Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P2Qu

Domino volente, finietur, quia multum debilitata est anno Christi millesimo trecentesimo, et eius cultores multi mortui, et plurimi sunt fugati; et prophetia dicitur apud eos esse quod secta eorum est finienda

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 2
95 Quaeritur utrum cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori sit sufficienter tradita in sacra Scriptura. Quod non: Quia cognitio necessaria numquam defuit humano generi; Scriptura sacra non erat in lege naturae, quia Moyses primus scripsit Pentateuchum, nec tota sacra Scriptura erat in lege mosaica, sed tantum Vetus Testamentum; ergo etc.	95. The question is whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture. That it is not: Because necessary knowledge was never lacking to the human race; Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature, because the Pentateuch was first written by Moses, nor was the whole of Sacred Scripture in the Mosaic law, but only the Old Testament; therefore etc.
96 Item, quicumque auctor scientiarum humanarum quanto acutior est intellectu tanto plus vitat superfluitatem in tradendo; sed in sacra Scriptura videntur contineri multa superflua, ut caeremoniae et historiae multae, quorum cognitio non videtur necessaria ad salutem; ergo etc.	96. Again, the more acute in intellect any author of human sciences is, the more he avoids superfluity in handing them on; but in Sacred Scripture there seem to be many superfluous things contained, as the many ceremonies and histories, knowledge of which does not seem necessary for salvation; therefore etc.
97 Item, multa sunt de quibus non cognoscitur certitudinaliter ex Scriptura utrum sint peccata vel non; quorum tamen cognitio necessaria est ad salutem, quia nesciens aliquid esse peccatum mortale, non sufficienter vitabit illud; ergo etc. ƿ	97. Again, there are many things that one does not with certitude know from Scripture whether they are sins or not; however knowledge of these things is necessary for salvation, because he who does not know that something is a mortal sin will not avoid it sufficiently; therefore etc.
98 Contra. Augustinus XI De civitate Dei cap. 3 loquens de Scriptura canonica ait: ((Huic fidem habemus de his rebus quas ignorare non expedit, nec per nos nosse idonei sumus)).	98. To the contrary: Augustine in City of God XI ch.3 says, speaking of canonical Scripture: “We have faith in it for things that ignorance of is not expedient and that we are not fit to recognize by ourselves.”
99 In ista quaestione sunt haereses innumerae damnantes sacram Scripturam, totam vel partes eius, sicut in libris Augustini et Damasceni De haeresibus patet. Quidam haeretici de Scriptura nihil recipiunt. Quidam specialiter improbant Vetus Testamentum, ut manichaei, sicut patet in libro De utilitate credendi a, dicentes Vetus Testamentum esse a malo principio. Quidam tantum Vetus Testamentum recipiunt, ut iudaei. Quidam aliquid utriusque, ut saraceni, quibus immundus Mahometus miscuit alias immunditias innumeras. Quidam autem aliquid dictum in Novo Testamento, puta haeretici diversi, qui sententias diversas Scripturarum male intellectas habentes pro fundamentis, ƿ alias neglexerunt; verbi gratia ad Rom. 13: Qui infirmus est, olera manducet, et huiusmodi. Item, Iac. 5: Confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra, si ex hoc erretur circa sacramentum paenitentiae dicendo illud posse a quocumque non sacerdote dispensari, - et huiusmodi auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae innitendo, male intellectis.	99. [Diverse Heresies] – There are on this question innumerable heresies that condemn Sacred Scripture, in whole or in part, as is clear from the books of Augustine and Damascene On Heresies. Some heretics accept nothing of Scripture. Some reject the Old Testament in particular, like the Manicheans, as is clear in Augustine’s book On the Utility of Believing ch.2 n.4, who say that the Old Testament is from the bad principle. Some accept only the Old Testament, like the Jews. Some, like the Saracens, accept something of both, into which impure Mohammed mixed innumerable other impurities. But some accept up to a point what is said in the New Testament, to wit the diverse heretics who, holding for their foundations diverse statements of Scripture badly understood, have neglected others; for example Romans 14.2: “He who is weak will eat herbs,” and the like. Again James 5.16: “Confess your sins one to another,” if from this the error about the sacrament of penance has arisen, that it can be dispensed by any nonpriest, – relying on bad understandings of these sorts of authorities of Sacred Scripture.
100 Contra istas omnes in communi sunt octo viae eas rationabiliter convincendi, quae sunt: praenuntiatio prophetica, Scripturarum concordia, auctoritas scribentium, diligentia recipientium, rationabilitas contentorum et irrationabilitas singulorum errorum, Ecclesiae stabilitas, miraculorum limpiditas.	100. [Various Ways of Convicting Heretics] – Against all these together there are eight ways of rationally convicting them, which are: prophetic foretelling, the agreement of the Scriptures, the authority of the writers, the carefulness of the recipients, the 47 rationality of the contents and the irrationality of the separate errors, the firmness of the Church, the clear evidence of miracles.
101 De primo patet. Quoniam solus Deus praevidet naturaliter futura contingentia certitudinaliter, et non ab alio, ergo solus ipse vel ab ipso instructus potest ea certitudinaliter praedicere. Talium autem multa, praenuntiata in Scriptura, impleta sunt (patet consideranti libros prophetales), ƿ ex quibus ((non est dubium quin sequantur pauca quae restant)), secundum Gregorium in homilia quadam De adventu Domini. Istam viam tangit Augustinus XII De civitate cap. 10g: ((Vera esse praeterita ex his quae futura praenuntiavit, cum tanta veritate implentur, ostendit)).	101. [On Prophetic Foretelling] – About the first the matter is clear. Since only God naturally and not from someone else foresees future contingents with certitude, therefore only he, or someone instructed by him, can predict them with certitude. Now many such things, foretold in Scripture, have been fulfilled (it is clear to anyone who considers the prophetic books), of which “the few that remain there is no doubt but that they will follow,” according to Gregory in a certain homily On the Advent of the Lord. [40 Homilies on the Gospels I hom.1 n.1]. The same way is touched on by Augustine City of God XII ch.10: “That what he said in the past is true he shows from the future things he foretold when these with so much truth are fulfilled.”
