Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D8/Q5
From The Logic Museum
< Authors | Duns Scotus | Ordinatio | Ordinatio I | D8
Jump to navigationJump to search
Translated by Peter Simpson
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Quaestio 5 | |
| 223 De immutabilitate Dei, de qua tractat Magister in secunda parte distinctionis 8 (quae tamen videtur posse concludi de simplicitate Dei, de qua quaesitum est), quaero utrum solus Deus sit immutabilis. Quod non: Quia si est immutabilis, ergo immutabiliter se habet ad illud ad quod immediate se habet; ergo illud aliud est immutabile. Probatio consequentiae primae: immutabile, quod est ex se primum agens, non potest diversimode se habere ad effectum suum, quia si quandoque agat, quandoque non, hoc videtur esse ex mutatione sui; non enim hoc potest poni propter approximationem novam passivi vel propter amotionem impedimentorum, quia actio primi agentis non requirit ista. - Probatio secundae consequentiae: ad quodcumque necessarium se habet necessario, illud est necessarium. ƿ | 223. On the immutability of God, that the Master treats of in the second part of distinction 8 (which, however, seems it could be concluded from the simplicity of God, about which the question has already been raised [nn.1-26]), I ask whether God alone is immutable. That he is not: Because if he is immutable then he is disposed immutably to that to which he is immediately disposed; therefore that other thing is immutable. Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely disposed to its effect, because if it sometimes acts and sometimes does not, this seems to be from a change in itself; for this change cannot be posited as because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of the removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. - Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily disposed, that is itself necessary. |
| 224 Oppositum: Augustinus VII De Trinitate, vel VI: ((Omnis creatura mutabilis)), ((solus Deus immutabilis)). | 224. To the opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.6 n.8: "Every creature is changeable," "only God is immutable." |
| 225 Et ad Tim. ultimo: solus habet immortalitatem; quod exponens Augustinus libro I De Trinitate cap. 1, dicit quod ((vera 'immortalitas' immutabilitas est)). | 225. And Paul, I Timothy 6.16: "Only he has immortality;" which Augustine expounds in On the Trinity I ch.1 n.2 when he says that "true 'immortality' is immutability." |
| 226 Huius exclusivae de qua quaeritur, pars affirmativa probatur a Philosopho VII Physicorum, per hoc quod ((omne quod movetur, movetur ab alio)): quod probatur, quia ((quiescente parte quiescit totum)), et non est procedere in infinitum in motis ab alio, quia tunc posset fieri ex eis infinitum mobile quod moveretur tempore finito (quod est improbatum VIII Physicorum, et prius, distinctione 2 quaestione 1 in responsione ad ultimum argumentum); oportet ergo stare ad aliquod movens quod non movetur ab alio, et per consequens omnino non movetur. | 226. The affirmative part of this question [the negative part begins n.230] is proved by the Philosopher Physics 7.1.242a13-20, 242b18-10, through the fact that "everything that is moved is moved by another;" the proof of which is that "when the part rests, the whole rests," and it is not possible to proceed to infinity in things moved by another, because then an infinite movable could be made from them which would be moved in a finite time (which is rejected in Physics 8.10.266a25-b6, and before in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.152]); therefore one must make a stand at some mover which is not moved by another, and which consequently is altogether unmoved. |
| 227 Probatur etiam ab eo VIII Physicorum, eadem conclusio, per divisionem moventium et motorum naturaliter vel violenter, et ƿquia ultimo oportet stare ad aliquod movens quod non movetur ex se 'per se et primo', et ultimo etiam oportet stare ad aliquid simpliciter immobile. | 227. The same conclusion is also proved by him in Physics 8.4.255b31-5.256a21 through a division of movers and things moved naturally or violently, and because one must ultimately make a stand at some mover which is not moved of itself per se and first, and must also ultimately make a stand at something simply unmovable. |
| 228 Sed processus isti (qui sunt principales in duobus libris, scilicet VII et VIII Physicorum) indigent maiore expositione ad hoc ut rationes ostendantur valere, et si forte valeant, tamen deminute concludunt, sicut alias ostendetur; forte non plus concludunt nisi quod Primum non movetur ut corpus, vel ut virtus in corpore, sicut anima movetur per accidens in corpore moto. | 228. But these processes (which are the principal ones in two books, namely books 7 and 8 of the Physics) need a greater exposition so as to show that the reasonings are valid, and if perhaps they are valid, yet they have a diminished conclusion, as will be shown elsewhere [II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.10-15]; perhaps they entail no more than that the First thing is not moved as a body, or as a virtue in a body, in the way the soul is moved per accidens in the moved body. |
| 229 Ideo non insistendo modo circa declarationem illarum rationum, ostendo breviter illam partem ex simplicitate Dei: quia enim Deus est perfecte simplex (ut probatum est ex infinitate eius), ideo non potest mutari ad aliquam formam quae in ipso recipiatur; quia etiam est necesse esse (ut probatum est ex primitate efficientiae distinctione 2 quaestione 1), ideo non potest mutari ab esse in non esse vel a non esse in esse, quae mutatio dicitur 'versio' a Damasceno. Omni ergo mutatione, sive substantiali sive accidentali, dicitur Deus simpliciter immutabilis. ƿ | 229. Therefore, without pausing now to make these reasonings clear, I show briefly the affirmative part from the simplicity of God: for because God is perfectly simple (as was proved from his infinity [nn.17-19]), therefore he cannot be changed to any form that is received in himself; also because he is necessary existence (as was proved from the primacy of his efficient causality in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.70]), therefore he cannot be changed from being to not-being or from not-being to being, which change is called 'turning' by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.3. Therefore God is said to be simply immutable in respect of any change, whether substantial or accidental. |
| 230 Sed pars negativa illius exclusivae, quod scilicet nihil aliud ab eo habet immutabilitatem, habet maiorem difficultatem: circa enim illam partem theologi a philosophis discordant, et e converso. | 230. But the negative part of this question, namely that nothing else besides God has immutability, poses a greater difficulty; for on this point the theologians differ from the philosophers, and vice versa. |
| 231 Ad quod considerandum, primo oportet videre quae fuerit intentio philosophorum, et quae motiva pro eis et quae sint rationes contra eos. | 231. In order to consider this, one must first see what the intention of the philosophers was and what motives there are in their favor and what reasons there are against them. |
| 232 Quantum ad primum, specialiter de intentione Aristotelis et Avicennae. Ponitur quod decem modis potest aliquid se habere ad esse, ƿsed ad propositum sufficiant tres modi. Potest enim aliquid aliud a Deo - puta intelligentia alia a prima - tripliciter poni in esse, vel immutabilis et necessaria: uno modo, quod ex se formaliter sit necesse esse, sed ab alio causaliter; secundo modo, quod ex se formaliter sit necesse esse et ab alio dependenter, sic quod propter ordinem essentialem contradictio esset secundum esse sine primo et non e converso, et similiter tertium sine secundo et non e converso, - et est ordo iste inter perfectius et minus perfectum, non inter causam et causatum; tertio modo, quod aliquid habeat esse formaliter ex se possibile, ab alio etiam necessario esse, quia scilicet illud aliud necessario causat. ƿ | 232. As to the first point, specifically about the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna. It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence, but for my purpose [n.230] let three modes be sufficient. For something other than God -to wit an intelligence other than the first - can be posited in being, or be immutable and necessary, in three ways:[1] in one way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence but is from another causally; in a second way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence and is dependent on another, such that, because of essential order, it would be a contradiction for the second to be without the first but not vice versa, and likewise for the third to be without the second but not vice versa, - and this order is between the more perfect and the less perfect [supply: as with figures and numbers [n.245]], but not between cause and caused; in the third way, that something have formally of itself possible existence and have from another also necessary existence, namely because this other causes necessarily. |
| 233 Istorum trium primus modus includit contradictionem, ut dicunt, et ideo illum non posuit Philosophus, quia non videtur verisimile eum contradictoria posuisse; quod includat contradictionem, patet, quia quod est causatum ab alio, est ex se non ens et de se est possibile (aliter impossibile causaretur), sed quod est necesse esse, nullo modo est possibile: ergo inconveniens est dicere Aristotelem hunc modum posuisse de substantiis separatis, propter contradictionem inclusam. | 233. Of these three ways the first way involves a contradiction, as they say [sc. Henry and his followers], and therefore the Philosopher did not posit it, because it does not seem likely that he posited contradictories; that it involves a contradiction is plain, because what is caused by another is of itself a non-being and is of itself a possible being (otherwise it would be impossible for it to be caused), but what is a necessary existent is in no way a possible existent; therefore it is discordant to say that Aristotle posited this way about the separate substances, because of the contradiction involved. |
| 234 Quod etiam negaverit tertium modum, probatur, quia includit contradictionem. ƿ | 234. That he also denied the third way is proved by the fact it too involves a contradiction. |
| 235 Confirmatur etiam hoc, quia Commentator XII Metaphysicae (in quaestione Ioannis Grammatici) vult quod motus cum sit de se possibilis, potest ab alio perpetuari, quia habet esse ab alio, - substantia autem possibilis non potest perpetuari: ergo substantia perpetua non potest esse ab alio. | 235. There is a confirmation also of this, because the Commentator in Metaphysics XII com.41 (in the question of John the Grammarian) means that since motion is of itself possible it can be made perpetual by another, because it has being from another - but a possible substance cannot be made perpetual; therefore a perpetual substance cannot be from another. |
| 236 Item, ut Commentator dicit I De caelo et mundo, super ƿillud 'Impossibile est ut non generabile cadat sub corruptione': exponens illud dicit quod ((si inveniretur aliquod generabile aeternum, possibile esset ut aliquod possibile vel natura possibilis transmutaretur in necessariam)). | 236. Again, as the Commentator says in On the Heavens I com.138, about Aristotle's remark 'It is impossible that the non-generable fall under corruption'; expounding this, the Commentator says that "if some eternal generable thing were found to exist, it would be possible that something possible, or some possible nature, should be changed into something necessary." |
| 237 Ulterius, imponitur Philosopho quod voluerit ibi (I De caelo et mundo) quod quaelibet substantia habeat suum esse ex sua natura - haec semper, haec quandoque - ita quod haec necessario semper est, haec necessario quandoque non est: nec aliter posset esse nisi una natura mutaretur in aliam, vel quod duae naturae contrariae sint simul in eodem, - ut in eodem libro I De caelo et mundo deducit Aristoteles et Commentator. ƿ | 237. Further, it is imputed [by Henry] to the Philosopher that he wished there (On the Heavens, ibid.) that any substance have its existence from its nature - this one always, that one sometime - so that this one necessarily always is, that one necessarily sometime is not; nor could it be otherwise unless one nature were to change into another, or two contrary natures be at the same time in the same thing - as in the same book of On the Heavens both Aristotle and the Commentator conclude. |
