Authors/John of Salisbury/Metalogicon/Liber 2/Caput 1

Chapter 1

Latin	English
LIBER SECUNDUS.
[0857]
[0857A] Superioris libri serie, satis arbitror expeditum, grammaticam non esse inutilem: et quod sine illa, non modo eloquentia perfecta non constat, sed nec ad alias philosophiae professiones, eo tendentibus aliqua patet via, pro ea quoque mitius interpretandum est: eo quod non modo naturae obnoxia subiacet, sed voluntati hominum acquiescit.	It has been sufficiently proved in the preceding book, I believe, that grammar is not useless. I feel that we have adequately demonstrated that, in the absence of grammar, not only is perfect eloquence precluded, but also the gateway to other philosophical pursuits is blocked to those who would engage in them. Attention has also been called to the fact that grammar is to be judged leniently, since it is subject both to nature and to the will of man.
Nam et leges civium, ab humana constitutione plerumque vigorem sumunt: et quod publicae utilitati creditur expedire, naturali iustitiae coaequatur. Nondum tamen absoluta est logica, quam, etsi mutilus sit, et amplius mutilandus, Cornificius parietem solidum caecati more palpans, impudenter attentat et impudentius criminatur. Utique veritatis amatori non placent iurgia, et ultro, nedum sponte, se subtrahit [0857B] contentioni, quisquis amplectitur charitatem.	In like manner, civil laws frequently derive their force from human constitution while what is deemed expedient for the common welfare is considered equivalent to natural justice. But they [the Cornificians] are still not silenced, and refuse to acquit logic. Though maimed, and destined to be yet further mutilated, Cornificius, beating against a solid wall like a blind man, rashly brings to trial, and still more brazenly accuses logic. One who [really] loves the truth hates wrangling, whereas one who is charitable instinctively and spontaneously withdraws from contention.
Sit, aut non sit, grammatica pars logices, non contendo; constat enim, quod in sermonibus vertitur, eosque ministrat, etsi non omnes sermonum examinet rationes. Tu vero cui de re constat, de nomine iudicabis, eamque cunctis applicabis sermonibus; aut circa rationum duntaxat instantiam coarctabis. Non formido iudicium, qui et de aequitate causae, et iudicis peritia, et sinceritate, confido. Respiciamus ergo an rationalis, utilis sit, et vires eius, reluctante aemulo, metiamur. In quo quidem, tanto minus laboris meo incumbit officio, quanto, favorem suum etiam citra persuasionem, facilius impendit auditor. Omnes enim se esse logicos gloriantur, [0857C] non modo qui scientiam aliquibus superaverunt blanditiis, sed et illi, qui eam nondum salutaverunt a lumine.	I will pass over the question whether grammar is a part of logic, although logic certainly treats and serves words, despite the fact that it does not, of course, discuss them from every angle. I will leave it to you, who are informed on this matter, to judge the extension of the term [logic], and to decide whether logic includes all speech, or is limited to the critical evaluation of reasoning. I have no misgivings as to your decision. For I have confidence in both the equity of my cause, and the capability and fairness of my judge. Let us pass over the question whether what relates to reasoning is useful, and let us consider the power of logic, notwithstanding the unwillingness of our opponent. My task here will be lightened, since my reader is favorably disposed and does not need persuasion. For all take pride in being logicians: not only those who have become engaged to the science with a few sweet pleasantries, but even those who have not yet made her acquaintance.
CAP. I. Quod logica, eo quod verum quaerit, ad totam proficit philosophiam.
Ut itaque nominis significatio contrahatur, logica est ratio disserendi, per quam totius prudentiae agitatio solidatur. Cum enim omnium expetibilium prima sit sapientia, ipsiusque fructus in amore boni et virtutum cultu consistat, mentem necesse est in illius investigatione versari, et res, plena inquisitione discutere, ut ei de singulis esse possit purum incorruptumque iudicium.
Constat ergo exercitatio eius in scrutinio veritatis, quae, sicut Cic. in lib. De officiis auctor est, materia est virtutis primitivae, [0857D] quam prudentiam vocant; reliquis enim tribus utilitates necessitatesque subiectae sunt. Prudentia vero tota consistit in perspicientia veri et quadam solertia illud examinandi: porro iustitia illud amplectitur, fortitudo tuetur, temperantia virtutum praecedentium exercitia moderatur.
Unde liquet prudentiam, virtutum omnium esse radicem; quae si praecidatur, caeterae, velut rami naturae beneficio destituti, marcida quadam ariditate evanescunt. [0858A] Quis enim amplectetur aut colet quod ignorat? At veritas, materia est prudentiae et virtutum fons; quam, qui plene noverit, sapiens est; qui amaverit, bonus, et beatus qui tenuerit eam. Unde nostrorum doctissimus poetarum, vitae beatae monstrans originem, ait:
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas:
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum,
Subiecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari (VIRG. Georg. II, 490.) Et alius fide et notitia veritatis praestantior: “Felix qui potuit boni fontem visere lucidum, felix qui potuit gravis terrae solvere vincula,” ac si aliis verbis dicant, sed eodem sensu: “felix cui rerum collata est intelligentia,” quia quo familiarius [0858B] fluida et ad momentum transeuntia, innotescunt, eo amplius, apud mentem sui compotem, peritura vilescunt. Nec iugo premitur vitiorum, quem de servitute veritas in libertatem vindicat et educit. “Impossibile enim est, ut diligat et colat vanitatem, quisquis ex toto corde quaerit et amplectitur veritatem.”