102 De secundo, scilicet Scripturarum concordia, patet sic: in non evidentibus ex terminis, nec principia sic evidentia ex terminis habentibus, non consonant multi firmiter et infallibiliter, diversimode dispositi, nisi a causa superiori ipso intellectu inclinentur ad assensum; sed scriptores sacri Canonis, varie dispositi, et exsistentes in diversis temporibus, in talibus inevidentibus consonabant omnino . Hanc viam pertractat Augustinus XVIII De civitate cap. 42: ((Auctores ƿ nostri pauci esse debuerunt, ne prae multitudine vilescerent; nec ita sunt pauci, ut eorum non sit miranda consensio: neque enim in multitudine philosophorum facile quis invenerit, inter quos cuncta quae senserunt conveniant)), et hoc Augustinus probat ibi in exemplis. Maior enim assumpta non tantum probatur per exemplum de philosophis, ut videtur probare Augustinus, sed etiam per rationem: quia cum intellectus natus sit quantum ad assensum moveri ab obiecto evidente in se vel in alio, nihil aliud ab obiecto videtur posse talem assensum causare nisi virtualiter includat evidentiam obiecti; nam si nihil tale moveat intellectum, remanebit theologia sibi neutra. Nihil autem est tale de non evidentibus ex terminis nisi intellectus superior nostro; nihil autem intelligens superius homine potest hominem effective docere nisi Deus.	102. [On the Agreement of the Scriptures] – On the second, namely the agreement of the Scriptures, the matter is clear thus: in things that are not evident from the terms, nor have principles thus evident from the terms, there is no firm and infallible agreement among many persons diversely disposed unless they receive inclination to assent from a cause superior to their intellect itself; but the writers of the Sacred Canon, being variously disposed and existing at different times, were on such inevident things altogether in agreement. This way is dealt with by Augustine City of God XVIII ch.42 n.1: “Our authors needed to be few lest, by their great numbers, they should be rendered cheap; and they are not so few that their agreement is not marvelous; for neither might one find in a great number of philosophers that all they thought was in agreement among them,” and Augustine proves the fact there by examples. 48 For the assumed major premise is not only proved by the example of the philosophers, as Augustine seems to prove it, but also by reason; because since the intellect is, as far as assent is concerned, naturally moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing else besides the object seems able to cause such assent unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object; for if nothing of this sort moves the intellect, theology will remain neutral for it. Now there is nothing of this sort in respect of things not evident from the terms save an intellect superior to our own; but nothing intelligent superior to man can effectively move man save God.
103 $a Si dicatur hic quod posteriores, licet aliter dispositi quam priores, et aliis temporibus exsistentes, tamen habuerunt doctrinam ƿ praecedentium in scriptis, et acquieverunt credendo, sicut discipuli doctrinae magistrorum, et ita nihil scripserunt dissonum a prioribus, licet Deus non doceret hos et illos, - contra hoc videtur Augustinus obicere ubi prius, dicens de philosophis: ((Labore litteratorio monimenta suorum dogmatum reliquerunt)), quae discipuli legerunt, et licet in aliquibus essent assentientes prioribus, ut discipuli, aliqua tamen improbaverunt. Patet ibidem de Aristippo et Antisthene, qui ambo socratici fuerunt, tamen in aliquibus sibi contradixerunt; et quandoque magistro discipuli etiam contradixerunt, ut Aristoteles Platoni. Quomodo igitur non contradixissent posteriores nostri prioribus in aliquibus, si non habuissent communem doctorem, eorum intellectus ad eadem non evidentia inclinantem?	103. If it be said here that the later writers, although differently disposed than the earlier ones and existing at different times, did yet possess the doctrine of their predecessors in their writings and acquiesced in believing them, as disciples acquiesce in the teaching of their masters, and in this way wrote nothing that was discordant with the earlier writers, although God did not teach either the latter or the former, – Augustine in the earlier place seems to bring an objection against this when he says about the philosophers: “they left in their literary labor memorials of their doctrines,” which memorials their disciples read, and although in some things they, as disciples, assented to their predecessors, yet other things they rejected. The thing is clear in the same place [of Augustine] about Aristippus and Antisthenes, who were both Socratics, yet in some things they contradicted each other; and disciples have sometimes even contradicted their master, as Aristotle did Plato. How then did our later writers not contradict the earlier ones in some things if they had not had a common teacher inclining their intellect to the same inevident things?
104 Responsio: quia non evidentia tradiderunt priores, ideo posteriores non potuerunt eos per rationem improbare, et noluerunt eis discredere, nisi possent pro se rationem cogentem habere, reverentes eos ut magistros veraces; sed philosophi discipuli per rationem potuerunt magistros improbare, quia materia circa quam ƿ altercabantur potuit habere rationes sumptas ex terminis. - Exemplum: non ita contradicit discipulus historiographus magistro historiographo sicut philosophus philosopho, quia historiae de praeteritis non possunt esse evidentes, ut avertant discipulum a magistro, sicut possunt esse philosophicae rationes. Contra istud saltem est Ezechiel prophetans in Babylonia eo tempore quo Ieremias prophetavit in Iudaea. Cum non ambo sola illa dicerent quae a Moyse quasi magistro communi eorum potuerunt habere, sed etiam alia multa, in eis potuissent dissentire cum non essent evidentia ex terminis, nisi habuissent aliquem doctorem communem supra intellectum humanum. a$	104. Response: because the earlier writers handed on inevident things, therefore the later ones were not able to reject them by reason, and, if they were not able to get a cogent reason for themselves, they did not wish to disbelieve them, reverencing them as truthful masters; but the philosopher disciples were able by reason to reject their masters, because the matter about which they were disputing was capable of receiving reasons taken from the terms. – An example: a disciple in historiography does not contradict his master in historiography in the way that a philosopher contradicts a philosopher, because histories are not capable of being evident about the past, enough to turn a disciple from the master, in the way that philosophical reasons can do. Contrary to this is at least the fact of Ezekiel prophesying in Babylon at the time that Jeremiah prophesied in Judea. Since they both said not only the things that they could have had from Moses, their common master as it were, but also many other things, they would have been able to disagree in these things, since these were not evident from the terms, unless they had had some common teacher superior to the human intellect.