| 238 Item, ex istis - I videlicet Caeli et mundi et XII Metaphysicae ostendit quod negaverit primum modum, supra, quia omni substantiae necessariae esse attribuitur naturae eius intrinsecae, ƿet ita nihil perpetuum ponit causatum nisi motum in caelo (et mediante illo individua quae non sunt necessaria, licet species eorum sint necessariae), sed generabilia et corruptibilia fieri; et ex quo posuit aliquem ordinem earum, concluditur quod hoc est secundum secundum modum. Sed in incorruptibilibus species dixit necessario esse in uno individuo, in corruptibilibus vero dixit species necessario esse in pluribus individuis, et diversis individuis, ita quod species de se sunt necessariae, corruptibiles tamen per accidens, sicut elementa posuit secundum se tota incorruptibilia, sed secundum partes corruptibilia. | 238. Again, from these places - namely On the Heavens I and Metaphysics XII [235-236] - [Henry] shows that [Aristotle] denied the first way above [n.232], because to every necessary substance is attributed the being of its intrinsic nature, and thus that he posited no perpetual caused thing save what is moved in the heavens (and, by its mediation, individuals which are not necessary, although their species are necessary), but that generable and corruptible things come to be; and from the fact that he posited some order among them, it is concluded [by Henry] that this is in accord with the second way [n.232]. But the species in incorruptible things he said were necessarily in one individual, while the species in corruptible things he said were necessarily in several and diverse individuals, so that the species are of themselves necessary, although corruptible per accidens, just as he posited that the elements were in their totality incorruptible but in their parts corruptible. |
| 239 Contra istam opinionem, quae imponit ista Aristoteli, arguitur primo quod non negaverit primum modum. Hoc videtur ex intentione eius II Metaphysicae: ((Sempiternorum principia verissima esse necesse est)), quia sunt aliis causa veritatis, - ((unumquodque autem sic se habet ad esse sicut ad veritaƿtem)) (ibidem); patet autem secundum ipsum, omne sempiternum esse necessarium, ex I De caelo et mundo et IX Metaphysicae cap. paenultimo. Item, V Metaphysicae, nihil prohibet quorumdam necessariorum esse alteras causas (cap. 'De necessario'). Si tamen de ratione causati esset possibilitas repugnans necessitati (sicut arguit dicta opinio), contradictio esset alicuius necessarii esse aliquam causam. | 239. Against this opinion, which imputes these things to Aristotle, an argument is given first [by Scotus himself] that he did not deny the first way. This is seen from his intention in Metaphysics 2.1.993b28-31: "Of eternal things the principles must be the truest," because they are the cause of truth for the other things, - "but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth;" now it is clear, according to him, that everything eternal is necessary, from On the Heavens 1.12.283b1-6 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050b6-8. Again, Metaphysics 5.4.1015b6-11, nothing prevents there being other causes for certain necessary things [e.g. premises causing the conclusions of syllogisms]. If, however, a possibility repugnant to necessity were of the idea of a caused thing (as the said opinion [of Henry] argues [nn.233, 235-236]), it would be a contradiction for any necessary thing to have a cause. |
| 240 Item, XII Metaphysicae concludit unitatem universi esse ex unitate finis, - ergo omne aliud ab illo fine est ad ipsum ut adfinem; sed cuiuscumque est causa finalis, eius est efficiens causa; ergo etc. Probatio ultimae propositionis: finis non est causa nisi in quantum movet efficiens ad agendum et dandum esse. Movet, inquam, ut amatum et desideratum (hoc patet ex ratione finis V Metaphysicae cap. 3), propter quem finem agens agit, propter quem - scilicet finem amatum - agens dat esse alii, ad ipsum ordinato. | 240. Again, Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-23, he deduces the oneness of the universe from the oneness of the end, - therefore everything other than the end is for it as for the end; but of whatever there is a final cause, there is also an efficient cause; therefore etc. Proof of the final consequence: an end is not a cause save insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act and to give being. It moves, he says, as loved and desired (this is plain from the idea of end Metaphysics 5.2.1013b25-27), for which end the agent acts, for which end - namely the end loved - the agent gives being to another thing that is ordered to itself. |
| 241 $a Item, Commentator XII Metaphysicae concedit quod est ƿibi causa et causatum 'sicut intellectum est causa intellectionis', et Aristoteles dicit quod movet sicut amatum et desideratum. Balneum ut in mente, movet effective, secundum Commentatorem; saltem obiectum ad intelligere movet effective: ergo et ad esse, quia imponitur Philosopho quod posuit unamquamque substantiarum illarum esse suum intelligere. | 241. Again, the Commentator Metaphysics XII com.37 concedes that there is there [in the heavens] cause and caused 'as the intellect is the cause of intellection', and Aristotle says that [the first mover] moves as loved and desired. 'Bath' as it is in the mind moves as efficient cause, according to the Commentator; at any rate the object moves, as efficient cause, to an act of understanding; therefore also to existence, because [Henry] imputes to the philosopher that he posited each of those substances to be its own act of understanding. |
| 242 Item, Avicenna expresse ponit necessarium 'ab alio causaliter'. Ergo si in hoc non vidit contradictionem, quare debet negari ab Aristotele, propter contradictionem quam tu ibi ponis) a$ | 242. Again, Avicenna [Metaphysics IX ch.4 (104vb)] expressly posits that the necessary 'is from another causally'. Therefore if in this he saw no contradiction, why should it be denied of Aristotle, because of the contradiction that you [Henry] posit there [n.233]? |
| 243 Item, Commentator De substantia orbis cap. 3: ((Corpus caeleste non indiget virtute movente in loco, tantum, sed etiam virtute largiente in se et in substantia sua permanentiam aeternam)) etc.; ƿet post: ((de opinione Aristotelis dixerunt quidam ipsum non dicere causam agentem totum, sed tantum causam moventem, et illud fuit valde absurdum)). | 243. Again, the Commentator in On the Substance of the Globe ch.2 says: "The celestial body does not only need a virtue moving it in place, but also a virtue bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence, etc.;" and later: "of the opinion of Aristotle some said that he does not assert a cause activating the whole, but only a moving cause, and that was very absurd." |
| 244 Eis respondetur ab eis, quod ((qui ponunt fundamenta falsa ex rationibus verisimilibus, contingit quod postmodum contradicant eisdem ex rationibus veris)). Contra: ostendisti Aristotelem negare primum modum 'quia videtur includere contradictionem', et nunc concedis ipsum sibi ipsi contradicere; sed rationabilius videtur non imponere sibi contradictoria, sed quod dicat consequenter ad antecedens falsum, concedendo consequens. | 244. To these points they [Henry and his followers] reply that "those who posit a false foundation on the basis of probable reasons, end up after a while contradicting themselves on the basis of true reasons." On the contrary: you [Henry] have shown [n.233] that Aristotle denies the first way 'because it seems to involve a contradiction', and now you concede that he himself contradicts himself;[2] but it seems more reasonable not to impute contradictories to him, but to say that he speaks consistent to a false antecedent when he concedes the consequent. |
| 245 Item, quod non posuerit secundum modum, quem imponis ei, videtur propter irrationabilitatem illius modi; probatio: nihil enim dependet ab alio in essendo, a quo non habet esse, et ita nec in permanendo ab alio, a quo non habet permanentiam, quia ab eodem habet esse et permanentiam. - Nec est simile de figuris et numeƿris, quia ibi prior licet non sit causa efficiens posteriorum, est tamen causa materialis, sicut pars est - potentia - in toto; in proposito autem non potest poni causalitas nisi efficientiae vel finis, secundum Aristotelem. | 245. Again, that Aristotle did not posit the second way, which you impute to him [n.238], is seen from the irrationality of this way; proof: for nothing depends for its existence on another thing from which it does not get being, and so neither does it depend for its permanence on another thing from which it does not get permanence, because it gets being and permanence from the same thing. - Nor is the case of figures and numbers similar [n.232], because although there the prior is not the efficient cause of the posterior, it is yet the material cause, as a part is - by potency - in the whole; but in the proposed case no causality can be posited but that of the efficient and final cause, according to Aristotle [n.240]. |
| 246 Quod etiam imponitur Aristoteli de necessitate specierum in corruptibilibus 'in diversis individuis', non est verum nisi quia intellexit necessitatem motus caeli, et ita productionem individuorum, quando est talis vel talis approximatio vel proportio agentis ad passum; necessitas autem est condicio exsistentiae: non ergo convenit speciei nisi in individuis. Nec est simile de elemento 'secundum totum et secundum partem', nam elementum secundum totum est singulare, per se exsistens, et principalis pars universi. ƿ | 246. Also, what is imputed to Aristotle about the necessity of the species in corruptible things 'in diverse individuals' [n.238] is not true unless he understood it of the necessity of the motion of the heaven, and so of the production of individuals when there is such and such closeness or proportion of the agent to the patient; but necessity is a condition of existence; it does not then belong to species save in individuals. Nor is the case of the element 'as a whole and in its parts' similar [n.238], for the element as a whole is a singular, existent of itself, and a principal part of the universe.[3] |
| 247 Item, si 'corruptibile' ex causa intrinseca quandoque necessario non sit, ut sibi imponitur, ergo a se corrumpetur, sine corrumpente exteriore. | 247. Again, if what is 'corruptible' from its intrinsic cause sometime necessarily is not, as is imputed to him [by Henry to Aristotle, n.237], then it will be corrupted by itself without an external thing corrupting it. |
| 248 Imponitur etiam Avicennae tertius modus, et probatur ex VI Metaphysicae, ubi dicit quod ((causatum, quantum est ex se, est ei ut non sit, quantum vero ad suam causam, est ei ut sit; quod autem est ei de se - ut apud intellectum - est prius, non duratione, eo quod est ei ex alio)), et hoc ((apud sapientes vocatur 'creatio', dare esse rei post non esse absolute)). | 248. The third way [n.232] is also imputed to Avicenna, and a proof is taken from Metaphysics VI ch.2 (92ra), where he says that "a caused thing, as to itself, is that it not be, but, as to its cause, that it be; but what is of itself - as it is in the intellect - is prior [sc. in nature], not in duration, to what is of another," and this "among the wise is called 'creation', to give existence to a thing after absolute non-existence." |
| 249 Contra ipsum arguitur quia ille modus includit contradicƿtionem, quia si possibile ponatur non esse, sequitur non tantum falsum sed etiam impossibile - secundum Philosophum - scilicet causam non necessario causare et dare esse. | 249. Against him it is argued [by Henry] that that way [n.248] involves a contradiction, because if the possible is posited not to be, it follows that it is not only false but also impossible - according to the Philosopher - namely that the cause does not necessarily cause and give being [the opposite of which is posited by Avicenna, nn.248, 242]. |
| 250 De intentione istorum philosophorum, Aristotelis et Avicennae. - Nolo eis imponere absurdiora quam ipsi dicant vel quam ex dictis eorum necessario sequantur, et ex dictis eorum volo rationabiliorem intellectum accipere quem possum. | 250. On the intention of these philosophers, Aristotle and Avicenna. - I do not wish to impute to them things more absurd than they themselves say or than follows necessarily from what they say, and I wish to take from their sayings the more reasonable understanding that I can take. |
| 251 Respondeo ergo quod Aristoteles posuit, et similiter Avicenna, Deum necessario sese habere ad alia extra se, et ex hoc sequitur quod quodlibet aliud necessario se habet ad ipsum (quod quasi immediate comparatur ad ipsum), vel non mediante motu, quia ex uniformitate in toto posuit difformitatem in partibus moƿbilis, et mediante motu generabilia et corruptibilia difformiter comparantur ad ipsum. | 251. I respond then that Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily disposed to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that some other thing is necessarily disposed to God (which is as it were immediately compared to him), or disposed not by an intermediate motion, because from a uniformity in the movable whole they posited a lack of uniformity in the parts of the movable, and that by intermediate motion generable and corruptible things were non-uniformly compared to God. |
| 252 Tenendo illud falsum fundamentum Aristoteles, ponendo ipsum esse necessariam causam, non videtur contradicere sibi ponendo causatum necessarium (ut vult V Metaphysicae cap. 'De necessario', quod quorumdam necessariorum est altera causa, et II Metaphysicae ((sempiternorum principia semper esse verissima necesse est)), ut argutum est), et ita ponit non tantum tertium modum sed etiam primum modum. ƿ | 252. By holding this false foundation, Aristotle does not seem, in positing that God is a necessary cause, to contradict himself by positing a necessary caused thing (as he intends in the Metaphysics 5, that of certain necessary things there is some other cause, and in Metaphysics 2 that "of eternal things the principles must be the truest," as was argued [n.239]), and so he posited not only the third way but also the first [n.232].[4] |
