Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q1

• I. Beginning Arguments
• To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
• B. Scotus' own Opinion
• II. To the Principal Argument
• III. To the Confirmation of the Opinion

Latin	English
	Question One: Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular of Itself or from its Nature
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem tertiam quaerendum est de distinctione personali in angelis. Ad videndum autem de ista distinctione in eis, primo quaerendum est de distinctione individuali in substantiis materialibus, de qua sicut diversi diversimode dicunt, ita consequenter dicunt de pluralitate individuorum in eadem specie angelica. Et ut videatur de diversis opinionibus distincte, quae quaeruntur de distinctione vel indistinctione substantiae materialis, quaero singulatim de diversis modis ponendi, - et primo, utrum ƿsubstantia materialis ex se sive ex natura sua sit individua vel singularis.	1. As to the third distinction one must ask about the distinction of persons in angels. But to get a view of this distinction in angels one must first inquire about the distinction of individuals in material substances; and just as different people speak differently about this distinction, so they speak in like different ways about the plurality of individuals in the same species of angels. And in order to have a distinct view of the diverse opinions that are inquired into as to the distinction or lack of distinction in material substance, I inquire individually about the diverse ways of positing the distinction - and first about whether material substance is individual or singular of itself or from its own nature.
2 Quod sic: Philosophus VII Metaphysicae probat - contra Platonem quod ((substantia cuiuscumque rei est propria illi cuius est, et non inest alii)); igitur etc. Igitur substantia materialis ex natura sua, circumscripto omni alio, - est propria ei cui inest, ita quod ex natura sua non potest inesse alii; igitur ex natura sua est individua.	2. That it is: The Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 7.13.1038b10-11 against Plato, that "the substance of any thing is proper to that in which it is, and is not present in something else;" therefore etc. So material substance of its own nature, with everything else removed, is proper to that in which it is, so that it cannot of its own nature be in something else; therefore it is individual of its own nature.
3 Contra: Quidquid inest alicui ex ratione sua per se, inest ei in quocumque; igitur si natura lapidis de se esset 'haec', - in quocumque esset natura lapidis, natura illa esset ' hic lapis'. Consequens est inconveniens loquendo de singularitate determinata, de qua est quaestio. ƿ	3. On the contrary: Whatever is present in something from its idea per se, is present in it wherever it is; therefore if the nature of a stone were of itself a 'this', then wherever the nature of a stone was, that nature would be 'this stone'. The consequent is unacceptable when speaking of determinate singularity, and the question is about this.
4 Praeterea, illi cui de se convenit unum oppositum, ei de se repugnat aliud oppositum; igitur si natura de se sit una numero, repugnat ei multitudo numeralis.	4. Further, that to which one opposite per se belongs, to it the other opposite is per se repugnant; therefore if a nature be of itself numerically one, numerical multitude is repugnant to it.
	I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
5 Hic dicitur quod sicut natura ex se formaliter est natura, ita est ex se singularis, ita quod non oportet quaerere aliam causam singularitatis a causa naturae ac si natura prius tempore vel natura - sit natura quam sit singularis et tunc per aliquid adveniens contrahatur ut fiat singularis.	5. Here the statement is made that, just as nature is of itself formally nature, so it is of itself singular, such that to look for a cause of singularity beside the cause of nature (as if nature is nature first - first in time or in nature - before it is singular, and then is narrowed down by something additional so as to become singular) is not necessary.
6 Quod probatur per simile: quia sicut natura ex se habet verum esse extra animam, non autem habet esse in anima nisi ab alio, id est ab ipsamet anima (et ratio est, quia esse verum convenit ei simpliciter, - esse autem in anima, est esse eius secundum quid), ita universalitas non convenit rei nisi secundum esse secundum quid, scilicet in anima; singularitas autem convenit rei secundum verum esse, et ita ex se et simpliciter. Est igitur quaerenda causa quare natura est universalis (et dandus est 'intellectus' pro causa), - non autem est quaerenda aliqua causa quare natura est singularis, alia a natura rei, medians inter ipsam et eius singuƿlaritatem, sed eaedem causae quae sunt causae unitatis rei, sunt et singularitatis eius; ergo etc.	6. This is proved by a likeness: that just as nature has of itself true existence outside the soul but does not have existence within the soul save from something else, that is, from the soul itself (and the reason is that true existence belongs to nature simply, but existence within the soul is its existence in a certain respect), so universality only belongs to a thing according to existence in a certain respect, namely existence in the soul, but singularity belongs to a thing according to true existence, and thus belongs to it of itself and simply. Therefore one must look for a cause as to why a nature is universal (and the intellect is to be given as the cause), but a cause other than the nature of the thing as to why a nature is singular - a cause mediating between the nature and its singularity - is not to be looked for, but the same causes that are causes of the unity of a thing are causes also of its singularity; therefore etc.
