Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P1Q1

• I. First Opinion as Reported and Held by Bonaventure
• A. Arguments for the Opinion
• B. Arguments against the Opinion
• II. Second Opinion
• A. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Positing it
• B. Henry of Ghent's Way of Positing it
• III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained A. The First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure 1. As to the Opinion itself
• 2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion
• B. Second Way, which is tangential to the Intention of Bonaventure
• IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in itself
• V. Scotus' own Response to the Question
• VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion
• VII. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question One: Whether in the Actual Existence of an Angel there is any Succession Formally
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem secundam, ubi agit Magister de loco creationis angeli et tempore quando creabatur, quaero de duobus: et primo de mensura durationis exsistentiae angelorum, et secundo de loco angelorum.	1. About the second distinction, where the Master deals with the place of creation of angels and the time when they were created, I ask two questions: first about the measure of existence of angels, and second about the place of angels.
2 Quantum ad primum, quaero primo utrum in exsistentia actuali angeli sit aliqua successio formaliter.	2. As to the first question I ask firstly whether in the actual existence of an angel there is any succession formally.
3 Quod non: Primo, quia quantitas non potest recipi in non quanto; igitur nec successio - quae quantitas est - potest recipi in exsistentia actuali angeli, quae indivisibilis est.	3. That there is not: First, because quantity cannot be received by what lacks extension, or is a non-quantum; therefore succession - which is a quantity - cannot be received by the existence of an angel, which is indivisible.
4 Confirmatur ratio, quia quantitas permanens non potest recipi in indivisibili; ergo nec quantitas successiva.	4. A confirmation of the reason is that a permanent quantity cannot be received by something indivisible; therefore not a successive quantity either.
5 Secundo sic: prius et posterius, in ratione numeri, possunt integrare rationem temporis; ubicumque est successio, ibi est prius ƿet posterius, et ibi potest inveniri ratio numeri et mensurae; igitur si in actuali exsistentia angeli esset successio formaliter, ipsa mensuraretur tempore.	5. Second, as follows: before and after, in idea of number, can bring together the idea of time [time is 'the number of motion with respect to before and after' according to Aristotle]; wherever there is succession, there is before and after, and there the idea of number and of measure can be found; therefore, if succession were formally in the actual existence of an angel, that existence would be measured by time.
6 Tertio, ad hoc est Augustinus 83 Quaestionum quaestione 72: ((Aevum est stabile, tempus autem mutabile)).	6. Third, relevant to this is Augustine 83 Questions q.72, "Aeviternity is stable but time is changeable."
7 Quarto, arguitur idem per Dionysium De divinis nominibus cap. 5 et 10 (haec, cum ibi videntur, ibi dicuntur esse).	7. Fourth, the same is argued by Dionysius Divine Names ch. 10 (these things that, when they are looked at there, are said to be there ["The property of aeviternity is something ancient and invariable, and the whole of it is measured as a whole..."]).
8 Contra: Non est necesse Deum creare unum angelum, quando creat alium; igitur potest aliquis angelus esse alio non exsistente, et potest alius creari ita quod sit alio nunc exsistente. Igitur ille qui fuit isto non exsistente, et est cum isto nunc exsistente, videtur esse prior ipso, et esse eius ut 'non cum ipso' videtur praecedere esse eius ut 'cum ipso'. ƿ	8. On the contrary: When God creates one angel it is not necessary for him to create another; so some angel can exist when another does not exist, and this other can be created such that it exists while the former is still now existing. So the former, which existed when the latter did not exist and exists with it when it does now exist, seems to be prior to the latter, and its existence as 'not being along with the latter' seems to precede its existence as 'being along with the latter'.
9 Secundo sic: angelus potest annihilari, circumscripto tempore. Quaero igitur, in quo? Non in 'nunc' temporis, quia illud non est; nec in 'nunc' aeternitatis, formaliter; nec in 'nunc' aevi, quia illud 'nunc' manet unum et idem. Igitur in eodem erit et non erit, quae sunt contradictoria.	9. Second as follows: an angel, when time has been excluded, can be annihilated. I ask then in what moment? Not in the 'now' of time because it does not exist; nor in the 'now' of eternity, formally; nor in the 'now' of aeviternity, because that 'now' remains one and the same. Therefore it will exist and will not exist in the same moment, which is contradictory.
10 Tertio sic: aliquis angelus potest nunc esse et post annihilari et iterum reparari; sed esse reparatum non est ita unum cum esse creato, sicut si nulla fuisset interruptio (alioquin ita unum esset aliquod interruptum, sicut non interruptum, quod falsum est); igitur in alio 'nunc' erit istud esse reparatum, et in alio 'nunc' prius creatum, - et si hoc, igitur si mansisset sine interruptione, fuisset in alio 'nunc' quam modo. Probatio huius consequentiae: tanta enim mora est quiescentis, quanta esset moti; ergo a simili, tanta mora fuisset non tendentis in non esse (potentis tamen tendere) quanta est si actu tendat.	10. Third as follows: an angel can exist now and afterwards be annihilated and again be restored; but his having been restored is not as one and the same with his having been created as it would have been had there been no interruption (otherwise something interrupted would be as one as something not-interrupted, which is false); therefore his having been restored will be in one 'now' and his having been created before in another 'now' - and if so, then, if he had persisted without interruption, he would have been then in a different 'now' than he is in at this moment. The proof of this consequence is that there is as much duration of him as at rest as there would be of him as moved; therefore, by similarity, there would have been as much duration of him as not-tending to not-being (although as able so to tend) as there is if he does actually so tend.
	I. First Opinion as Reported and Held by Bonaventure
11 Hic dicitur quod in exsistentia actuali angeli est successio formaliter. Vide opinionem in Bonaventura et in Scriptis. ƿ	11. Here it is said that there is succession formally in the actual existence of an angel. See the opinion of Bonaventure and in his writings [Bonaventure, 2 d.2 p.1 a.1 q.3].
	A. Arguments for the Opinion
12 Et pro ista opinione arguitur quadrupliciter: Primo, ex parte conservationis. Et fundatur ratio super auctoritatem Augustini Super Genesim ad litteram libro VIII cap. 19, ubi vult quod 'sicut aer respectu solis non est factus lucidus, sed fit lucidus (alioquin absente sole remaneret aer lucidus), ita se habet creatura respectu Dei'; item, vult - IV Super Genesim cap. 14 - quod Deus non ita se habet respectu creaturae sicut aedificator respectu domus.	12. And for this opinion there is argument in four ways: First on the part of conservation. And the reason is founded on the authority of Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 8.12 n.26, where he maintains that "as air is not a having been made to be bright, but a continual being made bright, in respect of the sun (otherwise the air would remain bright in the absence of the sun), so is the creature disposed in respect of God;" and again (ibid. 4.12 n.22), Augustine maintains that God is not disposed in respect of the creature the way the builder is disposed in respect of the house.
13 Ex isto arguitur sic: si creatura respectu Dei non est facta in ƿesse ab ipso, sed est quasi in fieri formaliter, igitur formaliter semper ponitur a Deo in esse, - et ita sicut continue manet, ita continue est creatio eius in esse a Deo.	13. And from this an argument is made as follows: if the creature in respect of God is not a having been made in its being by God but is as it were formally in a state of becoming, then it is always formally being posited in being by God - and so its creation in being is as continuously from God as it is continuous in persisting.
14 Confirmatur istud, quia 'conservare' non est tantum non destruere, sed est aliqua actio Dei positiva (alioquin diceretur conservare lumen qui non claudit fenestram; similiter, tunc 'annihilare' esset actio positiva, quod falsum est, quia 'annihilare' est non agere); ergo 'conservare' est agere.	14. The point is confirmed, because 'to conserve' is not merely not to destroy but is some positive action of God's (otherwise one who does not close a window would be said to be conserving light; similarly, 'to annihilate' would then be a positive act, which is false, because 'to annihilate' is 'to non-act'); therefore to conserve is to act.
15 Quod etiam patet ex hoc, quod nulla creatura est in esse suo independens, quia nec actus purus; igitur continue in essendo dependet a sua causa: et non tantum a causa quae dedit esse et modo non dat, quia tunc 'conservare' nihil esset nisi prius egisse et modo non destruere.	15. This is also plain from the following, that no creature is independent in its existence, because neither is any creature pure act; therefore a creature depends for existence continually on its cause, and not just on a cause that has given it being and is not giving it now, because then 'to conserve' would be nothing other than to have acted before and not to be destroying now.
