Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q6
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- A. To the Question 1. The Opinion of Others a. Exposition of the Opinion
- b. Rejection of the Opinion
- 2. Scotus' own Opinion
- B. To the Principal Arguments
- C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others
- II. Scotus' own Solution to the Fifth Question (Continuation of Question Five)
- III. To the Authorities from the Philosopher for the Opposite
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Question Six: Whether Material Substance is Individual through Some Entity per se Determining' Nature to Singularity | |
| 142 Quia solutio auctoritatum Philosophi ad oppositum requirit solutionem sextae quaestionis, scilicet per quid completive subƿstantia materialis sit individua, - ideo sexto quaero utrum substantia materialis sit individua per aliquam entitatem positivam, per se determinantem naturam ad singularitatem. | 142. Because the solution to the authorities from the Philosopher for the opposite [nn.130, 132-135] require a solution to the sixth question, namely through what a material substance is made completely individual, therefore I ask sixth whether material substance is individual through some entity per se determining nature to singularity. |
| 143 Quod non: Quia tunc illud 'determinans' se haberet ad naturam sicut actus ad potentiam; ergo ex natura specifica et illo determinante esset vere et proprie compositum unum, quod est inconveniens: nam istud 'determinans' aut esset materia, aut forma, aut compositum aliquod ex eis; quodcumque detur, est inconveniens, - quia tunc in composito esset alia materia ab illa materia quae est pars naturae, vel alia forma ab illa quae ponitur pars naturae, vel aliud compositum ab illo quod est compositum naturae. | 143. That it is not: Because then the determinant would be disposed to nature as act to potency; so there would truly and properly be a single composite from the specific nature and the determinant, which is unacceptable; for the determinant would be either matter or form or something composed of them, and whichever is taken the result would be unacceptable; for then there would be in the composite another matter beside the matter that is part of the nature, or another form beside the form posited as part of the nature, or another composite beside that which is composed of the nature. |
| 144 Praeterea: tunc singulare, compositum ex natura et illo per se determinante, esset per se unum; ergo per se intelligibile, - quod videtur contra Philosophum II De anima et VII Metaphysicae, ubi videtur aperte velle quod intellectio est 'universalis' et sensus et sensatio est 'ipsius singularis'. | 144. Further, the singular composed of the nature and the per se determinant would then be per se one, and so per se intelligible; and this seems against the Philosopher, On the Soul 2.5.417b22-23 and Metaphysics 7.10.1035b33-6a8, where he seems openly to maintain that understanding is of the universal, and sense and sensation of the singular. |
| 145 Praeterea, si esset per se intelligibile, posset de ipso esse demonstratio et scientia, - et ita de singularibus esset scientia proƿpria in quantum singularia sunt, quod negat Philosophus VII Metaphysicae cap. 'De partibus definitionis'. | 145. Further, if the singular were per se intelligible, there could be demonstration and science of it, and so there would be a science proper of singulars as they are singulars, which the Philosopher denies, Metaphysics 7.10.1035b33-6a8, 15.1039b26-40a5, ch. 'On Parts of Definition'. |
| 146 Item, si includeret naturam specificam et illud per se determinans, posset per se definiri per ista duo (inclusa per se in ratione sua), et ita esset alia definitio individui et alia speciei, - saltem addens super definitionem speciei, sicut definitio speciei addit super definitionem generis. | 146. Again, if the singular included the specific nature and the per se determinant, it could be per se defined through those two (included per se in its idea), and so there would be one definition of the individual and another of the species - the former making addition to the definition of the species at least in the way the definition of the species makes addition to the definition of the genus. |
| 147 Ad oppositum: Omne inferius includit per se, aliquid, quod non includitur in intellectu superioris, - alioquin conceptus inferioris esset aeque communis sicut conceptus superioris, et tunc 'per se inferius' non esset per se inferius, quia non subesset communi et superiori; ergo aliquid per se includitur in ratione individui, quod non includitur in ratione naturae. Illud autem 'inclusum' est entitas positiva, ex solutione secundae quaestionis, - et facit 'unum per se' cum natura, ex solutione quartae quaestionis; igitur est per se determinans illam naturam ad singularitatem, sive ad rationem illius inferioris. ƿ | 147. For the opposite side: Every [logical] inferior includes per se something that is not included in the understanding of the [logical] superior, otherwise the concept of the inferior would be as common as the concept of the superior, and then the per se inferior would not be per se inferior because it would not be under the common and superior; therefore something is per se included in the idea of the individual that is not included in the idea of the nature. But the included something is a positive entity, from the solution to the second question [n.57], and makes with the nature something per se one, from the solution to the fourth question [n.111]; therefore it is a per se determinant of the nature to singularity, or to the idea of the inferior. |
| A. To the Question 1. The Opinion of Others a. Exposition of the Opinion | |
| 148 Hic dicitur quod natura specifica de se est haec, et tamen per quantitatem potest esse 'natura' communis pluribus singularibus, sive quantitas potest esse ratio quare plura singularia possunt esse sub natura. ƿ | 148. Here it is maintained [by Godfrey of Fontaines] that the specific nature is of itself a 'this', and yet it can, through quantity, be the nature common to several singulars, or quantity can be the reason that several singulars can exist in the nature.[1] |
| 149 Primum declaratur sic: species specialissima de se est atoma; igitur indivisibilis. | 149. The first point [sc. specific nature is of itself a 'this'] is made clear thus: the most specific species is of itself an atomic unit; therefore it is indivisible. |
| 150 Et confirmatur per illud Porphyrii: ((Descendentibus nobis a generalissimis usque ad specialissima, iubet Plato quiescere)); sed si esset possibile divisionem esse ulteriorem huius naturae, non esset quiescendum in illa natura; igitur etc. | 150. And there is confirmation from the remark of Porphyry [Book of Predicables ch.2 2b14-16], "When we descend from the most general to the most specific, Plato [Politicus Latinus I 596] bids us come to a rest;" but if it were possible for there to be a further division of this nature, one should not rest at the nature; therefore etc. |
| 151 Similiter, Boethius libro Divisionum, enumerans omnes divisiones non tantum 'per se' sed etiam 'per accidens', non enumerat divisionem speciei in individua; igitur illa natura specifica non est 'haec' per aliquid aliud. | 151. Likewise Boethius in his book Of Divisions, when he is enumerating all the divisions not only per se but also per accidens, does not enumerate a division of the species into individuals; therefore the specific nature is a not a 'this' through something else. |
| 152 Item, si aliqua realitas esset in individuo praeter solam realitatem naturae specificae, species non diceret 'totum esse individuorum', - quod est contra Porphyrium. | 152. Again, if there were some reality in an individual beside the sole reality of the specific nature, the species would not state 'the whole being of individuals' - which is against Porphyry [Predicables ch.2 3a5-9]. |
| 153 Secundum declaratur, quia licet quantitas non sit ratio formalis divisionis alicuius in partes subiectivas, tamen quando totum quantitativum dividitur in partes quantitativas, dividitur per se in illa quae sunt eiusdem rationis; idem autem est principium divisionis in aliqua et principium distinctionis ipsorum dividentium; ƿigitur sicut ipsa quantitas est principium illius divisionis, ita est principium distinctionis illorum dividentium. Sed illa sunt partes subiectivae naturae communis; igitur quantitas est principium distinctionis talium partium. | 153. The second point [n.148] is made clear by the fact that quantity, although it is not the formal idea of the division of anything into subjective parts, yet, when a quantitative whole is divided into quantitative parts, it is divided per se into things that are of the same idea; now the principle of a division into something is the same as the principle of distinction of the very dividers; therefore, just as quantity itself is the principle of the division, so it is the principle of the distinction of the dividers. But these dividers are the subjective parts of the common nature; therefore quantity is the principle of the distinction of such parts. |
| 154 Qualiter autem ista duo membra possunt simul stare, patere potest per exemplum, quia secundum Philosophum I Physicorum 'substantia de se est indivisibilis', loquendo de partibus eiusdem rationis, - et tamen adveniente quantitate est partibilis in tales partes, immo tunc habet tales partes. Ita igitur potest natura speciei esse de se haec, et tamen per naturam 'advenientem sibi extrinsece' esse haec et haec. | 154. Now how these two points [n.148] can stand together can be made plain through an example, because, according to the Philosopher Physics 1.2.185a32-b5, 'substance is of itself indivisible into parts', speaking of parts of the same idea - and yet, when quantity is added, substance is divisible into such parts, indeed it then has such parts. In this way, then, can a nature of a species be of itself a 'this' and yet, though a nature coming to it from without, be this here and this there. |
| b. Rejection of the Opinion | |
| 155 Ista positio videtur posse habere duplicem intellectum: Unum talem, quod substantia materialis in quantum distinguitur essentialiter a quantitate, maneat eadem, omnino non distincta secundum rationem suae propriae et essentialis entitatis, et tamen recipiat multas quantitates, - et recipiendo eas, cum eis constituat multa simul tota; hoc est dictu - planis verbis - quod eadem substantia materialis, in se non divisa nec distincta, informatur multis quantitatibus et ex hoc sunt multa individua sub specie. ƿ | 155. This position [n148] seems it can be understood in two ways: One such way is that material substance, to the extent it is essentially distinguished from quantity, remains the same, wholly non-distinct by reason of its proper and essential entity, and yet receives many quantities and, when receiving them, constitutes along with them many wholes at the same time; that is to say, in plain words, that the same material substance, being in itself neither divided nor distinct, is informed with many quantities, and thereby are there many individuals in a species. |
