Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P2Q1

• I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
• B. Scotus' own Opinion
• C. Instances against Scotus' own Opinion
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question One: Whether an Angel can Know Himself through his own Essence
255 Circa cognitionem angelorum quaero utrum angelus posset se cognoscere per essentiam, ita quod essentia sua sit ratio cognoscendi se sine aliquo repraesentante praecedente actum naturaliter.	255. Concerning the knowledge of angels I ask whether an angel can know himself through essence, such that his own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing that naturally precedes the act.
256 Quod non: Quia hoc non esset nisi quia eius essentia est intelligibilis et praesens ipsi intellectui; sed anima nostra est actu intelligibilis et actualiter sibi praesens, secundum Augustinum in multis loƿ cis; igitur ipsa esset ratio intelligendi se ipsam respectu sui ipsius. Sed hoc est contra Philosophum III De anima, qui vult quod 'anima intelligit se sicut et alia', et quod ((nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere)), et quod 'non possit se intelligere aliis non intellectis'.	256. That he cannot: Because this could only be because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect itself; but our soul is actually intelligible and actually present to itself, according to Augustine in many places [On the Trinity 8.6 n.9, 9.3 n.3, 9.4 nn.4 & 7, 9.5 n.8, 9.6 n.9, 9.12 n.18, 10.3 n.5, 10.4 n.6, 10.7 n.10, 10.8-10 nn.11-16, 10.12 n.19, 14.4 nn.6-7]; therefore our soul would be the reason for understanding itself with respect to itself. But this is contrary to the Philosopher On the Soul [3.4.429b26-29, 429a21-24, 429b5-10], who maintains that 'the soul understands itself the way it understands other things,' and that '[the intellect] is none of the things that are before it understands', and that 'it cannot understand itself when other things are not understood'.
257 Praeterea, essentia angeli est singularis; 'singulare' non est per se intelligibile, nec per se ratio intelligendi; igitur etc.	257. Further, the essence of an angel is singular; a singular is not per se intelligible, nor is it the per se reason for understanding; therefore etc.
258 Praeterea, omnem cognitivam potentiam oportet, secundum se, denudari ab illo quod est ratio cognoscendi; sed angelus, in quantum cognitivus est, non denudatur ab essentia sua; igitur essentia sua non est sibi ratio cognoscendi se ipsum.	258. Further, every cognitive power must, as to itself, be bare of that which is the reason for knowing; but an angel, insofar as he is cognitive, is not bare of his essence; therefore his essence is not for him his reason for knowing himself.
259 Probatio maioris: tum per Philosophum II De anima oportet oculum esse extra omnem colorem, ad hoc ut omnem coƿ lorem possit videre; tum ex III De anima, ubi vult quod intellectus est impermixtus et immaterialis, ad hoc quod omnia possit intelligere.	259. Proof of the minor: first from the Philosopher On the Soul 2 [7.418b26-28,], that every eye must be without all color so that it can see every color; second from On the Soul 3 [4.429a18-20] where he maintains that the soul is unmixed and immaterial, so that it can understand everything.
260 Praeterea, nihil 'idem' patitur a se ipso, quia tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia; essentia angeli est idem sibi; ergo non est obiectum, immediate imprimens in ipsum intellectum.	260. Further, no thing the same is acted on by itself, because then the same thing would be in act and in potency; the essence of an angel is the same as himself; therefore the essence is not the object that immediately makes an impress on the intellect.
261 Praeterea, si angelus posset intelligere se per essentiam suam, igitur illa intellectio esset eadem vel idem cum obiecto vel essentia sua. Consequens falsum, quia hoc est proprium soli Deo quod intellectio sua sit idem cum essentia sua; ergo et antecedens est falsum. Probatur consequentia, quia medium inter extrema magis convenit cum utroque extremo quam alterum extremum cum alƿ tero; 'intelligere' autem mediat inter potentiam et obiectum; igitur si idem est potentia et obiectum, multo magis erit 'idem' actus cum obiecto (confirmatur, quia intellectio non habet distinctionem nisi ab obiecto vel a potentia).	261. Further, if an angel could understand himself through his essence, then the intellection would be the same either as the object or as his essence. The consequent is false, because this is proper to God alone, that his intellection is the same as his essence; therefore the antecedent too is false. The proof of the consequence is that the middle between extremes agrees more with both extremes than either extreme agrees with the other; but 'to understand' is intermediate between the power and the object; therefore if the power and the object are the same, much more will the act be the same as the object (the confirmation is that intellection only gets distinctness from the object or from the power).
262 Contra: Aliqua forma materialis est ratio agendi secundum essentiam suam (sicut calor in igne, ad calefaciendum), aut saltem aliqua in communi, - aut erit processus in infinitum in rationibus agendi; igitur cum immaterialia sint magis activa quam materialia, forma immaterialis erit per essentiam suam ratio agendi actionem sibi competentem; talis est ratio obiecti ad actum cognoscendi.	262. On the contrary: Some material form is the reason for acting according to the material thing's essence (as heat is in fire, for the act of heating), or at any rate something in common is, else there will be an infinite regress in reasons for acting; therefore, since immaterial things are more active than material ones, an immaterial form will be, by its essence, the reason for performing the act that belongs to it; such is the idea of object to act of knowing.
	I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others
263 Hic dicitur sic, quod licet in actione transeunte obiectum sit separatum ab agente, tamen in actione immanente oportet ƿ obiectum esse unitum ipsi operanti, - et ut unitum, est formalis ratio talis operationis immanentis, sicut species visionis in oculo; ex hoc ultra: cum essentia angeli sit de se unita intellectui suo, potest esse principium intellectionis, quae est operatio immanens.	263. Here the following is said [Aquinas STIa q.56 a.1, SG II ch.98], that although the object is separate from the agent in the case of an action that passes over to something extrinsic, yet in the case of an action that is immanent the object must be united to the operator, and, as united, it is the formal idea of such immanent operation, as the species of vision is in the eye; and from this it is further said that, since the essence of an angel is of itself united to his intellect, it can be the principle of the intellection, which is an immanent operation.