16 Si concedantur omnia ista, quod Deus conservando agat positive aliquid circa creaturam, non tamen actione aliqua continua (quia nulla est ibi forma secundum quam posset assignari continuatio actionis), nec etiam alia et alia actione sed semper eadem, contra: hac causatione non habetur formaliter et ultimate illud quod potest non haberi posita hac causatione (hanc probo, quia causa causans hac causatione, est causa ultimata, applicata ad producendum effectum in esse; igitur si cum hac possit stare effectum non ƿesse, non videtur quod hac causatione habetur ultimate); sed hac causatione qua angelus producebatur in esse, posita, potest angelus non habere esse cras; igitur non habebit illud esse cras formaliter ista causatione: et habet esse, igitur alia causatione.	16. If all these things be conceded, that God in conserving does something positive as regards the creature, yet not by any continuous action (because there is no form in him according to which continuation of action could be assigned), nor even by different actions one after the other, but always by the same action - then, on the contrary: by this causation there is not had formally and ultimately that which, when this causation is in place, can possibly not be had (my proof for this is that a cause causing by this causation is a cause that is ultimate and applied to producing an effect in existence; therefore if the non-existence of the effect can stand along with this cause, then existence does not seem to be had ultimately by this causation); but when this causation, by which an angel was produced in existence, is in place, the angel can possibly not have existence tomorrow; so he will not formally by this causation have existence tomorrow; and he does have existence; therefore by some other causation.
17 Si dicas quod non habet esse cum coexsistentia in tempore crastino ex prima causatione, sed ad hoc requiritur illud 'futurum exsistere' (et ideo futuro exsistente tunc, illa 'ratio futuri' est ratio coexsistendi angelo), - contra: ita est in aeternitate, quod non habet coexsistentiam cum tempore in quantum coexsistentia esta. Similiter, non tantum 'non posita causatione futuri' angelus potest non habere esse cum futuro, sed potest etiam non habere fundamentum illius coexsistentiae, scilicet esse absolute; ergo illud 'esse absolute' non habet ex tali coexsistentia.	17. If you say that from the first causation he does not have existence along with coexistence in time tomorrow, but that for this there is required the 'existence of the future' (and so, when the future then exists, this 'reason of the future' is the reason of coexistence for the angel) - on the contrary: this is how it is in eternity, that eternity does not have coexistence with time insofar as coexistence is coexistence. Likewise, not only can an angel, when 'causation of the future is not in place', not have existence with the future, but he can even not have the foundation of the coexistence, namely existence absolutely; therefore he does not have 'existence absolutely' from such coexistence.
18 Item, secundo: si esse eius est simplex, igitur sicut Deus non potest facere angelum non fuisse, sic nec non fore.	18. Again, second: if an angel's existence is simple, then just as God cannot make an angel not to have been, so neither can he make an angel not to be going to be.
19 Confirmatur ratio, quia in aeternitate non sunt 'contradictoria' ƿvera de voluntate divina, nec etiam volitio divina est respectu contradictoriorum ut contradictoria sunt; sed Deus in aeternitate potuit velle creare angelum aliquem et eundem annihilare; igitur voluit ipsum esse et voluit ipsum non esse. Ergo oportet hic invenire aliquas condiciones ex parte esse et non esse, ut non sint contradictoria. Sed ista quae tollunt contradictionem, non videntur posse assignari nisi diversa 'nunc' (puta quod voluit ipsum esse pro a et non esse pro b), igitur incompossibile fuit Deum velle creare unum angelum et annihilare eundem, nisi vellet hoc et illud pro diversis 'nunc'; sed potuit velle hoc et illud absque respectu ad tempus, igitur necesse est posse ex parte angeli intelligi aliud et aliud 'nunc' absque respectu ad tempus; ista alietas non potest esse nisi ipsorum 'nunc' aevi, ergo etc.	19. There is a confirmation of the reason, that in eternity there are no true contradictories about the divine will, and neither is there divine volition in respect of contradictories as they are contradictories; but God could in eternity have willed to create some angel and to annihilate him; therefore he willed him to be and willed him not to be. Therefore some conditions on the part of being and not being must be found here so that they are not contradictories. But there seems to be nothing capable of being assigned to take away the contradiction save diverse 'nows' (namely, that God willed the angel to be at now a and not to be at now b); so it was incompossible for God to will to create an angel and to annihilate the same angel unless he willed the former and the latter to be at diverse 'nows'; but God could have willed the former and the latter without any respect to time; therefore it must be possible to understand one now and another now on the part of the angel without any respect to time; this otherness can only be of the 'nows' of aeviternity; therefore etc.
20 Tertia via arguitur ex infinitate, - quia ex quo angelus durabit in infinitum cum toto tempore futuro, si nunc habet totam durationem suam quam habebit semper, igitur nunc habet formaliter durationem infinitam.	20. The third way of argument is from infinity - because from the fact an angel will persist infinitely with the whole of future time, then, if he has now the whole duration that he will always have, he has now formally infinite duration.
21 Confirmatur hoc, quia illud 'nunc' quod est ex se tale quod ƿpotest coexsistere infinito, est formaliter infinitum, - sicut si angelus haberet in se unde coexsistere posset omni loco, esset infinitus secundum locum.	21. There is confirmation of this in that the 'now' that is of itself such that it can coexist with the infinite is formally infinite - just as an angel, if he had in himself wherewith he was able to coexist with every place, would be infinite in place.
22 Et si dicas quod hoc non est verum nisi hoc habeat ex se unde sic possit coexsistere, - contra: licet non habeat ex se unde sic coexsistens habeat infinitatem, tamen sicut formaliter habet unde coexsistat sic, ita videtur formaliter infinitum, - sicut si haberet unde esset praesens omni loco (actuali et potentiali), licet effective a Deo, esset tamen immensus formaliter; et licet sua immensitas non aequaretur immensitati divinae secundum intensionem, aequaretur tamen ei secundum extensionem, ita quod nusquam posset Deus esse per suam immensitatem nisi quo posset esse angelus.	22. And if you say that this is not true unless the angel has of himself wherewith he can coexist - on the contrary: although he does not have of himself wherewith, as thus coexisting, he may possess infinity, yet, just as he formally has wherewith he does thus coexist, so he seems to be formally an infinite thing - just as if he had wherewith he might be present to every place (actual and potential), although he would have this from God effectively, yet he would be formally immense; and although his immensity would not be equal to the divine immensity in intensity, yet it would be equal to it in extension, such that God could be nowhere in his immensity save where the angel could be.
23 Et confirmatur ista ratio, quia negatio negationis est affirmatio positionis, - igitur negationes infinitarum negationum ponunt infinitas positiones, vel unam formaliter infinitam; sed angelus, habens istam coexsistentiam simplicem, habet ex ipsa negationes infinitarum negationum ('non esse cum infinitis instantibus temporis'); igitur habet ex ipsa infinitas positiones, vel unam positionem virtualiter infinitam. ƿ	23. There is a confirmation for this reason too, that the negation of a negation is the assertion of the affirmation - therefore the negations of infinite negations assert infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally; but an angel, being possessed of this simple coexistence, has from it the negations of infinite negations ('he does not exist with the infinite moments of time'); so he has from it infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally.
24 Quarta via est ex ordine eorum quae fiunt in aevo: potuit enim angelus fuisse creatus non peccator, sed innocens, et potuit postea peccare et non peccare, circumscripto omni tempore; iste igitur angelus prius fuisset innocens quam peccator; igitur 'prius' et 'post' in esse eius.	24. The fourth way is from the order of the things that come to be in aeviternity; for an angel could have been created not a sinner but innocent, and could afterwards have sinned or not sinned, with all time abstracted away; so this angel was innocent before he was a sinner; therefore there is in his existence 'before' and 'after'.
25 Similiter, potuit unus angelus prius creari et postea statim annihilari, et post creari alius; ille primus numquam fuit isto secundo exsistente, igitur nec in eodem 'nunc' cum eo; igitur prius est unus, et alius posterius (quia si fuerunt, et non simul, igitur unus post alium). Igitur si unus alius exstitisset cum ambobus illis, fuisset in esse eius 'prius' et 'posterius', sicut esse unius istorum est prius quam esse alterius.	25. Likewise, an angel could have been first created and afterwards at once annihilated, and another angel later created; the first angel never existed when the second existed, and so was not in the same 'now' as the second was; therefore the first was before and the second was afterwards (because if they existed, and not together, then one after the other). So if some other angel had existed along with both of them, there would have been 'before' and 'after' in his existence, just as the existence of one of them was before the existence of the other of them.
