Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D1/Q6

• I. To the Question A. About the Conclusion in Itself
• B. On the first Reason for this Distinction
• 1. First Opinion
• 2. Second Opinion
• 3. Scotus' own Solution
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Six: Whether Angel and Soul differ in Species
296 Sexto - et ultimo - circa hanc distinctionem, ubi Magister tractat de creatura mere spirituali et creatura composita ex spirituali et corporali, quaero utrum angelus et anima differant specie. ƿ	296. Sixth - and finally - about this distinction, where the Master [Lombard] deals with the purely spiritual creature and with the creature composed of the spiritual and corporeal, I ask whether angel and soul differ in species.
297 Quod non, probatio: Quia si essentiae differrent specie, igitur et potentiae quae fundantur in eis; et si potentiae, igitur et operationes, - et ulterius, igitur et obiecta, ex II De anima. Consequens falsum, quia idem est obiectum intellectus angeli et mei.	297. Proof that they do not: Because if the essences differ in species then the powers also do that are founded on them; and if the powers differ then so do the operations - and further, the objects then differ as well, from On the Soul 2.4.415a18-22. The consequent is false, because an angel's intellect and mine have the same object.
298 Secundo sic: Augustinus III De libero arbitrio: 'Angelus et anima sunt natura pares, sed officio impares'; sed paritas naturae non est in differentibus specie; igitur etc.	298. Secondly as follows: Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3.11 n.32 says, "Angel and soul are equal in nature but unequal in office;" but an equality of nature does not exist in things differing in species; therefore etc.
299 Tertio sic, quia si sunt alterius speciei, una secundum se totam erit nobilior alia et per consequens quodlibet individuum nobilioris erit nobilius quolibet individuo ignobilioris: et ita vel quilibet angelus erit perfectior qualibet anima, vel e converso; et tunc ulterius, cum capacitas sequatur naturam, vel erit capacitas maior cuiuslibet angeli capacitate cuiuslibet animae, vel e converso; et cum beatitudo requirat totam capacitatem animae satiari, sequitur quod maior perfectio sit necessario in quolibet angelo (ad hoc quod sit beatus) quam in quacumque anima, vel e converso, - quorum ƿutrumque est falsum, quia angelus et anima se habent sicut excedentia et excessa in beatitudine.	299. Thirdly as follows, that if they are of different species, then one of them will, as to its totality, be nobler than the other, and consequently each individual of the nobler kind will be nobler than any individual of the less noble kind; and then either any angel at all will be more perfect than any soul at all, or conversely; and then further, since capacity follows nature, either the capacity of any angel at all will be greater than the capacity of any soul at all, or conversely; and since blessedness requires the whole capacity of the soul to be satisfied, it follows that there is necessarily a greater perfection in any angel (so that it may be blessed) than in any soul, or conversely - each one of which is false, because angel and soul are disposed as exceeding and as exceeded in blessedness.
300 Contra: Quanto forma creata nobilior, tanto distinguitur in plures gradus nobilitatis (sicut plures sunt formae mixti quam elementares, et plures formae animati quam inanimati, et forte plura animalia quam plantae); ergo plura erunt differentia specie in natura intellectiva quam non intellectiva, quod non potest esse nisi angelus et anima differant specie; ergo etc.	300. On the contrary: The more noble a created form is, the more it is distinguished into degrees of nobility (as there are more forms of mixed things than there are elementary forms, and more forms of animate things than of inanimate ones, and perhaps more animals than plants); so there will be more differences in species in the case of intellective nature than of non-intellective nature, which cannot be if angel and soul do not differ in species; therefore etc.
	I. To the Question A. About the Conclusion in Itself
301 Conclusio istius quaestionis certa est, quod scilicet angelus et anima differunt specie, - quia formae eiusdem rationis eandem rationem habent perficiendi et non perficiendi; sed anima naturaliter est perfectiva corporis organici ut forma, angelus autem naturaliter non est perfectivus alicuius materiae; igitur etc.	301. The conclusion of this question [n.296] is certain, namely that angel and soul differ in species - because forms of the same idea have the same idea of perfecting and not perfecting; but the soul is naturally perfective of an organic body as form of it, but an angel is not naturally perfective of any matter; therefore etc.
