Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P2Q2

• I. The Response of Others to the Question
• A. First Opinion
• B. Second Opinion
• C. Rejection of the Opinions
• II. Scotus' own Response to the Question A. On Distinction of Intellections
• B. Solution
• III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion
• IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion
• V. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Two: Whether an Angel has a Distinct Natural Knowledge of the Divine Essence
302 Secundo quaero de intellectione angeli respectu aliorum a se, et primo, utrum angelus habeat notitiam naturalem distinctam essentiae divinae. ƿ	302. Second I ask about an angel's intellection with respect to things other than himself, and first whether an angel has a distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence.
303 Quod non: Quia aut hoc esset per essentiam divinam, aut per speciem essentiae. Non per essentiam, quia tunc esset naturaliter beatus, quod non potest competere creaturae. Non per speciem, quia essentia divina est intimior intellectui quam esset illa species; ergo superflueret ibi speciem ponere, quia essentia illa per se posset efficacius illud facere propter quod ponitur species, quam ipsa species.	303. That he does not: Because this knowledge would come either through the divine essence or through a species of the essence. But not through the essence because then the angel would be naturally blessed, which is not something that can belong to a creature. Nor through a species because the divine essence is more intimate to the intellect than the species would be; therefore it would be superfluous to posit a species there, because the essence by itself would be able more efficaciously to do what the species is posited for than would the species itself.
304 Praeterea, Philosophus III De anima non videtur assignare speciem necessariam, nisi quia obiectum non est per se in anima: Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis)); quare etc.	304. Further, the Philosopher On the Soul 3.8.431b29-432a1 seems only to posit that a species is necessary because the object is not by itself in the soul, "For the stone is not in the soul but the species of the stone is;" therefore etc.
305 Contra: Vel ergo angelus nullam haberet notitiam essentiae divinae, et tunc frustra esset sibi dictum illud praeceptum Diliges Dominum Deum tuum etc. (frustra enim praecipitur dilectio eius quod omnino ignoratur), - vel tantum haberet notitiam confusam illius essentiae, et tunc videtur intellectus ille esse potentialis sicut noster (qui potest procedere a confuso ad distinctum), quod videtur inconveniens. ƿ	305. On the contrary: The angel would then either have no knowledge of the divine essence, and then in vain would the precept be given to him, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.' (for in vain is a love prescribed of what is altogether unknown), or he would have a confused knowledge of that essence, and then his intellect seems to be potential like ours (which can proceed from the confused to the clear), and this seems unacceptable.
	I. The Response of Others to the Question
306 Hic concordant aliqui in ista negativa, quod 'angeli non habent distinctam notitiam essentiae divinae naturaliter'.	306. There are some here [Aquinas ST Ia q.12 a.4, q.56 a.3, Henry Quodlibet 3 q.1] who agree in the negative proposition that 'angels do not naturally have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence'.
	A. First Opinion
307 Istam negativam tenendo, si quaeris per quid affirmative, respondetur quod angelus non cognoscit essentiam divinam naturaliter per aliquam speciem.	307. If, when holding this negative proposition, you ask by what affirmative it is held, the response is that the angel does not know the divine essence naturally, through any species.
308 Quod probatur: Quia omnis propria ratio intelligendi aliquod obiectum, per ƿ adaequationem repraesentat illud obiectum; nulla essentia vel species creata potest adaequate repraesentare effigiem divinam vel increatam, quia quodlibet tale est finitum, - obiectum autem infinitum (finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio); ergo etc.	308. The proof is: Because every reason proper for understanding any object represents that object adequately; no created essence or species can represent adequately the divine or uncreated effigy, because anything of the former sort is finite but the object is infinite (there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite); therefore etc.
309 Item, species creata unius rei magis assimilatur alteri rei creatae quam Deo, quia utrumque finitum; ergo distinctius repraesentat creaturam quam Deum. Ergo non est propria ratio et distincta intelligendi Deum.	309. Again, the created species of one thing is more similar to another created thing than to God, because each of them is finite; therefore it more distinctly represents a creature than God. Therefore it is not a reason proper and distinct for understanding God.
310 Item, ratio formalis secundum quam apprehenditur obiectum (sicut et ratio obiecti), est determinata, - alias non magis repraesentaret hoc obiectum quam aliud; Deus est maxime indeterminatus et illimitatus, quia infinitus; ergo etc. Unde VIII De Trinitate 5:((Tolle hoc bonum et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, - et Deum utique vidisti, bonum omnis boni, supra omne bonum)); igitur non potest cognosci per talem speciem distincte.	310. Again, the formal reason according to which an object is apprehended is determinate (as is also the idea of the object), otherwise it would not represent this object more than that; God is most indeterminate and unlimited because he is infinite; therefore etc. Hence Augustine On the Trinity 8.3 n.4, "Take this good away and that good away, and look at the good itself, if you can, and you have indeed seen God, the good of every good, beyond every good;" therefore God cannot be known distinctly by such a species.
311 Item, si necesse sit ponere talem speciem per quam distincte ƿ cognoscatur Deus, sequitur quod illa species magis erit imago Dei quam angelus vel anima in se, - quod est contra Augustinum, qui dicit quod ((eo aliquid imago Dei est, quo capax et particeps eius esse potest)); magis autem potest angelus esse particeps quam species; ergo etc.	311. Again, if it is necessary to posit a species such that through it God is known distinctly, then as a result that species will be more an image of God than an angel or the soul in themselves are; but this is against Augustine (ibid., 14.8 n.11), who says that "the more something is an image of God, the more it is able to have a capacity for him and to participate in him;" but an angel is able more to participate in God than a species; therefore etc.
	B. Second Opinion
312 Alius modus dicendi est quod angelus cognoscit Deum per essentiam suam propriam, id est essentiam angeli, - quia essentia angeli est imago et similitudo Dei; unumquodque autem cognoscitur per suam similitudinem et imaginem; ergo angelus per natuƿ ram et essentiam suam, in quantum imago Dei, potest ipsum cognoscere. Et dicitur haec imago esse 'specularis'; ergo etc.	312. Another way [Aquinas] is to say that an angel knows God through his own proper essence, that is, through the angel's essence, for the essence of an angel is an image and likeness of God; but each thing is known through its likeness and image; therefore an angel can know God through his nature and essence insofar as this is an image of God. And this image is called a 'mirror' image; therefore etc.