26 Pro ista positione sunt auctoritates: Augustinus Confessionum XI: 'Nunc temporis, si semper staret et non flueret, non esset tempus sed aeternitas'; et videtur ibi loqui de vera aeternitate Dei, exponendo illud Psalmi Tu autem idem ipse es et anni tui etc.	26. Authorities for this position [n.11] are: Augustine Confessions 11.14 n.17, "The now of time, if it always stood and did not flow, would not be time but eternity;" and he seems there to be speaking of the true eternity of God, by expounding the verse of Psalm 101.28, "But you are yourself the same and your years, etc."
27 Praeterea, idem IV Super Genesim 14: ((Quod autem ait Pater ƿmeus usque modo operatur, continuationem operis signat)); hoc probat, subdens: ((Aliter enim posset intelligi si diceret 'nunc operatur' (ubi non esset necesse ut operis continuationem acciperemus), aliter autem cogit intelligi cum ait 'usque nunc', ex illo scilicet quo - cum cuncta conderet - operatus est)).	27. Further, Literal Commentary on Genesis 4.12.n.23, "But as to his saying (John 5.17), 'My Father works until now', it signifies continuation of work;" and Augustine proves this by adding, "For he could be understood otherwise if he said 'works now' (where it would not be necessary for us to take it as continuation of work), but he compels us to understand it differently when he says 'until now', namely from then on -when he was making all things - he has been working."
28 Praeterea, Boethius De Trinitate: Quamvis secundum philosophos de corporibus caelestibus et spiritibus dici possit quod semper sunt, magna tamen difFerentia est; 'semper esse' in Deo tantum praesens est, non currens finaliter sempiternitatem.	28. Further, Boethius On the Trinity ch.4 says that although, according to the philosophers, one could say of the heavenly bodies and spirits that they always are, yet there is a great difference; 'being always' in God is always present, not a running ultimately through eternity.
29 Praeterea, Damascenus libro I cap. 15: (('Saeculum' dicitur quod semper protenditur cum aeternis, velut spatium)) etc.	29. Further, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.15, "The term 'age [saeculum]' means what is always being extended with eternal things, as space etc."
30 Praeterea, Gregorius Moralium XXVII (super illud Iob Numerus dierum etc.) de angelis ait: ((In eis initium cernimus, cum mentem retro revocamus)) etc.	30. Further, Gregory Morals 27.7 n.11 (on the remark in Job 36.26, 'the number of his years is without reckoning') says of the angels, "In them we discern a beginning when we turn our mind backwards etc."
31 Praeterea, Anselmus Proslogion 20, loquens Deo ait: ((Transis ƿomnia, etiam aeterna, quia tua et illorum aeternitas tota tibi praesens est, cum illa de sua aeternitate non habeant quod futurum est, sicut nec quod praeteritum est)).	31. Further, Anselm Proslogion ch.20 speaking to God says, "You pass through all things, even eternal ones, because your eternity and theirs is all present to you, since they from their eternity do not have what is future as neither what is past."
32 Praeterea, Hieronymus Ad Marcellam: ((Solus Deus non novit fuisse, nec futurum esse)).	32. Further, Jerome To Marcella [rather Isidore Etymologies 7.1 n.12] , "Only God does not know 'has been' or 'will be'."
	B. Arguments against the Opinion
33 Contra istam positionem arguitur quod includat contradictionem, quia ubi est successio, ibi est prius et posterius, - quae non sunt simul, sed adveniente posteriore decidit 'prius', et per consequens 'prius' veterascit et 'posterius' novum est.	33. Against this position [n.11] the argument is made that it involves a contradiction, because where succession is, there before and after are - and these are not together, but when what is after arrives, what was before falls away, and consequently what was before grows old and what comes after is new.
34 Quod si intelligatur successionem esse in mensura, absque hoc quod innovatio sit in mensurato, - contra hoc arguitur, quia secundum Philosophum, IV Physicorum, 'prius' et 'posterius' in tempore, sunt propter 'prius' et 'post' in motu, ita quod si non ƿesset aliud et aliud in motu, non esset 'prius' et 'posterius' in tempore; ergo a simili, si non sit aliqua exsistentia nova in aeviterno (nec aliqua novitas in eo), non erit aliqua distinctio inter 'prius' et 'posterius' in mensura.	34. And if the succession is supposed to exist in the measure without newness coming to be in the measured - an argument against this is that, according to the Philosopher Physics 4.11.219a10-29, 'before' and 'after' in time are because of 'before' and 'after' in motion, such that if there were no different stages in motion there would not be 'before' and 'after' in time; therefore, by similarity, if there is no new existence in what is aeviternal (nor any newness in it), there will be no distinction between 'before' and 'after' in the measure of it.
35 Hoc etiam confirmatur per Philosophum X Metaphysicae, quia mensura debet esse unigenea mensurato, ita quod si mensura sit divisibilis, et mensuratum; quod etiam probatur per hoc, quod indivisibile (in quantum indivisibile) non potest mensurari divisibili.	35. This is confirmed by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10.1.1053a18-27, because a measure should be of the same genus as the measured, such that, if the measure is divisible, so too is the measured; this is also proved by the fact that the indivisible (insofar as it is indivisible) cannot be measured by the divisible.
36 Praeterea, 'nunc' aevi si deficit et non semper manet idem, hoc non potest esse propter defectum subiecti, quia per te subiectum manet idem; nec potest poni propter aliquam causam corrumpentem, quia non videtur posse assignari causa corrumpens. Igitur non deficit. Aliter est de 'nunc' temporis, quia illius subiectum proximum (vel mensuratum proximum) deficit, scilicet mutatio.	36. Further, if the 'now' of aeviternity passes away and does not always remain the same, this cannot be because of a defect in the subject, because the subject for you remains the same; nor can this be posited because of some corrupting cause, because it does not seem that any corrupting cause can be assigned. Therefore the 'now' does not pass away. It is otherwise with the 'now' of time, because its proximate subject (or the proximate measured thing) passes, namely change.
37 Praeterea, si est hic aliqua innovatio et manens circa aliquid idem, igitur illud proprie mutatur, quia illud aliter se habet nunc quam prius; mutationis autem mensura est 'nunc' temporis; igitur aeviternum in quantum ponitur mensurari 'nunc' aevi, mensurabitur 'nunc' temporis. ƿ	37. Further, if there is here some newness and some remaining with respect to the same thing, then it properly changes, because it is disposed differently now than before; but the measure of change is the 'now' of time; therefore to the extent aeviternity is posited as being measured by the 'now' of aeviternity, it will be measured by the 'now' of time.
38 Pro hoc sunt auctoritates beati Augustini De civitate Dei, quaere.	38. On behalf of this view are the authorities of Blessed Augustine City of God -look there.
	II. Second Opinion
39 Hanc conclusionem negativam tenendo, dupliciter ponitur differentia aevi ad tempus et aeternitatem.	39. By holding to this negative conclusion, then [sc. that there is no succession in the existence of an angel], a twofold difference of aeviternity from time and eternity is posited.
	A. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Positing it
40 Uno modo sic, - quaere opinionem alibi.	40. In one way as follows - look for the opinion elsewhere.
41 Contra, - quaere. ƿ	41. On the contrary - look for it.
	B. Henry of Ghent's Way of Positing it
42 Alio modo ponitur, Quodlibet V quaestione 13, - quaere.	42. In another way, [Henry] Quodlibet 5 q.13 - look for it.
43 Contra istum modum ponendi arguo: Videtur enim contradicere sibi ipsi, quia si in aeviterno ((non ƿest quod esse quod habet in praesente 'nunc', habeat in sequente 'nunc')), ((immo esse angeli, quantum est ex se, habet terminari)) (sicut dicit expresse), et post quod ((aevum potest in quolibet instanti, quantum est ex se, deficere)), - igitur, si istud aeviternum habeat formaliter esse cum primo 'nunc', ex quo illud esse habuit terminari cum primo 'nunc' (secundum illos), igitur vel oportet quod alio esse sit cum secundo 'nunc', vel eodem iterum posito.	43. Against this way of positing it I argue thus: For he seems to contradict himself, because if in aeviternity "it is not the case that an angel should have in the following 'now' the being he has in the present 'now' ... rather the being of an angel, as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit" (as Henry says expressly), and later he says that "aeviternity can, as far as concerns itself, fail at any instant" - then, if this 'now' of aeviternity have being formally along with the first 'now', whereby that being had to have a limit along with the first 'now' (according to Henry and his followers), then it must exist along with the second 'now' either by another being or by the same being posited again.
