Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D1/Q5

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Question Five: Whether the Relation of the Creature to God is the Same as its Foundation
188 Et quia haec quaestio dependet a quadam alia, scilicet 'de identitate relationis ad suum fundamentum', et hoc specialiter loquendo de relatione illa quae est creaturae ad Deum, - ideo quaero quinto utrum relatio creaturae ad Deum sit eadem fundamento. 188. And because this question [question 4, n.179] depends on a certain other question, namely about 'the identity of the relation with its foundation', and this when speaking specifically of the relation which is of the creature to God - therefore I ask fifth whether the relation of the creature to God is the same as its foundation.
189 Quod non, videtur: Primo sic: si omnia 'alia a Deo' habent relationem ad ipsum, ergo omnia alia essent 'ad aliquid', non tantum accidentaliter sed per identitatem; consequens videtur impossibile, quia illud infert Philosophus IV Metaphysicae ex dicto dicentium 'omnia apparentia esse vera'. ƿ 189. It seems that it is not: First thus: everything 'other than God' has a relation to him, therefore everything other would be 'relative to something' not only accidentally but by identity; the consequent seems impossible, because the Philosopher infers it, Metaphysics 4.6.1011a19-20, from the statement of those who say 'everything that appears is true'.
190 Secundo sic: praedicamenta sunt primo diversa - ex V et X Metaphysicae - et ut simpliciter diversa entia, quia ens secundum se dividitur in illa (V Metaphysicae); ergo nihil unius praedicamenti est idem alicui alterius praedicamenti. Ergo nulla relatio est eadem alicui absoluto. 190. Second thus: the categories are primarily diverse - from Metaphysics 5.9.1018a12-13, 10.3.1054b28-30 - and are as beings simply diverse, because being is of iself divided into them (Metaphysics 5.7.1017a22-27); therefore nothing in one category is the same as something in another category. Therefore no relation is the same as something absolute.
191 Oppositum: Non minus dependet quodlibet creatum ad Deum quam quodcumque creatum ad aliud creatum, quia dependentia ad Primum videtur essentialissima; sed totum habet relationem ad partes eandem sibi, quia non potest esse totum et non esse ex partibus; ergo pari ratione ad causam primam, licet extrinsecam, habebit dependentiam eandem sibi. Licet enim causa extrinseca non componat rem, sicut facit causa intrinseca, perfectius tamen causat rem quam causa intrinseca: componere enim rem, includit imperfectionem, scilicet potentialitatem. ƿ 191. The opposite: Any created thing whatever does not less depend on God than any created thing whatever depends on another created thing, because dependence on the First thing seems most essential; but a whole has a relation to its parts the same as to itself, because it cannot be a whole and not be made of parts; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will have a dependence on the first cause, albeit an extrinsic first cause, the same as to itself. For although an extrinsic cause does not constitute a thing the way the intrinsic cause does, yet it causes the thing more perfectly than an intrinsic cause does; for to constitute a thing involves imperfection, namely potentiality.
I. To the Fifth Question A. On the Identity of Relation in General to its Foundation 1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent
192 Hic dicitur quod omnis relatio est eadem fundamento suo, - quaere Quodlibet IX quaestione 3 et Quodlibet V quaestione 2 (quae videntur quasi contraria). ƿ 192. [Exposition of the opinion] - Here it is said [sc. by Henry] that every relation is the same as its foundation - look at his Quodlibet 9 q.3 and 5 q.2 (which seem as it were to be contrary).
193 Pro ista opinione arguitur multipliciter: Primo, quia relatio transfertur ad Deum secundum propriam rationem relationis, et ideo in divinis dicuntur manere duo praedicamenta proprie, scilicet relatio et substantia; sed si de ratione relationis foret quod esset alia res a fundamento, tunc in Deo esset res et res, et ita compositio, quod est contra simplicitatem divinam. 193. For this opinion multiple arguments are given: First, that relation is transferred to God according to the proper idea of relation, and therefore there are said to be two categories properly in divine reality, namely relation and substance [1 d.8 n.130]; but if it were going to be of the idea of relation that it would be a different thing from its foundation, then in God there would be thing and thing, which is against divine simplicity.
194 Et ex hoc medio arguitur generaliter, scilicet ex simplicitate: non enim est compositius 'album simile' quam album tantum, et per consequens relatio similitudinis non addit aliam rem a fundamento; ergo nec est alia res. ƿ 194. And from this middle term, namely from simplicity, a general argument is made: for a 'like white thing' is not more composite than a white thing simply, and consequently the relation of likeness does not add anything different from the foundation; therefore neither is relation a different thing.
195 Secundo arguitur hoc per viam mutationis, quia si esset alia res a fundamento, ergo cuicumque fundamento ipsa adveniret de novo, ipsum mutaretur, - quod videntur negare multae auctoritates: primo Philosophi V Physicorum, quia negat in 'ad aliquid' esse motum vel mutationem; secundo Boethii Trinitatis cap. 13 (quaere eum ibi); tertio Anselmi Monologion. ƿ 195. Secondly this point is argued by way of change, that if relation were a different thing from the foundation, then whatever foundation it would come to de novo would be changed - which seems to be denied by many authorities; first of the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a34, who denies that there is motion or change in the category of relation; second of Boethius On the Trinity ch.5 (look at him there [not expressis verbis but implicity]); third of Anselm Monologion ch.25.[1]
196 Tertio arguitur ex hoc quod si relatio esset alia res a fundamento, ergo similitudo haberet suum proprium inesse, aliud ab inesse albedinis; quod prima facie videtur inconveniens, quia tunc relatio fundata super substantiam (si quae sit) esset accidentalis propter suam propriam accidentalitatem, - quod videtur contra ƿSimplicium Super praedicamenta, ubi dicit quod Philosophus prius tractat de quantitate et qualitate quam de relatione, quia relatio fundatur in illis immediate; et non fundatur in substantia immediate (et hoc loquendo de relatione accidentali), quia relatio fundata super substantiam non habet ex se propriam accidentalitatem. 196. Third an argument is made from this, that if relation were a thing different from its foundation then likeness would have its own presence in a subject different from the presence in it of whiteness; and this seems prima facie unacceptable, because a relation founded on a substance (if there is any) would be accidental because of its own accidentality - which seems against Simplicius On the Categories (f. 95r, 40v-41r) where he says that the Philosopher treats of quantity and quality before relation because relation is founded immediately on these; and it is not founded on substance immediately (and this when speaking of accidental relation), because relation founded on substance does not have a proper accidentality of itself.
197 Probatur etiam idem illatum prius esse inconveniens, quia tunc genus relationis non esset simplex sed quasi compositum ex 'in' et 'ad', - quod videtur esse inconveniens, quia primus conceptus cuiuslibet generis primi debet esse simplex omnino, ut videtur; ergo etc. 197. The same preceding inference [n.196] is also proved to be unacceptable because then the genus of relation would not be simple but as it were composed of 'in' and 'to' - which seems unacceptable because the first concept of any first genus should be altogether simple, as it seems; therefore etc.
198 Quarto arguitur quod si esset alia res a fundamento, tunc esset processus in infinitum in relationibus: nam si ista relatio sit alia res a fundamento, pari ratione et illa alietas (quae est quaedam relatio) erit alia res a fundamento, et illa alietas a suo fundamento, et sic in infinitum, - quod est inconveniens; ergo etc. 198. Fourth it is argued that if relation were a thing other than the foundation, then there would be an infinite regress in relations; for if this relation is a thing other than the foundation, by parity of reasoning the otherness too (which is a certain relation) will be a thing other than the foundation, and this otherness a thing other than the foundation, and so on ad infinitum; but this is unacceptable, therefore etc.
199 Quinto sic: relatio non habet distinctionem in species suas ƿnisi penes fundamenta (non enim distinguitur dominium a paternitate penes hoc quod est 'esse ad', sed penes fundamentum, - nec relationes illae disquiparantiae distinguuntur, vel sunt eaedem cum relationibus aequiparantiae, nisi per unitatem et difformitatem in fundamentis); sed si relatio esset alia res a fundamento, haberet ex se formaliter distinctionem in species suas; ergo etc. 199. Fifth thus: relation does not have a distinction in its species save by reason of the foundation (for lordship is not distinguished from paternity by the fact it is 'in relation to' but by reason of the foundation - nor are these disparate relations distinguished, nor are they the same as relations of equivalence, save by reason of unity and difference of form in the foundations [n.205]); but if relation were a thing other than the foundation, it would have of itself formally a distinction in its species; therefore etc.[2]
200 Contra istam opinionem arguo primo sic: nihil est idem realiter alicui, sine quo potest esse realiter absque contradictione; sed multae sunt relationes sine quibus fundamenta ƿpossunt esse absque contradictione; ergo multae sunt relationes quae non sunt realiter idem cum fundamento. 200. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion I argue first as follows: nothing is the same really as anything that it can, without contradiction, really be without; but there are many relations that foundations can, without contradiction, be without; therefore there are many relations that are not the same really as their foundation.
201 Probatio maioris: quia quod 'idem ens' sit realiter et non sit realiter, videtur esse oppositum primi principii, ex quo 'principio primo' videtur statim concludi diversitas entium; quia si de aliquibus contradictoria dicantur, eo modo quo dicuntur de eis, videntur non idem, et ita si contradictoria 'esse' et 'non esse' dicantur de eis, videntur esse non idem in esse vel in re, sive non idem ens. 201. Proof of the major: because that the 'same being' should really be and really not be seems to be opposed to the first principle [sc. the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time etc.], from which first principle the diversity of things seems at once to be inferred; because if contradictories are said of certain things, these things seem not to be the same in the way that the contradictories are said of them, and so if the contradictories 'to be' and 'not to be' are said of them, they seem not to be the same in being or in reality, or not to be the same being.
202 Confirmatur istud, quia si illa maior negetur, non videtur relinqui unde possit distinctio entium probari: dicetur enim a protervo, non tantum quia in uno supposito plures naturae - ut substantia et accidentia - sunt eadem, sed etiam quod Socrates et Plato, vel Socrates et lapis vel albus, non differunt realiter; et si arguatur contra eum quod 'Socrates potest esse non exsistente lapide' et per hoc concludatur distinctio unius ab alio, vel 'Socrates potest esse Socrates et non albus' et per hoc concludatur distinctio subiecti et accidentis, - negabitur consequentia, quia protervus negabit propositionem cui innituntur istae consequentiae, quam propositionem et tu negas. ƿ 202. There is confirmation of this, because if the major [n.200] is denied, there seems no way left for being able to prove the distinction of things; for it will be said by the impudent not only that the several natures in one supposit - as substance and accidents - are the same, but also that Socrates and Plato are the same, or that Socrates and stone or white do not really differ; and if it be argued against him that 'Socrates can exist when a stone does not exist' and if from this the distinction of one from the other is inferred, or if it be argued that 'Socrates can exist and not be white' and if from this the distinction of subject and accident is inferred - the consequence will be denied, because the impudent will deny the proposition [sc. the major, n.200] on which these consequences rely, which proposition you also deny [sc. ex hypothesi from the beginning of this paragraph].
203 Hanc etiam propositionem 'illa sunt distincta realiter quorum unum potest manere sine altero', negaret protervus. Ista autem negata, perit tota doctrina Philosophi VII Topicorum, qua docet quod propositio vel problema faciliter destruitur per contradictionem inventam, sed difficulter construitur; si autem negetur ista propositio, non videtur posse destrui (quia si non destruitur per contradictionem, nec per aliquam aliam oppositionem!), aut saltem non faciliter et facillime videtur posse sustineri, - quia nullus locus secundum eum vel ab eo assignatus videtur efficax ad destruendum aliquid, si iste locus destruatur. 203. This proposition too, 'those things, one of which can persist without the other, are really distinct', will be denied by the impudent. But once it has been denied, the whole doctrine of the Philosopher perishes, Topics 7.8-9.154a23-55a38, whereby he teaches that a proposition or problem is easily destroyed by discovery of its contradictory but is with difficulty established; but if this proposition [sc. at the beginning of this paragraph] is denied, no proposition or problem seems able to be destroyed (because if it is not destroyed by a contradiction then not by any other opposition either), or at least it seems not able easily or very easily to be sustained - because no place [sc. of argument] according to or assigned by Aristotle seems efficacious for destroying anything if this place is destroyed.
204 In ista etiam via Philosophi fundatur illa via de motu sive mutatione, ad probandum distinctionem, - qua utitur Philosophus probando materiam esse aliam rem a forma, quia manet eadem sub oppositis formis; qua etiam utitur Philosophus IV Physicorum, ad probandum locum esse aliud a locatis, quia idem locus manet cum diversis locatis. 204. On this way of the philosopher is also founded the way of motion or change for proving a distinction - the way that the philosopher uses when proving that matter is a thing other than form, because it remains the same under opposed forms; the Philosopher also uses it, in Physics 5.2.220a1-11,[3] to prove that place is other than the things placed in it, because the same place persists along with different things placed in it.