	B. On the first Reason for this Distinction
302 Sed quae sit prima ratio huius distinctionis specificae? ƿ	302. But what is the first reason for this distinction in species?
	1. First Opinion
303 Dicitur ab aliquibus quod unibilitas ad materiam et non unibilitas ad materiam.	303. Some say [Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas] that the first reason is unitability with matter and non-unitability with matter.
304 Contra: forma est finis materiae, ex II Physicorum, - et ideo distinctio materiae est propter distinctionem formae, et non e converso (unde membra cervi differunt a membris leonis, quia anima differt ab anima); ergo non erit prima distinctio specifica huius et illius per materiam et non materiam, sed prior erit ipsorum actuum in se.	304. On the contrary: form is the end of matter, from Physics 2.8.199a30-32, and so the distinction of matter is for the distinction of form and not conversely (hence the bodily members of a deer are different from the bodily members of a lion, because soul differs from soul [1 d.2 n.332]); so the first distinction of this thing and of that will not be through matter and non-matter, but will be prior in itself to those acts.
305 Quod confirmatur: quia enim haec natura est talis et illa non, ideo haec non est illa; igitur ista ratio perficiendi et non perficiendi non erit prima ratio distinctiva.	305. There is a confirmation; for because this nature is such and that nature is not, so this nature is not that nature; therefore this idea of perfecting and of not perfecting [matter] will not be the first reason for distinction.
	2. Second Opinion
306 Aliter dicitur quod gradus maior vel minor, in angelo et anima, est primum distinctivum unius ab alio. ƿ	306. In another way it is said [Thomas Aquinas] that a greater or lesser degree, in angel and in soul, is what first distinguishes one from the other.
307 Quod confirmatur per simile, quia anima sensitiva non videtur distingui in brutis nisi secundum diversos gradus sentiendi, et tamen ibi est differentia specifica; igitur ita potest esse hic penes diversos modos intelligendi, perfectiorem scilicet et imperfectiorem.	307. There is a confirmation through a likeness, because the sensitive soul does not seem to be distinguished in the brutes save because of diverse degrees of perceiving, and yet there is there a specific difference; therefore it can be like this here with diverse modes of understanding, namely a more perfect mode and a more imperfect one.
308 Quis autem sit iste distinctus modus intelligendi? - Ponitur quod angelus intelligit sine discursu et anima cum discursu (loquendo de intellectu naturali); et isti modi sunt specie distincti, et sunt intellectualitates alterius speciei.	308. But what is this distinct mode of understanding? - What is posited is that an angel understands non-discursively and a soul understands discursively (speaking of the natural intellect); and these modes are distinct in species and are intellectualities of different species.
309 Contra: Anima non discurrit circa principia et discurrit circa conclusiones; igitur si cognoscere sic et sic, est alterius speciei, et ideo reƿquirit intellectualitatem alterius speciei, - erunt duae intellectualitates alterius speciei in anima, una in quantum intelligit principia et alia in quantum intelligit conclusiones.	309. On the contrary: The soul is not discursive as to principles and is discursive as to conclusions; therefore if knowing in this way and knowing in that way are different species, and if that is why they require intellectualities of different species, then there will be two intellectualities of different species in the soul, one insofar as it understands principles and another insofar as it understands conclusions.
310 Praeterea, anima beati, in obiecto beatifico, non discurrit circa illud, - discurrit autem circa obiectum cognitum naturaliter; ergo alia esset intellectualitas specie in quantum intelligit Deum beatifice et in quantum intelligit aliquid naturaliter.	310. Besides, the soul of the blessed is not discursive about the beatific object, but it is discursive about an object known naturally; therefore there will be one intellectuality in species insofar as the soul understands God beatifically and another insofar as it understands something naturally.
