Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D1/Q2

• I. To the Question
• A. About Creation from Nothing as 'From' denotes Order of Nature
• B. About Creation from Nothing as 'From' denotes Order of Duration
• II. To the Principal Arguments
• III. To the Other Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Two: Whether God could create Something
50 Secundo quaero utrum Deus possit aliquid creare.	50. Secondly I ask whether God could create something.
51 Quod non, videtur: Quia si aliquid producitur quod prius non producebatur, hoc est quia aliquid se habet aliter nunc quam prius; istud in proposito non potest poni passum nisi causa varietatis suae sit agens, quia passum non praefuit; ergo oportet agens aliter se habere nunc quam prius et per consequens mutari. Sed primum agens non potest mutari; igitur etc.	51. It seems that he could not: Because if something is produced which before was not produced, this is because something is disposed differently now than it was before; this cannot be posited as having happened in the issue at hand unless the cause of the change is the agent, because the passive thing did not exist before; therefore the agent must be disposed differently now than it was before and consequently must undergo change. But the first agent cannot change; therefore etc.
52 Si dicatur quod agens sine sui mutatione potest producere novum effectum, - contra: 'quia agens dat esse, ideo passum vel productum recipit esse', et non e converso 'quia productum recipit esse, ideo producens dat esse'; igitur in agente oportet naturaliter praecedere aliquam habitudinem novam ad productum et non e converso; ergo et mutationem, quae non est ponenda in Deo, - ergo nec creatio. ƿ	52. If it be said that the agent can produce a new effect without change of itself -on the contrary: 'because the agent gives being, therefore does the passive or produced thing receive being', and not conversely, 'because the produced thing receives being, therefore does the producer give being'; therefore some new relation in the agent to the produced thing must naturally precede and not conversely; therefore change in the agent must precede too, which is not to be posited in God - therefore not creation either.
53 Secundo sic: causa semper aeque determinata ad agendum, aeque videtur agere semper et effectum producere, quia non videtur aliqua ratio quare nunc debeat producere et non alias, si fuit alias ita determinata ad agendum sicut modo; sed si aliquid creatur nunc, aliter aliquo modo se habet nunc quam prius et per maiorem determinationem causae ad ipsum, nunc quam prius; ergo causa aliquando est magis determinata ad effectum producendum quam alias, et sic non aeque, - et per consequens erit mutata.	53. Secondly thus: a cause equally always determined to acting seems equally always to act and to produce the effect, because there does not seem any reason that it should produce now and not at other times, if it was at other times as determined to act as it is now; but if something is created now, the cause is otherwise disposed now than it was before and through a greater determination of it now to the effect than before; therefore the cause is sometimes more determined to producing the effect than at other times, and thus not equally so - and consequently it will have changed.
54 Tertio sic: secundum Philosophum II De generatione, 'idem manens idem, semper natum est facere idem'; ergo numquam erit aliqua variatio in effectu nisi prius naturaliter ponatur in causa.	54. Third thus: according to the Philosopher On Generation 2.10.336a27-28, "the same thing while remaining the same is of a nature to do the same thing;" therefore there will never be variation in the effect if variation is not first naturally posited in the cause.
55 Quarto sic: si nulla ponatur mutatio ex parte causae (ut modo dicatur 'magis approximata' et 'minus approximata' quam alias), nec possit esse aliquod impedimentum ex parte eius, - non videtur ratio quare nunc agit et prius non egit.	55. Fourth thus: if no change is posited on the part of the cause (so that it be said to be now 'more approximate' or 'less approximate' than at other times), and if there could not be any impediment on its part either - no reason appears for it to act now and not to have acted before.
56 Et si dicas quod 'quia voluntarie agit, ideo potest agere quando vult agere', - contra hoc: non videtur ratio quare voluntarium agens aliquando agat, et non alias, nisi quia exspectat maiorem opportunitatem agendi tunc quam alias; hoc autem non potest ƿassignari in primo agente et movente primo respectu sui effectus; igitur nec 'quia voluntarie agit, potest agere quando vult'.	56. And if you say, 'because it acts voluntarily, therefore it can act when it wants to act' - against this: there seems no reason for a voluntary agent to act sometimes and not at other times save because it expects a greater opportunity for acting now than at other times; but this cannot be assigned to the first agent and first mover with respect to its effect; therefore neither 'does it act when it wants because it acts voluntarily'.
57 Ad oppositum: Gen. 1: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.	57. To the opposite: Genesis 1.1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
	I. To the Question
58 Respondeo. 'Creare' est aliquid de nihilo producere in effectu. Ly 'de' autem licet possit multipliciter sumi (sicut patet per Anselmum Monologion cap. 8), scilicet prout notat ordinem etc., tamen adhuc est - praeter hoc - multiplex, sic sumendo 'de' ut notat ordinem, quia potest notare ordinem naturae vel durationis.	58. I reply: To create is to produce something in fact from nothing. Now although the 'from' can be taken in many ways (as is plain from Anselm Monologion 8), namely as far as it denotes order etc. [1 d.5 n.53], yet there is - in addition to this - still multiplicity when taking 'from' thus as it denotes order, because it can denote the order of nature or of duration.