| 156 Alio modo potest intelligi quod illa substantia materialis quae de se esset haec, circumscripta omni quantitate, - posita quantitate informante erit haec et illa, ita quod non tantum recipit quantitates distinctas, sed ipsa habet distinctionem in se, in entitate propria substantiali: ita quod illa substantia quae subicitur illi quantitati et distinguitur ab ea essentialiter, non est illa quae subest alii quantitati et distinguitur ab ea essentialiter, licet tamen istud 'quod haec non sit illa' non possit esse sine quantitate in hac et in illa. | 156. The position can be understood in another way, that the material substance, which of itself, with all quantity removed, would be a 'this', will, when a quantity informing it is posited, be this substance and that, such that it not only receives distinct quantities but also has distinctness in itself, in its proper substantial entity; so that the substance, which is subject of the quantity and is distinct from the quantity essentially, is not the substance which is subject of another quantity and distinct from this other quantity essentially, although however the fact that it is this substance and not that cannot be without quantity in this substance and in that. |
| 157 Primus intellectus videtur impossibilis, quia ex eo sequuntur inconvenientia in theologia, metaphysica et scientia naturali. | 157. The first way of understanding [n.155] seems impossible, because from it there follow things that are unacceptable in theology, metaphysics, and natural science. |
| 158 In theologia quidem sequitur inconveniens hoc, quod non sit proprium essentiae divinae infinitae esse 'haec', scilicet quod ipsa exsistens una, in se indistincta, possit esse in pluribus suppositis distinctis, - quod tamen non intelligitur communiter nisi de personis tantum relative distinctis; hic autem poneretur quod una natura substantialis, nullo modo in se distincta, haberet plura supposita re absoluta distincta. | 158. In theology indeed this unacceptable thing follows, that to be 'this' is not a property of the infinite divine essence, namely that the divine essence, existing as single, indistinct in itself, can be in several distinct supposits - but this is commonly understood only of persons distinct just in relation; here, however, what is posited is that a single substantial nature, in no way distinct in itself, would have several supposits distinct with absolute reality. |
| 159 Secundo sequitur quod non possit aliqua substantia vini transubstantiari in corpus et sanguinem nisi tota substantia vini transubstantiaretur, quia vinum non transubstantiatur nisi secunƿdum substantiam suam, nam quantitas manet eadem, - et per te substantia quae est in hoc vino, est eadem illi quae est in illo vino; idem autem non est transubstantiatum et non transubstantiatum; igitur etc. | 159. Second, it follows that some substance of wine cannot be transubstantiated into the body and blood [of Christ] unless the whole substance of wine is transubstantiated, because the wine is only transubstantiated as to its substance, for its quantity remains the same, and for you [n.148, specific nature is of itself a 'this'] the substance in this wine is the same as the substance in that wine; but the same thing is not both transubstantiated and not transubstantiated; therefore etc. |
| 160 In metaphysica sequuntur inconvenientia: Primum, quia poneretur idea quam posuit Plato. Plato enim posuit ideam esse substantiam exsistentem per se, naturam separatam, sine accidentibus (sicut sibi imponitur a Philosopho), in qua esset tota natura speciei, - quae, secundum quod imposuit sibi Aristoteles, diceretur de quolibet individuo praedicatione formali dicente 'hoc est hoc'; haec autem opinio posuit 'hanc substantiam' dici de quolibet huius speciei praedicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc', et tamen esse sub hoc accidente et illo. Haec igitur opinio ponit tantam communitatem quantam posuit Plato in ideis. | 160. In metaphysics the unacceptable things that follow are: First, that the Idea posited by Plato would be posited. For Plato posited that the Idea is a per se existing substance, a separate nature, without accidents (as is imputed to him by the Philosopher), in which would be the whole nature of the species, and this nature, according to what Aristotle imputed to Plato, would be said of any individual by a formal predication stating 'this is this' [n.41]; but this opinion has posited that 'this substance' is said of anything of this species by a predication stating 'this is this', and yet that it is under this accident and under that accident [n.143]. This opinion, therefore, posits as much commonness as Plato posited in the Ideas. |
| 161 Secundo, quia per istos duo accidentia eiusdem speciei non possunt esse in eodem subiecto (si fuerint accidentia absoluta), ƿquia secundum eos sequeretur contradictio manifesta, quod scilicet idem esset in actu et in potentia secundum idem; oppositum tamen sequitur ex isto, quia eadem natura est in actu secundum multos actus eiusdem speciei. | 161. Second, because for them [Godfrey and his followers] two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same subject (provided they were absolute accidents [sc.accidents of quantity or quality]), because a manifest contradiction according to them would follow, namely that the same thing would be in act and in potency in the same respect;[2] however the opposite hereby follows, that the same nature is in act in respect of many acts of the same species. |
| 162 Et iuxta hoc, posset inferri impossibile aliud, mathematicum (in quantum 'quantum' pertinet ad considerationem mathematici), scilicet quod duae quantitates dimensivae eiusdem rationis simul perficerent idem subiectum, - quod est contra rationem propriam quantitatum dimensivarum eiusdem rationis, loquendo secundum intentionem mathematici. | 162. Accordingly one could infer another impossibility, a mathematical one (insofar as a quantum pertains to the consideration of a mathematician), namely that two dimensive quantities of the same idea would perfect the same subject at the same time, and this is contrary to the proper nature of dimensive quantities of the same idea, speaking according to the intention of a mathematician. |
| 163 Tertio, in scientia naturali sequuntur duo inconvenientia: Primum, quod nulla substantia materialis potest generari et corrumpi. Non quidem generari, quia si 'hic lapis' est, erit in eo omnis substantia quae potest esse in quocumque lapide; tamen potest huic substantiae lapidis acquiri tanta quantitas et tanta, numero alia: acquisitio autem novae quantitatis non est generatio (patet ex terminis istius generationis); igitur etc. - Similiter: hoc lapide manente, manet natura lapidis specifica in illo; omnis autem natura lapidis est 'ista natura', - ergo manente ista natura, manet omnis natura; igitur non potest corrumpi aliqua substantia mateƿrialis, manente illo lapide, licet qualitas - vel quantitas - non sit eadem. | 163. Third, in natural science there follow two unacceptable things: First, that no material substance can be generated and corrupted. Not generated indeed, because if there is a 'this stone', all the substance will be in it that there can be in any stone; however, this substance of stone can acquire a quantity of this much and a quantity of that much, different in number; but the acquisition of a new quantity is not generation (as is plain from the terms of this generation); therefore etc. Likewise, while this stone remains, the specific nature of stone remains in it; but every nature of stone is 'this nature'; therefore, while this nature remains, every nature remains; therefore a material substance cannot be corrupted while the stone remains, although the quality - or the quantity - is not the same. |
| 164 Secundo sequitur quod licet secundum fictionem illius maledicti Averrois, de unitate intellectus in omnibus, possit sic fingere de corporibus tuo et meo, sicut de lapidibus isto et illo, tamen, non tantum secundum fidem sed secundum philosophiam necessariam tenendo aliam et aliam animam intellectivam, non potest natura humana esse de se atoma et tamen alia et alia per quantitatem, quia in hoc et in illo homine est alia et alia forma substantialis, alietate praecedente naturaliter quantitatem. Et ideo ad istam instantiam - tamquam insolubilem - non nituntur ipsi respondere, sed transferunt se ad alia 'homogenea', lapidem vel aquam; et tamen, si haberent aliquid pro se ex ratione naturae ƿspecificae 'atomae', ita concluderent de homine sicut de lapide. Possunt igitur videre quod nulla sunt principia ex quibus procedunt, cum ex eis sequantur manifesta impossibilia. | 164. Second, it follows that, although one could, according to the invention of that cursed Averroes about the unity of the intellect in everyone, make a like invention about your body and mine as about this stone and that; nevertheless, holding that different intellective souls, according not only to the faith but also to philosophy, are necessary, it cannot be that human nature is of itself atomic or undivided and yet is made different by quantity, because in this man and in that man there is a different substantial form, different by a difference naturally preceding quantity. And therefore they do not try to respond to this objection - as being insoluble - but betake themselves to different things, 'homogeneous' ones, stone or water; and yet, if they had anything in their favor from the idea of atomic specific nature, they would conclude about man as they conclude about stone. They are therefore able to see that the principles from which they proceed, since manifest impossibilities follow from them, are no principles. |
