad voluntatem.	175. "These reasons of the attributes, which the intellect forms from the simple essence through diverse conceptions, are only respects founded in the essence (because simplicity prevents the concept of several attributes within it), and they are several concepts, lest the concepts be synonymous, and lest they be empty in the essence, but they are not outward respects" (as was proved [nn.167-171]), "but inward ones. Thus all the divine attributes pertain to the intellect or will, and they mutually regard each other inwardly insofar as they all - these and those - fall, by congruence, under the apprehension of the intellect; this intellect firstly conceives, in a simple intelligence, the essence as it is essence, and then, busying itself about it, conceives it as understood and as understanding and as the reason of understanding, - such that the essence, insofar as it is essence, has a respect to the other things as they are founded in it; but the essence as conceived, and as moving the intellect to understand, is called truth, whose proper reason is that it have a respect to the essence, insofar as it is essence, as being that of which it is clarificatory, and to the intellect as that to which it has to clarify it, and to the act of understanding as that by which it has to clarify it, and to wisdom as the habit in which the intellect is fit to have a clarification made to it. But the essence itself, as it is conceptive of itself by an act of understanding, is the intellect, and it has a respect to truth as that through which the essence which is conceived is made manifest," - and likewise of the act, etc. - Thus too about the attributes pertaining to the will.
176 ((A summa unitate essentiae, ordinate, secundum modum concipiendi, primo concipiuntur diversae rationes attributorum (et inter illas adhuc est ordo, secundum quod immediatius vel mediatius ordinantur ad emanationes), deinde concipiuntur emanationes et ibi est status intra, deinde sequuntur omnes respectus ad extra, qui sunt per accidens; sicut autem distinctio relationum realium ad sua correspondentia, sic et relationum rationalium ad sua correspondentia, et totum ad intra, secundum illud argumentum quod fuit pro hac parte)). ƿ	176. "From the supreme unity of the essence, in ordered manner, according to the mode of conceiving, the diverse reasons of the attributes are first conceived (and among these attributes there is still order, according as they are more immediately or more mediately ordered to the emanations), next the emanations are conceived, and there an inward stand is made, and finally there follow all the outward respects, which are per accidens; but just as the distinction of real relations is to what corresponds to them, so too is the distinction of relations of reason to what corresponds to them, and wholly inwardly, according to the argument that was made for this part [sc. that the relations of reason are inward only]."
177 Contra istam opinionem arguitur per rationes illas quas adduxi contra primam opinionem, - primo per rationem tertiam, quia contra eos: distinctio perfectionum attributalium est fundamentum respectu distinctionis emanationum, sed distinctio emanationum est realis, patet; nulla autem distinctio realis praeexigit necessario distinctionem quae tantum est rationis, sicut nec aliquid quod est vere reale praeexigit aliud quod est mere ens rationis; ergo distinctio attributorum non est tantum rationis sed aliquo modo ex natura rei. - Assumptum patet, quia ens reale quod distinguitur contra ens rationis, est illud quod ex se habet esse, circumscripto omni opere intellectus ut intellectus est; quidquid autem dependet ab ente rationis vel praeexigit illud, non potest habere suum esse circumscripto omni opere intellectus; nihil ergo quod praeexigit ens rationis, est ens vere reale.	177. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion there is argument through the reasons I adduced against the first opinion [nn.167-176], - first, by the third reason, because it is against them [sc. the followers of Henry, n.169]: the distinction of the attributal perfections is the foundation with respect to the distinction of the emanations, -but the distinction of the emanations is real, as is clear; but no real distinction necessarily pre-requires a distinction which is only one of reason, just as neither does anything that is truly real pre-require something else that is merely a being of reason; therefore the distinction of attributes is not one of reason only but is in some way from the nature of the thing. - The assumption is plain, because a real being, which is distinguished against a being of reason, is that which has existence of itself, setting aside all work of the intellect as it is intellect; but whatever depends on a being of reason, or pre-requires it, cannot have existence when all work of the intellect has been set aside; therefore nothing that pre-requires a being of reason is a truly real being.
178 Confirmatur ista ratio, quia quod est posterius naturaliter, ƿnon potest esse perfectius ente priore naturaliter; sed ens reale est perfectius ente illo quod est ens rationis tantum. Haec ratio licet sufficiat contra opinantem, tamen oportet eam confirmare propter conclusionem in se.	178. A confirmation of this reason is that what is naturally posterior cannot be more perfect than a being that is naturally prior; but real being is more perfect than a being which is a being of reason only [sc. therefore a real being cannot be posterior to a being of reason]. Although this reason is sufficient against one who holds the opinion, yet it is necessary to confirm it for the conclusion in itself [nn.180-181; the conclusion is that attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing,].
179 Dicitur ad eam quod attributa non sunt fundamenta emanationum distinctarum, immo essentia sola cum relationibus principiat diversas emanationes; tamen intellectus potest postea considerare ipsam essentiam ut cum relationibus principiat hanc et illam, et tunc considerare rationem naturae et voluntatis, et tamen non praecedunt ibi ex natura rei.	179. Let it be said to it that the attributes are not the foundations of the distinct emanations, nay the essence alone along with the relations is the principle of the diverse emanations; yet the intellect can afterwards consider the essence itself as it is, along with the relations, principle of this and that emanation, and then can consider the idea of nature and of will, and yet these will not there be prior from the nature of the thing.
180 Contra: in illo instanti originis in quo Filius generatur, quaero, aut principium productivum eius alio modo se habet ad ipsum, quam principium productivum Spiritus Sancti se habet ad ipsum, aut non alio modo. Si non alio modo, ergo nec magis est Filius filius nec imago Patris ex vi productionis suae quam Spiritus Sanctus, - si sic, ergo in illis signis originis ante omnem actum intellectus habetur aliqua distinctio et non identitas formalis. ƿ	180. On the contrary: in the instant of origin in which the Son is generated, I ask whether his productive principle is related to him in a way other than the productive principle of the Holy Spirit is related to him, or not in another way. If not in another way, then the Son is not more son or image of the Father by force of his production than the Holy Spirit is, - if in another way, then in those moments of origin, before all act of the intellect, some distinction and formal non-identity is obtained.
181 Nec valet attribuere istam distinctionem relationibus, quia omnis relatio aeque naturaliter respicit suum correlativum; ergo essentia ut sub ratione spirativi, aeque naturaliter respicit spiratum, sicut sub ratione generativi respicit generatum vel genitum. Non ergo posset ibi salvari alius et alius modus producendi - naturaliter et libere - propter relationes, sed tantum si illud absolutum, quo producens producit, sit alterius rationis.	181. Nor is it valid to attribute this distinction to the relations, because every relation has a respect naturally to its correlatives; therefore the essence, as it is under the idea of inspiriting, equally has a respect to the inspirited, just as under the idea of generative it has a respect to the generated or the begotten. The different modes, then, of producing - naturally and freely - cannot there be saved by the relations, but only if the absolute, by which the producer produces, is of a different idea.