44 Praeterea, quod dicit 'impossibilia esse quae inferuntur, et illa non sequi ex hoc quod aevum ponitur indivisibile, sed ex negatione temporis, quae negatio est incompossibilis positioni aevi, et propter illam incompossibilitatem sequi impossibile de aeviterno': hoc non videtur rationabile, quia secundum ipsum quidquid est prius natura quantum est ex se, potest esse prius duraƿtione quantum est ex parte sui. Igitur non repugnat sibi quin absque contradictione, quantum est ex parte sui, posset esse 'prius duratione' posteriore (respectu cuius dicitur 'esse prius natura'), - et ipso posito et posteriore non posito, nulla contradictio est ex parte 'prioris naturaliter', nec alicuius quod pertinet ad ipsum in quantum prius est. Igitur ex tali hypothesi non sequitur aliqua incompossibilitas ex parte aeviterni in quantum aeviternum est.	44. Further, as to his saying that 'there are impossible inferences which follow, and they do not follow from positing aeviternity as indivisible but from the denial of time, which denial is incompossible with the positing of aeviternity, and it is because of this incompossibility that the impossible conclusion about aeviternity follows': this does not seem reasonable, because, according to him, whatever is, as far as concerns itself, prior in nature can, as far as concerns itself, be prior in duration. So there is no repugnance for it in its being able without contradiction, as far as concerns itself, to be 'prior in duration' to the posterior (with respect to which it is said to be 'prior in nature') - and, when it is posited and the posterior is not posited, there is no contradiction on the part of what is 'naturally prior', nor on the part of anything that pertains to it insofar as it is prior. Therefore, from such an hypothesis, there follows no incompossibility on the part of what is aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal.
45 Exemplum huius: quia licet necessario ad subiectum sequatur propria passio, tamen, quia subiectum est prius natura, non est contradictio ex parte subiecti quod subiectum sit prius etiam duratione, sua propria passione, et si hoc ponatur, nulla sequitur incompossibilitas ex parte subiecti in se, eo modo quo est prius passione. Contradictio igitur si aliqua sequitur, hoc est per locum extrinsecum, ex habitudine scilicet causae ad effectum.	45. An example of this: that although the subject is necessarily followed by its special property, yet, because the subject is prior in nature, there is no contradiction on the part of the subject that it should exist prior even in duration to its special property; and if this supposition is made, no incompossibility follows on the part of the subject in itself as to the way it is prior to its property. Therefore if any contradiction does follow, this is through some extrinsic fact, namely from the relation of the cause to the effect.
46 Ita igitur si esset necessaria aevi ad tempus comparatio tamquam prioris natura ad posterius natura, propter negationem posterioris - ponendo 'prius' - non sequeretur aliqua contradictio ex parte prioris secundum se, nec ex parte alicuius quod convenit ƿpriori secundum se; ista autem illata, scilicet angelum 'non posse esse priorem alio angelo' vel 'non posse esse post suum non esse', sunt impossibilia per se ex parte aeviterni in quantum aeviternum est; igitur etc.	46. So, in this way, if there were some necessary comparison of aeviternity to time, as of what is prior in nature to what is posterior in nature, then no contradiction would follow, because of negation of the posterior and positing of the prior, on the part of the prior in itself, nor on the part of anything that belongs to the prior in itself; but those inferences [sc. of Henry], namely that an angel 'cannot be prior to another angel' or that 'an angel cannot be after its non-being', are impossible per se on the part of the aeviternal as it is aeviternal; therefore etc.
47 Quod etiam probat illam necessitatem concomitantiae temporis ad aevum propter ordinem perfectioris ad imperfectius, non videtur sufficere. Hoc enim non concluderet de continentia quasi quantitativa sed quiditativa, sicut quiditas superior continet inferiorem; sed cum tali continentia stat quod superior potest esse sine inferiore et quod sibi conveniat 'esse quod est proprium sibi' absque inferiore, aut saltem non conveniat sibi in respectu ad inferius. Ita igitur in proposito dicendum est quod nihil 'proprium aevo' convenit sibi praecise in respectu ad tempus.	47. Also, as to his proof of the necessity of the concomitance of time with aeviternity on the basis of the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect, it does not seem to suffice. For the proof would not conclude this about a quasi-quantitative containing but about a quidditative one, in the way a superior quiddity contains the inferior one; but with such containing there stands the fact that the superior can be without the inferior and the fact that the being proper to the superior may belong to it in the absence of the inferior, or at least need not belong to it in respect of the inferior. One must speak, therefore, in the same way about the issue at hand, that nothing proper to aeviternity belongs to it precisely in respect of time.
	III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained A. The First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure 1. As to the Opinion itself
48 Qui vult tenere primam opinionem (quae videtur probabilis et habere pro se rationes probabiles), potest dicere - secundum intentionem ponentis - quod aevum proprie est quantitas et per consequens habet propriam divisibilitatem; non autem permaƿnentem, igitur successivam: talis est indivisibile succedens indivisibili, et aliud alii.	48. He who wishes to hold the first opinion [n.11] (which seems probable and has probable reasons on its behalf) can say - according to the intention of him who poses it [sc. Bonaventure] - that aeviternity is properly a quantity and consequently has proper divisibility; but not a permanent divisibility, therefore a successive one; such is an indivisible succeeding to an indivisible, and a different indivisible to a different indivisible.
49 Et ita 'nunc' aevi, quantum est ex se, transit raptim, - et esse aeviternum, ut positum in esse in illo 'nunc', ex vi istius positionis habet praecise esse in illo 'nunc', et statim non esse (illo 'nunc' transacto) nisi eadem causa alia causatione poneret idem esse in alio 'nunc'. Et ita conservat, positive causando non aliud esse (sicut est in successivo), sed idem esse infinities, - ita quod prima causatio dicitur 'creatio', quia sequitur immediate non esse ordine durationis; quaelibet autem causatio sequens sequitur non esse mediate ordine durationis et non esse immediate ordine naturae, quod scilicet tunc inesset nisi causa conservans daret esse. Sed sequitur 'esse secundo positum' ordine durationis esse prius positum, - et sic, per hoc, est conservatio et continuatio eiusdem esse.	49. And so the 'now' of aeviternity, as far as concerns itself, passes instantaneously - and aeviternal being, as it is posited in being in the 'now', has, from the force of this position, being precisely in the 'now' and then immediately non-being (when the 'now' has gone by), unless the same cause, by another causation, were to posit the same being in another 'now'. And so the cause conserves it by positively causing, not another being (as is true in the case of something successive), but the same being over and over infinitely - such that the first causation is called 'creation', because it follows not-being immediately in the order of duration, but each following causation follows not-being mediately in the order of duration, and not-being immediately in the order of nature, namely because not-being would then be present unless the conserving cause were to bestow being. But the being posited secondly follows, in the order of duration, the being posited previously - and thus, in this way, there is conservation and continuation of the same being.
50 Exemplum huius est. Si angelus habet aliquam quantitatem virtualem per quam possit esse praesens alicui loco, ita per eam est praesens huic loco quod non potest simul esse praesens alii loco; nec absolute potest esse praesens alii loco nisi aliqua mutatione facta circa istum locum: vel quod ipsa fiat maior formaliter, vel ƿquod ipsa transferatur de loco ad locum, vel quod per potentiam divinam sit in alio loco non deserendo locum istum.	50. There is an example of this. If an angel has some virtual quantity by which he can be present at some place, then he is, by this virtual quantity, present at this place, because he cannot simultaneously be present at another place; and he can absolutely not be present at another place save by some change made with respect to the former place; either because the virtual quantity becomes formally greater, or because it is transferred from place to place, or because it is, by divine power, in another place without leaving the former place.
