Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D1/Q1

• I. Opinion of Henry of Ghent
• II. Scotus' own Solution
• A. The First and Perfect Causality is Necessarily in the Three Persons
• B. On Causality in regard to all Causables as to their Being in a certain Respect
• C. Whether in an Absolute Person, if posited, there could be Perfect Causality with Respect to all Causables
• D. Conclusion
• III. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
ƿ	Question One: Whether Primary Causality with Respect to all Causables is of Necessity in the Three Persons
1 Circa secundum librum, in quo tractat Magister de Deo quantum ad causalitatem eius primariam, et hoc specialiter circa causalitatem triplicis causae quam habet respectu creaturae, quaero, et primo circa distinctionem primam: utrum primaria causalitas respectu omnium causabilium de necessitate sit in tribus personis; et intelligo 'respectu omnium causabilium' in quocumque esse, et hoc de necessitate, ita quod non possit esse nisi in tribus personis. ƿ	1. About the second book, in which the Master treats of God as to his primary causality, and this specifically of the causality of the triple cause that he has in respect of creatures, I ask the following questions - and first about the first distinction: whether primary causality with respect to all causable things is of necessity in the three persons; and I understand 'with respect to all causable things' in any existence [sc. real and in a certain respect], and this of necessity, such that it cannot be save in the three persons.
2 Quod non, arguitur: Richardus De Trinitate libro III cap. 16: ((Si tantum)) - inquit - ((esset una persona, adhuc esset in ea plenitudo sapientiae et potentiae)); ergo posset producere omne producibile.	2. That it is not is argued as follows: Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity bk.3 ch.16: "If it were only in one person, there would still be in that person the fullness of wisdom and power." Therefore that one person could produce everything producible.
3 Secundo sic: actio est suppositi, igitur plurium suppositorum sunt plures actiones; ergo trium personarum non potest esse una actio, - igitur nec una potentia activa nec una causalitas, quia ((cuius est potentia, eius est et actus)), secundum Philosophum De somno et vigilia.	3. Second as follows: action belongs to a supposit, therefore in the case of several supposits there are several actions; therefore there cannot be one action of three persons, -therefore not one power or one causality either, because "what the power belongs to, that the act also belongs to," according to the Philosopher On Sleep 1.454a8.
4 Tertio sic: 'sicut principium operationis ad principium, ita operatio ad operationem' (haec propositio patet in sensitiva et intellectiva et volitiva, et actibus earum); sed principium causationis causabilium est aliquid essentiale (quia commune tribus), et tale prius est aliquo modo notionali sive personali; ergo et actio actione. ƿ	4. The third as follows: 'as the principle of operation is to the principle [sc. as the principle of operation of one power is related to the principle of operation of a second power], so the operation is to the operation' (this proposition is plain in the sensitive, intellective, and volitional powers and their acts); but the principle of causation of causable things is something essential (because it is common to the three), therefore it is in some way prior to what is notional and personal; therefore so is action prior to action.
	I. Opinion of Henry of Ghent
5 Hic est opinio Henrici, Quodlibet VI quaestione 2, - quaere eam ibi.	5. [Statement of the opinion] - There is here the opinion of Henry, Quodlibet VI q.2 - look at it there.
6 Contra ipsum arguitur multipliciter: Primo enim videtur sequi quod Pater formaliter non creat. Nihil enim formaliter agit, quod non est in actu secundum illud ƿquod est proxima ratio agendi; Pater non est formaliter in actu Verbo, nec Spiritu Sancto. Sed secundum istam positionem Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus sunt proxima ratio agendi et causandi, sicut intellectio et volitio sunt rationes remotae causandi; ergo Pater non creat formaliter et proximo.	6. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion there is a threefold argument: For first it seems to follow [sc. from Henry saying that 'the three are with respect to the essence one formal and, as it were, proximate principle of the act of creating, and the essence is the remote principle'] that the Father does not formally create. For nothing formally acts which is not in act according to the proximate reason for acting; the Father is not formally in act with the Word or with the Holy Spirit. But according to this position the Word and Holy Spirit are the proximate reason for acting and causing, as understanding and volition are the remote reasons for causing; therefor the Father does not formally and proximately create.
7 Et si dicas quod omnes creant 'quia omnes habent unum verbum in intellectu suo quo perficitur intellectio essentialis (licet illud verbum sit a solo Patre dicente vice omnium), et omnes habent unum amorem in voluntate communi (licet ille amor spiretur a Patre et Filio simul vice omnium trium)', - contra istud arguo sic: quaero quomodo Pater habet istam notitiam genitam? Non formaliter (secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 2), sed habet sicut correlativum, sicut producens habet productum; sed sic haƿbens non est in actu formaliter eo quod habetur; ergo nec formaliter agit illa actione respectu cuius habitum - sive illud quod habetur - est ratio formalis agendi.	7. And if you say that they all create 'because they all have one word in their intellect by which essential intellection is perfected (although that word is only from the Father who speaks in turn for all), and all have one love in the common will (although that love is inspirited by the Father and Son together in turn for all)', - against this I argue thus: I ask how the Father has this generated knowledge. Not formally (according to Augustine On the Trinity bk.7 ch.2), but he has it as a correlative, as the producer has the produced; but in this way the haver is not in act formally with what is had by him; therefore he does not formally act by the action with respect to which the had - or that which is had - is the formal reason for acting.
8 Videtur etiam ultra sequi quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non creent, quia communiter ratio formalis agendi non agit illa actione respectu cuius est formalis ratio agendi.	8. It seems further to follow that the Son and Holy Spirit do not create, because generally the formal reason for acting does not act in the action with respect to which it is the formal reason for acting.
9 Et si dicatur quod Filius creat et Spiritus Sanctus creat: - neutra tamen personarum videtur proximo creare, quia neutra est in actu formaliter per alteram, et 'omne agens proximo per intellectum et voluntatem' est in actu tam notitia quam volitione necessariis ad talem actum.	9. And if it be said that the Son creates and the Holy Spirit creates - however, neither of the persons seems to create proximately, because neither is in act formally through the other, and 'everything acting proximately through intellect and will' is in act by both the knowledge and the volition necessary for such act.