	C. Rejection of the Opinions
313 Contra primum, qui ponit illas rationes ad illam conclusionem negativam, arguitur sic:Quia ex eisdem posset probari quod per nullum repraesentativum creatum angelus cognoscat naturaliter essentiam divinam, et per essentiam non cognoscit (secundum eum), quia nulla creatura potest naturaliter videre illam essentiam. Et ex hoc videtur sequi quod nullam notitiam naturalem possit angelus habere de illa essentia: non enim de ea distincte et in particulari aliquid videtur, quia hoc non videtur possibile nisi vel per essentiam vel per aliquid repraesentativum distincte, quorum utrumque negatur; non autem indistincte sive in aliquo conceptu communiore (qui non sit proprius isti essentiae), quia omnem conceptum communem et univocum - isti essentiae et alii - negat iste. ƿ	313. Against the first [Henry], who posits the above reasons for the negative conclusion [nn.307-311], the argument is as follows: Because it can be proved from the same reasons that an angel does not naturally know the divine essence through any created representation; and, according to Henry, an angel does not know naturally through the divine essence, because no creature can naturally see that essence. And from this it seems to follow that an angel can have no natural knowledge of the divine essence; for nothing about this essence is seen distinctly and in particular, because this seems to be possible only through the essence, or through something distinctly representing it, both of which Henry denies; and it is not seen indistinctly, or in some more common concept (a concept not proper to the divine essence), because Henry denies every concept common and univocal to this essence and to another.
314 Praeterea, essentia divina - secundum istum - nata est tantum facere conceptum unicum in intellectu divino, ita quod nullus alius habetur de ea nisi per intellectum negotiantem; ergo illa essentia nata est tantum facere 'de se' conceptum unum realem de quocumque intelligibili. Probatio consequentiae. omnis conceptus, qui natus est haberi et causari virtute huius essentiae in aliquo intellectu, natus est haberi virtute eius in intellectu comprehendente ipsam; talis est intellectus divinus. Et ultra sequitur quod nullus conceptus realis possit haberi de ista essentia, nisi unus; probatio huius consequentiae, quia omnem conceptum realem quem potest intellectus aliquis habere de ista essentia, potest ipsa causare (alioquin non esset ipsa perfecta in ratione obiecti), quia illud quod est in ratione obiecti perfectissimum, potest causare omnem conceptum realem de se causabilem. Et tunc sequitur ultra quod vel intellectus angeli habebit illum conceptum unum, undecumque causetur, - vel omnino nullum habebit; illum autem habere non poterit ('cognoscere' scilicet 'per essentiam', vel 'per propriam rationem repraesentantem'); quare nullum habebit. ƿ	314. Further, the divine essence, according to him, is of a nature only to form a single concept in the divine intellect, so that no other concept is had about it save by an intellect busying itself about it [cf. Scotus 1 d.8 nn.55, 174-175, 188]; therefore the divine essence is of a nature only to make of itself one real concept about any intelligible whatever. Proof of the consequence: every concept that is of a nature to be had and to be caused by virtue of this essence in any intellect is of a nature to be, by virtue of it, had in an intellect comprehending it; such is the divine intellect. And further it follows that no real concept save one can be had about this essence; the proof of this consequence is that every real concept that any intellect can have about this essence can be caused by this essence (otherwise it would not be perfect in idea of object), because that which is most perfect in idea of object can cause every real, causable concept about itself. And the further consequence is that either an angel's intellect will have that one concept (however it is caused), or it will have altogether no concept; but it cannot have the former (namely 'to know through the divine essence' or 'through a proper representing reason', nn.306-311); therefore it will have no concept.
315 Contra secundum, qui ponit quod angelus intelligit illam essentiam per se ipsum, in quantum est imago Dei: Licet imago quae est tantum ratio cognoscendi, non 'ut cognita' (sicut est de specie visibili in oculo et de specie intelligibili in intellectu), repraesentet obiectum immediate, absque discursu, - tamen illa imago per quam non cognoscitur illud cuius est nisi ut per speciem cognitam, non est ratio cognoscendi illud nisi tantum per discursum, sicut discurritur a cognoscente ad cognitum; sed essentia angeli tantum potest poni 'imago' secundo modo, et non primo modo; non igitur per illam imaginem cognoscit angelus essentiam divinam, nisi discurrendo. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quia secundum eos intellectus angelicus non discurrit; ergo etc.	315. Against the second [Aquinas], who posits that an angel understands the essence through himself insofar as he is the image of God [n.312], I argue: Although the image that is only a reason for knowing, and is not as a known species (as is true of the visible species in the eye and the intelligible species in the intellect), represents the object immediately, or non-discursively, yet the image through which the object it is the image of is not known, save as through a known species, is not the reason for knowing the object save only discursively (the way the knower reaches discursively the thing known); but the essence of an angel can only be posited as an image in the second way and not in the first way; the angel then does not know the divine essence through the image save discursively. But this is unacceptable, because according to those who hold this opinion the angelic intellect is not discursive [Aquinas ST Ia 1.58 a.3]; therefore etc.
316 Praeterea, omnis discursus praesupponit notitiam simplicem illius ad quod discurritur; ergo si per istam 'essentiam cognitam' habetur notitia de essentia divina per discursum, oportet praehabere conceptum simplicem de essentia divina, - et tunc illius quaerenda est alia ratio, prior.	316. Further, all discursive thought presupposes simple knowledge of that which it discursively reaches; therefore, if through the known essence [sc. of the angel] discursive knowledge is had of the divine essence, a simple concept of the divine essence must be had first, and then another, prior reason must be sought after for knowing it.
317 Confirmatur etiam, quia nullum obiectum facit distinctam notitiam alterius obiecti nisi includat in se virtualiter illud aliud obiectum, - quia 'unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, sic ad cognosci; quod igitur non includit aliquid virtualiter in entitate, non ƿ includit illud in cognoscibilitate. Sed essentia angeli non includit virtualiter essentiam divinam sub ratione aliqua distincta; ergo nec sic cognoscit eam.	317. There is a confirmation too in that no object causes a distinct knowledge of some other object unless it includes that other object virtually in itself, because 'each thing is disposed to being known as it is disposed to being' [cf. Metaphysics 2.1.993b30¬-31]; an object then that does not include something virtually as to entity does not include it as to knowability. But the essence of an angel does not include virtually the divine essence under some distinct idea; therefore neither does the angel thus know the divine essence.
