Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q7

• I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
• B. Scotus' own Opinion
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Seven: Whether it is Possible for Several Angels to Exist in the Same Species
212 Septimo et ultimo circa istam materiam quaero utrum sit possibile plures angelos esse in eadem specie.	212. Seventh and last about this subject matter I ask whether it is possible for several angels to exist in the same species.
213 Quod non: Quia Philosophus VII Metaphysicae cap. 'De partibus definitionis', in fine, dicit quod 'in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est quod quid est et illud cuius est'; ergo cum angelus sit sine materia, quod quid eius est idem ipsi angelo. Igitur impossibile est angelum distingui ab angelo nisi quod quid eius distinguatur a quod quid alterius angeli; igitur non potest esse distinctio individuorum in angelis sub eodem quod quid est.	213. That it is not: Because the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7.11.1037a32-b5, ch. 'On Parts of Definition' at the end, says that "in things that are without matter the 'what it is' is the same as what it belongs to" [nn.133, 182, 204]; therefore since an angel is without matter, his 'what it is' is the same as the angel himself. Therefore it is impossible for an angel to be distinguished from an angel unless his 'what it is' is distinguished from the 'what it is' of the other angel; therefore there cannot be a distinction of individuals among angels under the same 'what it is'.
214 Praeterea, Avicenna IX Metaphysicae ponit ordinem intelligentiarum, ubi videtur velle quod intelligentia inferior producitur a superiore quasi ipsam creante; ista autem causalitas non est in aliquo respectu alterius eiusdem speciei.	214. Further, Avicenna Metaphysics 9.4 f.104vb-105rb sets down an order of intelligences wherein he seems to maintain that a lower intelligence is produced by a superior intelligence as by the one creating it; but this causality is not in anything with respect to another of the same species.
215 Praeterea, arguo per rationem: omnis differentia formalis est ƿdifferentia specifica; angeli, cum sint plures et formae, differunt aliqua differentia formali; igitur specifice.	215. I argue further by reason: every formal difference is a specific difference; angels, since they are several and are forms, differ by some formal difference; therefore they differ specifically.
216 Probatio maioris sumitur ex VIII Metaphysicae, ubi formae comparantur numeris, in quibus quodcumque additum vel subtractum variat speciem; igitur etc.	216. The proof of the major is taken from Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11 where forms are compared to numbers, in which any addition or subtraction varies the species; therefore etc.
217 Item, aliter probatur X Metaphysicae cap. paenultimo: 'Masculus et femina non differunt specie, quia masculinitas et femininitas non sunt nisi differentiae materiales formae humanitatis', ex hoc innuens quod differentiae formales omnes distinguunt specie; tum etiam, quia forma et species idem; quare etc.	217. Again the major is proved in another way in Metaphysics 10.9.1058a29-34 and b21-23, "Masculine and feminine do not differ in species, because masculinity and femininity are only material differences of the form of humanity," insinuating by this that all formal differences make a distinction in species, and also that form and species are the same; therefore etc.
218 Praeterea, omnis forma 'separata a materia' habet in se totam perfectionem speciei illius; igitur si ponatur aliqua talis forma in specie (ut forma huius angeli), et alia, - illa erit ista et ista erit illa, quia uterque angelus est forma separata a materia, et per consequens quilibet habet perfectionem totius speciei.	218. Further, every form separated from matter has in itself the whole perfection of the species; therefore if one such form is posited in the species (as the form of this angel) and another such form is posited, the former will be the latter and the latter will be the former, because each angel is a form separated from matter, and consequently any one of them has the perfection of the whole species.
219 Probatio antecedentis: quia quod forma non habeat totam essentiam speciei, hoc est quia participat eam; non autem habet essentiam formae per participationem nisi quia est in materia; igitur etc. ƿ	219. Proof of the antecedent [n.218]: because the fact that a form does not have the whole essence of the species is because it partakes of it; but the form only has the essence of the form by partaking of it because it exists in matter; therefore etc.
220 Praeterea, in entibus perfectis nihil est quod non intenditur a natura; sed pluralitas numeralis non per se intenditur a natura, quia differentia numeralis - quantum est ex se - potest intendi in infinitum: infinitas autem non intenditur per se ab aliquo agente, ergo non est differentia numeralis in entibus perfectis. Quae autem sunt in angelis, conveniunt eis tamquam perfectissimis entibus universi; ergo non est in eis differentia numeralis, sed tantum specifica, in qua principaliter consistit pulchritudo universi.	220. Further, in the case of perfect beings there is nothing that is not intended by nature; but numerical plurality is not per se intended by nature because numerical difference - as far as concerns it of itself - can be increased infinitely; now infinity is not per se intended by any agent; therefore there is no numerical difference in perfect beings. But what is in angels belongs to them as to the most perfect beings in the universe; therefore there is no numerical difference in them but only a specific one, wherein the beauty of the universe principally exists.