182 Hoc etiam arguitur contra istam positionem et ex alia ratione eorum, de obiectis veri et boni, - quia si 'ab aeterno Deus ex immaterialitate sui intelligit se et vult se', et hoc sub ratione veri et boni, ergo est ibi distinctio veri et boni ratione formalium in obiectis, ante omnem actum circa talia obiecta.	182. This point [that the attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing] is also argued against this position by yet another of their reasons, about the objects of true and good [n.170] - because if 'from eternity God, of his immateriality, understands himself and wills himself, and this under the idea of true and good, then there is there a distinction of true and good by reason of formalities in the objects, before every act about such objects.
183 Hoc etiam confirmatur per argumentum eorum de beatitudine, quae convenit Deo ex natura rei ante omnem actum intellectus negotiativi, quia actus negotiandi non est formaliter beatificus; illa autem beatitudo (ut dicitur), requirit rationem propriam obiecti et potentiae, et operationis; ergo etc.	183. This is also confirmed by their argument about beatitude [nn.174-176], which belongs to God from the nature of the thing before every act of busying intellect, because the act of being busy about something is not formally beatific; but that beatitude (as is said) requires the proper idea of object and of power and of the one operating; therefore etc.
184 Ista tamen positio exponitur sic, quod possumus loqui de ratione quam obiectum facit in intellectu de se, vel de illa quam ƿintellectus potest facere circa obiectum negotiando: si loquamur de prima, illa est unica, sicut et unica est in re,- et hoc dixit opinio in se, quod ut est in intelligentia per actum notitiae simƿplicis, habet omnino rationem indistincti; si secundo modo, sic intellectus potest formare circa illam unam rationem obiecti multas rationes distinctas, conferendo hoc ad illud,- et hoc similiter ƿdixit illa opinio, quod obiectum ut est in intellectu negotiante habet distinctas rationes, quasi formatas circa ipsum. Addit tamen ista expositio - quod opinio in se non videtur dicere - quod illa una ratio in se est formaliter veritas et bonitas, et quaelibet perfectio simpliciter, et quod illa una ratio, quae fit in intellectu virtute ƿobiecti, est etiam ratio bonitatis formaliter et veritatis, etc. Opinio tamen in se videtur dicere quod ista dicunt diversos respectus fundatos in essentia.	184. However the position [of Henry's] is expounded in this way, that we can speak about the relation that the object makes in the intellect of itself, or about that which the intellect can make by busying itself about the object; if we speak of the first, it is single, as it is also single in reality, - and this the opinion in itself said, that it has, as it is in the intelligence by an act of simple knowledge, the idea altogether of something indistinct [n.174]; if in the second way, thus the intellect can form about that one idea of the object many distinct ideas, comparing this to that, - and this likewise the opinion said, that the object, as it is in the intellect busying itself, has distinct ideas, quasi-formed about it [nn.174-175]. Yet this exposition adds - which the opinion in itself does not seem to say - that the one idea in itself is formally truth and goodness, and any perfection simply, and that the one idea, which is made in the intellect by virtue of the object, is also the idea of goodness formally and of truth, etc. The opinion in itself, however, seems to say that they state diverse respects founded in the essence.
185 Quia ergo diversimode potest intelligi dicta opinio, praeter argumenta iam facta appono alias rationes, - et primo ostendo quod formaliter veritas et bonitas sint in re, et quaelibet perfectio simpliciter, ante omne opus intellectus: quia quaelibet perfectio simpliciter est formaliter in ente simpliciter perfecto ex natura rei; veritas formaliter est perfectio simpliciter, et bonitas similiter; igitur etc. Maior patet, tum quia aliter non esset simpliciter perfectum, quia non esset 'quo maius cogitari non posset' (cogitaretur enim maius eo si esset sic et sic perfectum), tum quia aliter perfectio simpliciter in nullo esset perfecte (non enim est aliqua perfectio perfecte in creatura, quia ibi est finite, nec in Deo est perfecte si non sit in eo ut exsistens sed tantum ut cognitus est, quia 'esse ƿcognitum' est esse deminutum ut distinguitur contra exsistens), tum tertio, quia perfectio simpliciter in aliquo esset formaliter per participationem, et non formaliter in eo a quo participaret eam (immo perfectio talis in participante non esset per participationem illius perfectionis in causa, quia nihil est a quo sit participatio exsistentis nisi exsistens), quae omnia - illata scilicet - videntur absurda. - Minor patet, quia aliter Anselmus non poneret talia in Deo, quia secundum eum, Monologion 15, nihil tale ponendum est in Deo quod non est 'melius ipsum esse quam non esse', ac per hoc perfectio simpliciter. Patet etiam eadem minor, quia quodlibet tale potest formaliter esse infinitum; infinitas repugnat cuicumque quod non est perfectio simpliciter; ergo etc. ƿ	185. Because, therefore, the said opinion [nn.174-176] can be understood diverse ways, besides the arguments already made, I append other reasons, - and first I show that truth and goodness are formally in the thing, as well as any perfection simply, before all work of the intellect; because any perfection simply : formally in a simply perfect being from the nature of the thing; truth is formally ; perfection simply, and goodness likewise; therefore etc. The major is plain, first because otherwise there would not be a simply perfect thing, because there would not be 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' [I d.2 n.137] (for a greater than it would be thought if it were perfect thus and so), second because otherwise perfection simply would exist perfectly in nothing (for there is no perfection perfectly in a creature, because it exists there finitely, nor is there any perfection perfectly in God if it is not in him as existing but only as known, because 'to be known' is to exist in diminished fashion in contradistinction to something existent), then third because perfection simply in something would exist formally by participation and would not exist formally in that from which it would be participated (nay, such perfection in the participant would not be by participation of the perfection in its cause, because there is nothing on which participation in something existent depends save something existent), all which - namely all these inferred results - seem absurd. - The minor is plain, because otherwise Anselm would not posit such things in God, because according to him, Monologion ch. 15, nothing such should be posited in God which is not 'better existing than not existing', and hence a perfection simply. The same minor is also plain because anything such can be formally infinite; infinity is repugnant to anything that is not a perfection simply; therefore etc.