	II. Scotus' own Response to the Question A. On Distinction of Intellections
318 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo aliter. Primo distinguo de duplici intellectione: potest enim esse aliqua cognitio obiecti secundum quod abstrahit ab omni exsistentia actuali, et potest esse aliqua eius secundum quod exsistens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua exsistentia actuali.	318. I respond differently, then, to the question [n.302]. First I draw a distinction between two intellections: for some knowledge of an object can be according as it abstracts from all actual existence, and some can be according as the object is existent and is present in some actual existence.
319 Ista distinctio probatur per rationem et per simile:Primum membrum patet ex hoc quod possumus habere scientiam de aliquibus quiditatibus; scientia autem est obiecti secundum quod abstrahit ab exsistentia actuali, alioquin scientia 'quandoque posset esse et quandoque non', et ita non esset perpetua, sed corrupta re corrumperetur scientia illius rei, quod est falsum.	319. This distinction is proved by reason [nn.319-322] and by a likeness [nn.323]: The first member [abstract knowledge] is plain from the fact we can have science of certain quiddities; but science is of an object as it abstracts from actual existence, otherwise science could sometimes be and sometimes not be, and so would not be permanent but the science of a thing would perish on the perishing of the thing, which is false [Metaphysics 7.15.1039b31-1040a4].
320 Secundum probatur, quia quod est perfectionis in potentia inferiore, videtur eminentius esse in superiore quae est eiusdem ƿ generis; in sensu autem - qui est potentia cognitiva - perfectionis est quod est cognitiva rei secundum quod est in se exsistens et secundum quod est praesens secundum exsistentiam suam; igitur hoc est possibile in intellectu, qui est suprema vis cognitiva. Igitur potest habere talem intellectionem rei, secundum quod est praesens.	320. The second member [knowledge of actual existence] is proved by the fact that what is a matter of perfection in a lower power seems to exist more eminently in a higher power of the same genus; but in the senses - which are cognitive powers - it is a matter of perfection that the senses are cognitive of a thing according as it is in itself existent and is present in its existence; therefore this is possible in the intellect, which is a supreme cognitive power. Therefore the intellect can have the sort of knowledge of a thing that is of it as present.
321 Et ut brevibus utar verbis, primam voco 'abstractivam', quae est ipsius quiditatis, secundum quod abstrahit ab actuali exsistentia et non exsistentia. Secundam, scilicet quae est quiditatis rei secundum eius exsistentiam actualem (vel quae est rei praesentis secundum talem exsistentiam), voco 'intellectionem intuitivam'; non prout 'intuitiva' distinguitur contra discursivam (sic enim aliqua 'abstractiva' est intuitiva), sed simpliciter 'intuitivam', eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem sicut est in se.	321. And, to speak briefly, I give to the first knowledge, which is of the quiddity as the quiddity abstracts from existence and non-existence, the name of abstractive. To the second, namely the one that is of the quiddity in its actual existence (or is of the thing as present in such existence), I give the name intuitive intellection; not as 'intuitive' is distinguished from 'discursive' (for some abstractive knowledge is in this way intuitive), but as simply intuitive, in the way we are said to intuit a thing as it is in itself.
322 Istud etiam secundum membrum declaratur per hoc quod non exspectamus cognitionem de Deo, qualis possit haberi de eo, ipsoper impossibile - non exsistente vel non praesente per essentiam, sed exspectamus intuitivam, quae dicitur facie ad faciem, quia sicut sensitiva est 'facialiter' rei secundum quod est praesentialiter exsistens, ita et illa exspectatio. ƿ	322. The second member is also made clear by the fact that we are not waiting for a knowledge of God of the sort that can be had of him when - per impossibile - he is not existent or not present in his essence, but we are waiting for an intuitive knowledge that is called 'face to face' [I Corinthians 13.12], because just as sensitive knowledge is face to face with the thing as it is presently existent, so also is that knowledge we are waiting for.
323 Secunda declaratio huius distinctionis - per simile - est in potentiis sensitivis: aliter enim sensus particularis cognoscit obiectum, aliter phantasia. Sensus enim particularis, est obiecti secundum quod est per se et in se exsistens, - phantasia cognoscit idem secundum quod est praesens per speciem, quae species posset esse eius licet non esset exsistens vel praesens, ita quod cognitio phantastica est abstractiva respectu sensus particularis, quia quae sunt dispersa in inferioribus, quandoque sunt unita in superioribus. Ita isti duo modi sentiendi, qui sunt dispersi in potentiis sensitivis propter organum (quia non est idem organum, quod est bene receptivum obiecti sensus particularis et bene receptivum obiecti phantasiae), uniti sunt in intellectu, cui - ut uni potentiae - potest uterque actus competere.	323. This distinction [n.318] is made clear, second, by a likeness in the sensitive powers; for a particular sense knows an object in one way and imagination knows it in another way. For a particular sense is of the object as it is existent per se and in itself, while imagination knows the same object as it is present in a species, and this species could be of the object even if the object were not existent or present, so that imaginative knowledge is abstractive with respect to the particular sense, for things that are dispersed in inferior things are sometimes united in superior ones. Thus these two modes of sensing, which are dispersed in the sensitive powers because of the organ (because the organ that is well receptive of an object of a particular sense is not the same as the organ that is well receptive of the object of imagination), are united in the intellect, to which, as to a single power, both acts can belong.
	B. Solution
324 Hac ergo distinctione praemissa, ad quaestionem respondeo quod licet secundum communiter loquentes non possit angelus ex puris naturalibus habere cognitionem Dei intuitivam (de quo in IV libro), tamen non videtur negandum quin possit naturaliter habere cognitionem eius abstractivam, - hoc modo intelliƿ gendo, quod species aliqua distincte repraesentet illam essentiam, licet non repraesentet eam ut in se praesentialiter exsistentem; et tunc quidem bene possibile est habere intellectionem distinctam, licet abstractivam, nam abstractiva distinguitur in confusam et distinctam penes rationem aliam et aliam cognoscendi.	324. Having premised this distinction, then, I reply to the question [n.302] that, although according to what is commonly said an angel cannot, on the basis of his natural powers, have an intuitive knowledge of God (on which see book 4 [not in the Ordinatio since d.49, where this matter would likely have been treated, is missing]), yet it does not seem one should deny he can naturally have an abstractive knowledge of him, understanding this as follows, that some species distinctly represents the divine essence although it does not represent the essence as it is presently existent; and then indeed an angel can have a distinct, though abstractive, intellection of God, for abstractive intellection is distinguished into confused and distinct, according to different reasons for knowing.