10 Praeterea, secundo: quaero quid intelligis per sapientiam dispositivam sive disponentem, et amorem affectantem? Aut enim ƿista sunt appropriata Verbo et Spiritui Sancto, aut propria. Si appropriata, igitur secundum veritatem sunt communia tribus, et ita duae personae non sunt proximae rationes formales creandi. Si sunt propria, et dicunt respectum rationis ad creaturas (quia secundum ipsum dispositio dicit respectum rationis ad disposita), igitur aliquis respectus rationis est proprius alicui personae divinae, quod est improbatum distinctione 18 primi 'De dono' et distinctione 27 primi 'De verbo'.	10. Further, second: I ask what you understand by dispositive or disposing wisdom and by aspiring love. For these are either appropriated to the Word and Holy Spirit or they are proper. If appropriated then in truth they are common to the three, and thus two persons are not the proximate formal reasons for creating. If proper, and if they state a respect of reason to creatures (because according to him [Henry] disposition states a respect of reason to the disposed things), then some respect of reason is proper to some divine person, which was rejected earlier (1 d.27 n.95, Lectura 1 d.18 nn.6-16 [no d.18 in Ordinatio]).
11 Praeterea, quod dicit de ideis practicis, quod scilicet non sunt in Patre, sed in Verbo (ac si una persona non sufficeret ad productionem), videtur esse contra Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 14 vel 35: ((Ideo Verbum hoc vere veritas est, quia quidquid est in ea scientia de qua genitum est, et in ipso est, - quod autem in ea non est, neque in ipso est)); et paulo post: ((Novit omnia Deus Pater in se ipso, novit et in Filio)); et post: ((Omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, unusquisque eorum plene videt)). Ex quibus - et aliis verbis ibi positis - videtur velle manifeste quod nihil actuaƿlius est in Verbo quam in intelligentia Patris, et per consequens non est ibi distinctius quam in intelligentia Patris.	11. Further, what he says about practical ideas, namely that they are not in the Father but in the Word (as if one Person were not sufficient for production), seems to be contrary to Augustine On the Trinity 15.14 n.23, "Therefore this Word is truly truth, because whatever is in the science from which he is generated is also in him - but what is not in the science is not in him either;" and a little later, "God the Father knows all things in himself, and knows them in the Son;" and later, "All things that are in their science are fully seen by each of them." From these words - and from others set down there -Augustine seems manifestly to maintain that nothing is in the Word more actually than it is in the intelligence of the Father, and consequently that nothing is more distinctly in the Word than it is in the intelligence of the Father.
12 Praeterea, quod ibi dicitur 'esse verbum ad perficiendum intellectionem essentialem', videtur esse falsum, quia illud quod est ratio agendi alicui actione non immanente, non perficitur illa actione (sicut calidum, in quantum calidum, non perficitur calefactione, quae recipitur in passo); sed secundum istum intellectio actualis est ratio gignendi Verbum, et illa gignitio non est actio formaliter immanens ipsi Patri, quia terminus gignitionis non est forma Patris; ergo intellectio essentialis - quae est ratio gignendi Verbum secundum eum - non perficitur Verbo producto.	12. Further, what he [Henry] says there, that 'the word exists for perfecting essential intelligence' seems to be false, because that which is the reason for acting with some non-immanent action is not perfected by that action (just as the hot, qua hot, is not perfected by the heating that is received in some passive thing); but according to him [v. 1 d.2 nn.277-79, 290-96] actual intellection is the reason for generating the Word, and the generating is not formally immanent in the Father himself, because the term of generating is not the form of the Father; therefore essential intellection - which is the reason for generating the Word according to him - is not perfected by the produced Word.
13 Quod dicit de notitia universali, quod sit speculativa, improbatum est supra in prooemio I libri ('De scientia divina theologica, utrum sit speculativa vel practica'), quia conclusiones practicae resolvuntur in principia practica et non in speculativa principia, sicut conclusiones speculativae resolvuntur in principia speculativa et non in principia practica. ƿ	13. What he says about universal knowledge, that it is speculative, was rejected above (Prol. nn.360-61, 'about divine theological science, whether it is speculative or practical'), because practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles and not to speculative ones, just as speculative conclusions are resolved to speculative principles and not to practical ones
14 Quod etiam dicit quod 'ideo concesserunt philosophi Deum necessario producere aliud a se, quia negaverunt in eo sapientiam procedentem dispositivam vel disponentem, et amorem affectantem, esse producta', non videtur verum, quia volitio essentialis sive ut in tribus sive ut in Filio sive ut in Patre - non est necessario alterius a se (ut creaturae): nihil enim aliud a se vult voluntas divina necessario, etiam si per impossibile non esset principium productivum ad intra, - quia tunc necessario dependeret ad creaturam, quod est inconveniens maximum.	14. Also, as to his statement that 'the philosophers for this reason conceded that God necessarily produces what is other than himself, because they denied that in him proceeding dispositive or disposing wisdom and proceeding aspiring love are produced', does not seem true, because essential volition - whether as it is in the three persons or as it is in the Son or as it is in the Father - is not necessarily of something other than itself (as of a creature); for the divine will does not necessarily will anything other than itself, even if, per impossibile, it were not a principle productive internally - because then it would necessarily depend on a creature, which is unacceptable in the extreme.
	II. Scotus' own Solution
15 Ad solutionem ergo quaestionis tria sunt videnda: primo, quod prima causalitas respectu causatorum est necessario in tribus personis, et hoc respectu eorum ut causatorum quantum ad verum esse sive quantum ad esse simpliciter; secundo, propter illud quod additum est in quaestione 'de causabilibus secundum quodcumque esse causabile', videndum est de causalitate respectu omnium causabilium quantum ad esse secundum quid, ut esse cognitum vel esse volitum; tertio, propter illud quod etiam additur in quaeƿstione 'ita quod non posset aliter esse quam in tribus', videndum est - si per impossibile poneretur una persona absoluta - utrum posset in ea esse perfecta causalitas respectu omnium causabilium.	15. For the solution of the question, then, three things need to be looked at: first, that the first causality with respect to caused things is necessarily in the three persons, and this in respect of caused things as caused whether as to their true being or as to their being simply; second, because of what was added in the question, 'about causables according to their causable being' [n.1], one must look at causality with respect to all causables as to their being in a certain respect, as their being known or their being willed; third, because of what was also added in the question, 'such that it could not be otherwise than in the three' [n.1], one must look at whether - if per impossibile one absolute person were posited - there could be in that one person perfect causality with respect to all causables.
	A. The First and Perfect Causality is Necessarily in the Three Persons
16 Quantum ad primum, dico quod illa causalitas perfecta necessario est in tribus.	16. As to the first point, I say that the perfect causality is necessarily in the three persons.