| 253 Avicenna etiam videtur statim contradicere sibi ipsi, ponendo illud possibile, quia tunc necessarium non necessario comparatur ad illud. ƿSed arguitur pro parte Avicennae: si est ab alio, ergo in conceptu quiditatis eius non est de se esse; ergo est de se possibile esse et non ens, sicut humanitas non est de se nec una nec plures. Conceditur de isto modo possibilitatis, quae scilicet possibilitas non est nisi quod ordine naturae hoc est capax huius, et non est illud quiditative. | 253. Also Avicenna seems immediately to contradict himself when positing the [caused thing] to be a possible [n.248], because then a necessary thing is not necessarily compared to it. But there is an argument on Avicenna's behalf: if it is from another, then in the quiddity of it is not included its being of itself; therefore it is of itself a possible being and a non-being, just as humanity is not a being of itself, whether one or several. This way of possibility is conceded, namely the possibility which is just that, in the order of nature, this thing is capable of that, but it is not that quidditatively. |
| 254 Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum argumentum factum contra Avicennam, quasi contradicat sibi, quia non sequitur 'posse non esse', nec 'potest poni' - sicut nec 'ens non esse unum' - et sic Aristoteles concederet possibile, quod est necessarium ab alio, sed 'possibile potentia ante actum' improbat I De caelo et mundo. | 254. From this the response is plain to the first argument made against Avicenna [n.249], as though he were contradicting himself, because [from 'possible not to be'] there does not follow 'it is possible that it is not', nor [from 'it is possible'] does there follow 'it can be posited [that it is not]' - just as neither 'a being that is not one' - and thus Aristotle would concede something necessary from another to be a possible, but that 'it is possible for potency to be prior to act' he rejects in On the Heavens [n.249]. |
| 255 Itaque concordant Aristoteles et Avicenna in sequentibus ex uno principio falso - in quo concordant - scilicet quod Deus necessario se habet ad quidlibet quod est extra se, ad quod immediate vel mediante immutabili comparatur. ƿ | 255. Therefore Aristotle and Avicenna agree in the things that follow from one false principle - in which principle they agree - namely that God is necessarily disposed to something that is outside himself, to which immediately, or by mediation of something immutable, he is compared.[5] |
| 256 Ad illa quae adducebantur prius, ad probandum quod Aristoteles negaret primum modum. Ad primum, quod nititur probare contradictionem, forte diceret Aristoteles 'possibile obiective' non repugnare necessario si producens necessario producit; non enim requiritur quod realiter possit esse non tale, sed quod ordine naturae praeintelligatur, intelligendo non tale. Hoc probatur per confirmationem argumenti quod adducitur ab Henrico, quae est quod de quasi potentia subiectiva - secundum ipsum - generatur Filius in divinis; certum est enim quod illa possibilitas quasi subiectiva non prohibet necessitatem: nec quasi potentia obiectiva Filii, quia generans necessario generat. | 256. To the things first adduced, to prove that Aristotle denied the first way [nn.233, 235-238]. To the first, that he tries to prove a contradiction [n.233], perhaps Aristotle would say that 'possible objectively' is not repugnant to the necessary if the producer necessarily produces; for it is not required that the possible could really not be such [sc. existent], but that 'in the order of nature' be implicitly understood when understanding it not to be such [sc. it is possible in its nature, but, because of its cause, it is necessary]. This is proved by the confirmation to the argument adduced by Henry [n.233], which is that from quasi-subjective potency - according to him - the Son is generated in divine reality; for it is certain that that quasi-subjective possibility does not prevent necessity; nor does the quasi-objective potency of the Son, because the generator necessarily generates. |
| 257 Ad illud quod adducebatur de I Caeli et mundi - ((nisi una natura mutetur in aliam)) - potest dici quod substantia habet esse permanens, et ideo non datur sibi semper novum et novum esse. ƿErgo a causante, necessario causante secundum eum, datur sibi natura necessaria formaliter, et sic si possit non esse mutaretur eius natura. | 257. To what is adduced from On the Heavens - "unless one nature were to change into another" - it can be said that the substance has permanent existence, and so there is not given to it always a new and a new existence. Therefore from the causer, causing necessarily according to Aristotle, there is given to it a necessary nature formally, and thus if it were able not to be it would change its nature. |
| 258 Per idem patet ad illud de XII Metaphysicae, de motu , quia cum sit de se possibilis, non solum propter hoc potest ab alio perpetuari quia ab alio est, sed quia cum hoc semper habet novum esse, et ita numquam formam quae est necessitas; sed necessario semper fit, quia mobile totum necessario uniformiter se habet ad dans esse uniformiter necessario, secundum eos $a (et haec habitudo necessario uniformis, mobilis ad movens, est causa motum necessario fieri licet motus numquam habeat esse formaliter necessarium, - est etiam hic necessitas inevitabilitatis in motu sine necessitate immutabilitatis in motu, sed ex necessitate immutabilitatis in causis ipsius motus), a$ ita quod utraque auctoritas per hoc solvitur. Sed permanens, si est necessarium, habet simul esse quod est formaliter necessarium, et ita si corruptibile, contradictio erit, non sic motus. Vel argumentum Aristotelis contra Platonem (I De caelo et mundo) procedit ex suppositione necessarii agentis, ƿet tunc sic deduco: si caelum potest perpetuari, et ab agente necessario, ergo necessario perpetuabitur; huic autem 'necessario' repugnat actus iste 'corrumpere', ergo et potentia ad istum actum, quia cuicumque 'necessario' repugnat actus, eidem 'necessario' repugnat potentia ad talem actum, licet non cuicumque contingenti; ergo non stat potentia ad corruptionem nisi stet potentia ad opposita simul. Et per hoc tenet illa positio in esse, nam ex positione possibilis in esse non sequitur impossibilitas - nec nova incompossibilitas - alicui necessario. | 258. Through the same point an answer is plain to the passage from the Metaphysics about motion [nn.235, 238], because, since it is of itself possible, not only can it be perpetual for the reason that it is from another, but also that, along with this, it always has a new existence, and so it never has a form which is necessity; but it necessarily always comes to be, because the whole movable is necessarily disposed uniformly to what gives it uniform existence necessarily, according to them [Aristotle and Averroes] (and this necessarily uniform disposition of the movable to the mover is the cause that motion necessarily comes to be, although the motion never has necessary existence formally, - there is also here a necessity of inevitability in the motion without a necessity of immutability in the motion, but from a necessity of immutability in the causes of the motion), such that both authorities are hereby solved. But a permanent thing, if it is necessary, has at the same time to be what is formally necessary, and thus, if it is corruptible, there will be a contradiction, - motion is not like this. Or the argument of Aristotle against Plato (On the Heavens n.237) proceeds on the supposition of a necessary agent, and then I conclude in this way: if the heaven could be perpetual, and from a necessary agent, then it will necessarily be perpetual; but to this 'necessarily' is repugnant the act 'to corrupt', therefore also the potency for this act, because anything to which the act is 'necessarily' repugnant, to that same thing the potency to such act is repugnant, although not to anything contingent; therefore potency to corruption only stands if potency to opposites at the same time stands. And by this the position keeps itself in place, for, from the positing of what is possible to be, no impossibility follows -nor a new incompossibility - on anything necessary. |
| 259 Quantum ad secundum principale. Pro ista conclusione quae dicta est esse intentio amborum, scilicet Aristotelis et Avicennae, arguo sic: in omni differentia entis necessitas est perfectior condicio quam contingentia; probatio, quia necessitas est perfectior in ente in se, ergo et in omni differentia entis; ergo et in ista differentia entis quae est 'causa', necessitas est perfectior contingentia perfectissima; ergo causa necessario causat. ƿ | 259. As to the second principal point [n.231]. For this conclusion, which has been said to be the intention of both, namely of both Aristotle and Avicenna [nn.251-255], I argue as follows: in every difference of being necessity is a more perfect condition than contingency; the proof is that necessity is more perfect in being in itself, therefore in every difference too of being; therefore also in this difference of being, which is 'cause', necessity is more perfect than the most perfect contingency; therefore the cause necessarily causes. |
| 260 Respondetur quod necessitas est perfectior condicio ubi est possibilis; est autem incompossibilis rationi causae ut causa, quia sic loquimur et non de eo quod est causa. - Contra hoc: in multis divisionibus entis alterum dividens est perfectum, alterum imperfectum, et extrema illa quae sunt perfecta in diversis divisionibus, aut necessario concomitantur, aut compatiuntur se. Exemplum: si dividatur ens per finitum et infinitum, per necessarium et possibile, per potentiam et actum, - actus, necessitas et infinitas aut necessario se concomitantur, aut compatiuntur se. Ergo cum in divisione entis per causam et causatum causa sit perfectius extremum, concomitabitur cum eo quodcumque perfectius dividens ens, aut poterit stare cum eo, - et per consequens necessitas. | 260. The response is that necessity is a more perfect condition where it is possible; but necessity is incompossible with the idea of cause as cause, because thus are we speaking and not of the thing that is the cause. Against this: in many divisions of being one of the dividers is perfect, the other imperfect, and the extremes that are perfect in the diverse divisions are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. An example: if being is divided into finite and infinite, into necessary and possible, into potency and act, - act, necessity, and infinity are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. Therefore since, in the division of being into cause and caused, cause is the more perfect extreme, concomitant with it, or able to stand with it, will be any more perfect divider whatever of being, - and consequently necessity will be so. |
| 261 Praeterea, si primum causans naturaliter causaret et necessario causaret, tunc daret necessitatem suo causato; sed nulla perfectio tollitur a causato propter modum causandi ipsius causantis aeque perfectum: causare autem voluntarie, non est modus causandi minus perfectus quam causare naturaliter, et sic propter hoc quod est 'causare voluntarie' non tollitur necessario aliqua perfectio effectui; ergo causa, causans voluntarie, potest dare necessitatem effectui. Confirmatur ratio, quia si causaret naturaliter, posset producere plures differentias entis, scilicet possibile et necessarium; ergo si causans voluntarie non possit causare nisi tantum ens contingens, videretur esse causa imperfecta, quia tunc causalitas eius non se extenderet ad tot effectus ad quot se extenderet si naturaliter causaret. ƿ | 261. Further, if the first causer were to cause naturally and were to cause necessarily, then it would give necessity to its caused; but no perfection is taken away from the caused because of an equally perfect mode of causing in the causer itself; but to cause voluntarily is not a mode of causing less perfect than to cause naturally, and thus no perfection is, because of there being this 'to cause voluntarily', necessarily taken away from the effect; therefore a cause, causing voluntarily, can give necessity to the effect. -A confirmation for the reason is that, if a cause were to cause naturally, it could produce several differences of being, to wit the possible and the necessary; therefore if a cause causing voluntarily can only cause contingent being, it would seem to be an imperfect cause, because then its causality would not extend itself to as many effects as it would extend itself to if it were to cause naturally. |
| 262 Praeterea, aliqua causa necessario causat suum causatum, ergo prima causa necessario causat suum causatum. - Antecedens videtur manifestum propter multas causas naturales, quae necessario causant effectus suos. Consequentiam probo, quia in essentialiter ordinatis 'posterius' non potest habere necessitatem nisi 'prius' habeat esse necessarium; conexiones causatorum ad causas suas sunt essentialiter ordinatae; ergo nulla talis conexio est necessaria nisi illa, quae est primi causati ad suam causam. sit necessaria. | 262. Further, some cause necessarily causes its effect, therefore the first cause necessary causes its caused. - The antecedent seems manifest because of the many natural causes that necessarily cause their effects. I prove the consequence by the fact that in things essentially ordered the 'posterior' cannot have necessity unless the 'prior' has necessary being; the connections of caused things to their causes are essentially ordered; therefore no such connection is necessary unless the connection of the first caused thing to its cause is necessary. |