325 Et illam talem speciem, repraesentantem essentiam divinam, non videtur inconveniens ponere inditam esse intellectui angeli a principio, - ita quod licet ipsa non sit naturalis illi intellectui (hoc modo, quod iste intellectus possit ex naturalibus eam acquirere, neque etiam quod possit eam habere ex actione alicuius obiecti naturaliter agentis, quia non potest habere eam praesentialitate alicuius obiecti moventis nisi essentiae divinae tantum, quae nihil aliud a se causat naturaliter naturali causatione), tamen sicut perfectiones datae angelo in sua prima creatione (licet non necessario sequebantur naturam eius) dicerentur 'naturales' (distinguendo contra 'mere supernaturales', gratiae et gloriae), ita ista perfectio data intellectui angelico - qua essentia divina esset sibi praesens distincte (licet abstractive) - potest dici 'naturalis' et ad cognitionem angeli naturalem pertinere; ita quod quidquid cognoscit angelus de Deo virtute huius speciei, aliquo modo naturaliter cognoscit et aliquo modo non naturaliter: naturaliter, in quantum ista non est principium gratuiti actus, nec gloriosi, - supernaturaliter, ƿ in quantum ad istam non posset pertingere ex naturalibus, neque ex aliqua actione naturali.	325. And to posit that an angel's intellect has been endowed from the beginning with such a species, representing the divine essence, does not seem unacceptable, so that, although this species is not natural to his intellect (in the sense that his intellect could not acquire it on the basis of its natural powers, and could not even get it from the action of any naturally acting object, for it cannot get it by the presence of any object moving it save only of the divine essence, and this essence naturally causes nothing by natural causation other than itself), nevertheless, just as the perfections given to an angel in his first creation (even if they did not necessarily follow his nature) might be called 'natural' (by distinction from the 'purely supernatural' gifts of grace and glory), so too this perfection given to the angelic intellect - whereby the divine essence would be present to it distinctly, albeit abstractly - can be called 'natural' and be said to pertain to the natural knowledge of the angel; so that whatever an angel knows about God by virtue of this species, he would know in some way naturally and in some way not naturally: naturally insofar as this perfection is not the principle of a graced or a glorious act, supernaturally insofar as he could not attain to it on the basis of his natural powers nor of any natural action.
326 Quod autem talis species poni debeat, distincte repraesentans essentiam divinam (licet abstractive), persuadetur: sic, quia beatitudo angeli naturalis excedit beatitudinem hominis naturalem (etiam si fuisset in statu innocentiae tam angelus quam homo per quantumcumque tempus); ergo cum homo pro statu naturae lapsae possit habere cognitionem de ultimo fine in universali et pro statu innocentiae potuit aliquo modo habere notitiam distinctam, et volitio summi boni sequatur cognitionem ultimi veri ut sic, - sequitur quod in tali cognitione et volitione summi boni distincte, posset angelus habere maiorem beatitudinem quam homo.	326. Now that such a species, representing the divine essence (albeit abstractly), should be posited is rendered persuasive as follows: First because the natural blessedness of an angel exceeds the natural blessedness of man (even if both angel and man had been in the state of innocence for however long a time); therefore, since man in the state of fallen nature can have knowledge of the ultimate end in general, and since he could have had in the state of innocence a distinct knowledge of it in some way, and since volition of the supreme good follows knowledge of the ultimate end as such - it follows that an angel, in such knowing and willing the highest good distinctly, could have a greater blessedness than man.
327 Secundo persuadetur per hoc quod aliquis - raptus - videns transitorie essentiam divinam, cessante illo actu videndi potest habere memoriam obiecti, et hoc sub ratione distincta (sub qua erat obiectum visionis), licet non sub ratione praesentis actualiter, quia talis praesentia non manet post actum, in ratione cognoscibilis; ergo per aliquam rationem perficientem intellectum talem potest obiectum istud - illo modo - obiective esse praesens, et ita non est contra rationem essentiae quod species illius sit in aliquo intellectu, distincte repraesentans eam. Ergo nec videtur tale negandum ab intellectu perfectissimo creato: nihil enim videtur debere negari ab intellectu summo creato, quod non repugnat alicui ƿ intellectui creato in naturalibus, quia non est perfectio excellens nimis. - Assumptum potest declarari per raptum Pauli, qui, transeunte illo raptu, recordabatur illorum visorum, secundum quod ipse scribit, ad Cor.: Scio, inquit, hominem ante annos quattuordecim, sive in corpore sive extra corpus, nescio, Deus scit etc., qui audivit arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Quod autem post raptum possit species distincte manere, videtur, quia hoc est perfectionis in intellectu quod potest conservare speciem obiecti cessante praesentia obiecti.	327. This point is made persuasive, second, by the fact that someone in a state of rapture who has a transitory vision of the divine essence can, when the act of seeing ceases, have a memory of the object, and this under a distinct idea (under which idea the object of vision was), although not under an idea of its being actually present, because such presence does not, after the act, remain in its idea of being knowable; therefore, by some such idea perfecting the intellect, the object can in this way be objectively present, and thus it is not against the idea of the divine essence that a species of it, distinctly representing it, may be in some intellect. Therefore neither does it seem that such an object is to be denied to the most perfect created intellect; for it seems that to the highest created intellect nothing should be denied that is not repugnant to any created intellect in its natural powers, because it is not a perfection that is too excelling. The assumption here can be made clear by the rapture of Paul who, when the rapture passed, remembered the things he saw, according to what he himself writes, 2 Corinthians 12.2-4, "I know a man fourteen years ago, whether in the body or out of the body I know not, God knows etc., who heard secret words that it is not permitted for a man to speak." Now it seems that after the rapture the species can remain distinctly, because this belongs to perfection in the intellect, that it can preserve the species of an object when the presence of the object ceases.
