Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q2
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- I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent
- B. Scotus' own Opinion
- II. To the Principal Argument
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Question Two: Whether Material Substance is of itself Individual through Some Positive Intrinsic thing | |
| 43 Secundo quaero utrum substantia materialis per aliquid positivum intrinsecum sit de se individua. ƿ | 43. I ask second whether material substance is of itself individual through some positive intrinsic thing. [1] |
| 44 Quod non: Quia 'unum' non dicit nisi privationem divisionis in se et privationem identitatis ad aliud; ergo cum singularitas vel individuatio non dicat nisi duplicem negationem, non oportet eius causam quaerere aliquid positivum, sed sufficit negatio. | 44. That it is not: Because 'one' states only privation of division in the thing itself and privation of its identity with something else; therefore, since singularity or individuation only states a double negation, there is no need to look for something positive as its cause but negation suffices. |
| 45 Prima propositio probatur, quia si 'unum' diceret rationem positivam, non eandem quam dicit ens (tunc enim esset nugatio, dicendo 'ens unum'); nec aliam rationem dicit, quia tunc in quolibet ente esset entitas addita entitati, quod videtur inconveniens. | 45. The proof of the first proposition here is that if 'one' were to state a positive idea, it would not state the same idea as 'being' states (for then it would be otiose to say 'being is one'); nor does it state an idea other than 'being', because then in any being there would be an entity added to an entity, which seems unacceptable. |
| 46 Contra: Prima substantia per se generatur (ex VII Metaphysicae), et per se operatur (ex I Metaphysicae), - et in hoc distinguitur a secunda substantia, cui neutrum per se convenit; ergo ista conveniunt primae substantiae per illud quod addit supra secundam substantiam. Non autem conveniunt ista alicui formaliter per negationem; ergo prima substantia non addit tantum negationem supra secundam. ƿ | 46. On the contrary: Primary substance is generated per se (from Metaphysics 7.6.1033a24-b19) and operates per se (Metaphysics 1.1.981a16-19), and in this respect it is distinguished from secondary substance, to which neither of these per se belongs; therefore they belong to primary substance through what primary substance adds above secondary substance. But they do not belong to anything formally through negation; therefore primary substance does not just add negation to secondary substance [n.53]. |
| I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent | |
| 47 Hic dicitur quod individuatio in rebus creatis fit per duplicem negationem, - quam opinionem quaere Quodlibet V quaestione 8. | 47. Here the statement is made that individuation in created things is done by double negation - see this opinion in [Henry] Quodlibet 5 q.8.[2] |
| 48 Sed contra istam opinionem. Primo expono intellectum quaestionum motarum de ista materia: non enim quaero quo natura est singularis vel individua, si illa significent intentionem secundam (quia tunc intentione secunda formaliter esset 'natura' singularis et effective ab intellectu causante illam intentionem secundam, conferente videlicet 'hanc naturam' ad 'naturam' sicut subicibile ad praedicabile), - nec etiam ƿquaero de unitate numerali reali, quo formaliter natura est sic una (nam unitate numerali est res formaliter una sive illa unitas convertatur cum ente sive sit de genere quantitatis, sive dicat privationem sive positionem); sed, quia in entibus est aliquid indivisibile in partes subiectivas, hoc est 'cui formaliter repugnat dividi in plura quorum quodlibet sit ipsum', quaeritur non quo formaliter illud repugnat (quia repugnantia formaliter repugnat), sed quo ut fundamento proximo et intrinseco ista repugnantia insit isti. Est ergo intellectus quaestionum de hac materia, quid sit in hoc lapide, per quod 'sicut per fundamentum proximum' simpliciter repugnat ei dividi in plura quorum quodlibet sit ipsum, qualis 'divisio' est propria toti universali in suas partes subiectivas. | 48. But against this opinion: First I expound the meaning of the questions moved about this matter [sc. the six listed in the interpolation to n.1, and dealt with at nn.1, 43, 59, 66, 129, 142]; for I am not asking by what a nature is singular or individual if these terms signify a second intention (for then a nature would exist by a second intention formally and exist effectively by the intellect causing that second intention, namely by its bringing 'this nature' to 'nature' as a subject-able to a predicable); and I am also not asking about the real numerical unity whereby a