| 263 Contra istam conclusionem, in qua communiter concordant philosophi - quod prima causa necessario et naturaliter causat primum causatum - arguitur sic: primum agens nullo modo perficitur aliquo alio a se; agens naturale aliquo modo perficitur sua productione vel producto; ergo etc. - Minor ostenditur, quia agens naturale agit propter finem, ex II Physicorum; sed nihil videtur agere propter finem quo nullo modo perficiatur. | 263. [Reasons of Henry of Ghent] - Against this conclusion, in which the philosophers commonly agree - that the first cause necessarily and naturally causes the first caused - there is the following argument:[6] the first agent is in no way perfected by anything other than itself; a natural agent is in some way perfected by its production or its product; therefore etc. - The minor is shown by the fact that a natural agent acts for an end, Physics 2.5.196b21-22; but nothing seems to act for an end by which it is in no way perfected. |
| 264 Sed ad istud respondetur secundum intentionem Avicennae, VI Metaphysicae cap. ultimo, ubi vult quod agens perfectum agit ex liberalitate, hoc est, non exspectans perfectionem a producto, - sicut exposita est intentio liberalitatis distinctione quaestione 'De productionibus'. Negandum ergo videtur quod assuƿmitur, scilicet 'quod agens naturale perficitur eo quod producit', quia hoc non est nisi in agentibus naturalibus imperfectis. Et cum adducitur de 'agere primo propter finem', non oportet secundum philosophos agens naturale agere propter aliud quam propter se, sed propter se ipsum ut propter finem, - nec oportet ipsum perfici illo fine, sed esse naturaliter illum finem. | 264. But to this there is a response according to the intention of Avicenna Metaphysics VI ch.5 (95ra), where he means that a perfect agent acts from liberality, that is, not expecting perfection from the product - as the intention of liberality was expounded in distinction 2 in the question 'On Productions' (I d.2 n.234). One should deny, then, the assumption made, namely that 'a natural agent is perfected by that which it produces' [n.263], because this is only true in the case of imperfect natural agents. And as to what is added about 'acting first for an end', it is not necessary according to the philosophers that a natural agent act for an end other than itself, but for itself as for an end - nor is it necessary that it be perfected by that end, but that it is naturally that end. |
| 265 Alia etiam responsio habetur ab Avicenna, quod sicut aqua ex se ipsa est frigida, consequitur autem eam quod infrigidat aliud a se, ita primum agens (si ponatur naturale agens, secundum eos) ex se ipso erit perfectum, sed perfectionem eius consequetur 'producere perfectionem in alio', ita tamen quod illa productio perfectionis in alio non sit finis eius, sicut nec finis aquae est frigefacere. | 265. Another response too is got from Avicenna, that just as water is of itself cold, and a consequent of this is that it makes cold something other than itself, so the first agent (if it is posited as a natural agent, according to them) will be perfect of itself, but consequent to its perfection would be 'to produce perfection in another', such that, however, the production of perfection in another is not its end, just as neither is it the end of water to make things cold. |
| 266 Ratio reducitur contra istas responsiones, quia si aqua non posset stare in frigiditate sua absque hoc quod aliud frigefaceret, non esset summe perfecta in frigiditate, quia aliquo modo dependeret ab alio in frigiditate sua: ita ergo hic, de prima causa in entitate sua, respectu entitatis primi causati. | 266. This reason is turned back [by Henry] against these responses [nn.264-265], that if water could not remain in its coldness without its making something else cold, it would not be supremely perfect in coldness, because it would in its coldness depend in some way on another; the same here, then, as to the first cause in its own entity with respect to the entity of the first caused thing. |
| 267 Sed ista reductio non multum cogit, quia si aqua posset producere frigiditatem per se stantem, diceret Avicenna quod quantumcumque non posset esse in se frigida absque hoc quod frigefaceret, non esset propter hoc dependentia in frigiditate sua sed perƿfectio completa frigiditatis, ex qua necessario produceret vel frigus in alio vel frigus per se stans; et ita poneret de primo ente respectu productionis in aliis. | 267. But this turning back of the argument is not very cogent, because, if water could produce a coldness standing by itself, Avicenna would say that however much it could not be cold in itself without its making something else cold, there would not for this reason be a dependence in its coldness but a complete perfection of coldness, from which perfection it would necessarily produce either cold in another or a cold standing by itself; and he would posit the same of the first being with respect to production in the case of other things. |
| 268 Ultimo, videtur quod ista ratio posset sic declarari: omne agens naturale aut actione sua perficitur in se, aut in suo simili, aut in toto, aut per suam productionem natura eius accipit esse in alio. Hoc enim apparet inductive in omnibus: Intellectus enim, agens naturaliter, perficitur sua actione. Ignis, naturaliter agens, perficitur in suo simili et natura sua habet esse in alio, in quo posset illa natura esse etiam igne generante corrupto (et ita videtur necessitas generationis in corruptibilibus, secundum illud II De anima: 'generatio est perpetua ut salvetur esse divinum'). Sol generat vermem, qui licet non perficiatur in se, nec natura sua accipiat esse in alio, tamen perficitur in suo toto (in quantum sol est pars universi, cuius universi aliqua pars producitur), et perfectio totius videtur aliquo modo esse perfectio partis. Deus Pater, naturaliter producendo Filium, licet non perficiatur in se nec in toto (cuius sit pars, quia nullius est pars), tamen natura sua accipit esse in alio supposito, vel aliud suppositum accipit esse naturae. Patet igitur inductive ista maior divisiva, licet difficile sit assignare 'propter quid' istius maioris; sed si Deus produceret naturaƿliter creaturam, nullum istorum contingeret: nec enim perficeretur in se, ex tali productione, nec in simili, nec in toto, nec natura sua acciperet esse in producto; ergo nec creatura naturaliter producitur. | 268. Finally, it seems that this reason [of Henry's, n.263] could be made clear in this way: every natural agent is perfected by its own action either in itself, or in something similar to it, or in the whole, or, by its production, its nature receives being in another. For this appears by induction in all cases: For the intellect, acting naturally, is perfected by its own action. Fire, acting naturally, is perfected in something similar to it and its nature has being in another thing in which that nature could exist even when the generating fire has ceased to be (and in this way there seems to be a necessity of generation in corruptible things, according to the remark in On the Soul 2.4.415b7 'generation is perpetual so that it may be kept being divine'). The sun generates a worm, and the sun, although it is not perfected in itself, nor does its nature receive being in another, yet it is perfected in the whole (insofar as the sun is part of the universe, some part of which universe is being produced), and the perfection of the whole seems in some way to be the perfection of the part. Although God the Father, in naturally producing the Son, is not perfected in himself nor in the whole (of which he may be a part, because he is part of nothing), yet his nature receives being in another supposit, or another supposit receives natural being. This divided major [first paragraph of n.268] is plain, then, by induction, although it is difficult to assign the 'why' for this major; but if God were to produce creatures naturally, none of the following things would happen: for he would not be perfected in himself by such production, nor in something similar, nor in the whole, nor would his nature receive being in the product; therefore it is not the case that creatures are naturally produced. |
| 269 Secunda ratio apponitur contra philosophos, quia potentia respiciens aliquod obiectum per se et essentialiter, non necessario respicit illa quae non habent ordinem essentialem - sed accidentalem - ad illud primum, quia volens finem non propter hoc vult ƿnecessario aliud esse, cuius esse non est necessarium ad consequendum vel tenendum finem in se; voluntas autem divina primo respicit bonitatem divinam, ad quam creaturae habent ordinem accidentalem, quia nec sunt necessariae ad consequendum illam bonitatem, nec augent eam; ergo voluntas divina non necessario respicit illas creaturas. | 269. A second reason posed against the philosophers [n.263] is that a power that has a respect to some object per se and essentially does not necessarily have a respect to the things that do not have an essential order - but an accidental one - to the first thing,[7] because he who wills the end does not, for this reason, necessarily will another thing to be whose being is not necessary for attaining or retaining the end in itself; but the divine will has first a respect to the divine goodness, to which creatures have an accidental order, because neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it; therefore the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to those creatures. |
| 270 Licet ista ratio in se sit aliqualiter apparens, tamen videtur contradicere quibusdam dictis arguentis, quia ponit quod 'voluntas divina, ut respicit res in esse quiditativo, necessario vult quidquid vult', et tamen res in esse quiditativo non magis habent ordinem ad bonitatem divinam quam res in esse exsistentiae. | 270. Although this reason [n.269] seems in itself in some way evident, yet it seems to contradict certain things said by the arguer [sc. Henry], because he posits that 'the divine will, as it has a respect to things in their quidditative being, wills necessarily whatever it wills', and yet things in quidditative being no more have an order to the divine goodness than things in the being of existence. |
| 271 Videtur etiam ratio habere instantiam, quia sicut voluntas diƿvina habet essentiam suam pro primo obiecto, ita et intellectus divinus; ergo et intellectus divinus accidentaliter respiceret quidquid aliud ab essentia divina respiceret pro obiecto, et ita videretur sequi quod Deus non necessario sciret aliud intelligibile a se, sicut non necessario vult aliud volibile a se. | 271. The reason also seems to have an instance against it that, just as the divine will has its own essence for first object, so also does the divine intellect; therefore the divine intellect too would accidentally have a respect to anything that it has a respect to for its object other than the divine essence, and so there would seem to follow that God would not necessarily know any intelligible other than himself, just as he does not will any willable other than himself. |
| 272 Primam instantiam, quia non est contra veritatem sed contra opinantem, concedo. | 272. The first instance [n.270], because it is not against the truth but against the one holding the opinion [Henry], I concede. |
| 273 Secundam excludendo, confirmo propositum et rationem, quia voluntas quae determinatur ad finem, non determinatur ad aliquid eorum quae sunt ad finem nisi quatenus per syllogismum practicum concluditur ex fine necessitas illius entis ad finem $a videlicet vel necessitas eius in 'esse' vel 'haberi', ad hoc quod finis sit vel habeatur vel acquiratur, - vel necessitas eius in 'diligi', ut finis diligatur vel habeatur. a$ Hoc videmus in omnibus voluntatibus quae sunt ipsius finis - quia non oportet propter finem eas esse determinatas respectu alicuius entis ad finem, si tale ens non concludatur per syllogismum practicum esse necessarium ad finem aliƿquo istorum modorum. Ergo cum intellectus divinus non cognoscat aliud a se esse necessarium ad finem ultimum, voluntas sua, quomodocumque, ex hoc quod est necessario finis, non oportet quod sit necessario alterius a fine. | 273. By excluding the second [n.271], I confirm the intended proposition [sc. against the philosophers] and the reason [n.269], because the will which is determined to the end is not determined to anything of what is for the end save insofar as, by a practical syllogism, the necessity of that thing for the end is deduced from the end, namely either its necessity in 'being' or in 'being had' for the purpose of having or attaining the end, -or its necessity in 'being loved', the way the end is loved or possessed. We see this in the case of all wills - which are of the end itself - because they would not, because of the end, need to be determined with respect to any entity for the end if such entity was not, by a practical syllogism, deduced to be necessary for the end in any of these ways [sc. those just mentioned]. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not know anything necessary for the ultimate end other than itself, there is no need that God's will, from the fact that it is necessarily of the end, be in some way or other necessarily of something other than the end. |