| 165 Secundus intellectus videtur destruere se ipsum, quia illud quod est de se hoc, illo modo quo expositum est prius 'aliquid esse de se hoc' (hoc est, cui repugnat per se dividi in plures partes subiectivas, cui etiam repugnat esse de se non hoc), tale per nihil adveniens potest dividi in plures partes, quia si sibi repugnet ex se dividi, sibi repugnat ex se aliquid recipere per quod fiat non hoc. Dicere igitur naturam esse de se hanc (secundum intellectum praeexpositum de natura quae de se est haec), et tamen ipsam posse esse - hanc et illam alio adveniente, est dicere contradictoria. | 165. The second way of understanding the position [n.156] seems to destroy itself, because what is of itself a 'this', in the way that 'something is of itself a this' was expounded before (that is, something for which it is repugnant per se to be divided into several subjective parts and for which it is repugnant to be not-this [nn.48, 76]) - such a thing cannot be divided into several parts by something coming to it from outside, because if its being divided is repugnant to it of itself, then its receiving something by which it may become not-this is repugnant to it of itself. Therefore, to say that a nature is of itself a 'this' (according to the understanding expounded before about a nature that is of itself a 'this' [n.155-56]), and yet that it can be this or that through something coming to it from outside, is to state contradictories. |
| 166 Et hoc patet in exemplo posito in illa positione, quia licet substantia materialis non sit ex se divisa in partes eiusdem rationis, tamen ipsa de se non est indivisibilis in tales partes, - quia si esset de se indivisibilis (hoc est, repugnaret ei divisio), non posset recipere quantitatem, qua formaliter dividitur in tales partes; quod apparet, nam anima - vel angelus (qui est de se indivisibilis, hoc modo) - non potest recipere quantitatem, sicut nec partes. ƿ | 166. And this is plain from the example set down in the position [n.154], that, although a material substance is not of itself divided into parts of the same idea, yet it is of itself not indivisible into such parts - because if it were of itself indivisible (that is, if division were repugnant to it), it could not receive the quantity by which it is formally divided into such parts; the fact is clear, for a soul - or an angel (which is of itself indivisible in this way) - cannot receive quantity, just as it cannot receive parts. |
| 167 Videtur igitur esse deceptio in hac consequentia 'non est de se tale, igitur est de se non tale' (fallacia consequentis). Vere enim substantia, secundum aliquam positionem, non est habens de se partes eiusdem rationis, - et tamen non est de se non habens partes eiusdem rationis, ita quod repugnet sibi habere partes, quia tunc non posset recipere formalitet per 'aliquid sibi adveniens' tales partes. Et ita natura speciei specialissimae non est de se haec, sicut nec aliquod divisibile ex natura sua est de se hoc; non tamen est de se non haec, ita quod repugnet sibi de se dividi in plures partes, quia tunc non posset recipere aliquid per quod formaliter competeret sibi talis divisio. | 167. There seems then to be a deception in this consequence, 'it is not of itself such, therefore it is of itself not-such' (fallacy of the consequent). For substance, according to one position, is not of itself a haver of parts of the same idea, and yet it is not of itself a non-haver of parts of the same idea, such that having parts is repugnant to it; because then it could not receive such parts formally through 'something coming to it from outside'. And so the nature of a most specific species is not of itself a 'this', just as neither is anything of itself a 'this' that is in its nature divisible; but it is not of itself not-this, such that being divided into several parts is of itself repugnant to it, because then it could not receive anything by which such a division would formally belong to it. |
| 2. Scotus' own Opinion | |
| 168 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo quod sic. | 168. I respond then affirmatively to the question [sc. the sixth question, n.142]. |
| 169 Ad quod appono talem rationem: sicut unitas in communi per se consequitur entitatem in communi, ita quaecumque unitas per se consequitur aliquam entitatem; ergo unitas simpliciter (qualis est 'unitas individui' frequenter prius descripta, scilicet cui repugnat divisio in plures partes subiectivas et cui repugnat 'non esse hoc, signatum'), Si est in entibus (sicut omnis opinio supponit), ƿconsequitur per se aliquam per se entitatem; non autem consequitur per se entitatem naturae, quia illius est aliqua unitas propria et per se, realis, sicut probatum est in solutione primae quaestionis; igitur consequitur aliquam entitatem aliam, determinantem istam, et illa faciet unum per se cum entitate naturae, quia 'totum' cuius est haec unitas, perfectum est de se. | 169. For which purpose I bring forward the following sort of reason: just as unity in general per se follows entity in general, so any unity per se follows some entity; therefore if unity simply (of which sort is the unity of the individual frequently described before [nn.48, 76, 165], namely that to which division into several subjective parts is repugnant and to which not being this designated thing is repugnant) exists in things (as every opinion supposes), then it follows per se some per se entity; but it does not follow per se the entity of nature, because it has some unity proper to itself and per se, a real unity, as was proved in the solution to the first question [n.30]; therefore it follows some other entity and determines this entity, and it will make a one per se with the entity of nature, because the whole of which it is this unity is perfect of itself. |
| 170 Item, omnis differentia differentium reducitur ultimate ad aliqua primo diversa (alioquin non esset status in differentibus); sed individua proprie differunt, quia sunt 'diversa aliquid idem entia'; ergo eorum differentia reducitur ad aliqua quae sunt primo diversa. Illa autem 'primo diversa' non sunt natura in isto et natura in illo, quia non est idem quo aliqua conveniunt formaliter et quo differunt realiter, licet idem possit esse distinctum realiter et conveniens realiter; multum enim refert esse distinctum et esse quo aliquid primo distinguitur (ergo sic erit de unitate). Ergo praeter naturam in hoc et in illo, sunt aliqua primo diversa, quibus hoc et illud differunt (hoc in isto et illud in illo): et non possunt esse negationes, ex secunda quaestione, - nec accidentia, ex quarta quaestione; igitur erunt aliquae entitates positivae, per se determinantes naturam. ƿ | 170. Any difference of differences is ultimately reduced to things that are primarily diverse (otherwise there would be no stop to differences); but individuals differ properly, because they are diverse 'identical thing beings' [1 d.3 n.132]; therefore their difference is reduced to what is primarily diverse. But what is primarily diverse is not the nature in this thing and in that thing, because that by which things formally agree is not the same as that by which they really differ, although the same thing can be distinct really and agree really; for to be distinct and to be that by which something is first distinct differ a great deal (so it will be like this in the case of unity). Therefore, beside the nature in this thing and in that, there are some primarily diverse things by which this thing and that thing differ (this in this thing and that in that thing); and these primarily diverse things cannot be negations, from the second question [n.57], nor accidents, from the fourth question ]n.111]; therefore they will be some positive entities per se determining nature. |
| 171 Contra primam rationem obicitur: quia si est aliqua unitas realis minor unitate numerali, aut est alicuius in eodem numeraliter aut in aliquo alio. Non in eodem numero, quia quidquid est in eodem numero, est unum numero; nec in duobus, quia in eis nihil est unum realiter, quia hoc est proprium in suppositis divinis (sicut expositum est dictum Damasceni, ubi supra). | 171. An objection against the first argument here [n.169] is that if there is some real unity less than numerical unity, it is the unity of something either in what is numerically the same or in something other. Not in what is numerically the same, because everything in what is numerically the same is one in number; nor in two things, because nothing in them is really one, for that is proper to the divine supposits (the way the saying of Damascene was explained above, n.39). |
| 172 Respondeo. Sicut dictum est in solutione primae quaestionis (de hac materia) quod natura prius est naturaliter quam haec natura, et unitas propria - consequens naturam ut natura - est prior naturaliter unitate eius ut haec natura; et sub ista ratione est consideratio metaphysica de natura, et assignatur definitio eius, et sunt propositiones per se primo modo. In eodem igitur quod est unum numero, est aliqua entitas, quam consequitur mir or unitas quam sit unitas numeralis, et est realis; et illud cuius est talis unitas, formaliter est 'de se unum' unitate numerali. Concedo igitur quod unitas realis non est alicuius exsistentis in duobus individuis, sed in uno. | 172. I reply: just as in the solution to the first question (about this issue, nn.32, 34) it was said that nature is naturally prior to this nature, so too the proper unity consequent to nature as nature is naturally prior to the unity of it as this nature; and it is under this idea that nature is considered in metaphysics, that the definition of it is assigned, and that propositions about it are in the first mode per se [n.32]. There is, then, in the identical thing that is one in number some entity which unity less than numerical unity follows, and it is real; and that of which it is such unity is one of itself with numerical unity. I concede therefore that the real unity is not of something existing in two individuals but in one. |
| 173 Et cum obicis 'quidquid est in eodem individuo numero, est idem numero', - respondeo, primo in alio simili manifestiore: quidquid est in una specie, est unum specie; color igitur in albedine est unum specie, 'igitur non habet unitatem minorem unitate speciei' non sequitur. Nam sicut alias dictum est (scilicet in I libro, ƿquaestione 'De attributis', ante solutionem rationis principalis de attributis, solvendo primum dubium) quod 'aliquid potest dici animatum denominative, ut corpus, - vel per se primo modo, ut homo' (et ita superficies dicitur 'alba' denominative, et superficies alba dicitur 'alba' per se primo modo, quia subiectum includit praedicatum), - ita dico quod potentiale quod contrahitur per actuale, informatur ab illo actuali, et per hoc informatur ab illa unitate consequente illam actualitatem sive illum actum; et ita est 'unum' unitate propria illius actualis, sed denominative est sic unum (non autem est de se sic unum, neque primo modo, neque per partem essentialem). | 173. And when you object that 'everything in what is numerically the same is one in number' [n.171], I make my reply first in some other similar and more manifest case: everything that is in one species is one in species; the color therefore in whiteness is one in species; the conclusion 'therefore it does not have a unity less than the unity of the species' does not follow. For as was said elsewhere (namely 1 d.8 n.214 in the question about the attributes, before the solution of the principle argument about attributes, when solving the first doubt), that 'something can be said to be animate either denominatively, as body, or per se in the first mode, as man' (and thus a surface is said to be white denominatively, and a white surface is said to be white per se in the first mode because the subject includes the predicate) - so I say that a potential which is contracted by an actual is informed by that actual, and thereby it is informed by the unity consequent to that actuality or to that act; and so it is one by the unity proper to that actual, but it is thus one denominatively (and it is not of itself thus one, neither in the first mode nor through any essential part). |