7 Contra istud arguitur sic: Obiectum in quantum est obiectum, est prius naturaliter ipso actu, et in illo priore - per te - obiectum est ex se singulare, quia hoc semper convenit naturae non acceptae secundum quid sive secundum esse quod habet in anima; igitur intellectus intelligens illud obiectum sub ratione universalis, intelligit ipsum sub ratione opposita suae rationi, quia ut praecedit actum determinatur ex se ad oppositum illius rationis, scilicet universalis. ƿ	7. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this [n.5] there is argument as follows: An object insofar as it is an object exists first actually by its own act, and in that prior act - according to you - the object is of itself singular, because this belongs to the nature when not taken in a certain respect or in accord with the being that it has in the soul; therefore, when the intellect understands the object under the idea of a universal, it understands it in an idea opposite to the object's own idea, because as the object precedes the act [sc. of the intellect] it is determined of itself to the opposite of that idea, namely the idea of a universal.
8 Praeterea, cuiuscumque unitas realis, propria et sufficiens, est minor unitate numerali, illud non est de se unum unitate numerali (sive non est de se hoc); sed naturae exsistentis in isto lapide, est unitas propria, realis sive sufficiens, minor unitate numerali; igitur etc.	8. Further, whatever has a real, proper, and sufficient unity less than numerical unity is not of itself one with numerical unity (or is not of itself a 'this'); but the nature existing in this stone has a proper unity, real or sufficient, less than numerical unity; therefore etc.
9 Maior de se patet, quia nihil est de se 'unum' unitate maiore unitate sibi sufficiente: nam si propria unitas - quae debetur alicui de se - sit minor unitate numerali, numeralis unitas non convenit sibi ex natura sua et secundum se (aliter praecise ex natura sua haberet maiorem et minorem unitatem, quae circa idem et secundum idem sunt opposita, - quia cum unitate minore sine contradictione potest stare multitudo opposita maiori unitati, quae multitudo non potest stare cum unitate maiore, quia sibi repugnat; igitur etc.).	9. The major premise here is plain of itself, because nothing is of itself one with a unity greater than the unity sufficient for it; for if its proper unity - the unity that is of itself due to it - is less than numerical unity, then numerical unity does not belong to it from its nature or according to itself (otherwise it would have precisely from its nature both a greater and a lesser unity, which are opposites about and according to the same thing - because along with a lesser unity there can stand, without contradiction, a multitude opposed to a greater unity, and this multitude cannot stand along with a greater unity, since this is repugnant to it; therefore etc.).
10 Probatio minoris: quia si nulla est 'unitas realis' naturae, minor singularitate, et omnis unitas 'alia ab unitate singularitatis et naturae specificae' est minor unitate reali, - igitur nulla erit 'unitas realis' minor unitate numerali; consequens falsum, sicut probabo quinque vel sex viis; igitur etc. ƿ	10. Proof of the minor [n.8]; because if there is no real unity to nature less than singularity, and if all unity other than the unity of singularity and of specific nature is less than real unity, then there will be no real unity less than numerical unity; the consequent is false, as I will prove in five or six ways [in fact in seven ways, nn.11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23 28]: therefore etc.
11 Prima via est talis: Secundum Philosophum X Metaphysicae 'in omni genere est unum primum, quod est metrum et mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis'.	11. The first way is as follows: According to the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.1.1052b19-24, "in every genus there is one first, which is the standard and measure of everything that belongs to that genus."
12 Ista unitas primi mensurantis est realis, quia Philosophus probat quod 'uni' convenit prima ratio mensurae, et declarat per ordinem quomodo illud est 'unum' cui convenit ratio mensurandi in omni genere. Ista autem unitas est alicuius in quantum est 'primum' in genere: est ergo realis, quia mensurata sunt realia et realiter mensurata; ens autem reale non potest realiter mensurari ab ente rationis; igitur est realis.	12. This unity of the first measurer is real, because the Philosopher proves [ibid.] that the first idea of measure belongs to a 'one', and he explains by means of order how that to which the idea of measuring belongs in every genus is a 'one'. Now this unity belongs to something insofar as it is first in the genus; it is therefore real, because things measured are real and really measured; but a real being cannot be really measured by a being of reason; therefore it [sc. the unity of the measurer] is real.
13 Ista autem unitas non est numeralis, quia nullum 'singulare' est in genere, quod sit mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere, - nam secundum Philosophum III Metaphysicae ((in individuis eiusdem speciei non est hoc prius et illud posterius)).	13. But this unity is not numerical, because there is no singular in a genus that is the measure of all the things that are in that genus - for according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 3.3.999a12-13 "in individuals of the same species it is not the case that this individual is prior and that one posterior."