328 Tertio persuadetur propositum, quia secundum Augustinum, IV Super Genesim 23 vel 29, dies illi sex non erant in successione temporis sed in cognitione angelica creaturarum ordinem naturalem habentium, - ita quod prius naturaliter novit angelus creaturam in Verbo, secundo in genere proprio; et non stando ibi, rediit in Verbi laudem 'ex opere suo', - et in illo, iterum, videt rationem sequentis creaturae naturaliter: ita quod quando dixit Deus Fiat lux, vidit se angelus in Verbo aeterno cum facta est lux, - et cum factum est vespere, vidit se in genere proprio, - et cum factum est vespere et mane dies unus, ex se exsurrexit in laudem Dei, in quo vidit secundam creaturam; ita quod illa visio erat ƿ 'terminus' praecedentis diei in quantum ex cognitione primae creaturae in Verbo, surrexit in cognitionem Verbi, immo 'requies' omnium creatorum in primo artifice vel opifice (ita distinguit Augustinus singulos dies usque ad diem septimum, cuius erat 'mane' ultimae creaturae in Verbo, et non sequebatur 'vespere'), et erat 'principium' sequentis diei in quantum vidit aliam creaturam in genere proprio.	328. The proposed conclusion is made persuasive, third, by the fact that, according to Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 4.32 n.49, 26 n.43, ch.22 n.39, 18 n.32, the six days of creation were not days in succession of time but days in angelic knowledge of creatures possessed of a natural order, so that first the angel knew the creature in the Word and second in the proper genus and, not stopping there, he returned to praise the Word 'because of his work'; and in the Word again he sees naturally the idea of the creature next following; so that, when God said 'Let there be light', the angel saw it in the eternal Word; and when was said 'And there was light' and evening came, he saw it in the proper genus; and when was said 'And evening came and morning came one day', he rose up from it to praise God, in whom he saw the second creature; so that his seeing was the end of the preceding day in that, from his knowledge of the first creature in the Word, he rose to knowledge of the Word - indeed, there was a 'resting' of all creatures in the first maker and craftsman (thus does Augustine distinguish the individual days up to the seventh day, which had a 'morning' of the final creature in the Word and no 'evening' followed) - and his seeing was the beginning of the following day, in that the angel saw another creature in the proper genus.
329 Et licet ipse istam cognitionem 'rerum in Verbo' posuerit cognitionem beatificam (sicut patet ibi in principio 23 cap.: ((Cum sancti angeli semper videant faciem Dei Patris in Verbo, quia eius Unigenito - sicut Patri aequalis est - perfruantur, in ipso Verbo Dei prius noverunt universam creaturam, in qua ipsi principaliter sunt conditi)); perfruitio igitur pertinet ad beatitudinem. Similiter in eodem: ((Tunc nox ad diem pertinet, cum sublimes et sancti angeli illud quod creaturam in ipsa creatura noverunt, referunt in ipsius amorem in quo aeternas rationes - quibus creata est contemplantur; eaque concordissima contemplatione sunt unus ƿ dies, cui coniungetur Ecclesia ex hac peregrinatione liberata, ut et nos exsultemus et iucundemur in eo)) etc.), potest tamen probari ex dictis eius quod ista cognitio (quae vocatur communissime 'cognitio matutina') sit naturalis et non praecise beatifica, quia secundum eum - iste ordo erat in cognitione angelica 'creaturae post creaturam', et praecessit naturaliter cognitionem creaturarum in genere proprio: factis autem creaturis in genere proprio, statim potuit angelus earum cognitionem habere in genere proprio; igitur istae omnes cognitiones in Verbo praecesserunt naturaliter cognitionem creaturarum in genere proprio; omnes igitur (secundum eum) erant simul productae. Ergo ista 'cognitio in Verbo' praecessit naturaliter productionem creaturarum in genere proprio: sed tunc angeli erant in statu innocentiae et non beati, quia aliqua morula erat - sicut dicetur inferius - inter creationem et lapsum eius; erat igitur aliqua cognitio angelorum matutina (scilicet 'creaturarum in Verbo'), exsistentium in naturalibus (aut saltem non beatorum), et ita non videtur quod oporteat dare distinctam cognitionem angeli stantis in condicione naturali vel in gratia, quia alias in ipsa causa praecise cognita non posset prius cognoscere ipsas creaturas quam in genere proprio, nam ratio cognoscendi ƿ causam confuse non est ratio cognoscendi ipsam distincte et effectus ordinatos.	329. And although Augustine himself posited that the knowledge of things in the Word was a beatific knowledge - as is plain there in ch.24 n.4, "Since the holy angels always see the face of God the Father in the Word, for they enjoy his Only Begotten as he is equal to the Father, they knew first in the very Word of God the universal creation of which they themselves were made the first;" the enjoyment therefore pertains to blessedness. Likewise ibid., "Night then pertains to day, when the sublime and holy angels knew what the creature was in the creature, and they refer it to the love of him in whom they contemplate the eternal reasons by which the creature was created; and in that most concordant contemplation they are one day, with which the Church, when freed from this pilgrimage, will be joined, so that we too may exult and have joy in him etc." -yet it can be proved from Augustine's words that this knowledge (which is very commonly called 'morning knowledge') is natural and not precisely beatific, because -according to him - this order was in the angelic knowledge 'of creature after creature', and it naturally preceded the knowledge of creatures in the proper genus; but, when the creatures were made in the proper genus, at once the angel could have knowledge of them in the proper genus; therefore all those knowledges in the Word naturally preceded the knowledge of creatures in the proper genus; all of them then (according to Augustine) were produced at once. Therefore this 'knowledge in the Word' naturally preceded the production of creatures in the proper genus; but the angels were then in the state of innocence and not blessed, because there was some little delay - as will be said below [2 dd.4-5 qq.1-2 nn.5-7] - between creation and its fall; there was, then, in the angels some morning knowledge (namely of creatures in the Word) while the angels existed in their natural condition (or at least while they were not blessed), and so it does not seem one should give distinct knowledge to an angel while he is standing in his natural condition or in grace, because otherwise he could not know the creatures in the precisely known cause itself before he knew them in the proper genus, since a reason for knowing a cause confusedly is not a reason for knowing it and its ordered effects distinctly.