264 Et si obiciatur quod oportet formam talem inesse illi cui inest talis operatio (isto modo non inest essentia angeli sibi ipsi, cui tamen est ratio agendi), videtur respondere quod forma exsistens in alio et inhaerens alii, est principium operandi; et si per se esset, nihil minus esset per se ratio agendi, - sicut calor, si separatus esset, esset principium calefactionis quantum ex se est. Ergo ita est de essentia angeli, quod licet per se subsistat, potest tamen esse ratio operandi ista operatione immanente.	264. And if it be objected that such a form should be in that in which there is such an operation (it is not in this way in the essence itself of the angel, where however the reason for acting is), the response seems to be [Aquinas ST Ia q.56 a.1] that the form existing in something else and inhering in something else is the principle of operating; and if the form existed per se, it would no less be per se the reason for acting - just as heat, if it were separate, would, as far as concerns itself, be the principle of heating. Therefore so it is with the essence of an angel, that, although it subsists per se, yet it can be the reason for operating with the above immanent operation.
265 Et si obiciatur iterum quod oportet passum aliquid recipere ab agente (hic autem intellectus nihil recipit ab ipsa essentia, quia ƿ non ponitur aliqua species praecedens actum), respondet quod potentia cognitiva aliqua quandoque est in potentia cognoscens, quandoque in actu, aliqua autem non sic. Quod autem oporteat eam 'recipere', hoc non est quia potentia cognitiva, sed tantum quia quandoque est in potentia ad actum; non sic in proposito; quare etc.	265. And if it be again objected that the thing acted on should receive something from the agent (but here the intellect receives nothing from the essence itself, because no species preceding the act is posited), the response is [Aquinas ibid.] that some cognitive power is at times potentially knowing and at times actually knowing, but some other cognitive power is not so. Now, the fact that there is need for a cognitive power to receive something is not because it is a cognitive power, but only because it is sometimes in potency to act; in the issue at hand it is not so; therefore etc.
266 Contra istud. Haec opinio ponit - ut videtur - quod intellectus sit in potentia essentiali ad operationem et intellectionem (quam ponit operationem immanentem), et quod tota ratio illius operationis sit obiectum ut unitum est cum sua potentia, sicut calor est in ligno tota ratio calefaciendi. Ex hoc arguo: nihil potest habere principium actionis immanentis alicuius agentis, nisi sit in actu per illud quod est principium talis actionis; intellectus autem non est in actu per essentiam suam in hoc quod est per se subsistens, quia non informat, nec aliquam activitatem tribuit ipsi intellectui; igitur per hoc quod talis essentia 'per se exsistens' est praesens ipsi intellectui, non ƿ potest intellectus habere operationem cuius per eum illa essentia (vel eius similitudo) nata est esse ratio intelligendi.	266. Against this: This opinion posits, as it seems, that the intellect is in essential potency to operation and intellection (which it posits to be an immanent operation), and the whole reason for the operation is the object as it is united to the power, the way heat in wood is the whole reason for heating [nn.263-64]. From this I argue: nothing can have the principle of immanent action of any agent unless it is in act through that which is the principle of such action; but the intellect is not in act through its own essence in that which is per se subsistent, because the essence does not inform or impose any activity on the intellect itself; therefore the fact that such per se existing essence is present to an intellect itself cannot make the intellect have an operation where the essence (or its likeness) is, through the intellect, of a nature to be the reason for understanding.
267 Confirmatur istud per exemplum suum, contra ipsum: quia licet calor sit calefaciens vel ratio calefactionis, non tamen esset ligno - a quo esset separatus - ratio calefactionis, ita quod si 'calere' dicitur operatio immanens, impossibile esset calere calore separato a ligno; igitur impossibile est lignum habere istam operationem immanentem, quae est 'calere'. Ita in proposito; igitur etc.	267. His own example [about heat, n.264] confirms this against him; because although heat is what heats or is the reason for heating, yet it would not in the wood -from which it was separated - be the reason for heating, so that, if 'to heat' is called an immanent operation, it would be impossible for the wood to heat by the heat separated from the wood; therefore it is impossible for the wood to have this immanent operation, which is 'to heat'. So it is in the issue at hand; therefore etc.
268 Praeterea, secundo, contra illud quod dicit quod 'potentia nihil recipit, quia non est quandoque in potentia, quandoque in actu': obiectum respectu eius quod est in intellectu de eo (scilicet respectu intellectionis), non est tantum causa in fieri (sicut ƿ est aedificator respectu domus), sed est causa tam in fieri quam in esse (alioquin sicut aedificatore corrupto manet domus, ita obiecto quantumcumque absente vel corrupto in ratione obiecti, maneret illud quod est eius 'ut obiecti' apud intellectum); causa autem in esse et in fieri semper aeque causat, sicut patet de sole respectu radii; igitur obiectum quod ponitur principium operationis intellectionis, semper aeque causat, et per consequens intellectus semper aeque recipit. Non ergo solum ab obiecto recipit intellectus 'quia recipit actum novum, quem quandoque non recipit', sed quia est causa in esse respectu eius quod semper recipit ab eo. ƿ	268. Further, second, against what he says, that 'the power does not receive anything because it is not sometimes in potency and sometimes in act' [n.265] - the object in respect of that which is in the intellect about it (namely in respect of intellection) is not only the cause in its coming to be (the way a builder is cause in respect of the house), but is cause both in its coming to be and in its being (otherwise, just as the house remains when the builder is corrupted, so when the object is at all absent or corrupted in idea of object that which is in the intellect about it as object would remain); but a cause of coming to be and of being is always equally causing, as is plain about the sun with respect to rays of sunlight [1 d.3 nn.602-603]; therefore the object that is posited as the principle of the operation of intellection [n.263] is always equally causing, and consequently the intellect is always equally receiving. The intellect then receives from the object not merely because it receives a new act which it is sometimes not receiving, but because the object is cause of being with respect to that which is always from it receiving.
	B. Scotus' own Opinion
269 Ad quaestionem igitur dico quod angelus potest intelligere se per essentiam suam, secundum intellectum expositum in principio quaestionis.	269. To the question therefore I say that an angel can understand himself through his essence according to the sense expounded at the beginning of the question [sc. 'an angel's own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing that naturally precedes the act', n.255].