205 Minor etiam apparet in omnibus relationibus quarum fundamenta possunt esse sine terminis, sicut est in omnibus relationibus ƿaequiparantiae (sicut sunt simile, aequale et huiusmodi): si enim hoc album sit et illud album non sit, hoc album est sine similitudine, - et si aliud album fiat, in hoc albo est similitudo; potest igitur esse sine isto et cum isto. Similiter est in multis relationibus disquiparantiae: si enim iste sit homo, et talis ut nullus alius subsit potestati suae, erit sine dominatione, - et ipse etiam potest esse dominus, servorum accessione, sicut dicit Boethius; et ita est de multis aliis, de quibus omnibus non oportet exempla adducere. 205. The minor [n.200] is also plain in all relations whose foundations can exist without terms, as is the case with all relations of equivalence (as are similar, equal, and the like); for if this white exists and that white does not, this white is without likeness -and if that white should come to be, there is likeness in this white; therefore this white can exist with it and without it. It is similar in the case of many relations of non-equivalence; for if this man exists and he is such that no one else is subject to his power, he will be without lordship - and again he can be a lord with the accession of slaves, as Boethius says [On the Trinity ch.5]; and so it is in many other cases, about none of which is there need to adduce examples.
206 Confirmatur etiam ista ratio quantum ad se totam (quia istae confirmationes valent et pro maiore et pro minore): quia si relatio non sit aliud a fundamento, quod tamen manet sine ea, videtur negari incarnatio et separatio accidentium a subiecto in eucharistia, videtur etiam negari omnis compositio in entibus et omnis causalitas causarum secundarum. 206. This reason [n.200] is also confirmed as to the whole of itself (because the following confirmations are valid for both the major and the minor); for if a relation is not other than its foundation, which yet remains in the relation's absence, the incarnation seems to be denied, and the separation of accidents from the subject in the Eucharist; also every composition in things seems to be denied, and all the causality of second causes.
207 Probatio primi inconvenientis. Si idem realiter naturae humanae sit eius unio ad Verbum, igitur si Verbum numquam assumpsisset naturam illam et fecisset illam absolutam, eandem, ipsa aeque realiter fuisset unita Verbo sicut modo est, quia tota realitas assumptionis assumpta fuisset; si etiam deponeret illam naturam (manente ƿtamen ipsa eadem in se), maneret illa natura realiter unita Verbo et ita realiter sicut nunc est unita, quia salvaretur tota realitas naturae tunc sicut modo. 207. Proof of the first unacceptable result [sc. about the incarnation]: if the union of human nature with the Word is the same really as the human nature, then if the Word had never assumed that nature and made it, the same nature, absolute, then it would really have been united with the Word as it is now, because the whole reality of the assumption was assumed; also if the Word put aside the nature (while the nature itself remained in itself the same), the nature would remain really united with the Word and as really as it is united now, because the whole reality of the nature would then be preserved as it is now.
208 Secundum etiam inconveniens 'de eucharistia', probatur: quia, si manet eadem quantitas (quae prius erat) panis, et nihil aliud est inhaerentia eius pani quam realiter ipsamet quantitas, ergo ita realiter unitur pani (vel eum informat) nunc sicut prius. 208. The proof also of the second unacceptable result [n.206], about the Eucharist: that if the same quantity of bread remains (the same as was before), and if the inherence of the Eucharist in the bread is nothing other than really that very quantity, then the Eucharist is really united to the bread (or informs it) now as before.
209 Tertium inconveniens probatur: quia si a et b componunt ab, et unio istarum partium ad invicem nihil aliud sit nisi ista absoluta a et b, separatis ergo realiter a et b manet tota realitas illa quae est ipsorum a et b unitorum. Et tunc a et b separata, manent realiter unita et ita manet compositum separatis componentibus, et ita compositum non erit compositum, - quia quando manet compositum separatis partibus componentibus, non est compositum ex eis; nihil enim esset tunc nisi unum aggregatione, sicut Philosophus videtur deducere VII Metaphysicae. 209. Proof of the third unacceptable result [n.206, composition in things]: because if a and b compose ab, and if the union of these parts with each other is nothing other than absolute a and b, then when a and b are really separate the whole reality remains that belongs to a and b united. And then a and b when separated remain really united and so the composite remains when the components are separated, and so the composite will not be composite - because when the composite remains while the component parts are separated, it is not composed of them; for then nothing would remain but a one by aggregation, as the Philosopher seems to conclude in Metaphysics 7.17.1041b11-19.
210 Quartum etiam inconveniens probatur: quia quidquid causatur a diversis causis secundis, praeexigit in eis debitam proportionem ƿet approximationem, ad hoc quod causetur ab eis; sed si ista approximatio et proportio nihil sit nisi absolutum, igitur ita realiter sunt ipsa causativa huiusmodi effectus quando non sunt approximata sicut quando sunt approximata, et ita ipsa approximata nihil possunt causare realiter quod non possunt causare etiam non approximata; nulla enim alia realitate posita, non potest aliqua res causari quae prius non potuit causari. Et ita potuisset fuisse argutum in tertio membro, de extremis componentibus, quia si a et b separata non componant ab, ergo nec ipsa unita, quia sicut eadem res absque omni realitate alia - non potest aliquid causare modo quod prius non potuit, ita nec eaedem res absque omni alia realitate possunt modo aliquid componere quod prius non potuerunt componere; igitur etc. 210. Proof too of the fourth unacceptable result [n.206, about the causality of second causes]: because whatever is caused by diverse second causes requires in them first a due proportion and coming together so that it may be caused by them; but if this coming together and proportion are only something absolute, then the causes are in this way really causative of this sort of effect when they do not come together just as when they do, and thus they can when together really cause nothing that they cannot cause even when not together; for when no other reality is posited, no thing can be caused that could not have been caused before. And thus could one have argued in the case of the third member, about the composite parts [n.209], because if a and b when separate do not compose ab, then neither do they do so when united, because just as the same thing -without any other reality - cannot cause something now which it could not cause before, so neither can the same things without any other reality compose now something that they could not compose before; therefore etc.
211 Secundo principaliter arguo contra praedictam opinionem: nihil finitum continet secundum perfectam continentiam vel virtualem opposita formaliter (quia quantumcumque concedatur in Deo perfectissima continentia omnium perfectionum secundum identitatem, quae sunt in eo, non tamen potest continere 'opposita absoluta' formaliter in se, licet in se possit habere 'talia opposita' ƿvirtualiter, et 'relativa' formaliter, - sed ex hoc conceditur infinitas fundamenti). Sed aequalitas et inaequalitas sunt opposita formaliter, et similiter similitudo et dissimilitudo, - saltem ad idem correlativum; ista autem possunt perfecte fundari in eodem fundamento successive. Ergo 'illud fundamentum' neutrum illorum continet formaliter (vel magis ad propositum, realiter et secundum perfectam identitatem), quia qua ratione non ambo, eadem ratione nec alterum. 211. Second[4] principally I argue against the aforesaid position [n.192]: nothing finite contains, according to perfect or virtual containing, opposites formally (because however much in God is conceded a most perfect containing of all perfections by identity that are in him, yet he cannot contain absolute opposites formally in himself, although he could have in himself such opposites virtually and such relatives formally - but from this is conceded an infinity of the foundation). But equality and inequality are opposites formally, and similarly likeness and unlikeness - at any rate relative to the same correlative term; but these can be perfectly founded on the same foundation successively. Therefore the foundation contains neither of them formally (or, more to the point, really and by perfect identity), because the reason for its not containing both is the same as the reason for its not containing either.
212 Tertio sic: idem non continet plura eiusdem rationis, secundum perfectam identitatem eadem sibi; sed plures relationes eiusdem rationis sunt in eodem fundamento, sicut plures similitudines fundantur in eadem albedine; ergo etc. Maior patet inductive in omnibus quae continent plura per identitatem, quia unum continens continet unum eiusdem rationis. 212. Third thus: the same thing does not contain many things of the same idea the same in perfect identity with itself; but many relations of the same idea are in the same foundation, as there are many likenesses founded on the same whiteness; therefore etc. The major is plain inductively in the case of everything that contains many things by identity, because one containing thing contains one thing of the same idea.
213 Quarto sic: continens aliquid per identitatem, si est perfectius, concludit etiam 'contentum in eo' esse perfectius per identitatem (sicut anima perfectior habet intellectum perfectiorem, - et secundum ponentes eandem esse formam intellectivam et sensitivam, corporeitatis et substantiae, intellectiva perfectiorem sensitivam includit quam sit sensitiva in brutis); non autem perfectius fundaƿmentum continet in se perfectiorem relationem, quia non omne albius est similius, ut ad sensum est manifestum; igitur etc. 213. Fourth thus: that which contains something by identity entails too, if it is more perfect, that what is contained in it is more perfect by identity (as a more perfect soul has a more perfect intellect - and according to those who posit that the same form is intellective and sensitive, and of corporeity and of substance, the intellective form includes a more perfect sensitive form than is the sensitive form in brutes); but a more perfect foundation does not contain in itself a more perfect relation, because not every whiter thing is more alike, as is manifest to the senses; therefore etc.
214 Quinto sic: contenta in aliquibus per identitatem, non minus differunt in continentibus magis distinctis; sed relationes fundatae in duobus generibus minus differunt quam duae relationes fundatae in re eiusdem generis (immo in eadem specie specialissima), quia aequalitas quae fundatur super quantitatem et similitudo fundata super qualitatem minus differunt quam similitudo et relatio potentiae activae, quae possunt fundari super eundem calorem; igitur etc. 214. Fifth thus: things contained in something by identity are not less different if the containers of them are more distinct; but relations founded on two genera are less different than two relations founded on a thing of the same genus (nay on the same most specific species), because equality, which is founded on quantity, and likeness, founded on quality, are less different than likeness and relation of active power, which can be founded on the same heat; therefore etc.
215 Sexto et ultimo sic: relatio rationis est alia res rationis a suo fundamento, igitur et relatio realis erit alia res realis a suo fundamento. Consequentia probatur, quia sicut relatio rationis est modus obiecti in primo actu intellectus, et tamen non est in se nihil in genere intelligibilium, sed est in se aliquod vere intelligibile (licet non ita vel aeque primum sicut illud cuius est modus, cum non intelligatur nisi actu reflexo, - et ideo non ita perfecte sicut illud cuius est modus), ita etiam relatio realis, licet sit modus sui fundamenti (et non aeque primo cum eo, nec aeque perfectum cum eo), tamen in se est res aliqua, quia quod in se nihil est, nullius est modus realis; non enim est aliquod nomen generalius quam ens vel res (secundum Avicennam I Metaphysicae cap. 5), et ideo cui non convenit esse ens vel res, ei non convenit aliquod esse reale. ƿ 215. Sixth and last thus: a relation of reason is a thing of reason different from its foundation, therefore a real relation too will be a real thing different from its foundation. The proof of the consequence is that, just as a relation of reason is the mode of the object in the first act of the intellect, and yet it is in itself not nothing in the genus of intelligibles but is in itself something truly intelligible (although it is not as or equally first as that of which it is the mode, since it is only understood by a reflex act - and so it is not as perfectly understood as that of which it is the mode), so too a real relation, although it is a mode of its foundation (and not equally first with it, nor as equally perfect as it), yet in itself it is a thing, because what is in itself nothing is the real mode of nothing; for there is no more general name than being or thing (according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6, f. 72rb), and so that to which being or thing do not belong has no real being belonging to it.
216 Praeterea, probatur conclusio - ad quam adductae sunt rationes - per auctoritates: Et primo per Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 5: ((In rebus)) inquit - ((creatis, quod non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat ut secundum accidens dicatur)); ubi expresse vult quod relatio sit accidens in creatura. Etsi hoc non habeat intelligi de relatione quae est creaturae ad Deum, tamen certum est quod de relatione illa quae amitti potest manente fundamento, et secundum veritatem et secundum intentionem suam. 216. Further, the conclusion - for which these reasons have been adduced [nn.200-215] - is proved by authorities: And first from Augustine On the Trinity 5.5. n.6, "In the case of created things, what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;" here he expressly maintains that relation is an accident in creatures. Although this does not have to be understood of the relation that is of the creature to God [cf. nn.253-54, 260-63, below], yet it is certain that it holds, both in truth and in his intention, of the relation that can be lost while the foundation remains.
217 Item, Ambrosius I De Trinitate cap. 5: ((Si prius erat Deus et postea Pater, generationis accessione mutatus est; avertat Deus hanc dementiam)). Igitur per solam accessionem relationis realis fieret mutatio in persona divina, secundum ipsum, - quod non esset nisi illa 'relatio' aliqua alia res esset a fundamento, quia fundamentum praeexstitit. 217. Again, Ambrose On the Trinity 1.9 nn.59-60, "If God existed first and later the Father, he has changed by the accession of generation; may God ward off this madness." Therefore by mere accession of real relation a change could be made in a divine person, according to Ambrose - and this would not be unless that relation was a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation was there beforehand.
