Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 27

Latin	English
[CAP. 27. DE HOC NOMINE 'DESCRIPTIO']	[Chapter 27. On the name ‘description’]
(1) Descriptio est sermo compendiosus ex accidentibus et propriis compositus. Unde dicit Damascenus in Logica sua, cap.14: "Descriptio ex accidentibus componitur, id est propriis et accidentibus. Verbi gratia 'homo est risibile, erecte ambulativum, latas habens ungues'. Haec enim omnia accidentalia sunt. Propter quod et descriptio dicitur ut obumbrans et non substantialem exsistentiam subiecti manifestans sed consequentia".	A description is a brief discourse made up of accidents and properties. Hence Damascene says in his Logic, Ch. 14: “A description is made up of accidents, that is, from of properties and accidents. For example, ‘Man is capable of laughter, walks upright, [and] has broad nails’. For all these [features] are accidental. Because of this, it is also called a “description” as foreshadowing, and not making plain the substantial existence of the subject but the consequences [of it].”
(2) Ex verbis huius auctoritatis evidenter datur intelligi quod in descriptione nihil debet poni quod praedicatur in quid vel per se primo modo de descripto; et in hoc differt descriptio a definitione.	From the words of this authority it is evidently given to be understood that nothing ought to be given in a description that is predicated of the thing described in quid, or per se in the first mode, and in this a description differs from a definition.
(3) Secundo, ex praedicta auctoritate sequitur quod accidens non solum accipitur pro aliqua re inhaerente alteri sed pro praedicabili de aliquo contingenter, sicut dictum est prius, quia cum secundum praedictum Doctorem descriptio componatur ex accidentibus subiecti, et descriptio non componatur nisi ex praedicabilibus de subiecto, oportet quod vocet ipsa praedicabilia de descripto accidentia, quae non possunt esse nisi conceptus vel voces vel scripta.	Second, from the authority cited it follows that ‘accident’ is understood not only for some thing inhering in another but also for something contingently predicable of something, as was said above. For since, according to the Doctor mentioned, a description is made up of accidents of the subject, and a description is only composed of things predicable of the subject, we have to call “accidents” these things predicable of the thing described, which can only be concepts or utterances or inscriptions.
(4) Sequitur, tertio, ex praedictis quod non semper descriptio et descriptum sunt convertibilia, quia cum accidentia contingenter praedicentur de aliquo, potest descriptum praedicari de aliquo quamvis descriptio non praedicetur de eo. Tamen hoc non contingit nisi propter imperfectionem illius de quo praedicatur descriptum. Unde potest homo sic describi 'homo est bipes, duas habens manus', addendo sibi aliqua alia quae non possunt competere nisi homini; quo facto illa descriptio potest negari ab aliquo carente manibus, de quo tamen praedicatur descriptum. Sed hoc est propter hoc quod illud individuum non est perfectum.	It follows, third, from what was said above, that a description and the thing described are not always convertible. For since accidents are contingently predicated of something, the thing described can be predicated of something although the description is not predicated of it. Yet this does not happen except because of an imperfection of what the thing described is predicated of. Thus man can be described as follows: “Man is a biped having two hands”, adding to it some other things that can belong only to man. When this is done, the description can be denied of someone lacking hands, and yet the thing described term is predicated of him. But this is because of the fact that the individual is not perfect.
(5) Verumtamen potest dici quod descriptio dupliciter accipi potest, scilicet large, et sic loquitur iste Doctor de descriptione, vel potest accipi stricte, et sic non componitur ex accidentibus sed ex propriis; et sic semper convertuntur descriptio et descriptum.	Nevertheless, it can be said that “description” can be understood in two senses, namely broadly - and the Doctor is talking in this sense about description - or it can be understood strictly - and in this sense it is not made up of accidents but of properties. And in that sense a description and the thing described are always converted.