270 Quod probo: Primo, quia obiectum habet aliquam causalitatem partialem respectu intellectionis (et hoc, obiectum in quantum est actu intelligibile), et intellectus habet suam causalitatem partialem respectu eiusdem actus, secundum quam concurrit cum obiecto ad talem actionem perfecte producendam, - ita quod ista duo, quando sunt in se perfecta et unita, sunt una causa integra respectu intellectionis. Ex hoc arguo sic: omnis causa partialis quae est in actu perfecto sibi proprio, secundum quod talis causa, potest causare causalitate sibi correspondente effectum, - et quando est unita alteri causae partiali in suo actu, potest cum ea perfecte causare; sed essentia angeli est de se in actu primo correspondente obiecto, quia de se est actu intelligibilis, et est de se unita intellectui cum coniunctione utriusque causae partialis; ergo potest immediate, cum alia causa partiali unita, habere actum perfectum intellectionis respectu suae essentiae. ƿ	270. In proof I say: First, because an object has some partial causality with respect to intellection (and this the object insofar as it is actually intelligible), and the intellect has its own partial causality with respect to the same act, according to which it concurs with the object for perfectly producing such act - so that these two, when they are in themselves perfect and united, are one integral cause with respect to intellection [1 d.3 nn.486-494]. From this I argue as follows: every partial cause that is in the perfect act proper to itself as it is such a cause can cause the effect with the causality corresponding to itself; and, when it is united to the second partial cause in its act, it can, along with it, cause perfectly; but the essence of an angel is of itself in first act corresponding to the object, because it is of itself actually intelligible, and it is of itself united to the intellect with aconjunction of both partial causes; therefore it can, along with the other partial cause united to it, perfectly have a perfect act of intellection with respect to the essence.
271 Praeterea, in intelligibilibus habentibus species intelligibiles, illae species virtute obiectorum - cum intellectu - causant intellectionem, in quibus tamen obiecta habent esse deminutum; igitur si in se haberent tale esse absolutum et esse simpliciter (scilicet actu intelligibile), possent verius causare eundem effectum, quia quidquid potest causari ab aliquo deminute tali in aliquo esse, virtute alicuius simpliciter talis potest - et ab illo - simpliciter causari. Sed essentia angeli ut in se, est praesens intellectui suo, quae quidem essentia est simpliciter tale (scilicet actu intelligibilis in se, et secundum quid in specie intelligibili); quare etc. ƿ	271. Further, in the case of intelligible things possessed of intelligible species, the species, along with the intellect, cause an intellection by virtue of the objects; but the objects in the intelligible things have a diminished being; therefore, if they had in themselves an absolute such being and being simply (namely actually intelligible being), then they could more truly cause the same effect, because whatever can be caused by something diminishedly such in some being, can be simply caused by virtue of, and by, something simply such. But the essence of an angel as it is in itself is present to the angel's intellect, and this essence indeed is simply such (namely, actually intelligible in itself, and intelligible in a certain respect in the intelligible species); therefore etc.
	C. Instances against Scotus' own Opinion
272 Obicitur contra istud, quia tunc res sensibilis posset immediate - absque specie intelligibili - causare intellectionem (quod negatum est in I libro distinctione 3), quia res sensibilis 'praesens sensui' est simpliciter tale quale ipsum est secundum quid in specie intelligibili; igitur si in specie intelligibili (ubi est secundum quid) potest causare intellectionem, multo magis ut est in se secundum esse simpliciter et absolutum.	272. It is objected against this view [n.271] that then a sensible thing could cause intellection immediately, without an intelligible species (which was denied in 1 d.3 nn.334, 382); because a sensible thing present to the senses is of such sort simply as it is in a certain respect in the intelligible species; therefore if in the intelligible species (where it is in a certain respect) it can cause intellection, much more can it do so as it is in itself according to its being simply and absolutely.
273 Praeterea, videtur contra istam positionem posse argui sicut argutum est contra opinionem, - quia nihil est alicui ratio operandi operatione immanente nisi informet illud; essentia autem angeli, licet actu intelligibilis sit et praesens intellectui, tamen non informat ipsum intellectum; igitur non est ei ratio operandi operatione immanente. ƿ	273. Further, it seems one can argue against this position [n.269] as was argued against the opinion [of Aquinas, n.266], that nothing is for anything the reason for its operating with an immanent operation unless it informs it; but although the essence of an angel is actually intelligible and present to the intellect, yet it does not inform the intellect; therefore the essence is not for the intellect the reason for its operating with an immanent operation.
274 Praeterea, si ista duo agentia semper concurrunt ad eundem effectum communem, igitur habent ordinem, cum non sint eiusdem rationis; alterum ergo est prius sive superius, alterum posterius sive inferius, - et ita unum erit 'movens motum', et alterum respectu eius erit 'movens non motum'. Obiectum autem non est 'movens motum' respectu intellectus, sed 'movens non motum', igitur intellectus est 'movens motum'respectu obiecti.	274. Further, if these two agents always concur for the same common effect [n.270], then they have an order between them, since they are not of the same idea; therefore one of the two is prior or superior, and the other posterior and inferior, and so one will be a moved mover and the other will, with respect to it, be an unmoved mover. But the object is not a moved mover with respect to the intellect but an unmoved mover; therefore the intellect is a moved mover with respect to the object [1 d.3 n.554].
275 Praeterea, quarto: quod dicitur de istis causis partialibus concurrentibus ad unum effectum communem, videtur inconveniens, quia duo 'distincta genere' non possunt causare effectum eiusdem rationis; spirituale autem et corporale, sive intelligibile et sensibile, differunt genere; quare etc.	275. Further, fourth: what is said about these partial causes concurring for one common effect [sc. that they are one integral cause of intellection, n.270] seems unacceptable, because two things distinct in genus cannot cause an effect of the same idea; but the spiritual and bodily, or the intelligible and sensible, differ in genus; therefore etc.
276 Probatio maioris, quia duabus illis rationibus in causis partialibus, correspondent 'aliqua duo distincta' in ipso effectu, et ita idem effectus esset corporalis et spiritualis, quod est inconveniens. Tum quia omne agens est praestantius patiente; corporale autem sive sensibile nullo modo est praestantius spirituali; igitur non potest esse agens respectu eius nisi in virtute alicuius praestantioris agentis, et ita erit 'movens motum'. Tum tertio, quia tunc unum posset ita intendi quod virtus tota amborum esset in altero, et tunc illud solum posset causare illum effectum sufficienter sine alio, quod est inconveniens de talibus duobus agentibus. ƿ	276. Proof of the major: because corresponding to these two ideas in the partial causes are two distinct somethings in the effect, and so the same effect would be bodily and spiritual, which is unacceptable. Second, because every agent is more excellent than its patient [1 d.3 n.507]; but the bodily or sensible is in no way more excellent than the spiritual; therefore it cannot be the agent in respect of the spiritual save in virtue of some more excellent agent, and so it will be a moved mover. Next third, because then one of the causes could be so intensified that the whole virtue of both could be in that one of the two, and then it alone could sufficiently cause the effect without the other [1 d.3 n.497], which is unacceptable in the case of two such agents.