17 Quod probatur tripliciter: Primo, quia principium duarum productionum, necessariae scilicet et contingentis, necessario prius est principium necessariae quam contingentis (non enim potest effectus necessarius contingentem praesupponere); sed aliquid in divinis est principium productionis intrinsecae, quae est necessaria, - et aliquid est principium productionis extrinsecae, quae est contingens; ergo prius necessario est aliquid in Deo principium productionis necessariae et ad intra, quam in eo sit aliquid principium productionis contingentis et ad extra. In illo ergo priore, completa productione ad intra, communicatur tribus personis omnis fecunditas quae eis non repugnat, et per consequens communicatur eis illud quod est principium productivum communicationis ad extra; ergo in illo instanti, in quo est proximum principium in Deo ad producendum aliquid contingens ad extra, illud communicabitur tribus. ƿ	17. The proof is threefold: First, because in the case of the principles of the two productions, namely the necessary and the contingent, the principle of necessary production is necessarily prior to the principle of contingent production (for a necessary effect cannot presuppose a contingent one); but something in divine reality is principle of intrinsic production, which production is necessary - and something in divine reality is principle of extrinsic production, which production is contingent; therefore necessarily something in God is principle of production that is necessary and intrinsic before something in him is principle of production that is contingent and extrinsic. In that prior stage then, when intrinsic production is complete, there is communicated to the three persons all the fecundity that is not repugnant to them, and consequently there is communicated to them that which is the productive principle of extrinsic communication; therefore in the instant in which there is in God a proximate principle for producing something contingent extrinsically, that principle is communicated to the three persons.
18 Item, prius naturaliter est primum obiectum praesens potentiae respicienti tale obiectum ut primum, quam secundarium obiectum sit praesens, et hoc maxime verum est quando solum primum obiectum ex natura rei et ex se est obiectum, et secundarium obiectum non ex se est obiectum illius potentiae, sed fit per actum illius potentiae in tali esse; hoc autem modo primum obiectum intellectus divini et voluntatis eius est sola essentia divina, et omnia alia sunt tantum secundaria obiecta et producta aliquo modo in tali esse per intellectum divinum; ergo prius naturaliter est essentia divina praesens intellectui suo ut primum obiectum quam aliquid aliud. Sed intellectus divinus, habens obiectum sibi praesens, non tantum est potentia operativa circa illud, sed etiam est potentia productiva notitiae adaequatae illi intellectui ut principio productivo; ergo tunc est productiva Verbi infiniti et per consequens Verbi geniti in natura divina. Similiter voluntas divina, habens essentiam illam actu intellectam ut obiectum sibi praesens, non tantum est potentia operativa (qua scilicet formaliter habens eam, amet illud obiectum), sed etiam est potentia productiva adaequati amoris infiniti et per consequens personae spiratae in natura divina. Prius ergo naturaliter quam intellectus et voluntas divina habeant vel respiciant aliquod obiectum secundarium, habetur completa ratio productionis personarum divinarum intrinsecarum et per conseƿquens illae personae producuntur prius quam aliquod aliud obiectum praesentetur, et per consequens multo magis prius quam aliquod aliud obiectum causetur.	18. Again, the first object is naturally present to the power that has regard to such object as first before a secondary object is present to it, and this is especially true when only the first object is object of the power from the nature of the thing and of itself, and the secondary object is not of itself object of the power but comes to exist as such through the act of the power; now in this way the first object of the divine intellect and of its will is the divine essence alone, and all other things are only secondary objects and are produced in some way in their being by the divine intellect; therefore the divine essence is naturally present to its intellect as first object before anything else is. But the divine intellect, possessing the object present to itself, is not only an operative power about it, but also a productive power of knowledge adequate to the intellect as productive power; therefore it is then productive of the infinite Word and consequently of the Word generated in the divine nature. Likewise the divine will, possessing the essence actually understood as object present to itself, is not only an operative power (by which, namely, what formally has the will loves the object), but is also a productive power of adequate infinite love and consequently of a person inspirited in divine nature. Therefore naturally before the divine intellect and divine will naturally have or regard some secondary object, the complete idea is possessed of the production of the intrinsic divine persons and consequently those persons are produced before any other object is presented, and consequently much more are they prior to the causing of any other object.
19 Praeterea, tertio sic: habitudo naturae ad suppositum prior est habitudine eius ad actum secundum, quia agere praesupponit esse et habitudo naturae ad suppositum pertinet ad esse; similiter habitudo naturae ad suppositum est essentialis et in 'quid', illa autem habitudo quae est naturae ad agere, non videtur ita essentialis. Ergo natura divina prius habet esse in illis personis quam sit principium productionis extrinsecae. ƿ	19. Further, third, as follows: the relation of nature to supposit is prior to its relation to second act, because acting presupposes being and the relation of nature to supposit pertains to being; likewise the relation of nature to supposit is essential and is in the whatness, but the relation that is of nature to acting does not appear to be thus essential. Therefore divine nature has being in the persons before it is a principle of extrinsic production.
20 Secundo, quantum ad istum articulum, videndum est quae sit ratio huius. Et dico quod illa ratio non est sicut prima positio innuebat, scilicet quod Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus sint rationes formales proximae causandi, vel quod aliquo modo compleant causalitatem Patris (immo eadem causalitas et aeque perfecta est in Patre et in tribus). Ista igitur primitas est talis, qualis dicta est distinctione 12 primi libri, in Patre et Filio respectu Spiritus Sancti, - et ratio huius non ponitur ibi quod imperfectior fecunditas sit in una persona quam in duabus, sed quia prius communicatur fecunditas Filio quam Spiritus Sanctus spiretur; et tunc in illo instanti originis quo Pater producit Filium, illa fecunditas qua producitur Spiritus Sanctus erit in Patre et Filio, et ex hoc sequitur quod tunc producitur a duobus in quibus est una fecunditas. ƿ	20. Secondly, as to this article [n.16], one must look at what is the reason for this [sc. the priority of intrinsic production to extrinsic production]. And I say that the reason is not as the first position [sc. Henry's, n.5] gestures to, namely that the Word and Holy Spirit are the proximate formal reasons for causing, or that in some way they complete the causality of the Father [nn.6, 12] (rather the same and equally perfect causality is in the Father as in the three persons). Therefore this priority [sc. of intrinsic to extrinsic production] is of the same sort in the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit as was stated in 1 d.12 nn.7, 38-40 - and the reason posited there for this is not that there is a more imperfect fecundity in one person than in two, but that fecundity is communicated to the Son before the Holy Spirit is inspirited; and then in the instant of origin in which the Father produces the Son, the fecundity by which the Holy Spirit is produced will be in the Father and the Son, and from this the consequence is that then the Spirit is produced by the two, and the fecundity in them is one.