221 Confirmatur: intentio naturae stat per se in illis entibus quae pertinent ad ordinem universi, - huiusmodi vero sunt species et non individua; nihil autem est in angelis quod non pertinet ad ordinem et pulchritudinem universi; ergo nulla est in eis differentia numeralis.	221. There is a confirmation: the intention of nature stops per se at those beings that pertain to the order of the universe; but species and not individuals are of this sort; now there is nothing in angels that does not pertain to the order and beauty of the universe; therefore there is no numerical difference in them.
222 Praeterea, II De anima videtur Philosophus dicere quod multitudo individuorum non est nisi propter salvationem speciei; sed in incorruptibilibus salvatur sufficienter natura in uno individuo; igitur etc. ƿ	222. Further, the Philosopher in On the Soul 2.4.415a26-b7 seems to say that a multitude of individuals exists only for the sake of the preservation of the species; but in the case of incorruptible things nature is sufficiently preserved in one individual; therefore etc.
223 Confirmatur etiam per eundem, I Caeli et mundi, quia in corporibus caelestibus non est nisi tantum unum individuum unius speciei, sicut unus sol et una luna; ergo etc.	223. There is confirmation too from the Philosopher in On the Heaven 1.9.278a22-b8, that in the heavenly bodies there is only one individual of one species, as one sun and one moon; therefore etc.
224 Contra: Damascenus in Elementario suo, cap. 12.	224. On the contrary: Damascene in his Elements or On the Two Wills etc. in Christ n.3
	I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
225 Qui dicunt ad praecedentes quaestiones de individuatione, principium individuationis esse quantitatem vel materiam, diƿcunt secundum hoc consequenter, ad hanc quaestionem negative, quod scilicet non possunt esse plures angeli in eadem specie, quia non possunt in angelis inveniri illa principia talis 'differentiae individualis' speciei; et habent dicere quod non tantum est hoc impossibile impossibilitate intrinseca sed etiam impossibilitate extrinseca, quia simpliciter incompossibile, - ita quod isti naturae non potest competere distinctio individualis, ex quo sibi repugnat illud quod praecise potest esse principium talis distinctionis, sicut incompossibile esset sub animali plures esse species si repugnaret animali alia et alia actualitas per quas distinguerentur species.	225. Those who answer to the preceding questions about individuation that the principle of individuation is quantity or matter [nn.71, 132, 148, 153-154] accordingly in consequence give a negative answer to this question [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], namely that there cannot be several angels in the same species, because the principles of such an individual difference for a species cannot be found in angels; and they have to say that this is impossible not only by an intrinsic impossibility [sc. on the part of the angel] but also by an extrinsic one [sc. on the part of divine power], because it is simply incompossible in such a way that an individual distinction cannot belong to angelic nature, because that which precisely can be the principle of such a distinction is repugnant to the nature - just as it would be incompossible for there to be several species under animal if the different actualities by which the species were distinguished were repugnant to animal.
226 Fundamenta autem istius opinionis improbata sunt prius, in quaestionibus praecedentibus. ƿ	226. However, the foundations for this opinion were rejected before in the preceding questions [nn.75-104, 136-141, 155-167, 200].
	B. Scotus' own Opinion
227 Tenenda est igitur conclusio simpliciter opposita, quod videlicet simpliciter est possibile plures angelos esse in eadem specie. Quod probatur: Primo, quia omnis quiditas - quantum est ex se - est communicabilis, etiam quiditas divina; nulla autem est communicabilis in identitate numerali, nisi sit infinita; igitur quaelibet alia est communicabilis, et hoc cum distinctione numerali, - et ita propositum. Quod autem omnis quiditas sit communicabilis, patet, quia hoc sibi non repugnat ex perfectione, cum hoc quiditati divinae conveniat, - nec ex imperfectione, cum hoc conveniat generabilibus et corruptibilibus; quare etc.	227. The simply opposite conclusion must therefore be held, namely that it simply is possible for several angels to exist in the same species. The proof is as follows: First, because every quiddity - as far as concerns it of itself - is communicable, even the divine quiddity; but no quiddity is communicable in numerical identity unless it is infinite; therefore any other quiddity is communicable, and this with numerical distinctness - and thus the intended conclusion. But that every quiddity is communicable is plain because this is not repugnant to it from perfection, since it belongs to the divine quiddity, nor from imperfection, since it belongs to things generable and corruptible; therefore etc.
228 Praeterea, quaelibet quiditas creaturae potest intelligi sub ratione universalis, absque contradictione; si autem ipsa de se esset 'haec', contradictio esset eam intelligere sub ratione universalis (sicut est contradictio intelligere essentiam divinam sub ratione universalitatis), quia ratio intelligendi repugnat suo obiecto intellecto, - quod est, intellectum esse falsum; igitur etc. ƿ	228. Further, any quiddity of a creature can be understood, without contradiction, under the idea of a universal; but if it were of itself a 'this', it would be a contradiction to understand it under the idea of a universal (just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the idea of universality), because the idea of understanding the object is repugnant to the object understood, which means that the understanding is false; therefore etc.