105 De tertio, scilicet auctoritate scribentium, sic patet: aut libri Scripturae sunt illorum auctorum quorum esse dicuntur, aut non. Si sic, cum damnent mendacium, praecipue in fide vel moribus, quomodo est verisimile eos fuisse mentitos dicendo 'haec dicit Dominus' si Dominus non esset locutus? Aut si dicis eos esse deceptos, non mentitos, vel propter lucrum mentiri voluisse, - contra, et primo contra primum, quod ƿ scilicet non fuerunt decepti. Dicit enim beatus apostolus Paulus: Scio hominem, ante annos quattuordecim etc., et subdit ibi, audisse se verba arcana, quae non licet homini loqui. Quae assertiones non videntur fuisse sine mendacio si asserens non fuit certus, quia asserere dubium tamquam verum certum, est mendacium, vel non longe a mendacio. Ex ista revelatione Pauli, et multis aliis, factis diversis sanctis, concluditur quod intellectus eorum non potuerunt induci ad assentiendum ita firmiter illis quorum notitiam non potuerunt habere ex naturalibus, sicut assenserunt, nisi ab agente supernaturali. - Contra secundum, scilicet quod propter lucrum mentiti sunt: quia pro illis ad quae voluerunt homines inducere ad credendum, tribulationes maximas sustinuerunt.	105. [On the Authority of the Writers] – On the third, namely the authority of the writers, the thing is clear thus: the books of Scripture either belong or do not belong to the authors whose books they are said to be. If they do belong, since they condemn lying, especially in faith and morals, how is it likely that, if the Lord had not spoken, the authors lied and said ‘thus saith the Lord’? Or if you say they were deceived, and not lying or wanting to lie for the sake of gain, – to the contrary, and first against the first, namely that they were not deceived. For the Blessed Apostle Paul says, 2 Corinthians 12.2: “I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago etc.,’ and he adds there that he heard, v.4: “unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.” Which assertions do not seem to have been without lie if the assertor was not certain, because to assert a doubtful thing as if it were a certain truth is a lie, or not far from a lie. From this revelation of Paul, and from many others made to diverse saints, the conclusion is drawn that their intellect could not have been induced to assent, as firmly as they did assent, to things of which they could not by natural resources have had knowledge, save by a supernatural agent. – Against the second, namely that they lied for the sake of gain; the answer is that they endured on behalf of the things they wanted to induce men to believe the greatest tribulations.
106 Si libri non sunt illorum, sed aliorum, hoc videtur inconveniens dicere, quia ita negabitur quicumque liber esse illius auctoris ƿ cuius dicitur esse. Quare enim soli isti falso adscripti sunt, auctoribus quorum non erant? - Praeterea, aut illi qui adscripserunt illos libros eis fuerunt christiani, aut non. Si non, non videtur quod voluerunt tales libros conscribere et aliis adscribere, et magnificare sectam cuius contrarium tenuerunt. Si fuerunt christiani, quomodo igitur illi christiani mendaciter eis tales adscripserunt, cum lex eorum damnet mendacium, sicut prius? Et propter idem, quomodo asserunt Deum locutum esse multa quae ibi narrantur, et hoc personis quibus libri intitulantur, si talia non acciderunt talibus personis? Quomodo etiam isti libri fuissent ita authentici, et divulgati esse talium auctorum, nisi et fuissent eorum, et auctores fuissent authentici? De isto dicit Richardus De Trinitate libro I cap. 2: ((A summae sanctitatis viris sunt nobis tradita)). Item, Augustinus libro XI De civitate cap. 3, loquens de Christo: ((Prius)), inquit, ((per prophetas, deinde per seipsum, postea per apostolos, quantum satis iudicavit, locutus, Scripturam condidit, quae canonica ƿ nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis)). Hoc ibi. Et Augustinus in Epistola ad Hieronymum prima (et habetur De consecra tione): ((Si ad sacras Scripturas admissa fuerint vel officiosa mendacia, quid in eis remanebit auctoritatis? )) Et idem ad eundem, epistola eadem: ((Solis eis Scripturarum libris)) etc. (et Henricus 7, 8 g) .	106. If the books do not belong to them but to others, this seems an inconsistent thing to say, because in this way any book at all will be denied to belong to the author whose book it is said to be. For why have these books alone been falsely ascribed to authors whose books they were not? – Besides, those who ascribed the books to them either were or were not Christians. If they were not, it does not seem that their wish was to write down such books and ascribe them to others and magnify a sect whose contrary they maintained. If they were Christians, how then did those Christians deceitfully ascribe such books to them since their law condemns lying, as noted before [n.105]? And for the same reason, how do they assert that God said the many things that are there narrated, and this to the persons whose names the books bear, if such things did not happen to such persons? How too would these books in this way have become authentic and widely published as belonging to such authors if they were in fact not theirs and the authors not genuine? On this point Richard [of St. Victor] says On the Trinity bk.1 ch.2: “By men of the greatest sanctity have they been delivered to us.” Again Augustine City of 51 God XI ch.3, speaking of Christ says: “Having spoken first through the prophets, then through himself, afterwards through the apostles, as much as he judged sufficient, he established a Scripture, which is called canonical, of the most eminent authority.” This in that place. And in his first epistle to Jerome [Epist. 40 ch.3 n.3] (and it is contained in On Consecration [Gratian, Decretum p.1 d.9 ch.7]) he writes: “If even useful lies have been admitted into the Sacred Scriptures, what authority will remain to them?” And the same to the same in the same epistle [Epist. 82 ch.1 n.3]: “Only in those books of the Scriptures, etc.” (and Henry of Ghent, Summa a.7 q.7 in corp.).
107 De quarto, scilicet diligentia recipientium, patet sic: aut nulli credes de contingenti quod non vidisti, et ita non credes mundum esse factum ante te, nec locum esse in mundo ubi non fueris, nec istum esse patrem tuum et illam matrem; et ista incredulitas destruit omnem vitam politicam. Si igitur vis alicui credere de contingenti quod tibi non est nec fuit evidens, maxime credendum est communitati, sive illis quae tota commuƿnitas approbat, et maxime quae communitas famosa et honesta cum maxima diligentia praecepit approbanda. Talis est Canon Scripturae. Tanta enim apud iudaeos sollicitudo fuit de libris habendis in Canone, et tanta apud christianos de libris recipiendis tamquam authenticis, quod de nulla scriptura habenda authentica tanta sollicitudo fuit inventa, praecipue cum tam sollemnes communitates de Scripturis illis curaverunt tamquam de continentibus necessaria ad salutem. De hoc Augustinus XVIII De civitate cap. 38: ((Quomodo scriptura Enoch, de qua Iudas in epistola sua facit mentionem, non recipitur in Canone, et multae aliae scripturae, de quibus fit mentio in libris Regum?)), ubi innuit quod sola illa scriptura recepta sit in Canone quam auctores, non sicut homines sed sicut prophetae, divina inspiratione scripserunt. Et ibidem, cap. 41: ((Illi Israelitae, quibus credita sunt eloquia Dei, nullo modo ƿ pseudoprophetas cum veris prophetis parilitate scientiae confuderunt, sed concordes sunt inter se atque in nullo dissentientes: sanctarum Litterarum veraces ab eis agnoscebantur et tenebantur auctores)).	107. [The Carefulness of the Recipients] – On the fourth, namely the carefulness of the recipients, the thing is clear thus: either you do not believe anyone about a contingent thing you have not seen, and so you do not believe that the world was made before you, or that there is a place in the world where you have not been, or that he there is your father and she here your mother; and this refusal to believe destroys the whole of political life. If then you wish to believe someone about a contingent thing that is not and was not evident to you, you should most of all believe the community, or those things that the whole community approves, and especially the things that a noteworthy and reputable community has taught with the greatest care should be approved. Such is the Canon of Scripture. For so great was the care of the Jews for the books to be kept in the Canon, and so great was the care of the Christians for the books to be received as authentic, that so great care about any writing to be held as authentic has not been found, especially since very solemn communities have cared for those Scriptures as for things containing what is necessary for salvation. About this Augustine City of God XVIII ch.38 says: “How is it that the writing of Enoch, of which Jude makes mention in his epistle, is 52 not contained in the Canon, nor many other writings of which mention is made in the books of Kings?”, where he indicates that only the writing that the authors wrote, not as men, but as prophets, by divine inspiration, was received into the Canon. And in the same place ch.41 n.3 he says: “The Israelites to whom were entrusted the sayings of God did not in any way confound the false prophets with the true in equality of knowledge, but they are in agreement among themselves and dissent in nothing; they recognized and held the authors of the Sacred Letters to be truthful.”