21 Et ita hic: prius natura communicatur natura divina tribus suppositis divinis (secundum rationes prius positas), quam creatura possit immediate produci; et ideo in illo instanti in quo creatura est immediate producibilis, causalitas illa una est in tribus personis respectu creaturarum producendarum.	21. And thus here: the divine nature is communicated first in nature to the three divine supposits (according to the reasons set down above [nn.17-19]) before the creature can be immediately created; and therefore in the instant in which the creature is immediately producible, there is one causality in the three persons with respect to the creatures to be produced.
22 Et ista est ratio Augustini V Trinitatis cap. 17, quod 'sicut Pater et Filius ad Spiritum Sanctum sunt unum principium, sic omnes tres personae sunt unum principium creaturae' ad ipsam producendam.	22. And this is the reason of Augustine On the Trinity 5.14 n.15, that 'just as Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, so all three persons are one principle for the producing of creatures'.
	B. On Causality in regard to all Causables as to their Being in a certain Respect
23 Quantum ad secundum articulum principalem, videtur quod si in intellectu Patris sint ideae etiam practicae (sicut argutum est contra primam opinionem), igitur Verbum est genitum de creatura ut est idea in intellectu Patris; quod etiam confirmatur per Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 14: 'Natum de his omnibus quae sunt in scientia Dei'. ƿ	23. As to the second principal article [n.15], it seems that if in the intellect of the Father there are also practical ideas (as was argued against the first opinion [nn.17-19]), then the Word is generated from a creature as it is an idea in the intellect of the Father; and this is also confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity 5.14 n.15, "[The Word is] born from all things that are in the knowledge of God."
24 Sed contra istud sic arguitur: Tunc Spiritus Sanctus spiratur non tantum ut amor essentiae divinae, sed ut amor omnis amabilis intellecti, et ita ex vi productionis suae esset amor creaturae sicut essentiae divinae; vel ergo Deus necessario amaret creaturas, vel Spiritus Sanctus non necessario produceretur, - quorum utrumque est falsum.	24. But against this there is argument as follows: In that case [sc. if the Word is generated from all things as they are ideas in the Father's intellect] the Holy Spirit is inspirited not only as love of the divine essence but as love of every understood lovable thing, and thus by force of his production he would be love of creatures just as of the divine essence; either then God would necessarily love creatures or the Holy Spirit would not necessarily be produced - both of which are false.
25 Item, non tantum Pater novit creaturas formaliter, sed etiam novit Filium formaliter; ergo si de omnibus ut notis Patri gignitur Verbum, de Verbo ut noto Patri gigneretur Verbum, et ita de se gigneretur Verbum.	25. Again, not only does the Father know creatures formally but he also knows the Son formally; therefore if the Word is generated from all things as known to the Father, then the Word would be generated from the Word as known to the Father, and thus the Word would be generated from himself.
26 Item, nulla relatio realis alicuius personae divinae videtur esse ad aliquid aliud extra ipsam (ut ad creaturam), ex distinctione 30 primi libri; sed geniti ad illud de quo gignitur, si est distinctum realiter, est relatio realis; ergo Verbum non est genitum de lapide ut noto Patri. ƿ	26. Again, no real relation of any divine person seems to be to anything outside it (as to a creature), from what was said in 1 d.30 nn.49-51; but of the generated to that from which it is generated, if it is really distinct, there is a real relation; therefore the Word is not generated from a stone as it is known to the Father.
27 Quantum ad istud ergo, dico sic, quod duo ordines possunt intelligi in divinis, scilicet ordo naturae et ordo originis (quae sunt alterius rationis), et in quocumque gradu unius ordinis potest totus alius ordo assignari.	27. As to this issue [n.23] therefore, I say as follows that two orders can be understood in divine reality, namely the order of nature and the order of origin (and these are of different ideas), and to each degree of one order the whole of the other order can be assigned.
28 Exemplum primo: in creatura, ubi est ordo originis, naturae et durationis (quae sunt alterius ordinis et alterius rationis), totus unus ordo potest assignari in uno gradu alterius ordinis; accipiatur enim unum instans durationis, et possunt in illo uno instanti assignari omnia ordinata secundum originem et naturam, - accipiatur ƿetiam unum instans naturae, et possunt in eo assignari omnia ordinata secundum originem.	28. An example first: in a creature, where there is order of origin, of nature, and of duration (which are of different order and of different idea), the whole of one order can be assigned to one degree of another order; for let one instant of duration be taken, and to that one instant all the things ordered according to origin and nature can be assigned -also let one instant of nature be taken, and to it can all the things ordered to origin be assigned.
29 Simpliciter tamen in divinis ordo naturae primus est, ita quod simpliciter procedendo, in primo instanti naturae debet assignari totus primus ordo originis, et si in secundo instanti naturae assignetur primus ordo originis, non est primus ordo originis, sed secundus. Intelligo sic: ordo naturae accipitur comparando obiecta ad intellectum et voluntatem divinam, quia comparando essentiam suam ad intellectum et voluntatem eius - quae est primum obiectum in se intellectus sui et voluntatis suae - est primum instans naturae, et comparando alia obiecta, quae sunt secundaria, ad intellectum et voluntatem divinam, quae non sunt ex se obiecta sed producta per intellectum et voluntatem in esse obiecti, est secundum instans naturae.	29. Simply, however, the order of nature is first in divine reality, such that, by proceeding simply, the whole first order of origin should be assigned to the first instant of nature, and if to the second instant of nature the first order of origin is assigned, then it is not the first order of origin but the second. I understand this as follows: the order of nature is taken by comparing objects to the divine intellect and will, because when comparing God's essence to his intellect and will - which essence is the first object of his intellect and will - there is the first instant of nature, and when comparing other and secondary objects to the divine intellect and will, which objects are not of themselves objects but things produced in their being as objects by intellect and will, there is the second instant of nature.