277 Ad primum. Distinctione 3 primi, ideo posita est species intelligibilis differens ab actu, quia obiectum - sive ut in se exsistens sive ut in quacumque specie extra intellectum possibilemnon habet rationem actu intelligibilis. Et tunc concedo istud quod ubicumque est aliquid exsistens secundum quid tale et potest aliquid facere simpliciter tale, ibi, si esset simpliciter tale in actu, posset facere idem simpliciter; obiectum autem sensibile secundum quid est in specie intelligibili, et non est extra illam speciem actu intelligibile, - et ideo licet in illa (ubi est secundum quid tale) posset causare deminutam intellectionem, numquam tamen extra illam potest causare, nec deminutam nec perfectam, quia non est extra illam actu tale ens (sed potentia tantum) quale est suum activum. Essentia autem angeli deminute est tale ens et ens tale in specie (si habet); est autem simpliciter in se et ens tale actu intelligibile; quare etc.	277. Response to the first objection [n.272]. In 1 d.3 [nn.349-350, 382] an intelligible species different from the act was posited for this reason, that the object -whether as existing in itself or as existing in any species whatever outside the possible intellect - does not have the idea of an intelligible in act. And then I concede the fact that, wherever there is a thing existing as of some sort in a certain respect and something can make it simply of that sort, there it could, if it were simply such in act, do the same thing simply. But the sensible object is in a certain respect in the intelligible species and is not actually intelligible outside the species; and so, although in the species (where it is in a certain respect such) it could cause a diminished intellection, yet it can never cause intellection outside the species, whether a diminished or a perfect intellection, because outside the species it is not actually (but only potentially) such a sort of being as the actualizer of it is. Now the essence of an angel is such a sort of being diminishedly, that is, a being of such sort in the species (if it has a species); but it is in itself simply a being and such a being is actually intelligible; therefore etc.
278 Ad secundum dico quod ad illam opinionem quae non ponit intellectum habere activitatem aliquam, aliam ab illa quam habet formaliter ab obiecto vel per speciem obiecti (sicut nec lignum ƿ habet aliam actionem in calefaciendo, ab illa quae est caloris), necessario sequitur quod intellectus - non habens aliquid formaliter - non operatur aliquid formaliter; et ita argutum est contra primam opinionem, quae hoc idem videtur sentire de intellectu. Sed sicut dictum fuit in I libro, intellectus habet activitatem propriam suam cum obiecto praesente (in se sive in specie sua), sed concurrente secum ad causandum effectum communem amborum, ita quod sufficit unio et approximatio istarum partium formalium; nec tamen requiritur quod altera alteram informet, quia neutra dat alteri actum pertinentem ad suam causalitatem partialem.	278. To the second [n.273] I say that on the opinion that does not posit the intellect to have any activity, different from the activity it has formally from the object or through the species of the object (just as neither does the wood have an action in heating different from the action which is that of the heat [1 d.3 nn.456-459]) - that on this opinion it necessarily follows that the intellect (not having anything formally) does not do anything formally; and so was it argued against the first opinion [of Aquinas, nn.266-267], which seems to think this same thing about the intellect. But, as was said in 1 d.3 [nn.486-489, 494, 498, 500], the intellect does have its own proper activity along with an object present to it (present in itself or in its species), but an object concurring with it to cause an effect common to them both, so that the union and coming together of these formal parts suffice; and yet there is no requirement that one of the parts inform the other, because neither gives to the other an act pertaining to its own partial causality.
279 Ad tertium dico quod 'movens motum' potest intelligi duobus modis: vel quod recipiat a 'movente non moto' formam aliquam (qua moveat) sicut actum primum, - vel quod ipsa forma, habita sicut actus primus, recipiat ab eo aliquam formam (ulteriorem) sicut actum secundum, qua agat.	279. To the third [n.274] I say that 'moved mover' can be understood in two ways: either because it receives from the unmoved mover some form as first act (whereby it may move), or because the form, possessed as first act, receives from the unmoved mover some (further) form as second act, by which it may act.
280 Primo autem modo est in quibusdam causis ordinatis, quod prima dat virtutem secundae; sed hoc modo non est in proposito, quia neque intellectus 'ut agens causalitate sua partiali' dat speciei obiecti actum istum, quo operatur ad intellectionem, - neque multo magis e converso, quia species obiecti nullam activitatem dat intellectui, pertinentem ad causalitatem eius. ƿ	280. Now the first way exists in certain ordered causes where a first gives virtue to a second; but this way is not in the issue at hand, because neither does the intellect, as acting by its own partial causality, give this act, whereby it operates for intellection, to the species of the object; and much less does the reverse happen, because the species of the object does not give to the intellect any activity pertaining to the causality of it.
281 Secundo modo videtur esse in quibusdam moventibus localiter, sicut manus movet baculum et baculus movet pilam: non enim dat manus baculo duritiam, per quam expellit corpus ad locum, sed dat praecise baculo motionem localem, qua scilicet applicatur ad istam expulsionem propter incompossibilitatem unius corporis duri ad aliud corpus durum, quod non cedit ei. Hoc modo videtur esse in agentibus ad aliquem effectum productum per generationem vel alterationem, quia licet ibi causae ordinatae habeant aliquam rationem causandi et inferior non causet nisi in virtute superioris, ista tamen virtus sive assistentia sive influentia quocumque modo nominetur - non est impressio alicuius formae vel cuiuscumque inhaerentis in causa inferiore vel superiore, sed tantum est ordo et actualis coniunctio talium causarum activarum, ex quibus, sic coniunctis et suis propriis activitatibus praesuppositis coniunctioni, sequitur effectus communis ambarum causarum.	281. The second way is seen in certain things moving locally, the way the hand moves the stick and the stick moves the ball; for the hand does not give to the stick the hardness by which it impels the body toward some place; rather it gives to the stick precisely a local motion whereby, namely, it is applied to this impelling because of the incompossibility that one hard body against another hard body not yield to it. This is the way it seems to be in things acting for some effect produced by generation or alteration, because although the ordered causes there have some reason for causing and the inferior does not cause save in virtue of the superior, yet this virtue or assistance or influence -whatever name one gives it - is not the impression of some form or of something or other inhering in the inferior or superior cause, but is only an order and actual conjunction of such active causes, from which, as thus conjoined and with their proper activities presupposed to the conjoining, an effect follows common to both causes [1 d.3 nn.495- 496].
282 Ad propositum igitur dico quod non solum ista non sunt movens et motum primo modo, sed nec secundo modo proprie (sicut se habent sol et pater in generatione), sed tantum sunt duae causae quasi ex aequo se habentes, quoad hoc quod neutra per se totaliter movet et tamen una priorem causalitatem habet respectu effectus quam altera.	282. Therefore to the issue at hand [nn.274, 279] I say that not only are the causes in question not mover and moved in the first way but they are not even properly so in the second way (the way that the sun and a father are disposed in generation); rather they are only two causes disposed as it were equally, in respect of the fact that neither per se totally moves and yet one of them has, in respect of the effect, a causality prior to the other.