311 Item, tertio sic: si intellectualitas angeli et animae differunt specie, igitur illa quae dependent essentialiter ab illa et ab ista, differunt specie; sed ab istis dependent essentialiter visio beatifica angeli et visio beatifica animae (licet enim angelus non sit tota causa visionis suae, nec anima suae, tamen utraque visio essentialiter dependet ab intellectualitate naturae cuius est); igitur ista visio beatifica et illa differunt specie, - quod falsum est, quia omnes species diversae habent ordinem determinatum secundum perfectius et imperfectius, ita quod quodlibet individuum perfectioris excedit quodlibet individuum imperfectioris: et tunc sequitur vel quod quaelibet beatitudo cuiuslibet angeli excederet quamlibet beatitudinem cuiuslibet animae, vel e converso, quorum utrumque est falsum. ƿ	311. Again, third as follows: if the intellectuality of angel and soul differ in species, then things that essentially depend on the one and on the other differ in species; but essentially dependent on these is the beatific vision of an angel and of a soul (for although an angel is not the total cause of his vision nor the soul of its, yet each vision essentially depends on the intellectuality of the nature it belongs to); therefore this beatific vision and that differ in species - but this is false, because all diverse species have a determinate order according to more perfect and more imperfect, such that any individual of the more perfect species exceeds any individual of the more imperfect species; and then it follows that any blessedness of any angel would exceed any blessedness of any soul, or conversely, both of which are false.
312 Item, quarto: quid intelligitur per hoc quod dicitur 'angelum non intelligere discurrendo'? Aut quod angelus non habet potentiam, qua cognitis principiis posset conclusiones cognoscere (si illae non essent prius sibi notae actu vel habitu): et hoc tunc non videtur esse perfectionis in intellectu; immo hoc videtur esse imperfectionis in intellectu creato, quia perfectio in intellectu nostro est - supplens imperfectionem quod possit ex quibusdam cognitis, virtualiter includentibus alia, illorum aliorum cognitionem acquirere.	312. Again, fourth: what is meant by the statement 'an angel does not understand discursively'? Either that an angel does not have a power by which he can know the conclusions when he knows the principles (supposing the conclusions were not known to him in act or habit before); and then this does not seem to be a mark of perfection in an intellect; rather it seems to be a mark of imperfection in a created intellect, because it is a perfection in our intellect - supplying an imperfection - that it can from known things that virtually include other things acquire knowledge of those other things.
313 Aut intelligitur quod ideo non potest discurrere quia omnes conclusiones sunt sibi actualiter notae a principio (et ita non posset eas per principia cognoscere): sed hoc est falsum, quia non omnia a principio actu et distincte cognoscit et intelligit.	313. Or what is meant is that an angel can for this reason not know discursively, because all conclusions are actually known to him from the beginning (and so he cannot know them through the principles); but this is false, because he does not actually and distinctly know and understand everything from the beginning.
314 Aut ideo quia omnia sunt sibi nota habitualiter a principio (et ideo non potest habitualem cognitionem eorum acquirere ex principiis): et hoc non ponit differentiam essentialem intellectualitatis animae et angeli, quia sic esset in anima mea quod, si omnes conclusiones sibi essent notae a principio, a Deo imprimente notitiam earum simul cum notitia principiorum, ipsa non posset discurrere, non propter impotentiam naturae, sed quia iam praehaberet cognitionem conclusionum, et non potest acquirere de novo illud quod praehaberet (hoc modo anima Christi non discurrebat, sed ƿipsa novit habitualiter omnia principia et conclusiones in principiis, et tamen ipsa non fuit natura angelica).	314. Or for this reason, that everything is known to him habitually from the beginning (and therefore he cannot acquire an habitual knowledge of them from principles); and this does not posit an essential difference of intellectuality in soul and angel, because it might be thus in the case of my soul, that if all conclusions were known to it from the beginning (God impressing on it knowledge of the conclusions at the same time as knowledge of the principles), it could not know them discursively - not because of an inability of nature but because it would have knowledge of the conclusions beforehand and cannot acquire de novo what it would already have (in this way the soul of Christ was not discursive but knew habitually all the principles, and the conclusions in the principles, and yet his soul was not angelic in nature).