14 Quod 'prius' licet Commentator exponat de 'priore' constituente posterius, tamen nihil ad b, quia Philosophus intendit ƿibi assignare rationem quare Plato posuit rationem speciei separatam et non in genere, - quia in speciebus est ordo essentialis, propter quod posterius potest reduci ad prius (et ideo secundum eum non oportet ponere ideam generis 'per cuius participationem species sunt id quod sunt', sed ideam speciei, ad quam omnes aliae reducuntur); sed in individuis, secundum Platonem et secundum Philosophum recitantem, non est talis ordo, sive unum constituat aliud sive non; igitur etc.	14. And although the Commentator [Averroes Metaphysics 3 com.11] expounds the 'prior' here of a prior that constitutes a posterior, yet this is of no consequence for the minor premise [n.13], because the Philosopher intends to assign there [ibid. 999a6-13] the reason for Plato's positing that the nature of the species exists separately and not in a genus - because there is in a species an essential order, on account of which the posterior can be reduced to the prior (and so according to Plato there is no need to posit an idea of the genus, 'through participation in which the species are what they are', but only an idea of the species, to which all the others are reduced); but in individuals, according to Plato and according to the Philosopher reporting him, there is no such order, whether or not one of them constitutes another; therefore etc.
15 Est ergo intentio Philosophi, ibi, concordare cum Platone quod in individuis eiusdem speciei non est ordo essentialis. Nullum igitur individuum est per se mensura eorum quae sunt in specie sua, - ergo nec unitas numeralis sive individualis.	15. So the Philosopher's intention there is to agree with Plato that in individuals of the same species there is no essential order. Therefore no individual is the per se measure of the things that are in the species of it - and so no numerical or individual unity is either.
16 Praeterea, secundo, probo quod idem consequens sit falsum: Quia secundum Philosophum VII Physicorum, in specie atoma fit comparatio, quia est una natura, - non autem in genere, quia genus non habet talem unitatem.	16. Further, second, I prove that the same consequent [n.10, 'there will be no real unity less than numerical unity'] is false: Because according to the Philosopher Physics 7.4.249a3 - 8 comparison occurs within an undivided species, because there is one nature - but not within a genus, because a genus does not have such unity.
17 Ista differentia non est unitatis secundum rationem, quia conƿceptus generis est ita unus numero apud intellectum, sicut conceptus speciei; alioquin nullus conceptus diceretur in 'quid' de multis speciebus (et ita nullus conceptus esset genus), sed tot essent conceptus dicti de speciebus quot sunt conceptus specierum, et tunc in singulis praedicationibus idem praedicaretur de se. Similiter, unitas conceptus vel non conceptus, nihil ad intentionem Philosophi ibi, scilicet ad comparationem vel non. Igitur Philosophus intendit ibi naturam specificam esse unam unitate naturae specificae; non autem intendit ipsam esse sic unam unitate numerali, quia in unitate numerali non fit comparatio. Igitur etc.	17. This difference [sc. between unity of species and unity of genus] is not one of unity in idea, because the concept of a genus is as one in number in the intellect as the concept of a species is; otherwise no concept would be predicated in the whatness of many species (and so no concept would be a genus), but there would be as many concepts predicated of species as there are concepts of species, and then in individual predications the same thing would be predicated of itself [sc. the species would be predicated of the species]. Likewise, unity of concept or of non-concept is of no relevance to the Philosopher's intention there, namely for making comparison or not [n.16]. So the Philosopher intends there that a specific nature is one with the unity of specific nature; but he does not intend that it is one in this way with numerical unity, because in numerical unity no comparison is made. Therefore etc.
18 Praeterea, tertio: Secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. de 'Ad aliquid', idem, simile et aequale fundantur super 'unum', ita quod licet similitudo habeat pro fundamento rem de genere qualitatis talis, tamen relatio non est realis nisi habeat fundamentum reale et rationem proximam fundandi realem; igitur unitas quae requiritur in fundamento relationis similitudinis, est realis: non est autem unitas numeralis, quia nihil unum et idem est simile vel aequale sibi ipsi.	18. Further, third: According to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.15.1021a9-12, in the chapter on relation, the same, the like, and the equal are founded on 'one', so that although likeness has for foundation a thing of the genus of such and such a quality, yet relation is not real unless it has a real foundation and a real, proximate idea of founding; therefore the unity that is required in the foundation of a relation of likeness is real; but it is not a numerical unity, because nothing one and the same is like or equal to itself.
19 Praeterea, quarto: Unius oppositionis realis sunt duo prima extrema realia; sed ƿcontrarietas est oppositio realis (quod apparet, quia realiter unum corrumpit seu destruit alterum circumscripto omni opere intellectus, et non nisi quia sunt contraria); igitur utrumque primum extremum huius oppositionis est reale et 'unum' aliqua unitate reali: non autem unitate numerali, quia tunc praecise hoc album esset 'primum contrarium' huic nigro (vel praecise illud album), quod est inconveniens, quia tunc tot essent contrarietates primae quot individua contraria; igitur etc.	19. Further, fourth: Of one real opposition there are two real extremes; but contrariety is a real opposition (as is plain, because one of the contraries corrupts or destroys the other in the absence of any work of the intellect, and just because they are contraries); therefore both first extremes of this opposition are real and 'one' with some real unity; but not with numerical unity, because then this white thing would be precisely the first contrary to this black thing (or that white thing would precisely be so), which is unacceptable, because then there would be as many first contrarieties as there are contrary individuals; therefore etc.