283 Forte enim numquam causa inferior agit in virtute causae suƿ perioris (proprie loquendo), nisi in forma sua 'qua agit' aliquo modo dependeat a causa superiore, licet non tunc - quando agit recipiat eam ab illa, sed prius duratione vel natura. Nec enim obiectum dependet ab anima (saltem ut intellectus possibilis est) quantum ad illam formam qua actualiter operatur ad istam intellectionem, nec multo magis e converso; et ideo nullo modo est obiectum 'movens non motum' respectu animae ut operatur ad intellectionem.	283. For perhaps the inferior cause never acts in virtue of the superior cause (properly speaking), unless in its form, whereby it acts, it depends in some way on the superior cause, although it does not then - when it acts - receive that form from the superior cause but has it prior in duration or in nature. For neither does the object depend on the soul (at any rate as the soul is the possible intellect) with respect to the form by which it actually operates for the intellection, nor much less so the reverse dependence; and therefore the object is in no way an unmoved mover with respect to the soul as it operates for intellection.
284 Potest tamen esse movens respectu eius in quantum ipsa recipit speciem intelligibilem, sed tunc non movet animam quantum ad causalitatem quam habet anima per se, sed per accidens quantum ad illam formam respectu causae partialis, in quantum operatur ad illam. Et hoc modo dictum fuit in I distinctione 3 quod 'intellectus agens et phantasma sunt una causa totalis speciei', et ulterius 'species intelligibilis et aliquid animae (sive sit intellectus agens sive possibilis) sunt una causa totalis intellectionis': ita quod in primo est obiectum (sive phantasma) movens animam ad intellectionem, et non ad actum primum qui sit animae ut anima est, sed ad illum qui est a reliqua causa partiali, sibi praevia; in secundo autem obiectum omnino non movet animam, neque ad ƿ actum primum animae neque quoad aliquam causam concurrentem aliam, sed praecise agit ad effectum communem, - et tunc anima per suum actum quem habuit, 'agere' in suo ordine perfectum ostendit, ita quod nulla est ibi motio animae ad agendum, prior naturaliter ipso effectu producto. Ad effectum tamen movetur anima non in quantum activa, sed in quantum receptiva illius effectus, - et ita licet sit mota, non tamen est 'movens mota', quia non movetur ad movere active sed ad recipere.	284. However it can be a mover with respect to the soul insofar as the soul receives the intelligible species, but then it does not move the soul as to the causality that the soul has per se, but moves it per accidens to the form in respect of the partial cause, insofar as the soul operates on that form. And this is the way it was said in 1 d.3 [n.563] that 'the agent intellect and the phantasm are one total cause of the [intelligible] species', and further that 'the intelligible species and something in the soul (whether the agent intellect or the possible intellect) are one total cause of intellection' [nn.563-564]; so that in the first case there is an object (or a phantasm) moving the soul to intellection, and not to the first act that is the soul's as it is soul but to the act that is from the rest of the partial cause previous it; but in the second case the object does not move the soul at all, neither to the first act of the soul nor as to any other concurrent cause, but it acts precisely for the common effect - and then the soul, by the act that it had [sc. through its first act], displays in its own order its perfect acting [or: displays.. .its acting through the effect], so that there is no motion of the soul there for acting naturally prior to the effect produced. However the soul is not moved to the effect insofar as it is active but insofar as it receptive of the effect, and so, although it is moved, yet it is not a moved mover, because it is not moved to actively moving but to receiving.
285 Ad quartum dico quod illa propositio prima est falsa de causis partialibus, ordinatis quomodocumque ad eundem effectum, - hoc est, quod sit ordo essentialis eorum et non sint omnino eiusdem rationis. Tales enim, quae sunt alterius rationis, non sunt tantum distinctae specie (quia huiusmodi non concurrunt communiter ut causae ordinatae ad eundem effectum), nec tantum distinctae numero (quia tunc non talis rationis sunt), - igitur distinctae genere; et si accipias quod non in 'tali genere', ex ratione distinctionis generis non potest sequi magis in hoc genere quam in illo. ƿ	285. To the fourth [n.275] I say that the first proposition [sc. 'two things distinct in genus cannot cause an effect of the same idea'] is false of partial causes ordered in some way or other to the same effect - that is, that there is an essential order to them and they are not altogether of the same idea. For such partial causes, which are of a different idea, are not only distinct in species (because causes of the same species do not go together in common as causes ordered to the same effect), nor are they only distinct in number (because then they are not of such idea [sc. ordered partial causes]) - therefore they are distinct in genus; and if you take it that they are not distinct 'in this sort of genus', a consequence drawn from the idea of distinction in genus cannot hold more of this genus than of that.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
286 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum concedo quod anima de se est actu intelligibilis et praesens sibi, et ex hoc sequitur quod posset intelligere se, si non esset impedita; nihil enim deficit actui primo, neque a parte unius causae neque ambarum, neque ex parte unionis earum, - et ita totus actus primus de se perfectus est, ad quem deberet sequi iste actus secundus qui est 'intellectio'. Propter hoc forte dicit frequenter Augustinus quod anima 'semper novit se', propter istam proximitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo.	286. To the principal arguments [nn.256-261]: To the first [n.256] I concede that the soul is of itself actually intelligible and present to itself, and from this follows that it could understand itself if it were not impeded; for nothing is lacking to first act, neither on the part of one cause or both, nor on the part of their union; and thus the whole of first act is perfect of itself, and on this first act should follow the second act that is intellection. For this reason, perhaps, Augustine frequently says that the soul 'always knows itself, because of this proximity to the act of knowing when there is no imperfection in first act.