108 De quinto, scilicet rationabilitate contentorum, patet sic: quid rationabilius quam Deum tamquam finem ultimum super omnia debere diligi, et proximum sicut se ipsum? - id est 'ad quod se', secundum beatum Gregorium; in quibus duobus praeceptis universa lex pendet et prophetae, Matth. 22. Item, Matth. 7: Hoc facias alii etc. Ex istis quasi ex principiis practicis alia practica in Scripturis sequuntur tradita, honesta et rationi consona, sicut de eorum rationabilitate patere potest singulatim cuilibet pertractanti de praeceptis, consiliis et sacramentis, quia in omnibus videtur esse quasi quaedam explicatio legis naturae, quae scripta est in cordibus nostris. Hoc de moribus. De hoc Augustinus, De civitate libro II cap. 28: ((Nihil turpe aut flagiƿtiosum spectandum imitandumque proponitur, ubi veri Dei aut praecepta insinuantur, aut mirabilia narrantur, aut dona laudantur, aut beneficia postulantur)). De credibilibus patet quod nihil credimus de Deo quod aliquam imperfectionem importat; immo si quid credimus verum esse, magis attestatur perfectioni divinae quam eius oppositum. Patet de Trinitate personarum, de incarnatione Verbi, et huiusmodi. Nihil enim credimus incredibile, quia tunc incredibile esset mundum ea credere, sicut deducit Augustinus De civitate XXII cap. 5; mundum tamen ea credere non est incredibile, quia hoc videmus. De hac lege et honestate christianorum patet per Augustinum De utilitate credendi g: ((Vulgus marium et feminarum)) etc.	108. [On the Rationality of the Contents] – On the fifth, namely the rationality of the contents, the thing is clear thus: what is more rational than that God as ultimate end “should be loved above all things, and one’s neighbor as oneself”? – that is, ‘as to what one wants for oneself’ according to Blessed Gregory [40 Homilies on the Gospels, 2 hom.27 n.1]; “on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,” Matthew 22.40. Again Matthew 7.12: “this do ye even so to others etc.” From these practical principles, as it were, follow other practical principles handed on in the Scriptures, principles honorable and consonant with reason, as can be seen as to their rationality by anybody who one by one examines the precepts, the counsels, and the sacraments; because in all of these there seems to be, as it were, a sort of explication of the law of nature, which “is written in our hearts” [Romans 2.15]. This about morals. On this point Augustine says, City of God II ch.28: “Nothing base or shameful is proposed for consideration and imitation when of the True God either precepts are insinuated or miracles narrated or gifts praised or benefits requested.” About things for belief it is plain that we believe nothing about God which imports any imperfection; nay rather, if there is anything we believe to be true, it attests 53 more to the divine perfection than to the opposite. The thing is plain about the Trinity of persons, about the incarnation of the Word, and the like. For we believe nothing incredible, because then it would be incredible that the word believes them, as Augustine concludes in City of God XXII ch.5; yet that the world believes them is not incredible, because we see it. This law and integrity of Christians are clear in Augustine On the Utility of Believing ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.”
109 De sexto, scilicet irrationabilitate singulorum errorum, patet sic. Quid pagani pro idolatria sua adducent, colentes opera manuum suarum, in quibus nihil est numinis, sicut satis ostendunt philosophi? - Quid saraceni, illius vilissimi ƿ porci Mahometi discipuli, pro suis scripturis allegabunt, exspectantes pro beatitudine quod porcis et asinis convenit, scilicet gulam et coitum? Quam promissionem despiciens - qui fuit quasi illius sectae - Avicenna, IX Metaphysicae, alium finem quasi perfectiorem et homini magis convenientem ponens inquit: ((Lex nostra, quam dedit Mahometus, ostendit dispositionem felicitatis et miseriae quae sunt secundum corpus, et est alia promissio quae apprehenditur intellectu)). Et sequitur ibi: ((Sapientibus multo magis cupiditas fuit ad consequendum hanc felicitatem quam corporum, quae quamvis daretur eis, tamen non attenderunt, nec appretiati sunt eam comparatione felicitatis quae est coniuncta primae veritati)). - Quid iudaei Novum Testamentum damnant, quod in suo Veteri Testamento promittitur, ut ostendit Apostolus ad Hebraeos? Et quam insipidae sunt eorum caeremoniae sine Christo! Item, Christum advenisse et ita Novum Testamentum ab eo proƿmulgatum sicut authenticum fore acceptandum, prophetiae eorum ostendunt: Non auferetur, inquit Iacob, sceptrum etc. (in Genesi), et ipse erit exspectatio gentium; similiter illud Danielis: Cum venerit Sanctus sanctorum, cessabit unctio vestra. - Quid etiam asinini manichaei fabulantur 'primum malum', cum ipsi etiam etsi non 'primum', tamen valde essent mali! nonne viderunt omne ens in quantum ens bonum esse? nonne etiam in Novo Testamento potuerunt videre Vetus Testamentum esse authenticum, et approbatum?	109. [The Irrationality of Errors] – On the sixth, namely the irrationality of the separate errors, the thing is plain thus. What will the pagans introduce for their idolatry, worshipping as they do the works of their own hands, wherein there is nothing of the divine, as is shown sufficiently by philosophers [e.g. Aristotle Metaphysics 12.8.1084a38-b10]? What will the Saracens, disciples of that most worthless swine Mohammed, allege for their scriptures, expecting for beatitude, as they do, what befits swine and asses, namely sated gullet and coitus [e.g. Koran, sura 37 vv.42-50]? Which promise Avicenna, who was as though of that sect, despises in his Metaphysics IX ch.7 106vb, and he sets down another end as more perfect and more fitting to man when he says: “Our law, which Mohammed gave us, displays the disposition for a happiness and a misery that are in accord with the body, and there is another promise that is apprehended by the intellect.” And there follows there: “The eagerness of the wise was much more to obtain this felicity than that of bodies, which, although it were given them, yet did they not attend to it, nor did they value it in comparison with the felicity that is conjoined to the first truth.” What of the Jews who condemn the New Testament, which is promised in their Old Testament as the Apostle shows in his epistle to the Hebrews? And how tasteless are their ceremonies without Christ [Hebrews 9.1-28]! Again, that Christ has come and that thus the New Testament he promulgated as authentic would be something one should accept is shown by their prophecies: “The scepter,” says Jacob, “shall not depart from Judah…and for him shall the Gentiles wait” Genesis 49.10; likewise the verse of Daniel 9.24: “When the Holy of holies has come, your anointing will cease.” – What also of the asinine Manicheans who invent the fable of an ‘evil first principle’, although even they themselves, while not a ‘first’, were yet very evil! Surely they saw that every being, insofar as it is, is good? Surely too they could have seen in the New Testament that the Old Testament is authentic and approved?