218 Item, Hilarius XII De Trinitate d: ((Nasci quod erat, iam non tantum nasci est, sed se ipsum demutare nascendo)); et loquitur de nativitate Filii Dei. Igitur 'nasci' dicit relationem novam. ƿ 218. Again, Hilary On the Trinity 12 n.30, "That what was is born is already not only to be born but to undergo change by being born," and he is speaking of the nativity of the Son of God. Therefore 'to be born' states a new relation.
219 Item, Philosophus in Praedicamentis: (('Ad aliquid' sunt quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt, aliorum dicuntur vel ad aliud sunt)), et per hanc rationem excluduntur substantiae, quae licet sint aliorum, non tamen sunt ad aliud; igitur accipitur ibi 'hoc ipsum quod sunt' non pro esse in intellectu, sed pro esse in re. Quod si relationes in re 'hoc ipsum quod sunt' aliorum sunt, fundamentum autem non est alterius 'hoc ipsum quod est', - igitur aliud est esse huius et aliud esse illius; ergo etc. 219. Again, the Philosopher in the Categories 7.6136-37 says, "Relatives are all things that are said of others or exist to others as to what it is they are," - and by this reasoning are substances excluded, which, although they are 'of others', are yet not 'to another'; therefore the 'as to what it is they are' is taken here, not for existence in the intellect, but for existence in reality. But if relations in reality are of others 'as to what it is they are', and a foundation is not of another 'as to what it is' - then the being of the latter is one thing and the being of the former another thing; therefore etc.
220 Item, Simplicius ibidem Super praedicamenta ex intentione declarat relationem ad aliud esse. 220. Again, Simplicius On the Categories 'Relation' (f. 43r) declares expressly that relation is to another.
221 Item, Philosophus XII Metaphysicae cap. 2 vult quod sicut praedicamenta sunt alia, ita et principia sunt alia, - et exemplificat specialiter de distinctione relationis ad alia et principiorum relationis ad principia aliorum. 221. Again, the Philosopher Metaphysics 12.4.1070a31-b4 maintains that as the categories are different so also are their principles - and he exemplifies it specifically of the distinction of relation from other categories and of the distinction of the principles of relation from the principles of other categories..
222 Item, Avicenna III Metaphysicae cap. 'De relatione' videtur velle ex intentione quod relatio habeat propriam certitudinem; et in principio capituli vult quod secundum suam certitudinem habeat proprium inesse et propriam accidentalitatem. ƿ 222. Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 3.10 (f. 83va) seems to maintain expressly that relation has its proper certitude; and at the beginning of the chapter he maintains that it has, according to its certitude, its own presence in things and its own accidentality.
2. Objections
223 Et quia posset proterviari de relationibus, concedendo eas non esse easdem realiter fundamento, non tamen esse alias realitates, negando eas esse aliquas res dicendo relationem tantum esse in actu intellectus comparantis, - contra hoc arguitur: primo quia hoc destruit unitatem universi, secundo quia destruit omnem compositionem in universo substantialem et accidentalem, tertio quia destruit omnem causalitatem causarum secundarum, et quarto quia destruit realitatem omnium scientiarum mathematicarum. 223. And because stubbornness is possible about relations, by conceding that they are not the same really as their foundation but that they are not different realities, and by denying that they are certain things by saying that a relation exists only in the act of the comparing intellect [Henry of Ghent] - there are arguments against this view: first that it destroys the unity of the universe, second that it destroys all substantial and accidental composition in the universe, third that it destroys all causality of second causes, and fourth that it destroys the reality of all the mathematical sciences.
224 Primum probatur faciliter, quia secundum Aristotelem XII Metaphysicae unitas universi est in ordine partium ad se invicem et ad primum, sicut unitas exercitus est in ordine partium exercitus inter se et ad ducem; et ex hoc, contra negantes relationem esse rem extra actum intellectus, potest dici verbum Philosophi ƿXII Metaphysicae, quod tales qui sic dicunt, ((inconnexam faciunt universi substantiam)). 224. The first is easily proved, because, according to Aristotle Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-15, the unity of the universe exists in the order of the parts to each other and to the first thing, as the unity of an army exists in the order of the parts of the army to each other and to the leader; and from this can be asserted, against those who deny that a relation is a thing outside the act of the intellect, the word of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 12.10.1075b37-6a3, that the sort of people who speak thus "are disconnecting the substance of the universe."
225 Secundum probatur, quia nihil est compositum sine unione partium componibilium, ita quod partibus separatis non manet compositum; nihil autem reale dependet ab eo quod est tantum ratio (et praecise ratio causata per actum intellectus nostri), vel saltem reale tale quod non est artificiale; ergo nullum 'totum' erit reale naturale, si necessario ad suum esse requirit relationem, quae relatio nihil est nisi ens rationis! 225. The proof of the second is that nothing is composite without the union of composable parts, such that, when the parts are separated, the composite does not remain; but nothing real depends on what is merely a matter of reason (and precisely of reason caused by an act of our intellect), or at any rate the sort of real that is not a product of art; therefore no 'whole' will be a natural real thing if for its being is necessarily required a relation and if this relation is nothing but a being of reason.
226 Tertium probatur, quia causatio entis realis non requirit ens rationis in causa, et non possunt causae secundae causare nisi proportionatae et approximatae; igitur si ista approximatio est tantum ens rationis, non poterunt causae sub ista approximatione causare aliquid reale. Quia sine ista approximatione non possunt causare, et ista approximatio (quae est relatio) nulla res est, per te, - ergo causa secunda nihil confert ad posse causare. 226. The proof of the third is that the causing of a real being does not require a being of reason in the cause, and because second causes cannot cause unless they are proportioned and nearby; therefore, if this being nearby is only a being of reason, causes under this being nearby will not be able to cause anything real. Because without this being nearby they cannot cause, and this being nearby (which is a relation) is no real thing, according to you [n.223, Henry] - therefore a second cause contributes nothing to a being able to cause.
227 Quartum probatur, quia omnes conclusiones mathematicae demonstrant relationes de subiectis. Quod apparet primo ex auctoritate Philosophi XIII Metaphysicae cap. 1, in fine: ((Boni)) - inƿquit - ((maxime species sunt ordo)) etc., ((quae maxime ostendit mathematicus)), quia sua ars est in proportione et mensuris aliquorum ad invicem. Secundo apparet hoc idem per experientiam, discurrendo per conclusiones mathematicas, in quibus omnibus communiter praedicatum est aliqua passio relativa: sicut patet incipiendo a prima conclusione geometriae, ubi ostenditur aequalitas laterum de triangulo, vel de linea recta hoc praedicatum 'posse esse basim vel latus trianguli aequilateri'; et ita in omnibus aliis, puta quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis (passio demonstrata de tribus angulis trianguli est ista, scilicet 'aequalitas duobus rectis'), et ita est in aliis. 227. The proof of the fourth is that all mathematical conclusions demonstrate relations of subjects. The point is clear first from the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics 13.3.1078a31-b2, who says, "Of the good the species most of all are order [common measure and the definite] etc.. and these are shown most of all by the mathematician," because a mathematician's art lies in proportion and the measures of certain things with each other. Secondly, this same thing is plain from experience by running through mathematical conclusions, in all of which some relative property is commonly predicated; as is plain beginning from the first conclusion of geometry, where the equality of the sides of a triangle is shown, or the predicate 'able to be the base or side of an equilateral triangle' is shown of a straight line; and so in all the rest, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles (the property demonstrated of the three angles of a triangle is this, namely 'equal to two right angles'), and so in other cases.
228 Quod si adhuc proterviatur quod licet relationes non sint formaliter entia rationis sed aliquid extra intellectum et non idem fundamento, non tamen sunt alia res a fundamento, sed tantum sunt modi proprii rei, - ista instantia tantum videtur contendere de nomine modi rei: licet enim modus rei non sit alia res ab illa re cuius est modus, non tamen nulla res est (sicut nec nullum ens), quia tunc nihil esset; et ideo relatio cadit sub divisione entis secundum se, secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae. Nec omnia in quae dividitur 'ens secundum se' sunt aeque perfecta entia; imƿmo qualitas respectu substantiae potest dici 'modus', et tamen in se est vera res. Ita relatio, licet sit modus (adhuc tamen imperfectior qualitate), si sit extra intellectum (et non modus intrinsecus fundamenti, sicut est infinitas in Deo et omnium essentialium quae sunt in eo, sicut dictum est distinctione 8 primi libri), sequitur quod talis modus, alius a re ex natura rei, sit alia res a fundamento, accipiendo rem generalissime ut dividitur in decem genera. 228. But if the stubbornness is still continued, that although relations are not formally beings of reason but something outside the intellect and not the same as the foundation, yet they are not a thing different from the foundation but are only proper modes of the thing - this objection seems to be a contention only about the term 'mode of a thing'; for although the mode of a thing is not a thing other than the thing of which it is the mode, yet it is not no thing (just as neither is it no being), because then it would be nothing; and therefore relation falls under the division of being per se, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.7.1017a24-27. Nor is everything into which 'being per se' is divided an equally perfect being; on the contrary, quality in respect of substance can be called a 'mode' and yet quality is in itself a true thing. Thus relation, although it is a mode (though one more imperfect still than quality), yet if it is outside the intellect (and not a mode intrinsic to the foundation, as infinity is in God and the infinity of all the essentials in God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.192, 220-221 [d.3 n.58, d.10 n.30, d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19]) it follows that such a mode, being from the nature of the thing other than the thing, is a different thing from the foundation, taking 'thing' in its most general sense as divided into the ten categories.
229 Et si dicatur quod genus relationis est res non propter modum illum qui est habitudo ad aliud, sed propter illam rem cui convenit esse ad aliud, - hoc non est verum: quia sicut omne 'ens ad se', conceptum sub ratione absoluta, potest pertinere essentialiter ad aliquod genus absolutum, si est 'per se unum' (nullus enim modus concipiendi cum quo potest stare 'unitas per se' conceptus, et qui conceptus sit absolutus, tollit quin illud 'conceptum sic' pertineat ad genus absolutum, quia illud sic conceptum includit aliquid absolutum dictum de se in 'quid', et aliquid dictum in 'quale' per quod distinguitur ab aliis conceptibus absolutis, - ut genus et difƿferentiam, extra intellectum), ita omnis respectus talis, sive habitudo sive relatio (sive qualitercumque nominetur, quia ista sunt synonyma), potest per se concipi ut per se unum, habens aliquod praedicatum quiditativum dictum de eo in 'quid' (et est extra animam, ut probatum est) et distinctum ab illis in quibus fundatur, ut probatur in primo articulo; ergo potest haberi genus proprium respectuum istorum ut respectus sunt, non includendo essentialiter fundamenta, - et ita realitas eorum quae sunt in isto genere non est praecise talis propter fundamenta, formaliter loquendo, quia fundamentum est extra per se rationem istorum ut habent completam rationem entis in genere reali. 229. And if it be said that the genus of relation is a thing, not because of the mode that is a disposition to something else, but because of the thing to which the being toward another belongs - this is not true; because just as every 'being for itself, conceived under an absolute idea, can pertain essentially to some absolute genus provided it is per se one (for no mode of conceiving, along with which the concept 'per se unity' [or: the per se unity of a concept] can stand, and which concept is absolute, takes away from the thing thus conceived its belonging to an absolute concept, because what is thus conceived includes something absolute asserted of it in its whatness and something said of it in its what-sortness, whereby it is distinguished from other absolute concepts - as its genus and difference, outside the intellect), so every such respect, or disposition or relation (or however it is named, for these are synonyms), can be per se conceived as per se one, having some quidditative predicate asserted of it in its whatness (as it is outside the mind, as was proved [nn.224-227]), and distinct from that in which it is founded, as was proved in the first article [nn.200-222]; therefore a proper genus can be had of those respects as they are respects without including their foundations essentially - and so the reality of the things that are in this genus is not precisely such because of the foundations, formally speaking, because the foundation is outside the per se idea of them as they have the complete of idea of a being in a real genus.
3. Scotus' own Conclusion
230 Sic igitur declarata realitate relationis in secundo articulo, et eius distinctione reali a fundamento in primo articulo (et hoc quantum ad illas relationes de quibus concludunt rationes ibi adductae), videtur sufficienter improbari prima opinio, secundum quemcumque intellectum ponatur intelligi. ƿ 230. With the reality of relation thus made clear in the second article [nn.224-229], and its real distinction from the foundation made clear in the first article (and this as to the relations about which the reasons there adduced are conclusive[nn.200-222; the relations in question are those that the foundations can exist without]), the first opinion [sc. of Henry, n.192] seems sufficiently refuted, whatever understanding it is posited as being understood by.