51 Ita est in proposito, quod illud 'esse' quod habet angelus unica causatione, limitatum est ad hoc 'nunc', - et nullo facto novo circa ipsum, non potest vi huius causationis esse ultra hoc 'nunc'; sed Deus, dans ei quantitatem durativam perpetuam (et hoc una causatione continua vel infinitis causationibus eiusdem esse), dat ei semper uniformiter quo extendatur toti tempori.	51. So it is in the issue at hand, that the being that the angel has by a single causation is limited to this 'now' - and, when nothing new is done with respect to the angel, he cannot, by force of this single causation, exist beyond this 'now'; but God, by giving the angel perpetual, enduring quantity (and this by a single continuous causation or by infinite causations of the same being), gives it to him always uniformly, so that by it the angel is extended to the whole of time.
	2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion
52 Ad argumenta contra illam opinionem. Ad primum, quod probat contradictionem sequi ex ea, respondeo: in illa duratione sive mora essendi, quae est praecise successiva, est innovatio (et pars eius una recedit et alia succedit, et generaliter una pars succedit alteri), non tamen est innovatio aliqua in illa exsistentia cuius est illa mora; sicut si poneretur eadem caro, non habens partem et partem sub eadem quantitate permanente, tunc esset ibi alietas partium in ipsa extensione formaliter (quae quantitas est), absque extensione vel diversitate partium eius cui accidit talis extensio.	52. To the arguments against this position. To the first [n.33], which proves that a contradiction follows from the position, I reply: in the duration or persistence of being which precisely is successive there is renewal (and one part of it goes away and another part succeeds, and in general one part succeeds to another), but there is not any renewal in the existence of that of which there is persistence; just as, if the same flesh were posited, not possessed of part after part in the same permanent quantity, there would be an otherness there of parts in the extension itself formally (which is a quantity), without any extension or diversity of parts in that to which such extension happens.
53 Et cum probatur 'non esse distinctionem in mensura (per ƿPhilosophum IV Physicorum) nisi fuerit distinctio in mensurato', - dico quod bene sequitur quod 'si partes temporis sunt aliae, quod partes motus sint aliae', sicut ab effectu ad causam; sed non est necesse quod in quibuscumque partes durationis sunt aliae, quod aliqua sit 'distinctio partium' priorum: cuius causa est, quia illa distinctio quae alicui est secunda, potest in alio esse prima.	53. And when proof is given [n.34] that 'there is no distinction in the measure (from the Philosopher Physics 4. 11.219a10-29) unless there was distinction in the measured' - I say that the consequence is good that 'if the parts of time are other, then the parts of motion are other', as inference from effect to cause; but it is not necessary that in anything whatever the parts of duration are other, because there may be some 'distinction of parts' that are prior; the reason for this is that the distinction that is second to one thing can be first in another thing.
54 Exemplum huius est: ignis calefacit et desiccat, propter accidentia distincta ordinata in igne, ita quod distinctio actionum est ibi secunda, praesupponens aliam priorem, scilicet distinctionem accidentium activorum; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ubicumque est distinctio actionum, quod ipsa sit secunda, - quia si in sole continerentur virtualiter ista accidentia distincta ignis, tunc prima distinctio ibi esset actionum, quae tamen fuit secunda respectu ignis. Ita dicendum est in proposito.	54. There is an example of this: fire heats and dries, because of distinct ordered accidents in fire, such that the distinction of actions there is second, presupposing another prior distinction, namely the distinction of active accidents [sc. of hot and dry in fire]; but it does not follow from this that, wherever there is a distinction of actions, this distinction is second - because if these distinct accidents of fire were virtually contained in the sun, then the first distinction there would be of actions, which distinction was second with respect to fire. So must one say in the issue at hand.
55 Ad aliud argumentum dico quod 'nunc' potest deficere, quia ex se habet tantum raptim esse, - licet subiectum eius maneat idem, nec aliquod agens corrumpat ipsum. Et quod 'nunc temporis deficiat deficiente suo proprio subiecto', accidit sibi quod subiectum suum proximum deficiat, - quia si illud maneret idem (sicut est in quiescente), tunc posset dici quod illud idem agens per quod est aliud 'nunc' succedens isti, producendo aliud 'nunc' ƿincompossibile isti destruit istud, non ex se primo sed ex consequenti.	55. To the other argument [n.36] I say that the 'now' can fail, because of itself it has only instantaneous being - although its subject remains the same, and no agent corrupts it. And as to the fact that 'the now of time fails when its own proper subject fails' [n.36], it is accidental to a 'now' that its proximate subject fails - because if the subject were to remain the same (as in the case of something at rest), then one could say that the same subject, acting through what is another 'now' succeeding to the prior 'now', does, by producing another 'now' incompossible with the prior 'now', destroy the prior 'now', not first of itself but by way of consequence.
56 Et si quaeras tunc in quo deficiat istud 'nunc', aut in se aut in alio (sicut arguit Aristoteles IV Physicorum), - dico quod 'deficere' (sicut et 'desinere') potest exponi dupliciter: uno modo per positionem praesentis et negationem futuri, alio modo per positionem praeteriti et negationem praesentis. Primo modo debet exponi in indivisibilibus et in his quae habent ultimum sui esse: illa enim non habent primum sui non esse, et tunc desinunt cum sunt, - et hoc modo 'nunc' desinit in se, quia tunc est et post hoc non erit; et si quaeras primum sui non esse, nullum est, sicut nec alicuius habentis ultimum sui esse.	56. And if you ask what the prior 'now' fails in, whether in itself or in another (as Aristotle argues in Physics 4.10.218a8-21) - I say that 'to fail' (as also 'to cease') can be understood in two ways: in one way by positing a present and denying a future, and in another way by positing a past and denying a present. The first way must be understood in the case of indivisibles and things that have the ultimate of their being; for they do not have a first stage in their not-being, and they then cease to be when they are - and in this way the 'now' ceases to be in itself, because then it is and after this it will not be; and if you ask for the first stage in its not-being, there is none, as neither in the case of anything that has the ultimate of its being.
	B. Second Way, which is tangential to the Intention of Bonaventure
57 Alio modo posset conclusio sustineri (licet non ad intentionem ponentis positionem illam principalem), quod tota exsistentia angeli manet secundum quod absoluta est, habens tamen novum et novum respectum ad ipsam causam, - ita quod ipsa tota ut sub uno respectu ad suam causam causantem, succedit sibi ipsi ut sub alio respectu ad conservantem. ƿEt ista via forte esset facilior ad tenendum successionem, quam prior (quae ponit quantitatem), licet esset ex alia parte multum difficile sustinere quomodo esset ibi praecise successio respectuum absque omni distinctione in absoluto, quocumque, sive in fundamento sive in termino.	57. The conclusion [sc. that there is succession formally in the existence of an angel, n.1] can be sustained in another way (although not according to the intention of him who posits this principal position [n.11]), because the total existence of an angel persists according as it is absolute, but it has new respects, one after the other, to the cause - such that this total existence as it is under one respect to its causing cause succeeds to itself as it is under another respect to its conserving cause. And this way would perhaps be easier for maintaining succession than the previous one (which posits quantity [n.48]), although, on the other side, there would be much difficulty in sustaining how there would be there a succession precisely of respects without any distinction in what is absolute in any way, whether in the foundation or in the term.
	IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in itself
58 Sed contra conclusionem dictae opinionis in se, sive primo modo sive secundo modo sustineatur, arguo sic: Aut 'nunc' aevi - quod ponitur 'aliud et aliud absolutum' secundum primum modum sustinendi opinionem - est idem exsistentiae actuali, aut aliud. Si idem, patet quod exsistentia actualis sicut manet eadem, ita et 'nunc' aevi. Si aliud, - contra tunc sicut ipsa exsistentia potest infinities poni in esse, ita videtur quod illud 'nunc' absolutum (aliud ab eo) potest idem frequenter poni in esse, et ita potest conservari idem 'nunc' aevi, sicut eadem exsistentia.	58. But against the conclusion of the said opinion in itself [n.11], whether it is sustained in the first way or the second, I argue as follows: The 'now' of aeviternity - which is posited as one absolute after another according to the first way of sustaining the opinion [nn.48-51] - is either the same as actual existence or different from it. If the same, then it is plain that as actual existence remains the same so also does the 'now' of aeviternity. If different -to the contrary, for then, just as existence can be posited in being an infinite number of times, so it seems the same absolute 'now' of aeviternity (different from the being of existence) can be posited frequently in being, and so the same 'now' of aeviternity can be conserved just as the same existence can.