	A. About Creation from Nothing as 'From' denotes Order of Nature
59 Primo modo concedunt philosophi Deum posse creare et aliquid de nihilo producere, sicut patet per Avicennam, VI Metaphysicae cap. 2 (quaere ibi). ƿ	59. In the first way [sc. when 'from' denotes order of nature] the philosophers concede that God can create and produce something from nothing, as is plain from Avicenna Metaphysics 6.2 (f. 92ra) (look there).
60 Intelligo istud 'de prioritate naturae' sic: 'Prius natura' potest aliquid dici positive, quia ipsum prius inest alicui, et prior entitas est quam illa quae dicitur posterius natura inesse illi, - sicut est de animali et rationali in homine, et de substantia et accidente in composito per accidens.	60. I understand this point 'about priority of nature' as follows: Something can be said to be 'prior in nature' positively because it is in something first, and is a prior entity to that which is said to be present in the thing posteriorly in nature - as is the case with animal and rational in man, and with substance and accident in some per accidens composite thing.
61 Alio modo, 'prius natura' dicitur esse unum alio quasi privative sive potentialiter, ex alterius remotione sive alterius circumscriptione, quia conveniret sibi circumscripta causa alia, - quod scilicet non inest ei cui dicitur primo convenire, sed inesset ei nisi per aliud impediretur; sicut si dicatur in materia prius naturaliter esse privatio quam forma: non quidem quod ista duo sint simul in materia (ita quod privatio prius insit quam forma), sed privatio pro tanto potest dici prior natura et prius natura in materia quam forma, quia privatio semper inesset materiae nisi ab aliquo agente reciperet formam, - ita quod ad habendum privationem sufficit sola materia cum negatione vel cum privatione causae extrinsecae, ad habendum autem formam requiritur causa extrinseca; nec tamen est privatio de ratione materiae, sicut nec forma, nec ambo sunt simul in materia.	61. In another way one thing is said to be prior in nature to another privatively, as it were, or potentially, by the removal or exclusion of another, because it would belong to it when some other cause is excluded - namely because it is not present in what it is said to belong to first but would be in it unless it were prevented by something else; as if it were said that privation is naturally prior to form in matter, not indeed because the two are in matter together (such that privation would be present before form was), but privation can pro tanto be said to be prior by nature, and prior by nature to form in matter, because privation would always be present in matter unless it received form from some agent - such that for the having of privation matter alone suffices along with negation or privation of an extrinsic cause, but for having form an extrinsic cause is required; yet privation is not of the idea of matter, as neither is form, nor are both present together in matter.
62 Ita intelligo in proposito, quod creatura non habet ex se non ƿesse, neque quod simul sint in ea esse et non esse (quasi sint simul esse et non esse), neque aliquo modo habet non esse quando est; sed quantum est ex se, haberet non esse nisi causa extrinseca suum non esse impediret, dando sibi esse, - quia ex sola ratione sua non haberet esse, circumscripta omni causa extrinseca dante esse, quia nullo modo haberet esse nisi per causam extrinsecam produceretur in esse: ita quod magis proprie dicendum est creaturam non esse ex se formaliter quam habere non esse ex se formaliter (quia 'formaliter habere ex se' affirmatur), nec habet ex se esse nec non esse.	62. So I understand it in the issue at hand, that a creature does not have of itself not-being, nor that being and not-being are together in it (as if being and not-being were simultaneous), nor that it somehow has not-being when it is; but that, as far is of itself, it would have not-being unless an extrinsic cause were to prevent its not-being by giving it being - because from its own idea alone it would not have being, when every extrinsic cause giving it being is excluded, because in no way would it have being unless it were produced in being by an extrinsic cause; such that one should more properly say that of itself formally a creature is not rather than that of itself formally a creature has not-being (because 'of itself formally it has' is an affirmation [sc. and not a negation]); neither does it of itself have being nor not-being.
63 Pro ista positione, sic intellecta, arguitur sic: agens perfectius minus praesupponit in agendo quam agens imperfectius, sicut natura minus praesupponit quam ars, quia natura praesupponit tantum ens in potentia et ars ens in actu; sed Deus est agens perfectius quam natura vel ars; ergo minus praesupponit in sua actione quam ens in potentia (quod est praesuppositum a natura), et ita nihil, et per consequens potest creare.	63. On behalf of this position [n.59] as so understood [n.62], an argument is made as follows: a more perfect agent presupposes less in its acting than a more imperfect agent does - just as nature presupposes less than art, because nature presupposes only being in potency and art presupposes being in act; but God is a more perfect agent than nature or art; therefore he presupposes in his acting less than being in potency (which is something presupposed by nature), and so he presupposes nothing, and as a result he can create.
