Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II (Quaracchi)/D3/Question 3

Headings

• The position of others
• Disproof of the position
• Reply to the argument for the position

Question

Latin	English
[p237] [QUAESTIO III]	[QUESTION 3: Whether a material substance is individual, or the reason of individuating another, through its actual existence]
[59] Tertio quaero sine argumentis: An substantia materialis per actualem existentiam sit individua vel ratio individuandi aliquid aliud?	Thirdly, I ask, without preliminary arguments, whether material substance is individual, or the account of individuating another, through its actual existence.
[60] [Exponitur sententia tenens substantiam materialem per actualem existentiam esse individuam]	[The Position of Others]
Dicitur quod sic; quia ex VII Metaph. actus determinat et distinguit; ergo ultima distinctio est per ultimum actum: ultimus autem actus est individuorum secundum esse existentiae, quia quodlibet aliud ab ipso intelligitur in potentia ad ipsum.	It is said that it is, for according to Met. 7, “actuality determines and distinguishes”; therefore the ultimate distinction is through the ultimate actuality, but ultimate actuality belongs to individuals according to existential being, since anything other than it is understood in potentiality to it.
[61] [Impugnatur]	[Disproof of the Position]
Contra istud Primo quia quod non est ex se distinctum, nec determinatum non potest esse primum distinguens vel determinans aliud: sed esse existentiae eo modo quo distinguitur ab esse essentiae non est ex se distinctum, nec determinatum; non enim esse existentiae habet proprias differentias, alias a differentiis esse essentiae, quia tunc oporteret ponere propriam coordinationem existentiarum, aliam a coordinatione essentiarum; sed praecise determinatur ex determinatione alterius; igitur non determinat aliquid aliud.	Against this: first, what is not of itself either distinct or determinate cannot be the primary thing distinguishing or determining another; but existential being, in the way in which it is distinguished from essential being, is not of itself either distinct or determinate. Existential being has no proper differentiae other than the differentiae of essential being, for then we would have to posit a proper ordering of existences other than the ordering of essences. But existential being is precisely determined by the determination of the essential being; therefore, it does not determine something else.
[62] Ex hoc potest argui aliter: quia illud quod praesupponit coordinationem et distinctionem alterius non est ratio distinguendi ipsum vel determinandi ipsum: sed existentia ut determinata et distincta praesupponit ordinem et distinctionem essentiarum; igitur, &c.	From this it can be argued another way: for that which presupposes ordering and distinction of another is not the reason of distinguishing or determining it; but existence, as determinate and distinct, presupposes the order and distinction of essences; therefore &c.
[63] Et si dicatur quod praesupponit distinctionem et determinationem omnem aliam ab illa quae est ad individua, sed istam quae est quasi per individuum causat, igitur, &c.	If it were objected that existence presupposes every distinction and determination other than that which is into individuals, but causes that distinction that is (as it were) characteristic of individuals.
Contra: in coordinatione praedicamentali sunt omnia quae per se pertinent ad illam coordinationem, circumscripto quocumque [p 238] quod nihil est illius coordinationis; quia, secundum Philos. I. Poster., status est in quolibet praedicamento, et in sursum et in deorsum; igitur sicut invenitur supremum in genere, praecise considerando illud sub ratione essentiae, et ita inveniuntur genera intermedia et species et differentiae, ita invenitur etiam infimum, id est, singulare absque omni existentia actuali; quod patet evidenter, quia hic homo non plus includit formaliter existentiam actualem quam homo.	Against: in a categorial ordering there are all the things that pertain per se to that ordering, ignoring whatever does not belong to that ordering. For, according to the Philosopher in Post. an. 1, “there is a stopping-point in any given category, above and below.” Hence just as the highest in a genus is found precisely by considering it under the logical nature of essence, so too the intermediate genera and species and differentiae are found in this way; and the lowest, i. e. the singular, is also found there, without any actual existence, which is evidently clear, since this man does not formally include actual existence any more than a man.
[64] Praeterea, eadem quaestio est de existentia, quo et unde contrahitur ut sit haec, quae est et de natura; nam si natura specifica eadem sit in pluribus individuis, habet existentiam eiusdem rationis in eis; sicut ergo probatur in solutione primae quaestionis, quod ista natura non sit de se haec, ita potest quaeri per quid existentia sit haec, quia non est dare quod sit de se haec; et ita non sufficit dare primam existentiam, qua natura sit haec.	Furthermore, there is the same question about existence - by what and from what it is contracted such that it is a this - as about the nature, for if the specific nature is the same in several individuals, it has an existence of the same nature in them, and just as it was proved in the resolution of the first question, that the nature is not of itself a this, so too it can be asked through what the existence is a this (since it is not of itself a this), and thus is not sufficient to say that it is existence by which a nature is a this.
[65] [Solvitur argumentum praeexpositae sententiae]	[Reply to the Argument for the Position]
Per hoc patet ad argumentum pro opinione: dico quod actus distinguit eo modo quo est actus; sed actus accidentalis distinguit accidentaliter, sicut actus essentialis distinguit essentialiter. Ita dico quod ultima distinctio in coordinatione praedicamentali est distinctio individualis, et illa est per ultimum actum per se pertinentem ad coordinationem praedicamentalem: sed ad hanc coordinationem praedicamentalem non per se pertinet existentia actualis; actualis autem existentia est ultimus actus, sed posterior tota coordinatione praedicamentali.	From this [the reply] to the argument for the view is clear. I say that an actuality distinguishes in the way in which it is an actuality: an accidental actuality distinguishes accidentally, just as an essential act distinguishes essentially. Thus I say that the ultimate distinction in the categorial ordering is the individual distinction, and individual distinction exists through the ultimate act pertaining per se to the categorial ordering. But actual existence does not pertain per se to the categorial ordering, moreover actual existence is the ultimate actuality, but posterior to the entire categorial ordering.
Et ideo concedo quod existentia distinguit ultimate, sed distinctione quae est extra totam per se coordinationem praedicamentalem, quae distinctio est aliquo modo accidentalis, licet non sit vere accidentalis; tamen sequitur totam distinctionem secundum esse quidditativum. Eo ergo modo quo est actus distinguit, et in quo est ultimus actus ultimate distinguit.	And therefore I concede that [actual] existence distinguishes ultimately, but by a distinction that is outside the entire per se categorial ordering. This distinction is in a certain way accidental, although it is not truly accidental, yet it comes after the entire ordering according to quidditative being. Therefore, it distinguishes in the way in which it is an actuality, and it ultimately distinguishes in the way in which it is an ultimate actuality.