110 Quid singuli alii haeretici, qui unum verbum Scripturae male intellexerunt, secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 69 a. ((Non potest)), inquit, ((oriri error qui palliatur nomine chriƿstiano nisi de Scripturis non intellectis)); et hoc ideo, quia antecedentia et consequentia non contulerunt. Unde ibidem, b: ((Solet circumstantia Scripturarum illuminare sententiam)). Nec etiam alia loca Scripturae contulerunt. Unde haereses ortae sunt per se legendo, quae conferendo repulsae sunt, quia conferentes diversas sententias adduxerunt, quae ex se invicem mutuo inveniri potuerunt qualiter essent intelligendae. Contra istos est illud verbum Augustini in libro Contra epistolam Fundamenti: ((Non crederem)), inquit Augustinus, ((Evangelio, nisi quia Ecclesiae catholicae credo)). Ergo irrationabile est aliquid Canonis recipere et aliquid non, cum Ecclesia catholica, cui credendo Canonem recipio, recipiat totum aequaliter ut certum. - Item, doctrinae philosophorum aliquid irrationabile continent, prout de politiis diversis, ordinatis a philosophis diversis, probat Aristoteles II Politicae. Sed etiam et politia sua in quibusdam est irrationabilis, sicut patet ex solutione quaestionis praecedentis. ƿ	110. What of the other individual heretics who have understood one word of Scripture badly, according to Augustine 38 Questions q.69 n.1: “An error cloaked under the Christian name cannot arise except from Scriptures badly understood;” and for this reason, that they did not collect the antecedents and the consequents. Hence in the same place [q.69 n.2] Augustine says: “The circumstance in the Scriptures is wont to throw light on the meaning.” Nor did they even collect the other places of Scripture. Hence things read on their own gave rise to heresies that when read together repulsed them, because those collecting the diverse statements brought together the things that were, by their mutual interconnection, able to disclose how those statements were to be understood. Against them is the word of Augustine in his book Against the Letter of Fundamentus ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel,” he says, “save because I believe the Catholic Church.” Therefore it is irrational to accept one part of the Canon and not another, since the Catholic Church, by belief in which I accept the Canon, accepts as certain the whole equally. – Again, the doctrines of the philosophers contain something irrational, as is proved by Aristotle in Politics bk. 2 about the diverse polities arranged by diverse philosophers. But even his own polity too is in certain things irrational, as is clear from the solution of the previous question [n.67].
111 De septimo, scilicet Ecclesiae stabilitate, patet, quoad Caput per illud Augustini De utilitate credendi g: ((Dubitabimus nos eiusdem Ecclesiae credere gremio, quae usque ad confessionem generis humani ab Apostolica Sede per successiones episcoporum, frustra haereticis circumlatrantibus, culmen ƿ auctoritatis obtinuit?)) Et parum post: ((Quid est aliud ingratum esse ori Dei, quam tanto labore praedicatae auctoritati velle resistere?)) Unde Gamaliel, Act. 5: Si est ex hominibus consilium hoc aut opus, dissolvetur; si vero est ex Deo, non poteritis dissolvere, ne forte et Deo repugnare videamini. Et Luc. 22 ait Dominus ad Petrum: Ego rogavi pro te, ut non deficiat fides tua, et tu aliquando conversus, confirma fratres tuos. - Firmitas Ecclesiae in membris patet per illud Augustini De utilitate credendi g: ((Vulgus marium et feminarum)) etc. Similem sententiam dicit Augustinus Contra epistolam Fundamenti. Quid enim tantam multitudinem, ad peccatum pronam, ad legem contrariam carni et sanguini servandam induceret nisi Deus?	111. [On the Firmness of the Church] – On the seventh, namely the firmness of the Church, the thing is clear as to the Head of it from the remark of Augustine On the Utility of Believing ch.17 n.35: “Will we doubt to trust to the bosom of the same Church which has, in the continuous confession of the human race, obtained by the Apostolic See the summit of authority through its succession of bishops, though the heretics bark around it in vain,?” And a little later: “What else is displeasing to the face of God than to want to resist with so much effort his authority foretold?” Hence Gamaliel said, Acts 5.38-39: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.” And in Luke 22.32 the Lord says to Peter: “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou are converted, strengthen thy brethren.” – The firmness of the Church in its members is clear from the remark of Augustine On the Utility of Believing ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.” [cf. n.108]. Augustine states a like opinion in Against the Letter of Fundamentus ch.4 n.5. For what save God might induce so great a multitude, prone to sin, to keep a law contrary to flesh and blood?