287 Hoc autem modo non semper anima novit lapidem, quia etsi semper habeat actum perfectum intelligendi lapidem respectu suae propriae causalitatis partialis, non tamen semper habet aliam causam partialem in actu et actu praesentem, - et ideo potest dici 'quandoque in potentia essentiali' ad intelligendum lapidem, quando scilicet caret illa forma, quae nata est esse alia causa partialis in actu et in actu uniri sibi. Et hoc modo trinitatem ponit Auguƿ stinus et tamen ad solam memoriam pertinere, quia istud totum non est nisi praesentia obiecti sub ratione intelligibilis (quod pertinet ad memoriam, - sed in hoc est virtualis intellectio obiecti illius, quae pertinet ad intelligentiam; et hoc modo, cum voluntas sit praesens ut actus primus, est quodammodo perfectus ad habendum actum secundum respectu sui ipsius sicut effectus, in causa sufficiente ut in voluntate, et in eo 'sine quo non' ut in intellectione. Sed quia nihil est de toto isto in actu nisi solum quod pertinet ad memoriam, ideo ista tota trinitas (quae scilicet nata est esse trinitas) tantum est in memoria, quantum ad realitatem eius actualem.	287. Now the soul does not in this way always know a stone, because although it always has the perfect act of knowing a stone with respect to its own proper partial causality, yet it does not always have the other partial cause in act and present to it in act; and therefore the soul can be said to be 'sometimes in essential potency' to understanding a stone, namely when it lacks the form that is of a nature to be the other partial cause in act and of a nature to be united to it in act. And in this way does Augustine posit a trinity [On the Trinity 14.6 n.9, 7 n.10] and yet posits that it pertains to the memory alone, because the whole thing exists under the idea of being intelligible only in the presence of the object (and this pertains to the memory [1 d.2 nn.221, 291, 310, d.3 n.580]), but in it is the virtual intellection of the object, which intellection pertains to the intelligence; and in this way, when the will is present as first act, the first act is in some way, in the sufficient cause as in the will and in the sine qua non condition as in the intellection, perfected for having a second act with respect to itself as effect. But because nothing of this whole save what pertains to the memory is in act, therefore this whole trinity (namely, that which is of a nature to be a trinity) is in the memory alone as to its real actuality.
288 Sed quare non exit iste actus totalis primus in actum secundum, cum sit per se sufficiens principium eliciendi actum secundum? - Respondeo: quia est impedimentum, quod ista causa vincere non potest; sicut quantumcumque poneretur 'causa naturalis' perfecta, numquam tamen posset agere, propter impedimentum vincens.	288. But why does this total first act not proceed to second act [n.286], since it is per se a sufficient principle for eliciting the second act? I reply: because there is an impediment which this cause cannot overcome, in just the way that a natural cause, however much it be posited to be perfect, could yet never act because of some impediment overcoming it.
289 Sed quod est istud impedimentum? - Respondeo: intellectus noster pro statu isto non est natus movere vel moveri immediate, nisi ab aliquo imaginabili vel 'sensibili extra' prius moveatur. ƿ	289. But what is this impediment? I reply: our intellect, for this present state, is not of a nature immediately to move or be moved unless it is first moved by something imaginable or sensible from outside.
290 Et quare hoc? - Forte propter peccatum, sicut videtur Augustinus dicere XV Trinitatis cap. 27: 'Hoc tibi fecit infirmitas, et quae causa infirmitatis nisi iniquitas?' (idem dicit Commentator VI Ethicorum, et Lincolniensis ibidem et super librum Posteriorum similiter). Vel forte ista causa est naturalis, prout natura isto modo instituta est (non absolute naturalis), puta si ordo iste potentiarum (de quo dictum est in I diffuse) necessario hoc requirat, quod quodcumque universale intellectus intelligat, oporƿ tet phantasiam actu phantasiare singulare eiusdem; sed hoc non est ex natura (nec ista causa est absolute naturalis), sed ex peccato, - et non solum ex peccato, sed ex natura potentiarum pro statu isto, quidquid dicat Augustinus.	290. And why is this? Perhaps because of sin, as Augustine seems to say On the Trinity 15.27 [cf. 1 d.13 n.78], "Infirmity does this to you, and what is cause of infirmity but sin?" (The same is said by the commentator on Ethics 6 and by Lincoln on the same place and on Posterior Analytics likewise.) Or perhaps this cause is natural, in that in this way was nature set up (as not absolutely natural), namely, if the order of powers (which was discussed largely in 1 d.3 nm.187, 392) necessarily required this, that a phantasm must, as regard whatever universal the intellect may understand, make actually appear a singular of the same universal; but this does not come from nature (nor is this cause absolutely natural), but from sin - and not only from sin but from the nature of the powers in this present state, whatever Augustine may be saying.
291 Ad formam igitur argumenti dico quod illa causa quae est ex parte angeli, est sufficiens ad hoc quod essentia angeli sit ratio sufficiens intelligendi se; ipsa etiam talis est ex parte animae, sed in anima est impedita, in angelo non est impedita: non enim intellectus angeli habet talem ordinem ad imaginabilia sicut intellectus noster habet pro statu isto.	291. To the form, then, of the argument [n.256] I say that the cause that is on the part of the angel [sc. 'because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect itself, n.256] is sufficient for the essence of the angel to be the sufficient reason for understanding itself; the essence is also such on the part of the soul, but in the soul it is impeded, and in the angel not impeded; for the intellect of an angel does not have the sort of order to imaginables that our intellect has in this present state.
292 Et propter istam impotentiam intelligendi immediate 'intelligibilia in actu' (quae impotentia non est ex impossibilitate intrinseca sed extrinseca, quam impossibilitatem etiam experiebatur Philosophus, et non aliquam possibilitatem!), dixit ipse Philosophus quod 'intellectus non est aliquod intelligibilium ante intelligere', hoc est 'non est possibile intelligi a se ante intelligere aliorum'; quae propositio multiplex est, secundum compositionem et divisionem (sicut illa VI Topicorum 'hoc nunc est primo ƿ immortale vel incorruptibile'), ex eo quod praepositio cum suo casuali (quae aequipollet adverbiali determinationi) potest componi cum illo infinitivo signante terminum potentiae (et est sensus compositionis), vel cum ipsa compositione signata per terminum vel verbum indicativum (et est sensus divisionis): ut primus sensus sit iste 'non est possibile intellectum intelligi a se ante intelligere aliorum', et iste sensus verus est secundum eum, - alius autem sensus est quod 'ante intelligere aliorum intelligibilium non est possibile intellectum intelligere', et falsus est (sicut illa 'hoc nunc primo est immortale' falsa est de homine pro statu innocentiae, VI Topicorum). Et hoc modo Philosophus dicit quod 'anima intelligit se sicut alia'.	292. And because of this impotency for immediately understanding intelligibles in act (which impotency does not come from an intrinsic but an extrinsic impossibility, which impossibility, and not just any impossibility, the Philosopher also experienced), the Philosopher himself said that 'the intellect is not any of the intelligibles before it understands' [n.256], that is, 'it is not able to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things'; and this last proposition is multiple, according to composition and division (like the proposition in Topics 6.6.145b21-30, 'this now is first immortal or incorruptible'), from the fact that the preposition 'before' along with its clause 'the understanding of other things' (which is equivalent to an adverbial determination) can be composed with the infinitive 'to be understood' signifying the term of the power (and the sense is that of composition) or with the composition itself signified by the indicative term of verb 'is' (and the sense is that of division); so that the first sense [sc. of composition] is this: 'it is not possible for the intellect to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things', and this sense is true according to the Philosopher; but the other sense [sc. of division] is that 'before the understanding of other intelligibles it is not possible for the intellect to understand', and it is false (just as the proposition 'this is now first immortal' is false about man in the state of innocence, Topics 6 above). And in this way does the Philosopher understand that 'the soul understands itself as it does other things' [n.256].