186 Ulterius, probo quod tales perfectiones in natura rei, ante opus intellectus, non habent identitatem formalem: quia intellectus actu suo non potest causare nisi relationem rationis, ex hoc scilicet ƿquod est virtus collativa, potens conferre hoc ut cognitum ad illud. Quaero ergo utrum veritas dicat praecise illam perfectionem quae est in re formaliter, aut praecise illam relationem factam ƿab intellectu, aut utrumque? Si praecise relationem rationis, ergo non est perfectio simpliciter, quia nulla relatio rationis potest esse infinita: si enim realis - ut paternitas - non est formaliter infinita, quanto magis illa rationis. Si ambo, cum illa non sint unum nisi per accidens - quia relatio rationis cum ente reali numquam facit unum per se (quod patet, quia multo minus facit unum cum ente reali quam passio cum subiecto: passio enim consequitur subiectum ex ratione subiecti, nullum autem ens rationis consequitur ens reale ex ratione sui) - separa ergo ista duo quae concurrunt in isto ente per accidens, et sequitur tunc quod veritas semper dicat praecise illam perfectionem in re, et bonitas similiter; et tunc ultra, cum nulla sit distinctio in re, sive secundum opinionem sive secunƿdum expositionem opinionis, sequitur quod bonitas et veritas sint formaliter synonyma (quod ipsi negant), quia dicerent eandem perfectionem ut perfectio est in re, ut probatum est, et sine omni distinctione rei et rationis.	186. Further, I prove that such perfections in the nature of the thing do not, before the work of the intellect, have formal identity; because the intellect can by it< own act only cause a relation of reason, from the fact, namely, that it is a collative virtue, able to confer this thing as known to that. I ask then whether truth precisely the perfection which is in the thing formally, or precisely the rela by the intellect, or both? If precisely the relation of reason, then truth is not a perfection simply, because no relation of reason can be infinite; for if a real relation - as paternity - is not formally infinite, how much less so the relation of reason. If both, since they are not one save per accidens - because a relation of reason never makes with a real being something one perse (as is plain, because it makes one thing much less with a real being than a property does with the subject; for a property follows the subject from the idea of the subject, but no being of reason follows a real being from the idea of it) - then separate those two things apart that come together in this being per accidens, and it then follows that truth always states precisely that perfection in the thing, and goodness likewise; and then further, since there is no distinction in the thing, whether according to the opinion or according to the exposition of the opinion [nn.174-176, 184], it follows that goodness and truth are formally synonymous (which they themselves deny [n.175]), because they would state the same perfection as it is a perfection in the thing, as was proved [just above at "then separate..."], and without any distinction of thing or of reason.
187 Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsistens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuitiva, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto - sive sit distinctorum obiectorum formalium, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus - sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto, erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelligendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia 'ut relationem rationis', ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.	187. Further, the intuitive intellect has no distinction in the object save according to what is existent, because just as it does not know any object save as existent, so it does not know any things formally distinct in the object save as it is existent. Since, therefore, the divine intellect does not know its own essence save by intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object - whether of distinct formal objects or as of reasons caused by an act of intellect [sc. the two ways of taking Henry's opinion, his and the expositor's] - it follows that this distinction will be in the object as it is actually existent; and so, if this distinction is of distinct formal objects in the object, those distinct objects will be formally distinct (and then the intended proposition follows, that such distinction of formal objects precedes the act of the intellect), but if it is of reasons caused by an act of understanding, then the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence 'as a relation of reason', as it is existent, which seems absurd.
188 Item, arguitur contra illam expositionem,- quia si de aliquo obiecto tantum natus est haberi unus conceptus realis, nihil facit ƿconceptum realem illius obiecti nisi faciat illum unum; de essentia autem divina secundum eos, tantum natus est haberi unus conceptus realis, quia illa tantum nata est facere unum conceptum realem (nata est facere autem omnem conceptum realem qui de ea haberi potest, alioquin esset imperfectius intelligibile quam sit aliquod intelligibile creatum, quod quidem est causativum omnis conceptus realis possibilis haberi de eo); ergo nihil faciet in intellectu aliquem conceptum de Deo nisi faciat illum unicum, et ita cum creatura non possit causare in intellectu illum conceptum quia ille conceptus est essentiae ut est 'haec', in se, sub propria ratione - sequitur quod per nullam actionem creaturae possit haberi aliquis conceptus naturalis de Deo in vita ista.	188. Again, there is an argument against the exposition [n.184], - that if only one real concept is of a nature to be had about any object, nothing causes a real concept of the object unless it causes that one concept; but about the divine essence, according to them, only one real concept is of a nature to be had, because the divine essence is only of a nature to make one real concept (but it is of a nature to make any real concept that can be had of it, otherwise it would be a more imperfect intelligible than is any created intelligible, which created intelligible indeed is causative of every real concept that can be had of it); therefore nothing will cause the intellect any concept of God unless it make that single concept, and so since the creature cannot cause that concept in the intellect - because the concept is of the divine essence as the essence is a 'this', in itself, under its proper idea - it follows that by no action of a creature can any natural concept be had of God in this life [n.55].
189 Praeterea, contra opinionem in se, quia si ista qualitercumque distinguantur ratione, non distinguuntur ex natura rei, sed actu intellectus vel voluntatis. Ex hoc arguo: distinctio praecedens rationem primi distinctivi, non est per tale distinctivum; sed distinctio naturae et intellectionis vel voluntatis et intellectionis praecedit intellectionem, quae est principium distinctivum eorum quae diƿstinguuntur secundum rationem; ergo illa distinctio naturae et intellectionis vel intellectionis et voluntatis non erit per intellectionem. - Assumptum patet. Si enim nulla distinctio eorum praecederet, non magis distinguerentur ista intellectione, quam natura vel voluntate: quidquid autem distinguitur intellectione ut est indistincta omnino a natura, distinguitur etiam natura; $a quidquid enim competit a ut est omni modo indistinctum a b, idem competit ipsi b, - oppositum videtur includere contradictionem. a$	189. Further, against the opinion in itself, because if these things [the attributes] are distinguished in some way or other by reason, they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by an act of intellect or will. From this I argue: a distinction preceding the idea of the first distinguishing thing is not made by such a distinguishing thing; but a distinction between nature and intellection, or between will and intellection, precedes intellection, which is the distinguishing principle of things which are distinguished by reason; therefore the distinction between nature and intellection, or between intellection and will, will not be made by intellection. - The assumption is plain. For if no distinction of them were to precede, these [attributes] would not be distinguished more by intellection than by nature or will; but whatever is distinguished by intellection, as it is altogether indistinct from nature, is also distinguished by nature; for whatever belongs to a as it is in every way indistinct from b, belongs to b itself, - the opposite seems to involve a contradiction.
190 Et si dicatur, quasi contemnendo istud argumentum (forte ad cautelam, propter defectum responsionis), quod si per impossibile esset sola intellectio, per se, ipsa distingueret, non autem natura vel voluntas, - haec responsio non sufficit, quia quantumcumque aliqua per impossibile separentur, si eis separatis aliquid competat uni et non alteri, hoc non potest esse nisi propter aliquam distinctionem formalem rationis istius a ratione illius. Ergo si per impossibile, istis separatis, competeret distinctio intellectioni et non naturae, aliqua est distinctio 'rationis huius et illius' ƿetiam quando non sunt separata: separatis enim per impossibile albo et albo, non poteris habere quod album sit causa alicuius quin album sit causa eiusdem, quia nulla est distinctio inter album et album; unde numquam esset hic fallacia accidentis 'intellectione distinguuntur ista, intellectio est natura, ergo natura distinguuntur', nisi ratio intellectionis extranearetur rationi naturae, in quantum comparantur ad tertium; ergo illa extraneatio praevenit 'aliquam distinctionem' rationis ab illa, in quantum comparantur ad tertium, et illa praevenit distinctionem rationum inter se.	190. And if it be said, as if despising this argument [189] (perhaps by precaution, because of the defect of the reply), that if there were, per impossibile, intellection alone, by itself, it would do the distinguishing, not nature or will, - this response is not sufficient, because however much certain things are per impossibile separated, if, when they are separated, something belongs to one and not to another, this cannot be except because of some formal distinction of the reason of this one from the reason of that one. Therefore if, per impossibile, with these things separated, a distinction would belong to intellection and not to nature, there is some distinction 'between this reason and that' even when they are not separated; for, after white and white are per impossibile separated, you will not be able to have it that white is the cause of something without white being the cause of the same thing, because there is no distinction between white and white; hence, there would never be a fallacy of accident here, 'these attributes are distinguished by intellection, intellection is nature, therefore they are distinguished by nature', unless the idea of intellection were extraneous to the idea of nature, insofar as they are compared to a third thing; therefore that extraneity precedes 'any distinction' of this idea from that, insofar as they are compared to a third, and it [sc. the idea of intellection or of nature] precedes the distinction of the ideas between themselves.