4. To the Arguments for Henry's Opinion
231 Ad argumentum primum alterius opinionis dico quod nihil alicuius generis dicitur de Deo, sicut dictum est distinctione 8 primi libri; et sicut absoluta, ita et relationes quae formaliter dicuntur de Deo, non sunt alicuius generis, sed transcendentia et passiones 'entis in communi', quia quidquid convenit enti in quantum est indistinctum ad finitum et infinitum, convenit ei prius quam dividatur in genera, et ita est transcendens. 231. To the first argument for the other opinion [n193] I say that nothing of any genus is said of God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.95-115; and, just like absolutes, so relations too that are formally said of God are not of any category but are transcendentals and properties of 'being in general', because whatever belongs to being as it is not distinguished into finite and infinite belongs to it before it is divided into categories, and so is transcendent.
232 Ad illud 'quod non est compositius album simile quam album tantum': quamvis illud possit faciliter exponi faciendo vim de vocabulo, dicendo quod compositio est simul-positio, tamen - non curando de vocabulo - dicendum est consequenter quod 'album simile' est compositius quam album tantum, quia habet in se actum et potentiam distincta realiter. 232. To the point [n.194] that a like white thing is not more composite than a white thing merely, although it could be easily expounded by stressing the force of the word, saying that 'com-position' is 'position together' [sc. 'like' and 'white' are positioned together in a like white thing but not in a merely white thing, and so a like white thing is more 'com-posite'], however - not caring about the word - one should say as a result that a like white thing is more composite than a white thing merely, because it has in itself act and potency really distinct [sc. its potentiality to be like is now actual, while in a white thing merely its potential to be like remains potential].
233 Hoc etiam debet concedere ille pro cuius opinione fuit istud argumentum. Concedit enim ipse numquam esse differentiam intentionis sine compositione et quod relatio differt a fundamento in creaturis differentia intentionis. Concedit etiam in divinis personam esse quasi compositum et essentiam esse quasi potentiam ƿet relationem quasi actum; sed ubi ista sunt quasi actus et quasi potentia, est quasi compositio, - igitur ubi est actus et potentia, ibi est vere compositio (non tamen compositio ex duabus entitatibus absolutis, quia altera entitas non est absoluta entitas). 233. This should also be conceded by him [sc. Henry], on behalf of whose opinion the argument was made. For he himself concedes that there is never a difference of intention without composition, and that a relation differs from its foundation in creatures by a difference of intention. He concedes too that in divine reality person is a quasi-composite and essence a quasi-potency and relation a quasi-act [1 d.5 n.52], but where there are quasi-act and quasi-potency there is quasi-composition - so there, where there is act and potency, there is truly composition (but not a composition of two absolute entities, because one entity [sc. 'like'] is not an absolute entity).
234 Ad secundum, de mutatione, respondet Simplicius Super praedicamenta: quoniam sicut relatio non est ad se sed ad alterum, ita illud cui advenit, non mutatur ad se sed ad alterum; et si tunc 'mutari' dicatur solum illud quod aliter se habet ad se nunc quam prius, non est mutatio in 'ad aliquid', - si vero 'mutari' sit commune ad aliter se habere ad se et ad alterum, tunc mutatio est in 'ad aliquid' (sicut vult Simplicius), quia secundum relationem se habet aliquis aliter ad alterum. 234. To the second argument, about change [n.195], Simplicius On the Categories 'Relation' (f. 43r) replies: since just as relation is not in respect of itself but of another, so that to which relation applies does not change in respect of itself but of another; and if, in that case, only that is said 'to be changed' which is disposed to itself differently now than it was before, there is no change in the category of 'relation' - but if 'to be changed' is common to a thing's being differently disposed both to itself and to another, then change is in the category of 'relation' (as Simplicius maintains), because in relation someone is differently disposed to another.
235 Philosophus tamen, quia ponit quod non est possibile aliquid aliter se habere ad alterum nisi aliter se habeat ad se, ideo dicit ƿquod in 'ad aliquid' non est motus; unde solum ostendit in quibus praedicamentis est primo motus et in quibus non. 235. The Philosopher, however, because he posits that it is not possible for something to be differently disposed to another unless it is differently disposed to itself, says for this reason that there is no motion in the category of relation; hence he only shows what categories motion is first in and what it is not.
236 Item, Philosophus ostendit ibi quod in substantia non est motus, et tamen est ibi mutatio; ergo ex intentione Philosophi non potest haberi nisi quod in 'ad aliquid' non sit motus, cum quo stat tamen quod ibi sit mutatio. Et confirmatur ista responsio per auctoritatem Ambrosii supra adductam, qui relationem concedit esse aliam rem a fundamento. 236. Again, the Philosopher shows there [Physics 5.2.225b10-11] that there is no motion in substance, and yet there is change in substance; so from the Philosopher's intention one can only get that in the category of relation there is no motion, and with this stands however that there is change in it. And this response is confirmed by the authority of Ambrose adduced above [n.217], who concedes that relation is a thing different from the foundation.
237 Ad tertium, de inesse, concedo quod relatio habet proprium inesse (sicut dicit Avicenna III Metaphysicae), et tamen non sequitur compositio illius generis ex aliquibus essentialiter inclusis, quia etiam qualitas habet suum inesse (quod non est de ratione sui generis formaliter), et tamen non est composita compositione respiciente naturam generis; hoc autem ideo est, quia passio inest rei cuius est et non est de per se intellectu illius, quod tamen magis videtur esse verum de passione quam de relatione. 237. To the third argument, about presence-in [a subject, n.196], I concede that relation has its own presence-in (as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics [n.222]), and yet a composition of the genus out of things essentially included does not follow, because even quality has its own presence-in (which is not of the idea of its genus formally) and yet it is not composed with a composition respecting the nature of the genus; but this is because a property is present in the thing it belongs to and is not of the per se understanding of that thing, which however seems to be more true of property than of relation.
238 Cum ergo arguitur quod tunc relatio fundata super substantiam haberet propriam accidentalitatem, quia proprium inesse, ƿrespondeo: si sit aliqua talis relatio (de qua concludant rationes supra adductae, in primo articulo), concedo conclusionem; utraque pars antecedentis videtur esse vera de identitate specifica unius individui ad aliud individuum, in specie, sive de similitudine essentiali secundum formam specificam. 238. When therefore it is argued that then relation founded on substance would have its own accidentality, because it would have its own presence-in [n.196] - I reply: if there is any such relation (about which the reasons adduced above, in the first article [nn.200, 211-215], are conclusive) I concede the conclusion; both parts of the antecedent [sc. relation founded on substance, and having its own accidentality] seem to be true of the specific identity of one individual with another in species, or of essential likeness in specific form.
239 Ad quartum, de processu in infinitum, dico quod non sequitur, quia relatio se ipsa refertur ad fundamentum; non enim potest esse absque fundamento, vel absque se, sine contradictione. Ipsa enim exsistente, et fundamento simul, ambo sunt extrema illius relationis quae est eius ad fundamentum; igitur non potest esse sine contradictione - absque relatione eius ad fundamentum, et ita sine contradictione non potest esse absque suo fundamento, et ita illa relatio qua refertur ad fundamentum, erit eadem sibi (et de hoc magis patebit in proxima solutione sequentis quaestionis). 239. To the fourth, about infinite regress [n.198], I say that it does not follow, because the relation itself is referred to the foundation; for it cannot be without a foundation, or in the absence of it, without contradiction. For when it exists, and the foundation at the same time, both are the extremes of the relation which is of the relation to the foundation; therefore it cannot be - without contradiction - in the absence of the relation of it to the foundation, and thus it cannot, without contradiction, be in the absence of its foundation - and so the relation by which it is referred to the foundation will be the same as itself (and this will be plainer in the next solution in the following question, nn.268-71).
240 Ad quintum, de distinctione, dico quod relatio habet distinctionem in species suas sicut aliud genus habet distinctionem in species suas; et tamen illa non innotescit nisi per fundamenta, propter modicam entitatem suam quam habet in fundamentis. Ita est etiam ƿin aliis accidentibus quae habent maiorem identitatem et realitatem, quod aliquando distinctio fit per extrinseca et cognoscitur ex distinctione extrinseca; in eis tamen est formalis, intrinseca, sed innotescit per extrinseca. 240. To the fifth argument, about distinction [n.199], I say that relation has distinction into its species as any other genus has distinction into its species; and yet the distinction only becomes known through the foundations, because of the littleness of its entity, which it has in the foundations. So it is also in the case of other accidents, which have a greater identity and reality, that sometimes the distinction is made through extrinsic things and is known from extrinsic distinction; yet in them it is formal, intrinsic, but made known through extrinsic things.
B. On the Identity with its Foundation of the Special Relation of 'Creature to God': 1. First Opinion
241 Hoc ergo viso de relationibus in communi, de relatione speciali 'creaturae ad Deum' est una opinio, quae dicit illam relationem esse eandem fundamento, et hoc ita quod fundamentum nihil est nisi quaedam relatio ad Deum: quia sicut, licet creatura in se sit ens, in respectu tamen ad Deum dicitur non ens, secundum Anselmum, - ita etiam licet in se sit ƿens absolutum, tamen respectu Dei nihil aliud est nisi quidam respectus. 241. [Exposition of the opinion] - The point about relations in general then has been seen. About the special relation of 'creature to God' there is one opinion [from William of Ware] that says this relation is the same as its foundation, and this in such a way that the foundation is nothing other than a certain relation to God; for just as a creature, although in itself it is a being, yet in respect of God is called a non-being, according to Anselm [Monologion ch.31],[5] - so too, although in itself it is an absolute being, yet in respect of God it is nothing other than a certain respect.
242 Cum isto videtur concordare illud quod dicitur quod relatio sit ratitudo sui fundamenti, quod improbatum est distinctione primi libri, quaestione 'De vestigio'. 242. With this claim seems to agree the statement that relation is the ratifying of the foundation, which was rejected in 1 d.3 nn.302-329, about the vestige.
243 Contra istam opinionem est Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 2: ((Omne quod relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo)); et in principio dicit: 'Quod nihil est ad se, nihil est quod ad alterum dicatur'. 243. [Rejection of the opinion] Against this opinion there is Augustine On the Trinity 7.1 n.2, "Everything said relatively is, after removal of the relative, still something;" and again, "What is not anything in respect to itself is not anything that is said in respect of another."
244 Fundamentum igitur relationis est aliqua entitas formaliter, quae non includit ipsam relationem formaliter, - quia si includeret eam formaliter, non esset formaliter relatio ad aliud, sed ad se, ƿquia fundamentum suum est formaliter ad se, cum quo ponitur formaliter idem. Nec posset esse fundamentum primum relationis: adhuc enim esset quaerere de illa relatione prima, in quo poneretur? Non est igitur praecise aliqua relatio fundamentum alicuius relationis. 244. The foundation of a relation, therefore, is some entity formally that does not include the relation itself formally - because if it included it formally, the relation would not formally be a relation to another but to itself, for its foundation is formally to itself and the relation is being posited as formally the same as the foundation. Nor could relation be the first foundation of relation, for there would still remain the question what that first relation would be located in. It is not the case, therefore, that a relation is precisely the foundation of a relation.[6]
245 Quod etiam apparet in relationibus divinis, ubi est maxima identitas cum fundamento; et tamen fundamentum non est formaliter relatio, quia tunc non esset perfectio formaliter infinita. 245. This fact [sc. the foundation does not formally include the relation] is also plain in divine relations, where there is the greatest identity with the foundation; and yet the foundation is not formally the relation, because then the foundation would not be formally infinite perfection [1 d.5 nn.114, 117].
246 Secundo arguitur contra praedictam opinionem sic: definitio indicat totam quiditatem rei, si est perfecta; sed definitio lapidis non includit essentialiter vel formaliter respectum ad aliud, quia tunc non esset definitio lapidis ut est in genere absoluto, et ita non esset lapidis ut est in genere substantiae vel ut est species substantiae; igitur in essentia lapidis, formaliter, non includitur aliquis respectus. 246. Secondly there is argument against the aforesaid opinion [n.241] as follows: a definition indicates the total quiddity of a thing, provided it is perfect; but the definition of stone does not include, essentially or formally, respect to another, because then it would not be the definition of stone as stone is in an absolute genus, and so it would not be of a stone as stone is in the genus of substance or as it is a species of substance; therefore in the essence of stone, formally, no respect is included.
247 Tertio sic: secundum istam opinionem, creaturae non magis ƿdistinguuntur a Deo quam relationes in divinis inter se, quia omnes relationes oppositae sunt aeque distinctae et specialiter quando pertinent ad eundem modum relativorum; relationes autem divinae quae sunt relationes originis, pertinent ad secundum modum relativorum, ad quem etiam videntur pertinere illae relationes quae sunt in Deo in ratione causae efficientis ad creaturam; igitur si creatura sit tantum relatio, et relatio opposita in Deo - sicut filiatio - est relatio subsistens, opposita relationi Patris, aequalis erit distinctio hinc inde. 247. Third thus: according to this opinion [n.241] creatures are not more distinguished from God than the relations in divine reality are distinguished from each other, because all opposite relations are equally distinct and especially when they pertain to the same mode of relatives; but divine relations, which are relations of origin, pertain to the second mode of relatives, to which also seem to pertain the relations that are in God by reason of efficient causality to creatures [1 d.3 n.287]; therefore if the creature is only a relation, and if opposite relation in God - as filiation - is subsistent relation, opposed to relation of Father, there will be an equal distinction on this side as on that.