| 274 Quod instatur de intellectu, non est simile, quia intellectum esse necessario respectu alicuius obiecti non ponit illud obiectum esse aliquid in entitate reali aliud a primo obiecto, quia 'esse cognitum ab intellectu divino' non ponit illud esse in se, sed intellectui praesentatum vel in intellectu praesentialiter; non sic esse volitum, immo ponit tunc (vel consequenter) habere aliud esse a voluntate, et hoc loquendo de volitione efficaci, quia sic volitum a Deo aliquando est in effectu. Non est ergo intellectus divinus ita se habens ad intelligibilia alia a se sicut voluntas ad alia volibilia, quia ille intellectus potest esse necessario aliorum intelligibilium - immo omnium - absque hoc quod habeant esse aliud ab esse divino (quatenus sunt sibi praesentia), nec per hoc ponitur aliquid aliud ƿa Deo formaliter necessarium in esse reali; voluntas autem non posset esse necessario aliquorum aliorum volibilium nisi alia essent aliquando necessaria in aliquo esse reali, alio ab esse divino. ƿ | 274. As for the instance about the intellect [n.271], it is not similar, because the fact that the intellect is necessarily in respect of some object does not make that object to be in its real being something other than the first object, because 'to be known by the divine intellect' does not make the known thing to exist in itself but to be present to the intellect or to be in the intellect as present; it is not so in the case of being willed, nay being willed makes then (or subsequently) the willed thing to have a being other than the will, and this when speaking of efficacious will, because something thus willed by God is at some time in actual effect. The divine intellect, therefore, is not related to intelligibles other than itself in the way the will is related to other willables, because the intellect can be necessarily of other intelligibles - nay of all intelligibles - without them having a being other than divine being (insofar as they are present to it), nor by this is there posited that anything other than God is formally necessary in real existence; but the will could not be necessarily of other willable things unless these other things were at sometime necessary in some real existence other than divine existence.[8] |
| 275 Istis rationibus cuiusdam doctoris, aliqualiter sic fortificatis, addo rationes alias. Et arguo primo sic: ens absolutum, necessarium summe - quantum potest cogitari aliquid esse necessarium - non potest non esse, quocumque alio a se non exsistente; Deus est summe necessarium, secundum illum intellectum praeacceptum; ergo quocumque alio a se non exsistente, non propter hoc sequitur ipsum non esse. Sed si necessariam habitudinem haberet ad primum causatum, illo causato non exsistente non esset; igitur non habet ad illud necessariam habitudinem. | 275. [Scotus' own reasons] - To these reasons of a certain doctor [Henry], in some way thus strengthened [nn.268, 273], I add other reasons. And I first argue thus: an absolute being, supremely necessary - as much as anything can be thought to be necessary - cannot not exist, whatever else other than himself does not exist; God is supremely necessary, according to the understanding just accepted [sc. 'as much as anything can be thought to be necessary']; therefore, when whatever else other than him does not exist, it does not for this reason follow that he does not exist. But if he had a necessary relation to the first caused thing, then, when that caused thing does not exist, he would not exist; therefore he does not have to it a necessary relation. |
| 276 Maiorem probo, quia ex minus impossibili non sequitur impossibilius, sicut nec ex minus falso sequitur falsius; et hoc probo, quia si falsius habeat duplicem rationem falsitatis et minus falsum tantum unicam, circumscribamus ab illo falsiore illam rationem falsitatis in qua excedit minus falsum: stante alia ratione erit falsum, et minus falsum non erit falsum, quia circumscripta est ratio falsitatis minus falsi; ergo hoc posito falsius erit falsum: et minus falsum erit verum, et tunc ex vero sequetur falsum, ex hoc etiam patet tunc quod ex minus impossibili non sequitur impossibilius. Sed tale necessarium quale descriptum est, est magis necessarium quam quodcumque necessarium aliud ab eo, etiam secundum omnem opinionem philosophorum; igitur ex non esse cuiuslibet alterius ƿquod non esse est minus impossibile - non sequitur non esse istius quod est impossibilius. | 276. I prove the major by the fact that the more impossible does not follow from the less impossible, just as neither does the more false follow from the less false; and I prove this because, if the more false has a double reason for its falsity and the less false has only one, we would isolate out by the more false the reason for falsity in which it exceeds the less false; with this other reason standing in place, the more false will be false, and the less false will not be false, because the reason for the falsity of the less false has been isolated out; therefore, on this supposition, the false will be the more false and the true will be the less false, and then from the true will follow the false;[9] and also from this it is then plain that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible. But such a necessary thing as has been described [n.275] is more necessary than any necessary thing other than it, even according to all the opinions of the philosophers; therefore from the non-existence of any other thing - which non-existence is less impossible - the non-existence of that which is more impossible does not follow. |
| 277 Probo aliud assumptum, scilicet quod 'si necessariam haberet habitudinem ad' etc., quia habens necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid, non est, illa habitudine non exsistente, - non exsistente autem alio extremo, non exsistit illa habitudo; non exsistente ergo extremo habitudinis, non exsistit fundamentum. | 277. I prove the other assumption, namely that 'if he had a necessary relation, etc.' [n.275], because what has a necessary relation to something does not exist when that relation does not exist, - but when the other extreme does not exist, the relation does not exist; therefore when the extreme of the relation does not exist, the foundation of the relation does not exist. |
| 278 Contra istam rationem instatur, quia 'principium destruitur destructa conclusione' (ex II Phisicorum), et tamen principium videtur ex se formaliter esse necessarium; conclusio autem non est necessaria nisi ex principio, ergo etc. | 278. Against this reason there is an instance, that 'the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed' (Physics 2.9.200a20-22), and yet the principle seems to be formally of itself necessary; but the conclusion is not necessary save from the principle; therefore etc. |
| 279 Haec instantia nulla est, quia stat probatio maioris, quod ex minus impossibili non sequitur impossibilius. Sed nec est similis ad propositum, quia conclusio non est nisi quaedam veritas partialis principii (quod habet quasi totalem veritatem), sicut singulare est quasi quaedam veritas partialis respectu universalis. In entibus autem 'ens causatum' non est ut quaedam entitas 'quasi partialis' causae, sed est omnino alia entitas, dependens ab entitate causae. Etsi ergo conclusione destructa destruatur principium, non tamen ita erit de entitate in causa et causato. | 279. This instance is nothing, because the proof of the major remains, that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible [n.276]. But neither is it similar in relation to the intended proposition, because the conclusion is only a certain partial truth of the principle (which principle has a total truth), just as a singular is as it were a certain partial truth in respect of the universal. But in beings 'a caused being' is not a certain 'quasi-partial' entity of a cause, but is altogether another thing, dependent on the entity of the cause. So although the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed, it will not be so with the entity in the cause and in the caused. |
| 280 Ad hoc autem, ut istud 'de principio et conclusione' melius intelligatur, possunt poni exempla. Prima conclusio geometriae, ƿquod illae lineae trianguli sic constituti sunt aequales, non videtur esse nisi quoddam particulare istius universalis 'omnes lineae ductae a centro usque ad circumferentiam, sunt aequales', - et ita in multis aliis, conclusio non videtur esse nisi particulare vel minus universale, vel multorum, ex quibus simul infertur, sicut si iungamus isti istam universalem 'quae eidem sunt aequalia, inter se sunt aequalia'; et licet praedicatum primo conveniat subiecto ipsius universalis, id est adaequate, non tamen convenit primo tali primitate subiecto minus universali. Nec propter istam primitatem in principio et non primitatem in conclusione, est talis causalitas in principio respectu conclusionis qualis est in entibus unius entis respectu alterius, ita quod illa 'causalitas in principio' ponat veritatem aliam formaliter a veritate principii quae sit conclusionis, sicut in entibus entitas causae est formaliter alia ab entitate causati. Primitas autem praedicationis est propter primitatem terminorum, et termini speciales licet non sint adaequati illis praedicatis, tamen attributio praedicati illis terminis specialibus particulariter sumptis includitur in attributione eiusdem praedicati terminis communibus universaliter sumptis; includitur, inquam, sicut aliquid illius veritatis. ƿ | 280. But, to make this point 'about the principle and the conclusion' better understood, some examples can be given. First a conclusion of geometry, that the fact the sides of a triangle constructed in such and such a way are equal seems to be only a certain particular instance of this universal 'all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal', - and so in many other cases, the conclusion seems only a particular or a less universal, or one of many things from which it is at the same time inferred, just as if we were to join to the universal mentioned this universal 'things equal to the same thing are equal to each other'; and although the predicate belongs first, that is, adequately, to the subject of the universal, yet it does not belong first, with such primacy, to the less universal subject. Nor is it the case that, because of primacy in the principle and non-primacy in the conclusion, such causality in the principle with respect to the conclusion is, in the case of beings, the sort of causality of one being with respect to another, such that 'causality in the principle' posits in the conclusion a truth formally different from the truth of the principle in the same way as in beings the entity of the cause is formally different from the entity of the thing caused. Now the primacy of the predication is because of the primacy of the terms, and although special terms are not adequate to the predicates, yet the attribution of the predicate to the special terms taken particularly is included in the attribution of the same predicate to the common terms taken universally; included, I say, as some part of that truth.[10] |
| 281 Secundo arguo sic: aliquid contingenter fit in entibus, igitur prima causa contingenter causata. | 281. Second, I argue thus: something happens contingently in beings, therefore the first cause causes contingently.[11] |
| 282 Antecedens concedunt philosophi. Consequentiam probo sic: si prima causa necessario se habet ad causam proximam sibi, sit illud b, - b igitur necessario movetur a prima causa; b autem eodem modo quo movetur a prima causa, movet proximam sibi, - igitur ƿb necessario causat movendo c, et c movendo d, et sic in omnibus causis procedendo nihil contingenter erit si prima causa necessario causat. - Ista ratio pertractata est distinctione 2 quaestione 1 'De infinitate Dei', in argumento probante Deum esse formaliter intelligentem, et ideo non oportet hic amplius immorari. | 282. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers.[12] The consequence I prove in this way: if the first cause is necessarily related to the cause next to it, let the next cause be b, - therefore b is necessarily moved by the first cause; but in the same way that b is moved by the first cause, it moves the cause next to it, - therefore b causes necessarily when moving c, and c when moving d, and, by thus proceeding with all causes, nothing will exist contingently if the first cause causes necessarily. - This reasoning was handled in distinction 2 question 1 'On the Infinity of God', in the argument proving that God is formally intelligent [I d.2 n.149], and so there is no need to dwell on it further. |
| 283 Praeterea, et redit in idem: aliquod malum fit in universo, igitur Deus non necessario causat. | 283. Further, and it comes back to the same: something evil happens in the universe, therefore God does not cause necessarily. |
| 284 Antecedens concedunt philosophi. Et probo consequentiam, quia agens necessario producit necessario effectum suum in susceptivo, quantum potest produci in eo; effectus Primi est bonitas et perfectio; igitur si necessario agit, necessario producit bonitatem tantam in quolibet, quantam ipsum susceptivum potest recipere. Sed habens tantam bonitatem quantae ipsum est capax nullam habet malitiam; ergo etc. | 284. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers. And the consequence I prove by the fact that a cause acting necessarily produces its effect necessarily in what receives the effect insofar as the effect can in it be produced; the effect of the First thing is goodness and perfection; therefore, if it acts necessarily, it necessarily produces in anything at all as much goodness as that receptive thing can receive. But what has as much goodness as it is capable of has no malice; therefore etc. |