112 Confirmatur, quia secta iudaeorum non manet in vigore, sicut contra eos obicit Augustinus in illo sermone (dominica quarta de Adventu) ((Vos, inquam, convenio, o iudaei!)). ƿ Si obiciatur de permanentia sectae Mahometi, respondeo: illa incepit plusquam sexcentis annis post legem Christi, et in brevi, Domino volente, finietur, quia multum debilitata est anno Christi millesimo trecentesimo, et eius cultores multi mortui, et plurimi sunt fugati; et prophetia dicitur apud eos esse quod secta eorum est finienda.	112. There is confirmation in that the sect of the Jews does not remain in vigor, as Augustine objects against them in the sermon [Ps.-Augustine, Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians ch.11]: “Against you, I say, O Jews, I bring my charge!” If an objection be made about the permanence of the sect of Mohammed, I reply: that sect began more than six hundred years after the law of Christ, and in a short time, if the Lord will, it shall end, because it was much weakened in the 1300th year of Christ, and many of its worshippers are dead and very many put to flight; and a prophecy is said to exist among them that their sect must end.
113 De octavo, scilicet miraculorum claritate vel limpiditate, sic patet: Deus non potest esse testis falsus; sed ipse Deus, invocatus a praedicante Scripturam ut ostenderet doctrinam eius esse veram, fecit aliquod opus sibi proprium, ac per hoc testificatus est illud esse verum quod ille praedicavit. Confirmatur per Richardum I De Trinitate cap. 2: ((Domine, ƿ si est error, a te decepti sumus, nam confirmata sunt tantis signis facta tua, quae non nisi a te fieri possunt)).	113. [On the clear Evidence of Miracles] – On the eighth, namely the clearness and evidence of miracles, the thing is plain thus: God cannot be a false witness; but God himself, when invoked by a preacher of the Scripture to show that its doctrine was true, performed some work proper to himself, and thereby bore witness that what he preached was true. There is a confirmation from Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity I ch.2: “Lord, if it is an error, we have been by you deceived, for your deeds have been confirmed by signs so great that they can only have been done by you.”
114 Quod si dicatur miracula non fuisse facta, aut etiam non testificantia veritatem, quia etiam Antichristus faciet miracula, - contra primum potest dici illa sententia Augustini De civitate XXII cap. 5 g: ((Si ista miracula facta esse non credunt, hoc nobis unum grande miraculum sufficit quod iam orbis terrarum sine ullis miraculis credit)). Nota valde illud miraculum et illud capitulum, quia si quod credimus dicatur incredibile esse, non minus est incredibile ((homines)), inquit, ((ignobiles et infimos, paucissimos, imperitos, rem ita incredibilem tam efficaciter mundo, et in illo etiam mundo doctis persuadere potuisse)), mundus ut illud credat, sicut iam credidisse videmus, nisi per illos aliqua miracula fierent, per quae mundus ad credendum induceretur. Unde subdit ibi: ((Propterea mundus numero exiguo ignobilium, infimorum, imperitorum hoƿminum credidit, quia in tam contemptibilibus testibus multo mirabilius divinitas se ipsa persuasit)). Quid enim incredibilius quam quod ad legem contrariam carni et sanguini, doctores pauci, pauperes et rudes, plurimos potentes et sapientes converterent? Quod specialiter patet de multis prudentissimis, primo fidei rebellibus, post conversis: ut de Paulo, prius persecutore, postea gentium doctore; de Augustino, prius aliqualiter per manichaeos seducto, postea doctore catholico; de Dionysio, prius philosopho, postea Pauli discipulo; de Cypriano, prius mago, postea episcopo christianissimo, et aliis innumeris. Contra idem secundo potest dici illud Augustini X De civitate cap. 1 8a: ((An dicet aliquis ista non fuisse facta? Potest ƿ etiam dicere deos non curare mortalia)) etc. Et ibidem, g, de eodem: ((Si libris magicis sive theurgicis credunt, cur illis Litteris nolunt, ista esse facta, quibus)) etc. Contra idem tertio, quod quaedam facta non nisi a nimis protervientibus negari possunt, ut sunt miracula facta a Silvestro coram Constantino, tam in curatione leprae eius, quam postea in disputatione eius contra iudaeos, quae facta tamquam celebria mundum non latuerunt.	114. But if it be said that miracles have not been performed, or also that they do not testify to the truth, because even Antichrist will perform miracles, – against the first point can be stated the opinion of Augustine City of God XXII ch.5: “If they do not believe that these miracles were done, this one great miracle is sufficient for us, that now without any miracles the whole world believes.” Note well the miracle and the chapter, because if what we believe is said to be incredible, no less incredible, he says, is that “men of low birth, weak, few in numbers, unskilled, were able so effectively to persuade the world, and even the learned in the world, of a thing so incredible,” such that the world does believe it, as now we see it has believed [cf. n.108], unless it was that some miracles were done by those men, whereby the world was induced to believe. Hence he there subjoins: “For this reason did the world believe a tiny number of low-born, weak, unskilled men, because more marvelously in such contemptible witnesses did divinity itself persuade them.” For what is more incredible than that a few teachers, poor and uneducated, should convert many powerful and wise men to a law opposed to flesh and blood? Which fact is especially clear in the case of the many very prudent men, first fighting against the faith, afterwards converts; as about Paul, first a persecutor, afterwards teacher of the Gentiles; about Augustine, first in some way seduced by the Manicheans, afterwards a Catholic doctor; of Dionysius, first a philosopher, afterwards a disciple of Paul; of Cyprian, first a magician, afterwards a most Christian bishop, and about many others. Against the same can be said, second, the remark of Augustine The City of God X ch.18: “Or will someone say that these miracles were not done? He can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.” And in the same place on the same point, “If they believe magical or theurgical books , why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which…?” Against the same, third, is that some of the things done cannot be denied save by the most shameless, as are the miracles performed by Sylvester in the presence of Constantine, both in curing his leprosy and afterwards in his disputation against the Jews, which deeds, being famous, have not been hid from the world.