20 Praeterea, quinto: Unius actionis sensus est obiectum unum secundum aliquam unitatem realem; sed non numeralem; igitur est aliqua alia unitas realis quam unitas numeralis.	20. Further, fifth: Of one act of a sense there is an object that is one according to some real unity; but not numerical unity; so there is some real unity other than numerical unity.
21 Probatio minoris, quia potentia cognoscens obiectum sic (in quantum videlicet 'hac unitate' unum), cognoscit ipsum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum hac unitate, sed sensus non cognoscit obiectum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum illa unitate numerali: quod apparet, quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium solis differre numeraliter ab alio radio, cum tamen sint diversi propter motum solis; si circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia (puta diversitas loci vel ƿsitus), et si ponerentur duo quanta simul esse per potentiam divinam, quae etiam essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine, visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba (si tamen cognosceret alterum illorum in quantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum in quantum est unum distinctum unitate numerali!).	21. The proof of the minor is that a power which knows an object in this way (namely insofar as it is one 'with this unity') knows it insofar as it is distinct from anything that is not one with this unity - but a sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from anything which is one with numerical unity, as is plain because no sense distinguishes that this ray of the sun differs numerically from another ray, although however the rays are diverse because of the motion of the sun; if all common sensibles are removed (to wit, diversity of place or of position), and if two quantities were, by divine power, posited to be together at once, and they were also completely alike and equal in whiteness - sight would not distinguish that there were two white things there (yet if it knew either of them insofar as it is one with numerical unity, it would know it insofar as it is one distinct by numerical unity).
22 Posset etiam iuxta hoc argui de primo obiecto sensus, quod est unum in se aliqua unitate reali, quia sicut obiectum 'huius potentiae' - in quantum obiectum - praecedit intellectum, ita etiam secundum unitatem suam realem praecedit omnem actionem intellectus. Sed ista ratio non ita concludit sicut praecedens: posset enim poni aliquod obiectum primum - ut est adaequatum potentiae - esse commune aliquod, abstractum ab omnibus obiectis particularibus, et ita non habere unitatem nisi communitatis ad illa plura obiecta particularia; sed de uno obiecto unius actus sentiendi non videtur negare quin necessario habeat unitatem realem et minorem unitate numerali.	22. Next to this [n.20], one could also argue, as to the first object of a sense, that it is one in itself by some real unity, because just as the object 'of this power' - insofar as it is the object - precedes the intellect, so too it precedes, according to its real unity, every action of the intellect. But this argument does not conclude as the preceding one does; for one could posit that a first object - as it is adequate to the power - is something common, abstracted from all particular objects, and thus does not have a unity save the unity of commonness with the several particular objects; but the argument does not seem to deny, as to one object of one act of sensing, that it necessarily has a unity that is real and less than numerical unity.
23 Praeterea, sexto: Quia si omnis unitas realis est numeralis, ergo omnis diversitas realis est numeralis. Sed consequens est falsum, quia omnis diversitas numeralis in quantum numeralis, est aequalis, - et ita omnia essent aeque distincta; et tunc sequitur quod non plus posset intellectus a Socrate et Platone abstrahere aliquid commune, quam a Soƿcrate et linea, et esset quodlibet universale purum figmentum intellectus.	23. Further, sixth: Because if every real unity is numerical, then every real diversity is numerical. But the consequent is false, because every numerical diversity, insofar as it is numerical, is equal - and so everything would be equally distinct; and then it follows that the intellect could no more abstract something common from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and line, and every universal would be a pure figment of the intellect.
24 Prima consequentia probatur dupliciter: Primo, quia unum et multa, idem et diversum, sunt opposita (ex X Metaphysicae cap. 5); quoties autem dicitur unum oppositorum, toties dicitur et reliquum (ex I Topicorum); ergo cuilibet unitati correspondet sua propria diversitas.	24. The first consequence is proved in two ways: First, because one and many, same and diverse are opposites (from Metaphysics 10.3.1054a20-21, b22-23); but as often as one opposite is stated so also is the remaining one (from Topics 1.15.106b14-15); therefore to any unity there corresponds its own diversity.
25 Probatur secundo, quia cuiuslibet diversitatis utrumque extremum est in se unum, - et eo modo quo est unum in se, eodem modo videtur esse diversum a reliquo extremo, ita quod unitas extremi unius videtur esse per se ratio diversitatis alterius extremi.	25. The second proof is that each extreme of any diversity is in itself one - and the way it is one in itself it is in the same way diverse from the remaining extreme, so that the unity of one extreme seems to be the per se reason for the diversity of the other extreme.