30 In primo instanti naturae, stando in ipso, habetur persona perfecta, habens memoriam perfectam essentiae divinae (videlicet habens intellectum cui essentia divina est praesens in ratione obiecti actu intelligibilis), et ista persona memoria ista essentiae divinae potest et formaliter operari et formaliter producere, sicut dictum est in primo libro; prius autem aliquo modo intelligitur ƿista persona operari ista memoria quam producere, et in illo priore intelligitur ista persona in se perfecta, et est beata in actu intellectus sui intelligendo essentiam divinam sicut obiectum suum. Eadem etiam persona producendo ista memoria, producit notitiam adaequatam huic obiecto, et hoc obiectum cum sit infinitum, producit personam formaliter infinitam per se subsistentem; et illi personae communicatur voluntas ut actus primus, non habens adhuc terminum adaequatum productum. Ista autem una voluntate, prima persona et secunda operantur circa essentiam divinam tamquam circa obiectum, amando eam infinite, et tunc sunt in se perfectae et beatae in essentia divina; praeter hoc autem ista eadem voluntate - una in eis - istae duae personae producunt amorem adaequatum huic obiecto, cognito sub ratione amabilis, et ita producunt amorem infinitum et ita spirant personam divinam, quia nihil est formaliter infinitum nisi quod per identitatem est Deus.	30. In the first instant of nature, if one stops at it, there is a perfect person, possessing perfect memory of the divine essence (namely possessing an intellect to which the divine essence is present in idea of actually intelligible object), and this person, by this memory of the divine essence, can formally operate and formally produce, as was said before (1 d.2 n.311); but this person is understood in some way first to operate by this memory than to produce by it, and in this prior stage this person is understood perfect in himself and is blessed in his act of intellect in understanding the divine essence as his object. Also, the same person, producing by this memory, produces knowledge adequate to this object, and this object, since it is infinite, produces a per se subsistent formally infinite person; and to this produced person is communicated will as first act, not yet having an adequately produced term. Now by this single will, the first and second persons operate about the divine essence as about the object, loving it infinitely, and at this point they are in themselves perfect and blessed in the divine essence; in addition to this, however, these two persons by this same will - being single in them - produce love adequate to this object, known under the idea of being lovable, and so produce infinite love and so inspirit a divine person, because nothing is formally infinite save what is God by identity.
31 Stando igitur praecise in primo instanti naturae, comparando essentiam divinam ad intellectum et voluntatem, habetur totus ordo originis primus (scilicet quod duae personae perfectae originantur), et tota perfectio divinarum personarum 'ad intra', in intellectu divino et voluntate, habetur in primo instanti naturae, quia tota perfectio simpliciter cuiuslibet personae in intelligendo et volendo ƿessentiam divinam completur in isto instanti. Hoc ergo quantum ad primum instans naturae.	31. Stopping therefore precisely in the first instant of nature, comparing the divine essence to intellect and will, there exists in it the whole first order of origin (namely because two perfect persons are originated); and the whole perfection of the divine persons intrinsically, in intellect and will, exists in the first instant of nature, because the whole perfection simply of any person in understanding and willing the divine essence is complete in that instant. All this therefore as to the first instant of nature.
32 Sequitur secundum instans naturae, in quo comparantur intellectus et voluntas divina ad aliud obiectum, secundarium. Et quia in isto instanti obiectum illud non est ex se actu intelligibile, sed fit actu intelligibile per intellectum et voluntatem, - ideo non habet esse in memoria divina ut memoria est, sed producitur actu intelligentiae in tali esse obiecti (sicut in nobis intentiones secundae producuntur per intelligentiam et non sunt in memoria ut memoria est); et sive etiam poneretur quod haberent esse per memoriam, sive quod producerentur per intelligentiam in esse cognito, saltem prius natura quam habeant esse in memoria vel in intelligentia, tam memoria quam intelligentia est in tribus personis, - et ita in quantum memoria vel intelligentia est in tribus personis istis, est ratio producendi ista in tali esse. Non ergo Verbum prima productione producitur de lapide ut est in memoria Patris, quia vel lapis non habet esse in memoria Patris ut memoria est principium producendi Verbum, vel si habeat esse in memoria, non prius naturaliter quam intelligatur esse in tribus personis. Et ita potest probari quod causalitas respectu creaturarum causabilium in esse cognito, necessario sit in tribus personis, sicut ƿfuit probatum in secunda ratione ad primum articulum, quae aeque valet ad istum articulum. ƿ	32. The second instant of nature follows, when the divine intellect and will are compared to another object, a secondary one. And because in this instant the object is not intelligible of itself but becomes actually intelligible through the intellect and will [n.29] - therefore it does not have being in the divine memory as it is memory, but is produced into the being of object by an act of intelligence (just as second intentions are produced in us by intelligence and are not in memory as it is memory); and whether too these objects be posited as having being through the memory or as being produced in known being by the intelligence, at any rate both memory and intelligence exist in the three persons prior in nature to these objects having being in the memory or intelligence - and so, insofar as memory or intelligence is in the three persons, it is the reason for producing the objects in their being as objects. The Word, therefore, is not produced by first production from a stone as it is in the memory of the Father, because either a stone does not have being in the Father's memory as this memory is the principle of producing the Word, or, if a stone does have being in the memory, it does not have it naturally before memory is understood to be in the three persons. And in this way can it be proved that causality with respect to causable creatures in known being is necessarily in the three persons, as was proved in the second reason for the first article [n.18], and this reason is equally valid for this second article.
33 In secundo tamen instanti naturae potest assignari ordo quidam originis, quia prius origine Pater intelligit lapidem quam Filius, quia Pater intelligit lapidem a se, Filius autem non a se sed habet hoc a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio; sed iste secundus ordo originis non est originatio simpliciter, qua scilicet personae divinae producuntur in esse naturae simpliciter, sed quasi originatio secundum quid, consequens personas iam productas.	33. However, in the second instant of nature there can be assigned a certain order of origin, because the Father understands stone first in origin before the Son does, because the Father understands stone from himself while the Son not from himself but gets this from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; but this second order of origin is not origination simply, namely that by which the divine persons are produced in being of nature simply, but is as it were origination in a certain respect, consequent to the persons already produced.
34 Exemplum huius in creaturis: si origo sit Socratis a Platone per se secundum humanitatem, ordo originis in eis in habendo humanitatem est primus ordo originis simpliciter, ordo autem eorum in habendo risibilitatem est alius ordo originis, quasi secundum quid, - quia sicut in primo instanti naturae Socrates habet humanitatem a Platone, ita in secundo habet risibilitatem ab eo; et si prius naturaliter ambo haberent humanitatem quam risibilitas produceretur, ambo causarent simul risibilitatem, et tamen quod hoc causarent unus haberet ab alio.	34. An example of this in creatures: if there is an origin of Socrates from Plato per se in humanity, the order of origin in them in having humanity is the first order of origin simply, but the order of them in having the capacity to laugh is a different order of origin, in a certain respect as it were - because just as in the first instant of nature Socrates has humanity from Plato, so in the second instant he has the capacity to laugh from him; and if both naturally had humanity before the capacity to laugh was produced, both would together cause the capacity, and yet one would have from another the fact that they caused it.