| 174 Color igitur in albedine est unus specie, sed non est de se nec per se nec primo, sed tantum denominative; differentia autem specifica est una primo, quia sibi primo repugnat dividi in plura specie; albedo est una specie per se, sed non primo, quia per aliquid intrinsecum sibi (ut per illam differentiam). | 174. The color in whiteness, therefore, is one in species, but it is not so of itself either per se or first but only denominatively; now the specific difference is first one, because being divided into things several in species is first repugnant to it; whiteness is one in species per se, but not first, because it is so through something intrinsic to it (as through the difference). |
| 175 Ita concedo quod quidquid est in hoc lapide, est unum numero, vel primo, vel per se, vel denominative: 'primo' forte, ut illud per quod unitas talis convenit huic composito; 'per se' hic lapis, cuius illud quod est primo unum hac unitate, est per se pars; ƿ'denominative' tantum, illud potentiale quod perficitur isto actuali, quod quasi denominative respicit actualitatem eius. | 175. I concede therefore that everything in this stone is one in number, either first, or per se, or denominatively: 'first' perhaps as that by which such unity belongs to this composite; 'per se' this stone, of which that which is first one by this unity is per se part; 'denominatively' only the potential which is perfected by this actual, and which quasi-denominatively has regard to the actual's actuality. |
| 176 Ulterius declarando solutionem istam, - quae sit ista entitas a qua sit unitas illa perfecta, per simile ad entitatem a qua sumitur differentia specifica, potest declarari. Differentia quippe specifica, sive entitas a qua sumitur differentia specifica, potest comparari ad illud quod est infra se, vel ad illud quod est supra se, vel ad illud quod est iuxta se. | 176. I further clarify this solution [nn.168-170]: what the entity is by which that unity [sc. of the individual] is perfected can be made clear by a likeness to the entity from which the specific difference is taken. The specific difference indeed, or the entity from which the specific difference is taken, can be compared to what is below it, or to what is above it, or to what is next to it. |
| 177 Primo modo, differentiae specificae et illi entitati specificae repugnat per se dividi in plura essentialiter, specie vel natura, et per hoc repugnat toti cuius illa entitas est per se pars; ita in proposito, huic entitati individuali primo repugnat dividi in quascumque partes subiectivas, et per ipsam repugnat talis divisio per se toti cuius illa entitas est pars. Et tantummodo est differentia in hoc quod illa unitas naturae specificae minor est ista unitate, et propter hoc illa non excludit omnem divisionem quae est secundum partes quantitativas, sed tantum illam divisionem quae est partium essentialium; ista autem excludit omnem. | 177. In the first way [sc. comparison with what is below], it is per se repugnant to the specific difference, and to the specific entity, to be divided into things several in essence, in species or nature, and thereby this is repugnant to the whole of that of which the entity is per se part; thus, in the issue at hand, it is repugnant first to this individual entity to be divided into any subjective parts whatever, and thereby such division is per se repugnant to the whole of that of which the individual entity is part. And the difference is only in the fact that the unity of the specific nature is less than the former unity [sc. of the individual entity], and for that reason the specific nature does not exclude all division according to quantitative parts, but only excludes the division of essential parts; the former unity, however, excludes every division. |
| 178 Et ex hoc confirmatur satis propositum, quia ex quo quaecumque unitas minor unitate ista habet entitatem propriam quam per ƿse consequitur, non videtur probabile isti unitati perfectissimae negare propriam entitatem quam consequitur. | 178. And the proposed solution is sufficiently confirmed from this, that, because any unity less than the former unity has a proper entity which it per se follows, it does not seem probable to deny to the former most perfect unity [sc. the numerical unity of the individual entity, cf. n.58] a proper entity which it follows. |
| 179 Comparando autem naturam specificam ad illud quod est supra se, dico quod illa realitas a qua sumitur differentia specifica, est actualis respectu illius realitatis a qua sumitur genus vel ratio generis, - ita quod haec realitas non est formaliter illa; alioquin in definitione esset nugatio, et solum genus suffficienter definiret (vel illa differentia), quia indicaret totam entitatem definiti. Quandoque tamen istud 'contrahens' est aliud a forma a qua sumitur ratio generis (quando species addit realitatem aliquam supra naturam generis), - quandoque autem non est res alia, sed tantum alia formalitas vel alius conceptus formalis eiusdem rei; et secundum hoc aliqua differentia specifica habet conceptum 'non simpliciter simplicem', puta quae sumitur a forma, - aliqua habet conceptum 'simpliciter simplicem', quae sumitur ab ultima abstractione formae (de qua distinctione differentiarum specificarum dictum est distinctione 3 primi libri, qualiter aliquae differentiae specificae includunt ens et aliquae non). | 179. Now, comparing the specific nature to what is above it [n.176], I say that the reality from which is taken the specific difference is actual with respect to the reality from which is taken the genus or the idea of the genus, such that this latter reality is not formally the former; otherwise there would be trifling in the definition, and the genus alone (or the difference) would be sufficient for the defining, because it would indicate the whole entity of the thing defined. However, sometimes what contracts the genus is other than the form from which the idea of the genus is taken (when the species adds some reality over and above the nature of the genus), and sometimes it is not another thing but only another formality or another formal concept of the same thing; and accordingly some specific difference has a concept that is not simply simple, namely a difference that is taken from the form, and some does have a concept simply simple, namely a difference that is taken from the ultimate abstraction of the form (this distinction of specific differences was stated in 1 d.3 nn.159-161, about how some specific differences include a being and some do not). |
| 180 Quoad hoc ista realitas individui est similis realitati specificae, quia est quasi actus, determinans illam realitatem speciei quasi possibilem et potentialem, - sed quoad hoc dissimilis, quia ista numquam sumitur a forma addita, sed praecise ab ultima realitate formae. ƿ | 180. In this respect the reality of the individual is like the specific reality, because it is quasi act determining the quasi possible and potential reality of the species; but in this other respect it is not like it, because it is never taken from an added form but is taken precisely from the ultimate reality of the form. |
| 181 Quoad aliud etiam est dissimile, quia illa realitas specifica constituit compositum (cuius est pars) in esse quiditativo, quia ipsa est entitas quaedam quiditativa, - ista autem realitas individui est primo diversa ab omni entitate quiditativa. Quod probatur ex hoc quod intelligendo quamcumque entitatem quiditativam (loquendo de entitate quiditativa limitata), communis est multis, nec repugnat dici de multis quorum quodlibet est 'ipsum'; igitur ista entitas, quae de se est alia entitas a quiditate vel entitate quiditativa, non potest constituere totum (cuius est pars) in esse quiditativo, sed in esse alterius rationis. | 181. It is also unlike it in another respect, that the specific reality constitutes the composite (of which it is part) in quidditative being, because it is a certain quidditative entity; but the reality of the individual is primarily diverse from every quidditative entity. The fact is proved from this, that when one understands any quidditative entity (speaking of limited quidditative entity), the entity is common to many, and its being said of many, each of which is it, is not repugnant to it; therefore this other entity [sc. of the individual], which is of itself a different entity from the quiddity or the quidditative entity, cannot constitute the whole (of which it is part) in quidditative being, but in being of another idea. |