26 Confirmatur etiam aliter, quia si tantum est in hac re unitas realis numeralis, quaecumque unitas est in re illa, est ex se una numero; igitur istud et illud secundum omnem entitatem in eis sunt primo diversa, quia diversa in nullo ' uno ' aliquo modo convenientia.	26. There is also a confirmation of this in another way, that if there is only a numerical unity in this thing here, then whatever unity there is in that thing there is of itself one in number; therefore both this thing and that thing are, according to their whole entity, diverse first, because diverse things do not agree in anything 'one' in any way.
27 Confirmatur etiam et per hoc quod diversitas numeralis est hoc singulare non esse illud singulare, supposita tamen entitate utriusque extremi. Sed talis unitas est necessario alterius extremi.	27. There is confirmation too from this, that numerical diversity means that this singular is not that singular, though with the assumption of the entity of both extremes. But such unity belongs necessarily to one or other of them/[or alternative text:] is the negation of the other of them.
28 Praeterea: Nullo exsistente intellectu ignis generaret ignem et corrumperet aquam, et aliqua unitas realis esset 'generantis ad genitum' secunƿdum formam, propter quam esset generatio univoca. Intellectus enim considerans non facit generationem esse univocam, sed cognoscit eam esse univocam.	28. Further: When no intellect exists, fire would generate fire and corrupt water, and there would be some real unity of generator to generated in form, according to which form there would be univocal generation. For the intellect when considering does not make generation to be univocal but knows it to be univocal.
	B. Scotus' own Opinion
29 Ad quaestionem igitur, concedendo conclusiones illarum rationum, dico quod substantia materialis ex natura sua non est de se haec, - quia tunc, sicut deducit prima ratio, non posset intellectus intelligere ipsam sub opposito nisi intelligeret obiectum suum sub ratione intelligendi repugnante rationi talis obiecti.	29. To the question then [n.1], I say, conceding the conclusion of the above arguments [nn.7-8], that material substance is not of itself from its own nature a 'this', because in that case, as the first argument proves [n.7], the intellect could not understand material substance under its opposite if it did not understand its own object under an idea of understanding repugnant to the idea of such an object.
30 Sicut etiam deducit secunda ratio (cum suis probationibus omnibus), aliqua est unitas in re realis absque omni operatione intellectus, minor unitate numerali sive unitate propria singularis, quae 'unitas' est naturae secundum se, - et secundum istam 'unitatem propriam' naturae ut natura est, natura est indifferens ad unitatem singularitatis; non igitur est de se sic illa una, scilicet unitate singularitatis.	30. Also as the second argument proves [n.8], along with all its own proofs [nn.9-28], there is, without any operation of the intellect, some real unity in things less than numerical unity or than the proper unity of a singular, which unity belongs to nature of itself; and nature, according to this proper unity of nature as it is nature, is indifferent to the unity of singulars; so nature is not thus one by that unity, namely the unity of singulars.
31 Qualiter autem hoc debeat intelligi, potest aliqualiter videri per dictum Avicennae V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod 'equinitas ƿsit tantum equinitas, - nec est de se una nec plures, nec universalis nec particularis'. Intelligo: non est 'ex se una' unitate numerali, nec 'plures' pluralitate opposita illi unitati; nec 'universalis' actu est (eo modo scilicet quo aliquid est universale ut est obiectum intellectus), nec est 'particularis' de se.	31. But how this should be understood can in some way be seen from the statement of Avicenna Metaphysics 5.1 f.86va, where he maintains that 'horseness is just horseness, and is not of itself one or many, or universal or particular'. I understand this to mean that horseness is not of itself one by numerical unity, nor many by the manyness opposed to that oneness; nor is it actually universal (namely in the way that something is universal as it is the object of the intellect), nor is it of itself particular.
32 Licet enim numquam sit realiter sine aliquo istorum, de se tamen non est aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis, - et secundum prioritatem naturalem est 'quod quid est' per se obiectum intellectus, et per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem; et propositiones 'verae primo modo' sunt verae ratione quiditatis sic acceptae, quia nihil dicitur 'per se primo modo' de quiditate nisi quod includitur in ea essentialiter, in quantum ipsa abstrahitur ab omnibus istis, quae sunt posteriora naturaliter ipsa.	32. For although it is really never without some of them, yet it is of itself none of them, but is naturally prior to all of them, and according to natural priority its 'what it is' is per se the object of the intellect and, as such, it is per se considered by the metaphysician and expressed in a definition; and propositions 'true in the first mode' are true by reason of the whatness thus taken, because nothing is said 'per se in the first mode' about a whatness save what is essentially included in the whatness, insofar as it is abstracted from all of the above things which are naturally posterior to it [1 d.3 n.164, d.5 n.18, d.2 nn.19, 25].