| 285 Etsi posset evadi ad istud argumentum, de malo in natura sicut tactum est distinctione 2 quaestione praeallegata - tamen de malo contingenter facto, quod scilicet est vituperabile, non videtur possibilis evasio, quin si aliquod tale malum eveniat quod scilicet sit vituperabile, ac ex hoc sequatur quod contingenter eveniat, causa prima non necessario causat, sicut ostendit ista deductio. ƿ | 285. Although there could be a way out of this argument about evil in nature - as was touched on in the aforementioned question of distinction 2 [n.282] - yet a way out of it about evil done contingently, namely the evil that is blameworthy, does not seem possible, but rather, if any such evil as is blameworthy happens, and if from this it follows that it happens contingently, then the first cause does not necessarily cause, as this deduction shows.[13] |
| 286 Item, causa necessario agens agit secundum ultimum potentiae suae, quia sicut non est in potestate eius agere et non agere, ita nec intense agere et remisse; ergo si prima causa necessario causat, causat quidquid potest causare: potest autem causare ex se omne causabile, ut probabo, - ergo causat omne causabile; ergo nulla causa secunda aliquid causat. | 286. Again, an agent acting necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, for, just as acting and not acting is not in its power, so neither is acting intensely or lightly in its power; therefore if the first cause necessarily causes, it causes whatever it can cause; but it can cause of itself everything causable, as I will prove [n.288] -therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no second cause causes anything.[14] |
| 287 Istam secundam consequentiam probo, quia causa prior prius naturaliter respicit causatum quam causa posterior, ex prima propositione De causis; ergo in illo priore, si totaliter causat, tunc causat totum illud quod in secundo signo deberet a causa secunda causari, et ita in secundo signo quo deberet causa secunda causare nulla est possibilis actio causae secundae, quia iam praeintelligitur totus effectus a causa prima causatus. ƿ | 287. I prove this second consequence because a prior cause naturally has a respect to the caused before a later cause does, from the first position in the book On Causes [of ps.-Aristotle = from Proclus' Elements of Theology]; therefore in the case of the prior cause, if it causes totally, it causes the whole of what in the second moment should be caused by the second cause, and so in the second moment, in which the second cause should cause, no action will be possible for the second cause, because the total effect caused by the first cause is already presupposed. |
| 288 Assumptum in argumento, scilicet quod 'possit causare omne causabile', probo, quia habet potentiam cuiuscumque causae secundae, totam etiam quae est in causa secunda, quantum ad quidlibet perfectionis causalitatis quod est in quacumque causa secunda, sicut deductum est in quaestione praeallegata 'De infinitate', via prima, sumpta de efficientia; non requiritur autem cum causa efficiente aliqua imperfectio, sed tantum perfectio, quia causare effective est perfectionis simpliciter; ergo Primum habens in se omnem ƿcausalitatem causae secundae, quantum ad quidlibet perfectionis, potest immediate causare ex se omne causabile sicut et cum causa secunda. | 288. The assumption in this argument, namely that 'it causes everything causable' [n.286], I prove from this, that it has the power of any second cause whatever, even the total power that exists in the second cause, as far as whatever perfection of causality there is in any second cause,[15] as was deduced in the aforementioned question 'On Infinity' [n.282], in the first way, taken from effectiveness [I d.2 n.120]; now there is not required along with the efficient cause any imperfection but only perfection, because to cause effectively is a matter of perfection simply;[16] therefore the First thing, possessing in itself all the causality of the second cause, as regards anything of perfection, can immediately cause of itself everything causable just as it also can along with the second cause. |
| 289 Et si consequens ultimum, scilicet quod causae secundae priventur actionibus suis, non habeatur pro inconvenienti, duco ad maius inconveniens, quod causabit et omnia et unum solum, ita quod omnia erunt tantum unum, - quia sicut causabit omnia causabilia propter hoc quod causat omnia quae potest causare, ita etiam in quacumque causatione causabit quantum potest causare, et ita perfectissimum, et ita omnia illa erunt illud unicum causatum, et tunc omnia erunt unum. | 289. And if the final consequence, namely that second causes are deprived of their actions, is not held to be discordant, I reduce it to a greater discordance, that [the first cause] will cause both everything and only one thing, such that everything will be only one thing, - because just as it will cause all causables, on account of its causing everything that it can cause, so also in any causation it will cause as much as it can cause, and so something most perfect, and thus all the causables will be that single caused thing, and in that case everything will be one. |
| 290 Per idem etiam medium 'ex necessitate causandi et ultimata causatione' sequitur quod movebit in non tempore, aut saltem mutabit caelum in non tempore, ita quod caelum in non tempore movebitur. ƿ | 290. Also through the same middle term 'from the necessity of causing and with the utmost of causation' it follows that it will move in non-time, or at any rate it will change the heavens in non-time, so that the heavens will be moved in non-time.[17] |
| 291 Nec valet illa responsio prius tacta, quaestione allegata prius 'De infinitate', quia ista virtus infinita habet omnem perfectionem ƿcausae efficientis in se quam ipsa habet cum causa secunda proxima, et ideo sequitur quod immediate potest causare per se omnem illum ƿeffectum in caelo quem potest causare cum intelligentia; ergo et causat si necessario agit quidquid potest, - et ultra, si causat illud immediate, ergo et mutat in non tempore, quia potentia infinita, agens secundum ultimum potentiae suae, non potest agere in temƿpore: et si hoc, ergo nulla est generatio et corruptio in istis inferioribus, quae sunt contra philosophos; ergo illa ex quibus sequuntur ista, sunt falsa secundum philosophos. | 291. Nor is the response valid that was touched on above, in the aforementioned question 'On Infinity' [nn.282, 288], because infinite virtue has all the perfection of the efficient cause in itself that it has along with the second and proximate cause, and so the consequence is that it can immediately cause per se in the heavens the whole effect that it can cause along with the intelligence;[18] therefore it also causes, if it acts necessarily, whatever it is capable of, - and further, if it causes immediately, then it also causes change in non-time, because an infinite power, acting according to the utmost of its power, cannot act in time; and if so, then there is no generation and corruption in the things down here, which is contrary to the philosophers; therefore, the premises from which these conclusions follow are false according to the Philosophers. |
| 292 Ad quaestionem, quantum ad exponentem negativam illius exclusivae, respondeo: concedo conclusiones istarum rationum, quarum licet forte aliquae non convincerent philosophos quin possent respondere, sunt tamen probabiliores illis quae adducuntur pro philosophis, et aliquae forte necessariae. | 292. To the question, as to the exposition of the negative part of it [sc. that nothing other than God is immutable, n.230], I reply: I concede the conclusions of those arguments [nn.275-291, 273, 268], although perhaps some of them would not so convince the philosophers that they could not reply, yet they are more probable than those adduced on behalf of the philosophers [nn.259-262], and some perhaps are necessary. |
| 293 Dico tamen, quantum ad istam partem, quod nihil aliud est immutabile loquendo de mutatione quae est 'versio', quia nihil aliud est formaliter necessarium. Quidlibet enim aliud est mutabile subiective, nisi propter imperfectionem negativam: puta ultimum accidens, quod nullius perfectionis est capax propter sui imperfectionem (utpote si sit aliqua relatio) non est mutabile subiective, quia non potest esse subiectum alicuius, hoc est quia est imperfectum negative, id est non capax alicuius perfectionis. Sed nihil aliud a Deo propter perfectionem sui est immutabile, quia si aliquid esset tale, hoc maxime esset prima intelligentia. Sed illa est mutabilis ab intellectione ad intellectionem; probatio: potest enim habere intellectionem cuiuscumque intelligibilis, quia hoc potest intellectus noƿster habere, - non autem unicam omnium, quia tunc illa esset infinita (ex 2 distinctione, quaestione 1), nec infinitas simul omnium intelligibilium, quia tunc intellectus habens omnes illas simul in actu distincte, videretur esse infinitus; ergo potest intellectionem unius intelligibilis habere post aliud intelligibile et post alterius intelligibilis intellectionem; ergo est mutabilis. | 293. I say however, as to this part, that nothing else is immutable when speaking of the change that is called 'turning' [n.229], because nothing else is formally necessary. For anything else whatever is mutable subjectively, save because of negative imperfection; for example, a final accident, which is capable of no perfection because of its own imperfection (as suppose it is a relation), is not mutable subjectively, because it cannot be the subject of anything, namely because it is imperfect negatively, that is, not capable of any perfection. But nothing other than God is, because of its own perfection, immutable, because if anything were such it would most of all be the first intelligence. But that intelligence is mutable from intellection to intellection; proof: for it can have intellection of any intelligible, because our intellect can have this, - but not one intellection of everything (from I d.2 nn.101, 125-129), nor an infinite number of intellections of all intelligibles, because then an intellect possessing all of them at once in act distinctly would seem to be infinite; therefore it can have intellection of one intelligible after another intelligible and after the intellection of another intelligible; therefore it is mutable. |
| 294 Ad argumenta posita pro opinione philosophorum. Ad illud quod arguunt de mutatione antiqua Primi si non necessario se habeat ad proximum sibi, respondeo quod voluntate antiqua potest fieri novus effectus sine mutatione voluntatis. Sicut ego volitione mea eadem continuata, qua volo aliquid fieri, faciam tunc illud pro 'quando' pro quo volo illud facere, ita Deus in aeternitate voluit aliquid aliud a se esse pro aliquo tempore et tunc illud creavit pro 'quando' pro quo voluit illud esse. | 294. To the arguments set down on behalf of the opinion of the philosophers [sc. that something else besides God is immutable, n.223]. As to what they argue about an ancient change in the First thing if the First thing is not necessarily related to what is next to it [n.223], I reply that a new effect could come about from an ancient will without any change of will. Just as I, by that same continued will of mine by which I wish something to be done, will then do it at the 'when' at which I will to do it, so God in his eternity wished something other than himself to be at some time and then created it at the 'when' at which he willed it to be. |
| 295 Et si obicias, secundum Averroem VIII Physicorum, quod salƿtem exspectabit tempus, si non statim ponat effectum in esse | 295. And if you object, according to Averroes Physics VIII com.4, that he will at least be waiting for time, if he does not at once put the effect into being when he wishes it to be; - |
| 296 quando vult illum esse; - et praeter hoc, secundum eundem alibi, indeterminatum contingentia ad utrumlibet talem indeterminationem ponit, quod illud quod sic est indeterminatum non potest ex se exire in actum, ut videtur: ergo si in Deo sit talis contingentia ad causandum, non videtur posse ex se determinari ad causandum: | 296. - and in addition to this, according to Averroes elsewhere, a thing indeterminate by contingency posits such indeterminacy as to either eventuality, because what is thus indeterminate cannot of itself, as it seems, proceed to act; therefore if there is in God such contingency as to causing, he does not seem able of himself to be determined to causing. |
| 297 Ad primum respondeo. Exsistens in tempore et volens, aut vult efficacissima volitione, non respiciendo tempus pro quo vult, aut vult illud esse pro aliquo tempore certo. Si primo modo, statim poneret volitum in esse si voluntas sua sit perfecte potens. Si secundo modo, posito quod voluntas eius esset simpliciter potens, non tamen poneret rem statim in esse sed pro tunc quando vult illud esse; exspectaret ergo tempus, quia ens est in tempore.- Sed ƿapplicando ad Deum, auferendae sunt imperfectiones. Nec enim voluntas eius impotens est, nec voluntas eius habet esse in tempore ut exspectet tempus pro quo producat volitum: quod utique non vult tunc necessario esse quando vult, sed vult esse pro tempore determinato, quod tamen non exspectat, quia operatio voluntatis eius non est in tempore. | 297. To the first [n.295] I reply. Something existing and willing in time either wills with most efficacious volition, not having regard to the time for which it wills, - or it wills the thing to be for some definite time. If in the first way, it would at once put the willed thing into being if its will is perfectly powerful. If in the second way, to posit that its will were simply powerful would yet not put the thing at once into being but only at the time when it wanted the thing to be; it would wait then for time, because the thing is in time. - But when we apply this to God we must remove the imperfections. For neither is his will impotent nor does it have being in time so that it should wait for the time at which to produce the thing willed; which thing it does not will to be necessarily then when it wills, but it wills it for a determinate time; but it does not wait for the time, because the operation of his will is not in time. |