191 Ad quaestionem respondeo quod inter perfectiones essentiales non est tantum differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam, et utique maior est inter sapientiam et veritatem), nec est ibi tantum distinctio obiectorum formalium in intellectu, quia ut argutum est prius, illa nusquam est in cognitione intuitiva nisi sit in obiecto intuitive ƿcognito. Ista etiam duo membra probantur per rationes factas contra praecedentem opinionem.	191. [Solution of the question] - To the question [n.157] I reply that between the essential perfections there is only a difference of reason, that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object (for there is such a distinction between wise and wisdom, and a greater one at any rate between wisdom and truth), and there is not there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as argued before, that distinction is nowhere in intuitive cognition unless it is in the object intuitively known [n.187]. These two members are also proved by the reasons made against the preceding opinion [sc. of Henry, nn.177-178, 182-183, 185-190].
192 Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo, et est ista, quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei, et bonitas in re ex natura rei, - sapientia autem in re, formaliter non est bonitas in re. Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita bonitas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi. Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio (qui tamen 'gradus' est gradus illius perfectionis), non tollitur formalis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, et ita si non includit formaliter 'ut in communi, in communi', nec 'ut infinitum, infinitum'.	192. So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing - but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing. The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which 'grade' however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.
193 Hoc declaro, quia 'includere formaliter' est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaƿretur, inclusum esset definitio vel pars definitionis; sicut autem definitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se sapientiam, ita nec infinita infinitam: est igitur aliqua non identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles. Definitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatam ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei: est ergo non identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam 'sapientia non est formaliter bonitas', non causat actu suo collativo veritatem huius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione fit actus verus.	193. I make this clear by the fact that 'to include formally' is to include something in its essential idea, such that, if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; but just as the definition of goodness in general does not include wisdom in itself, so neither does infinite goodness include infinite wisdom; there is then some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them, if they were definable. But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect, when combining this proposition 'wisdom is not formally goodness', does not, by its collative act, cause the truth of this proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.
194 Et istud argumentum 'de non formali identitate' dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divinis aliquam esse praedicationem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formaliter bonitatem.	194. And this argument 'about non formal identity' the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing in divine reality that there was some predication true by identity that yet was not formal; thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in the thing, but truth is not formally goodness.
195 $a Regula Anselmi, Monologion 15: ((Necesse est ut sit quidquid omnino melius est ipsum quam non ipsum)); nulla relatio ƿrationis est huiusmodi, et nihil est nisi omnino idem re et ratione, circumscriptis relationibus rationis; ergo nihil aliud est regula sua nisi quod 'Deus est Deus'.	195. The rule of Anselm, Monologion ch.15: "It is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better it than not it;" no relation of reason is of this sort [sc. a perfection simply, n.185], and nothing is unless, when relations of reason have been removed, it is altogether the same in the thing and in reason; therefore Anselm's rule is nothing other than 'God is God'.
196 Contra. Capitulo 16 c: ((Si quaeritur quid sit illa natura, quid verius respondetur quam iustitia?)) Ergo quidlibet dicitur in 'quid'. Conceptus quiditativus perfectus est tantum unicus, vel saltem non est distinctio formalis inter 'quid' et 'quid'. - Item, capitulo 17: ((Ipsa natura uno modo et una consideratione est quidquid est essentialiter)).	196. On the contrary. In [Monologion] ch.16: "If it be asked what that nature is, what better response than that it is justice?" Therefore anything at all is said of it in the 'what'. The perfect quidditative concept is only one, or at any rate there is no formal distinction between 'what' and 'what'. - Again, ch.17: "The nature itself in one way and in one consideration is whatever it is essentially."
197 Responsio. 'Quid' per identitatem, non formaliter; probatio glossae: cap. 17 dicit, ((iustitia idem significat quod alia, vel omnia simul vel singula)). Hic non intelligitur idem 'formaliter et primo' significare, quia tunc essent synonyma; ergo connotare, vel idem realiter, non formaliter. Item, Damascenus. - Ad secundum: subdit exemplum de homine, qui ((non uno modo ƿnec una consideratione dicitur haec tria: corpus, rationalis, homo)). Quare, ponit duas rationes: ((secundum aliud est corpus, secundum aliud est rationalis)); alia ratio: ((singulum horum non est totum hoc quod est homo)). Per oppositum istis duobus, dicitur 'uno modo et una consideratione'. a$	197. Response. 'What' by identity, not formally; proof of this gloss: ch.17 says: "justice signifies the same as the other things, whether all together or singly." It is not understood here that they signify the same 'formally and first', because then they would be synonyms; therefore they connote the same, or signify the same really, not formally. Again, Damascene [n.198]. To the second [quote from Anselm, n.196]: he adds an example about man, who "is not in one way or in one consideration said to be these three: body, rational, man." As to why, he posits two reasons: "in one respect man is body, in another rational;" second reason: "each of these is not the whole thing that is man." It was in opposition to these two reasons that the remark 'in one way and in one consideration' was made.
198 Ista opinio confirmatur auctoritate Damasceni cap. 4 praeallegato, et cap. 9, ubi ipse vult quod inter omnia nomina de Deo dicta, propriissimum est Qui est, quia esse dicit 'quoddam pelagus infinitae substantiae'; cetera autem - ut dixit cap. 4 - dicunt illa quae 'circumstant naturam'. Istud non videretur verum nisi esset aliqua distinctio ex parte rei; non enim est 'pelagus infinitae substantiae' propter hoc quod multae relationes rationis possunt causari circa ipsum - ita enim per actum intellectus possunt causari circa quodlibet.	198. This opinion [of Scotus, nn.193-194] is confirmed by the authority of Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.4 cited previously [n.158], and ch.9, where he himself means that, among all the names said of God, the most proper is 'Who is', because he says God is 'a certain sea of infinite substance'; but the other names - as he said in ch.4 - state things that 'circumstance the nature'. This would not seem true unless there were some distinction on the part of the thing; for God is not 'a sea of infinite substance' because of the fact that many relations of reason can be caused in respect of him - for thus can they be caused by an act of intellect in respect of anything.
199 $a Nota pro dicto Damasceni, quod 'pelagus perfectionum' ƿuno modo potest intelligi pro continente actu et formaliter in se omnes perfectiones, sub propriis rationibus formalibus: sic nihil unum formaliter est 'pelagus', quia contradictio est unicam rationem formalem continere actu tot rationes. Hoc ergo modo nihil est 'pelagus' nisi unum identice, quod est: 'Deus, sapiens, bonus, beatus', et cetera omnia huiusmodi. Hoc modo non accipit Damascenus 'pelagus'.	199. Note on behalf of the saying of Damascene, that 'sea of perfections' can be understood in one way for an act containing, both formally and in itself, all perfections under their proper formal reasons; thus nothing formally one is a 'sea', because it is a contradiction for one formal reason actually to contain so many reasons. In this way, then, nothing is a 'sea' unless it is identically one, that is: "God, wise, good, blessed', and all the rest of this sort. Damascene is not taking 'sea' in this way.