64 Istam rationem adducunt aliqui ad secundum membrum, scilicet prout 'de' notat ordinem durationis. Sed ibi omnino non valet, quia etsi Deus nihil praesupponat in producendo de quo ƿproducat, non tamen sequitur quod possit producere novum, sicut nec de natura et arte sequitur (ex vi argumenti), quia 'quia natura non praesupponit in actione sua ens in actu, igitur potest producere aliquid omnino novum secundum esse in actu' non sequitur.	64. This reason is adduced by some for the second member, namely as 'from' denotes an order of duration. But there [n.62] it is altogether invalid, because although God does not, in producing, presuppose anything from which he may produce, yet the consequence does not thereby hold that he could produce something new, just as this does not follow (by force of the argument) about nature and art either, because the inference 'nature does not presuppose in its action a being in act, therefore it can produce something altogether new as to existence in act' does not follow.
65 Sed nec ad istud primum valet, quia secundum philosophos quaecumque intelligentia est agens superior quam agens naturale, et tamen non conceditur communiter (licet Avicenna hoc concederet) quod intelligentia posset creare sive aliquid de nihilo producere.	65. But the argument [n.63] is not valid for the first member either, because, according to the philosophers, any intelligence is an agent superior to a natural agent, and yet they do not commonly concede (although Avicenna would concede it) that an intelligence could create or produce something from nothing.
66 Ideo aliter arguo, ad idem membrum, sic: Deus potest aliquid immediate causare et efficere, ergo potest creare et aliquid de nihilo facere.	66. Therefore I argue differently for this same first member, namely thus: God can immediately cause and effect something, therefore he can create and make something from nothing.
67 Antecedens est manifestum, quia Deus est primum efficiens, ex secunda distinctione primi libri; et si nihil potest immediate facere, tunc nec mediate potest aliquid facere (quia est primum efficiens), et ita nullum effectum producet.	67. The antecedent is manifest, because God is the first efficient cause, from 1 d.2 nn.43-59; and if he makes nothing immediately then he cannot make anything mediately either (because he is the first efficient), and so he would produce no effect.
68 Consequentiam probo sic, quia si potest efficere aliquid, illud non habet ex se esse necessarium formaliter, et ita habet esse a causa; ergo habet esse post non esse secundum intellectum istius membri. Et producit etiam immediate, nullo aIio praesupposito, ƿquia si aliquid praesupponatur, illud esset effectum ab eo (sicut patet ex distinctione 8 primi libri), et ita istud non esset immediatum effectum ab eo. Habemus ergo, a primo antecedente ad istud consequens, quod producit aliquid ordine naturae de non esse ad esse, et hoc nullo praesupposito; secundum istum intellectum ergo creat. Ista ratio videtur innui ab Avicenna VI Metaphysicae cap. 2, ubi prius (quaere eum ibi).	68. The consequence [n.66] I prove thus, because if he can effect something, that something does not have of itself necessary being formally, and so it has being from a cause; therefore it has being after non-being, according to the understanding of this member [sc. where 'from' states order of nature]. And he produces immediately, with nothing else presupposed - because if something is presupposed, then that something presupposed would be effected by him (as is plain from 1 d.8 nn.7-8), and so the thing that presupposes it would not be an immediate effect from him. We have, therefore, from the first antecedent [n.66] to this consequent, that he produces, in order of nature, something from not-being to being, and that with nothing presupposed; therefore according to this understanding he creates. This reason seems to be pointed to by Avicenna Metaphysics 6.2 [n.59, see the note there].
	B. About Creation from Nothing as 'From' denotes Order of Duration
69 De secundo membro, prout 'de' notat ordinem durationis, negatur communiter creatio a philosophis, quia dicunt Deum necessario producere quidquid immediate producit et nullo praesupposito, - quod autem mediate producit, producit aliquo praesupposito de quo producit, quia tunc producit per causas secundas; et ita nec mediatum nec immediatum effectum producit de nihilo, sic accipiendo 'de'.	69. About the second member, as 'from' denotes order of duration [n.58, cf. Prol. n.18, 1 d.2 nn.83, 120, 149, d.8 nn.251, 255, d.42 nn.10, 13], creation is commonly denied by the philosophers, because they say that God necessarily produces something immediately and with nothing presupposed - but what he mediately produces, he produces presupposing something from which he produces, because he then produces through second causes; and so he produces neither a mediate nor an immediate effect from nothing, taking 'from' here in the sense of order of duration.
