Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 52

Latin	English
[CAP. 52. DE ILLIS QUAE SECUNDUM ISTAM OPINIONEM PONUNTUR ESSE IN GENERE RELATIONIS VEL AD ALIQUID]	[Chapter 52. Of those things which are supposed to be in the genus of relation or 'to something', according to that opinion]
Ista opinione sic declarata, quae mihi videtur fuisse Aristoteles, videndum est secundum istam opinionem de illis quae ista opinio ponit esse in genere relationis. Et est primo sciendum quod secundum istam opinionem, sicut dictum est, nihil est in genere relationis nisi nomen, et hoc vel mentale vel vocale vel scriptum; et hoc nonnisi nomen illud cui potest convenienter addi in propositione casus obliquus.	With that opinion clarified (which to me seems to have been Aristotle’s), we must examine – according to that opinion –those which that opinion posits to be in the genus of relation. And you should know first that according to the opinion, just as we said, nothing is in the genus of relation except a name, and this is either mental or uttered or written. And this is nothing but a name to which a name in the oblique case can appropriately be in added in a proposition.
Sed sciendum est quod talia nomina quibus convenienter potest addi casus obliquus sunt in duplici differentia. Quaedam enim sunt quibus semper, quandocumque vere praedicantur de aliquo, convenienter addi potest sibi solum suum abstractum, quod est abstractum primo modo abstractorum, de quo modo dictum est prius. Sicut est de talibus nominibus concretis 'album', 'calidum', 'dulce', 'animatum', nam nihil est album nisi sit album albedine, nec aliquid est calidum nisi calore sit calidum, et sic de aliis. Sed talia, quamvis ponantur connotativa, non tamen dicuntur relativa.	But it should be known that such names, to which a name in the oblique case can appropriately added, are in a twofold differentia. For some of these are to which always, whenever they are truly predicated of something, only its abstract can be appropriately added to it, which is the abstract of the first kind of abstracts, in the way said above. So it is with such concrete names as ‘white’, ‘hot’, ‘sweet’, ‘animated’. For nothing is white unless it is white by whiteness, nor is anything hot, unless it is hot by hotness, and so on. But such, although they are called connotative, are nevertheless not called relatives.
Alia nomina sunt quae non possunt de aliquo verificari nisi convenienter et vere possint addi eis nomina, non abstracta eorum, sed alii casus obliqui qui non sunt eorum abstracta, cuiusmodi sunt talia nomina 'dominus', 'servus', 'pater' et 'filius', et sic de aliis. Nullus enim est pater nisi sit alicuius pater, nec aliquis est similis nisi sit alicui similis. Et ista vocantur relativa 'secundum esse', quia scilicet impossibile est quod verificentur de aliquo nisi tunc eis convenienter possit addi casus obliquus.	Other names are those which cannot be verified of something unless names which are not their abstracts can be truly and appropriately added to them, but rather names in the oblique case which are not their abstracts, of which sort are such names as ‘master’ / ‘servant’, ‘father’ / ‘son’ and so on. For nothing is a father unless he is the father of someone, nor is someone similar unless he is similar to someone. And those are called relatives ‘according to being’, namely because it is impossible that they be verified of something unless a name in an oblique case can then be appropriately added to them.
Et de istis relativis, quando sunt talia quod contingenter praedicantur de aliquo et contingenter verificantur de illis de quibus praedicantur posita constantia subiecti, impossibile est scire ipsum verificari de aliquo nisi sciatur determinate ad quid dicitur, sicut impossibile est scire aliquem esse servum nisi sciatur cuius est servus, et impossibile est scire aliquem esse similem nisi sciatur cui est similis. Et de istis intelligit Philosophus quando dicit in Praedicamentis quod qui scit determinate unum relativorum, scit determinate reliquum. Si autem tale relativum sic verificetur de aliquo quod non potest non verificari de ipso posita constantia subiecti, tunc non oportet quod qui determinate scit unum relativorum quod determinate sciat reliquum.	And of these relatives, when they are such that they are contingently predicated of something, and contingently verified of those of which they are predicated (given the persistence of the subject), it is impossible to know that it is verified of something unless it is known determinately of what it is predicated, just as it is impossible to know that someone is a servant unless it is known of whom he is the servant, and that it is impossible to know that someone is similar unless it is known to whom they are similar. And it is those that the Philosopher has in mind when he says (in the Categories) that whoever knows determinately one relative, knows determinately the other. But if such a relative is verified of something in this way, which is unable not be verified of it, given the persistence of the subject, then it does not have to be the case that whoever determinately knows one relative knows determinately the other.