200 Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid unum formaliter, continens omnem perfectionem modo eminentissimo, quo possibile est omnes in uno contineri: ille autem est quod non tantum contineantur identice, propter infinitatem formalem continentis (sic enim quaelibet continet omnes), sed ultra, contineantur virtualiter, quasi in causa, - et adhuc, in aliquo ut prima causa a se continente, et universalissima, quia omnes continente. Hoc modo essentia 'haec' est 'pelagus', quia in qualibet multitudine oportet stare ad aliquod omnino primum; in hac nihil est omnino primum nisi 'haec' essentia, ideo ipsa non est tantum formaliter infinita, sed virtualiter continens alias: nec tantum aliquas (sicut forte intellectus continet sapientiam et intelligere, et voluntas caritatem et diligere), sed omnes, nec ab alio virtute alterius continens, sed a se. Itaque habet infinitatem formaliter et primariam, tam scilicet a se quam respectu omnium, universaliter causalem et virtualiter ƿcontentivam, - et ita 'pelagus', ita continens omnes sicut possunt eminenter in uno formaliter aliquo contineri. Omnia flumina intrant in mare, unde exeunt revertuntur.	200. In another can be understood [sc. by 'sea of perfections'] something formally one, containing all perfections in the most eminent way in which it is possible for them all to be contained in one; but this way is that they are not only contained identically, because of the formal infinity of the container (for thus any [perfection] contains them all), but that further they are contained virtually, as in their cause, - and further still, in something as first cause containing them of itself, and as most universal cause, because containing them all. In this way 'this' essence is a 'sea', because in the case of any multitude one must come to a stand at something altogether first; in this [divine multitude] there is nothing altogether first save 'this' essence, therefore it is not only formally infinite, but it virtually contains the others; nor only some of them (as perhaps the intellect contains wisdom and understanding, and the will love and loving), but all of them, nor containing them by some other virtue of something else, but by itself. Therefore it has infinity formally and primarily, namely as well from itself as in respect of everything, an infinity universally causal and virtually containing, - and thus it is a 'sea', thus containing all of them as they can be contained eminently in some formally one thing. "All the rivers flow into the sea; whence they come thither do they return" (Ecclesiastes 1.7).
201 Est ergo haec magis per se 'Deus est sapiens' quam ista 'sapiens est bonus'. Aliae habent infinitatem formalem, et si causalem vel virtualem (propter ordinem propinquiorem ad essentiam, et remotiorem, salvandum), sed non respectu omnium habent causalem, nec respectu aliquorum habent a se, sed ab essentia. - Haec omnia patent in exemplo de ente et passionibus eius (si ponantur eaedem, ut necesse est), Si vitatur infinitas.	201. Therefore this proposition 'God is wise' is more per se than this other 'the wise is good'. The other [sc. perfections other than the essence] have formal infinity, and if they have causal or virtual infinity (which needs to be preserved because of their nearer or remoter order to the essence), yet they do not have causal infinity with respect to all, nor do they have it with respect to any from themselves, but from the essence. - All these points [nn.199-201] are plain in the example of being and its properties (if they be posited to be the same, as is necessary [sc. for the purpose of the example]), if infinity is avoided.
202 Contra: verissima unitas ponenda est in Deo; formalis est verior quam identica tantum. Responsio: illa ponitur, sed non cuiuscumque ad quodcumque . Si sic accipiatur maior, falsa est de persona et persona, et glossa esset: 'verior quae est possibilis'; nunc autem non est possibilis formalis identitas cuiuscumque ad quodcumque, sed tantum realis. Ex hoc medio arguitur pro opposito, quia omnis unitas simpliciter perfectionis est ibi ponenda: talis est identica, sine formali, quia est simplex et illimitata, formalis autem non ponit illimitationem. a$ ƿ	202. On the contrary: the truest unity is to be posited in God; formal unity is truer than mere identical unity. Response: formal unity is posited, but not of anything whatever in respect of anything whatever. If the major be taken in this way it is false of person and person, and the gloss would be: '[the unity] which is possible is true'; but, as it is, formal identity of anything whatever with anything whatever is not possible, but only real identity. From this middle the argument is made to the opposite, that every unity simply of perfection is to be posited there [sc. in God]; such unity there is identical unity, without formal unity, because it is simple and unlimited, but formal unity does not posit un-limitation.
203 Confirmatur per Augustinum VIII De Trinitate cap. 2, ubi probat quod in divinis 'non est aliquid maius duae personae quam una, quia non aliquid verius'. Quae consequentia esset ista? Si tantum esset distinctio rationis inter veritatem et sapientiam et magnitudinem, non videretur aliud argumentum quam si probaretur 'sapientia, ergo sapiens', vel e converso.	203. The opinion [n.198] is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2, where he proves that in divine reality 'two persons are not something greater than one, because they are not something truer'. What consequence would that be? If it were only a distinction of reason between truth and wisdom and greatness, the argument would not seem to be different from an argument that proved 'wisdom, therefore wise', or conversely [n.191].
204 Ad quid etiam doctores qui tenent oppositam opinionem, implent tot quaternos, ostendendo unum attributum ex alio, si non est inter ea nisi tantum differentia relationum rationis ? Ita enim perfecte videretur Deus cognosci - quantum ad omnem conceptum realem - ut cognoscitur sub uno attributo sicut si cognoscatur sub ratione omnium attributorum, quia cognitio plurium relationum rationis non facit perfectiorem cognitionem, nec aliquid facit ad perfectiorem cognitionem realem habendam de aliquo.	204. To what purpose, too, do the doctors who hold the opposite opinion [to that of Scotus] fill up so many pages demonstrating one attribute from another if there were between them only a difference of relations of reason? For God would seem thus to be perfectly known - as to every real concept - as he is known under one attribute just as if he were known under the idea of all the attributes, because the knowledge of several relations of reason does not make a more perfect knowledge, nor does it do anything for having a more perfect real knowledge of anything.
205 Similiter, tertio: iuxta auctoritatem Damasceni praedictam, ad quid assignant ipsi ordinem attributorum, quasi essentia sit fundamentum, et quaedam sint propinquiora essentiae et quaedam ƿpropinquiora emanationibus? Si tantum sint relationes rationis, quis ordo per comparationem ad emanationes?	205. Likewise, third, in line with the aforesaid authority of Damascene [n.198], to what purpose do they [sc. those who hold the opposite opinion to Scotus] assign an order to the attributes, as if the essence were the foundation and certain attributes were closer to the essence and certain closer to the emanations? If they are only relations of reason, what is the order in comparison to the emanations?