35 Ita dico in proposito, quod Verbum esse notitiam infinitam genitam, est ipsum esse infinitam notitiam essentiae infinitae, et hoc est per originem ipsius a Patre in primo instanti naturae; sed Verbum esse notitiam lapidis, vel habere notitiam lapidis a Patre giƿgnente, hoc est quasi originare Verbum secundum quid sive secundum aliquid adveniens 'Verbo simpliciter': hoc enim non est ipsum gigni simpliciter sub ratione personae divinae, quia nec notitiae simpliciter infinitae et formaliter infinitae essentiae ut obiecti per se; licet enim concomitanter illa notitia infinita quae est infinitae essentiae ut obiecti per se, sit notitia lapidis, quatenus tamen est lapidis non habet formaliter infinitatem.	35. So I say in the issue at hand, that the Word's being infinite generated knowledge is his being infinite knowledge of infinite essence, and this is through his origin from the Father in the first instant of nature; but the Word's being knowledge of a stone [n.23] or having knowledge of a stone from the Father generating him, this is as it were to originate the Son in a certain respect or in a respect that is additional to 'Word simply'; for this is not his being generated simply under the idea of a divine person, because neither is it under the idea of knowledge simply infinite and of formally infinite essence as its per se object; for although this infinite knowledge, which is of infinite essence as per se object, is concomitantly knowledge of a stone, yet insofar as it is of a stone it does not have infinity formally.
36 Et sicut dictum est de producto in esse intellecto, consimiliter dici potest de esse volito.	36. And as has been said of what is produced in understood being [nn.32-35], so can it likewise be said of willed being [n.15].
37 Et si arguatur contra istud quod Pater prius origine producit lapidem in esse cognito quam Filius illum producat, ergo Filius non producit, vel idem bis producetur, vel saltem producetur postquam intelligitur esse prius productum (praeintelligitur enim in illo priore originis esse productum a Patre), - respondeo: Pater producit lapidem prius origine quam Filius (hoc est, Pater a se et Filius non a se), et tamen Filius eadem productione producit lapidem et in eodem instanti naturae, et tamen in eodem instanti naturae possunt assignari omnes gradus originis. Ideo non sequitur quod sit bis productus, nec prius naturaliter, quia tunc in priore ƿinstanti naturae produceretur a Patre quam a Filio, quod non est verum; nam in eodem instanti naturae in quo Pater producit lapidem in tali esse, Filius habet eandem naturam et per consequens omnem fecunditatem productivam (quae sibi non repugnat), et ita virtutem producendi lapidem, - et ante illud instans, ordine naturae, non intelligitur lapis productus in esse cognito.	37. And if it be objected against this [sc. against the causality of the three persons in respect of the creature in known being] that the Father produces a stone in known being prior in origin to the Son's producing it, therefore the Son does not produce it or the same thing may be produced twice or at any rate may be produced after it is understood to have been already produced (for it is already understood to have been produced by the Father in the prior instant of origin) - I reply that the Father does produce a stone prior in origin to the Son (that is, the Father from himself and the Son not from himself), and yet the Son produces the stone with the same production and in the same instant of nature, and yet to the same instant of nature can be assigned all the degrees of origin [n.33]. So it does not follow that a stone is twice produced or is produced naturally beforehand, because then it would be produced by the Father in an instant prior in nature than by the Son, which is not true; for in the same instant of nature when the Father produces a stone in such being, the Son has the same nature and consequently all the productive fecundity (that is not repugnant to him), and so has the virtue of producing a stone - and before that instant, in order of nature, the stone is not understood to have been produced in known being.
38 Et si dicas 'saltem aliquo ordine praeintelligitur productus a Patre quam a Filio, ergo non potest produci a posteriore, origine, ergo nec a Filio, quia Filius non potest producere filium, quia ante origine vis generativa ut in Patre, habet terminum sibi adaequatum', - respondeo et dico quod non est ita in originatione secundum quid sicut in originatione simpliciter: originatio enim simpliciter, ponit originatum in esse simpliciter, et ideo quod in esse reali praecedit originationem simpliciter, praecedit etiam originatum simpliciter, et ita non potest esse ab ipso originato, - et inde est quod Verbum non potest producere aliud verbum; sed in originatione secundum quid, originans non producit originatum in aliquo esse simpliciter, et ideo potest stare cum hoc quod productio eius praecedat aliquod originatum, sic quod tamen simpliciter non praecedat illud originatum.	38. And if you say 'at any rate there is some order in which stone is understood to have been produced by the Father before by the Son, therefore it cannot be produced by the posterior in origin, therefore not by the Son either, for the Son cannot produce a son, because the generative force as it is in the Father prior in origin has a term adequate to it' - I reply and say that in the case of origination in a certain respect things are not as they are in origination simply; for origination simply posits an originated in being simply, and therefore what in real being precedes origination simply precedes also the originated simply, and thus it cannot be from the originated - and hence it is that the Word cannot produce another word; but in the case of origination in a certain respect the thing originating does not produce an originated in any being simply, and so there can stand with this that its production precedes some originated in such a way that yet it does not simply precede that originated.
39 Sed istud non videtur sufficere, quia semper videtur dubium ƿquomodo Verbum potest producere lapidem in esse cognito et quomodo lapis possit produci a Verbo, cum prius origine producatur a Patre in tali esse, - et Verbum non potest producere verbum, ergo similiter nec lapidem in esse cognito. Si ista sit ratio quare Verbum non potest producere verbum, quae communiter ponitur, quia scilicet 'praeintelligitur terminus iam adaequatus illius virtutis vel vis generativae ut in Patre', respondeo: ista propositio 'omnis potentia praehabens origine terminum adaequatum, antequam sit in aliquo non est illi principium producendi', non est vera nisi addatur quod 'habens illud principium communicatum (vel adaequatum) non potest esse terminus alius', vel nisi addatur quod 'ab illo habente ille terminus non est secundo producibilis'. Ita est in productione simpliciter, quod 'Verbum habens eandem memoriam cum Patre' non potest esse prius realiter quam Verbum simpliciter sit productum, nec etiam aliud verbum producibile est a Verbo habente memoriam illam; non sic autem est in productione creaturarum in esse intelligibili.	39. But this does not seem to suffice, because there seems to go on being a doubt how the Word can produce a stone in known being and how a stone can be produced by the Word when it is produced first in origin by the Father in such being, and the Word cannot produce a word, therefore likewise neither can he produce a stone in known being - provided the reason that the Word cannot produce a word is this which is commonly posited, namely that 'a term already adequate to the generative virtue or force as it is in the Father is pre-understood' [n.38] - I reply that this proposition 'every power having an adequate term prior in origin before it exists in something is not for that something a principle of producing' is not true unless is added that 'the haver of the communicated (or adequate) principle cannot be a different term', or unless is added that 'the term is not producible a second time by this haver'. So it is in production simply, because 'the Word having the same memory as the Father' cannot exist really before the Word is produced simply, and neither is another word producible by the Word having that memory; but it is not thus in the case of the production of creatures in intelligible being.
