Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 24

Latin	English
[1.24. DE PROPRIO]	[Chapter 24. On property]
Postquam tractatum est de differentia, sequitur videre de proprio, quod quatuor modis accipitur.	After we have dealt with differentia, it follows to look at property, which is understood in four ways.
Uno modo dicitur proprium illud quod convenit uni speciei vel uni generi, non tamen oportet quod convenit omnibus contentis sub illa specie vel sub illo genere. Sicut hoc commune ‘grammaticum’ dicitur proprium homini, quia convenit soli homini, non tamen convenit omni homini; non enim omnis homo est grammaticus. Similiter ‘moveri motu progressivo’ dicitur proprium animali, quia non convenit nisi animali; non tamen convenit omni animali.	In one way, a ‘property’ is that which belongs to one species or one genus, yet does not have to belong to all the things subsumed under that species or that genus. For example, the common name ‘grammatical’ called a ‘property’ of a man, because it belongs only to man, yet it does not belong to every man, for not every man is grammatical. Similarly “to move by progressive motion” is called a ‘property’ of an animal, because it only belongs to animals, yet it does not belong to every animal.
Secundo modo dicitur proprium illud quod convenit omni individuo alicuius speciei, non tamen soli, sicut si dicerem quod ‘bipes’ est proprium homini.	In the second way, a ‘property’ is that which belongs to every individual of some species, yet not to that species alone. For example, if I were to say that ‘two-footed’ is a property of man.
Tertio modo dicitur proprium quod convenit alicui universaliter sumpto, non tamen omni tempore, sed aliquo tempore convenit cuilibet individuo et aliquo tempore sibi non convenit. Sicut si omnis homo in senectute canesceret, tunc ‘canescere’ esset proprium homini isto tertio modo.	In the third way, a ‘property’ is that which belongs to something universally taken, yet not at every time, but rather at some time it belongs to every individual, and sometime does not belong to it. For example, if every man goes grey in old age, then ‘go grey’ would be a property of man in the third way.
Quarto modo dicitur proprium omne illud quod convenit alicui communi universaliter sumpto, et nulli alii nisi illi communi et contentis sub illo, ita quod est convertibile cum illo, necessario praedicabile de eodem, saltem si esse exsistere praedicetur de illo. Et proprium sic acceptum est unum de quinque universalibus, alia autem magis continentur sub accidente.	In the fourth way, a ‘property’ is that all which belongs to some common term universally taken, and to no other except to that common, and the things subsumed under it, so that it is convertible with it, necessarily predicable of it, at least if existential being is predicated of it. And ‘property’ understood in this way is one of the five universals, but the others are more subsumed under ‘accident’.
Et sic ‘risibile’ est proprium homini; sic enim competit omni homini et soli et semper quod Deus non posset facere aliquem hominem exsistere quin ille esset risibilis, quia vere posset ridere, ita quod non includeret contradictionem ipsum ridere, et per consequens esset risibilis; hoc enim voco risibile. Et ita ‘risibile’ est proprium homini, ‘ridens’ autem non est proprium homini, sed magis est accidens. Et ideo non sunt idem ista duo praedicabilia ‘ridens’ et ‘risibile’; in tantum enim differunt quod unum illorum affirmatur de aliquo a quo negatur reliquum.	And so ‘capable of laughter’ is a property of man, for in this way it belongs to every man, and only to man, and always, so that God could not make some man exist but that he would be capable of laughter, because he could truly laugh, so that it would not involve a contradiction for him to laugh, and as a consequence would be capable of laughter, for this is what I call ‘capable of laughter’. And so ‘capable of laughter’ is a property of man, but ‘laughing’ is not a property of man, but is more an accident. And therefore the two predicables ‘laughing’ and ‘capable of laughter’ are not the same. They differ inasmuch as one of them can be affirmed of something of which the other is denied.
Ad istum autem quartum modum pertinent illae passiones quae non tantum conveniunt superioribus sed etiam inferioribus. Unde omne proprium est alicui proprium, non tamen est cuilibet proprium, et ideo passio generis praedicatur de specie, non tamen est propria speciei.	To this fourth way pertain those attributes which belong not only to superiors but also to inferiors. Hence, every property is a property of something, yet is not a property of everything, and therefore the attribute of genus is predicated of a species, and yet is not a property of the species.
Est autem notandum quod proprium non est aliqua res inhaerens realiter illi cuius est proprium; tunc enim non esset universale, nec competeret alicui communi universaliter sumpto, nec praedicaretur de pluribus. Non solum autem tenendum est quod proprium non semper est inhaerens subiecto cuius dicitur proprium, immo etiam tenendum est quod proprium non semper importat rem absolutam inhaerentem illi quod importatur per subiectum, sed aliquando importat rem distinctam ab illa re importata per subiectum et extrinsecum sibi. Et hoc aliquando affirmative, aliquando negative. Affirmative, sicut ‘calefactivum’, ‘creativum’ et huiusmodi.	But it should be noted that a property is not some thing really inhering in that of which it is a property, for then it would not be a universal, nor would it belong any common term universally taken, nor would it be predicated of several. But not only should it be held that a property is not always inhering in the subject, but also it should be held that a property does not always convey something absolute inhering in that which is conveyed by the subject. Rather, sometimes it conveys some distinct thing from that which is conveyed by the subject, and extrinsic to it. And sometimes happens affirmatively, sometimes negatively. Affirmatively, for example, as in ‘capable of heating’, ‘creative’ and so on.