229 Praeterea, si Deus potest hunc angelum in hac specie annihilare, isto annihilato potest istam speciem de novo producere in aliquo alio individuo, quia per annihilationem huius singularis non repugnat speciei esse; aliter enim esset tantum ens ficticium, sicut chimaera. Potest ergo iterum producere ipsam speciem in aliquo individuo, alias non posset eundem ordinem facere universi quem fecit a principio; sed non in isto, secundum illos qui sunt istius opinionis 'quod homo non posset resurgere idem numero nisi anima intellectiva maneret eadem numero'.	229. Further, if God can annihilate this angel in this species, then, after the angel has been annihilated, he can produce this species anew in some other individual, because being does not become, by the annihilation of this singular, repugnant to the species; for otherwise it would be only a fictitious being, like a chimaera. God can, then, produce the same species in some individual, otherwise he could not make the same order of universe as he made at the beginning; but not in this angel [sc. the one annihilated], according to those who hold this opinion, 'because a man could not rise again the same in number unless the intellective soul remained the same in number'.
230 Praeterea, animae intellectivae distinguuntur numero in eadem specie, et tamen sunt formae purae licet perfectivae materiae; non igitur est impossibilitas a parte formarum quod distinguantur nuƿmero in eadem specie: quidquid enim concluderet istam impossibilitatem ratione formae, in angelis, concluderet et in animabus.	230. Further, intellective souls are distinguished by number in the same species, and yet they are pure forms, albeit perfective of matter; there is, then, on the part of forms, no impossibility in their being distinguished by number in the same species; for whatever would entail, by reason of form, this impossibility in angels would entail it also in souls.
231 Quod si dicas quod animae habent inclinationem ad diversa corpora et ita habent aptitudinem perficiendi materiam, et ideo per diversas habitudines distinguuntur, - contra: Ista inclinatio non est entitas absoluta, quia non potest aliquid inclinari ad se; igitur praesupponit aliquam entitatem absolutam et distinctam, et ita in illo priore distinguitur haec anima ab illa. Ergo animae sine huiusmodi habitudinibus, ut sine formali ratione distinguendi, distinguuntur.	231. But if you say that souls have an inclination to diverse bodies and thus they have an aptitude for perfecting matter, and so they are distinguished by diverse relations - on the contrary: This inclination is not an absolute entity, because a thing cannot be inclined to itself; therefore it supposes some prior entity absolute and distinct, and so in that prior entity this soul is distinguished from that. Therefore souls are distinct without these sorts of relations (as without a formal reason for distinguishing).
232 Confirmatur, quia ista aptitudo non potest esse de formali ratione animae, quia est respectus; respectus autem non est de formali ratione alicuius absoluti.	232. There is confirmation, because this aptitude cannot be of the formal idea of the soul, for it is a relation; but a relation is not of the formal idea of anything absolute.
233 Item, quia est haec anima, ideo habet hanc inclinationem, et non e converso (quia forma est finis materiae, et non e converso); igitur haec inclinatio non est ratio essendi hanc animam, sed praesupponit eam.	233. Again, it is because a soul is this soul that it therefore has this inclination and not conversely (because form is the end of matter and not conversely); therefore this inclination is not the idea of being this soul, but presupposes this idea.
234 Confirmatur etiam hoc per aliquos, quibus est inconveƿniens quod aliqua species simul tota sit damnata naturae intellectualis simpliciter; multae autem species angelorum essent, in quibus nulla esset salvata, posita illa positione; igitur positio non est vera.	234. This point [n.230] is also confirmed for some [e.g. Aquinas] who find it unacceptable that any species simply of intellectual nature should be damned in its totality; but, on the positing of this position [sc. that there is one angel per species], there would be many species of angels where none would be saved; therefore the position is not true.
235 Et persuadetur prima propositio, per hoc quod dicit Augustinus in Enchiridion cap. 29: ((Placuit universali dominatori, ut, quoniam non tota multitudo angelorum Deum deserendo perierat, - illa quae perierat, in perpetua damnatione remaneret, - quae autem cum Deo illa deserente perstiterat, de sua certissime cognita semper futura felicitate gauderet; at vero natura rationalis quae in hominibus erat, quoniam peccatis atque suppliciis tota perierat, ex parte reparari meruit, - unde angelorum societati curtatae iungeretur quod ruina illa minuerat)). Ista totalitas et partialitas in angelis, non videtur esse rationalis nisi ponatur quod nulla species angelica quantum ad omnia individua totaliter perierat, et ita aliqui de quacumque specie corruerunt et aliqui perstiterunt; quare etc.	235. And there is proof of the first proposition [n.234] from what Augustine says Enchiridion ch.29 n.9: "It has pleased the universal Lord that, since not the whole multitude of angels, by deserting God, had perished, the part which had perished should remain in perpetual damnation, but that the part that had stood with God, while the other part was deserting him, should rejoice in their happiness most certainly known to be always going to be; however the rational nature that was in man, since it had all perished in sins and punishments, deserved to be in part repaired, whence it might be joined to the curtailed society of angels that the former ruin had diminished." This totality and partial-ness in angels does not seem to be rational unless it be posited that no angelic species had totally perished as to all individuals, and so some from each species fell and some stood; therefore etc.