40 Sed ista responsio destruit quamdam positionem quae ponitur a multis distinctione 7 primi libri, quae ponit quod Filius non ƿpotest generare: non enim tota illa ratio est 'quia memoria ut in Patre, habet terminum adaequatum', sed oportet addere quod 'habet terminum adaequatum illi principio, non producibilem ab eo cui communicatur tale principium'; quia si esset producibile ab eo cui communicatur tale principium, communicaretur etiam ei principium in ratione principii ad producendum, et ita posset illo principio producere. Quaerendo autem ultra quare 'Verbo habenti eandem memoriam cum Patre' non communicatur ipsa memoria in ratione principii productivi, videtur quod oporteat probare per aliud quam per terminum adaequatum rationi huius principii ut in Patre. ƿ	40. But this response destroys a certain position that is set down by many in 1 d.7, which posits that the Son cannot generate; for the whole reason is not that 'the memory as it is in the Father has an adequate term', but one must add that 'it has a term adequate to the principle, and a term not producible by that to which such a principle is communicated'; because if it were producible by that to which such a principle is communicated, the principle would be communicated to it also in idea of being a principle for producing, and so it could produce by that principle. Now when one asks further why 'to the Word having the same memory as the Father' the memory is not communicated in idea of productive principle, it seems one must prove it by something other than by a term adequate to the idea of this principle as it is in the Father.
	C. Whether in an Absolute Person, if posited, there could be Perfect Causality with Respect to all Causables
41 Quantum ad tertium articulum videndum et intelligendum, sciendum est quod in creaturis, si comparetur causa ad duos effectus ordinatos, essentialior est eius comparatio ad utrumque effectum quam unius effectus ad alterum: propter enim dependentiam illoƿrum ad causam eandem, ordinate dependent ad invicem, et non econverso propter dependentiam unius ad alterum dependent ordinate ad causam eandem; ergo si per impossibile destruatur ibi ordo effectuum inter se ordinatorum, non propter hoc negandus est ƿordo et dependentia utriusque ad causam, quia propter minus impossibile non est concedendum maius impossibile, nec propter minus necessarium negandum est maius necessarium.	41. As to seeing and understanding the third article [n.15], one needs to know that, in the case of creatures, if a cause is compared to two ordered effects, the comparison of it to each effect is more essential than the comparison of one effect to the other; for they depend in order on each other because of their dependence on the same cause, and do not, conversely, depend in order on the same cause because of the dependence of one on the other; therefore if in this case, per impossibile, the order of effects ordered among each other be destroyed, then not for this reason is the order and dependence of each on the cause to be denied, because a more impossible thing is not to be conceded because of a lesser impossible thing, nor is a more necessary thing to be denied because of a lesser necessary thing.
42 Exemplum. Si ponatur ignem habere duos effectus ordinatos, scilicet calefacere et ignire, si essentialius se habeat ignis ad utrumque quam quod ignire praesupponat calefacere, - si ponatur per impossibile ignem non posse calefacere, non propter hoc negandum est ipsum ignem non posse ignire, nec obligans se ad tenendum antecedens, est obligatus ad tenendum consequens. Non enim teneret illa consequentia 'si ignis non posset calefacere, ergo nec ƿignire', nisi per hanc propositionem affirmativam intellectam 'potens ignire, potest calefacere', - quae destruitur ex positione, ubi ponitur ratio perfecta ipsius ignis posse stare cum opposito eius quod est calefacere: et ita illud quod est immediatius igni (scilicet ignire) quam sit calefacere, potest stare cum opposito eius quod est calefacere (quia ponitur stare cum 'non calefacere'), et ita ista positio destruit propositionem illam per quam teneret talis consequentia.	42. An example. If it be posited that fire has two ordered effects, namely to heat and to burn, and if fire is disposed to each effect more essentially than burning presupposes heating - then, if it is posited per impossible that fire cannot heat, not for this reason must the denial be made that fire cannot burn, nor is he who binds himself to holding the first obliged to hold the second. For this consequence would only hold, 'if fire could not heat therefore neither could it burn', because of this understood affirmative proposition 'what can burn can heat' - which is destroyed by the supposition [sc. 'if it be posited that fire cannot heat'], where the perfect idea of fire is posited as being able to stand with the opposite of what it is to heat [sc. not to heat]; and so that which is more immediate to fire (namely to burn) than heating is can stand with the opposite of what it is to heat (because it is posited as standing with 'not to heat'), and so this position destroys the proposition by which such a consequence would hold.