115 Contra secundum dici potest quod si aliquis invocatus in testem signum consuetum testificationis permittat adduci et praesens non contradicat, talis taciturnitas non stat cum veritate perfecta; miraculum autem est tale signum Dei ut testis; igitur si permittat miracula fieri a daemonibus, non contradicens, annuntians videlicet illa non esse testimonia sua, non videtur esse perfecte verax, quod est impossibile. Et per hoc ad illud de ƿ Antichristo, quia praedixit illa miracula facienda non esse testimonia veritatis, sicut patet Matth. 24 et ad Thess. 2. Item, contra idem, est differentia mirabilium quae fiunt a Deo et quae fiunt a diabolo, de qua differentia tractat Augustinus in libro De utilitate credendi: ((Miraculum)), inquit, ((voco quidquid arduum supra spem vel facultatem mirantis apparet; quaedam solam faciunt admirationem, quaedam magnam gratiam benevolentiamque conciliant)), qualia fuerunt miracula Christi; et per tractat ibi diffuse.	115. Against the second point it can be said that if anyone, after being summoned as a witness, should permit some customary sign of bearing witness to be adduced and, although present, should not contradict it, such silence does not cohere with perfect truthfulness; but a miracle is such a sign of God as witness; therefore if he should permit miracles to be performed by demons and not contradict them, namely by declaring that they are not his testimonies, he does not seem to be perfectly truthful, which is impossible. And hereby is the response to what is said of Antichrist, because God predicted that the miracles to be done were not testimonies of the truth, as is clear in Matthew 24.24 and 2 Thessalonians 2.8-9. Again, against the same point is the difference in the miracles performed by God and those performed by the devil, which difference Augustine treats of in his book On the Utility of Believing ch.16 n.34: “I call a marvel [miracle],” he says, “anything that appears difficult beyond the hope or capacity of the one who marvels; some marvels only cause admiration, others unite great grace and goodwill,” of which sort were the miracles of Christ; and he deals with the matter there extensively.
116 Item, contra utrumque dici potest quod sunt aliqua miracula, facta in lege christiana, in quibus non potest esse deceptio an sint facta, nec quin sint testimonia veritatis, quia a Deo facta: ut raptus Pauli et revelatio contingentium futurorum. Primum patet: quia impossibile est aliquem decipi circa se videre Dei essentiam, igitur impossibile fuit Paulum credere se videre divinam essentiam nisi illam videret; sed hoc asserit de se II Cor. 2, secundum expositionem sanctorum; igitur illud fuit vere factum, et non tantum apparenter. ƿ Probatio primi antecedentis, quia nullus potest decipi circa primum principium aliquod - credendo se intelligere cum non intelligat tale principium - quod non constaret ex terminis apprehensis quod esset principium et quod non; igitur multo magis non potest decipi circa Deum visum. Consequentia ista patet, quia plus distat visio Dei ab intellectione cuiuscumque obiecti, etiam quantum ad perceptionem intellectus viatoris, quam distet intellectio principii complexi ab intellectione alicuius non principii. Item, qualiter crederet intellectus se quietari si non quietaretur? Nonne poterit cognoscere inclinationem suam ad verum quod non videt? Si credit se videre Deum, credit se quietari in Deo; si non videt, non quietatur. ((Stultius)), ait Augustinus, ((nihil dici potest quam quod anima falsa opinione sit beata)), X De civitate ƿ cap. 4. Secundum, scilicet quod hoc a solo Deo fieri potuerit, est manifestum, quia nulla creatura potest animam beatificare, nec simpliciter nec ad tempus.	116. Again, against both points it can be said that there are some miracles, performed in the Christian law, wherein there can be no deceit whether they have been performed, nor that they are testimonies of truth, because they were performed by God; like the rapture of Paul and the revelation of future contingents. The first claim is clear: because it is impossible for anyone to be deceived about his seeing the essence of God, therefore it was impossible for Paul to believe he saw the divine essence unless he did see it; but this he asserts of himself in 2 Corinthians 12.2-4, according to the exposition of the saints; therefore it happened truly and not in appearance only. The proof of the first antecedent is that no one can be deceived about some first principle – by believing he understands such a principle when he does not understand it – because it would not be clear from the apprehended terms what was a principle and what was not; therefore much more can one not be deceived about seeing God. The consequence is plain, because the vision of God is more distant from the understanding of any object at all, even as to the perception of the intellect of the wayfarer, than is the understanding of a propositional principle distant from the understanding of any nonprinciple. Again, how would the intellect believe it was at rest if it was not at rest [cf. 1 d.2 p.2 q.2 n.31]? Surely he would be able to recognize that he had an inclination toward a truth that he does not see? If he believes he sees God, he believes he is at rest in God; if he does not see, he is not at rest. “Nothing more stupid,” says Augustine, “can be said than that a soul with a false opinion might be blessed,” City of God XI ch.4 n.2. A second point, namely that this could only be done by God, is manifest, because no creature can beatify the soul, either simply or for a time [cf. 1 d. 35 q. un. n.13].
117 Secundum patet ex multis prophetiis in utroque Testamento. Unde contra falsa miracula Antichristi posset sibi obici, saltem de istis duobus, hoc modo: si tu es Deus, fac me videre nude divinam essentiam, et post visionem memoriam certam habere visionis, et certitudinem quia illa fuit visio divinae essentiae nude, et tunc credam tibi; item, si tu es Deus, dic mihi quid faciam vel quid cogitabo vel appetam tali die vel hora. Et huiusmodi viae efficaciam, ex miraculis, innuit Salvator, Ioan. 5: Opera quae ego facio, illa testimonium perhibent de me; si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite.	117. The second claim [n.116, miracles as testimonies of truth, like the revelation of future contingents] is plain from many prophecies in both Testaments. Hence against the false miracles of Antichrist an objection, at least as to these two miracles, can be made to him in this way: if you are God, make me to see bare the divine essence, and to have, after the vision, a sure memory of the vision and a certitude that it was the vision bare of the divine essence, and then I will believe you; again, if you are God, tell me what I will do or what I will think or desire on such a day or at such an hour. And the efficacy of this sort of way, the way of miracles, is indicated by the Savior in John 5. 36: “The works that I do bear witness of me,” 10.38: “if you do not wish to believe me, believe the works.”
118 $a Nono quoque loco adduci potest testimonium eorum qui foris sunt. Iosephus in libro XVIII Antiquitatum pulcherrimum testimonium ponit de Christo, ubi inter ƿ alia de Iesu scripta ait. ((Christus hic erat)); ubi etiam veram eius doctrinam et resurrectionem a mortuis confitetur. - Item, de prophetia Sibyllae; notatur De civitate libro XVIII cap. 23. - Item, Contra epistolam Fundamenti, nota quomodo singuli haeretici de catholicis inquisiti, non ad suos mittunt sed ad veros catholicos, quasi etiam illi soli ab omnibus, etiam haereticis, catholici nominentur.	118. [On the Testimony of Non-believers] – In ninth place too can be adduced the testimony of those who were without [sc. the Church]. Josephus in Antiquities of the Jews XVIII ch.4 n.3 sets down a very beautiful testimony about Christ, where among other things written about Christ he says: “This man was Christ;” where he also confesses his true doctrine and resurrection from the dead. Again, about the prophecy of the Sibyl; it is noted in Augustine City of God XVIII ch.23 n .1. Again, Against the Letter of Fundamentus ch.4 n.5, note how individual heretics send inquirers about Catholics, not to their own people, but to true Catholics, as though they alone indeed are by everyone called Catholics, including by heretics.