330 Et si obiciatur quomodo potuit in Verbo, non intuitive sed abstractive cognito, alia cognoscere, - respondeo: tota scientia nostra est nunc de passionibus abstractive per intellectum, ita quod non tantum obiectum intuitive cognitum, sed etiam abstractive, est illud in quo ut in cognito cognoscitur passio.	330. And if an objection be raised as to how in the Word not intuitively but abstractly known an angel could know other things, I reply that the whole of our knowledge of properties now is by abstraction through the intellect, so that an object not only intuitively but also abstractly known is that in which, as known, the property is known.
331 Breviter ergo ad quaestionem: Quia non habemus regulam de intellectu angelico (neque enim possumus attribuere illi quidquid est perfectionis in intellectu simpliciter, neque tantam imperfectionem quantam experimur in intellectu nostro), quia rationabile est attribuere illi omnem perfectionem quae convenit intellectui creato et nulla repugnantia occurrit quare intellectus creatus haberet talem cognitionem distincte repraesentantem essentiam divinam (dum tamen non intuitive), talem videtur rationabile concederel, etsi obiciatur quod Deus possit immediate causare intellectionem sine specie. ƿ	331. Briefly then to the question [n.302]: Because we do not have a rule about the angelic intellect (for we are able neither to attribute to it whatever is a matter of perfection in an intellect simply, nor to attribute to it as much imperfection as we experience in our own intellect), and because it is rational to attribute to it all the perfection that belongs to a created intellect and no repugnance stands in the way of why a created intellect had such a knowledge distinctly representing the divine essence (provided however it not represent it intuitively), the concession seems rational [sc. the concession that an angel can know the divine essence abstractly through a species representing the divine essence], even if it be objected that God can cause intellection immediately without a species [nn.303, 347].
	III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion
332 Ad rationes pro prima opinione, quae improbant istam speciem. Ad primam dico quod non videtur esse proprium vocabulum, loquendo de Deo, hoc vocabulum 'effigies'; forte enim 'effigiatum' non dicitur aliquid proprie nisi quod est figuratum.	332. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.308-311], which reject this species. To the first [n.308] I say that, when speaking of God, the word 'effigy' does not seem to be a proper one; for perhaps nothing is properly said to be 'effig-ied' save what is figured.
333 Sed utendo verbis propriis, si accipiatur illa propositio 'omnis propria ratio intelligendi aliquod obiectum, per adaequationem repraesentat illud obiectum', - dico quod hic potest intelligi adaequatio simpliciter entitatis ad entitatem, vel adaequatio secundum proportionem repraesentantis ad repraesentatum (sicut materia dicitur adaequari formae secundum proportionem, licet non secundum entitatem, pro eo quod eorum entitates sunt inaequales; tamen ista est ita perfectibilis sicut illa est perfectiva, hoc est quod tantum ista repraesentat quantum illa est repraesentabilis), vel, tertio modo, 'per adaequationem' secundum proportionem non absolute sed per comparationem ad actum talem (puta quod istud repraesentat obiectum ita perfectum et ita perfecte sicut ipsum apprehenditur a potentia, per talem actum quem repraesentat). ƿ	333. But if, using proper words, the proposition 'every reason proper for understanding any object represents that object adequately' is taken, I say that here 'adequately' can be understood simply of entity to entity, or it can be understood according to the proportion of thing representing to thing represented (as matter is said to be adequate to form according to proportion, although not according to entity because the entities of them are unequal; yet matter is as perfectible as form is perfective, which is that the matter represents the form as much as the form is representable), or, in a third way, 'adequately' can be understood according to a proportion, not absolutely, but by comparison to such act (to wit, that it represents an object as perfect and as perfectly as the power, through the sort of act it represents, apprehends the object).
334 Primo modo, universaliter, nullum per se repraesentans (quod est ratio repraesentandi et non cognitum) adaequatur illi quod repraesentat, sed deficit, - sicut patet de albedine et specie albi. Secundo modo, aliqua ratio repraesentat per adaequationem, sicut species perfectissima albi repraesentat illud album, et ipsa est ratio quasi comprehensive videndi illud album. Tertio modo, quaecumque species albi - etiam in oculo caecutiente - licet non ita perfecte repraesentet album sicut illud esset repraesentabile, tamen perfecte repraesentat per comparationem ad actum sequentem, quia ita perfecte repraesentat sicut requiritur ad habendum talem speciem circa obiectum.	334. Universally in the first way, no per se representing thing (because it is the reason for representing and is not a something known) is adequate to what it represents but falls short, as is plain of whiteness and the species of a white thing. In the second way some reason does represent adequately, as the most perfect species of white represents the white thing, and it is a reason for quasi comprehensively seeing the white thing. In the third way any species of white (even in an eye going blind), even if does not represent the white thing as perfectly as the white thing was representable, yet does perfectly represent it by comparison to the ensuing act [sc. of sight], because it represents it as perfectly as is required for having such a species about the object.
335 Ad propositum ergo dico quod nulla species per adaequationem potest repraesentare essentiam divinam secundo modo (neque etiam primo modo), quia illa essentia - quae comprehensibilis est ab intellectu suo - non potest comprehendi nisi per essentiam ut per rationem; sed tertio modo, comparando ad intellectum creatum, aliquo modo potest repraesentare, hoc est ita perfecte illam essentiam repraesentat sicut actus talis attingit.	335. As to the issue in hand, then, I say that no species can adequately represent the divine essence in the second way (nor even in the first way), because that essence -which is comprehensible to its own intellect - cannot be comprehended save through the essence as through the reason for comprehending; but in the third way, by comparison with a created intellect, a species can in some way adequately represent the divine essence, that is, as perfectly as such an act attains it.
336 Cum probatur minor propositio per illam 'infinitatem', dico ƿ quod sicut actus finitus potest habere obiectum infinitum sub ratione infiniti, et tamen actus immediatius attingit obiectum quam species, ita species finita potest repraesentare obiectum infinitum sub ratione infiniti; non tamen ipsa est adaequata in essendo, nec etiam in cognoscendo simpliciter, - quia ipsa non est principium comprehendendi.	336. When the minor proposition is proved through the term 'infinity' [sc. 'no created essence or species can represent adequately the divine or uncreated effigy, because anything of the former sort is finite but the object is infinite', n.308], I say that, just as a finite act can have an infinite object under the idea of infinite and yet the act more immediately attains the object than the species does, so a finite species can represent an infinite object under the idea of infinite; the species is not however adequate in being, nor even in knowing simply, because it is not a principle for comprehending [1 d.3 n.65].