236 Praeterea, si concedatur quod quiditas angeli ex se est pluribus ƿcommunicabilis, et per consequens - quantum est de se - infinitis (quia non est ratio impossibilitatis ex parte multitudinis numeralis), si per hoc quod ipsa 'natura' producta est in isto individuo auferatur possibilitas eius essendi in pluribus, igitur est in hoc individuo secundum totam communicabilitatem suam, - et per consequens infinite, quia est infinite communicabilis secundum quiditatem suam; igitur ille unus angelus esset formaliter infinitus. Consequens inconveniens, ergo et aliquod antecedens.	236. Further, if it be conceded that the quiddity of an angel is of itself communicable to many and so - as far as concerns it of itself - communicable to an infinite number (for there is no idea of impossibility on the part of a numerical multitude), then, if the fact the nature is produced in this individual means that the possibility of its being in more is taken away, the nature exists in this individual according to its whole communicability and so infinitely, because it is infinitely communicable according to its quiddity; therefore that single angel would be formally infinite. The consequent is unacceptable, therefore the antecedent is too.
237 Dico igitur quod omnis natura quae non est de se actus purus, potest - secundum illam realitatem secundum quam est natura esse potentialis ad realitatem illam qua est haec natura, et per consequens potest esse 'haec'; et sicut de se non includit aliquam entitatem quasi singularem, ita non repugnant sibi quotcumque ƿtales entitates, et ita potest in quotcumque talibus inveniri. ln eo tamen quod est ex se necesse esse, est determinatio in natura ad esse 'hoc', quia quidquid potest esse in natura, est ibi, - ita quod determinatio non potest esse per aliquid extrinsecum ad singularitatem, si possibilitas sit in natura de se ad infinitatem; secus est in omni natura possibili, ubi potest cadere multiplicatio.	237. I say therefore that every nature which is not itself pure act can - according to the reality according to which it is nature - be potential to the reality by which it is this nature, and consequently can be a 'this'; and just as it does not of itself include any quasi singular entity, so such entities in whatever number are not repugnant to it, and so it can be found in any number of them. But in the case of what is of itself a necessary being, there is a determination in nature to being 'this', because whatever can be in the nature is in it - so that the determination cannot be through something extrinsic to singularity if there is in the nature of itself a possibility for infinity; things are otherwise in the case of any possible nature, where there can be multiplication.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
238 Ad primum argumentum dico quod licet Philosophus intelligat ibi per se de materia (hoc est de entitate contrahente per se quiditatem), tamen applicando ad habens materiam quae est altera pars compositi, et non habens, - concedo intentionem Philosophi fuisse quod omne non habens materiam pro aliqua natura componente, est idem suo quod quid est primo, quia omne tale quod quid est ponit per se 'hoc'; et ratio ad hoc est, quia omne tale quod non habet materiam partem sui, posuit formaliter necessarium. Quidquid autem potest esse in natura formaliƿter necessaria, est in ea, - igitur quidlibet quod potest habere illam quiditatem, habet eam, quia non est ibi potentia distans ab actu; unde omnem possibilitatem quam posuit in tali natura ad supposita, posuit esse in actu. Si autem esset ibi possibilitas ad plura individua, esset possibilitas ad infinita, - igitur essent infinita in actu; quare, cum infinitas sit impossibilis in aliqua natura, igitur et in 'hac natura' (secundum eum) est impossibilitas ad infinitatem. Ideo est de se 'haec', secundum ipsum.	238. To the first argument [n.213] I say that although the Philosopher's understanding there is per se about matter (that is, about the entity that per se contracts the quiddity [nn.182, 206-207]), yet it is by application of it to what has matter, which is the other part of a composite, and to what does not have matter - I concede that the Philosopher's intention was that everything not possessed of matter as some component nature is the same first as its 'what it is', because every such 'what it is' per se posits a 'this'; and the reason for this is that he posited that everything such as not to have matter as part of itself is formally necessary. Now whatever can be in a nature formally necessary is actually in it; therefore anything whatever that can have that quiddity does have it, because there is no potency there distant from act; hence every possibility for supposits that he posited in such a nature he posited as being actual. Now if there were a possibility there for several individuals, there would be a possibility there for an infinity of individuals, and so the individuals would be actually infinite; therefore, since an infinity is impossible in any nature, so there is in this nature too (according to him) an impossibility for infinity. Therefore this nature is of itself a 'this', according to him.