293 Et secundum istum modum expositionis, movetur intellectus ab obiectis imaginabilibus, - et eis cognitis, potest ex eis cognoscere rationes communes et immaterialibus et materialibus, et ita reflectendo cognoscit se ipsum sub ratione communi sibi et ƿ imaginabilibus. Non autem potest statim intelligere se, nullo alio intellecto, quia non potest statim moveri a se, propter ordinem eius necessarium pro statu isto ad imaginabilia.	293. And, according to this mode of exposition, the intellect is moved by imaginable objects and, when these are known, it can know from them ideas common to immaterial and to material things and thus, by reflection, know itself under an idea common to itself and to imaginable things. But it cannot understand itself immediately without understanding something else [n.256], for it cannot be moved immediately by itself because of its necessary ordering, in this present state, to imaginable things [1 d.3 nn.541-542].
294 Ad secundum dicit unus doctor quod 'singulare potest per se intelligi, licet non singulare materiale, - quia singularitas non prohibet, sed materialitas' (alioquin Deus non esset intelligibilis, cum sit singulare, - quod falsum est); et tunc patet responsio, quod propositio assumpta 'de non intellecto singulari' non est vera nisi de singulari materiali. Alius dicit quod 'non valet nec se nec alia intelligere sub ratione singularis (materialis vel immaterialis), sed universalis, quod est per se obiectum intellectus, quod ƿ etiam relucet in habitu intelligibili'; et secundum hoc etiam patet responsio ad argumentum. - Neutrum tamen credo esse verum nisi loquendo de intellectu materiali, qui propter imperfectionem sui non potest - forte - quodcumque intelligibile intelligere, quod intellectus angelicus potest.	294. As to the second principal argument [n.257], one doctor says [Aquinas ST Ia q.56 a.1 ad2] that a singular can be per se understood although not a material singular, because it is not the singularity but the materiality that gets in the way (otherwise God would not be intelligible since he is singular, which is false); and then the response is plain, that the assumed proposition about the non-understood singular ['a singular is not per se intelligible', n.257] is only true of a material singular. Another doctor says [Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.15] that the intellect is not able to understand either itself or other things under the idea of a singular (material or immaterial) but under the idea of a universal, which is per se the object of the intellect and also shines forth in the intelligible habit; and according to this opinion too the response to the argument is plain. However I believe neither is true save when speaking of the material intellect, which is not able perhaps, because of its imperfection, to understand every intelligible that an angelic intellect can understand.
295 Ad tertium dico quod ratio illius propositionis maioris - primo in potentiis sensitivis - est ista 'quia omnis potentia sensitiva requirit determinatum organum'; unde ex determinato numero possibili organorum, concludit Philosophus II De anima determinatum numerum actionum vel obiectorum. Istud autem organum oportet ita esse dispositum ut possit recipere ipsum sensibile sine materia, - et in corporalibus quidquid est receptivum formae sine materia, non est receptivum communiter cuiuslibet formae (ideo dixi 'communiter', quia non est modo sermo de organo tactus, de quo est difficultas specialis). Organum igitur sensus oportet esse non tale, hoc est carens obiecto secundum esse ƿ suum materiale et sensibile (non tantum in actu, sed etiam in potentia), quod non sit receptivum illius secundum esse materiale (secundum quod 'esse', ipsum est obiectum sensus), - sicut bene apparet de colore, cuius receptivum 'secundum esse materiale' est superficies corporis terminati, receptivum autem eiusdem 'sine materia' est corpus perspicuum sive non terminatum. Et ita oppositae dispositiones requiruntur in organo sensus: quod debet esse receptivum sensibilis sine materia, et in eo quod debet recipere obiectum secundum esse materiale; ideo igitur oportet organum denudari a forma quam recipit, et per consequens sensum qui est in tali organo.	295. To the third [n.258] I say that the reason for the major proposition [sc. 'every cognitive power must, as to itself, be bare of that which is the reason for knowing'] is this - first in the case of the sensitive powers - 'that every sensitive power requires a determinate organ'; hence from the possible determinate number of organs the Philosopher concludes, On the Soul2.6.418a7-17, 3.1.424b22-27, 3.2.426b8-12, to a determinate number of actions or objects. But the organ has to be so disposed that it can receive the sensible thing without matter, and, in the case of bodily things, whatever is receptive of the form without the matter is not commonly receptive of every form (I said 'commonly' for this reason, that the discussion is not now of the organ of sense, about which there is a special difficulty [Reportatio ad loc.]). So the organ of sense must be not such, that is, it must lack the object in the object's material and sensible being (not only actually but even potentially), because it is not receptive of the object in its material being (according to which being it is the object of sense). The point is very clear about color, where the thing that receives it in material being is the surface of a determinate body, but where the thing that receives it without matter is a transparent or indeterminate body [sc. the water or air etc. through which a colored object is seen]. And thus opposed dispositions are required in the organ of sense, because it must be receptive of the sensible without matter and in something which must receive the object in material being [sc. the eye, qua seeing, is transparent but qua determinate body has a colored surface]; so for this reason the organ, and consequently the sense that is in the organ, has to be bare of the form that it receives.