59 Si dicatur quod 'si ponatur in esse frequenter, ponitur in diversis nunc', - contra: illud 'nunc' absolutum, aliud ab esse exsistentiae, si potest frequenter poni in esse et in alio et alio 'nunc', adhuc eadem erit ratio quod in quolibet illorum 'nunc' poterit conservari; et tunc erit processus in infinitum, vel status erit in ƿhoc quod sicut exsistentia conservatur eadem, ita quodcumque absolutum in angelo poterit conservari idem.	59. If it be said that 'if it is posited frequently in being, then it is posited in diverse nows' - on the contrary, if the absolute 'now', different from the being of existence, can be posited frequently in being and in different nows, there will still be the same reason for its being able to be conserved in each of those 'nows'; and then there will be a process to infinity or a stand will be made in this, that just as existence is conserved the same, so any absolute in an angel will be able to be conserved the same.
60 Similiter, in sequente quaestione probabitur quod non est in angelo aliquod aliud absolutum ab exsistentia eius, et ita non poterit esse identitas in exsistentia et successio in aliquo alio absoluto; et sive sic, sive sic, non videtur posse esse respectus novus sine novitate fundamenti vel termini, nam respectus consequens extrema - ita quod utroque posito sequitur respectus ex natura extremorum - non potest esse novus (ut videtur) sine novitate in altero extremorum: nihil autem per te est novum in fundamento huius respectus, - nec in termino, ut patet.	60. Likewise, in the following question [nn.122-123] it will be proved that there is no other absolute in an angel besides his existence, and so there cannot be identity in existence and succession in some other absolute; and, whether it is this way or that, a new respect does not seem able to exist without newness in the foundation or the term, for a respect consequent to extremes - such that, when either is posited, the respect follows from the nature of the extremes - cannot be new (as it seems) without newness in one or other extreme; but, for you, there is nothing new in the foundation of this respect - nor in the term, as is plain.
61 Similiter, iste respectus est idem fundamento, ut patet ex distinctione praecedente; igitur non potest iste respectus esse alius, fundamento exsistente eodem.	61. Likewise, this respect is the same as the foundation, as is plain from the preceding distinction [2 d.1 n.260]; therefore this respect cannot be other while the foundation exists the same.
	V. Scotus' own Response to the Question
62 Potest igitur dici quod nulla est necessitas ponendi aliquid novum sive aliquam successionem in aliquo angelo (quod scilicet 'novum' sit in eo formaliter), quin 'quidquid est ibi' potest manere idem (sicut exsistentia manet eadem) et per consequens quilibet respectus consequens absolutum. ƿ	62. Therefore, one can say that there is no necessity of positing anything new or any succession in any angel (which, namely, would be formally 'new' in it); rather 'whatever is there' can remain the same (as the existence remains the same) and consequently so can any respect consequent to the absolute.
	VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion
63 Ad argumenta pro prima opinione. Ad primum dico quod utraque via salvat dictum Augustini. Nam sicut prima via dicit 'semper essentialiter creaturam aeque dependere a Deo', ita quod sit quasi una continua causatio (vel infinitae causationes sint) conservatio rei, ac per hoc semper ita actualiter causat rem sicut in primo instanti causavit (licet illa causatio ut in primo instanti, dicatur 'creatio', et in aliis 'conservatio'), - ita secunda positio, non videns rationem continuationis in hac causatione (quia nullam formam continuatam), nec videns tantam rationem distinctionis (quia non videns illam distinctionem nec in causante nec in causato, quantum ad terminum formalem), dicit quod una actio 'semper manens respectu creaturae' est creatio in quantum intelligitur coexsistere primo 'nunc' temporis, quod 'nunc' temporis immediate praecessit non esse illius causati; et illa eadem actio manens dicitur 'conservatio' in quantum coexsistit aliis partibus temporis, non immediate sequentibus non esse, sed esse praehabitum cum illis partibus temporis, - et ita illa actio est continuatio quasi praehabiti, non comparando ad non esse (ubi non est prius et posterius), sed comparando ad partes temporis quibus coexsistit. ƿ	63. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.12-25]. To the first [n.12] I say that both ways [nn.11, 33] save the saying of Augustine. For as the first way says that 'the creature always essentially depends equally on God', so that the conservation of a thing is as it were one continuous causation (or there are infinite causations), and thereby it always actually causes the thing in the way it caused it in the first instant (although the causation, as it is in the first instant, be called creation and in the other moments conservation) - so the second position [n.33], not seeing a reason for continuation in this causation (because not seeing any continued form), nor seeing so much reason for a distinction (because not seeing that distinction either in the causer or in the caused, as far as concerns the formal term) [n.16], says that one action 'persisting always in respect of the creature' is creation insofar as it is understood to coexist with the first 'now' of time, which 'now' of time was immediately preceded by the non-being of the caused thing; and that the same action persisting is called 'conservation' insofar as it coexists with the other parts of time, parts not immediately following not-being but following the pre-had being along with the parts of time - and so the action is a sort of continuation of what was pre-had, without comparing it to not-being (where there is no before and after), but comparing it to the parts of time with which it coexists.
64 Sed praeter intentionem beati Augustini, ratio ibi adducta videtur habere difficultatem, scilicet quod alia causatione res habeat esse cum uno nunc, et cum alio, quia 'non habetur completive aliqua causatione, cuius oppositum videtur stare posita tali causatione'. Respondeo. Ista propositio est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem: et in sensu compositionis est vera, quod 'illud non habetur aliqua causatione completive cuius oppositum stat stante tali causatione, ita quod ista sint simul'; sed in sensu divisionis falsa est, quia et ipsa conservatio poterit non esse, licet posita fuerit causatio qua res ultimate habet suum esse, - et ita licet posita sit causatio angeli, potest tamen divisim (hac posita) stare quod angelus non sit, non coniunctim. ƿ	64. But, apart from the intention of Blessed Augustine, the reason there adduced [n.16] seems to have the difficulty that, namely, the thing has being by one causation with one 'now' and by another causation with another 'now', because 'being is not had in its completion by any causation, the opposite of which seems to stand when such causation is posited' [n.16]. I reply. This proposition [sc. 'being is not had.. .such causation is posited'] is to be distinguished as to composition and division; and in the sense of composition it is true, because 'it is not had in its completion by any causation the opposite of which stands when such causation stands, such that these are simultaneous'; but in the sense of division it is false, because even the conservation itself is able not to be, although the causation, by which the thing has its being to the ultimate, has been posited - and so, although the causation of an angel has been posited, yet the non-existence of the angel can stand with this causation (when it has been posited) in the sense of division, but not in the sense of composition.
65 Et per hoc patet ad simile argumentum, quod 'non possunt simul stare quod angelus creetur et annihiletur, igitur non est idem creari et conservari, - quia quando conservatur, potest annihilari, non autem quando creatur'. Respondeo. Sicut non stant simul in sensu compositionis angelum creari et annihilari, ita nec conservari et annihilari stant simul in sensu compositionis; sed in sensu divisionis stat, circa angelum, esse quandoque creationem sive conservationem, et tamen quod quandoque possit non esse (et sic possit esse annihilatio), - sicut dictum est in materia de praedestinatione Dei et praescientia eius, quod in sensu divisionis est potentia ad unum oppositum 'manente alio', non tamen quod sit potentia ad illud oppositum 'simul manente alio opposito'.	65. And hereby is plain the response to the like argument, that 'an angel's being created and being annihilated cannot stand together, therefore being created and being conserved are not the same thing - because when an angel is being conserved it can be annihilated, but not when it is being created.' I reply. Just as an angel's being created and being annihilated do not stand together in the sense of composition, so neither does an angel's being conserved and being annihilated stand together in the sense of composition; but in the sense of division it does stand that, as concerns an angel, creation or conservation at some point are and yet that they can at some point not be (and thus annihilation can be) - just as was said in the matter of God's predestination and foreknowledge, that in the sense of division there is potency for one opposite when the other opposite persists, yet not that there is potency for the opposite when the other opposite persists at the same time [1 d.40 nn.4-7, or Lectura 1 d.40 nn.4-8 and d.39 nn.53-54 - there being no d.39 in the Ordinatio].