	3. Scotus' own Solution
315 Dico tunc ad quaestionem quod quidquid est potens agere, est aliquod ens habens actum primum; et prior est ibi secundum naturam ratio actus primi secundum se quam in comparatione ad actum secundum, cuius potest esse principium, ita quod licet illud quo tale ens est principium actus secundi, non sit aliud a natura sua, non tamen prima entitas sua est natura sua ut est principium actus secundi talis, sed natura sua ut est in se 'haec'; et ita prima distinctio entis non est per naturam suam in quantum est principium talis operationis, sed per naturam suam ut est 'haec natura', licet per identitatem ipsa sit principium actus secundi.	315. I say then to the question [n.302] that whatever is able to act is some being possessed of first act; and by nature the idea there of first act in itself is prior to first act in comparison with second act, of which first act is the principle, such that, although that by which such a being is the principle of second act is not other than its own nature, yet its primary entity is not its nature as its nature is principle of such second act, but it is its nature as its nature is in itself a 'this'; and so the first distinction of being is not through its nature as its nature is principle of such operation but through its nature as it is 'this nature', although it is by identity the principle of second act.
316 Ita dico in proposito quod licet natura angelica sit principium intelligendi et volendi, et anima similiter (ita quod istae potentiae nihil dicunt essentiae animae additum), tamen primum - hic et ibi - est haec natura et illa natura, ad se. Et ista 'distinctio' prima est, ad quam sequitur illa distinctio principiorum operandi, sive eiusdem actus sive operationum aliarum: quia enim est haec natura, ideo est principium talis operationis, et non e converso.	316. So I say in the issue at hand that, although the angelic nature is the principle of understanding and willing, and the soul likewise (such that these powers do not state anything added to the essence of the soul), yet what is first - in this case and that - is this nature and that nature, in relation to itself. And so the first distinction is that on which there follows the distinction of principles of operating, whether operating the same act or different ones; for it is because it is this nature that is the principle of such operation, and not contrariwise.
317 Exemplum huius est: sol habet virtutem generandi multa mixta, inferius. Et si quaeras primam rationem distinctionis solis a planta, non est prima ratio distinctionis unius ab alio per potentiam geneƿrandi plantam ex parte solis, quia si illa potentia communicaretur alii, non propter hoc illud esset sol, nec distingueretur a planta sicut sol distinguitur. Prima igitur ratio distinctiva est, quia forma solis est talis forma et forma plantae est talis forma, et ad hoc sequitur quod ista forma potest esse principium talium operationum et illa non.	317. There is an example of this: the sun has the virtue of generating many mixed bodies inferior to it. And if you ask for the first reason for the distinction of sun from plant, the first reason for the distinction of one from the other is not through the power of generating a plant on the part of the sun, because, if that power were communicated to another, yet not for this reason would that other be the sun, nor would it be distinguished from a plant as the sun is distinguished. The first distinguishing reason then is that the form of the sun is such and such a form and the form of a plant is such and such a form, and on this follows the fact that this form can be the principle of such operations and the other cannot be.
318 Ita dico in proposito quod, quia angelus est talis natura ad se et anima talis natura ad se, ideo primo specie distinguuntur; non quidem sicut duae species, sed sicut species et pars speciei, quia anima proprie non est species, sed pars speciei: et tamen ipsa est prima ratio distinguendi suam speciem - cuius est pars - ab angelo, et ideo prima ratio distinctionis specificae ex parte speciei suae est ipsa.	318. So I say in the issue at hand, that because an angel is such a nature in itself and because the soul is such a nature in itself, therefore are they first distinct in species; not indeed as two species but as species and part of a species, because the soul is not properly a species but a part of a species; and yet soul is the first reason for distinguishing its species - the species of which it is a part - from an angel, and so the first reason for specific distinction on the part of its species is itself.