337 Ad aliam probationem, cum arguitur de specie unius creaturae respectu alterius, - dico quod similitudo naturalis in 'essendo' non est per se ratio repraesentandi unius respectu alterius, quia 'hoc album', quantumcumque sit similius alii albo quam species, non est ratio repraesentandi illud; species autem huius, quae multo minus est in entitate naturali, similior est huic in convenientia et similitudine proportionis 'quae est repraesentantis ad repraesentatum'. Ita hic, licet species - propter suam finitatem - in entitate et in essendo plus conveniat cum essentia creata quam cum essentia divina, non tamen plus convenit cum ea convenientia proportionis 'quae est repraesentantis ad repraesentatum'. ƿ	337. To the next proof [n.309], when argument is made about the species of one creature in respect of another, I say that a natural likeness in being is not a per se reason for representing one thing in respect of another thing, because this white thing, however much it is more like another white thing than the species is, is not the reason for representing it; but the species of this white thing, which is much less in natural entity, is more like the white thing in the agreement and likeness of the proportion that is of representing thing to represented thing [n.333].
338 Ad tertium dico quod 'determinatio in obiecto' potest intelligi duobus modis: uno modo, determinatio ad singularitatem, per oppositum indeterminationi 'universalis'; alio modo, determinatio ad certum gradum participatum, per oppositum ad illimitationem illius quod participatur. Primo modo 'determinatio in obiecto' non impedit intellectionem summi boni, quod Deus est, - immo ipsum est summum bonum, quod de se singularitas quaedam est; secundo modo impedit, quia non est bonum secundum aliquem gradum determinatum sed absolute bonum, participabile ab omnibus gradibus.	338. To the third [n.310] I say that 'determination in an object' can be understood in two ways: in one way as determination to singularity, in opposition to the indetermination of a universal; in another way as determination to a definite participated degree, in opposition to the unlimitedness of what is participated. In the first way 'determination in an object' does not impede intellection of the supreme good, which is God; rather that is the supreme good which is of itself a certain singularity; in the second way 'determination in an object' does impede this intellection, because the supreme good is good not in some determinate degree but good absolutely, able to be participated in by all degrees.
339 Et licet Augustinus dicat de hoc bono et illo (forte singularibus bonis quae occurrunt animae) 'Tolle hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes' etc., tamen non intelligit hoc nisi quia ista bona particularia includunt limitationem: qua limitatione ablata, statur in illimitatione boni in communi, - et in hoc intelligitur Deus in universali, sicut dictum fuit in I libro distinctione 3; vel ulterius, statur in bono universalissimo secundum perfectionem, - et tunc intelligitur Deus magis in particulari (et illud bonum nec est hoc nec illud), per ablationem gradus boni limitati.	339. And although Augustine says about this good and that good (perhaps about singular goods that occur to the soul) 'Take this good away and that good away, and look at the good itself, if you can etc.', yet he has this understanding only because particular goods include limitation; but, when limitation is taken away, there is a stand at the unlimitedness of the good in general, and in this good is God understood in general, as was said in 1 d.3 n.192; or, further, there is a stand at the good most universal in perfection, and then, by taking away the limited degree of good, God is understood more in particular (and such good is neither this good nor that).
340 Ad quartum dico quod 'imago' uno modo accipitur pro similitudine praecise imitante sive repraesentante, quae non repraesentat quia cognita, sed praecise quia ratio cognoscendi, - alio modo ƿ accipitur pro imitante quod est aliquid aliud a se, et repraesentat quia cognitum; primo modo, species albi in oculo est imago, secundo modo, statua Herculis est imago eius.	340. To the fourth [n.311] I say that 'image' is in one way taken for a likeness that depicts or represents precisely, which represents, not because it is known, but precisely because it is the reason for knowing; in another way 'image' is taken for a likeness that depicts what is something other than itself, and it represents because it is known; in the first way the species of white in the eye is an image; in the second way a statue of Hercules is an image of him.
341 Primo modo ista species Dei in angelo magis est imago quam angelus. Secundo modo angelus est imago, et ad istam imaginem pertinet similitudo aliquo modo naturalis in exsistendo, et consistit in proposito aliqualiter (in hoc quod anima habet trinitatem et unitatem aliquo modo sicut essentia divina habet), et ista similitudo concurrit ad rationem beatificabilis. Licet ergo species divina repraesentet distinctius essentiam divinam quam angelus, tamen angelus est magis imago prout imago dicitur aliquid magis simile in natura, habens actus similes illis actibus qui ponuntur in Trinitate, - cui, ex hoc quod habet tales actus, convenit esse capax illius cuius est imago; et hoc per ista media (scilicet similitudinem naturalem in actibus) convenit imagini Dei prout Augustinus loquitur de ea, quod 'sit capax eius et particeps esse possit'.	341. In the first way the species of God in an angel is more an image than the angel is. In the second way is the angel an image, and to this image belongs a likeness in some way natural in existence, and it consists somehow in what Augustine proposed (in the fact that the soul in a way possesses a unity and trinity, just as the divine essence does), and this likeness is a concurring part in the idea of what is capable of blessedness. Although, therefore, the divine species represents the divine essence more distinctly than an angel does, yet an angel is more of an image to the extent an image is said to be something more alike in nature, possessing acts similar to the acts that are posited in the Trinity - and to this image, from the fact it has such acts, there belongs a capacity for that of which it is the image; and, through these means (namely natural likeness in acts) this capacity belongs to the image of God as Augustine is speaking of it, that 'it is able to have a capacity for him and to participate in him'.