248 Et confirmatur, quia tunc 'suppositum creatum' non esset nisi relatio subsistens, et sic difficilius esset concipere modum exsistendi personae creatae quam increatae. 248. And there is confirmation, because then a created supposit would only be a subsistent relation, and thus it would be more difficult to conceive the mode of existing of a created person than of an uncreated person.
249 Et si dicas quod creaturae differunt in natura absoluta, inter se, et non sic personae, - hoc videtur destruere positum, quia tunc creatura habebit essentiam absolutam quae non tantum erit relatio. 249. And if you say that creatures differ in absolute nature among themselves but [divine] persons not so - this seems to destroy the position [n.241], because then the creature will have an absolute essence that will not be merely a relation.
250 Videtur etiam sequi ulterius quod minus differat creatura a Deo quam una persona divina ab alia persona divina, quia in personis divinis est relatio realis et mutua, sed inter creaturam et Deum non est mutua relatio realis; ergo etc. ƿ 250. The further consequence also seems to follow [sc. from the view that a creature is only a relation] that a creature differs less from God than one divine person differs from another, because in divine persons the relation is real and mutual, but between creature and God there is no real mutual relation [1 d.30 nn.30-31, 40, 43]; therefore etc.
251 Quarto, ad principale, sic: quae distinguuntur formaliter, non sunt idem formaliter et praecise (quia tunc distinguerentur formaliter et non distinguerentur formaliter, quia nihil essent nisi idem, indistinctum formaliter); sed relatio creaturae ad Deum non distinguitur formaliter, nec specifice, in diversis creaturis; ergo creaturae vel non differunt specie, vel creatura non erit praecise illa relatio. Probatio minoris: illis relationibus omnibus - in creaturis - correspondet idem extremum ex parte Dei, relationibus autem alterius rationis non correspondet terminus eiusdem rationis. 251. Fourth, to the opinion itself [n.241], as follows: things that are formally distinct are not formally and precisely the same (because then they would be formally distinct and not formally distinct, because they would be nothing but the same, formally indistinct); but the relation of creature to God is not formally or specifically distinct in diverse creatures; therefore either creatures do not differ in species or they will be precisely that relation. Proof of the minor: to all those relations - in creatures - there corresponds the same extreme on the part of God, but to relations of different idea there does not correspond a term of the same idea.
252 Quinto sic: in creatura est triplex relatio ad Deum; igitur qua ratione ipsa nihil erit nisi una relatio, pari ratione nihil erit nisi alia relatio; igitur non potest praecise esse aliqua una illarum. Nec potest esse omnes illae, quia ipsae differunt formaliter inter se, - et tunc quaelibet una essentia creata haberet distinctionem formalem a se ipsa. Igitur etc. ƿ 252. Fifth thus: in creatures there is a triple relation to God [1 d.3 n.287]; so a reason that the creature will be nothing but one relation is equally a reason that it will be nothing but another relation; therefore it cannot be precisely any one of the relations. Nor can it be all of them, because they are formally different among themselves - and then any one created essence would have a formal distinction from itself. Therefore etc.[7]
2. Second Opinion
253 Aliter ponitur quod ista relatio angeli ad Deum differt realiter ab essentia angeli. 253. [Exposition of the opinion] - Another position [of Peter of Tarantsia and Romanus of Rome, based on sayings of Thomas Aquinas] is that this relation of an angel [and of any creature] to God differs really from the essence of the angel [and any creature].
254 Quod confirmatur per auctoritatem beati Augustini V De Trinitate cap. 5, ubi dicit quod in creaturis ((quidquid non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat ut secundum accidens dicatur)); et arguit quod in istis creaturis sit accidens. ƿ 254. There is confirmation of this from blessed Augustine On the Trinity 5.5 n.6, where he says that in the case of creatures "what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;" and he argues that in this case of creatures relation is an accident.
255 Quod etiam expresse vult in eodem V cap. 19: ((Illa)) - inquit ((sunt accidentia relativa, quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt)); et vult ex hoc relationem creaturae ad Deum esse accidens, non autem Deo quae relative dicitur Dei ad creaturam. 255. He also expressly maintains this in the same place 5.16 n.17, "Those things are relative accidents that occur with some change in the things of which they are said," and he means from this that the relation of creature to God is an accident, but that the relation said relatively of God to creature is not an accident in God.
256 Et ex hoc expressius ibidem in fine: ((Quod)) - inquit - ((temporaliter incipit dici Deus quod antea non dicebatur, relative dici manifestum est; non tamen secundum accidens Dei dicitur (quod aliquid ei acciderit), sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid incipit Deus relative)). 256. And from this he says more expressly toward the end, "That God begins to be called in time what he was not called before is manifestly said relatively; however it is not said as an accident of God (because something happens to him), but plainly as an accident of that in reference to which God begins to be relatively called something."
257 Contra istud: Substantia est tripliciter prior accidente (secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae), scilicet cognitione, definitione et temƿpore; et hoc quod est esse prius tempore, intelligitur sic quod nulla est contradictio ex parte substantiae quin prior possit esse duratione omni accidente; igitur non esset contradictio quod lapis esset prior duratione omni dependentia ad Deum, et per consequens non esset contradictio lapidem non dependere ad Deum, quod videtur absurdum. 257. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this: Substance is said to be prior to accident in three ways (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-33), namely in knowledge, in definition, and in time; and what it is to be prior in time is so understood that there is no contradiction on the part of substance to prevent it being able to exist prior in duration to any accident; so there would be no contradiction in a stone's being prior in duration to all dependence on God, and as a result there would be no contradiction in a stone's not depending on God, which seems absurd.[8]
258 Praeterea, aut Augustinus accipit ibi 'accidens' communiter, pro quocumque mutabili, - et tunc quaelibet substantia creata est accidens, quia est mutabilis; aut accipit ibi 'accidens' pro mutabili, id est amissibili (scilicet quod potest aliquo manente amitti, et 'hoc manente' est posterius vel duratione vel natura): si hoc modo, igitur relatio creaturae ad Deum non est accidens, quia non potest creatura manere nec duratione nec natura sine ista. ƿ 258. Further, Augustine is either taking 'accident' generally there [nn.254-56] for anything changeable - and then any created substance is an accident, because it is changeable; or he is taking it there for what is changeable, that is, able to be lost (namely because it can be lost when something remains, and because it is posterior in nature or in duration to the something that remains); if in this second way, then the relation of creature to God is not an accident, because a creature cannot remain either in duration or in nature without that relation.
259 Et hoc modo videtur ipse loqui cap. 5, quomodo aliqua sint accidentia inseparabilia: ((Sicuti)) - inquit - ((est plumae corvi color niger, - amittit eum tamen, non quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illa pluma, amittit utique etiam illum colorem)). Nec tamen est mutatio, quia sic quidem amissio plumae esset mutatio; sed est amissio, quia sicut pluma est prior natura nigredine, ita etiam posset esse posterior natura nigredine, hoc est non primo corrumpi corruptione nigredinis. 259. And it seems that Augustine is speaking in this way in 5.4 n.5, in the way some accidents are inseparable: "Just as the color of a raven's feather is black - but it loses the color, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. Wherefore the material itself of the feather is changeable, and because it ceases to be a feather, so it loses the color also."[9] The loss of color however is not a change, because thus indeed the loss of the feather would be a change; but the loss of color is a loss, because just as the feather is prior in nature to the blackness, so too it could be posterior in nature to the blackness, that is, not be at once corrupted together with the corruption of the blackness.
3. Scotus' own Solution
260 Ad quaestionem igitur istam dico quod relatio ad Deum, communis omni creaturae, est idem realiter fundamento; non tamen idem formaliter, nec praecise idem (sive non identitate adaequata), ita quod fundamentum tantum sit relatio formaliter. ƿ 260. As to this question then [question five, nn.188, 241], I say that the relation to God common to all creatures is the same really as the foundation; it is not however the same formally, nor is it the same precisely (or not the same with adequate identity), such that the foundation is only relation formally [cf. on real identity and formal non-identity, 1 dd.33-34, nn.1-3].
a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as its Foundation
261 Primum probatur per duas rationes: Quia illud quod proprie dicitur inesse alicui, sine quo illud non potest esse sine contradictione, est idem sibi realiter; relatio autem ad Deum proprie inest lapidi, et sine ea non potest lapis esse sine contradictione; ergo illa relatio est realiter idem lapidi. 261. The first point is proved by two reasons: Because what is said properly to be present in something, and in the absence of which the something cannot be without contradiction, is the same as the something really; but relation to God is properly present in a stone, and in the absence of this relation a stone cannot be without contradiction; therefore the relation is the same really as the stone.
262 Probatio maioris: quia sicut contradictio dicta de aliquibus est via concludendi distinctionem, ita impossibilitas recipiendi praedicationem contradictoriorum pertinentium ad esse est via concludendi identitatem in esse, - et hoc, ubi non est dependentia essentialis, quae requirit distinctionem manifestam (quod declaro sic: quia impossibilitas quod a sit sine b aut est propter identitatem b ad a, aut propter prioritatem, aut simultatem in natura; igitur si b non sit prius naturaliter quam a, nec necessario simul natura, et a non potest esse absque b, - sequitur quod a sit idem b: si enim sit aliud et posterius eo, non est verisimile quod naturaliter non possit esse sine eo absque contradictione); sed quod inest alicui proprie, sicut relatio inest fundamento (hoc est, ita inest quod si esset aliud, esset posterius natura tali), non est prius natura nec simul natura cum eo cui inest; igitur si necessario requiritur ad esse eius, ita quod illud non potest esse sine eo, necessario est idem sibi realiter. Ita est in proposito. ƿ 262. Proof of the major: because just as a contradiction stated of certain things is a way of proving distinction, so an impossibility of receiving the predication of contradictories pertaining to being is a way of proving identity in being - and this when there is no essential dependence that requires a manifest distinction (which I make clear thus: because the impossibility that a [e.g. a creature] is without b [e.g. relation to the Creator] is either because of the identity of a with b or because of its priority or simultaneity in nature with b; therefore if b is not naturally prior to a nor necessarily simultaneous in nature with it, and if a cannot be without b, the result is that a is the same as b; for if b is other than a or posterior to it, it is not likely that a could not naturally be in the absence of b without contradiction); but what is present in something properly, as relation is present in the foundation (that is, what is so present in what it is present in that if it were other than what it is present in then it would be posterior to what it is present in), is not prior in nature nor simultaneous in nature with what it is present in; therefore if what is present in something is necessarily required for the being of what it is in, such that what it is in cannot be without it, necessarily it is the same really as what it is in. So it is as to the issue at hand.
263 Minor est manifesta, quia sicut impossibile est lapidem esse sine Deo, ita impossibile est ipsum esse sine dependentia eius ad Deum, - nam sicut posset esse sine dependentia, ita posset esse sine termino illius dependentiae: non enim est incompossibilitas essendi absque termino, nisi propter ipsam dependentiam, - non est autem aliquid 'non necessarium simpliciter' ratio simpliciter necessarii; igitur etc. 263. The minor [n.261] is manifest, because just as it is impossible for a stone to be without God, so it is impossible for it to be without its dependence on God - for it could be without the term of the dependence in just the same way as it could be without the dependence; for being without the term is not incompossible save because of the dependence itself - but something 'not necessary simply' is not the idea of what is simply necessary; therefore etc.
