Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 68

Latin	English
[CAP. 68. DE SUPPOSITIONE SIMPLICI]	[Chapter 68. On simple supposition]
Sicut autem cuilibet complexo et incomplexo potest competere suppositio materialis, ita cuilibet complexo et incomplexo significativo vel consignificativo potest competere suppositio simplex, nam quolibet tale, sive sit mentale sive vocale sive scriptum, potest supponere pro conceptu mentis, sicut patet inductive.	Now just as material supposition can belong to any complex or incomplex, so simple supposition can belong to any significative or co- significative complex or incomplex, for any such , whether it is mental or verbal or written, can supposit for a concept of the mind, as is clear by example.
Et sicut quandoque suppositio materialis est pro illo quod supponit, et quandoque non pro illo quod supponit sed pro alio, quod tamen non significat, ita terminus mentalis supponens simpliciter quandoque supponit pro se, sicut in istis 'homo est species', 'animal est genus', et sic de aliis; quandoque autem supponit pro alia intentione animae, quam tamen non significat, sicut in tali propositione mentali 'hominem esse animal est propositio vera'. Et sic potest dici de multis aliis.	And just as sometimes material supposition is for that which supposits, and sometimes not for that which supposits but for something else, which nevertheless it does not signify, so a mental term suppositing simply sometimes supposits for itself, as in 'man is a species', 'animal is a genus', and so on, but sometimes supposits for another intention of the soul, which nonetheless it does not signify, for example in the mental proposition "that man is an animal is a true proposition". And so it can be said of many other cases.