70 Sed contra istud probatum est distinctione 8 primi libri (et etiam ƿtactum est distinctione 39 eiusdem primi), quod Deus causat 'omnia quae sunt ad extra' contingenter et ex se: et ex hoc sequitur quod non necessario, et per consequens non necessario sempiternum (quia videtur IX Metaphysicae concedere omne sempiternum esse necessarium; idem etiam videtur innuere I De caelo et mundo contra Platonem, qui concessit aliquid sempiternum esse et tamen possibile non esse).	70. But proof was given against this in 1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281-291 (and it was also touched on in 1 d.39 nn.35-37, 41, 91 [in the Lectura; there is no d.39 in the Ordinatio]), because God causes 'everything that exists outwardly' contingently and from himself; and from this it follows that he does not cause necessarily, and consequently that he does not necessarily cause something eternal (because Aristotle seems in Metaphysics 9.8.1050b6-8 to concede that everything eternal is necessary; he seems to indicate the same in On the Heavens 1.12.283b1-6 against Plato, who conceded that something is eternal and yet is able not to be, Timaeus 30-33).
71 Sed instabis huic rationi quod non oportet, ubi est contingentia in effectu, quod ibi inferatur possibilitas ad novitatem: Deus enim vult contingenter a (ex distinctione 8 primi libri), et tamen non potest de novo non velle a, quia tunc esset mutabilis.	71. But you will object against this reason [n.70] that it is not necessary that, where there is contingency in the effect, there possibility for newness may be inferred; for God wills a contingently (from 1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281, 291), and yet he cannot de novo not will a, because then he would be changeable.
72 Respondeo. In productione divina potest esse novitas producti ƿlicet non sit novitas in producente ipso, quia in 'productione prima' mutatio et novitas est ex parte producti, sicut patebit respondendo ad primum argumentum principale. Sed in 'velle' non potest esse novitas vel mutatio ex parte voliti nisi esset aliqua novitas ex parte actus volendi, quia actus volendi - idem et eodem modo se habens - non potest esse alicuius noviter voliti; volitum enim non habet esse volitum nisi per actum volendi, et ita non est novum in esse voliti nisi per actum volendi novum.	72. I reply. In divine production there can be newness of product although there is no newness in the producer himself, because in the case of 'first production' there is change and newness on the part of the product, as will be plain when responding to the first principal argument [nn.85-86]. But in 'willing' there cannot be newness or change on the part of the thing willed unless there is some newness on the part of the act of willing, because the act of willing - being disposed the same and in the same way -cannot be of anything newly willed; for a willed thing does not have willed being save through the act of willing, and so it is not new in the being of being willed save through a new act of willing.
73 Sic ergo videtur aliqualiter sequi quod si Deus potest aliquid contingenter causare, potest etiam contingenter causare novum aliquid (quia non est ratio quare non possit causare non sempiternum contingenter), sicut potest causare contingenter sempiternum, ex quo non causat necessario; quod enim oporteret 'causatum' esse sempiternum, videretur sequi ex necessitate causationis vel ex immutabilitate ipsius causantis, quorum neutrum infert sempiternitatem ipsius; ergo possibilis est novitas inferri.	73. So it seems in some way to follow, therefore, that if God can cause something contingently, he can also contingently cause something new, because there is no reason that he could not cause a non-eternal thing contingently just as he can cause something eternal contingently, on the grounds that he does not cause necessarily; for that a 'caused thing' had to be eternal seemed to follow from the necessity of causation or from the immutability of the causer himself, neither of which entails the eternity of the thing caused; therefore newness has the possibility of being inferred.
74 Arguitur etiam ad istud membrum: quia si aliquid sit novum, quaero a qua causa sit novum? Sit illa causa a. - Tunc arguo: aut a eodem modo se habens produxit hoc novum, aut aliter. Si eodem modo, habetur propositum, quod ab eadem causa non mutata potƿest esse aliquis effectus novus. Si ab a aliter se habente, quaero a quo movente aliter se habuit ad hunc novum effectum producendum: non est processus in infinitum, igitur stabitur tandem quod aliquid erit novum a causa uniformiter se habente. Et confirmatur ratio, quia si potest esse a primo movente haec pars motus novi quae numquam praefuit, quare non potest ita aliquod totum esse novum cuius nihil umquam praefuit?	74. There is also another argument for this member [the second, n.69], because if something is new, I ask by what cause is it new? Let the cause be a. - I then argue: a produced this new thing either when disposed in the same way or when disposed in a different way. If in the same way then the intended conclusion is obtained, that from the same unchanged cause there can be some new effect. If when a is disposed in a different way, I ask by what mover a was disposed differently for producing this new effect; there is no process to infinity, therefore a stand will at length be made at something that will be new from a cause that is uniformly disposed. The reason is confirmed too, because if from the first mover this part of new motion can be that never was before, why cannot some whole thing thus be new, nothing of which ever was before?
75 Sed ista ratio (cum sua confirmatione) contra philosophos parum valet, et leviter solveretur ab eis; conclusio tamen vera est, quod ab aliquo agente non mutato potest esse productum quodammodo sic novum.	75. But this reason (along with its confirmation) is of little validity against the philosophers [n.69] and would easily be solved by them; however the conclusion is true, that from some unchanged agent there can be a product in some way thus new.
