Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q3

• I. The Opinion of Others
• II. Rejection of the Opinion
• III. To the Argument for the Opinion

Latin	English
	Question Three: Whether Material Substance is Individual, or the Reason for Individuating Another, through Actual Existence
59 Tertio quaero, sine argumentis, an substantia materialis per actualem exsistentiam sit individua vel ratio individuandi aliud.	59. I ask third, without arguments, whether material substance is individual, or the reason for individuating another, through actual existence.
	I. The Opinion of Others
60 Dicitur quod sic, quia ex VII Metaphysicae 'actus determinat et distinguit', igitur ultima distinctio est per ultimum actum; ultimus autem actus individuorum est secundum esse exsistentiae, quia quidlibet aliud ab eo intelligitur in potentia ad ipsum.	60. The statement is made that it is, because, from Metaphysics 7.13.1039a3-7, 'act determines and distinguishes', so ultimate distinction is through ultimate act; but the ultimate act of individuals is according to the being of existence, because anything other than this is understood to be in potency to it.
	II. Rejection of the Opinion
61 Contra istud: Primo, quia quod non est ex se distinctum nec determinatum, non potest esse primum distinguens vel determinans aliud; sed esse exsistentiae, eo modo quo distinguitur ab esse essentiae, non est ex se distinctum nec determinatum (non enim esse exsistentiae ƿhabet proprias differentias alias a differentiis esse essentiae, quia tunc oporteret ponere propriam coordinationem exsistentiarum aliam a coordinatione essentiarum), sed praecise determinatur ex determinatione alterius; ergo non determinat aliquid aliud.	61. Against this: First, because what is not distinct or determinate of itself cannot be the first distinguisher or determiner of something else; but the being of existence, in the way it is distinguished from the being of essence, is not distinct or determinate of itself (for the being of existence does not have its own differences besides the differences of the being of essence, because then one would have to posit a proper ordering for existences other than the ordering for essences), but the being of existence is determined precisely by the other's determination; therefore it does not determine anything else.
62 Ex hoc posset aliter argui: quia illud quod praesupponit determinationem et distinctionem alterius, non est ratio distinguendi vel determinandi ipsum; sed exsistentia, ut determinata et distincta, praesupponit ordinem et distinctionem essentiarum; igitur etc.	62. On this basis one can argue in another way: because that which presupposes the determinateness and distinctness of something else is not the reason for distinguishing and determining itself; but existence, as it is determinate and distinct, presupposes the order and distinctness of essences; therefore etc.
63 Et si dicatur quod praesupponit omnem aliam distinctionem ab illa quae est ad individua, sed illam quae est quasi ad individuum causat, - contra: in coordinatione praedicamentali sunt omnia quae per se pertinent ad illam coordinationem, circumscripto quocumque quod nihil est illius coordinationis, quia secundum Philosophum I Posteriorum 'status est in quolibet praedicamento, in sursum et in deorsum'. Igitur sicut invenitur supremum in genere praecise considerando illud sub ratione essentiae, ita inveniuntur genera intermedia, et species et differentiae; invenitur etiam ibi infimum, scilicet singulare, omnino circumscripta exsistentia actuaƿli, - quod patet evidenter, quia 'hic homo' non plus includit formaliter exsistentiam actualem quam 'homo'.	63. And if it be said that existence presupposes every distinctness other than the one that is for individuals, but that it causes the distinctness that is as it were for an individual - on the contrary: in the ordering in a category there exist, when whatever is no part of the ordering is removed, all the things that per se pertain to the ordering, because, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 1.20.82a21-24, 'in any category a stand is made upwards and downwards'. Therefore just as the highest in a genus is found precisely by considering it under the idea of essence, so the intermediate genera and species and differences are found in this way; the lowest, namely the singular, is also found there, with actual existence altogether removed - as is plainly evident, because 'this man' does not formally include actual existence any more than 'man' does.
64 Praeterea, eadem quaestio est de exsistentia - quo et unde contrahitur ut sit haec - quae est de natura, nam si 'natura specifica' eadem sit in pluribus individuis, habet exsistentiam eiusdem rationis in eis: sicut probatur in solutione primae quaestionis, quod illa natura non sit de se haec, - ita potest quaeri per quid exsistentia sit haec (quia non est de se haec), et ita non sufficit dare exsistentiam qua natura sit haec.	64. Further, there is the same question about existence - by what and how it is contracted so as to be a 'this' - as there is about nature, for if the specific nature is the same in several individuals, it has an existence in them of the same idea: following the way the proof that specific nature is not a 'this' goes in the solution to the first question [nn.29-30], it can in the same way be asked what existence is a 'this' by (because it is not of itself a 'this'), and so to give existence as what nature is a 'this' by is not sufficient.
	III. To the Argument for the Opinion
65 Per hoc ad argumentum pro opinione dico quod actus distinguit eo modo quo est actus, - sed actus accidentalis distinguit accidentaliter, sicut actus essentialis distinguit essentialiter. Ita dico quod ultima distinctio in coordinatione praedicamentali est distinctio individualis, et illa est per ultimum actum, per se pertinentem ad coordinationem praedicamentalem, - sed ad hanc non per se pertinet exsistentia actualis; exsistentia autem actualis est ultimus actus, sed posterior tota coordinatione praedicamentali, - et ideo concedo quod distinguit ultimate, sed distinctione quae est extra totam per se coordinationem praedicamentalem. Quae 'distinctio' quasi quodammodo accidentalis est: licet non sit vere ƿaccidentalis, sequitur tamen totam coordinationem secundum esse quiditativum; eo ergo modo quo est actus, distinguit, - et in quo est ultimus actus, ultimate distinguit.	65. On this basis I say to the argument for the opinion [n.60] that act distinguishes in the way it is act, but accidental act distinguishes accidentally, just as essential act distinguishes essentially. Accordingly I say that the ultimate distinction in ordering in a category is individual distinction, and individual distinction is through an ultimate act pertaining per se to the ordering in the category - and therefore I concede that this act distinguishes ultimately, but by a distinction that is outside the whole per se ordering in the category. This distinction is as it were somehow accidental; even though it is not truly accidental, yet it is subsequent to the whole of the ordering by quidditative being; in the way then that it is act it distinguishes, and in the way it is ultimate act it ultimately distinguishes.