239 Sed discordamus ab eo in hac propositione 'omnis quiditas non habens materiam, est formaliter necessaria', - et ideo in conclusione. Rationabilius enim est theologo discordare a Philosopho in principio propter quod tenet aliquam conclusionem, quam errare cum eo in conclusione et discordare ab eo in principio propter quod ipsemet erravit. Ita enim concordare cum eo, nec est philosophari nec theologice sentire, quia talis non habet rationem quae valeat apud Philosophum, quia nec Philosophus concederet conclusionem nisi propter illud principium; nec etiam habet talis ad conclusionem suam principium theologicum, ƿquia praecise ad eam est principium philosophicum, quod ipse negat.	239. But we disagree with him in the proposition that 'everything such as not to have matter as part of itself is formally necessary' [n.238], and so we disagree with him in the conclusion. For it is more rational for a theologian to disagree with a philosopher in the principle because of which the philosopher holds some conclusion, than to err with him in the conclusion and to disagree with him in the principle because of which he himself erred. For thus to agree with him is neither to philosophize nor to think theologically, because such a theologian does not have a reason that would be valid with the philosopher, because the philosopher would not be conceding the conclusion save because of that principle; nor even does such a theologian have a theological principle for his conclusion, because there is precisely a philosophical principle for it, which the theologian denies.
240 Per idem ad Avicennam dico quod intentio eius fuit quod tantum sit unus angelus in una specie, sed propositio cui haec ƿconclusio innititur - scilicet quod 'angelus superior causat inferiorem angelum' - eo quod ponit quod 'ab uno, eodem modo se habente, non potest esse nisi unum', a nullo theologo vel catholico conceditur; quare, nec eius conclusio debet concedi ab aliquo theologo.	240. On the same basis I say as to Avicenna [n.214] that his intention was that there is one angel in one species, but the proposition on which this conclusion rests -namely that 'a superior angel causes an inferior angel' (because he posits that there can only be one thing from one thing disposed in the same way)- is conceded by no Catholic theologian; therefore neither should his conclusion be conceded by any theologian.
241 Ad rationem primam alias fuit dictum quod differentia formalis potest accipi pro differentia in forma (et hoc proprie videtur significare hoc quod dicitur 'differentia formalis'), - vel potest accipi 'differentia formalis' pro differentia formarum, licet non sit in forma ut in ratione differendi.	241. As to the first of the reasons [n.215], it was said elsewhere [1 d.17 n.255] that formal difference can be taken for a difference in form (and what is called 'formal difference' seems properly to signify this), or 'formal difference' can be taken for a difference of forms, although the difference is not in the form as in the reason for the difference.
242 Primo modo potest concedi maior, et sic est minor falsa. ƿProbatio autem minoris, scilicet quod 'angelus differt ab angelo quia est forma, igitur habent differentiam formalem', includit fallaciam consequentis: non enim sequitur 'forma differunt, ergo formaliter differunt (vel differunt in forma)', sicut non sequitur 'homines plures differunt, ergo in humanitate differunt'; aliud est enim 'aliquid distingui' et aliud 'ipsum esse primam rationem distinguendi (vel distinctionis)', quia cum hoc quod ipsum sit distinctum, stat quod ipsum sit etiam ratio distinguendi, - cum hoc autem quod ipsum sit ipsa ratio distinguendi, non stat ipsum esse distinctum. Et ratio logica est ad hoc, quia negatio inclusa in nomine 'differentiae' non tantum confundit terminum 'huius' relationis confuse et distributive, sed etiam illud quod specificat differentiam, ut in quo notatur esse differentia: haec quippe confunditur (quantum ad negationem inclusam in hoc nomine 'differentia'), quia si Socrates differt a Platone in albedine, non est idem sibi nec in hac albedine nec in illa. - Si autem accipiatur maior improprie, secundum secundum intellectum, nego maiorem.	242. In the first way the major [n.215, sc. 'every formal difference is a specific difference'] can be conceded, and thus the minor [sc. 'angels differ by some formal difference'] is false. And the proof of the minor, namely that 'an angel differs from an angel because he is a form, therefore angels have a formal difference', involves the fallacy of the consequent; for the inference 'the forms differ, therefore they differ formally (or they differ in form)' does not follow, just as the inference 'many men differ, therefore they differ in humanity' does not follow; for it is one thing that 'something is distinct' and another that 'it is the first reason for the distinguishing (or the distinction)', because that the thing is the reason for the distinguishing entails that the thing is distinct, but that the thing is distinct does not entail that it is the reason for the distinguishing. And the logical reason is to this effect, that the negation included in the term 'difference' not only confounds the term of this relation [sc. the relation of difference] by confusing and distributing it, but also confounds the thing that specifies the difference (as that in which the difference is noted to be); the difference is indeed confounded (as to the negation included in the term 'difference'), because if Socrates differs from Plato in whiteness then he is not the same as him, neither in this whiteness nor in that. - But if the major [n.215] is taken improperly, according to the second understanding [n.241], I deny the major.