76 In isto tamen secundo membro (scilicet intelligendo 'de' prout dicit ordinem durationis) distingui potest de hoc quod est 'nihilo', quod scilicet potest accipi pro nihilo omni modo, vel pro nihilo secundum esse exsistentiae, aliquo tamen modo secundum esse essentiae.	76. However, in this second member (namely when understanding 'from' as it states an order of duration), a distinction can be made about what is meant by 'nothing' [n.58], namely that it can be taken for nothing in every way [nn.83-84], or for nothing in being of existence, although it is in some way in being of essence [n.82].
77 Et ponitur exemplum ab aliquibus, quod licet Deus possit ƿcreare de nihilo secundo modo, non tamen de nihilo primo modo, quia non potest aliquid producere quod non est ex parte sui possibile, secundum Avicennam II Metaphysicae; 'nihil' autem non est possibile ex parte sui, quia non est aliqua ratio quare unum nihil esset possibile ex parte sui et non aliud nihil.	77. And some people give an example, that although God could create from nothing in the second way, yet not from nothing in the first way [n.76], because nothing can be produced that is not on its own part possible, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 4; but nothing is not possible on its own part, because there is no reason that one nothing should be possible on its own part and another nothing not.
78 Confirmatur etiam ista ratio, quia in omni creatura est compositio ex actu et potentia, - et ubicumque ista sunt, ordine naturae praecedit possibilitas vel potentialitas; igitur potentialitas, in quacumque re creata sit, praecedit naturaliter et est prior natura actualitate. Et tunc ista potentialitas non est nihil, sed alicuius entis, secundum aliquod esse: non secundum esse exsistentiae, igitur secundum esse quiditativum.	78. The reason is also confirmed, because in every creature there is composition of act and potency - and wherever these are, possibility or potentiality precedes in order of nature; therefore potentiality, in whatever created thing it is, naturally precedes and is prior in nature to actuality. And then this potentiality is not nothing but belongs to some entity according to some being; not according to being of existence, therefore according to quidditative being.
79 Et hoc ponitur secundum illum modum qui recitatus est distinctione 43 primi libri. Ibi enim ponitur quod per potentiam Dei activam ad se, producuntur res primo in esse possibili passive ad se; et tunc ultra possunt produci in esse exsistentiae, non tamen nisi prius natura fuerint productae in esse quiditativo et in esse possibili passive. ƿ	79. And this is posited according to the way recited in 1 d.43 n.5 [of the Lectura, not the Ordinatio]. For it is there posited that, by the active power of God relative to itself, things are first produced in passive possible being relative to themselves; and then further they can be produced in being of existence, but not unless they have first in nature been produced in quidditative being and in passive possible being.
80 Contra istud est argumentum ibidem distinctione 43, quia 'non producitur res aliqua in esse possibili per omnipotentiam, sed per intellectum, quo producitur in esse intelligibili': et quando est in esse intelligibili, non repugnat sibi esse, nec est ex se formaliter necessarium; igitur est possibile.	80. Against this is the argument in the same place [1 d.43 nn.6-9], that 'a thing is not produced in possible being by omnipotence but by intellect, whereby the thing is produced in intelligible being'; and when it is in intelligible being, existence is not repugnant to it, nor is it of itself formally necessary; therefore it is possible.
81 Similiter aliud argumentum est distinctione 36 primi libri contra illud esse essentiae, quia 'si illud esse esset verum esse, productio in illo esse vere esset creatio et ad aliquod esse simpliciter de nihilo'. Igitur ista productio est simpliciter alia; non in esse possibili (vel non rei in esse possibili), quia si res non sit possibilis antequam sit in esse essentiae, et producitur in isto esse, - igitur aliquid producitur in aliquo esse, aliqua productione, quod non est possibile ex parte sui.	81. Likewise there is another argument, in 1 d.36 n.17, against this being of essence, that 'if this being were true being, production in that being would be truly creation and it would be into some being simply from nothing'. Therefore this production is simply different; not in possible being (or not of a thing in possible being), because if a thing is not possible before it is in being of essence, and if it is produced in this being -then something is produced in some being, by some production, that is not possible on the part of itself.
82 Quantum ergo ad istum articulum, dico quod de nihilo (id est non de aliquo) secundum esse exsistentiae potest Deus creare, et per consequens de nihilo (id est non de aliquo) secundum esse essentiae, quia ut probatum est distinctione 36 primi libri, numquam esse essentiae realiter separatur ab esse exsistentiae.	82. As to this third article then [n.76], I say that God can create in being of existence from nothing (that is, not from anything), and consequently he can create from nothing (that is, not from anything) according to being of essence, because, as was proved in 1 d.36 nn.26-29, 48-49, 53, never is being of essence really separated from being of existence.