264 Contra istam rationem insto, quia tunc quaelibet relatio quae inest essentiae divinae per actum intellectus divini, esset eadem illi essentiae (probatio: incompossibile est illi essentiae esse sine ea, si enim talis relatio posset esse nova, igitur intellectus divinus posset mutari, quod est impossibile); sed ponere talem eandem illi, est inconveniens, quia tunc esset realis (quidquid enim est idem rei, est reale): illa autem relatio non est realis (ex distinctione 31 primi libri); quare etc. ƿ 264. Against this reason [n.261] I raise the objection that then [sc. if relation to God were the same really as the creature] any relation that is present in the divine essence through act of the divine intellect would be the same as the essence (proof: it is incompossible for the essence to be without it - for if such a relation could be new then the divine intellect could change, which is impossible); but to posit that such a relation is the same as the essence is unacceptable, because then it would be real (for whatever is the same as a thing is real); but the relation is not real (from 1 d.31 nn.6, 8-9, 16, 18); wherefore etc.[10]
265 Respondeo. Incompossibilitas separationis potest esse ex ratione ipsius a quo aliquid est inseparabile, et potest esse ab aliquo ƿextrinseco. Exemplum huius secundi: quia secundum Philosophum contradictio esset caelum esse sine motu, non quidem ex causa intrinseca in caelo (quia est receptivum motus, indifferens ad quietem sicut ad motum), sed ex causa extrinseca movente; non tamen sequitur quod caelum sit motus suus, licet non possit esse sine eo. Modo dico quod incompossibilitas essendi lapidem absque dependentia eius ad Deum, est ex ratione lapidis praecise, ex qua etiam est ratio incompossibilitatis essendi lapidem sine termino dependentiae illius, - et quidquid est ratio requirendi terminum dependentiae, est ratio habendi dependentiam illam. Sed in ista instantia adducta, non est necessitas simpliciter inhaerentiae talis relationis, nec incompossibilitas non esse obiecti ex parte ipsius essentiae divinae (quasi impossibile sit eam esse nisi exigat terminum 'ad quem', quem impossibile est non esse), sed tantum est illa incompossibilitas ex causa extrinseca, scilicet intellectu divino (causa, inquam, simpliciter necessario agente), et incompossibilitas est ex parte eius noviter agere. 265. I reply. The incompossibility of a separation can be by reason of that from which something is inseparable, and it can be by something extrinsic. An example of the second: because, according to the Philosopher, for the heaven to be without motion would be a contradiction, not indeed from a cause intrinsic to the heaven (because the heaven is receptive of motion, indifferent to rest and to motion), but from an extrinsic moving cause; yet it does not follow that the heaven is [the same as] its own motion, although it cannot be without motion. Now I say that the incompossibility of being a stone without dependence of it on God is by reason of the stone precisely; and by this reason is also the reason for the incompossibility of being a stone without a term for the dependence of it - and whatever is the reason for requiring a term of dependence is the reason for having the dependence. But in the objection adduced [n.264], there is no necessity for the inherence simply of such relation, nor any incompossibility of the non-being of the object on the part of the divine essence itself (as if it were impossible for the essence to be unless it required a term 'to which' and this term was unable not to be), but there is only incompossibility from an extrinsic cause, namely the divine intellect (a cause, I say, simply necessarily acting), and the incompossibility is on the part of the intellect's doing something new.
266 Secunda ratio principalis ad primum membrum solutionis est ista: quod uniformiter dicitur de omni alio a termino, nulli 'dicto ƿad talem terminum' accidit; haec relatio creaturae ad Deum est huiusmodi; igitur etc., - et ita est idem fundamento. 266. The second principal reason for the first member of the solution [nn.260-61] is as follows: what is uniformly said of everything other than the term [of a relation] is not accidental to anything that is said relative to that term; the relation of creature to God is of this sort [sc. said uniformly of everything other than the term]; therefore etc.[11] - and so it is the same as the foundation.
267 Probatio maioris: quia si alicui accideret, pari ratione et alteri; ut puta, si relatio effectus ad causam accideret lapidi (et per consequens esset res alia a lapide), pari ratione ipsa haberet relationem effectus ad Deum, - et tunc accideret sibi alia relatio effectus, et sic in infinitum. 267. Proof of the major: because if it were accidental to one it would, by parity of reason, be accidental to another; as, for example, if the relation of effect to cause were accidental to the stone (and would consequently be a thing other than the stone), then by parity of reason this relation would have the relation of effect to God - and then another relation of effect would be accidental to the first relation, and so on ad infinitum.
268 Contra istam rationem insto, quia non videtur inconveniens procedere in infinitum in relationibus; dictum est enim in I libro quod relatio fundatur super relationem, sicut proportionalitas super proportionem. Ex hoc arguitur sic: si Socrates est idem Platoni, igitur et identitas Socratis est eadem identitati Platonis, et pari ratione illa identitas est eadem identitati; et prima identitas erit alia res a fundamento, quia fundamentum poterat esse sine ea; ergo pari ratione quaelibet identitas erit alia res ab illo cuius est, et ita erunt infinitae relationes reales. Et ita potest argui de proportionibus et similitudinibus. 268. Against this reason [n.267] I raise the objection that there appears nothing unacceptable in relations proceeding to infinity; for it was said in 1 d.19 n.6 that relation is founded on relation, as proportionality on proportion. From this the argument goes as follows: if Socrates is the same as Plato then the sameness of Socrates is the same as the sameness of Plato, and by parity of reason the sameness is the same as sameness; and the first sameness [sc. of Socrates with Plato] is a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation could be without it; therefore by parity of reason any sameness will be a thing other than that which it belongs to, and so there will be infinite real relations. And so can it be argued about proportions and likenesses.
269 Ad istud respondeo quod status est in secundo. Quod ut intelƿligatur, accipiantur prima fundamenta, scilicet Socrates et Plato, inter quae est identitas mutua, et dicatur illa in Socrate a et illa in Platone b; identitas a ad b dicatur c, et illa identitas e converso dicatur d. Dico quod a differt a Socrate, quia Socrates potest esse sine a (quia potest esse sine termino eius) et ipsa non potest esse sine termino, a non tamen differt a c sed c est idem sibi, quia a non potest esse absque b (cum sint simul natura); et per consequens contradictio est a esse nisi tam fundamentum eius quod est c quam etiam terminus eius sint. Sed fundamento et termino ipsius c exsistentibus, necessario erit c, - igitur contradictio est a esse sine c; et c inest formaliter a, quia a dicitur idem ipsa identitate quae est c; ergo c est idem ipsi a, et per consequens ibi erit status. 269. To this I reply that there is a stand in the second stage [of the infinite process]. To understand this, let the first foundations be taken, namely Socrates and Plato, between which there is mutual sameness, and let this sameness in Socrates be called a and that in Plato b; let the sameness of a with b be called c, and let the reverse sameness, of b with a, be called d. I say that a differs from Socrates because Socrates can be without a (because he can be without the term of a), and a cannot be without the term; however a does not differ from c but c is the same as it, because a cannot be without b (since they are by nature together); and consequently it is a contradiction for a to be unless both the foundation of that which is c and also the term of it are. But when the foundation and the term of c exist, c will necessarily exist - so it is a contradiction for a to be without c; and c is formally present in a, because a is said to be the same with the very sameness that is c; therefore c is the same as a, and consequently a stand will be made there.
270 Et si quaeras qua identitate est c idem ipsi a, - dico quod ipso a, quia illa identitas non est nisi rationis, quia simpliciter eiusdem ad se. 270. And if you ask by what sameness c is the same as a, I say that it is so by a itself, because the sameness is only one of reason, for it is simply of what is the same as itself.
271 Eodem modo est status de similitudinibus proportionalitatum, quia una proportionalitas est similis alteri similitudine essentiali (duo autem individua eiusdem speciei dicuntur esse similia in forma specifica), et ita sicut est status in specifica identitate in secundo (et non in primo), ita etiam in similitudine proportionalitatum. ƿ 271. In the same way there is a stand in likenesses of proportionalities, because one proportionality is like another with essential likeness (but two individuals of the same species are said to be alike in specific form), and so just as there is a stand in specific sameness in the second stage [of the process to infinity] (and not in the first stage), so too in the case of likeness of proportionalities.
b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the same formally as the Foundation nor is it precisely the same
272 Secundum articulum, scilicet quod relatio non sit formaliter eadem fundamento, suppono manifestum ex intellectu eius quod dicitur 'formaliter idem', quia per se ratio respectus non includit formaliter rationem absoluti, nec e converso ratio absoluti per se includit formalem rationem respectus; similiter, quod ibi additur quod fundamentum non sit praecise ipsa relatio, hoc probatur contra primam opinionem. 272. As to the second article, namely that a relation is not formally the same as its foundation [n.260], I suppose this to be manifest from the understanding of what it is to be 'formally the same', because the per se idea of a respect does not formally include the idea of an absolute, nor conversely does the idea of an absolute per se include the formal idea of a respect; likewise, as to what is there added [n.260], that the foundation is not precisely the relation itself, this was proved against the first opinion [nn.243-52].
273 Et tunc intelligo, qualiter possit esse vera identitas et non praecisa, hoc modo: Quando in creaturis aliquid continet aliud per identitatem, sive unitive plura, non est hoc ex perfectione illius contenti sed ex perfectione continentis, - sicut si anima intellectiva (secundum aliquos) contineat animam vegetativam et formam substantiae, hoc non est ex perfectione formae substantiae (quia ipsa non continet omnes alias), sed ex perfectione animae intellectivae. Similiter, sit quod ens contineat quamlibet passionem entis (ut veritatem, bonitatem et unitatem), non tamen est ista continentia ex perfectione contenti sed ex perfectione continentis, - quemadmodum etiam in divinis, quod relatio sit eadem fundamento, non est ex perfectione ƿrelationis (quasi ipsa contineat essentiam per identitatem), sed ex infinitate formali essentiae, propter quam ipsa habet in se relationem per identitatem. 273. And then I understand how there can be a true and non-precise identity in the following way: When, in the case of creatures, something contains another thing by identity, or is unitively many things, this is not because of the perfection of what is contained but of the perfection of what contains - just as, if the intellective soul (according to some) contains the vegetative soul and the form of substance, this is not because of the perfection of the form of substance (because it does not contain all the others), but because of the perfection of the intellective soul. Likewise, let it be that being contains any property at all of being (as truth, goodness, and unity), yet this containing is not from the perfection of what is contained but from the perfection of what contains - just as also in divine reality, the fact that relation is the same as the foundation is not from the perfection of the relation (as if it contains the essence by identity), but from the formal infinity of the essence, because of which the essence has in itself relation by identity.
274 In omnibus istis (et maxime in creaturis) continens non est praecise 'contentum', sed est ita perfecta entitas in se sicut esset si 'contentum' esset extra continens, additum sibi, - immo perfectior entitas est, quia ex perfectione sua continet omnem aliam entitatem; unde anima intellectiva non tantum est forma substantialis (quia tunc non esset perfecta), sed est ita perfecte illa ultima entitas quae est ibi - sicut si praesupponeret aliam entitatem a se. 274. In all these cases (and especially in the case of creatures) the container is not precisely the contained, but is an entity as perfect in itself as it would be if the contained were outside the container and added to it - nay, a more perfect entity, because by its perfection it contains every other entity; hence the intellective soul is not merely substantial form (because then it would not be perfect), but is as perfectly the ultimate entity - which is there - as it would be if it presupposed entity other than itself.
275 Ita dico in proposito quod fundamentum non est tantum relatio (quam continet per identitatem), sed est ita absolutum sicut si relatio esset sibi addita, vel omnino nullam haberet relationem; sed hoc non est ex imperfectione sua, sed ex perfectione (vel simpliciter, vel aliqualiter), quia illam relationem continet per identitatem, ita quod ipsa continentia praevenit accidentalitatem relationis ne ipsa possit esse accidens, quia perfecte continetur in substantia, quae tamen relatio, si non sic contineretur, ex se non haberet forte quod esset per identitatem substantia. 275. So I say in the issue at hand, that the foundation is not only the relation (which it contains by identity), but is as absolute as it would be if the relation were added to it, or if it had altogether no relation; but this is not because of its own perfection [sc. as foundation], but it is because of perfection (either simply or in some way or other), because the foundation contains the relation by identity, so that the containing itself prevents the accidentality of the relation from being able to be an accident, because it is perfectly contained in the substance - which relation, however, if it were not thus contained, would of itself not perhaps have the fact that it is the substance by identity.
C. To the Principal Arguments
276 Ad argumenta principalia huius quintae quaestionis. Ad primum, de IV Metaphysicae. Dicitur quod infert ƿ'omnia esse ad aliquid', id est ((ad opinionem et sensum)). - Sed contra: consequens debet differre ab antecedente, in proposito. Ideo dico quod inconveniens est 'omnia esse ad aliquid', ita quod ipsorum esse sit formaliter ad aliud esse, sicut dixit illa opinio quae ponit omnia apparentia esse vera, - quae etiam dixit quod ipsum esse rei est formaliter in 'apparere'. Nec sic concedo 'omnia esse ad aliquid', ita quod ipsorum esse sit formaliter ad aliud, immo ipsorum esse est formaliter 'ad se', licet per identitatem contineat esse 'illorum quae sunt ad aliud'. 276. To the principal arguments of this fifth question. To the first, from Metaphysics 4 [n.189]. It is said that Aristotle infers that 'everything is relative to something', that is, 'relative to opinion and sense'. - But on the contrary: the consequent should differ from the antecedent in a proposed conclusion [1 d.3 n.316]. Therefore I say that it is unacceptable to say that 'all things are relative to something' such that their being is formally to be relative to something else, as the opinion said which posits that all appearances are true [n.189] - which opinion also said that the being of a thing is formally appearance. And I do not in this way concede that 'all things are relative to something' such that their being is formally relative to something -rather their being is formally to themselves, although this being contains by identity the being of things that are relative to something else.