243 Ad probationem dico quod Philosophus loquitur (in VIII Metaphysicae) de forma prout indicat quiditatem. Quod apparet ex prima comparatione formarum ad numeros; dicit enim: ((Si)) (inquit) ((aliqualiter numeri substantiae, sic sunt, - nam definitio ƿnumerus quidam, divisibilis in indivisibilia (non enim infinitae rationes); numerus autem tale)). Hoc est: resolutio definitionum stat ad indivisibile sicut et resolutio numerorum stat ad indivisibile; et talis definitio est eius quod vocat 'substantiam', hoc est quiditatis, - non formae, quae est eius altera pars.	243. As to the proof [sc. of the major, n.216] I say that the Philosopher in Metaphysics 8 is speaking of form as it indicates quiddity. This is apparent from his first comparison of forms with numbers; for he says [8.3.1043b32-36], "If substances are in some way numbers, they are so in this way - that definition is a sort of number, a divisible into indivisibles (for accounts are not infinite), and number is such." That is: the resolution of definitions stops at an indivisible just as the resolution of numbers stops at an indivisible; and such a definition is of what he calls 'substance', that is 'quiddity', not form, which is a second part of quiddity.
244 Hoc modo dico quod nihil additur formae quin variet speciem: vel 'simpliciter', hoc est de una specie faciat aliam speciem (contrariam vel disparatam), - vel 'secundum quid', hoc est de non tali specie faciat aliam speciem (puta, si addatur differentia 'pertinens ad esse quiditativum' generi, facit speciem specialissimam, et non praefuit talis species specialissima, sed tantum praefuit species intermedia).	244. I say that in this way [sc. as form indicates quiddity] nothing is added to form without varying the species, whether simply, that is, without making from one species another species (a contrary or disparate species), or in a certain respect, that is, without making another species from what is not such a species (for example, if a difference pertaining to quidditative being is added to a genus, then it makes a most specific species, and such a most specific species was not present before but only an intermediate species was present).
245 Et hoc modo dico quod quidquid est circa naturam in inferioribus, nihil addit formae. Sive sit proprietas individualis, sive sit magis vel minus (vel quodcumque aliud quod non respicit naturam ut est in suo esse quiditativo), non aufert nec addit aliquid substantiae hoc modo. Exemplum huius esset: si unitas in quantum est pars ternarii, esset pars praecisa in quantum differentia numeralis individualis, et tamen ipsa posset in se intendi et remitti, - ista differentia esset eius per se, et per accidens in quantum est pars ternarii; ideo non esset alius ternarius unitate intensa et remissa. ƿ	245. And I say that in this way nothing circumstantial to nature in inferior things adds anything to the form. Whether this something circumstantial is an individual property or is a more or less (or anything else that does not regard the nature as it exists in its quidditative being), it neither removes nor adds in this way anything to the substance. An example of this would be if a unity, as it is part of a triple, were a precise part as a numerical individual difference, and yet it could in itself be intensified or relaxed - this difference would belong per se to the unity but per accidens to it as it is part of a triple; so there would not be a different triple when the unity was intensified or relaxed.
246 Quando ergo dicis quod 'quaecumque distinctio formarum est sicut distinctio numeri', falsum est, nisi sit eorum secundum illud esse formale quod pertinet ad quiditatem per se; et talis non est hic.	246. So when you say that 'any distinction of forms is like a distinction of number' [n.216], this is false save as it is about what accords with the formal being that pertains to the quiddity per se; and such is not the case here.
247 Ad illud de X Metaphysicae dico quod est fallacia consequentis, inferendo ex textu 'omnes formas differre specie'. Vere enim Philosophus vult ibi quod 'differentia non formalis non est specifica', sed ex hoc non sequitur quod 'differentia non specifica est non formalis' (quod ipsi volunt habere), - sicut non sequitur in affirmativis, aequipollentibus istis, quia universalis affirmativa non convertitur terminis eodem modo se habentibus.	247. As to the statement from Metaphysics 10 [n.217] I say that a fallacy of the consequent is involved in inferring, from the text, that 'all forms make a difference in species'. For the Philosopher is really maintaining there that 'a non-formal difference is not specific', and from this it does not follow that 'a non-specific difference is not formal' (which they themselves want to have), just as this does not follow in the case of the affirmative propositions that are equivalent to these, because a universal affirmative does not convert with the terms disposed in the same way.