| 182 Et quia apud Philosophum quiditas frequenter dicitur 'forma' (ut patet V Metaphysicae cap. 'De causa' et in multis aliis locis; et VII Metaphysicae cap. 'De partibus definitionis', quod 'in quibuscumque non est materia, idem est quod quid est cum eo cuius est': sicut exponetur, loquitur de materia et forma), et 'materiale' apud eum vocatur quidlibet habens quiditatem contractam (et Boethius in libello De Trinitate vult quod nulla ƿforma potest esse subiectum accidentis, quia forma dicitur in 'quid' de quocumque alio: et si humanitas sit subiectum, hoc tamen ei non convenit in quantum est forma; humanitas quidem non est forma alterius partis compositi, ut formae vel materiae, sed totius compositi habentis quiditatem contractam, sive in quo est quiditas contracta), - ideo omnis realitas specifica constituit in esse formali (quia in esse quiditativo), realitas individui constituit praecise in esse materiali (hoc est in esse contracto). Et ex hoc sequitur illa logica quod 'illa essentialiter est formalis, ista materialis', quia ista constituit in ratione subicibilis et illa in ratione praedicabilis praecise; praedicatum autem formale habet rationem formae, subicibile autem habet rationem materiae. | 182. And because the quiddity is often called form by the Philosopher (as is plain from Metaphysics 5.2.1013a26-28 ch. 'On Causes' and in many other places; and from Metaphysics 7.11.1037a32-b5 ch. 'On Parts of Definition', that "in things where there is no matter the 'what it is' is the same as the 'of what it is';" Aristotle is speaking, as will be explained [nn.204-207], of matter and form), and because whatever has a contracted quiddity [nn.206-205] is often called by him a material thing (and Boethius in his book On the Trinity maintains that no form can be the subject of an accident, because form is predicated of the 'what' of some other thing; and if humanity is a subject, this yet does not belong to it as it is form; humanity indeed is not a form of another composite part, as of a composite of form and matter, but belongs to the whole composite that is possessed of a contracted quiddity, or in which there is a contracted quiddity) - therefore every specific reality constitutes a thing in formal being (because it constitutes it in quidditative being), and the reality of the individual constitutes it precisely in material being (that is, in contracted being). And herefrom follows the logical point that 'the former is essentially formal, the latter material', because the latter precisely constitutes a thing in idea of what can be a subject and the former in idea of what can be a predicate; but a formal predicate has the idea of form, and what can be a subject has the idea of matter. |
| 183 Comparando vero tertio differentiam specificam ad illud quod iuxta se est, scilicet ad aliam differentiam specificam, - licet quandoque posset esse non primo diversa ab alia sicut est illa entitas quae sumitur a forma, tamen ultima differentia specifica est primo diversa ab alia, illa scilicet quae habet conceptum 'simpliciter simplicem'. Et quoad hoc dico quod differentia individualis assimilatur differentiae specificae universaliter sumptae, quia omnis entitas individualis est primo diversa a quocumque alio. ƿ | 183. But, third, comparing specific difference to what is next to it, namely to another specific difference [n.176] - although sometimes it is possible for the specific difference not to be first diverse from another, as with the entity that is taken from form, yet the ultimate specific difference is first diverse from another, namely the one that has a concept simply simple [n.179]. And in this respect I say that the individual difference is likened to the specific difference universally taken, because every individual entity is first diverse from any other. |
| 184 Et ex hoc apparet ad istam obiectionem: obicitur enim, aut entitas haec et illa sunt eiusdem rationis, aut non. Si sic, igitur potest ab eis aliqua entitas abstrahi, et hoc specifica (et de illa quaerendum est per quid contrahitur ad hanc entitatem et illam: si de se, sic pari ratione potuit esse status in natura lapidis; si per aliud, ergo processus in infinitum); si illae sunt alterius rationis, ergo et 'constituta' erunt alterius rationis, et ita non erunt individua eiusdem speciei. | 184. And from this the answer to the following objection appears: for it is objected that either this [individual] entity and that are of the same idea or they are not. If they are, then from them can be abstracted some entity, and this a specific one (and about it one must ask by what it is contracted to this entity and to that; if it is contracted of itself, then by parity of reasoning there could be a stand at the nature of stone; if by something else, then there will be a regress to infinity); if they are of a different idea, then the things constituted will also be of a different idea, and so they will not be individuals of the same species. |
| 185 Respondeo. Differentiae specificae ultimae sunt primo diversae, et ideo ab eis nihil 'unum per se' potest abstrahi; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod 'constituta' sunt primo diversa et non alicuius unius rationis. Aliqua enim 'aequaliter distingui' potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia aequaliter incompossibilia (quia scilicet non possunt inesse eidem), vel quia aequaliter in nullo conveniunt. Et primo modo verum est quod 'distincta' sunt aeque diversa sicut ipsa distinguentia (non enim possunt distinguentia esse incompossibilia, quin etiam 'distincta' sint incompossibilia); secundo modo universaliter est impossibile, quia 'distincta' non solum includunt distinguentia, sed aliquid aliud (quod est quasi potentiale respectu distinguentium), et tamen distinguentia in eo non conveniunt. ƿ | 185. I reply. Ultimate specific differences are primarily diverse, and so from them nothing per se one can be abstracted; yet it does not thereby follow that the things constituted are primarily diverse and not of some one idea. For that certain things are equally distinct can be understood in two ways: either because they are equally incompossible (namely because they cannot be in the same thing), or because they agree equally in nothing. And in the first way it is true that distinct things are as equally diverse as what distinguishes them (for what distinguishes them cannot be incompossible without the distinct things also being incompossible); in the second way it is universally impossible, because distinct things include not only what distinguishes them but also something else (which is quasi potential with respect to what distinguishes them), and yet the things that do the distinguishing in that something else do not agree. |
| 186 Sicut responsum est de differentiis primo diversis, ita respondeo de entitatibus individualibus quod sunt 'primo diversa' (id est in nullo eodem convenientia), et tamen non oportet 'distincta' esse simpliciter diversa; sicut tamen illae entitates sunt incompossibiles, ita et individua habentia illas entitates. | 186. About individual entities I reply in the same way as was replied about differences primarily diverse [n.185], that individual entities are primarily diverse (that is, they agree in nothing the same), and yet there is no need that distinct things be diverse simply; still, just as the entities are incompossible so are also the individuals that have those entities. |
| 187 Et si quaeras a me quae est ista 'entitas individualis' a qua sumitur differentia individualis, estne materia vel forma vel compositum, - respondeo: Omnis entitas quiditativa - sive partialis sive totalis - alicuius generis, est de se indifferens 'ut entitas quiditativa' ad hanc entitatem et illam, ita quod 'ut entitas quiditativa' est naturaliter prior ista entitate ut haec est, - et ut prior est naturaliter, sicut non convenit sibi esse hanc, ita non repugnat sibi ex ratione sua suum oppositum; et sicut compositum non includit suam entitatem (qua formaliter est 'hoc') in quantum natura, ita nec materia 'in quantum natura' includit suam entitatem (qua est 'haec materia'), nec forma 'in quantum natura' includit suam. | 187. And if you ask me what this individual entity is from which the individual difference is taken, whether it is matter or form or the composite, I reply: Every quidditative entity - whether partial or total - of any genus is of itself indifferent, as quidditative entity, to this entity or to that, so that it is, as quidditative entity, naturally prior to this entity as it is this; and just as being a 'this' does not agree with it as it is naturally prior, so the opposite is not repugnant to it of its own idea; and just as the composite, as it is nature, does not include its own entity (by which it is formally 'this'), so neither does mater, as it is nature, include its own entity (by which it is 'this matter'), nor either does form, as it is nature, include its own entity. |
| 188 Non est igitur 'ista entitas' materia vel forma vel compositum, in quantum quodlibet istorum est 'natura', - sed est ultima realitas entis quod est materia vel quod est forma vel quod est comƿpositum; ita quod quodcumque commune, et tamen determinabile, adhuc potest distingui (quantumcumque sit una res) in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa: et haec est formaliter entitas singularitatis, et illa est entitas naturae formaliter. Nec possunt istae duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas unde accipitur genus et realitas unde accipitur differentia (ex quibus realitas specifica accipitur), - sed semper in eodem (sive in parte sive in toto) sunt realitates eiusdem rei, formaliter distinctae. | 188. Therefore 'this entity' is not matter or form or the composite insofar as each of them is 'nature'; but there is an ultimate reality of the being that is matter or that is form or that is the composite, such that whatever is common and yet determinable can, however much it is one thing, still be distinguished into several formally distinct realities, of which this reality is not formally that one; and this reality is formally an entity of singularity, and that is formally an entity of nature. Nor can these two realities be thing and thing in the way that the realities can from which genus is taken and from which difference is taken (from which the specific reality is taken); but always they are, in the same thing (whether in a part or the whole), realities, formally distinct, of the same thing. |
| B. To the Principal Arguments | |
| 189 Et ex hoc apparet ad primum argumentum principale. Cum enim concluditur quod 'omne individuum in quo natura est contrahibilis, est compositius ipsa natura', dico quod compositio potest intelligi proprie, prout est ex re actuali et re potentiali, vel minus proprie, prout est ex realitate et realitate actuali et potentiali in eadem re. Primo modo non est individuum compositum respectu naturae specificae, quia nullam realitatem addit, quia neque materiam neque formam neque compositum, sicut procedit argumentum. Secundo modo est necessario compositum, quia illa realitas a qua accipitur differentia specifica, potenƿtialis est respectu illius realitatis a qua accipitur differentia individualis, sicut si essent res et res; non enim realitas specifica ex se habet unde includat per identitatem realitatem individualem, sed tantum aliquod tertium includit ista ambo per identitatem. | 189. And from this the response to the first principal argument [n.143] is clear. For when the conclusion is drawn that 'every individual where the nature can be contracted is more composite than the nature itself, I say that composition can be understood properly, insofar as it is composition of an actual and of a potential thing; or less properly, as it is composition of a reality and of an actual and potential reality in the same thing. In the first way the individual is not a composite with respect to the specific nature, because it adds no reality (for it adds neither matter nor form nor composite in the way the argument proceeds [n.143]). In the second way the individual is necessarily composite, because the reality from which the specific difference is taken is potential with respect to the reality from which the individual difference is taken, as if they were thing and thing; for the specific reality does not of itself have that whereby it includes by identity the individual reality, but some third thing includes by identity those two. |