277 Ad secundum. Etsi posset negari de relativis vel de his quae sunt in diversis generibus (et tunc dicerentur esse primo diversa, quantum scilicet ad rationes formales eorum, ita quod nullum eorum formaliter includit alterum nec aliquid alterius, licet per identitatem in exsistendo unum contineat alterum), potest tamen dici - consequenter ad dicta alias - quod huiusmodi relatio est transcendens, quia quod convenit enti antequam descendat in genera, est transcendens; sed quod convenit omni enti, convenit sibi antequam deƿscendat in genera; ergo quod est tale, est transcendens et non alicuius generis. Et ideo istae relationes quae consequuntur ens antequam descendat in entia cuiuscumque generis, cum sint transcendentes, non erunt alicuius generis determinati. 277. As to the second [n.190], although its conclusion could be denied of relatives or of things in diverse genera (and they would then be said to be primarily diverse as far, namely, as concerns their formal reasons, such that none of them formally includes another or anything of another, although by identity in existing one contains another), yet it can be said - in consequence of what has been said elsewhere [n.231] - that this sort of relation is transcendent, because what belongs to being before it descends to genera is transcendent; but what belongs to every being belongs to it before it descends to genera; therefore anything such is transcendent and does not belong to any genus. And so these relations that follow being before it descends to beings of any genus will, since they are transcendent, not be of any determinate genus.[12]
D. To the Authority for the Second Opinion
278 Ad auctoritatem Augustini pro ultima opinione: concedo, quod 'relationes in creaturis sunt accidentia', de relationibus creaƿturarum ad illa ad quae non dependent essentialiter; ad quaecumque autem essentialiter dependet aliquid, ipsa dependentia eius essentialis ad illa non est sibi accidens, hoc est, non est aliud realiter. 278. As to the authority of Augustine for the last opinion [nn.254-56], I concede that 'relations in creatures are accidents' in the case of relations of creatures to what they do not essentially depend on; but as to what something essentially depends on, its essential dependence on it is not an accident of it, that is, is not something really different from it.
279 Et tunc ad primum: quod adducitur de cap. 5, quod ((in rebus creatis illud quod non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat)) etc., exponendum est 'secundum accidens dici', quod non praedicatur per se 'in quid', et cum hoc etiam est mutabile, non tamen manente fundamento sed per mutationem fundamenti; et prima condicio deficit in praedicatis essentialibus (vel potius substantialibus) dictis de creaturis, secunda condicio deficit in relationibus divinis, - sed ambae concurrentes sufficiunt. 279. And then to the first [n.254], which is adduced from ch.5, that "what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident," one must expound 'spoken of as accident' in the sense that it is not predicated per se in the what of a thing, and along with this that it is also changeable, not while the foundation remains, but by change of the foundation; and the first condition here fails in the case of essential (or rather substantial) predicates said of creatures, and the second condition fails in the case of divine relations - but both when concurrent are sufficient [sc. for something to be spoken of as an accident].
280 Et ita potest exponi ultima auctoritas de cap. 19, quod ((illa sunt accidentian)), 'in his ad quae dicitur Deus': hoc est, sunt simpliciter mutabilia, non tamen amissibilia, - et sunt dicta 'accidentaliter', hoc est non essentialiter de subiectis; et una condicio deficit in relationibus divinis. 280. And so can the last authority [n.255] from ch.19 be expounded, that "they are accidents", 'in the case of things to which God is said' [n.256]; that is, they are simply changeable but not losable - and they are said 'by way of accident' [n.256], that is, are not said essentially of their subjects; and one condition fails in the case of divine relations.
II. To the Fourth Question A. Solution
281 Ad quartam quaestionem, de creatione, dico quod creatio non tantum videtur importare relationem ad Deum in ratione causae ƿefficientis, - sed etiam respectum ad non esse praecedens, et hoc ordine durationis, ut proprie accipitur creatio. Sed iste ordo potest intelligi vel ad non esse immediate praecedens, vel indistincte: et primo modo, tantum dicitur res creari in primo instanti, - secundo modo potest dici res semper esse creata, dum manet. 281. As to the fourth question, about creation [n.179], I say that creation seems to import not only relation to God in idea of efficient cause but also a respect to preceding not-being, and this in order of duration, as creation is properly taken. But this order can be understood to be either to immediately preceding not-being or to not-being taken indistinctly; and in the first way a thing is said to be created only in the first instant - in the second way a thing can be said to have always been created, as long as it persists.
282 Si loquamur de prima relatione (scilicet ad causam efficientem), patet solutio ex praecedente quaestione. 282. If we speak of the first relation (namely to the efficient cause), the solution is plain from the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260].
283 Si de secunda relatione, videtur quod illa non sit eadem fundamento, - quod sequitur ex illo primo modo prout tantum convenit rei in primo instanti, si ille respectus ad non esse maneat tantum in illo instanti; absolutum autem manet post illud instans, et manenti non manens non est idem realiter. 283. If we speak of the second relation [sc. order to preceding not-being], the relation seems not to be the same as the foundation - and this follows from the first way [n.281], insofar as the relation belongs to the thing in the first instant, provided the respect to not-being persists only in that instant; but what is absolute persists after that instant, and what does not persist is not the same really as what does persist.
284 Si de ordine illo ad non esse indistincte acceptum, videtur idem, nisi posset probari contradictio quod illa essentia posset esse absque respectu ad non esse praecedens duratione. Quod si probetur (in tertia quaestione quaesita) quod contradictio sit lapidem esse sine respectu ad non esse praecedens duratione, tunc posset dici consequenter quod ille respectus non differt a fundamento, nisi quod iste respectus non est dependentia ad aliquid, ƿad quod 'habens illum' essentialiter dependeat; et non generaliter dictum est in praecedente quaestione quod 'omnis respectus est idem realiter cum suo fundamento', sed 'omnis respectus dependentiae ad aliquid, sine quo dependens non potest esse, est idem dependenti'. Si autem non sit contradictio lapidem esse sine tali respectu et ordine ad non esse, tunc planum est illum ordinem non esse idem fundamento. 284. If we speak of the order to not-being taken indistinctly, the same conclusion seems to hold [sc. that the relation is not the same as the foundation], unless proof can be given that it is contradiction for the essence to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration. But if there be proof (in the third question asked [n.95]) that it is a contradiction for a stone to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration, then it could be said as a consequence that the respect does not differ from the foundation save in that the respect is not a dependence on something on which what has the foundation essentially depends; and it was said generally in the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260], not that 'every respect is the same really as its foundation', but that 'every respect of dependence on something, without which the dependent thing cannot be, is the same as the dependent thing' [nn.261, 263, 265, 278]. But if it is not a contradiction for a stone to be without such respect and order to not-being, then it is plain that the order is not the same as the foundation.
285 Sic ergo vel, secundum unam opinionem, creatio quantum ad utrumque respectum quem dicit, est idem fundamento, - vel saltem quantum ad primum respectum (licet non quantum ad secundum), secundum primam opinionem. 285. Thus, therefore, creation is the same as the foundation either, according to one opinion, as to both respects that it states [nn.282, 284], or, according to the first opinion, at least as to the first respect (though not as to the second [n.282]).
B. To the Principal Arguments
286 Potest responderi ad primum argumentum quod auctoritas loquitur de his praecise quae includuntur per se in quiditate rei unde quiditas est (unde excludit unum et multa, actum et potentiam, quia nullum tale est de per se intellectu quiditatis); et ita concedo quod nulla relatio sit formaliter idem fundamento, etsi realiter et per identitatem quandoque contineatur in eo, ut est in proposito. 286. One can reply as to the first argument [n.180] that the authority is speaking precisely of things that are included per se in the quiddity of the thing as it is quiddity (as quiddity excludes one and many, act and potency, because nothing such is of the per se understanding of quiddity); and in this way I concede that no relation is formally the same as the foundation, even if it is sometimes really and by identity contained in it, as is the case with the issue at hand.
287 Ad secundum patet quod ille respectus ad Deum non tantum ƿmanet in primo instanti, sed semper, dum manet res, - sicut dicetur in prima quaestione secundae distinctionis, huius II. 287. As to the second [n.181], it is plain that the respect to God in question remains not only in the first instant but always, as long as the thing remains - as will be said below in d.2 n.62.
288 Ad tertium. Etsi non sit verum 'Deum non posse reparare eundem motum' (de quo et in IV dicetur), tamen si hoc concedatur, conceditur propter interruptionem, quae secundum eos prohibet identitatem motus reparati et destructi. Sed hoc non contingit in proposito, nisi quod creatio non potest reparari eadem in quantum dicit ordinem immediatum ad non esse, non autem in quantum dicit respectum ad causam; unde, idem respectus potest reparari. quia eadem maternitas fuit in matre Christi (ad ipsum) post resurrectionem, quae ante fuit. 288. As to the third [n.182]. Although the statement 'God cannot renew the same motion' is not true (there will be discussion of this in 4 d.43 q.1 n.8, q.3 n.7), yet, if this is conceded, it is conceded because of the interruption, which according to them prevents the sameness of a renewed motion with a motion that has been destroyed. But this does not happen with the issue at hand save in that the same creation cannot be renewed insofar as it states an immediate order to not-being, but not insofar as it states a respect to the cause; hence, the same respect can be renewed, because the same maternity was in the mother of Christ (in relation to Christ) after the resurrection as before [4 d.43 q.1 n.13].
289 Ad quartum concedi potest quod creatio passio inest igni ab igne generante (illa scilicet creatio qua omne 'aliud a Deo' dicitur creari, sive creetur sive generetur); nec sequitur 'si inest ab igne generante, ergo est ad ignem generantem ut ad terminum', - nam similitudo inest huic albo et illi, a generante ipsum, et tamen non oportet ipsam similitudinem esse ad generans sicut ad terminum. 289. To the fourth [n.183] one can concede that creation as undergone is in the fire from the generating fire (namely the creation by which everything other than God is said to be created, whether it is created or generated); but the consequence does not hold 'if creation is in the fire from the generating fire, therefore the creation is related to the generating fire as to the term' - for likeness is in this white thing and in that from what generates it, and yet the likeness does not have to be related to the generator as to the term.
290 Ad quintum, cum arguitur de mutatione, - ibi videtur esse difficultas et de maiore et de minore. Dico quod in mutatione naturali, ibi est materia et forma, et agens, et compositum ex materia et forma, et respectus multi (puta: respectus agentis ad compositum ƿproductum et e converso respectus compositi producti ad agentem, respectus materiae ad formam et e converso, et respectus utriusque ad totum et e converso, et respectus compositi et formae praesentis ad oppositum praecedens; et non solum ista absoluta scilicet compositum et formam - praecesserunt sua opposita, sed etiam respectus illos 'materiae ad formam et e converso' et 'formae ad compositum et e converso' praecesserunt sua opposita, et ideo potest esse respectus omnium istorum respectuum ad opposita sua; nec hoc tantum, sed etiam omnes isti respectus sunt ab agente, et ideo potest esse respectus omnium istorum respectuum ad agens), - ita quod de istis 'multis respectibus', accipiendo illos qui sunt ad propositum, materia habet respectum ad formam sicut perfectibile et illud quod perficitur ad suam perfectionem, et ista coaeva sunt exsistentiae compositi; iste etiam respectus est ab agente, effective inducente formam et perficiente materiam hac perfectione formali, ita quod in respectu isto qui est 'materiae ad formam ut receptivi ad perfectionem sive ut perfectibilis ad perfectionem' fundatur respectus passivi ad agens; iste etiam respectus succedit suo opposito, quia materia prius non fuit formata. Istos tres respectus videtur dicere mutatio passiva, scilicet: respectum materiae ad formam ut receptivi ad perfectionem sive ut perfectibilis ad perfectionem, et respectum passivi sive producti ad agens sive ad producens, et respectum posterioris ad oppositum praecedens. ƿDuo autem istorum respectuum, scilicet primus et tertius, videntur concurrere ad mutationem absolute (non comparando eam ad agens), et isti exprimuntur per illam rationem mutationis qua dicitur aliquid mutari 'quia aliter se habet nunc quam prius': Si 'habere' exprimat respectum materiae ad formam sive perfectibilis ad perfectionem secundum quam sic se habet, hoc est quod actuatur illa perfectione; si 'aliter quam prius', ecce alius respectus, fundatus in aliquo respectu materiae ad formam sive perfectibilis ad perfectionem. Et si addatur quod mutari est aliquid aliter se habere nunc quam prius 'ab aliquo mutante', ecce tertius respectus. 290. As to the fifth, the argument about change [n.184] - there seems to be a difficulty there both about the major and about the minor. I say that in natural change there is matter and form and agent and composite of matter and form and many respects (to wit: the respect of the agent to the produced composite, and conversely a respect of the produced composite to the agent, a respect of the matter to the form and conversely, and a respect of both to the whole and conversely, and a respect of the composite and of the present form to the preceding opposite; and not only were these absolutes preceded -namely composite and form - by their opposites, but the respects of matter to form and conversely, and the respects of form to composite and conversely, these too were preceded by their opposites, and so there can be respects of all these respects to their opposites; nor is this all, but also all these respects are from the agent, and so there can be respects of all these respects to the agent) - such that about these many respects, taking those that relate to the issue at hand, matter has respect to form as the perfectible and that which is perfected to its perfection, and these are coeval with the existence of the composite; this respect too is from the agent, which effectively induces the form and perfects the matter with this formal perfection, such that there is founded on this respect, which is 'of matter to form as of receptive to perfection or of perfectible to perfection', a respect of the passive thing to the agent; this respect too succeeds to its opposite, because the matter was previously unformed. These three respects seem to be what is meant by passive change, namely: the respect of matter to form as of perfective to perfection or of perfectible to perfection; the respect of passive or produced thing to the agent or producer; and the respect of a later thing to the preceding opposite. But two of these respects, namely the first and third, seem to concur in change absolutely (when not comparing change to the agent), and these are expressed by the idea of change whereby something is said to be changed 'because it is disposed differently now than before'; if 'disposed' expresses the respect of matter to form or of the perfectible to the perfection which it is thus disposed to, this is what is actualized by that perfection; if 'differently than before' expresses it, here is another respect, founded on some respect of matter to form or of perfectible to perfection. And if one adds that change means that something is disposed differently now than before by some changer, here is a third respect.