248 A Philosopho ergo accipi potest quod 'differentia formalis sola est specifica'; non quod omnis differentia in forma sit specifica, quia exclusiva licet inferat affirmativam de terminis transpositis, non tamen eodem modo de terminis non transpositis, - sed est fallacia consequentis, sicut convertendo indefinitam in universalem affirmativam. Immo ex loco illo magis videtur posse accipi oppositum huius propositionis 'omnis differentia formarum est specifica': differentia enim hominis albi et equi nigri est differentia formarum, et aliquo modo per formas, - non tamen est differentia specifica (secundum eum ibi), quia illae formae respectu naƿturarum in quibus sunt, sunt 'formales', hoc est consequentes individua, non autem per se consequentes vel per se terminantes esse quiditativum.	248. From the Philosopher then is got that 'only a formal difference is specific', not that 'every difference in form is specific', because although an exclusive proposition [sc. a proposition of the form 'only A is B'] entails an affirmative proposition with the terms transposed [sc. 'only A is B' entails 'every B is A'], it does not do so in the same way with terms not transposed [sc. 'only A is B' does not entail 'every A is B'] – but there is a fallacy of the consequent in converting an indefinite proposition into a universal affirmative [sc. 'only A is B' is equivalent to 'some A is B' and 'some A is B' does not convert to 'all A is B']. Indeed from that place [from Aristotle, n.217] it seems rather that one can take the opposite of the proposition 'every difference of forms is specific'; for the difference of a white man and a black horse is a difference of forms and in some way through forms, but it is not a specific difference (according to Aristotle there), because the forms are formal with respect to the natures in which they are [sc. white and black are formal with respect to this man and this horse], that is, they are consequent to the individuals, but they are not consequent per se or terminative per se of the quidditative being [sc. white and black are forms determining individuals, not species].
249 Ad aliud dico quod si aliquod individuum - ex hoc solo quod est sine materia - haberet in se totam perfectionem speciei, quae ex se nata est esse in infinitis (quantum est ex se), igitur videretur habere perfectionem infinitam ex sola carentia materiae; quidquid autem potest habere perfectionem infinitam, habet eam, - et ita in qualibet specie esset perfectio infinita, et per consequens perfectio speciei non esset limitata nec determinata per determinationem vel specificationem vel limitationem differentiae ultimae (quae addita generi, constituit ultimate speciem), quod est falsum et contra omnes philosophos. Falsa est igitur illa propositio assumpta, quod 'illud individuum quod potest esse sine materia, ex hac sola causa privativa - quia est sine materia - habet totam perfectionem speciei', quia si cum hoc ponatur quod nihil positive fiat circa ipsum (sed sola separatio), nihil ponitur quod non praefuit. Si autem intelligatur prout habet aliquam probabilitatem, quod videlicet 'forma, si esset separata a materia, ipsa haberet totam perfectionem speciei quia non est participabilis a materia', - ista est falsa et petit principium, nisi intelligatur prout materia dicit illam entitatem individualem, contrahentem formam. Hoc modo ƿintelligendo aequivocationem istius propositionis assumptae, omnis forma habet totam perfectionem speciei, et est de se 'haec'; et tunc est minor - sumpta sub, de angelo - simpliciter falsa, quia licet illa essentia non sit participabilis a materia quae est altera pars compositi, est tamen participabilis a pluribus materialibus, id est a pluribus individuis habentibus entitates materiales, quae dicuntur 'materiales' - sicut saepe dictum est - respectu quiditatis contractae prout quiditas dicitur 'forma'.	249. To the other argument [n.218] I say that if some individual - from the mere fact that it is without matter - had in itself the whole perfection of a species that of itself is of a nature to be in infinite individuals (as far as concerns itself), then it would seem to have infinite perfection from the mere lack of matter; but whatever can have an infinite perfection has it, and so there would be infinite perfection in any species, and consequently the perfection of a species would not be limited or determined by the determination or specification or limitation of the ultimate difference (which, by addition to the genus, constitutes the ultimate species), which is false and contrary to all the philosophers. So the assumed proposition is false that 'the individual which can be without matter has, from this privative cause alone (that it is without matter), the whole perfection of the species' [n.218], because if, along with this, one posits that nothing positive is done in respect of it (but there is just separation), nothing that was not there before is posited. But if the proposition be set down as it has some probability, namely that 'if a form were separated from matter, it would have the whole perfection of the species, because the species cannot be participated by matter' [n.219], it is false and begs the question, unless it be understood in the sense that matter states the individual entity that contracts the form. By understanding in this way the equivocal meaning of the assumed proposition, then every form has the whole perfection of the species and is of itself a 'this'; and then the minor - assumed thereunder, about an angel [sc. 'an angel is a separate form not able to be participated by matter as by an individual entity contracting the form'] - is simply false, because although the essence that is the other part of a composite is not able to be participated by matter, yet it can be participated by several material things, that is, by several individuals having material entities, which entities are called 'material' - as has often been said - in respect of the contracted quiddity, to the extent quiddity is called form [nn.182, 201, 206-207, 238, 243].
250 Ad aliud dico quod in forma arguendi est fallacia consequentis 'infinitas non intenditur, igitur nec pluralitas'; non enim pluralitas numeralis est de se infinita, sed tantum potest stare infinitas, ipsa non repugnante. Licet igitur nullus per se intendat infinitatem, tamen aliquis potest intendere pluralitatem numeralem, quae non est de se infinita, - quae, sicut compatitur secum infinitatem, ita et finitatem.	250. To the next [n.220] I say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the form of the arguing, 'infinity is not intended, therefore plurality is not intended'; numerical plurality is not of itself infinite, but infinity can stand only if the plurality is not repugnant to it. So although no one per se intends infinity, yet someone can intend a numerical plurality that is not of itself infinite, and which, just as it admits of infinity, so it also admits of finitude.
