Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I

Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali (A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the corporeal ear)

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PART I: OF TERMS

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Prologue and letter

Prologue

Chapters 1-13: names and terms

Chapter 1 The definition of the term, and of its division in general.
Chapter 2 On the division of the term, and that 'term' can be specifically understood in different ways.
Chapter 3 On the division of incomplex terms.
Chapter 4 On the division of terms into categorematic and syncategorematic, which is common to mental and spoken terms.
Chapter 5 On the division of names into concrete and abstract.
Chapter 6 A concrete and an abstract name sometimes signify the same thing.
Chapter 7 Whether concrete and abstract names such as ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ etc., are synonymous names.
Chapter 8 Of abstract names which equivalently include some syncategoremata or some adverbial determinations.
Chapter 9 Of concrete and abstract names where the abstract names only supposit for many items, and the concrete names are only verifiable for one.
Chapter 10 On the division of names into purely absolute and connotative.
Chapter 11 On the division of names signifying by convention, for example into names of first and of second imposition.
Chapter 12 What a first intention is, & what a second is, and in what way they are distinguished from one another.
Chapter 13 On the division of names and terms into equivocal, univocal and denominative, and what ‘equivocal’ is, and in how many ways it is said.

Chapters 14-17: on universals

Chapter 14 On the common term ‘universal’, and its opposite, ‘singular’.
Chapter 15 That a universal is not some thing outside the soul.
Chapter 16 Of an opinion about universal being: in what way does it have being outside the soul? Against Scotus.
Chapter 17 Of the resolution of doubts by means of objections which can be raised against the foregoing.

Chapters 18-25: The five predicables

Chapter 18 On the five universals [predicables].
Chapter 19 On 'individual'.
Chapter 20 On genus.
Chapter 21 On species.
Chapter 22 Comparing genus with species.
Chapter 23 On differentia.
Chapter 24 On property.
Chapter 25 On accident.

Chapters 26-39: Various logical and metaphysical terms

Chapter 26 'Definition'.
Chapter 27 'Description'.
Chapter 28 Descriptive Description.
Chapter 29 Two senses of the terms ‘defined’ and ‘described’.
Chapter 30 On the term ‘subject’.

Chapter 31 On the term ‘predicate’.
Chapter 32 On how the predicate can be said to ‘inhere’ in or ‘be in’ the subject.
Chapter 33 On the term ‘signify’.
Chapter 34 On the term ‘divided’.
Chapter 35 On the term ‘whole’.
Chapter 36 On the term ‘opposites’.
Chapter 37 On the term ‘attribute’.
Chapter 38 On the term ‘being’.
Chapter 39 On the term ‘one’.

Chapters 40-62: Aristotle's Categories

Chapter 40 On the term ‘category’.
Chapter 41 On the number of categories.
Chapter 42 On the category of substance.

Substance

Chapter 43 On the properties of substance.

Quantity

Chapter 44 On the category of quantity.
Chapter 45 Objections to the previous view.
Chapter 46 About things supposed to be in the genus of quantity.
Chapter 47 On the properties of quantity.
Chapter 48 Reply to the view that quantity is some absolute thing, distinct from substance.

Relation

Chapter 49 On the category of relation.
Chapter 50 That relation is no different from an absolute thing.
Chapter 51 Objections which could be raised.
Chapter 52 Things which are supposed to be in the genus of relation.
Chapter 53 On the properties of relatives.
Chapter 54 On the opinion that every relation is something really distinct from its foundation.

Quality

Chapter 55 On the category of quality.
Chapter 56 On the category of quality according to another opinion.

Action

Chapter 57 On the category of action.

Affection

Chapter 58 On the category of affection.

The remaining four categories

Chapter 59 On the category of ‘when’.
Chapter 60 On the category of ‘where’.
Chapter 61 On the category of ‘position’.
Chapter 62 On the category of ‘having’.

Chapters 63-77: Supposition

Chapter 63 On supposition.
Chapter 64 On the division of supposition.
Chapter 65 When a term in a proposition can have personal, simple or material supposition.
Chapter 66 Objections which can be raised against the above.
Chapter 67 Material supposition.
Chapter 68 Simple supposition.
Chapter 69 Personal supposition.
Chapter 70 On the division of personal supposition.
Chapter 71 When a common term has one supposition, and when another.
Chapter 72 Doubts that could be raised.
Chapter 73 Of 'merely confused' supposition, and the rules concerning it.
Chapter 74 Of 'distributive and confused' supposition, and the rules concerning it.
Chapter 75 How the predicate supposits in propositions about 'beginning' and 'ceasing'.
Chapter 76 On the supposition of relative terms, taking ‘relative’ as the grammarian understands it, not as the logician does.
Chapter 77 Improper supposition.