| 190 Et haec est talis compositio, qualis non potest stare cum perfecta simplicitate divina. Illa enim non tantum non compatitur secum compositionem rei et rei actualis et potentialis, sed neque realitatis actualis cum realitate potentiali: comparando enim quodcumque essentiale ad quodcumque in divinis, essentiale est formaliter infinitum, - et ideo ex se habet unde includat per identitatem quodcumque potest secum esse (sicut frequenter tactum est supra, libro I), et non sunt praecise illa extrema eadem perfecte 'quia aliquod tertium includit utrumque perfecte'. Sed in proposito neque enti as specifica includit per identitatem entitatem individualem, nec e converso, sed tantum aliquod tertium - cuius ambo ista sunt quasi per se partes - includit ambo ista per identitatem, et ideo tollitur illa compositio perfectissima quae est ex re et re; non tamen omnis: universaliter enim, quaecumque natura non est de se haec, sed determinabilis ad essendum haec (sive ut determinetur per aliam rem, quod est impossibile in quocumque, - sive ut determinetur per aliam realitatem), non est simpliciter simplex. ƿ | 190. And this composition is of such sort as cannot stand along with the divine simplicity. For the divine simplicity not only does not allow a composition with itself of thing and of actual and potential thing, but not a composition either of actual reality and potential reality; for, when comparing anything essential with anything whatever in divine reality, the essential is formally infinite, and therefore it has of itself that whereby it includes by identity whatever can exist along with it (as was often touched on in the first book, 1 d.8 nn.194, 209, 213, 215-217, 220-221, d.5 nn.117-118, 127, d.2 n.410), and the extremes [e.g. wisdom and goodness, deity and paternity] are not precisely the same perfectly, because some third thing includes them both perfectly. But in the issue at hand neither does the specific entity include by identity the individual entity nor the reverse, but some third thing - of which both are as it were per se parts - alone includes those two by identity, and therefore the most perfect composition which is of thing and thing is removed; not however every composition for, universally, any nature that is not of itself a 'this' but determinable to being a 'this' (either so as to be determined by some other thing, which is impossible in anything whatever, or so as to be determined by some other reality) is not simply simple. |
| 191 Ad secundum concedo quod 'singulare' est per se intelligibile, quantum est ex parte sui (si autem alicui intellectui non sit per se intelligibile, puta nostro, de hoc alias); saltem non est ex parte eius impossibilitas quin possit intelligi, sicut nec ex parte solis est impossibilitas videndi et visionis in noctua, sed ex parte oculi noctuae. | 191. To the second argument [n.144] I concede that the singular is per se intelligible, as concerns it on the part of itself (but whether it is not per se intelligible to some intellect, namely to ours - about this elsewhere [n.294]); at any rate any impossibility in its being able to be understood is not on its part, just as neither is the impossibility of seeing or of vision in an owl on the part of the sun but on the part of the eye of the owl. |
| 192 Ad illud de definitione dico quod si aliqua ratio possit exprimere quidquid concurrit ad entitatem individui, non tamen illa ratio erit perfecta definitio, quia non exprimit quod quid erat esse, et secundum Philosophum I Topicorum 'definitio est exprimens' etc. Et ideo concedo quod singulare non est definibile definitione alia a definitione speciei, et tamen est per se ens, addens aliquam entitatem entitati speciei; sed illa 'per se entitas' quam addit, non est entitas quiditativa. | 192. To the argument about definition [n.146] I say that if any account could express whatever comes together in the entity of an individual, yet that account will not be a perfect definition, because it does not express the 'what it is to be', and according to the Philosopher, in Topics 1.5.101b39, a definition is what expresses the whatness of a thing. And therefore I concede that the singular is not definable by a definition other than the definition of the species, and yet it is a per se being, adding some entity to the entity of the species; but the per se entity which it adds is not a quidditative entity. |
| 193 Per hoc patet ad alia, de scientia et demonstratione, - quia definitio subiecti est medium in demonstratione potissima; singulare autem non habet definitionem propriam, sed tantum definitionem speciei, - et ita non est de ipso demonstratio propria, sed tantum demonstratio quae est de specie (non enim habet passionem propriam, sed tantum passionem speciei). ƿ | 193. From this is plain the answer to the other arguments about science and demonstration [n.145], because the definition of the subject is the middle term in the most powerful demonstration; but the singular does not have a proper definition but only a definition of the species, and so there is of it no demonstration proper but only a demonstration that is of the species (for it does not have its own particular property but only the property of the species).[3] |
| C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others | |
| 194 Ad argumenta pro opinione. Cum primo dicitur quod species est atoma, - dico quod est atoma, hoc est, est indivisibilis in plures species; non tamen est pure atoma, hoc est simpliciter indivisibilis: indivisibilitas enim in plures species compatitur secum divisibilitatem in plura eiusdem speciei. | 194. To the arguments for the opinion. First, when it is said that a species is an atomic unit [n.149], I say that it is such a unit, that is, it is not divisible into several species; it is however not purely atomic, that is, indivisible simply; for indivisibility into several species is compatible with divisibility into several things of the same species. |
| 195 Et cum probatur indivisibilitas per illud Platonis, quod dicit Porphyrius, - dico quod divisio artificialis statum habet ad speciem specialissimam, quia ulterius procedere, est procedere ad infinita, quae ((relinquenda sunt)) ab arte secundum ipsum; non enim est ex parte individuorum unde sit numerus eorum certus, sed possent esse infinita, non repugnante ratione eorum. | 195. And when indivisibility is proved by the remark of Plato that Porphyry states [n.150], I say that division by art stops at the most specific species, because to proceed further is to proceed to infinites, which "must be set aside" by art according to Plato; for there is nothing on the part of individuals whereby their number should be definite, but they can be infinite, provided their nature is not repugnant to this [1 d.2 n.176]. |
| 196 Et si accipitur divisio stricte, prout est in illo quod requirit determinatas partes in multitudine et magnitudine, hoc modo species non dividitur in individua; genus autem requirit determinatam multitudinem specierum (quia, secundum Boethium, primum divisibile est in duo), - 'quantum' autem requirit determiƿnatam magnitudinem, et illa praesupposita sunt in toto terminante medietates, quia duae. Et si stricte accipitur divisio prout est in partes habentes proportionem ad totum, quod vel constituunt vel sub ipso continentur in determinata multitudine vel magnitudine, - species per se non dividitur in individua; et per hoc potest exponi tam Plato quam Porphyrius. Si autem accipitur divisio communiter, prout est in quaecumque participantia naturam divisi (sive habeant talem proportionem ad totum in integrando vel in subiciendo, sive non), - species per se dividitur in individua; et reducitur ista divisio ad genus apud Boethium, quia illae condiciones et proprietates quas assignat Boethius in divisione generis, conveniunt huic divisioni quae est speciei in individua. | 196. But if division is taken strictly [nn.150-151], as it is in what requires parts determinate in multitude and magnitude, then a species is not in this way divided into individuals; but a genus does require a determinate multitude of species (because, according to Boethius On Division, the first divisible is into two); and a quantum requires a determinate magnitude, and they are, because two, presupposed in the whole that bounds the middle parts. And if division is taken strictly as it is into parts having a proportion to the whole, because they either constitute it or are contained under it in a determinate multitude or magnitude - then a species is not per se divided into individuals; and by this can both Plato and Porphyry be explained. But if division is taken commonly, as it is present in all things that share the nature of the divided thing (whether they have such a proportion to the whole in being the integral parts of it, or in being the subject of it, or not) - then a species is per se divided into individuals; and this latter division is reduced to genus in Boethius, because the conditions and properties that Boethius assigns in the division of a genus agree with the division that is of a species into individuals. |
| 197 Ad aliud, 'species dicit totum esse', - dico quod ibi accipitur 'esse' pro esse quiditativo, sicut Porphyrius loquitur in cap. 'De differentia', ubi vult quod differentia per se non recipit magis et minus; quod probat: ((Esse enim uniuscuiusque unum et idem est, neque intensionem neque remissionem recipiens)) (accipit 'esse' pro quiditate, sicut Philosophus VIII Metaphysicae ((anima et animae esse sunt idem)) ). Et quia illa entitas quam ƿaddit singulare super speciem, non est entitas quiditativa, - dico quod tota entitas quiditativa quae est in individuo, est entitas speciei, et ideo species dicit totum esse individuorum; non sic autem genus dicit totum esse speciei, quia species superaddit entitatem quiditativam. | 197. As to the other argument, that the species states the whole being of individuals [n.152], I say that 'being' is taken there for quidditative being, as Porphyry says in his chapter 'On Difference' [Predicables 3.3a45-48], where he maintains that difference per se does not admit of a more and less; his proof is: "For the being of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease" (he takes 'being' as quiddity, the way the Philosopher does in Metaphysics 8 [n.133], "soul and being a soul are the same"). And, because the entity that the singular adds to the species is not a quidditative entity, I say that the whole quidditative entity that is in the individual is the entity of the species, and for this reason the species states the whole being of individuals; but the genus does not in this way state the whole being of species, because species adds further quidditative entity. |