Alia autem nomina sunt quibus quandoque addi potest casus obliquus, hoc tamen non semper requiritur. Unde quandoque quidem vere contingit dicere quod iste asinus est asinus Sortis, et quod est asinus alicuius. Quandoque autem quamvis haec sit vera 'iste asinus est asinus', haec tamen est falsa 'iste asinus est asinus alicuius'. Et ista possunt vocari 'relativa secundum dici', hoc est aliquando possunt dici aliorum vel sub aliqua alia habitudine casuali.	But other other names are such that sometimes an oblique case can be added to them, although this is not always required. Hence, it is of course sometimes truly possible to say that this donkey is Socrates' donkey, and that it is someone’s donkey. But sometimes, although ‘this is a donkey’ is true, ‘this donkey is someone’s donkey’ is false. And these can be called ‘relatives according to speech’, that is, sometimes they can be said of others or with some other casual relationship.
Hoc tamen non requiritur, ideo non sunt per se in genere relationis. Talia nomina sunt 'manus', 'caput' et huiusmodi. Unde ista manus aliquando est manus hominis aliquando non est manus hominis, quando scilicet est abscisa; quod si tunc non vocetur manus, hoc nomen 'manus' vere erit in genere relationis, et sic de consimilibus.	But this is not required, therefore they are not per se in the genus of relation. Such names are ‘hand’, ‘head’ and so on. Hence, this hand is sometimes the hand of a man, and is sometimes not the hand of a man, namely, when it is cut off, but if it is then not called a hand, the name ‘hand’ will truly be in the genus of relation, and so for similar names.
Sic igitur omne nomen quod de nullo significative sumptum potest verificari nisi vere et convenienter possit sibi addi aliquis casus obliquus alicuius alterius dictionis quam sui abstracti, est in genere relationis. Et ista possunt vocari 'relativa secundum esse', alia autem possunt vocari 'relativa secundum dici', quia aliquando convenienter additur eis casus obliquus aliquando non. Verumtamen istis vocabulis 'relativa secundum esse' et 'relativa secundum dici' philosophi non utuntur, sicut nec utuntur aliis verbis quibus magistri communiter nunc utuntur, scilicet 'relatione reali' et 'relatione rationis'.	Thus, every name that cannot be verified of anything, significatively taken, unless there can truly and appropriately be added to it some name in an oblique case of some other expression than its (corresponding) abstract name, is in the genus of relation. And these can be called ‘relatives according to being’. But the other kind can be called ‘relatives according to speech’, because sometimes appropriate to add to them a name in an oblique case, sometimes not. But nevertheless philosophers do not use the expressions ‘relatives according to being’ and ‘relatives according to speech’, just as they do not use other expressions which Masters commonly now use, namely ‘real relation’ and ‘relation of reason’.
Unde talis distinctio a Philosopho numquam invenitur, et ideo secundum eum ita vere et realiter sunt ista relativa 'causa', 'dominus' et huiusmodi sicut quaecumque alia. Unde semper vel frequenter exemplificat de domino, et hoc quia non potest esse dominus nisi sit alicuius servi dominus. Et ideo apud Aristotelem nulla erat talis distinctio inter relationem realem et relationem rationis; distinguit tamen diversos modos relativorum V Metaphysicae, de quibus modo non est tractandum.	Hence, such a distinction is never found in the works of the Philosopher, and therefore, according to him, ‘cause’, ‘master’ and the like are truly and really relatives, just as any others. Hence, always or frequently he gives the example of ‘master’, and this is because one cannot be a master unless the master of some servant. And therefore, in the works of Aristotle, there will be no distinction such as the one between real relation and relation of reason, although he distinguishes diverse modes of relatives in Metaphysics V, which I will am not now going to treat of.
Sed sufficat nunc scire quod [secundum] Aristotelem omne nomen vel habens vim nominis, cuiusmodi est participium, quod de nullo significative sumptum potest verificari nisi vere et convenienter contingat sibi addere et adiungere casum obliquum alterius dictionis quam sui abstracti, est vere ad aliquid et in praedicamento relationis, sive significet substantiam praecise sive qualitatem sive utrumque sive etiam connotet aliquid aliud in actu sive in potentia, sive affirmative sive negative sive qualitercumque. Et ideo omnia talia 'dominus-servus', 'signum-significatum' 'causa-causatum', 'efficiens-effectus', 'activum-passivum', 'producens-productum', 'agens-patients', 'calefaciens-calefactum' et omnia talia in praedicamento relationis sunt collocanda.	But it is sufficient to know now that according to Aristotle, every name that has the [linguistic] force of a name (of which sort is the participle), which cannot be verified of anything, significatively taken, unless it is possible truly and appropriately to add and adjoin to it some name in an oblique case of some other expression than its (corresponding) abstract name, is truly ‘to something’ and in the category of relation, whether it precisely signifies a substance, or a quality, or both, or also connotes some other thing in actuality or potentiality, or afffirmatively or negatively or in whatever way. And therefore all such names as ‘master-servant’, ‘sign-significate’, ‘cause-caused’, ‘efficient-cause-effect’, ‘active-passive’, ‘producer-product’, ‘agent-patient’, ‘warmer-warmed’, and all such are to be included in the category of relation.