| 298 Et cum dicit secundo 'de indeterminatione causae contingenter causantis', dictum est alias de duplici indeterminatione, scilicet potentiae passivae et potentiae activae illimitatae. Deus non erat indeterminatus ad causandum prima indeterminatione sed secunda, et hoc non ad plura disparata (ad quorum quodlibet est naturaliter determinatus), sicut sol se habet ad multos effectus suos quos potest, sed indeterminatus ad contradictoria, ad quorum utrumlibet poterat ex libertate sua determinari. Ita et voluntas nostra est indeterminata hoc modo, virtualiter, indeterminatione potentiae activae ad utrumque contradictoriorum et ex se potest determinari ad hoc vel illud. | 298. And when Averroes speaks second 'about the indeterminacy of a cause causing contingently' [n.296], there was discussion elsewhere [I d.7 nn.20-21] about double indeterminacy, namely of passive power and of active unlimited power. For God was not indeterminate as to causing with the first indeterminacy but with the second, and this not to several disparate things (to each of which he is naturally determined) in the way the sun is related to the many effects it is capable of, but he is indeterminate to contradictories, to each of which he could be of his liberty determined. So too our will is indeterminate in this way, virtually, with indetermination of active power as to either contradictory, and it can of itself be determined to this or that. |
| 299 Et si quaeras quare ergo voluntas divina magis determinabitur ad unum contradictoriorum quam ad alterum, respondeo: 'indisciƿplinati est quaerere omnium causas et demonstrationem' (secundum Philosophum IV Metaphysicae), 'principii enim demonstrationis non est demonstratio'. Immediatum autem est voluntatem velle hoc, ita quod non est aliqua causa media inter ista, sicut est immediatum calorem esse calefactivum (sed hic naturalitas, ibi autem libertas), et ideo huius 'quare voluntas voluit' nulla est causa nisi quia voluntas est voluntas, sicut huius 'quare calor est calefactivus' nulla est causa nisi quia calor est calor, quia nulla est prior causa. | 299. And if you ask why the divine will, then, will be more determined to one contradictory than to the other, I reply: 'it is a mark of lack of education to seek causes and demonstration for everything' (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13), 'for there is not demonstration of a principle of demonstration'. But it is a thing immediate that the will wills this thing, such that there is no cause intermediate between these terms, just as it is a thing immediate that heat heats (but here it is a matter of nature, there of freedom), and so of this 'why the will wills' there is no cause save that the will is the will, just as of this 'why heat heats' there is no cause other than that heat is heat, because there is no prior cause. |
| 300 Et si dicas 'quomodo potest hic esse immediatio, cum sit contingentia ad utrumlibet', dictum est alias in quaestione 'De subiecto theologiae' quod in contingentibus est aliquid primum quod est immediatum, et tamen contingens, quia non statur ad necessarium (non enim ex necessario sequitur contingens), et ideo oportet hic stare ad istam 'voluntas Dei vult hoc', quae est contingens et tamen immediata, quia nulla alia causa prior est ratione voluntatis, quare ipsa sit huius et non alterius. - Per hoc apparet ad illud quod Avicenna adducit, quod 'actio sua est in eo per essentiam', et non est in eo accidentaliter: verum est quod suum velle est essentia sua, tamen contingenter transit super hoc obiectum et illud, sicut infra dicetur 'de futuris contingentibus'. ƿ | 300. And if you say 'how can there be immediacy here, since there is contingency to either result?', there was discussion elsewhere in the question 'On the subject of theology' [Prol. n.169], that in contingent things there is some first thing which is immediate and yet contingent, because no stand is made at something necessary (for the contingent does not follow from the necessary), and so it is necessary here to make a stand at this proposition 'the will of God wills this', which is contingent and yet immediate, because no other cause is prior to the reason of the will as to why it is of this and not of something else. - By this is apparent the answer to what Averroes adduces, that 'his own action is in him by his essence' and is not in him accidentally; it is true that his willing is his essence, yet his willing contingently passes to this object and to that, as will be said later 'about future contingents' [I d.39, see footnote to n.281]. |
| 301 Per istud patet ad argumentum principale, quia cum necessitate Dei stat quod illud ad quod immediate se habet est mutabile, quia 'immediate ab immutabili' est mutabile sine mutatione immutabilis, quia contingens habitudo est illius immutabilis ad proximum sibi; et ideo extremum illius habitudinis est contingens et mutabile, licet fundamentum sit immutabile. | 301. By this the answer to the principal argument [n.223] is plain, that with the necessity of God stands the fact that what he is immediately related to is mutable, because 'immediately from the immutable' is mutable without change of the immutable, because the relation of the immutable to what is next to it is mutable; and therefore the extreme of that relation is contingent and mutable, although the foundation is immutable. |
| 302 Ad argumenta posita pro philosophis. Ad primum, de illis 'dividentibus ens', dico quod 'necessarium' est perfectior condicio in omni entitate (quam 'possibile') cui condicio necessitatis est possibilis; non est autem perfectior in illa entitate cui non est compossibilis, quia contradictio non ponit aliquam perfectionem, et hoc non est ex ratione sui sed ex ratione illius entis cui repugnat. Et ita dico quod necessitas repugnat omni respectui ad posterius, quia ex quo omne posterius est non necessarium, primum non potest habere necessariam habitudinem ad aliquod eorum. | 302. To the arguments posited for the philosophers [sc. that the first cause necessarily causes, nn.259-262]. To the first, about 'the things that divide being' [n.259], I say that 'necessary' is a more perfect condition (than 'possible') in any being for which the condition of necessity is possible; but it is not more perfect in that being with which it is not compossible, because a contradiction does not posit any perfection, and this is not from its own nature but from the nature of the being with which it is repugnant. And so I say that necessity is repugnant in every respect to what is posterior, because, from the fact that every posterior is non-necessary, the first thing cannot have a necessary relation to any of them. |
| 303 Et cum dicis quod 'omnia dividentia perfectiora entis concomitantur se', dico quod hoc est verum de dividentibus quae dicunt perfectionem simpliciter et ad se (ut sunt actus, infinitas et huiusmodi), non autem de illis quae dicunt respectum ad aliquid posterius, quia habere necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid tale, non est perfectionis, quia non stat cum perfecta necessitate illius quod diciƿtur habere talem habitudinem; hoc confirmatur, quia talis habitudo non est formaliter infinita, cum tamen infinitas sit nobilius extremum in divisione entis. | 303. And when you say that 'all of the more perfect dividers of being are concomitant with each other' [n.260], I say that this is true of the dividers that state a perfection simply and in themselves (as are act, infinity, and the like), but not of those that state a respect to something posterior, because to have a necessary relation to something of that sort is not a mark of perfection, because it does not stand with the perfect necessity of that which is said to have such a relation; the confirmation of this is that such a relation is not formally infinite, although however infinity is the more noble extreme in the division of being. |
| 304 Ad aliud, cum dicitur 'si naturaliter causaret, necessario causaret et tunc daret necessitatem producto' etc., dico quod tunc sequitur quod necessario causaret, sicut ex antecedente includente incompossibilia sequitur consequens includens incompossibilia: in antecedente enim repugnat 'ei quod est causare' modus ille qui est 'naturaliter', quia causare dicit productionem diversi in essentia, et ita contingentis, 'naturaliter' dicit modum causandi necessarium et ita respectu necessarii; et ideo sequitur consequens includens simul duo opposita, ratione causationis et modi causandi. Hoc modo prima propositio est vera. - Et cum addis 'nulla perfectio tollitur a causato propter modum perfectiorem causandi ipsius causae', concedo; nec modus causandi 'voluntarie' tollit aliquam perfectionem a causabili, sibi possibilem, sed tollit a causabili necessitatem (quae est in se perfectio, sed incompossibilis causabili), et dat perfectionem causato compossibilem sibi, sicut 'voluntarie' in creatione dicit modum compossibilem causationi. | 304. To the other remark, when it is said 'if it causes naturally, it would necessarily cause and would then give necessity to the product etc.' [n.261], I say that it does then follow that it would cause necessarily, just as from an antecedent that includes incompossibles follows a consequent that includes incompossibles; for in the antecedent that mode 'naturally' is repugnant to 'what it is to cause', because 'to cause' states the production of something diverse in essence, and so of something contingent, but 'naturally' states a necessary mode of causing and thus a mode of causing in respect of something necessary; and therefore the consequent follows which includes two opposites at the same time, by reason of the causation and of the mode of causing. It is in this way that the first proposition is true. - And when you add 'no perfection is taken from the caused because of the more perfect mode of causing of the cause itself, I concede it; nor does the mode of causing 'voluntarily' take from the causable any perfection that is possible for it, but it takes necessity from the causable (which is in itself a perfection, but one incompossible with the causable), and it gives the caused the perfection compossible with it, just as 'voluntarily' in creation states a mode compossible with causation. |
| 305 Per hoc apparet ad confirmationem de pluribus differentiis entis producibilibus: dico quod ens causabile non potest habere istas plures differentias, necessarium et possibile, sed omne ens causabile est tantum possibile; et ideo non est perfectionis in causa posse ƿcausare istas plures differentias, quia ad impossibile nulla est potentia, - similiter si per impossibile necessario causaret et ideo necessario non produceret plures differentias entis, quia tantum produceret necessaria, non contingentia. | 305. By this is apparent the response to the confirmation about the many producible differences of being [n.261]; I say that causable being cannot have those several differences, necessary and possible, but every causable being is only possible; and therefore it is not a mark of perfection in the cause to be able to cause those several differences, because there is no power for what is impossible, - likewise, if it were per impossibile to cause necessarily, it would also therefore necessarily not cause several differences of being, because it would produce only necessary things and not contingent ones. |
| 306 Ad ultimum dico quod nulla est naturalis conexio causae et causati simpliciter necessaria in creaturis, nec aliqua causa secunda causat naturaliter simpliciter vel necessario simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid. Prima pars apparet, quia quaelibet dependet ab habitudine primae causae ad causatum; similiter, nulla causa secunda causat nisi prima causa concausante causatum eius, et hoc prius naturaliter quam causa proxima causet; prima autem non causat nisi contingenter, ergo secunda simpliciter contingenter causat, quia dependet ab ipsa causatione primi, quae simpliciter contingens est. Secunda pars, scilicet de necessitate secundum quid, patet, quia multae causae naturales, quantum est ex parte earum, non possunt non causare effectus, et ideo necessitas est secundum quid - quantum scilicet est ex parte earum - et non simpliciter: sicut ignis, quantum est ex parte sui, non potest non calefacere, tamen potest absolute non calefacere, Deo non cooperante, sicut apparet, et apparuit de tribus pueris in camino. | 306. To the final one [n.262] I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect - namely as far as concerns themselves - and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [Daniel 3.49-50]. |
Notes
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "Here Henry's opinion, Quodlibet VIII question 9, is badly held." The Vatican editors are puzzled as to what Scotus means here, since Henry's opinion, they say, does not seem to be in any way a distortion.