43 Ita in proposito applicando, potest dici quod aliquid est in Deo principium productionis intrinsecae et aliquid in eo est principium productionis extrinsecae, ita quod istae productiones ordinatae sunt ad idem principium et quodammodo magis necessarius est ordo utriusque productionis ad causam quam alterius ad alteram. Si igitur - per impossibile - ponatur aliquod principium non esse principium productionis prioris (quod ponitur ponendo unam personam esse absolutam, et negando productionem intrinsecam), non propter hoc videtur esse negandum illud principium esse principium productionis extrinsecae, quia adhuc, hoc posito, habetur tota illa ratio principii productionis extrinsecae et tantummodo ƿnegatur ille ordo productionis ad productionem, qui non stat, sed destruitur per positum. Et ideo si arguatur 'ista persona non potest producere intra, igitur non potest producere extra', neganda est consequentia ab obligato ad antecedens; non enim tenet illa consequentia, nisi per hanc propositionem 'potentia ad producendum aliquid extra praesupponit productionem intra', quae destruitur per hypothesim. Et ideo videtur quod causalitas perfecta ex ratione sui - in quantum scilicet dicit comparationem ad productum extra vel ad productionem extrinsecam - non requirat habitudinem ad productionem intrinsecam, licet idem fundamentum necessario sit ratio et causa utriusque productionis, intrinsecae et extrinsecae, et prius intrinsecae quam extrinsecae. Ex hoc autem videtur quod philosophi non posuerunt habitudinem in eis; licet enim viderent necessariam habitudinem ad principium efficiens, non tamen viderunt necessariam habitudinem causationis vel productionis extrinsecae ad productionem intrinsecam, - et ideo licet negarent illam productionem intrinsecam, concesserunt tamen illam aliam causationem vel productionem extrinsecam. ƿ	43. So applying this to the proposition, one can say that something in God is the principle of intrinsic production and something in him is principle of extrinsic production, so that these productions are ordered to the same principle, and in some way the order of each production to the cause is more necessary than the order of either production to the other. If then - per impossibile - it be posited that one of the principles is not a principle of a prior production (which is posited when one person is posited to be absolute and when intrinsic production is denied), yet not for this reason does it seem one should deny that the other principle is a principle of extrinsic production, because even on this supposition the whole idea of a principle of extrinsic production is still had and all that is denied is the order of production to production, which order does not stand but is destroyed by the supposition. And so if the argument is made 'this person cannot produce inwardly, therefore he cannot produce outwardly', the consequence should be denied by one who is bound to the antecedent; for the consequence only holds through the proposition 'the power to produce something outwardly presupposes inward production', which is destroyed by the hypothesis. And therefore it seems that a causality perfect in its idea - namely insofar as it states a comparison with an outward product or with extrinsic production - does not require a relation to intrinsic production, although the same foundation is necessarily the idea and cause of each production, intrinsic and extrinsic, and of intrinsic before of extrinsic. Now for this reason does it seem that the philosophers did not posit a relation between these productions; for although they saw a necessary relation to an efficient principle, yet they did not see a necessary relation of extrinsic causation or production to intrinsic production - and so, while they denied the intrinsic production, yet they conceded the extrinsic causation or production [n.14].
	D. Conclusion
44 Ad quaestionem ergo principalem patet quod de necessitate causalitas perfecta respectu causabilium extra est in tribus, et hoc respectu omnium causabilium, in quocumque esse causabili (sive secundum quid sive simpliciter), ita quod non posset non esse in tribus; tamen si per impossibile esset una persona absoluta, consequenter esset dicendum quod in tali persona absoluta simpliciter esset talis 'causalitas perfecta'. Et ita 'causalitas perfecta' ex ratione istius termini non videtur includere necessario quod ipsa sit in tribus personis, sicut nec ex ratione istius termini includit rationem productionis ad intra, licet illa in re necessario praesupponatur sibi, - sicut nec posse ignire ex ratione sui necessario includit posse calefacere, licet in re praesupponatur. Ad argumenta principalia.	44. To the principal question therefore [n.1] it is plain that perfect causality with respect to causables outwardly is of necessity in the three, and this with respect to all causables in any causable being (whether being in a certain respect or simply), so that it could not fail to be in the three [nn.21, 32]; yet if per impossibile there were one absolute person, it should as a consequence be said that in such an absolute person simply there would exist such 'perfect causality' [n.43]. And thus 'perfect causality' does not seem, from the idea of this term, to include necessarily that it exist in the three persons, just as neither does it include, from the idea of this term, the idea of inward production, even though in fact inward production is necessarily presupposed to it - just as neither does being able to burn, from the idea of it, necessarily include being able to heat, although in fact the latter is presupposed to the former [n.42].
	III. To the Principal Arguments
45 Primo ad Richardum: patet quod concludit pro tertio articulo positionis.	45. To the principal arguments. First to Richard [n.2]: it is plain that he concludes to the third article of the position [nn.41-43].
46 Ad secundum dictum est in simili, distinctione 12 primi libri, quomodo Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti, ƿet melius, quoad propositum, distinctione 4 primi libri, ubi dictum est de veritate huius 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'; et tactum est etiam supra distinctione 20 eiusdem primi, de potentia, quomodo est eadem in tribus personis.	46. To the second [n.3], it was stated in a like case, 1 d.12 n.49-52, how Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit - and better, as to the issue in hand, in 1 d.4 nn.11-13, where there was discussion about the truth of the proposition, 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'; and it was also touched on 1 d.20 nn.24-27, about how power is the same in the three persons.
47 Ad tertium dico quod licet aliquid essentiale sit principium productionis alicuius ad extra, non tamen est principium statim applicabile ad opus vel ad actum nisi ut intelligitur in tribus, quia sicut dictum est distinctione 12 primi libri - illud quod est principium actuum ordinatorum non intelligitur esse in potentia proxima ad actum remotum nisi ut est sub actu priore (sicut anima numquam intelligitur in potentia proxima ad actum volendi nisi ut est actu intelligens, quia quando est in potentia proxima volendi aliquid, actu vult illud, et nihil est volitum nisi cognitum); et ita licet quodlibet essentiale - ad se - praecedat aliquo modo notionale, tamen non oportet omne essentiale sub omni respectu ad extra posse praecedere quodlibet notionale.	47. To the third [n.4] I say that although something essential is the principle of producing something externally, yet it is only a principle immediately applicable to work or to act as it is understood in the three persons, because - as was said in 1 d.12 nn.38-40 - what is a principle of ordered acts is only understood to be in proximate potency to remote act as it is under prior act (just as the soul is never understood to be in proximate power to an act of willing save as it is actually understanding, because when it is in proximate potency for willing something it does actually will it, and nothing is willed unless it is understood); and thus although any essential [sc. in God] - in respect of itself - precedes the notional [sc. in God] in some way, yet not every essential needs to be in every outward respect able to precede something notional.
48 Ad primum argumentum in oppositum dico quod personae divinae necessario conveniunt in omni operatione ad extra, plus quam substantia et virtus, - quia personae divinae unam operationem habent, qua sunt simpliciter unus operator; et tamen si per impossibile illa virtus esset in una persona, nihil perfectionis deesset sibi quin perfecte posset producere omne producibile. ƿ	48. To the first argument for the opposite [sc. the second argument from the Lectura, note to n.4 above] I say that the divine persons necessarily come together in every operation outwardly, and more so than substance and virtue - because the divine persons have one operation, by which they are one operator simply; and yet if per impossibile the virtue were in one person, nothing of perfection would be lacking to him to prevent him being perfectly able to produce everything producible.
49 Ad secundum argumentum dico quod procedit de facto, quia productio praesupponit productionem, - non tamen ut 'formaliter causam' sive sub ratione qua productio est, sed quasi principium immediatum.	49. To the second argument [note to n.4] I say that it proceeds about the fact, that production presupposes production - not however as 'formally cause' or under the idea by which it is production, but as immediate principle as it were.