nature is one in this way (for a thing is formally one by numerical unity, whether the unity converts with being or is in the genus of quantity or states a privation or something positive); but, because there is in entities something incapable of division into subjective parts, that is, something 'to which its being divided into several things, each of which things is it, is formally repugnant', the question being asked is not whereby it is formally repugnant (because it is formally repugnant by repugnance), but by what, as by proximate and intrinsic foundation, this repugnance is in an entity. Therefore the meaning of the questions about this matter is 'what is it in this stone by which, as by proximate foundation, its being divided into several things each of which is it is simply repugnant' - which division is the sort proper to a whole universal into its subjective parts. |
| 49 Hoc modo intelligendo, probo quod non sit aliquod individuum formaliter sicut videtur illa positio ponere: Primo, quia nihil simpliciter repugnat alicui enti per solam privationem in eo, sed per aliquid positivum in eo; igitur dividi in partes subiectivas non repugnat lapidi - in eo quod est ens quoddam - per aliquas negationes. | 49. Understanding the questions in this way, then, I prove that there is not anything formally individual in the way this position [n.47] seems to posit. First, because nothing is simply repugnant to any being through a mere privation in it but through something positive in it; therefore being divided into subjective parts is not repugnant to a stone - in that a stone is a certain thing - through any negations. |
| 50 Probatio antecedentis: quia quantumcumque negatio tollat potentiam proximam ad agere et pati, ut per hoc illud ens in quo est negatio, non sit in potentia proxima ad aliquid, - non tamen ponit ƿformalem repugnantiam illius entis ad aliquid, quia per possibile vel impossibile circumscriptis illis negationibus (cum non sint) staret tale ens cum opposito illarum negationum, et ita cum illo cui dicitur repugnare per se, quod est impossibile. Exemplum huius: si substantia intelligatur non quanta, non est divisibilis (hoc est, non est possibilis dividi potentia propinqua), non tamen repugnat sibi dividi, quia tunc repugnaret sibi recipere quantitatem, per quam posset formaliter dividi; stante igitur natura eiusdem substantiae corporeae, non repugnat sibi quod sit divisibilis. Similiter: si 'non habere visum' tollat potentiam proximam ad videndum, tamen non facit repugnantiam ad videre, quia potest stare eadem natura positiva (in qua fuit haec negatio) et potest sibi inesse oppositum illius negationis absque repugnantia ex parte naturae. | 50. Proof of the antecedent: because however much negation may take away the proximate potency for acting and undergoing, so that thereby the being which the negation is in is not in proximate potency to anything - yet it does not posit in that being a formal repugnance to anything, for, when the negations are removed, possibly or impossibly (since they do not exist), such a being would stand along with the opposite of the negations, and so along with what it is said to be repugnant to, which is impossible. An example of this: if a substance be understood to be a non-quantum, it is not divisible (that is, it is not able by proximate potency to be divided), yet being divided is not repugnant to it, because then receiving a quantity would be repugnant to it, a quantity by which it could be formally divided; therefore, while the nature of the same bodily substance stands, being divisible is not repugnant to it. Likewise: if 'not having sight' takes away the proximate potency for seeing, yet it does not create a repugnance to seeing, because the positive nature (where this negation was) can stand, and the opposite of the negation can, without repugnance on the part of the nature, be present in it. |
| 51 Ita posset argui in proposito: cum ille ponat naturam 'ex se esse unam et individuam', numquam tamen per aliquam negatioƿnem 'positam in natura' repugnabit sibi formaliter dividi, et ita numquam erit aliquod ens positivum in rebus quod erit complete individuum. | 51. So can it be argued in the issue at hand: although he [sc. Henry] posits nature to be 'of itself one and individual',[3] yet never will being formally divided be repugnant to nature through some negation posited in it, and so never will there be in things any positive being that will be completely individual. |