66 Ad secundum dico quod non est aliud, ex parte angeli, ipsum esse, fuisse et fore, tamen aliam habitudinem ipsius esse ad tempus notant ista, - quia sicut dictum est distinctione 9 primi libri de generari et genitum esse, quod consignificant 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum coexsistens diversis partibus temporis, ita etiam dicerent isti de 'nunc' aevi quod idem potest esse et coexsistere omnibus partibus temporis. ƿ	66. To the second argument [n.18] I say that, on the part of an angel, there is no difference between its being, its having been, and its going to be, yet these indicate a different relation of the angel to time - because, just as was said in 1 d.9 n.17 and d.40 n.9, about being generated and having been generated, that these co-signify the 'now' of eternity insofar as it coexists with the diverse parts of time, so too they would state of the 'now' of aeviternity that the same 'now' can be and coexist with all the parts of time.
67 Et cum dicitur in argumento 'non potest facere angelum non fuisse', negatur ut rei significatae per 'fuisse', - quia illa res significata per 'fuisse', est illud idem esse quod habet angelus.	67. And when in the argument it is said that 'God cannot make an angel not to have been' [n.18], this is denied as it is said of the thing signified by the 'have been' -because the thing signified by the 'have been' is the same being as what the angel has.
68 Et si dicatur 'praeteritum non potest non fuisse', negatur minor quae coassumeretur, quia hic non est praeteritum in se. Exemplum huius esset: si Filius Dei, cum hoc quod generatur in aeternitate, acciperet aliam naturam secundum quam dependeret a Patre, per impossibile, - tunc diceretur idem in eo esse 'generari' et 'genitum esse', et illud esse Filii posset absolute non esse; et in quantum istud esse quasi sequeretur suum non esse, diceretur 'generari', - et in quantum quasi mediate sequeretur suum non esse, ut coexsistens aliis partibus temporis, diceretur 'genitum esse'. Et ita conservatio et productio (sive creatio) differunt sola actione intellectus; et potest 'conservatum' non esse, quando conservatur et quando producitur, in sensu divisionis.	68. And if it be said that 'the past cannot not have been', the minor that would be co-assumed [sc. 'an angel has been'] is denied, because it is not past in itself. An example of this would be if the Son of God, along with his being generated in eternity, were to receive, per impossibile, another nature in accord with which he would depend on the Father - then the 'being generated' and the 'having been generated' would state the same in him, and this being of the Son could absolutely not be; and insofar as this being would as it were follow its not-being, it would be called 'being generated', and insofar as it would as it were mediately follow its not-being, as coexisting with the other parts of time, it would be called 'having been generated'. And so conservation and production (or creation) differ only by the action of the intellect; and the 'having been conserved' is able not to be when this being is being conserved, and when it is being produced, in the sense of division.
69 Et si arguatur sic 'praeteritum non potest non coexstitisse isti, igitur istud non potest non fuisse', - videtur esse fallacia figurae dictionis, commutando 'quando' in 'quid'. ƿ	69. And if it be thus argued that 'the past is able not to have coexisted with it, therefore it is able not to have been' - this seems to be the fallacy of figure of speech, by changing 'when' into 'what'.
70 Ad confirmationem istius secundae rationis, de contradictoriis volitis in aeternitate, - potest dici quod licet Deus voluit me sedere pro a et non sedere pro b, tamen prius naturaliter volita sunt ab eo ipsa obiecta quam ipsa 'nunc' mensurantia, et in illo priore oportet quaerere non contradictionem illorum volitorum; alioquin per ipsa 'nunc' posteriora, adiecta, non videretur posse tolli contradictio huiusmodi. Etsi igitur vellet angelum esse pro hoc 'nunc' et non esse pro illo 'nunc', prius quaerenda esset possibilitas quomodo vellet angelum esse et non esse.	70. As to the confirmation of this second reason, about contradictory things willed in eternity [n.19] - one can say that although God willed me to sit at moment a and not to sit at moment b, yet the objects willed by him are naturally prior to the things that measure the 'now', and one must look in the prior stage for the non-contradiction of the things willed; otherwise a contradiction of this sort does not seem it could be taken away by the adding on of those posterior 'nows'. Although therefore God might will an angel to be for this 'now' and not to be for that 'now', one must look first for the possibility of how he might will an angel to be and not to be.
71 Dico tunc quod si 'nunc' ponatur in quocumque etiam aeviterno tamquam proprium sibi, Deus vult ipsum esse in illo 'nunc', positive, - et vult ipsum non esse, negative, volendo illud 'nunc' non esse; et tunc si aliud aeviternum sit in cuius 'nunc' fiunt ambo ista, hoc accidit ipsis 'nunc', nam illud 'nunc' illius aeviterni non est propria mensura eorum, - sicut nec aeternitas, in qua possunt esse contradictoria, quae succedunt sibi in omnibus mensuris.	71. I say then that if the 'now' is posited in any even aeviternal thing as proper to it, God wills it to be in that 'now' positively - and he wills it not to be negatively by willing that 'now' not to be; and then if there is another aeviternal thing in whose 'now' both of the former come to be, this is accidental to those 'nows', for the 'now' of that aeviternal thing is not the proper measure of them - just as neither is eternity a measure, in which there can be contradictories that succeed to each other in the case of every measure.
72 Aut si non ponatur in aliquo aeviterno aliquod 'nunc' aliud ab exsistentia actuali ipsius (sicut dicetur in quaestione sequente), tunc vult ipsum esse cum aeternitate et vult ipsum non esse cum aeternitate. Non tamen vult ipsum esse cum tota aeternitate 'secundum omnem praesentialitatem aeternitatis', nec non esse cum aeterƿnitate tota hoc modo, quia tunc esset contradictio; non est autem contradictio, comparando ista ad aeternitatem 'non secundum totam rationem infinitae praesentiae suae'.	72. Or if there is not posited in any aeviternal thing some 'now' different from the actual existence of the thing (as will be said in the following question [nn.122-123]), then God wills it to be along with eternity and wills it not to be along with eternity. He does not however will it to be along with the whole of eternity 'according to all the being present of eternity', nor not to be along with the whole of eternity in this way, because then there would be a contradiction; but there is no contradiction when comparing these to eternity 'not in accord with the whole idea of eternity's infinite present'.
73 Ad tertium dico quod ad hoc quod ex coexsistentia alicuius quanti virtualis cum aliquo quanto proprie - scilicet molis - debeat concludi infinitas quanti virtualis, oportet illud necessario coexsistere omnibus partibus quanti alterius. Probatio, quia illud 'quantum aliud' non esset infinitum nisi haberet omnes partes sibi possibiles (sicut tempus, si simul esset, non esset actu infinitum nisi haberet necessario omnes partes sibi possibiles); igitur nihil concluditur esse infinitum virtualiter, ex coexsistentia eius cum toto tempore, nisi necessario coexsistat cum omnibus partibus temporis. Tale autem non est aevum. Dico tunc quod licet formaliter habeat unde possit coexsistere infinitis partibus temporis, non oportet propter hoc - quod sit in se infinitum, quia non habet formaliter unde necessario sic coexsistat.	73. To the third [n.20] I say that in order to be obliged to infer, from the coexistence of some virtual quantity with some quantity properly - namely some quantity of bulk -, to the infinity of the virtual quantity [n.21], the virtual quantity must necessarily coexist with all the parts of the other quantity. The proof is that 'the other quantity' [sc. the quantity of bulk] would not be infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it (just as time, if it were simultaneous, would not be actually infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it); therefore nothing is deduced to be infinite virtually from the coexistence of it with the whole of time unless it necessarily coexist with all the parts of time. But aeviternity is not such. I say then that although aeviternity has wherewith it can coexist with the infinite parts of time, there is no need - for this reason - that it be in itself infinite, because it does not have formally wherewith it necessarily thus coexists.