33 Non solum autem ipsa natura de se est indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse universale et particulare (sive singulare), - sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet enim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici (logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones, applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellectio est 'naƿturae' ut non cointelligitur aliquis modus, neque qui est eius in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectumi licet illius intellecti modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non modus intellectus!	33. But not only is the nature of itself indifferent to existence in the intellect and in the particular, and thereby indifferent to universal and to particular (or singular) existence, but also, as it has existence in the intellect, it does not first of itself have universality. For although it is understood under universality as under the mode of understanding it, yet universality is not part of its first concept, because it is not part of a metaphysical but of a logical concept (for the logician considers second intentions applied to first intentions, according to Avicenna). Therefore the first understanding is of the nature without any mode being understood along with it, either the mode that belongs to it in the intellect or the mode that belongs to it outside the intellect; and although the mode in which that understanding is understood is universality yet it is not a mode of that understanding.
34 Et sicut secundum illud esse non est natura de se universalis, sed universalitas accidit illi naturae secundum primam rationem eius, secundum quam est obiectum, - ita etiam in re extra, ubi natura est cum singularitate, non est illa natura de se determinata ad singularitatem, sed est prior naturaliter ipsa ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illam, et in quantum est prior naturaliter illo contrahente, non repugnat sibi esse sine illo contrahente. Et sicut obiectum in intellectu secundum illam primitatem eius et universalitatem habuit vere esse intelligibile, ita etiam in re natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum esse reale extra animam, - et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionalem, quae indifferens est ad singularitatem, ita quod non repugnat illi unitati de se quod cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur (hoc igitur modo intelligo 'naturam habere unitatem realem, minorem unitate numerali'); et licet non habeat eam de se, ita quod sit intra rationem naturae (quia ' equinitas est tantum equinitas', secundum Avicennam V Metaphysicae), tamen illa unitas est propria passio naturae secundum entitatem suam primam, et per consequens neque est ex se 'haec' intranee, neque seƿcundum entitatem propriam necessario inclusam in ipsa natura secundum primam entitatem eius.	34. And just as, according to that existence [sc. existence in the intellect], the nature is not of itself universal, but universality is an accident of the nature according to its first idea, according to which idea the nature is object - so too in the thing outside [the intellect], where the nature exists along with singularity, the nature is not of itself determined to singularity but is naturally prior to the idea that contracts it down to that singularity; and insofar as it is naturally prior to what contracts it, there is no repugnance in its existing without what contracts it. And just as the object in the intellect did, according to the primacy and universality of it, have intelligible existence, so too the nature according to that entity has true real being outside the soul in the thing; and according to that entity it has the unity proportioned to it, which unity is indifferent to singularity, so that there is no repugnance in that unity's being of itself posited as existing with some unity of singularity (so this is how I understand 'nature has a real unity less than numerical unity'); and although it not have the unity of singularity of itself, so that such unity be internal to the idea of the nature (because 'horseness is just horseness', as Avicenna says in Metaphysics 5 [n.31]), yet that unity is a proper accident of the nature according to its first entity, and consequently the nature is not of itself a 'this', either intrinsically or according to the proper entity necessarily included in the nature according to its first entity.
35 Sed contra istud videntur esse duae obiectiones: Una, quia videtur ponere universale esse aliquid reale in re (quod est contra Commentatorem I De anima commento 8, qui dicit quod 'intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus, ita quod non exsistit nisi per intellectum', et sic est tantum ens rationis), nam ista natura secundum quod ens in isto lapide, prior tamen naturaliter singularitate lapidis, est ex dictis indifferens ad hoc singulare et illud.	35. But against this [n.34, about the indetermination and indifference of nature to singularity] there seem to be two objections: One, that it seems to posit that the universal is something real in the thing (which is against the Commentator [Averroes] in On the Soul 1 comm.8, when he says that 'the intellect makes universality in things, so that universality does not exist save through the intellect', and thus universality is just a being of reason) - for although the nature as it is a being in this stone is naturally prior to the singularity of the stone, yet, from what was said [n.34], it is indifferent to this singular and to that [sc. and such indifference is a mark of universality].
36 Praeterea, Damascenus cap. 8: ((Oportet scire quod aliud est re considerari, et aliud ratione et cogitatione. Igitur, et speciaƿlius, in omnibus quidem creaturis hypostaseon divisio in re consideratur (in re enim Petrus a Paulo separatus consideratur), - communitas autem et copulatio, in intellectu tantum, ratione et cogitatione consideratur (intelligimus enim intellectu quoniam Petrus et Paulus unius sunt naturae, et communem unam habent naturam))); ((neque enim hae hypostases in se invicem sunt, sed unaquaeque est singulatim partita, id est secundum rem separata)). Et post: ((In sancta vero et supersubstantiali Trinitate est e converso: illic enim commune quidem unum re consideratur)), ((cogitatione vero post, divisum)).	36. Further, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.8 n.16 says, "It must be borne in mind that it is one thing to be considered in reality and another to be considered in reason and thought. So, and more particularly, the division of hypostases [supposits] in the case of any creature is considered in reality (for Peter is considered in reality as separate from Paul), but commonness and union are considered only in the intellect, reason, and thought (for we understand by the intellect that Peter and Paul belong to one nature and have one common nature); .. .for neither do these hypostases exist in one another, but each is divided one by one, that is, separated in reality." And later [ch.8 n.17], "However, in the holy and supersubstantial Trinity it is contrariwise; for there what is common is considered one in reality, .but afterwards in thought it is considered divided."