| 198 Ad argumentum pro alio membro, de quantitate, - dico quod illa propositio est falsa 'idem est principium divisibilitatis et distinctionis dividentium'; conceptus quidem secundum se communis speciebus est ratio divisibilitatis eius in species, sed non est ratio distinguendi species ab invicem, sed haec species ab illa distinguitur per differentiam. In quantitativa autem divisione, tota quantitas, ut confuse continet omnes partes, est ratio divisibilitatis in toto quanto, - non sic autem est ratio distinctionis partium ab invicem, sed in quantum 'haec quantitas' distincte in actu non est 'illa' in actu quae est in toto. | 198. To the argument for the other member, about quantity [n.153], I say that this proposition is false, 'the principle of divisibility and of the distinction of the dividers is the same'; the concept indeed that is common to species is the reason for the divisibility into species, but it is not the reason for distinguishing the species from each other, but this species is distinguished from that by the difference. Now in a quantitative division, the whole quantity, as it contains confusedly all the parts, is the reason for divisibility in the whole quantum; but the reason for the distinction of the parts from each other is not thus but as this quantity distinctly in act is not that quantity in act, which is in the whole. |
| 199 Cum etiam deducitur ulterius quod 'diviso toto quanto homogeneo, habetur per quantitatem divisio', - sit ita. Tamen illa divisio non est prima divisio individuorum, sed haec substantia et illa habent divisionem ab invicem et distinctionem - in quantum haec et haec - priorem naturaliter distinctione in quantum erant partes distincti quanti per accidens (accidebat enim eis partes esse); tamen facta divisione secundum partes quantitativas, per accidens fit divisio secundum partes subiectivas. ƿ | 199. When the deduction too is further drawn that 'when a whole homogeneous quantum is divided, the division is got through quantity' [n.153] - let it be so. However that division is not the first division of individuals, but this substance and that substance -insofar as they are a 'this' and a 'this' - have a division and distinction from each other naturally prior to the distinction insofar as they were parts of distinct quantity per accidens (for it is accidental to them to be parts); yet once a division according to quantitative parts is made, a division is made according to subjective parts per accidens. |
| II. Scotus' own Solution to the Fifth Question [Continuation of Question Five] | |
| 200 Ad quaestionem quintam praecedentem, de materia, patet solutio per argumenta contra opinionem. Concedo enim quod materia absolute, ut est natura, non est ratio distinctionis vel individuationis; quidquid enim est natura in quocumque genere, totalis vel partialis, non est de se haec, - et ideo inquirendum est per quid sit haec. | 200. As to the preceding fifth question, about matter [n.129], the solution is plain from the arguments against the opinion [nn.132, 136-141]. For I concede that matter absolutely, as it is nature, is not the reason for distinction or individuation; for whatever is a nature, total or partial, in any genus is not of itself a 'this'; and therefore one has to ask by what it is a 'this'. |
| III. To the Authorities from the Philosopher for the Opposite | |
| 201 Ad auctoritatem Philosophi V Metaphysicae (((Unum numero)) etc.) respondeo: dico quod accipit ibi materiam pro illa entitate individuali quae constituit in esse materiali, non autem in esse formali (prout quiditas dicitur 'forma'), quia illa entitas non est quiditativa. Et ista expositio patet per illud quod subdit: ((Specie, quorum ratio est una)) etc.; 'ratio' quidem ibi sumitur pro quiditate, quae dicitur 'forma' respectu esse individualis. | 201. To the authority from Aristotle Metaphysics 5 [n.130] ("in number one" etc.), I reply and say that Aristotle is there taking matter for the individual entity that it constitutes in material, and not in formal, being (as far as quiddity is said to be form), because that individual entity is not quidditative. And this exposition is plain from what he subjoins, "Those things are one in species whose idea is one, etc.," where indeed 'idea' is taken for quiddity, which is called form in respect of individual being. |
| 202 Per idem patet ad illud De caelo et mundo, de caelo et hoc caelo, - quod confirmat propositum. | 202. Thereby is plain the answer to the remark in On the Heaven about heaven and this heaven [n.135] - and it confirms the conclusion proposed. |
| 203 Per idem etiam patet ad illud XII Metaphysicae. Concedo enim ƿquod non possunt esse plures motores primi, quia in primo motore non est materia: hoc est, non est in eo aliquid contrahens ut materia, vel aliquid aliud, - sed est de se 'hic', sine aliquo alio contrahente, nam talis contractio non stat cum perfecta simplicitate; et ideo quiditas primi est de se 'haec'. | 203. Thereby too is plain the answer to the remark in Metaphysics 12 [n.134]. For I concede that there cannot be several first movers because there is no matter in the first mover: that is, there is not in it anything that, as matter or as anything else, contracts it, but it is of itself a 'this' without anything else contracting it; for such contracting does not stand along with perfect simplicity; and therefore the quiddity of the first mover is of itself a 'this'. |
| 204 Ad illud VII Metaphysicae 'in eis quae sunt sine materia, quod quid rei est idem cum eo cuius est', dico quod 'quod quid rei' potest comparari ad illud cuius est per se et primo, et ad illud cuius est per se et non primo; et universaliter, eo modo quo est alicuius, eo modo est idem sibi, quia - sicut Philosophus arguit in 3 cap. VII - ((singulum)) etc. ((et quod quid erat esse dicitur singuli substantia)) (si enim quod quid est non est ens, nihil est). Quod quid autem est illud quod res primo est, et ideo cuius est quod quid est per se, ipsum est idem illi per se, - cuius est per accidens, illi idem est per accidens, et ideo illi non est simpliciter idem (unde et ipse vult in 3 cap. quod in dictis per accidens, non est idem quod quid est cum eo cuius est, - nec mirum, quia in 2 cap. declaravit quod nihil eorum est quod quid est nec definitio). ƿ | 204. As to the remark in Metaphysics 7 [n.133], that 'whatever there is of reality in things that are without matter is the same as what it is the reality of, I say that the 'what it is' of a thing can be compared with what it belongs to per se and first and with what it belongs to per se and not first; and, universally, the way it belongs to something is the way it is the same as it, because, as the Philosopher argues in 7.6.1031a17-18, "The singular seems to be not other than its substance, and the 'what it is' is called the substance of the singular" (for if the 'what it is' is not being, it is nothing). But the 'what' is that which a thing first is, and so that to which the 'what it is' per se belongs is the same per se as the 'what it is', and that to which the 'what it is' per accidens belongs is the same per accidens as the 'what it is' and so is not simply the same as it (hence Aristotle too himself maintains there [6.1031a19-21] that, in the case of things said per accidens, the 'what it is' is not the same as what it belongs to - and no wonder, because he has earlier made it clear 4.1029b12-30a17] that nothing is the 'what it is' or definition of them). |
| 205 Habens autem quod quid est, potest intelligi vel ipsa natura, cuius est primo quod quid est, - vel suppositum naturae, cuius est per se, licet non primo. Primo modo quod quid est, tam in materialibus quam in immaterialibus, est idem cum eo cuius est, etiam primo, quia primo habet quod quid est. Secundo modo, habens non est idem, quando includit aliquam entitatem extra rationem suae quiditatis; tunc enim non est idem cum quod quid est primo, quia quod quid est non est eius primo, pro eo quod habens includit entitatem aliquam extra rationem eius quod est quod quid primo. | 205. Now that which has a 'what it is' can be understood either as the nature itself, which the 'what it is' first belongs to, or as the supposit of nature, which the 'what it is' per se but not first belongs to. The 'what it is' taken in the first way, in both material and immaterial things, is the same as what it belongs to - even first belongs to, because what it belongs to has the 'what it is' first. Taken in the second way, what has a 'what it is', when it includes some entity outside the idea of its whatness, is not the same as the 'what it is'; for then it is not the same first as the 'what it is', because the 'what it is' does not belong to it first, in that what has the 'what it is' includes some entity outside the idea of what is first the 'what'. |
| 206 Ad propositum igitur Philosophi dico quod in non conceptis cum materia (hoc est non cum entitate individuali contrahente quiditatem), idem est primo quod quid est cum eo cuius est, quia 'tale' cuius est, nullam rationem habet extra rationem eius quod est quod quid est; in conceptis autem cum materia (hoc est cum entitate individuali contrahente quiditatem), non est idem primo quod quid est et illud cuius est, quia sic conceptum primum non haberet quod quid est ex se sed tantum per partem, scilicet per naturam quae contrahitur per illam entitatem individualem. | 206. To the intended conclusion of the Philosopher, therefore, I say that in things not conceived along with matter (that is, not conceived along with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the 'what it is' is the same as what it belongs to, because such a 'what it belongs to' has no nature outside the nature of that which is the 'what it is'; but in things conceived along with matter (that is, conceived with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the 'what it is' is not the same first as what it belongs to, because a first thus conceived would not have the 'what it is' of itself but only through a part, namely through the nature which is contracted by the individual entity. |