83 Et tamen non potest aliquid creari, id est produci ad 'esse' simƿpliciter de nihilo, id est nullo modo ente (nec simpliciter nec secundum quid). Nihil enim creatur quod non prius habuit esse intellectum et volitum, et in esse intellecto fuit possibile formaliter, sicut dictum est in prima ratione contra illam positionem; et tunc fuit quasi in potentia propinqua ut posset esse obiectum omnipotentiae et poni in esse simpliciter.	83. And yet a thing cannot be created, that is, produced in being simply, from nothing, that is, from what is in no way a being (whether simply or in a certain respect). For nothing is created that did not first have understood and willed being, and was in understood being formally possible, as was said in the first reason against the position in question here [nn.80, 79]; and then it was as it were in proximate potency so as to be able to be an object of omnipotence and to be posited in being simply.
84 Potest aliquid produci (licet non creari) de simpliciter nihilo, id est non de aliquo secundum esse essentiae nec esse exsistentiae, nec secundum aliquod esse secundum quid, - quia creatura producitur in esse intelligibili non de aliquo esse, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid, nec possibili ex parte sui in isto esse; istud tamen 'produci' non est creari, quia non creatur aliquid in esse simpliciter, sed producitur ad esse secundum quid.	84. Something can be produced (although not created) from nothing simply, that is not from anything in being of essence or in being of existence or in any being in a certain respect - because a creature is produced in intelligible being not from any being, neither simply nor in a certain respect, nor from something possible in that being from its own side; but this 'to be produced' is not to be created, because there is not anything created in being simply, but it is produced in being in a certain respect.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
85 Ad primum argumentum principale dico quod causa prima potest immediate producere aliquem effectum novum, absque omni novitate in ipsa causa. Quod patet per exemplum: si enim ponatur sol semper esse in se aeque luminosus et creetur aliquod medium perspicuum approximatum, sol de novo illuminabit illud, ita quod nihil novum erit in sole ad hoc quod ab eo sit nova illuminatio; et si posset ex se ponere medium perspicuum et sub lumine, sicut ƿcausat in ipso lumen, ita posset producere in esse hoc totum - scilicet medium illuminatum - sine aliqua novitate in se ipso.	85. To the first principal argument [51] I say that the first cause can immediately produce some new effect without any newness in the cause itself. The thing is plain from an example: for if the sun be posited always to be in itself equally bright and if there is created some transparent medium near to it, the sun will de novo illuminate it, such that nothing new will be in the sun in order for there to be from it a new illumination; and if it could of itself posit a transparent medium and put it under the light, then, just as it causes light in it, so it could produce in being the whole thing - namely the illumined medium -without any newness in its own self.
86 Et si dicas 'hoc non posset si esset agens naturale et uniformiter se habens (quia tunc semper uniformiter produceret), ergo exemplum non valet ad propositum ostendendum', - respondeo: verum est quod istud exemplum quoad hoc valuit, quod non oportet propter novitatem effectus ponere novitatem in causa; tamen non valuit quoad hoc quod effectus possit esse novus a causa naturaliter agente et totali, quia tale agens semper uniformiter ageret (si tale esset) respectu effectus. Agens autem liberum potest eadem volitione antiqua effectum novum producere, pro tunc quando vult illum effectum novum esse; non enim est necesse quod 'si sempiternaliter vult, et non potest de novo velle, ergo vult pro sempiterno', sicut non est necessarium in me quod si nunc volo aliquid, quod pro nunc velim illud: sed possum velle illud pro cras, et eadem volitione stante (sine omni mutatione a parte voluntatis meae) possum illud novum causare cras, pro quo illud volo.	86. And if you say 'it could not do this if it were a natural agent and disposed uniformly (because then it would always produce uniformly), therefore the example is not valid for illustrating the issue at hand' - I reply: it is true that this example was valid to this extent, that it is not necessary to posit newness in the cause because of newness of effect; yet it was not valid as to there being a new effect from a cause naturally acting and complete, because such an agent would always uniformly act (if it were such) with respect to the effect. But a free agent can by the same previous will produce a new effect for the time when it wills that new effect to be; for it is not necessary that 'if it eternally wills and cannot will de novo, therefore it wills for the eternal', just as it is not necessary in me that if I now will something, that I will it for now; but I can will it for tomorrow, and with the same will in place (without any change on the part of my will) I can cause that new thing tomorrow, for which I will it.