37 Ad primum dico quod universale in actu est illud quod habet aliquam unitatem indifferentem, secundum quam ipsum idem est in potentia proxima ut dicatur de quolibet supposito, quia secundum Philosophum I Posteriorum 'universale' est quod est unum in multis et de multis. Nihil enim - secundum quamcumque uniƿtatem - in re est tale quod secundum illam unitatem praecisam sit in potentia proxima ad quodlibet suppositum praedicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc', quia licet alicui exsistenti in re non repugnet esse in alia singularitate ab illa in qua est, non tamen illud vere potest dici de quolibet inferiore, quod 'quodlibet est ipsum'; hoc enim solum est possibile de obiecto eodem numero, actu considerato ab intellectu, - quod quidem 'ut intellectum' habet unitatem etiam numeralem obiecti, secundum quam ipsum idem est praedicabile de omni singulari, dicendo quod 'hoc est hoc'.	37. As to the first [n.35], I say that a universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity, according to which the identically same universal is in proximate potency to being stated of any supposit whatever, because, according to the Philosopher Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b26-33, a 'universal' is what is a one in many and of many. For nothing in reality - according to any unity - is such that according to that precise unity it is in proximate potency for any supposit by a predication stating 'this is this'; because, although there is no repugnance for something existing in reality to be in a singularity other than the one it is in [n.34], yet this something cannot truly be stated of any inferior beneath it, that 'anything whatever is this'; for this is only possible of an object the same in number actually considered by the intellect - which object indeed 'as understood' has also the numerical unity of an object, according to which it is, as identically the same, predicable of every singular, by saying that 'this is this'.
38 Et ex hoc apparet improbatio illius dicti quod 'intellectus agens facit universalitatem in rebus', per hoc quod de omni 'quod quid est' in phantasmate exsistente potest dici quod est tale cui non repugnat esse in alio, et per hoc quod denudat 'quod quid' in phantasmate exsistens, - nam ubicumque est antequam in intellectu possibili habeat esse obiective, sive in re sive in phantasmate, sive habeat esse certum sive deductum per rationem (et sic non per aliquod lumen, sed semper sit talis natura ex se cui non repugnet esse in alio), non tamen est tale cui potentia proxima conveniat dici de quolibet, sed tantum est potentia proxima in intellectu possibili. Est ergo in re 'commune', quod non est de se hoc, et per consequens ei de se non repugnat non hoc. Sed tale commune non est universale in actu, quia deficit illa indifferentia secundum quam ƿcompletive universale est universale, secundum quam scilicet ipsum idem aliqua identitate est praedicabile de quolibet individuo, ita quod quodlibet sit ipsum.	38. Hereby is evident the refutation of the statement that 'the agent intellect creates universality in things' [n.35, cf. Scotus On the Soul q.17 n.14] on the ground that one can say of any 'what it is' existing in a phantasm that it is such that being in something else is not repugnant to it, and on the ground that there is a denuding [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8 q.12, 13 q.8] of the 'what is' existing in the phantasm - for whenever a 'what is' exists beforehand in the possible intellect, it has objective being, either in reality or in a phantasm, or it has a being that is definite or deduced through reason (and thus not through any [intelligible] light, but it is always of itself a nature of such sort that being in another is not repugnant to it); but it is not of such sort that being said of anything whatever belongs to it in proximate potency, but only in the possible intellect is it in [such] proximate potency. There is then in reality a 'common thing' that is not of itself a 'this', and consequently 'non-this' is not repugnant to it of itself. But such a common thing is not a universal in act, because there is lacking to it the indifference by which a universal is a completed universal, namely the indifference by which the common thing, being identically the same by some identity, is predicable of any individual, such that any individual is it.
39 Ad secundam obiectionem - de Damasceno - dico quod eo modo quo in divinis 'commune' est unum realiter, eo modo commune in creaturis non est unum realiter. Ibi enim 'commune' est singulare et individuum, quia ipsa natura divina de se est haec, et eo modo manifestum est quod nullum universale in creaturis est realiter unum; hoc enim ponendo, esset ponere quod aliqua natura creata non divisa praedicaretur de multis individuis praedicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc', sicut dicitur quod Pater est Deus et Filius est idem Deus. In creaturis tamen est aliquod commune unum unitate reali, minore unitate numerali, - et istud quidem 'commune' non est ita commune quod sit praedicabile de multis, licet sit ita commune quod non repugnet sibi esse in alio quam in eo in quo est.	39. To the second objection - from Damascene [n.36] - I say that what is common in creatures is not really one in the way that what is common in divine reality is really one. For in divine reality what is common is singular and individual, because the very divine nature is of itself a 'this', and it is manifest that in this way no universal in creatures is really one; for to posit this would be to posit that some undivided created nature was predicated of many individuals by a predication stating that 'this is this', just as it is said that the Father is God and the Son is the same God. But in creatures there is some common thing one by a real unity less than numerical unity, and this 'common thing' is not so common that it is predicable of many, although it is so common that its being in something other than what it is in is not repugnant to it.