342 Ad aliud posset dici quod licet illa species in intellectu angeli sit ratio distincte cognoscendi essentiam divinam, non tamen est ƿ ratio distincte cognoscendi modum illius essentiae in suppositis, sicut et in nobis, distincte potest cognosci aliqua quiditas creata, licet non cognoscatur in quibus suppositis sit vel qualiter sit in eis.	342. To the next argument [sc. the fifth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a] one could say that, although the species in the intellect of an angel is the reason for distinctly knowing the divine essence, yet it is not a reason for distinctly knowing the mode of that essence in the supposits [persons], just as also some created quiddity in us can be distinctly known although what supposits it is in and how it is in them is not known.
343 Et si obiciatur contra istud, quod quando supposita sunt in natura ex naturali necessitate intrinseca, quod est ratio distincte cognoscendi naturam, erit ratio distincte cognoscendi supposita illa in natura, et tunc videtur quod angelus posset naturaliter cognoscere essentiam divinam in tribus suppositis (pro eo quod posset naturaliter cognoscere in primo supposito esse memoriam infinitam productivam suppositi, et in duobus esse voluntatem infinitam productivam alterius suppositi), - posset dici quod illa co gnitio non esset mere naturalis, quia ad eam non posset angelus naturaliter pertingere ex naturalibus suis, neque ex causis necessariis alicuius naturaliter agentis; ita quod licet angelus, habens speciem essentiae divinae, posset naturaliter uti ea, tamen ipsa species est a causa supernaturali et supernaturaliter agente.	343. And if it be objected against this that when the supposits are, from natural necessity, intrinsic to the nature, then that which is the reason for distinctly knowing the nature will be a reason for distinctly knowing the supposits in the nature, and in that case it seems that an angel could naturally know the divine essence in the three supposits (because he could naturally know that in the first supposit there is an infinite memory productive of a supposit, and that in two there is an infinite will productive of another supposit) - one could say that the knowledge would not be purely natural, because an angel could not naturally reach it on the basis of his natural powers, nor on the basis of the necessary causes of something acting naturally; so that, although an angel possessing a species of the divine essence could naturally use the species, yet the species itself is from a cause that is supernatural and acting supernaturally.
344 Sed contra istud obicitur quod quodlibet 'aliud a Deo' naturaliter cognoscit, quamvis illas 'species alias' recipiat a Deo, imprimente supernaturaliter. - Posset dici quod illas 'alias' posset habere ab illis obiectis in se, nullis 'aliis ab ipsis' agentibus requisitis; sed nullo modo posset habere illam speciem distinctam respectu essentiae divinae, nisi ab ipso imprimente, et hoc non naturaliter sed supernaturaliter. ƿ	344. But against this is objected that an angel naturally knows all things other than God, although he receives the other species from God imprinting them supernaturally. One could say that the angel could have the other species from the objects in themselves, with no agents being required other than those objects; but in no way could an angel have the distinct species with respect to the divine essence save from God imprinting it, and imprinting not naturally but supernaturally.
345 Ad ultimum dico quod si teneatur quod angelus beatus non videt per illam speciem, tunc nec alius - videns eam in intellectu eius - videbit per eam supernaturalia. Si autem ponatur quod illa sit ratio intellectui 'ut in quo' videndi Trinitatem, potest concedi quod etiam alii videnti sit ratio, quia et alius habet in se speciem similem videndi: tunc autem oportet dicere quod visio est naturalis uno modo, et non alio modo, - sicut expositum est in responsione praecedente.	345. To the last argument [sc. the sixth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a] I say that if one holds that a blessed angel does not see supernatural things through that species, then neither will another angel, seeing the species in the first angel's intellect, see supernatural things through it. But if it is posited that the species is, for the intellect, the reason 'as that in which' for seeing the Trinity, one can concede that it is the reason also for another intellect that sees, because the other intellect too has in it a like species of seeing; but then one has to say that the seeing is natural in one way and not in another way, as was expounded in the preceding response [nn.343-344].
	IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion
346 Ad illud pro secunda opinione, quod 'angelus est imago', dico quod aequivocatur imago, quia non est talis quae sit praecise ratio cognoscendi ut cogniti, sed est imago habens similitudinem naturalem aliquo modo in essendo, et in ratione cognoscendi ut ƿ cognita; et praeter omnem talem rationem cognoscendi, quae est ratio in quantum cogniti, oportet ponere aliam - praesuppositam discursui - ab ipsa.	346. To the argument for the second opinion [n.312], that an angel is an image, I say that the term 'image' is equivocal, because an angel is not an image of the sort that is precisely a reason for the knowing of something as known thing; but it is an image having in some way a natural likeness in existing [nn.337, 340-341], and in being a reason for knowing as itself something known; and, in addition to every such reason for knowing as is a reason insofar as it is known, one must posit - as presupposed to discursive knowing - a reason different from it [nn.315-316].
	V. To the Principal Arguments
347 Ad argumenta principalia patet quomodo angelus potest per speciem distincte cognoscere essentiam divinam. Et cum obicitur quod essentia se ipsa 'est intimior intellectui quam ipsa species', dico quod licet propter illam intimitatem posset causare immediate illum actum quem causat species, non tamen ille actus esset in potestate angeli, sicut nec ipsa causa causans ipsum; et si quandoque cessaret ab actu, non posset illum actum iterum habere nisi essentia illa causante actum, quod non esset in potestate ipsius angeli. Ut ergo iste actus - non necessario perpetuus - sit in potestate operantis, necesse est ponere in eo talem speciem, per quam posset perpetuo distincte cognoscere Deum. ƿ	347. As to the principal arguments [nn.303-304], it is plain how an angel can know the divine essence distinctly through a species [nn.324-325, 332-345]. And when it is objected [as by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 3 q.1] that the divine essence 'is more intimate to the angel's intellect than the species is' [n.303], I say that although that intimacy could immediately cause the act that the species causes, yet the act would not be in the power of the angel, just as neither is the cause that causes it; and if the cause should sometimes cease from acting, the angel could not have the act again unless the essence is causing the act, and this would not be in the power of the angel himself. In order, then, that this act, an act not necessarily perpetual, may be in the power of the angel doing it, one must posit in the angel a species of the sort that he can perpetually through it know God distinctly.
348 Per hoc patet ad secundum, scilicet quod non tantum propter hoc ut obiectum sit praesens animae, est species necessaria, sed etiam ut actus sit in potestate operantis.	348. Hereby is plain the answer to the second argument [n.304], namely that a species is necessary, not only so that the object be present to the soul, but also so that the act be in the power of the doer of the act.