Unde ‘calefactivum’ non importat rem inhaerentem illi quod est calefactivum, sed importat rem quae produci potest ab eo; et hoc loquendo de primo subiecto ipsius. Similiter ‘creativum’ non importat rem inhaerentem Deo, sed importat rem natam produci a Deo. Negativae passiones sunt sicut ‘immortale’, ‘incorruptibile’, ‘immateriale’ et huiusmodi. Aliquando tamen propria important res inhaerentes vel natas esse inhaerentes illi quod importatur per subiectum, sicut huiusmodi passiones ‘dealbabile’, ‘alterabile’, ‘calefactibile’, ‘beatificabile’ et huiusmodi.	Hence ‘capable of heating’ does not convey something inhering in that which is capable of heating, but rather conveys a thing which can be produced from it, by speaking of its primary subject. Similarly ‘creative’ does not convey something inhering in God, but rather conveys a thing which by nature is produced by God. Negative attributes are such as ‘immortal’, ‘incorruptible’, ‘immaterial’ and so on. Yet sometimes ‘properties’ convey things inhering or naturally inhering in that which is conveyed by the subject, such as attributes like ‘able to bleach’, ‘alterable’, ‘heatable’, ‘able to be blessed’ and so on.
Secundo est notandum quod quaelibet propositio affirmativa simpliciter, non aequivalens negativae, in qua praedicatur proprium, est aequivalens uni de possibili. Et hoc quia si non aequivaleret propositioni de possibili, illa posset per divinam potentiam esse falsa simul cum veritate propositionis in qua esse exsistere enuntiatur de subiecto.	Second, it should be noted that every proposition that is absolutely affirmative, not equivalent to a negative, in which a property is predicated, is equivalent to a de possibili proposition. And this is because if it were not equivalent to a de possibili proposition, that proposition could be false by divine power together with the truth of the proposition in which existential being is asserted of the subject.
Unde quaelibet talis est contingens ‘substantia est quanta’, ‘omnis ignis est calidus’, ‘homo ridet’, et sic de aliis. Sed tales propositiones ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis disciplinae’, omne corpus est mobile’, “omnis homo est risibilis” necessariae sunt, sic quod non possunt esse falsae cum veritate propositionis in qua enuntiatur esse de subiecto, et aequivalent propositionibus de possibili. Sicut ista “Omnis homo est risibilis” aequivalet isti ‘omnis homo potest ridere’; et hoc forte accipiendo subiectum in illa de possibili pro eo quod est, per quod una cavillatio puerilis excludi posset.	Hence every such proposition is contingent: “substance is a quantum”, “every fire is hot”, “a man is laughing”, and so on. But such propositions as “every man is receptive of learning”, “every body is moveable”, “every man is capable of laughter” are necessary, so that they cannot be false together with the truth of the proposition in which existence is asserted of the subject, and they are equivalent to de possibili propositions. For example “every man is capable of laughter” is equivalent to “every man can laugh”, and this perhaps by taking the subject in the de possibili proposition for that which exists, forestalling a childish objection.
Ratio autem quare aliae propositiones sunt contingentes, ita quod possunt esse falsae simul cum veritate propositionis in qua enuntiatur esse de subiecto, est quia Deus potest omnem rem creatam facere sine alia, saltem priorem sine posteriore.	Now the reason why the other propositions are contingent, so that they can be false together with the truth of the proposition in which existence is asserted of the subject, is because God can create every thing without another, or at least the prior without the posterior.
Breviter igitur, quasi recapitulando, dicendum est quod proprium, secundum quod hic loquimur de proprio quod est distinctum universale ab aliis universalibus, est quaedam intentio praedicabilis de aliquo adaequate et convertibiliter in quale, connotans affirmative vel negative aliquid extrinsecum illi quod importatur per subiectum. Non tamen oportet quod semper illud extrinsecum sit aliqua res extra animam, exsistens realiter in rerum natura, sed forte aliquando sufficit quod sit aliquid possibile in rerum natura, vel forte aliqua propositio exsistens vel potens in mente exsistere.	Briefly therefore, by way of a recapitulation, it should be said that a property, according as we speak here of ‘property’ – that it is a universal distinct from other universals – is an intention predicable of something adequately and convertible in quale, connoting affirmatively or negatively something extrinsic to that which is conveyed by the subject. Yet the extrinsic element does not have to be some thing outside the soul, really existing in the state of nature, but perhaps sometimes it is sufficient that it is something possible in the state of nature, or perhaps some proposition existing or capable of existing in the mind.
Et consimiliter debet dici, proportionaliter, de passione quae praedicatur per se secundo modo de subiecto, quia non est res inhaerens rei extra animam, - tunc enim non esset praedicabilis de aliquo, nec esset universale, nec posset esse praedicatum conclusionis demonstrationis, nec principii demonstrationis, quae tamen omnia competunt passioni -, sed est intentio animae.	And similarly it ought to be said, correspondingly, of an attribute which is predicated of the subject per se in the second mode, because it is not a thing inhering in some thing outside the soul, for then it would not be predicable of something, nor would it be a universal, nor could it be the predicate of the conclusion of a demonstration, nor of the principal of a demonstration, all of which however belong to an attribute, but it is an intention of the soul.