87 Et quando arguitur contra istud per istam rationem 'quia oportet naturaliter aliquam habitudinem novam praecedere in producente ad productum et non e converso', - dico (sicut dictum est distinctione 35 primi libri et alias frequenter) quod absolutum in causa immediate sequitur absolutum in effectu, - et in effectu, primo consequitur respectus ad causam; et tunc, si aliquis est reƿspectus causae ad effectum, ille respectus ad effectum est ultimus et aliquando nullus. Quod igitur dicit quod 'quia causa dat esse, ideo effectus recipit esse et non e converso', dico quod si intendit per ly 'quia' reduplicationem relationis in causa vel aliquam realitatem novam in causa (sive relativam sive absolutam), propositio est falsa; si autem intendat reduplicare actum primum causae quae naturaliter praecedit causatum, isto modo propositio est vera: absolutum enim in causa naturaliter praecedit causatum.	87. And when argument is made against this by the reasoning 'that it is naturally necessary for some new relation to the product to precede in the producer and not conversely' [n.52] - I say (as was said in 1 d.35 nn.31-32, 47-50, and frequently elsewhere, d.3 n.326, d.30 nn.22-23, 30-45, 65-68, d.43 nn.11-12) that on an absolute in the cause there follows immediately an absolute in the effect - and in the effect there first follows a respect to the cause; and then, if there is some respect of the cause to the effect, the respect to the effect is last and as it were null. As to what the argument says, therefore, that 'because the cause gives being, therefore the effect receives being and not conversely' [n.52], I say that if the argument intends by the 'because' a reduplication of relation in the cause to some new reality in the cause (whether relative or absolute), the proposition is false; but if it intends to reduplicate the first act of the cause, which cause naturally precedes the thing caused, in this way the proposition is true: for the absolute in the cause naturally precedes the thing caused.
88 Et si dicas 'non tantum quia est absolutum, causat, quia tale est - scilicet absolutum - quando etiam non causat', dico quod in illo instanti in quo causat, adhuc causat ut prius naturaliter ipsa actione, - et ut sic, nihil intelligitur nisi ipsum absolutum, a quo ponitur ipsum causatum in esse; et ideo nihil potest accipi cum hoc quod est 'causat', nisi illud sit prius, nec respectu huius instantis nec respectu alterius. Fallit autem imaginatio 'quia semper videtur quod causa sit indeterminata usque ad illud instans quando causat, et tunc quod aliqua relatio - determinans ipsam ad effectum - primo requiratur ex parte eius', quod falsum est; illud enim idem absolutum, quod in ea praecessit tam natura quam duratione ipsum effectum productum vel causatum, est in ea in illo instanti prius naturaliter quam causet, - et secundum idem absolutum ƿ'secundum quod prius fuit causativum' est nunc causans, et non secundum aliquid additum, neque absolutum neque respectivum.	88. And if you say 'it does not cause merely because it is absolute, for it is such -namely absolute - even when it is not causing', I say that in the instant in which it causes, it still causes as naturally prior to the action itself - and as such only the absolute itself is understood, from which the caused is posited in being; and so nothing can be taken along with the 'it causes' save that it is prior, and not that it is so in respect of this instant or in respect of another one. But imagination deceives 'because it always seems that the cause is indeterminate up to the instant when it causes, and then that some relation -determining the cause to the effect - is required first on the part of the cause', which is false; for the same absolute, which in the cause preceded both in nature and in duration the effect produced or caused, is in the cause in that instant naturally before it causes -and according to the same absolute 'according to which it was first causative' it now is causing, and not according to anything added, whether absolute or relative.
89 Ad secundum, cum arguitur pro determinatione, - dico per idem quod causa aeque determinata ad producendum aliquod productum (quantum est ex parte sui) potest quandoque producere et quandoque non producere, quia sicut in naturalibus 'causam determinari ex parte sui' est ipsam habere formam qua causet, ita in liberis 'causam esse determinatam' est ibi causam habere volitionem respectu volibilis; et sicut ibi potest forma haberi antequam effectus causetur (sed tunc est impedimentum extra, vel absentia passi), ita quoque potest volitio hic haberi antequam volibile habeatur, et prius natura et duratione.	89. To the second [n.53], when argument is made for determination - I say on the same basis [n.88] that a cause equally determined to producing some product (as far as concerns its part) can sometimes produce and sometimes not produce, because just as in natural things 'a cause being determined on its own part' is its having the form whereby to cause, so in a free thing 'a cause being determined' is its having there a volition with respect to something willable; and just as in the former case the form can be had before the effect is caused (but it is now prevented from the outside or by the absence of a passive thing), so also a volition can be had in the latter case before the willable thing is had, and before both in nature and in duration.
90 Ad tertium, de Philosopho II De generatione, - dico quod Philosophus intelligit de agente naturali, sicut patet per eum ibi.	90. To the third, from the Philosopher in On Generation [n.54] - I say that the Philosopher's understanding is about a natural agent, as is plain from him in that place.