74 Et ad simile de immensitate, dico quod non est 'simile', - quia ibi illud quod posset esse praesens omni loco, esset in eo simul et non per aliquam conservationem causae extrinsecae. In proposito ƿautem non habet 'unde coexsistat omnibus partibus temporis' nisi per conservationem causae extrinsecae, et nihil haberet 'per quod coexsisteret' nisi idem quasi continue causaretur a causa extrinseca, licet non alia causatione; ita quod simile huius magis esset de illo, si causaretur continue coexsistentia eius cum alio et alio loco - si hoc posset - eadem causatione. Numquam tamen ut simul coexsistens, haberet infinitam praesentiam loco, et ita illud numquam esset immensum. Ita in proposito.	74. And as to the likeness about immensity [n.22], I say that there is no likeness -because, in the case of immensity, that which could be present to every place would exist in every place at once, and not through any conservation by an extrinsic cause. In the issue at hand, however, an aeviternal thing does not have wherewith it may coexist with all the parts of time save through conservation by an extrinsic cause; and it would have nothing through which it might coexist unless it were caused to be quasi-continuously the same by the extrinsic cause, although not by a different causation; so there would be more a likeness of this [sc. aeviternity] with that [sc. immensity] if the coexistence of the latter with different places - if this were possible - were caused by the same causation. However, in order to coexist simultaneously, it would never have infinite presence to place, and so it would never be immense. So it is in the issue at hand.
75 Contra: finitum non potest simul coexsistere toti infinito, ita quod in se habeat totum unde possit ei coexsistere; igitur quod sic coexsistit, est infinitum. - Respondeo: antecedens negatur de illo infinito quod est in successione; et de finito, formaliter habente 'quod habet semper eadem actione', ita quod non sine tali actione.	75. On the contrary: a finite thing cannot coexist together with a total infinite thing, such that it have in itself wherewith it could coexist with it; therefore because it does coexist it is infinite. - I reply: the antecedent is denied of an infinite which is infinite by succession, and denied of a finite formally having what it has always by the same action, such that it does not have it without such action.
76 Ad quartum conceditur quod unum aevum succedit alteri aevo, et exsistentia aeviterni succedit suo opposito (hoc est, unum est post alterum), sed ex hoc non concluditur aliqua successio in aliqua una exsistentia alicuius aeviterni.	76. As to the fourth [nn.24-25], that one aeviternal thing succeeds to another is conceded, and that the existence of an aeviternal thing succeeds to its opposite (that is, one is after another) is conceded, but from this there is not deduced any succession in any single existence of some aeviternal thing.
77 Et per hoc patet ad omnia illa argumenta: Quod illi duo angeli: de quibus conceditur 'prius' et 'post' (quod unus manet post alium); si tamen tertius coexsisteret amboƿbus, in esse illius tertii nullum esset 'prius' et 'posterius', - sicut quamvis dies hodiernus et crastinus coexsistant aeternitati, non propter hoc est 'prius' et 'posterius' in aeternitate.	77. And from this is plain the answer to all the arguments: As to those two angels [n.25], about these a 'before' and 'after' are conceded (because one remains after the other); if however a third were to coexist with the two of them, there would be no 'before' and 'after' in the existence of that third - just as, though today and tomorrow coexist with eternity, not for this reason is there a 'before' and 'after' in eternity.
78 Similiter, conceditur quod prius esset natura angeli quam ipsius culpa, ita quod exsistentia ista (scilicet sub innocentia) esset cum opposito illius exsistentiae, et ex illa secunda exsistentia sequeretur oppositum primae; non tamen exsistentia angeli in sua natura haberet aliquam successionem, neque ut est sub innocentia exsistens, neque ut exsistens sub culpa, - sed tantum esset successio in accidentibus (hoc est, quod exsistentia unius actus esset post exsistentiam alterius), sine tamen diversitate alterius in se.	78. Likewise [n.24], it is conceded that the nature of an angel would be prior to his guilt, such that this existence (namely under innocence) would be with the opposite of that existence, and from the second existence would follow the opposite of the first; however the existence of the angel in its own nature would not have any succession, neither as it is existent under innocence nor as it is existent under guilt - but there would only be a succession in accidents (that is, that the existence of one act would be after the existence of the other), without however a diversity in the other in itself.
79 Auctoritates adductas pro ista opinione concedo, quia nulla creatura est a prima causa independens, sed semper dependens a causa, - non tamen dependentia continua, nec alia et alia, sed eadem; et propter illam eandem, potest quaelibet creatura habere esse cum una parte temporis et non cum alia, et pro tanto potest quasi cadere sub tempore: hoc est, ut coexsistat uni parti et non coexsistat alteri, et ita dicatur 'fuisse' et 'non fore', et ita non aeternum. ƿ	79. The authorities adduced for this opinion [nn.26-32] I concede, because no creature is independent of the first cause, but is always dependent on the cause - not however with a continuous dependence, nor with difference dependences, but with the same dependence; and, because of this same dependence, any creature can have being with one part of time and not with another part, and to this extent it can as it were fall under time, that is, so as to coexist with one part and not coexist with another, and in this way it may be said 'to have been' and 'not to be going to be', and thus not something eternal.
	VII. To the Principal Arguments
80 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum conceditur quod unus angelus creatur prius alio, sed propter hoc non sequitur quod in esse angeli prius creati sit 'prius' et 'posterius'.	80. To the principal arguments [nn.8-10]. As to the first [n.8], it is conceded that one angel is created before another, but it does not follow because of this that there is in the existence of the angel first created a 'before' and 'after'.
81 Ad secundum similiter potest dici quod angelus potest annihilari, et in eodem 'nunc' negative (si habet 'nunc'), id est quod suum 'nunc' desinat secum; si autem suum 'nunc' non differat a sua exsistentia, tunc potest annihilari cum aeternitate et esse cum aeternitate, sed non cum tota ratione praesentialitatis aeternitatis.	81. As to the second [n.9], it can likewise be said that an angel can be annihilated, and in the same 'now' negatively (if it has a 'now'), that is, that its 'now' should cease along with it; but if its 'now' does not differ from its existence, then it can be annihilated with eternity and can exist with eternity, but not with the whole nature of the present-ness of eternity [nn.71-72].
82 Ad ultimum dico quod esse reparati sequitur non esse annihilati, et illud non esse praecessit esse creati, et illud esse praecessit non esse creabilis, - et ita sequitur 'esse' idem esse, mediante non esse interrumpente. Nec sequitur ex hoc aliqua continuatio in ipso esse 'si non fuisset annihilatum', quia modo non est successio in aliquo uno, sed unius oppositi ad alterum.	82. To the last one [n.10] I say that the being of the [angel] restored follows the not-being of the [angel] annihilated, and that the not-being of the annihilated was preceded by the being of the created, and that the being of the created was preceded by the not-being of the creatable - and so the 'being' follows the same being, with the interrupting not-being in between. Nor does there follow from this any continuation in the being itself 'if it had not been annihilated' [n.10], because there is not now any succession in some one thing, but succession of one opposite to another [sc. not-being to being to not-being to being].
83 Contra: igitur ita est simul exsistentia interrupta cum se ipsa re parata, sicut non interrupta. Respondeo: si non esset ibi successio oppositi ad oppositum 8 ƿ(quod oppositum mediat inter hoc esse et se), sequeretur quod esset tanta simultas sicut si oppositum non interveniret; nunc autem oppositum quasi mediat inter esse creatum et ipsum esse reparatum (et hoc 'oppositum' est aliquod medium, vel habitudinem aliquam habet ad utrumque extremum), et ideo non sunt ita simul sicut si non esse non interveniret. Sicut tamen modo idem 'nunc' reparatum (vel eadem exsistentia, si nullum requirit 'nunc') est idem, et in eodem est 'exsistentia creata et reparata' sine omni successione in illo in se (licet ipsum ut positum in esse, succedat sibi ipsi ut prius positum in esse), - ita fuisset in eodem 'nunc' si non fuisset interruptum, et absque omni successione, utroque modo.	83. On the contrary: therefore in this way the interrupted existence is at one with itself restored, as if it was a non-interrupted existence. I reply: if there was no succession there of opposite to opposite [sc. of being to not-being to being] (which opposite [not-being] mediates between this being [the being of the created] and itself [the being of the restored]), the consequence would be that there would be as much at-oneness as if the opposite did not intervene; but now the opposite mediates as it were between the created being and that very being repaired (and this 'opposite' is a mean, or has a certain relation to both extremes), and so these are not as at one as if not-being did not intervene. However, just as in this case the same repaired 'now' (or the same existence, if it requires no 'now' [n.72]) is the same, and there is 'created existence and repaired existence' in the same thing without any succession in it in itself (although, as posited in being, it succeeds itself as previously posited in being) -so it would have been in the same 'now' if it had not been interrupted, and without any succession, in either way.