Ex quo sequitur ulterius quod quandoque verba sunt in genere actionis vel passionis vel in aliquo alio praedicamento et tamen participia et nomina verbalia correspondentia eis sunt in praedicamento relationis, secundum principia Aristotelis. Et quod haec sit intentio sua satis insinuat V Metaphysicae, cap. De ad aliquid, ubi enumerans modos relativorum dicit: "Alia", scilicet dicuntur relativa, "ut calefactivum ad calefactibile et sectivum ad secabile et omne activum ad passivum". Et postea sequitur: "Activa vero et passiva secundum potentiam activam et passivam sunt, et actiones potentiarum: ut calefactivum ad calefactibile, quia potest; et iterum calefaciens ad id quod calefit, et secans ad id quod secatur, tamquam agentia".	Furthermore, it follows from this that sometimes verbs are in the genus of action or passion, or in some other category, and yet the participles and verbal names corresponding to them are in the category of relation, according to the principles of Aristotle. And that this is his intention is sufficiently suggested in Metaphysics V, in the chapter on relation , where, enumerating to the modes of relatives, he says “some things” – namely are called ‘relatives’ – “such as able to heat to what is able to be heated, able to cut to able to be cut, and in general active to passive”. And afterwards he continues “Things that are active or passive exist according to an active or a passive potency and the actualizations of the potencies; e.g. that which is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being heated, because it can heat it, and, again, that which heats is related to that which is heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, as if agents”.
Ecce quod calefaciens potest esse de secundo modo relativorum. Unde puto quod apud Aristotelem omnia nomina et participia, quae non possunt de aliquo verificari nisi convenienter possit eis addi casus obliquus, correspondentia secundum significationem verbis activis et passivis, quae non tantum secundum vocem et formam verborum sunt activa et passiva sed vere significant quod aliquid realiter agit et aliquid realiter patitur, vel quod aliquid vere facit et aliquid vere fit, sunt relativa de secundo modo, cuiusmodi sunt 'agens' et 'patiens', 'calefaciens-calefactum', 'creans-creatum', 'activum-passivum' et huiusmodi.	Hence capable of heating can be of the second mode of relatives. So I think that according to Aristotle all nouns and participles, that cannot be verified of something unless something can fittingly be added to in an oblique case, in correspondence according to the meaning of active and passive verbs, which not merely in voice and form are active and passive, but truly signify that something really acts and really is acted upon, or that that something truly does and something is done, are relatives of the second mode, of which mode are "agent" and "patient", "heating" and "heated", "active-passive" and the like.
Quod etiam Aristoteles ponat nomina vel participia in genere relationis et verba correspondentia eis in aliis praedicamentis, patet per eundem in Praedicamentis, cap. de ad aliquid, ubi dicit sic: "Similiter autem accubitus et statio et sessio positiones quaedam, positio vero ad aliquid; iacere vero vel stare vel sedere ipsa quidem positiones non sunt, sed denominative ab his quae dictae sunt positionibus nominantur". Ex quo patet quod stare non est in genere relationis, sed tamen statio est in genere relationis, quia si sit statio, alicuius est statio. Tamen ultimate oportet resolvere talem propositionem in talem 'partes talis corporis sunt sic distantes', et in tali resolutione habebitur expresse aliquod nomen vel participium quod de nullo verificari potest nisi sibi convenienter possit adiungi casus obliquus.	And that Aristotle also puts names or participles, and the verbs corresponding to them in other categories, in the genus of relation, is clear from the Categories, in the chapter on relation , where he says “Similarly, reclining and standing and sitting are particular positions, but position is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves positions, but take their name from the attitudes mentioned above”. From which it is clear that standing is not in the genus of relation, but nevertheless ‘station’ is in the genus of relation, for if there is a station, it is a station of someone. Yet we must ultimately resolve such a proposition into something like “the parts of such a body are distant in this way”, and in such a resolution it will be expressed as some noun or participle that cannot be verified of anything unless something can be joined to it in an oblique case.