| 207 Non igitur ex isto habetur quod materia quae est altera pars compositi, sit extra rationem per se quiditatis, - immo materia vere pertinet ad quiditatem, et species (et habens formam in uniƿversali) habet primo quod quid est et primo est idem sibi; et ideo non sequitur quod materia quae est altera pars compositi, sit individuans, sed tantum sequitur de materia quae est entitas contrahens quiditatem, quod concessi. Utrum autem carentia materiae quae est altera pars, inferat carentiam huiusmodi entitatis individualis secundum Philosophum, de hoc in sequente quaestione. | 207. So from this one does not get that the matter which is the other part of a composite is outside the idea per se of the quiddity - rather, matter truly belongs to the quiddity, and the species (and what has the form universally) has the 'what it is' first and is the same as it first; and so it does not follow that the matter that is the other part of a composite is what individuates it, but this only follows about the matter that is the entity contracting the quiddity, and I have conceded that [n.206]. But whether a lack of the matter that is the other part entails, according to the Philosopher, the lack of this sort of individual entity will be discussed in the following question [nn.238-239]. |
| 208 Ad illud Philosophi quod 'generans generat aliud propter materiam', dico quod intentio Philosophi ibi est quod ideae non sunt necessariae ad generationem, quia tam distinctio generantis a genito quam assimilatio geniti cum generante (quae duo requiruntur ad generationem univocam) possunt haberi sine ideis. Agens enim particulare habet ex forma sua unde assimilet sibi passum, et generans genitum, - et ex materia habet quod sit distinctum a genito: non principaliter, licet tamen necessario sequatur quod distinguitur per materiam a genito, quia materiam non suam sed aliam perficit per formam terminantem generationem (sua enim iam perfecta est forma); et ex hoc quod assimilat per formam, perficit aliam materiam quam suam, et ita sua est alia ab illa quae privatur forma tali. Cuiuscumque autem est alia materia, ex quo materia est pars essentialis rei, ipsum est aliud ab eo. | 208. To the remark of the Philosopher that 'the generator generates another because of matter' [n.132] I say that the intention of the Philosopher there is that [Platonic] ideas are not necessary for generation, because both the distinction of the generator from the generated and the assimilation of the generated to the generator (which two are required for univocal generation) can be got without ideas. For the particular agent has from its form wherewith to assimilate the passive thing to itself, and the generator has from its form wherewith so to assimilate the generated - and from matter the generator has that it is distinct from the generated: not principally, although however it may follow that it is distinguished by matter from the generated, because, through the form that terminates generation, it perfects another matter and not its own matter (for its own matter is already perfected by the form); and, because it assimilates through the form, it perfects another matter than its own, and so its own matter is other than the matter which is deprived of such form. But whatever has a different matter is, from the fact that matter is an essential part of a thing, other than it. |
| 209 Dico tunc quod assimilationis (vel similitudinis) principalis ra-, tio est ipsa forma inter generans et genitum, et hoc non secundum ƿunitatem et identitatem individualem 'in quantum forma haec', sed secundum unitatem et identitatem illam minorem 'in quantum forma est', et secundum hoc est ratio generandi; forma etiam est principalior ratio distinctionis quam materia, quia sicut forma est principalius quo 'compositum' est, quam materia, ita est principalius quo 'compositum' est unum, et per consequens in se indistinctum et ab alio distinctum. | 209. I say then that the principal reason for assimilation (or of likeness) is the form itself between the generator and the generated, and this not according to individual unity and identity insofar as the form is a 'this', but according to a lesser unity and identity insofar as it is a form, and the reason for generating accords with this; the form too is a more principal reason for distinction than matter is, because just as form is more principally that by which a composite is than matter, so it is more principally that by which a composite is one and so that by which the composite is not in itself distinct but is distinct from another. |
| 210 Appropriate tamen (distinguendo 'assimilativum' contra 'distinctivum') forma est assimilativa, ita quod non materia proprie, quia non est qualitas substantialis vel accidentalis; materia autem est distinctiva (appropriate loquendo), quia necessario - ex hoc quod est carens forma - distinguit ab illa materia quae praehabet formam, et ita compositum a composito. | 210. However (distinguishing 'what assimilates' from 'what distinguishes'), the form is appropriately assimilative in a way that the matter properly is not, because matter is not a substantial or an accidental quality; but matter is a distinguishing thing (speaking appropriately), because - from the fact it lacks form - it necessarily distinguishes from the matter which already has the form, and so it distinguishes composite from composite. |
| 211 Potest etiam alio modo compositum intelligi 'aliud propter materiam', sicut propter causam alietatis praeexsistentem: forma enim geniti licet sit causa alietatis in composito principalior quam materia, non tamen est causa praeexsistens huius alietatis, sed materia, - et hoc, quia ipsa praeexsistit privata; et ideo non potest esse eadem cum materia informata. ƿ | 211. The composite can also in another way be understood to be 'other because of matter', as being other because of a pre-existing cause of otherness: for the form of the generated thing is a more principal cause of otherness in the composite than the matter is; however it is not the pre-existing cause of this otherness, but matter is - and that because it pre-existed as deprived matter; and therefore it cannot be the same as informed matter. |
Notes
- ↑ Godfrey, Quodlibet 7 q.5: "For just as the universal that is genus cannot be divided into several things differing in species save by the addition of something pertaining to the idea of the species...so too it seems that the universal that is species cannot be divided into several individuals unless each individual adds something over and above the idea of the species, which idea of the species - as concerns itself - is one in all individuals... But it does not seem that something can be understood to be added that pertains to the essence and nature of the individual, because the species, which is the whole being of individuals, states the whole of that essence; therefore if something is added, it seems to be something pertaining to accidental nature. For in direct descent under a category, the division stops at the most specific species, in that this species includes the ultimate difference below which one cannot take a more determinate difference whereby the species could be made more determinate in the individual (the way this happens in a species in respect of a genus), unless there is to be a regress to infinity; and so, as Plato says [Politicus Latinus I 596], one must rest at singulars -namely in this way, that one is not to posit in singulars something formal pertaining to essence or quiddity beyond what is included in the idea and quiddity of the species. Therefore, if anything is added whereby a nature universal in itself is to be thus determined and contracted, it must be something pertaining to accidental nature [sc. to the nature of quantity], as was said." Ibid.: "But since material substance is in itself not divided into several things of the same idea or species.therefore, just as it is a 'how much' that comes per accidens, so it is divided per accidens into several things of the same idea, namely divided through quantity. Now that seems to be properly called one 'according to number' which is one in number or one by number; but number is properly caused by division according to quantity; therefore that seems to be properly called 'one in number' which is undivided first in that nature by which it is distinguished first from another of the same species; but this nature is quantity, and so a 'one in number' seems properly to be something undivided in the nature of quantity. Therefore, quantity is the per se principle of a one according to number, just as form.is the principle of individuation; and thus, properly speaking, there is not the same principle for per se individuation in the genus of material substance and for a one according to number, because the principle of a one according to number is quantity, in that according to quantity it is undivided in itself and divided from another of the same idea...; but the principle of per se individuation is the form, by which substance is divided into several things of the same idea... And accordingly it seems one should say that the formal principle (or the formal idea) of this sort of distinction.is each individual's substantial form undivided in itself and divided from another, and thus do they differ in substantial number... The principle...of 'distinction according substance' of several individuals is quantity, since it is the principle of division both of the matter and also of the form in divided matter; for if there were not pre-understood in matter a quantity that would make the matter divisible, the matter could not receive several forms... Hence, because of this, there are several entities according as there are quanta, or according to division of quantity.; for, by the fact that quantity makes the substance to be really extended, it happens that the substance...also has parts really and essentially differing from each other."
- ↑ Godfrey, Quodlibet 6 q.5, "One must say that, just as several accidents of the same species cannot be at the same time in the same subject, so also one accident cannot, by any agent, be at the same time in two subjects... For accidents that have in themselves no distinction do not acquire distinction, but unity, from being in the same subject; hence, just as two points cannot be at the same time in the same subject (but they become one point), nor two lines, so neither can two whitenesses... Therefore it is impossible for two accidents of the same idea and species to become one in a subject and to remain two and distinct."
- ↑ Tr. The most powerful demonstration demonstrates a property of a subject through the definition of the subject, and an individual has neither property nor definition.