- ↑ That is, Aristotle does not merely, on probable grounds, assert a first thing from which a contradiction then follows [n.233], but directly contradicts that first thing, by later, on true grounds [n.244], asserting the opposite of it.
- ↑ Text cancelled by Scotus: "That it is also imputed to Aristotle that no substance is from another seems manifestly false in the case of generable things. For generation is into substance; therefore by very generation a thing which before was not receives being, and generation is the efficient cause of what is produced; but nothing produces itself into existence."
- ↑ Note cancelled by Scotus: "Again, there is the following argument: he [Aristotle] set down the first mover to be of infinite power; infinite power cannot immediately move the globe, because it moves neither in time nor in the 'now'; therefore he posited that it precisely moves mediately. But this can be understood in three ways, but none of these three ways [see footnote to n.290] is possible unless it produces into being the proximate mover, because the other two modes are there [ibid.] rejected; therefore he intends to posit such a production."
Another note cancelled by Scotus: "This also proves [sc. the previous paragraph in this footnote] that Aristotle posited that all the intelligences are immediately produced by the first intelligence (against Avicenna Metaphysics IX ch.4 (104vb-105ra)), because a cause of infinite power causes every infinite motion, and this mediately (but no other cause besides the first is of infinite power, because any cause is conjoined to some sphere; therefore it is finite); therefore any motion whatever is from the first cause by an intermediate mover and from its proper mover immediately moving it; therefore the first cause produced that proximate mover. Thus too the intellect is produced from outside (On the Generation of Animals 2.3.736b27-29), because, although he did not posit that the first thing acted without second causes, together with a matter disposed to the effect of the first thing, the first thing, according to him, necessarily informs the matter, so that this informing is the only change (not two changes, as in positing creation and informing). Thus too in On Good Fortune [Eudemian Ethics 7.15.1248a22-b7] he says that a separate cause moves immediately a man so disposed to what is of advantage to him, etc." - ↑ Note by Scotus: "And do they both say the first way [sc. immediately]? - Avicenna in Metaphysics [footnote to n.252]. But whether Aristotle thought so about one produced intelligence only [sc. whether Aristotle like Avicenna thought God was compared immediately to one intelligence only or to all] is doubtful; however he posited nothing else immediately from the first thing save intelligence, which, if it did not produce it, would altogether not move it, because not according to any of the three ways contained here [footnote to n.290]."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: " Henry Quodlibet V question 4 makes two arguments, which are here:..."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "Anything else other than God has an essential order to him (although not conversely), hence it seems that the major should be taken in this way: 'a power that necessarily has a respect to some first object is related necessarily to no other thing unless the object is the idea of necessarily tending to that other thing'; then the minor goes in this way: 'the divine goodness is not the idea for the will of necessarily tending with efficacious volition to any other object, because neither is anything else necessary for attaining that goodness nor either does it increase it or along with it give more quiet to the will'; therefore etc.
But the 'because' [the one following the note in the text] is a proof about the volition of being well pleased, as about volition that is efficacious, - the confirmation about the practical syllogism, on which you rely [n.273], proves a similar conclusion; therefore either deny the necessity of each volition of the creature, or seek another special middle term." - ↑ Note by Scotus: "Therefore can [the divine will] be necessarily well pleased in something displayed to it without wanting it to exist, as the intellect necessarily understands it without however understanding it to exist? I concede that it is similar on both sides, - and then when the minor is proved, namely that 'it is not required for attaining the end nor for increasing it' [n.269], the conclusion would hold equally against the willing of being well pleased as against efficacious willing; therefore the instance against him [sc. Henry] seems to be good, because it concedes that the divine will necessarily wills a thing in its quidditative being [n.270], since its proof 'from accidental order' is equally there [n.269] conclusive.
Let then the reasoning be formed as before [see footnote to n.269], and the minor [ibid.] is proved by the remark about the practical syllogism; which proof is conclusive about efficacious willing (as is plain), but not about the willing of being well pleased; the proof is that it concludes that the will, perfectly loving the first goodness, is well pleased in anything shown to it that participates that goodness, just as in the intellect the first object is the reason for necessarily tending to the second, because it manifests that it is in some way a participation of it." - ↑ The argument as contained in the text does not seem to make sense, or to make a sense opposite to that required (although how the text is to be construed is dubious). The point, however, seems clear: if we posit that the less false is true, we are not thereby compelled to posit that the more false is true (for if the more false has lost the reason for falsity it shares with the less false, it has not lost the reason for falsity it has by itself). So likewise, if we posit the less impossible we are not thereby compelled to posit the more impossible.
- ↑ Note of Scotus: "On the contrary: therefore there is no necessary propositional truth other than the truths of the first principles, which seems discordant; again it is against you, who above adduce, against them on Aristotle's behalf, the statement that 'the conclusion has a caused necessary truth' [nn.239, 252]."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "This reason and the two following [nn.283, 286] are not valid against the philosophers, but they are valid for us later in the matter of 'future contingents' [d.39, which however is lacking in the Ordinatio and so the equivalent discussions in the Reportatio and Lectura must be looked at instead]; for if the first cause is omnipotent, then it does not will necessarily any possible; the consequence is proved by these three reasons."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "Response: the antecedent is true precisely of what depends on our will in order to come about; for there is nothing else they can say happens contingently. - About our acts there is the same difficulty for them as for you, namely whether our will moves moved by the First thing -except that you can save contingency in its motion from the First, but they cannot, as is here argued" [nn.285, 287].
- ↑ Vatican editors: "if evil happens contingently and is blameworthy, it is possible for it not to be done when it is done, because if it is necessary then it will not be blameworthy" [Lectura I d.8 n.258].
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "This reason and the following one 'about what moves in no time' [n.290] are solved later [footnote to n.290], where the intention of Aristotle is proved that [God] can only be the proximate cause of intelligence and that he is called the 'remote' cause of motion and of other things, insofar as he gives being to the first mover [sc. the first mover after God]; each reason then [nn.286, 290] proceeds badly against the Philosopher, as if God could immediately move anything besides the intelligence, one or all, that he causes" [footnote to n. 255].
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "I concede this, but of the way of eminence. The power of the second cause is also required as proximate, because the first cause itself is of a nature to be, as it were eminently, in a remote cause. - When the statement 'now there is not required along with the efficient cause, etc.' [sc. the next statement in the text] is taken, I say that some formal perfection that is more imperfect is required eminently, such that the same perfection when eminently possessed cannot be the proximate idea of producing. Nor yet is the imperfection in the proximate cause perse the idea of acting, but such perfection (which yet is an imperfection) is the idea of thus acting, namely for the proximate thing, - which proximate thing is to act imperfectly; the other perfection, the more eminent one, is the idea of acting remotely, - which is to act more perfectly."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "It is not true of 'to cause immediately', but this is a mark of some sort of perfection along with imperfection; but to cause first, and as a result mediately, is a mark of perfection."
- ↑ Note by Scotus: "In a second way: it can be said to the discordance 'that the First thing will move the heavens in an instant' that this does not follow, because the body is not susceptive of motion in the 'now'; therefore no power at all is able to do this. The point is clear precisely about motion in a circle, because, if it go round in a 'now', any part of the moved thing is in the same place as it was before, otherwise, if some part do not return wholly to the same place and reach it afterwards - when the circular motion is complete -, then the circular motion was in time. So it follows that, if it go round in the 'now', in that 'now' any part is in the same place it was before, from which it follows that it is altogether not moved, because it remains altogether in the same 'where' and place, both as to the whole and as to the parts. Therefore to go round in a 'now' is not to go round, and altogether not to change.
This second reason well proves that, by not positing a conjoined mover, the First thing (even if it has infinite power) cannot move the sphere round in a 'now', - but not in time either, because of Aristotle's proof, that then a finite virtue or power would move it 'in an equal time' [Physics 8.10.266a24-b6]; from which points it follows that an infinite power cannot immediately move the sphere round, and yet we see the sphere moving round. So this seems to be Averroes' necessity [Metaphysics XII com.41] for positing a conjoined mover (that is an immediate and finite mover), without which the First thing would move nothing in spherical motion, for it can only act mediately, on account of its perfection and the effect's imperfection, between which a mediating proximate cause is required.
Against this. I ask what is it for the First thing to move mediately? Either because it has produced a proximate moving cause, to which it has, by giving being, given a finite moving power, -Or if the second thing exists of itself, the First thing gives it virtue or some influence by which it causes motion, - Or, third, the First and the second thing cause the same effect in a certain order without the second cause receiving anything from the first cause. If the third, it follows that a finite power without another second cause will move in a time equal to the infinite power moving along with a second cause; if the second, it follows that the 'influx' is different from the nature of the second cause; therefore if it be denied, against the third answer, that the First thing has motion 'for proximate effect', and, against the second, that in no intelligence is the 'influx' an accident, the first answer must be said to be of the mind of Aristotle, and is what Avicenna expounds [Metaphysics XI ch.4 (104vb-105ra)] 'on the order of the intelligences'. [Cf. Lectura I d.8 n.236: "Therefore Avicenna's exposition of the Philosopher is most beautiful and better than all the rest, as to how many things can be produced without change in the First thing, by positing that only one thing is produced by the First, and so on."] And then the infinity of the motion is reduced to the First thing, because the infinity of duration of the second cause is from the first cause always moving it, just as the Son is always generated, - but the First is of itself of infinite duration; but the succession is reduced to the finite virtue of the proximate mover, such that for no other reason is the first mover there save for giving being to the mover. Thus are well saved the first efficient and the final end (because the final end is loved by the mover for its own sake), but the first mover is saved only as a remote mover, that is by giving being to the mover." - ↑ Note by Scotus: "Again, the second cause does not take away the first's proper mode of causing. -Response: its proper mode of causing is to cause through the medium of the second cause, and not immediately; again, the primacy of adequacy includes the whole order of the many things to which the cause extends itself (it is here just as you say it is elsewhere [I d.28 q.3 n.11] about the primacy of the three persons to the essence, and about the other immediacy of the first person to the essence), and then the first cause, when it is posited, is in proximate potency to the second, and then it acts as much as it can act."