206 Similiter, Augustinus Contra Maximinum: 'Si potes Deum Patrem concedere simplicem, et tamen esse sapientem, bonum', etc. (et enumerat ibi multas perfectiones), 'quanto magis unus Deus potest esse simplex et tamen Trinitas, ita quod tres personae non sint partes unius Dei.' - Arguit ibi, quod si in eodem sine compositione et partialitate possunt esse multae perfectiones simpliciter, ergo multo magis possunt esse in deitate tres personae sine compositione et partialitate. Quod argumentum esset istud, si attributa tantum dicerent relationes rationis, et personae distinguerentur realiter? Non enim sequitur: 'relationes rationis non faciunt compositionem in aliquo, ergo nec relationes reales'.	206. Likewise, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.10 n.3: "If you can concede God the Father to be simple and yet to be wise, good, etc." (and he enumerates there many perfections), "how much more can one God be simple and yet a Trinity, so that the three persons are not parts of one God." - He argues there that if in the same thing without composition or division into parts there can be many perfections simply, therefore much more can there be in the deity three persons without composition and division into parts. What argument would that be if the attributes only stated relations of reason and the persons were distinguished really? For this inference does not follow: 'relations of reason do not cause composition in anything, therefore neither do real relations'.
207 Idem etiam Augustinus, XV De Trinitate cap. 3, dicit omnia ista esse aequalia. Nihil autem est sibi ipsi aequale. Quid enim est dicere quod aliquid sub una relatione rationis est sibi aequale sub alia relatione rationis?	207. Also the same Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.3 n.5 says that all those predicates [the ones listed in n.206] are equal. But nothing is equal to its own self. For what does it mean to say that something under one relation of reason is equal to itself under another relation of reason?
208 Hilarius etiam in XII De Trinitate f, alloquens Deum Patrem. ƿait sic: ((Perfecti Dei, qui et Verbum tuum et sapientia et veritas est, absoluta generatio est, qui in his aeternarum proprietatum nominibus natus est)). Dicit ergo quod istae proprietates sunt aeternae, et in his natus est Filius de Patre, id est: Pater praehabens ista, communicat ea Filio. Si autem essent tantum distincta ratione, non viderentur prius origine esse in Patre quam produceretur Filius. Quidquid enim est ibi productum in esse rationis per actum intellectus, videtur esse productum a tota Trinitate (et ita non esse in Patre ut praecedit origine Filium), quasi necessario praecedens originem.	208. Hilary too in On the Trinity XII n.52, addressing God the Father, speaks thus: "Of Perfect God, who is both your Word and wisdom and truth, there is absolute generation, who in these names of eternal properties is born." He says then that these properties are eternal, and that in this the Son is born of the Father, that is: the Father, possessing them first, communicates them to the Son. But if they were only distinct in reason, they would not seem be first in origin in the Father before the Son was produced. For whatever is produced there in being of reason by an act of intellect seems to be produced by the whole Trinity (and so is not in the Father as he precedes the Son in origin), as if necessarily preceding the origin.
209 Ista autem non identitas formalis stat cum simplicitate Dei, quia hanc differentiam necesse est esse inter essentiam et proprietatem, sicut supra distinctione 2 quaestione ultima ostensum est, et tamen propter hoc non ponitur compositio in persona. Similiter, ista distinctio formalis ponitur inter duas proprietates in Patre (ut inter innascibilitatem et paternitatem), quae, secundum Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 6, non sunt eadem proprietas, quia non est 'eo Pater quo ingenitus'. Si ergo in una persona possint esse duae proprietates absque compositione, multo magis, vel saltem aequaliter, possunt esse plures perfectiones essentiales in Deo 'non formaliter eaedem' sine compositione, quia illae proprietates in Patre non sunt formaliter infinitae, essentiales autem perfectiones sunt infinitae formaliter, - ergo quaelibet eadem cuilibet. ƿ	209. But this formal non-identity stands along with the simplicity of God, because there must be this difference between the essence and the property, as was shown above in distinction 2, the last question [I d.2 nn.388-410] - and yet for this reason no composition is posited in the person. Likewise, this formal distinction is posited between two properties in the Father (as between not-being-born and father), which, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, are not the same property, because it is not the case that 'he is Father by the fact he is ungenerated'. If then there can in one person be two properties without composition, much more, or at least equally, can there be several essential perfections in God 'not formally the same' without composition, because the properties in the Father are not formally infinite, but the essential perfections are formally infinite, - therefore any of them is the same as any of them.
210 Contra istam solutionem sunt tria dubia. Primo enim videtur quod non salvetur simplicitas divina, quia ex quo essentia ponitur quasi fundamentum et ista quasi circumstantia essentiam, videtur quod ista se habeant ut actus et formae respectu essentiae divinae.	210. [Doubts] - Against this solution [nn.191-209] there are three doubts. For first it seems that the divine simplicity is not saved, because from the fact the essence is posited as the foundation and the attributes as circumstances of the essence [n.198] it seems that the attributes are disposed as acts and forms with respect to the divine essence.
211 Secundum dubium est, quia Augustinus (VII De Trinitate, cap. 4 'de magnis' et 31 'de parvis'), ubi negat identitatem paternitatis et deitatis - non enim 'eo' inquiens 'Pater quo Deus' sicut nec ((eo Verbum quo sapientia)) - ibi concedit identitatem magnitudinis et bonitatis, et perfectionum essentialium, quia dicit quod ((eo magnus quo Deus)), etc. Ergo sicut ibi negat identitatem, ita concedit hic: non autem negat ibi nisi identitatem formalem, ergo illam concedit hic.	211. The second doubt is that when Augustine (On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9 'On Great Things' and ch.2 n.3 'On Little Things') denies the identity of paternity and deity -for he says he is 'not Father by the fact he is ungenerated' just as neither 'is he the Word by the fact he is wisdom' - he there concedes the identity of greatness and goodness, and of the essential perfections, because he says 'he is great by the fact he is God' etc. Therefore, just as he there denies identity, so he concedes it here; but he only denies formal identity there, so he concedes it here.
212 Tertium dubium est, quia sicut non esset bonitas realiter infinita nisi esset realiter eadem sapientiae, ita videtur quod ratio bonitatis non sit infinita formaliter nisi sit formaliter eadem rationi sapientiae. Ergo propter eandem rationem propter quam ponis veram identitatem inter ista, deberes ponere identitatem formalem rationis ad rationem. ƿ	212. The third doubt is that, just as goodness would not be really infinite unless it was really the same as wisdom, so it seems that the idea of goodness is not formally infinite unless it is formally the same as the idea of wisdom. Therefore, for the same reason as you posit true identity between the former, you should posit the formal identity of reason with reason.