291 Ad propositum ergo potest dici quod mutatio, proprie accepta, non est eadem formae (quia tunc mutatio maneret manente forma), nec est eadem respectui materiae ad formam nec e converso (quia tunc semper maneret manente huiusmodi respectu), nec est eadem respectui totius ad oppositum nec e converso oppositi ad totum (quia tunc similiter maneret dum manet compositum), - sed est ordo 'materiae ad formam' ut novus et immediatus ad talem formam; et neuter istorum ordinum est dependentia essentialis ad ƿaliquid, ad quod dependeat habens illum ordinem, et ideo neuter est idem absoluto. Sic ergo conceditur maior illius rationis. 291. As to the issue at hand, therefore, one can say that change, properly taken, is not the same as form (because then change would remain while the form remains), nor is it the same as the respect of matter to form or conversely (because then it would always remain while this sort of respect remains), nor is it the same as the respect of the whole to the opposite or conversely of the opposite to the whole (because then it would likewise remain while the composite remains) - but it is the order of matter to form as a new and immediate order to such form; and neither of these orders is an essential dependence on anything on which what has the order depends, and so neither is the same as the absolute thing. In this way then the major of the reason [nn.184-85] is conceded.
292 Et ad minorem dico quod creatio est productio totius creati in esse, non praesupposita aliqua parte eius, - ita quod licet creatum habeat duas partes (quarum altera posset naturaliter praecedere alteram et eam recipere ut suam perfectionem), tamen ut totum creatur. Non videtur primus terminus creationis esse aliqua pars, sed totale esse; aut saltem, si loquamur de angelo creato, - ibi nihil est 'potentiale' recipiens aliquod actuale, sub cuius opposito praefuerit. 292. And to the minor [nn.184, 186] I say that creation is the producing into being of the whole created thing without presupposing any part of it - such that, although the created thing has two parts (one of which naturally precedes the other and receives it as its perfection), yet it is created as a whole. The first term of creation does not seem to be any part but total being, or at least it is so if we are speaking of a created angel, where nothing is a potential receiving something actual the opposite of which it was under previously.
293 Et tunc si dicatur mutatio 'nova habitudo potentialis ad actuale', ita quod potentiale praefuerit in se et tamen sine illo actu, patet quod nulla creatio est mutatio, quia nullum potentiale praeexsistebat. 293. And then if change is called 'a new relation of the potential to the actual', such that the potential pre-existed in itself and yet without the actuality, it is plain that no creation is change, because nothing potential pre-existed creation.
294 Si autem mutatio dicatur 'actuatio ipsius potentialis nova', ita quod illud potentiale non praefuerit sub illo actu, nec tamen oporteat quod in se praefuerit, - nec sic creatio angeli est mutatio, quia nullum potentiale est in eo. Tamen sic posset dici quod creatio ignis esset mutatio (si ignis crearetur), quia in eo esset potentiale et actuaretur per formam et aliter se haberet nunc quam prius; non 'aliter quam prius fuerat', sed quod non sic se habuit prius, sicut ƿmodo. Et videtur quod in definitione mutationis, illud 'aliter se habere nunc quam prius' non oporteat quod accipiatur positive, quia planum est quod non refertur ad subiectum, sed ad terminum 'a quo'; terminus autem 'a quo' mutationis proprie non est aliquid positivum, sed privatio, secundum Philosophum V Physicorum. 294. But if change is called 'a new actualization of a potential', such that the potential did not pre-exist under the act nor need it have pre-existed in itself - then in this way the creation of an angel is not change, because there is nothing potential in it. Yet it could in this way be said that creation of fire was change (if fire was created), because in fire there would be a potential and it would be actualized by form and it would be disposed differently now than before; not that it is 'differently disposed than it was before', but that it was 'not disposed before as it is now'. And it seems that in the definition of change the 'being disposed differently now than before' should not be taken positively, because it is plain that the reference is not to a subject but to the term 'from which'; but the term 'from which' of motion is properly not anything positive but is a privation, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b35-5a16.
295 Dico tunc quod vel nulla creatio est mutatio, si oporteat semper potentiale in se praefuisse et noviter actuari a forma recepta (quia nullius creati potentiale praefuit), vel saltem creatio simplicis non est mutatio, si sufficiat potentiale non fuisse sub illo actu in quo nunc est et ita noviter fuisse sub actu per mutationem. Sed quocumque modo, ratione illius ordinis immediati ad non esse, propter quem concessum est mutationem differre a forma, concessum est etiam creationem non esse eandem realiter fundamento, quia ille ordo immediatus ad non esse non est idem si non maneat nisi in primo instanti, sicut propter illum eundem ordinem non manet creatio nisi in primo instanti cum forma. ƿ 295. I say then that either no creation is change, if change is that a potential always has to have pre-existed and be newly actualized by a received form (because the potential of no created thing pre-existed), or at least no creation of a simple is change, if it is sufficient for change that a potential was not in the act it is in now and was thus newly in act through change. But, in whichever way it is taken, the immediate order to not-being [n.281], by reason of which it was conceded that change differs from form [n.291], is also the reason by which it was conceded that creation is not the same really as the foundation [n.283], for the order immediate to not-being is not the same if it only remains in the first instant, just as, on account of the same order, creation does not remain in the same instant as form.

Notes

  1. ↑ a. [Interpolation] from Boethius On the Trinity: negative and relative predicates make no composition (look at him there); third of Anselm, Monologion, "For it is clear that for a man after a year..."
  2. ↑ a. [Interpolation]: Again, if likeness in this thing [sc. one of two things alike in whiteness] is other than the whiteness in it, by parity of reasoning the likeness in the other term [sc. the other white thing the first white thing is like] is also other than the whiteness in it; therefore both foundations can be together without this likeness or that, as things prior in nature can be without things posterior in nature; and so two white things can be together and not two like things - which seems incompossible, because likeness is unity in quality.
  3. ↑ a. [Interpolation from Appendix A] Averroes com.3 and more manifestly in com.7 says, "If place is prior to any natural body (as Homer posits), then there could be place without body, and the place would not be corrupted on the corruption of the body." See there.
  4. ↑ a. [Interpolation from Appendix A] This reason is doubly deficient: first because the major is false of divine relations, second because the first part of the minor is false, save when making comparison to the same thing; thus there are two false premises. However the major holds the difficulty by adding to the subject the 'nothing finite' etc. - The minor is true when comparing equality and inequality to the same thing, and thus both are in the same foundation, though successively.
  5. ↑ a. [Interpolation] which statement must be understood insofar as the comparison falls under negation (in this way: 'a creature, not in comparison to God, is something'), because according to no comparison is a creature's entity proportional to God. But the statement is false if the comparison is affirmed (in this way: 'in comparison to God a creature is nothing'); for such speech is metaphorical, according to Anselm.
  6. ↑ a. [Interpolation] A reason as follows is formed: if relation is not founded in another it is not relation; so either there will be an infinite regress [sc. if relation is founded in relation] or relation will eventually be founded in the absolute. But the idea of the absolute is that it is to itself, while the formal idea of relation is disposition to another; but formal entity to itself is not the same as formal entity to another; therefore etc. - Again, that in whose quidditative idea there is a disposition to another is not to itself, nor is it absolute; therefore nothing created is an absolute entity.
  7. ↑ a. [Interpolation] Or thus: a nature one formally and specifically is not many specifically; but any nature has three relations specifically different with respect to God, as is plain - conversely in God to creatures there are three relations of reason; therefore etc.
  8. ↑ a. [Interpolation] Or thus: if the relation of creature to God is other than the creature, it is naturally posterior to the creature; but what is prior in nature can exist without what is naturally posterior -as far as it itself is concerned - without contradiction; therefore a stone can exist without a respect to God - therefore it can exist without a term for the respect, which includes a contradiction. The first proposition, the major, is plain, because a relation cannot be prior; for a relation, being founded on the absolute, cannot exist prior to it - nor can it exist simultaneously in nature with it, for the same reason; therefore it is posterior, because it is an accident of it. The second proposition, the minor, is plain, because the idea of 'naturally prior' is that - as far as concerns itself - it can be without the other, and in this way, according to the Philosopher, substance precedes accident.
  9. ↑ a. [Interpolation] because while the raven remains it cannot lose the blackness, but it can lose feathers and certain other things.
  10. ↑ a. [Interpolated note] Again, the relation of likeness is not the same as whiteness, and yet it is necessarily present when the term is in place; therefore if the term were necessary, the relation would simply necessarily be present - and yet it is not then more the same, because it is not more intrinsic to the term just because the term is incorruptible. Likewise there is this argument: if the term were corruptible the relation would not be the same as the foundation, therefore neither is it the same when the foundation is incorruptible. - This reason well shows that incorruptibility of the term does not make per se for this identity; but incorruptibility of the term in comparison with the foundation does well make for it, that is, if it is simply impossible for the term not to be unless the foundation is not - and further, if this is the first relation of dependence of the foundation on a term, because then by reason of the foundation there is simply this necessity of coexistence; because of the first of these points ['if it is simply impossible for the term not to be etc.'] the relation, according to one opinion, of vision to the object would be that of identity - because of the second of them ['and further, if this is the first etc.'] the dependence of our nature on the person of the Word in Christ would not be identical with our nature. Again, a relation to something simultaneous in nature as to a term is posterior to the foundation (as likeness is posterior to whiteness); therefore also a relation to something prior in nature to the term can likewise be posterior. Nor does it therefore follow, from the fact that the foundation's being without the term is a contradiction, that the foundation's being without the relation is a contradiction [nn.262-263]. These two reasons [sc. in the preceding two paragraphs] are probable reasons against the first reason about the contradiction of 'being without each other' [n.261]. Likewise, the foundation cannot generally be without a respect that is other than it (as body and figure); therefore the inference 'not without this, therefore the same as this', when the thing in question is a respect, does not follow. Against the other reason, namely that a respect common to everything other than the term is not the accident of anything [n.266], has a logical instance against it, that creation is not created (a concrete is not asserted of an abstract). Again, more really: 'inherence accidentally' is itself present in a thing but whiteness is not; therefore a relation is itself related but the foundation is not. There is therefore not the same reason of standing in the first case and the second. [Vatican editors: these interpolated objections are left without answer.] Note, in the year 1304 (almost at the end): 'the two extremes are the one total cause of relation'; later differently: 'because the foundation is the total cause of relation but the term is a sine qua non' (just as fire is the total active cause of heat but wood is a sine qua non), such that the foundation is prevented from causing as long as it does not have the term. [Vatican editors remark that the first note in this paragraph is the regular teaching of Scotus; the second or later note is nowhere found in him.]
  11. ↑ a. [Interpolation] but such a relation, common to every creature, is uniformly said 'of everything other than God' in relation to God himself; therefore it is not accidental to any creature.
  12. ↑ a. [Interpolated note by Richard of Sloley] against the first response [n.277]: Then, for the same reason, the powers of the soul could be set down as qualities and yet be really the same as the substance of the soul, because the reason that something in one accidental category - for instance relation - is the same in reality with substance is also a reason that something in another accidental category should also be. Again, nothing finite includes by identity anything primarily diverse from it; therefore substance does not include a relation of the genus of relation. Against the second response [n.277]: That which is of a determinate genus cannot be the same as that which is of some other genus but is transcendent. Again, what is a substance to one thing is not an accident to anything (from the Philosopher and Commentator, Physics 1.3.186a32-b12). Again, then an absolute thing and a comparative thing would not be contraries nor the first differences dividing being, because -according to Aristotle - great and small are not contraries because they are present in the same thing [Categories 6.5b11-6a11]; the second point is plain, because the first differences divide more than the second ones (but the second differences dividing being, when one says 'another substance, another quality, etc.' are primarily diverse; therefore). Again Avicenna Metaphysics 3.10, f 83rb, "There is no relation which is not an accident;" again On the Soul 5.2, f 23va, "Substance is not of itself referred to anything in any way."
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