319 Potest etiam addi (licet non sit necessarium absolute pro solutione quaestionis) quod intellectualitas angeli, in quantum intellectualitas, non differt specie ab intellectualitate animae in quantum intellectualitas, - hoc est quod licet iste actus primus et ille differant specie ut considerantur absolute in se, non tamen secundum illam perfectionem quam virtualiter continent, secundum quam sunt principia actuum secundorum; quod videtur per hoc, ƿquia sunt circa obiecta eiusdem rationis et ad obiecta eiusdem rationis (et simile huius est: si anima bovis et aquilae differant specie, non tamen propter hoc vis visiva hic et ibi, in quantum talis perfectio et talis, differunt specie).	319. One can also add (although it is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the question) that the intellectuality of an angel, qua intellectuality, does not differ in species from the intellectuality of the soul qua intellectuality - this is because, although this first act and that first act differ in species as these acts are considered absolutely in themselves, yet not as they are considered according to the perfection that they virtually contain, namely the perfection according to which they are principles of second acts; the point is seen from this, that these acts are about objects of the same idea and in relation to objects of the same idea (and a likeness of this is that, if the soul of ox and eagle differ in species, yet not for this reason do the powers of seeing of the one and of the other, insofar as they are this sort of perfection and that sort of perfection, differ in species).
320 Istud autem est bene possibile, quod continentia aliqua differant specie et tamen contenta non differant specie, sicut passiones entis continentur per identitatem in entibus quantumcumque distinctis et tamen illae passiones in eis non distinguuntur specie: unitas enim lapidis (quae non est aliud realiter a lapide) et unitas hominis (quae est eadem realiter homini) non ita distinguuntur formaliter specie sicut homo et lapis; immo haec unitas et illa tantum videntur differre numero.	320. Now this is very possible, because some containing things differ in species and yet what they contain does not differ in species, as the properties of being are contained by identity in beings ever so distinct and yet these properties in them are not distinct in species; for the oneness of a stone (which is not really other than the stone) and the oneness of a man (which is really the same as the man) are not as formally distinct in species as man and stone are; rather, this oneness and that oneness seem to differ only in number.
321 Hoc etiam declaratur per aliud, quia sicut in eodem possunt contineri per identitatem illa quorum est distinctio formalis quasi specifica (sicut in eadem anima includuntur perfectiones intellectivae et sensitivae, ita quod sunt distinctae formaliter sicut si essent duae res), ita e converso potest aliquid 'indistinctum formaliter' contineri in distinctis.	321. This is also made clear through something else, that just as things, whose formal distinction is as it were one of species, can be by identity contained in the same thing (as in the same soul are included the intellective and sensitive perfections such that they are as formally distinct as if they were two things), so conversely something 'formally non-distinct' can be contained in distinct things.
322 Et si hoc sit verum, tunc planum est quod angelus et anima non sic distinguuntur specie primo, per talem et talem intellectualitatem, - immo, nec primo nec non primo distinguuntur specie ƿquia talis et talis est intellectualitas in eis'. Vel si istud non sit verum sed relinquatur modo sicut dubium, saltem primum dictum videtur satis clarum, quod per istud non est prima distinctio eorum.	322. And if this is true [sc. that formally non-distinct things can be contained in formally distinct things, as an intellective power not distinct in species can be contained in specifically distinct angel and soul], then it is plain that angel and soul are not in this way distinguished first in species, namely by such and such an intellectuality - rather, neither first nor not-first are they distinguished in species 'because such and such an intellectuality exists in them'. Or, if this not be true, but be left now as in doubt, at least the first statement [sc. that angel and soul differ specifically on the part of their absolute natures, nn.315-318] seems sufficiently clear, because their first distinction is not through this [sc. through distinct intellectualities].
	II. To the Principal Arguments
323 Ad primum argumentum principale potest concedi quod essentiae angeli et animae possunt differre specie, et tamen non potentiae, Si illud ultimum dictum in solutione quaestionis sit verum, - et tunc illud argumentum non procedit.	323. As to the first principal argument [n.297], one can concede that the essences of angel and soul can differ in species and that yet the powers do not, if the final statement in the solution of the question [nn.319-21] is true - and in that case the argument [n.297] does not proceed.