296 Ex hoc etiam sequitur propositum Philosophi III De anima, quod scilicet intellectus non sit potentia organica, et ideo separatur ab omni materia, sicut ab omni organo quo operatur. Si enim requireret aliquod, illud esset determinatae dispositionis (sicut est omne organum corporeum), et ita ex hoc quod est receptivum aliquorum secundum esse materiale determinatum (propter determinatam dispositionem corporis), non esset receptivum omnium formarum corporalium secundum esse immateriale; et ita intelƿ lectus non posset recipere formas omnium materialium, ut obiectorum, si esset virtus materialis et organica. Tamen hoc habito quod sit virtus non organica, non oportet ipsum esse non tale realiter, qualis - vel cuius - debet esse 'receptivum' intellectualiter; non enim oportet oppositam esse dispositionem in receptivo 'alicuius' realiter et intellectualiter, supposito quod intellectus non sit virtus organica, quod tamen requireretur si esset virtus organica: idem enim intellectus potest esse 'ipsemet' realiter, et in actu per habitum realiter, et tamen receptivus intellectualiter et sui et habitus sui et cuiuscumque informantis eum realiter; et ratio tota est, quia talia sic recepta intellectualiter, non requirunt in recipiente determinatam dispositionem, oppositam enti intelligibili reali.	296. From this too follows what is put forward by the Philosopher in On the Soul 3.4.429a24-27, namely that the intellect is not the power of an organ and so is separated from the whole of matter, just as from any organ by which it operates. For if it required some organ, that organ would be of a determinate disposition (as is every bodily organ), and so from the fact it is receptive of things according to determinate material being (because of the determinate disposition of the body) it would not be receptive of all bodily forms according to immaterial being; and so the intellect could not receive the forms of all material things, as of its objects, if it were a material and organic power. However, when one has that it is a non-organic power, there is no need for it to be really not of the sort as that is of which it has to be intellectually receptive; for there is no need that there be an opposite disposition in what is receptive really and intellectually of something - on the supposition that the intellect is not an organic power, although this would be required if it were an organic power; for the same intellect can be itself really and be habitually in act really, and yet receptive intellectually both of itself and of its habit and of anything that really informs it; and the whole reason is that such things, when intellectually received, do not require in the receiver a determinate disposition opposite to intelligible real being [1 d.3 nn.383-390].
297 Illa ergo propositio quae dicit quod 'oportet cognoscens esse non tale, vel denudatum ab eo quod cognoscit vel recipit et a ratione cognoscendi', si generaliter accipiatur, concludit omnem intellectum esse nihil, quia omnis intellectus secundum se est totius entis, - et ita nihil erit entium; et intellectus iste est falsus. Sed tamen non est materiale vel organicum ut sit capax omnium, quia si esset materiale vel organicum, esset tantum capax aliquorum sine materia, quorum talis receptio non repugnaret suae entitati materiali; suae autem entitati intellectuali non repugnat receptio intellectualis quorumcumque. ƿ	297. The proposition, then, which says that the knower must be not such, or bare of that which it knows or receives and of the reason for knowing [n.258], entails, if it is taken generally, that every intellect is nothing, because every intellect in itself belongs to the totality of beings, and so it will be none of the beings; and this understanding is false. But it is however not material or organic, so that it can be capable of all beings; because if it were material or organic it would be receptive only of some things without matter, things the reception of which would not be repugnant to its material entity; but to its intellectual entity the intellectual reception of anything whatever is not repugnant.
298 Ad quartum responsum est frequenter quod idem potest movere se (non tantum motione corporali sed etiam spirituali), et universaliter quaecumque actio virtualis univoca potest stare cum potentia ad actum secundum formalem; et tunc quomodo idem non sit in potentia et in actu 'prout sunt differentiae oppositae entis', neque per se neque denominative, et tamen idem est in potentia (hoc est principium passivum) et in actu (hoc est principium activum eiusdem), hoc frequenter dictum est.	298. To the fourth principal argument [n.260] the reply has been made frequently [1 d.3 nn.430, 513-520] that the same thing can move itself (not only with bodily but also with spiritual motion), and universally any virtual univocal action can stand with a power for a second formal act; and, next, it has been frequently said [2 d.2 nn.472-473, 1 d.2 n.231, 1 d.7 n.72] how the same thing is not in power and in act as these are opposite differences of being, whether per se or denominatively, and yet the same thing is in potency (that is, is a passive principle) and in act (that is, is an active principle of the same).
299 Ad ultimum. Etsi aliqui concedant illam conclusionem ibi illatam - quae videtur impossibilis, quia tunc sequeretur quod illa intellectio esset actu infinita (potest enim intellectus quicumque esse infinitorum intelligibilium, et si tunc haberet intellectionem eandem sibi, pari ratione intellectio cuiuslibet esset eadem sibi, - et ita haberet intellectionem, eandem sibi, quae esset vel esse posset infinitorum intelligibilium) - nego tamen consequentiam.	299. As to the final argument [n.261], although some [Averroes, Metaphysics 12 com.51] concede the conclusion there drawn [sc. 'the intellection would be the same either as the object or as his essence'] - which seems impossible, because then it would follow that the intellection would be actually infinite (for any intellect can be of infinite intelligibles, and if it then had an intellection the same as itself, the intellection of anything whatever would, by parity of reason, be the same as itself, and thus it would have an intellection the same as itself which was or could be of infinite intelligibles) -however I deny the consequence [sc. 'if an angel could.. .then.. .the object or as his essence'].
300 Et ad probationem dico quod intellectio illa - secundum veritatem - est extremum tam respectu potentiae quam respectu ƿ obiecti, quia effectus est amborum: quia sicut quando a diversis cognoscente et cognito - paritur notitia, est effectus communis illorum duorum (IX De Trinitate cap. ultimo), ita etiam quando gignitur ab eodem, habente rationem tam potentiae quam obiecti, est effectus illius unius (habentis realiter illam duplicem causalitatem) et non medians inter idem et se secundum naturam rei, quomodo mediat medium inter contraria; et de tali medio, prout est ex natura rei, vera est illa propositio quod 'medium plus convenit cum extremis quam extrema inter se'.	300. And as to the proof of the consequence [n.261] I say that the intellection, according to truth, is an extreme both with respect to the power and with respect to the object, because it is the effect of both; for just as when knowledge is produced by diverse things (knower and known) there is an effect common to them both (Augustine On the Trinity IX.12 n.18), so too when an effect is produced by something the same that has the nature of both the power and the object, it is the effect of that one thing (which thing really has the double causality) and is not in between the same thing and itself in natural reality, the way that a middle is in between contraries; and about such a middle, as far as concerns the nature of the thing, the proposition is true that 'the middle agrees more with the extremes than the extremes agree with themselves' [n.261].
301 Ad confirmationem dico quod intellectio ab alia intellectione distinguitur per obiectum, ab obiecto vero et potentia distinguitur per se ipsam formaliter; quod autem ab eis distinguitur causaliter, habet a causis extrinsecis (ut a potentia et obiecto), sicut radius habet causaliter a sole quod ab eo distinguitur.	301. To the confirmation [n.261] I say that an intellection is distinguished from another intellection by the object, but it is distinguished from the object and the power by itself formally; but the fact it is distinguished from them causally it gets from the extrinsic causes (as from the power and the object), as the ray has causally from the sun that it is distinguished from it.