119 Decimo et ultimo potest addi quod Deus non deest quaerentibus toto corde salutem. Multi enim diligentissime inquirentes salutem ad hanc sectam conversi sunt; et quanto ferventiores facti sunt inquirendo, tanto in hac secta amplius confirmati, subitoque in ea paenitentes, de malitia ad vitam ƿ bonam mutati sunt; tertio quoque, pro ea plures in magna exsultatione spiritus tristitias sunt perpessi. Quae non videntur probabilia, nisi Deus hanc sectam, sacrae Scripturae innitentem, singulariter approbaret et ordinaret ad salutem.	119. [On the Efficacy of Promises] – Tenth and last can be added that God does not fail those who seek salvation with all their heart. For many most diligent inquirers after salvation have been converted to this sect [the Catholic]; and the more fervent they became in inquiry, the more confirmed they were in this sect, and the more suddenly therein have they been changed, in repenting of their malice, to goodness of life; third, too, many have in great exultation of spirit suffered sorrows on its behalf. Which things do not seem probable did not God especially approve this sect, resting as it does on Sacred Scripture, and ordain it for salvation.
120 Habito igitur contra haereticos quod doctrina Canonis vera est, videndum est secundo an sit necessaria et sufficiens viatori ad consequendum suum finem. Dico quod ipsa tradit quis sit finis hominis in particulari, quia visio et fruitio Dei, et hoc quantum ad circumstantias appetibilitatis eius; puta quod ipsa habebitur post resurrectionem ab homine immortali, in anima simul et corpore, sine fine. Ipsa etiam determinat quae sunt necessaria ad finem, et quod illa sufficiant, quia illa mandata, Si vis, inquit, ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata (in Matthaeo), de quibus habetur in Exodo; horum etiam explicatio et quantum ad credenda et quantum ad operanda explicatur in diversis locis Scripturae. Proprietates etiam substantiarum immaterialium in ea traduntur, quantum possibile est et utile viatori nosse. a$ ƿ	120. Having established, then, against heretics that the doctrine of the Canon is true, one must see second whether it is necessary and sufficient to the wayfarer for attaining his end. I say that the Canon hands on what is the end of man in particular, that it is the vision and enjoyment of God, and this as far as concerns the circumstances of its desirability; to wit, that it will be possessed after the resurrection by man immortal in soul as well as in body, endlessly. The Canon also determines the things necessary for the end, and that these are sufficient because commanded, “If thou wilt enter into life,” says our Lord, Matthew 19.17, “keep the commandments,” about which there is the statement in 62 Exodus 20.1-17; explication is given also of these, as to what to believe and what to do, in diverse places of Scripture. The properties too of immaterial substances are handed on in the Canon, to the extent it is possible and useful for the wayfarer to know them.
121 Ad primam rationem. Ad minorem respondeo quod lex naturae paucioribus fuit contenta, quae memorialiter per patres ad filios devenerunt. Illi etiam magis erant praediti in naturalibus, et ideo modica doctrina inspirata potuit eis sufficere. Vel aliter dicendum est ad istud et ad illud de lege Moysi, quod ordinatus Scripturae progressus ostendit eius decorem. Patet per Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 53 c.	121. To the principal reasons. To the first reason [n.95]. To the minor I reply that the law of nature was content with fewer things, which were passed down by memory from fathers to sons. Those men were also more endowed in natural powers, and therefore a modicum of inspired doctrine was able to suffice them. Or it should otherwise be said to this instance, and to the one about the law of Moses, that the ordered progress of Scripture showed the fittingness of it. The thing is made plain by Augustine 83 Questions q.53 n.4.
122 Ad secundum dico quod dulcius capitur quod latet sub aliqua sententia litterali quam si esset expresse dictum: et ideo ad devotionem confert, illa quae expressa sunt in Novo Testamento, sub figura velata fuisse in Veteri, hoc quoad caeremonias; sed quoad historias ambo sunt exempla legis declarativa. Similiter ex toto processu Scripturae patet ordinata gubernatio respectu hominis et totius creaturae. ƿ	122. To the second reason [n.96] I say that one grasps more delightfully a thing that lies hid under some literal statement than if it were said expressly; and for this reason the fact that what is express in the New Testament was veiled under figures in the Old contributes to devotion; and this as to the ceremonies; but as to the histories, both these and the ceremonies are examples declarative of the law. Likewise, from the whole progress of Scripture is made plain an ordered government with respect to man and the whole creation.
123 Ad tertium, Origenes in homilia De arca Noe: ((In Scriptura super hoc opportunum videtur habitum silentium, de quo sufficienter consequentiae ipsius ratio doceret)). Unde multae veritates necessariae non exprimuntur in sacra Scriptura, etsi ibi virtualiter contineantur, sicut conclusiones in principiis; circa quarum investigationem utilis fuit labor doctorum et expositorum. Si obicias, multa in actibus humanis sunt dubia utrum sunt peccata mortalia vel non, etiam suppositis omnibus doctrinis doctorum et expositorum, - respondeo: non est dubia via salutis, quia a talibus tamquam a periculosis debet homo se custodire, ne dum se exponit periculo incidat in peccatum. Quod si voluerit quaerere salutem, sed non curando exponat se illi periculo ubi forte ex genere actus non esset peccatum mortale, tamen peccabit mortaliter, se ipsum tali periculo exponendo, sicut alias tangetur. ƿ	123. To the third reason [n.97], Origen in his homily On Noah’s Ark [Homilies on Genesis, hom. 2 n.1]: “In Scripture silence seems to have been considered appropriate on this point, which would be sufficiently taught by the nature of the consequence itself.” Hence many necessary truths are not express in Sacred Scripture, although they are virtually contained there as conclusions in the principles; the labor of doctors and expositors has been useful for the investigation of these things. If you object that about many things in human acts it is doubtful whether they are mortal sins or not, even after one supposes all the teachings of the doctors and expositors, – I reply: the way of salvation is not in doubt, because a man ought to guard himself from such doubtful things as from things dangerous, lest, while he is exposing himself to the danger, he fall into sin. But if someone wants to seek salvation yet carelessly exposes himself to the danger, although there would perhaps, by the nature of the act, be no mortal sin, nevertheless he will sin mortally by exposing himself to such danger, as will be touched on elsewhere [4 d.5 q.3 n.2; d.30 q.1 nn.4-5].