251 Et sic potest intelligi illud communiter dictum eorum, et secundum veritatem: In toto universo, licet principaliter ordo attendatur secundum ƿdistinctionem specierum, in quibus est imparitas, pertinens ad ordinem, - tamen, quia secundum Augustinum, De civitate libro XIX cap. 13, ((ordo est parium impariumque, unicuique sua loca tribuens, congrua dispositio)), - ab illo agente qui principaliter intendit ordinem universi (sicut principale bonum, intrinsecum sibi), non tantum intenditur ista imparitas, quae est 'unum requisitum' ad ordinem (scilicet specierum), sed etiam paritas individuorum (scilicet in eadem specie), quae est 'aliud concurrens' ad ordinem. Et simpliciter individua intenduntur ab ipso Primo prout ipsum intendit aliquid 'aliud a se' non ut finem, sed ut aliquid aliud ad finem; unde propter bonitatem suam communicandam, ut propter suam beatitudinem, plura in eadem specie produxit. In principalissimis autem entibus est a Deo principaliter intentum individuum.	251. And thus can their common saying be understood [sc. the order and beauty of the universe consists in species, nn.220-221], and truly: Although order in the whole universe is principally found in the distinction of species, wherein there is the inequality pertaining to order, yet because, according to Augustine City of God 19.13.n.1, "order is the fitting disposition of equal and unequal things, bestowing on each of them its own place," the principal agent who intends the order of the universe (as the principal good internal to it) intends not only the inequality, which is one of the requisites for order (namely the inequality of species), but also the equality of individuals (namely in the same species), which is the other of the concurrent requisites for order. And individuals are intended simply by the First Cause insofar as he intends something 'other than himself, not as end, but as something other for the end; hence, for the sake of communicating his goodness, as for the sake of communicating his blessedness, he produced many individuals in the same species. But in the case of the most principal beings, God principally intended the individual.
252 Et cum hoc modo sumitur 'differentia numeralis non intenditur', falsum est; et cum probatur hoc modo 'potest esse infinita', non sequitur. 'Potest esse infinita, et illa infinitas non intenditur, igitur illa differentia non intenditur', non sequitur; potƿest enim esse aliqua differentia numeralis finita, et est, - et illa potest intendi, et intenditur!	252. And when the proposition 'numerical difference is not intended' [n.220] is taken in this way, it is false; and when it is proved in this way that 'numerical difference can be infinite,' the conclusion does not follow. The inference 'numerical difference can be infinite, and the infinity is not intended, therefore the difference is not intended' does not hold; for there can be some finite numerical difference, and there is; and it can be intended, and it is.
253 Ad ultimum dico quod licet Philosophus dicat quod generatio est perpetua 'ad salvandum esse divinum', et hoc in corruptibilibus, in quibus non potest species semper permanere in uno individuo, - non tamen dicit ipse quod multitudo est praecise propter salvationem speciei, in individuis corruptibilibus; unde illa est una causa multitudinis individuorum in eadem specie, sed non praecisa causa, sed illa quae praedicta est.	253. To the last [n.222] I say that although the Philosopher says that generation is perpetual 'so as to preserve a divine existence', and this in corruptible things where the species cannot remain for ever in one individual, yet he does not himself say that a multitude is precisely for the preservation of the species in corruptible individuals; hence such preservation is one cause of the multitude of individuals in the same species but it is not the precise cause; rather the one stated before is [sc. the goodness of God, n.251].
254 Et quod adducitur de corporibus caelestibus, quod 'in una specie est tantum unum singulare et unum individuum corpus', respondeo: ratio sua fuit quod tale 'corpus singulare' fuit ex tota materia speciei (et hoc non tantum actuali sed etiam potentiali, secundum eum), quia secundum eum nulla erat materia possibilis in aliqua specie tali, quae non erat totaliter in uno singulari in tali specie; nihil enim posuit posse produci novum in immobilibus sive in sempiternis secundum quod talia sunt, scilicet immobilia et sempiterna. Et quia non concordant cum eo theologi ƿin hac propositione 'omne corpus sempiternum est ex tota materia illius speciei, actuali et potentiali', ideo non est cum eo concordandum in conclusione. ƿ	254. And as to what is adduced about the celestial bodies, that 'in one species there is only one singular and one individual body' [n.223], I reply: Aristotle's reason was that such a singular body came from the whole matter of the species (and this not only actual matter but also potential matter, according to him), because there was, according to him, no possible matter in any such species that was not totally in the one individual of such species; for he posited that nothing new could be produced in immobile or eternal things as they are such, namely immobile and eternal [n.222]. And because theologians do not agree with him in this proposition 'every eternal body is made of the whole matter, actual and potential, of the species', therefore there should be no agreement with him in the conclusion.