213 Ad ista. - Ad primum respondeo quod forma in creaturis habet aliquid imperfectionis dupliciter, scilicet quia est forma informans aliquid et quia pars compositi, - et aliquid habet quod non est imperfectionis, sed consequitur eam secundum suam rationem essentialem, scilicet quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est tale. Exemplum: sapientia in nobis est accidens, et hoc est imperfectionis, - sed quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est sapiens, hoc non est imperfectionis sed essentialis rationis sapientiae. In divinis autem nihil est forma secundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis, quia nec informans nec pars; est tamen ibi sapientia in quantum est quo illud - in quo est ipsa - est sapiens, et hoc non per aliquam compositionem sapientiae ad aliquid quasi subiectum, nec quasi sapientia illa sit pars alicuius compositi, sed per veram identitatem, qua sapientia propter sui infinitatem perfectam perfecte est idem cuilibet cum quo nata est esse. Sed obicies: quomodo est aliquid formaliter sapiens sapientia, si ipsa non est forma eius?	213. To these doubts. - To the first [n.210] I reply that form in creatures has something of imperfection in a double way, namely because it is a form informing something and because it is part of a composite, - and it has something which is not of imperfection, but is consequent to it according to its own essential reason, namely that it is that by which something is the sort of thing it is. Example: wisdom in us is an accident, and this is a matter of imperfection - but that it is that by which something is wise, this is not a matter of imperfection but of the essential idea of wisdom. Now in divine reality nothing is a form according to that double idea of imperfection, because it neither informs nor is it a part; yet there is wisdom there insofar as it is that by which it - what wisdom is in - is wise, and this not by any composition of wisdom with anything as a subject, nor as the wisdom is a part of some composite, but by true identity, by which wisdom, because of its perfect infinity, is perfectly the same as anything with which it naturally exists. But you will object: how is something formally wise by wisdom if wisdom is not the form of it?
214 Respondeo. Corpus est animatum quasi denominative, quia anima est forma eius, - homo dicitur animatus non quasi denominative sed essentialiter, quia anima est aliquid eius ut pars: non ergo requiritur aliquid esse formam informantem aliquid ut ipsum sit tale per ipsum, quia forma non est forma informans totum, ƿquod tamen formaliter dicitur tale per ipsam. Si ergo veriore identitate esset aliqua forma idem alicui quam sit identitas eius ad informatum, vel ad totum cuius est pars, sufficeret illa vera identitas ad hoc ut illud tale esset, tali forma; ita est in proposito. - Et tunc si quaeris utrum a primo actu posset esse aliqua abstractio formae, - dico quod non est ibi abstractio formae ut informantis vel ut partis a toto, sed est ibi abstractio formae in quantum per eam aliquid est tale praecise acceptum, non considerando identitatem eius ad illud quod est tale per ipsum.	214. I reply. The body is ensouled as it were denominatively, because the soul is the form of it - man is called ensouled not as it were denominatively but essentially, because the soul is something of it as a part; there is no requirement, then, that, for something to be the form informing something, it be itself of such a sort in itself, because the form is not a form informing the whole, although the whole is formally said to be such through it. If therefore some form were the same as something by a truer identity than is its identity with the thing informed, or with the whole of which it is a part, that true identity would be enough for the thing to be of such a sort by such a form; so it is in the intended proposition. - And then if you ask whether by first act there could be some abstraction of the form, - I say that there is not there abstraction of the form insofar as by it something is of such a sort taken precisely, without consideration of its identity with that which is of such a sort in itself.
215 Ad secundum, quod videtur habere difficultatem ex verbis Augustini, dico quod quintupliciter eodem est Deus sapiens et magnus, et tamen non sic eodem est Deus et Pater: uno modo, quia sapientia et magnitudo sunt perfectiones eiusdem rationis, hoc est quiditativae, quia quidquid perficitur istis perfectionibus, perficitur non ut rationibus suppositi sed ut perfectionibus quiditativis, - non sic autem paternitas et deitas sunt eiusdem rationis; $a sunt etiam alio modo eiusdem rationis sapientia et bonitas, quia perfectiones simpliciter, - non sic paternitas et deitas; a$ tertio modo, quia magnitudo est eadem deitati in quolibet, - paternitas ƿnon, sed tantum in uno supposito; quarto modo, quia bonitas et sapientia et cetera huiusmodi, sunt eadem quasi identitate mutua, quia utrumque est formaliter infinitum, propter quam infinitatem utrumque est idem alteri, - sed paternitas et deitas non sunt eadem sic mutuo, quia unum eorum non est formaliter infinitum, sed tantum deitas est formaliter infinita, et propter istam infinitatem paternitas est sibi idem; $a et ex hoc quinto, eodem est bonus et sapiens, 'eodem' - inquam - identitate adaequata secundum perfectionem, quia utrumque infinitum; non sic paternitas habet ad deitatem identitatem adaequatam, quia non est infinita. a$	215. To the second, which seems to possess difficulty from the words of Augustine [n.211], I say that in five ways is God wise and great by the same thing, and yet he is not God and Father by the same thing; in one way because wisdom and greatness are perfections of the same idea, that is, of quidditative idea, because whatever is perfected by those perfections is perfected not as by reasons of the supposit but as quidditative perfections, - but paternity and deity are not thus of the same idea; wisdom and goodness are also in another way of the same idea, because they are perfections simply, - not thus paternity and deity; in the third way, because greatness is the same as deity anywhere, - paternity is not but only in one supposit; in the fourth way, because goodness and wisdom and the rest of this sort are the same as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite, because of which infinity each is the same as the other, - but paternity and deity are not thus mutually the same, because one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite, and because of this infinity paternity is the same as it; and, from this, fifth, he is good and wise by the same thing, 'by the same thing' - I say - by identity adequate in perfection, because each is infinite; paternity does not thus have adequate identity with deity, because it is not infinite.
216 Ad formam ergo concedo quod eo modo eodem est bonus et sapiens quo modo non est eodem Deus et Pater, quia eodem est bonus et sapiens, eodem scilicet in quolibet et eodem quasi identitate mutua; non sunt autem eadem in quolibet paternitas et deitas. Similiter, eodem - id est perfectione eiusdem rationis - est ƿbonus et sapiens, quia quiditative est bonus et sapiens; non sic eodem est Deus et Pater, quia non est utrumque 'quo', ibi, essentialis perfectio illius cuius est, quia licet quiditas paternitatis maneat ibi, tamen illa quiditas non est ratio quiditativa simpliciter suppositi alicuius, sed ratio personalis eiusdem.	216. To the form [of the argument, n.211] I concede that he is good and wise by the same thing in the way that he is not God and Father by the same thing, because by the same thing he is good and wise, namely by the same thing anywhere and by the same thing as by mutual identity; but paternity and deity are not the same anywhere. Likewise, by the same thing - that is by perfection of the same idea - he is good and wise, because he is quidditatively good and wise; he is not God and Father in this way by the same thing, because each 'by which', there, is not the essential perfection of that of which it is, because although the quiddity of paternity remains there, yet the quiddity is not the quidditative idea simply of any supposit, but the personal idea of the same is.
217 Ad tertium concedo quod ratio sapientiae est infinita, et ratio bonitatis similiter, et ideo haec ratio est illa per identitatem, quia oppositum non stat cum infinitate alterius extremi. Tamen haec ratio non est formaliter illa: non enim sequitur 'est vere idem alteri, ergo formaliter idem eidem'; est enim vera identitas a et b, absque hoc quod a includat formaliter rationem ipsius b.	217. To the third [n.212] I concede that the idea of wisdom is infinite, and the idea of goodness similarly, and therefore this idea is that by identity, because an opposite does not stand with the infinity of the other extreme. Yet this idea is not formally that one; for this does not follow 'it is truly the same as the other, therefore it is formally the same as the other'; for there is a true identity of a and b, without a formally including the idea of b.