| 52 Et si aliquo modo instetur primae propositioni huius rationis, saltem assumo istam propositionem: 'nulla imperfectio repugnat alicui formaliter nisi propter aliquam perfectionem', quae est aliquid positivum et entitas positiva; sed 'dividi' est quaedam imperfectio (et ideo non potest competere naturae divinae); ergo etc. | 52. And if an instance is in any way made against the first proposition of this argument [n.49], I will at least assume this proposition: 'no imperfection is repugnant to anything formally save because of some perfection', which perfection is some positive thing and a positive entity; but 'to be divided' is an imperfection (and for that reason it cannot belong to the divine nature); therefore etc. |
| 53 Item, negatione non constituitur aliquid formaliter in entitate perfectiore quam sit illa entitas praesupposita negationi (alioquin negatio esset formaliter entitas quaedam positiva); sed prima substantia (secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis) est maxime substantia, et etiam est magis substantia quam secunda substantia; igitur non formaliter constituitur in entitate primae substantiae per negationem, in quantum distinguitur a secunda. | 53. Again, a thing is not by a negation formally constituted in a more perfect entity than is the entity presupposed by the negation (otherwise the negation would be formally some positive entity); but primary substance (according to the Philosopher in Categories 5.2a11-15) is most of all substance, and is also more substance than is secondary substance; therefore primary substance, insofar as it is distinguished from secondary substance, is not constituted formally in the entity of primary substance by negation [n.46]. |
| 54 Item, de 'singulari' per se primo modo praedicatur illud cuius est singulare; sed de aliquo ente 'accepto sub negatione' non praedicatur per se aliqua entitas ratione totius subiecti, quia totum non ƿest per se unum (si ratione partis, tunc non est praedicatio superioris de inferiore, sed eiusdem de se). | 54. Again, that of which a singular is the singular is predicated of the singular in the first per se mode of predication; but of some being taken under negation no entity is per se said by reason of the whole subject, because the whole is not per se one (if it is said by reason of a part, then a superior is not being predicated of an inferior but the same thing of itself). |
| 55 Praeterea, licet ista positio videatur esse falsa in se propter argumenta iam facta, si intelligat individuum constitui in entitate et unitate singularitatis per negationem, - tamen videtur omnino superflua et non respondere ad quaestionem, quia ipsa posita, adhuc remanet eadem quaestio: Nam de duplici negatione, quam ponit, quaero quae est ratio quare negatio ista convenit illi? Si istam duplicem negationem dicit esse per se causam, non respondetur ad quaestionem: quaeritur enim illud per quod repugnant opposita istarum negationum, et per consequens per quae insunt istae negationes. | 55. Further, although this position [of Henry, n.47] seems to be false in itself because of the arguments already given [nn.49-54], yet, if the individual is understood to be constituted in the entity and unity of singularity through negation, the position seems altogether superfluous and not to respond to the question, because even when it is posited the same question remains: For about the double negation that it posits I ask what the reason is that the negation belongs to the thing. If the position says that this double negation is the per se cause, no response is made to the question; for the question is what makes the opposites of these negations to be repugnant, and consequently what makes these negations to be present in the thing. |
| 56 Similiter, quaero unde 'negatio' sit haec, cum sit eiusdem rationis in isto et in illo? Nam sicut in Socrate est duplex negatio, ita in Platone est negatio duplicis rationis; unde igitur Socrates est 'singulare' hac singularitate (propria et determinata) et non singularitate Platonis? Non potest dici, nisi inveniatur unde 'negatio' sit haec negatio, et hoc non potest esse nisi per aliquid positivum. | 56. Likewise I ask where the negation comes from, since it is of the same idea in this thing and in that thing. For just as there is a double negation in Socrates, so there is a negation of a double idea in Plato; why then is Socrates singular by this singularity (a proper and determinate singularity) and not by the singularity of Plato? It is impossible to say unless one finds what this negation is a negation by, and this cannot be anything other than something positive. |
| B. Scotus' own Opinion | |
| 57 Concedo igitur conclusiones istarum rationum, quod necesse est per aliquid positivum intrinsecum huic lapidi, tamquam per ƿrationem propriam, repugnare sibi dividi in partes subiectivas; et illud positivum erit illud quod dicetur esse per se causa individuationis, quia per individuationem intelligo illam indivisibilitatem sive repugnantiam ad divisibilitatem. | 57. I concede then the conclusions of these arguments [nn.49-56], that the repugnance in this stone for being divided into subjective parts must be through something positive as through a proper reason; and this positive thing will be what is said to be the per se cause of individuation, because by individuation I understand the indivisibility, or the repugnance to divisibility. |