91 Ad quartum dico quod - sicut dictum est distinctione 8 primi libri - quod 'indisciplinati est quaerere omnium demonstratioƿnes' (secundum Philosophum IV Metaphysicae): 'principiorum enim non est demonstratio'. Et eodem modo in contingentibus; alioquin foret processus in infinitum, in contingentibus, quia contingentia non sequuntur ex necessariis. Et ideo ista voluntas Dei quae vult hoc et pro nunc - est immediata et prima causa, cuius non est aliqua alia causa quaerenda: sicut enim non est ratio quare voluit naturam humanam esse in hoc individuo et esse possibile et contingens, ita non est ratio quare hoc voluit nunc et non tunc, sed tantum 'quia voluit hoc esse, ideo bonum fuit illud esse'; et quaerere huius propositionis - licet contingentis immediatae - aliam rationem, est quaerere rationem cuius non est ratio quaerenda.	91. To the fourth [n.55] I say - as was said in 1 d.8 n.299 - that 'it is a mark of lack of education to seek demonstrations for everything' (according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 4.4.1006a5-8), 'for there is no demonstration of principles'. And in the same way in contingent things; otherwise there would be a process to infinity in the case of contingents, because contingent things do not follow from necessary ones. And therefore this will of God - which wills this and for now - is immediate and first cause, for which no other cause must be sought; for just as there is no reason that he wanted human nature to be in this individual and to be possible and contingent, so there is no reason that he wanted it now and not then, but only that 'because he wished this to be, therefore it was good that it be'; and to seek some reason for this proposition - although it is an immediate contingent one - is to seek a reason for what no reason should be sought.
92 Et cum dicit de 'exspectare', dico quod ipsa voluntas quae habet bonitatem ex ipso volibili, ipsa - si est recta - vult statim volitum, nisi sit aliqua ratio quare magis velit illud alias esse, et tunc exspectet ad illud tempus opportunius; sed voluntatem quae nullam habet rationem quare nunc vult aliquid (sicut nec absolute habet rationem quare hoc velit), non oportet aliquam opportunitatem in volito exspectare, - nec suam bonitatem habet a volito, sed e converso. ƿ	92. And when the argument speaks about 'expecting' [n.56], I say that a will that has goodness from the willable itself, this will - if it is right - immediately wills the willed thing, unless there is some reason that it should will it rather to be at another time, and then it expects or waits for that more opportune time; but a will that has no reason for willing something now (just as neither does it absolutely have a reason for willing this thing) does not have to wait for some opportunity in the willed thing - neither does it have goodness from the willed thing, but conversely.
	III. To the Other Arguments
93 Ad primum quod arguitur pro tertia opinione 'de esse essentiae', patet responsio per praedicta. Concedo enim quod omne creabile prius erat possibile ex parte sui, sed ista possibilitas vel potentialitas non fundatur in aliquo esse simpliciter sed in esse cognito (ita quod esse cognitum concomitatur potentialitas ad esse simpliciter), licet formaliter esse cognitum non sit esse possibile, quia 'esse cognitum' est esse in actu secundum quid, - esse autem possibile, est esse in potentia ad esse simpliciter, et non in actu. Nec tamen 'esse in potentia' est esse simpliciter, sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: sicut nec 'futurum esse' est esse simpliciter, nec 'esse praeteritum' est esse simpliciter; sicut enim 'praeteriisse in esse simpliciter' non infert esse simpliciter, sic nec 'futurum esse' infert esse simpliciter; igitur multo magis nec 'posse esse simpliciter' infert esse simpliciter, quia 'posse esse' videtur esse remotius ab esse simpliciter quam 'fore'.	93. To the first argument for the third opinion 'about being of essence' [n.77; the first opinion, n.59; the second, n.69], the response is plain from what was said before [nn.80-81, 82-84]. For I concede that everything creatable was first possible on its own part, but this possibility or potentiality is not founded in any being simply but in known being (such that potentiality for being simply is concomitant to known being), although formally known being is not possible being, because 'known being' is being in act in a certain respect - but possible being is to be in potency for being simply, and not to be in act. Nor yet is 'being in potency' being simply, but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect; just as neither is 'future being' being simply, nor is 'past being' being simply; for just as 'to have passed in being simply' does not imply being simply, so neither does 'future being' imply being simply; therefore much more does 'able to be simply' not imply being simply, because 'able to be' seems to be more remote from being simply than 'to be future' does.
94 Ad aliam rationem, de compositione ex actu et potentia, patet per idem. Licet enim concedatur potentiam obiectivam praeceƿdere actum, non tamen ipsa est in aliquo actu, - et licet sit in aliquo 'esse cognito' hoc quod conceditur esse cognitum, non tamen est formaliter esse cognitum. Illa tamen ratio non valet, quia compositio non est ex potentia obiectiva et actu terminante, sed alio modo est ista compositio, sicut dictum est distinctione 8 primi libri.	94. To the other reason, about composition of act and potency [n.78], the answer is plain from the same point [n.93]. For although it be conceded that objective potency precedes act, yet that potency is not in any act - and although what is conceded to be known is in some 'known being', yet it is not formally known being. However the reasoning in question [n.78] is not valid, because the composition is not of objective potency and terminating act, but this composition is in some other way, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.32-33.