218 Ad argumentum principale quod sumitur de auctoritate Augustini XV De Trinitate, respondeo quod in creatura non est aliqua praedicatio per identitatem, quae non sit formaliter, et ideo numquam fuit tradita logica de praedicatione in creaturis vera formaliter et per identitatem; in divinis autem est vera praedicatio per identitatem, in abstracto, et tamen non est formalis.	218. To the principal argument that is taken from the authority of Augustine On the Trinity XV [n.212], I respond that in the creature there is no prediction through identity which is not so formally, and therefore never has a logic of true predication formally and by identity in creatures been handed down; but in divine reality there is true predication by identity, in the abstract, and yet it is not formal.
219 Ratio huius differentiae est ista - ut puto - quia concipiendo abstractum ultimata abstractione, concipitur quiditas absque habitudine ad quodcumque quod est extra propriam rationem quidiƿtatis; sic ergo concipiendo extrema, nulla est veritas uniendo ea nisi praecise quiditas unius extremi sit eadem praecise quiditati alterius extremi. Hoc autem non contingit in creaturis, quia ibi, abstrahendo illas realitates quae sunt in eodem (puta realitatem generis et differentiae) et considerando eas praecisissime, utraque est finita et neutra perfecte eadem alteri; non enim sunt alio modo eadem inter se nisi propter tertium cui sunt eadem, et ideo si abstrahantur a tertio non remanet causa identitatis eorum, et ideo nec causa veritatis propositionis unientis extrema illa. Haec ergo est falsa 'animalitas est rationalitas', et e converso, et hoc quacumque praedicatione, quia non tantum extrema non sunt formaliter eadem, sed nec vere eadem; quiditas enim haec praecise est potentialis ad quiditatem illam, et non est eadem illi nisi propter identitatem ad tertium a quo abstrahuntur: ergo abstractio illa tollit causam veritatis affirmativae unientis ea.	219. The reason for this difference is this - as I think - that, when conceiving something abstract with ultimate abstraction, a quiddity is conceived without relation to anything that is outside the proper idea of the quiddity; therefore, by thus conceiving the extremes, there is no truth in the uniting of them unless precisely the quiddity of one extreme is the same precisely as the quiddity of the other extreme. But this does not happen in creatures, because there, when abstracting the relations that are in the same thing (to wit, the reality of genus and difference) and considering them very precisely, each is finite and neither is perfectly the same as the other; for they are not in any way the same among themselves save because of a third thing with which they are the same, and therefore, if they are abstracted from that third thing, there does not remain a cause of identity for them, and therefore not a cause either for the truth of the proposition uniting the extremes. This proposition, then, is false 'animality is rationality', and conversely, and this in any predication whatever, because the extremes are not only not formally the same but they are not truly the same either; for this quiddity precisely is potential to that quiddity, and is not the same as it save because of identity to the third thing from which they are abstracted; therefore the abstraction takes away the cause of the truth of the affirmative proposition uniting them.
220 Oppositum est in Deo, quia abstrahendo sapientiam a quocumque quod est extra rationem sapientiae, et bonitatem similiter abstrahendo a quocumque quod est extra rationem eius formaliter, remanet utraque quiditas, praecise sumpta, formaliter infinita, et ex quo infinitas est ratio identitatis eorum - in tali abstractione praecisissima - remanet ratio identitatis extremorum. Non enim haec erant eadem praecise, propter identitatem eorum ad tertium a quo abstrahuntur, sed propter infinitatem formalem utriusque. ƿ	220. The opposite is the case in God, because by abstracting wisdom from whatever is outside the idea of wisdom, and abstracting goodness similarly from whatever is outside its reason formally, each quiddity remains, precisely taken, formally infinite, and from the fact that infinity is the idea of their identity - in such very precise abstraction - the idea of identity of the extremes remains. For they were not the same precisely because of their identity to a third thing from which they are abstracted, but because of the formal infinity of each.
221 Et quod ista sit ratio praedicationis per identitatem, signum est ex hoc quod non conceditur ista 'paternitas est innascibilitas' (neque ista 'paternitas in divinis est spiratio activa'), neque ut vera formaliter, neque ut vera per identitatem; ista autem conceditur 'paternitas est deitas', et e converso. Ratio videtur, quia abstrahendo patemitatem et innascibilitatem ab essentia sive a supposito, neutrum est formaliter infinitum et ideo neutrum in ratione sua sic abstracta includit rationem identitatis eius ad alterum, et ideo neutrum, sic abstractum, de alio vere praedicatur; sed abstrahendo deitatem et paternitatem quantumcumque, remanet adhuc alterum extremum formaliter infinitum, quae infinitas est ratio sufficiens identitatis extremorum, et ideo remanet ratio identitatis et per consequens ratio veritatis compositionis affirmativae. In ista autem 'deitas est bonitas', remanet infinitas non tantum in uno extremo sed in utroque, ideo esset hic veritas propter identitatem inclusam virtualiter in utroque extremo.	221. And a sign that this is the idea of predication through identity is from the fact that this proposition is not conceded 'paternity is not-being-born' (nor this proposition 'paternity in divine reality is active inspiriting'), whether as true formally or as true by identity; but this proposition is conceded 'paternity is deity', and conversely. The reason seems to be that, by abstracting paternity and not-being-born from the essence or the supposit, neither is formally infinite and therefore neither includes in its thus abstracted idea the idea of its identity to the other, and so neither, as so abstracted, is truly predicated of the other; but by abstracting deity and paternity to whatever extent, one of the extremes still remains formally infinite, which infinity is a sufficient reason for the identity of the extremes, and therefore the idea of identity remains, and consequently the idea of the truth of the composition of the affirmative proposition. But in this proposition 'deity is goodness' there remains infinity not only in one extreme but in both, and therefore there would be truth here because of the identity included virtually in each extreme.
222 Ex isto et responsione ad dictum Augustini prius adductum in secunda dubitatione, patet illud quod supponebatur prius in quaestione 'De genere', quomodo scilicet remaneant tantum duo modi praedicandi in divinis, - quia etsi per identitatem relationes transeant in essentiam, non tamen ita sicut praedicata essentialia, ƿquia omnia essentialia magis dicunt perfectiones quiditativas, ratio autem personalis non dicit perfectionem quiditativam; et ideo omnia essentialia magis reducuntur ad unum modum praedicandi inter se quam personalia reducantur ad unum modum praedicandi cum eis, ut secundum hoc posset dici duos modos praedicandi manere in divinis, non tantum propter modos concipiendi ipsa praedicata, sed aliquo modo propter realitatem eorum quae praedicantur. ƿ	222. From this, and from the response to the saying of Augustine adduced before in the second doubt [nn.215-216], what was supposed before in the question 'about genus' is clear, namely how there remain only two modes of predicating in divine reality [nn.130-131], - because although by identity the relations pass into the essence, yet not in the way the essential predicates do, because all essential predicates state rather quidditative perfections, but the personal idea does not state a quidditative perfection; and therefore all the essential predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating among themselves more than the personal predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating along with them, so that, according to this, it can be said that two modes of predicating remain in divine reality, not only because of the modes of conceiving the predicates, but also in some way because of the reality of the things that are predicated.