324 Tamen potest dici quod potentiae, differentes specie ex parte fundamenti (non tamen ex parte obiecti), possunt habere actus differentes specie in quantum illi actus dependent a fundamento illius potentiae, licet illi actus sint eiusdem speciei in quantum dependent ab obiectis; et tunc concederetur quod intellectio angeli et hominis, de eodem intelligibili, ex parte obiecti est eadem specie, ex parte autem fundamenti - in quantum fundamentum est potentiae ratio agendi - sunt alia specie.	324. Yet one can say that powers, different in species on the part of the foundation (but not on the part of the object), can have acts different in species insofar as the acts depend on the foundation of the power, though the acts are of the same species insofar as they depend on the objects; and then it would be conceded that the intellection of angel and of man about the same intelligible thing is the same in species on the part of the object, but on the part of the foundation - insofar as the foundation is the power's reason of acting - is different in species.
325 Oporteret etiam tunc dicere quod operationes simpliciter differunt specie, - quia illa identitas ex parte obiecti, simpliciter non ƿest identitas in specie, sed diversitas simpliciter et identitas secundum quid (quaecumque enim differentia sufficit ad distinguendum, sed non quaecumque identitas sufficit ad perfectam identitatem aliquorum!); et tunc videtur sequi idem inconveniens quod illatum est contra secundam opinionem, de actibus beatificis, nisi forte diceretur quod tota causa actus beatifici est obiectum et quod potentiae se habeant ibi respectu illius actus ut tantum receptivae et passivae, - et receptiva non distinguunt 'formas receptas' specie, sicut patet de albedine, recepta in lapide et ligno.	325. One should then also say that the operations simply differ in species -because the identity on the part of the object is not simply an identity in species but is a diversity simply and an identity in a certain respect (for any difference suffices for drawing a distinction between certain things but not any identity suffices for a perfect identity between them); and then the same unacceptable result seems to follow as was inferred against the second opinion, the one about beatific acts [n.311], unless perhaps it be said that the total cause of the beatific act is the object and that the powers are disposed there in respect of the act as merely receptive and passive - and receptive things do not distinguish received forms in species, as is plain about whiteness when received in a stone and in wood.
326 Ad secundum (et ad omnes auctoritates consimiles) patet per illam auctoritatem Augustini 'anima, sola veritate formatur': propter hoc quidem nihil superius est anima, - verum est enim, in ratione obiecti in quo quiescat; et quoad hoc, par est anima cum angelo, quia nulla natura intellectualis potest quietari nisi in obiecto infinito. Et ita intelligenda est illa auctoritas, et omnes similes.	326. As to the second argument [n.298] (and all like authorities), the answer is plain from the authority of Augustine [On 83 Diverse Questions q.51 n.4] 'the soul is formed by truth alone'; indeed for this reason nothing is superior to the soul - for this is true by reason of the object in which it rests; and to this extent the soul is equal to an angel, because no intellectual nature can be made to rest save in an infinite object. And thus must the authority be understood, and all like authorities.
327 Ad tertium potest concedi quod quodlibet individuum unius excedit quodlibet individuum alterius, - sed quid sit illud, non oportet explicare ante III librum, comparando animam Christi ad ƿnaturam angelicam. Et concedendum est totum argumentum, usque ad illud 'quod tota capacitas naturae satiatur in beatitudine': illa enim propositio non est vera, loquendo de capacitate mere naturali; praecise enim satiatur secundum proportionem ad merita (communiter loquendo), et in hoc sufficienter satiatur appetitus deliberativus. Qualiter autem stare potest perfecta beatitudo ex sola tali satietate, etsi appetitus naturalis possit esse ad ulteriorem perfectionem, additam, - potest tractari alias, in materia de beatitudine, in IV.	327. As to the third [n.299] it can be conceded that any individual of one species exceeds any individual of the other - but what that means does not have to be explained before book 3, when comparing the soul of Christ with the angelic nature [2 d.13 qq.1-4 nn.2, 5-6, 9, 19]. And the whole argument should be conceded up to the phrase that 'the whole capacity of nature is satisfied in blessedness' [n.299]; for that proposition is not true when speaking of merely natural capacity; for this capacity is precisely satisfied in proportion to its merits (commonly speaking), and in this is deliberative appetite sufficiently satisfied. But as to how blessedness from only such satisfaction can stand perfect even though there can be natural appetite for a further and added perfection - this can be dealt with elsewhere, in the subject matter of blessedness in book 4 (Suppl. d.50 p.2 qq.1-3 n.3).