40 Dupliciter ergo patet quomodo auctoritas non est contra me: primo, quia loquitur de unitate singularitatis in divinis, - et hoc modo non solum 'universale creatum' non est unum, sed nec 'commune', in creaturis; secundo, quia loquitur de communi praedicabili, non praecise de communi quod determinatum est de facto (licet non repugnet sibi esse in alio), quale 'commune' praecise potest poni in creaturis realiter. ƿ	40. So it is plain in two ways how the authority [of Damascene] is not against me: first because he is speaking of the unity of singularity in divine reality, and in this way not only is the created universal not one but it is also not common in creatures [or: the common in creatures is not one]; second because he is speaking of a common predicable, not precisely of a common that is determinate in fact (even though being in another is not repugnant to it), and a common of this sort can be precisely posited really in creatures.
	II. To the Principal Argument
41 Et per hoc quod dictum est, patet ad illud argumentum principale, quia Philosophus improbat illam fictionem quam imponit Platoni, quod scilicet non possit 'hic homo' per se exsistens - qui ponitur 'idea' - esse per se universale omni homini, quia 'omnis substantia per se exsistens est propria illi cuius est', hoc est: vel est ex se ipsa 'propria', vel per aliquod contrahens 'facta propria', quo contrahente posito non potest inesse alii, licet non repugnet ei ex se inesse alii, - et ista etiam glossa vera est, loquendo de substantia secundum quod sumitur pro natura; et tunc sequitur quod idea non erit substantia Socratis, quia nec natura Socratis, - quia nec ex se propria, nec appropriata Socrati ut tantum sit in eo, sed etiam est in alio, secundum ipsum. Si autem substantia accipiatur pro substantia prima, tunc verum est quod quaelibet substantia est ex se propria illi cuius est, et tunc multo magis sequitur quod illa idea - quae ponitur 'substantia per se ƿexsistens' - illo modo non possit esse substantia Socratis vel Platonis; sed primum membrum sufficit ad propositum.	41. And from what has been said the answer to the principal argument [n.2] is plain, that the Philosopher is rejecting the invention that he imputes to Plato, namely because 'this man' existing per se - which is posited to be the Idea - cannot be per se universal to every man, because 'every substance existing per se is proper to that in which it is', that is: either it is of itself proper or it is made proper by something contracting it and, once this something contracting it is posited, it cannot be in anything else, even though being in something else is not repugnant to it of itself - and this gloss is certainly true when speaking of substance as it is taken for nature; and then it follows that the Idea will not be the substance of Socrates because it is not even the nature of Socrates - for the Idea is neither proper of itself nor made so proper to Socrates that it exists only in him, but it exists also, according to Plato, in someone else. But if substance is taken for first substance, then it is true that any substance is of itself proper to that to which it belongs, and then it much more follows that the Idea - which is posited as a 'substance existing per se' - cannot be in that way the substance of Socrates or of Plato; but the first member [sc. substance as taken for nature] suffices for the conclusion.
	III. To the Confirmation of the Opinion
42 Ad confirmationem opinionis patet quod non ita se habet communitas et singularitas ad naturam, sicut esse in intellectu et esse verum extra animam, quia communitas convenit naturae extra intellectum, et similiter singularitas, - et communitas convenit ex se naturae, singularitas autem convenit naturae per aliquid in re contrahens ipsam; sed universalitas non convenit rei ex se. Et ideo concedo quod quaerenda est causa universalitatis, non tamen quaerenda est causa communitatis alia ab ipsa natura; et posita communitate in ipsa natura secundum propriam entitatem et unitatem; necessario oportet quaerere causam singularitatis, quae superaddit aliquid illi naturae cuius est.	42. As to the confirmation of the opinion [n.6], it is plain that commonness and singularity are not related to nature as existence in the intellect and true existence outside the soul are related, because commonness belongs to nature outside the intellect as likewise does singularity - and commonness belongs of itself to nature while singularity belongs to nature through something in reality that contracts nature, but universality does not belong to reality of itself. And so I concede that one must look for a cause of universality, but one must not look for a cause of commonness other than nature itself; and once commonness is posited in nature according to its proper entity and unity, then one must necessarily look for a cause of singularity, a cause that super-adds something to the nature to which it belongs [sc. which cause is what is looked for in the following sections, nn.43-211].