| II. To the Principal Argument | |
| 58 Ad argumentum 'in oppositum'. Licet assumptum sit falsum forte (de quo alias), tamen si verum esset quod 'unum' significaret formaliter illam duplicem negationem, non sequitur quod non habeat aliquam causam positivam per quam insit ei illa duplex negatio, - nam et unitas specifica pari ratione significaret duplicem negationem, et tamen nullus negat entitatem positivam esse in ratione entitatis specificae, a qua entitate positiva sumitur ratio differentiae specificae. Et istud est argumentum bonum pro solutione quaestionis et pro opinione, quia cum in qualibet unitate minore unitate numerali sit dare entitatem positivam (quae sit per se ratio illius unitatis et repugnantiae ad multitudinem oppositam), maxime - vel aequaliter - erit hoc dare in unitate perfectissima, quae est 'unitas numeralis'. ƿ | 58. To the argument for the opposite [n.44]: Although the assumption [sc. 'that 'one' states only privation of division in the thing itself and privation of its identity with something else'] is perhaps false (about which elsewhere [not in the Ordinatio; see Metaphysics 4 q.2 nn.2, 4, 7, 9, 13; 7 q.3 n.17]), yet, if it were true that 'one' signified formally that double negation, it does not follow that the double negation does not have some positive cause whereby it is present in a thing - for specific unity would by parity of reason signify double negation, and yet no one would deny that there is a positive entity in the idea of a specific entity, from which positive entity the idea of the specific difference is taken. And this is a good argument for the solution of the question and for the opinion [sc. Scotus' solution and opinion] because, since in any unity less than numerical unity there is a positive entity given (which is the per se reason for the unity and for its repugnance to the opposed manyness), a positive entity will be most of all - or equally - given in the most perfect unity, which is numerical unity. |
Notes
- ↑ [Interpolation] Argument about the second, namely whether material substance is individual through some positive intrinsic thing.
- ↑ "It is necessary then that the cause of individuation be something negative or positive-relative; but not positive-relative, because the relation would necessarily be founded on the thing itself as made and so as determinate in a supposit; so the cause must be some negative condition. One must therefore say that in specific created forms...the reason for individuation...is negation, whereby the form itself..., as it is the term of the making, is made altogether undivided in the supposit and individual and singular by privation of all divisibility (per se and per accidens), and divided from any other thing whatever... This negation, indeed, is not simple but double, because it is a remover of all multiplicability and diversity from within and of all identity from without... And this double negation altogether formally determines the idea of the form, by which determination an absolute supposit over and above the essence of the form is constituted... Thus, therefore, only by the determination of negation as to form...does the individuation and constitution of a supposit come, as by its formal idea, completely to be."
- ↑ Quodlibet 5 q.8, "Now there is another form which, as to thing and nature, is one and undivided in itself, and it is divided from a different form in the way that, with nothing formal being added to it, it subsists in supposits - the way it is the form of any most specific species, whose unity is only according to reason; 'undivided' I say, as far as concerns it of itself, in respect of subjective parts... But any specific form does not of itself and by its nature admit division into supposits but is simple, and it exists whole in whatever it exists in;" "An individual form (as humanity or ass-ness) is of itself and by its nature simple and indivisible, in that of itself and by its nature it does not have parts that differ in form, the way the form of a genus does - which differs in this respect from the form of a species, that the form of a genus...of itself and by its nature is divided through parts that differ in form, and it does not have a natural unity of itself but only according to reason and conception of the intellect; but the form of a species is of itself and by the nature of species individual in form, having of itself a unity terminated at the same time in the being of nature and in the intellect."
